The Monopoly Regulation and Fair Trade Act (“MRFTA”) is the primary legislation that regulates cartels in Korea. The Enforcement Decree of the MRFTA, together with guidelines published by the Korea Fair Trade Commission (“KFTC”), detail or supplement the MRFTA provisions. The KFTC guidelines include:

• Guidelines on Examination of Cartels;
• Guidelines on Examination of Cartels in Bidding;
• Guidelines on Examination of Cartels Involving Administrative Guidance;
• Guidelines on Examination of Cartels Involving Information Exchange between Undertakings;
• Guidelines on Trade Association Activities;
• Notice on the Operations of the Leniency Guidelines for Voluntary Disclosure of Cartels; and
• Guidelines for Filing Applications for the Approval of Cartels and Competition-Restrictive Practices.

There are also guidelines issued by the Prosecutors’ Office (“PO”), Guidelines for the Reduction of Penalty in Cartel Cases and Investigation Procedures, through which a criminal leniency programme (in addition to a leniency programme available under the MRFTA) was formally implemented for cartel cases.

Even if conduct falls within one of the categories of anti-competitive agreement specified in the MRFTA, an exemption may be granted where the conduct serves a specific purpose, and the KFTC’s prior approval is obtained upon application. These purposes include:

• Industrial restructuring for recovery from economic recession;
• Research and technical development;
• Rationalization of transaction terms; and
• Improvement of competitiveness of small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs)

However, these exemptions have been granted in very few cases, and there is some debate about the need to broadly recognize these exemptions to protect SMEs.

In February 2026, the KFTC announced its intent to pursue reforms that would exempt small businesses from antitrust law when they collectively negotiate with large corporations (a so-called “counter-cartel”). The KFTC expressed its commitment to this system improvement in its Work Plan for the second half of 2026. However, the KFTC has stated that it will design the system carefully so that collective responses by economically disadvantaged parties do not raise concerns such as inflation or reduced export competitiveness. The specific requirements have yet to be codified.

The MRFTA identifies nine categories of cartel conduct: (i) fixing, maintaining or changing prices; (ii) setting transaction terms; (iii) restricting production, release or transportation; (iv) allocating trading areas or counterparties; (v) restricting product or service specifications or formats; (vi) jointly conducting or managing principal areas of business, or establishing a company or similar entity for that purpose; (vii) interfering with or restricting key areas of business; (viii) bid rigging; and (ix) exchanging information that substantially restricts competition, which was added by the amended MRFTA that took effect in 2021.

In addition to the MRFTA, bid rigging is also regulated by the Criminal Act and the Framework Act on the Construction Industry. The Criminal Act prohibits undermining the fairness of auctions or tenders through fraudulent, coercive or other deceptive methods. Similarly, the Framework Act on the Construction Industry penalizes individuals who collude with other bidders to submit prearranged bid prices, thereby obtaining an unjust benefit or undermining fair price determination. Consequently, a single act of bid rigging may constitute separate offenses under the MRFTA, the Criminal Act and the Framework Act on the Construction Industry. Meanwhile, the KFTC established the Private Sector Bid Rigging Investigation Team in 2021 to address widespread bid rigging in the private sector, and the number of private-sector bid rigging cases has been increasing since then. According to the KFTC’s Statistical Yearbook for 2025, in 2024 and 2025, there were 83 and 174 cartel cases that the KFTC found and sanctioned, respectively, and bid rigging cases accounted for 70 and 161 of them.

The MRFTA defines “illegal cartel conduct” as an agreement by a business entity, by contract, agreement, resolution, or any other means, to engage jointly with other business entities in conduct that unfairly restricts competition. Accordingly, the essential elements of an illegal cartel under the MRFTA are (i) an agreement between two or more independent business entities and (ii) the unfair restriction of competition arising from that agreement. An agreement is not limited to an explicit one and includes a tacit meeting of minds; it may be established by the agreement itself, even where no implementation has actually occurred. The specific types of conduct correspond to the nine categories described above.

Yes, to establish an infringement under the MRFTA, it is necessary to demonstrate that the concerted conduct among competitors unreasonably restrains competition in the relevant market. This requirement applies to both hard-core and soft-core cartels; however, under the Guidelines on Examination of Cartels, the depth of review differs depending on whether the conduct is a hard-core or soft-core cartel. For hard-core cartels, the burden of proof is eased: the KFTC may conduct only a basic assessment of the market, including its structure and the competitive dynamics affected by the conduct, and presume illegality without a detailed analysis of competitive effects (akin to per se illegality). Conversely, for soft-core cartels, which may have both anti-competitive and efficiency-enhancing effects, a thorough examination of those effects is mandated to ascertain the legality of the conduct. Against this backdrop, the use of economic analysis has increased in recent cartel cases. The KFTC has sought to strengthen its economic analysis capabilities since publishing a booklet on understanding and utilizing economic analysis in 2017.

In 2025, it appointed a serving university professor to head its Economic Analysis Division for the first time. As a further step, effective 1 October 2026, the KFTC expanded the Division into an Economic Analysis Bureau. Led by a Chief Economist and staffed primarily by specialists, including PhD economists, the new Bureau is responsible for market definition, analysis of anticompetitive effects, and assessment of unlawful gains.

Additionally, the Guidelines on Examination of Cartels provide that if the combined market share of the cartel participants does not exceed 20%, the conduct is generally presumed to have negligible or no anticompetitive effects and the KFTC will conclude its review (“safe harbour”). However, this safe harbour does not apply to hard-core cartels, such as agreements on (i) fixing, maintaining or changing prices; (ii) restricting production, release or transportation; (iii) allocating trading areas or counterparties; and (iv) rigging bids.

The MRFTA applies to conduct occurring outside Korea if it affects the Korean market. Specifically, the MRFTA provides that it covers extraterritorial conduct that has an effect on the Korean market. The Korean Supreme Court has held that only conduct with a direct, substantial, and reasonably foreseeable effect on the Korean market falls under the MRFTA’s jurisdiction. The Court also emphasised the principle of comity in competition law, cautioning against overly broad extraterritorial enforcement of the MRFTA. Similarly, the KFTC upholds the principle of comity in applying competition law, broadly consistent with the approach taken in other jurisdictions.

The KFTC is the government agency that enforces the MRFTA. A final KFTC decision on whether the MRFTA has been violated, reached on the basis of the evidence and testimony gathered during its investigation and deliberations may be appealed to the Seoul High Court within 30 days from the date of receipt of the decision. The Seoul High Court has exclusive jurisdiction over such appeals, and its judgment may in turn be appealed to the Supreme Court.

As for criminal prosecution, generally, the PO may prosecute an MRFTA cartel offense only if the KFTC refers the matter to the PO, because the KFTC has the exclusive right to make criminal referrals for MRFTA violations. However, a matter that the KFTC does not refer on its own initiative may still become subject to criminal proceedings through the mandatory criminal-referral request system described below.

The Prosecutor General may request that the KFTC make a criminal referral to the PO if the conduct constitutes a serious violation of the MRFTA. The Chairperson of the Board of Audit and Inspection of Korea, the Minister of SMEs and Startups, and the Administrator of the Public Procurement Service may also make such a request based on factors, such as the conduct’s far-reaching social effects, its impact on national finances, and the extent of harm to SMEs. Upon receiving a request for a criminal referral from any of these authorities, the KFTC must refer the matter to the Prosecutor General (“mandatory criminal-referral request system”).

An exception applies to certain bid-rigging conduct that independently violates the Criminal Act or the Framework Act on the Construction Industry. The PO may prosecute such conduct without a referral from the KFTC. Accordingly, even if the KFTC does not make a criminal referral on its own initiative, a company may still face criminal proceedings either because another competent government authority requests such a referral or, in the case of certain bid-rigging conduct constituting a separate statutory offense, because the PO prosecutes the conduct without a KFTC referral.

The enforcement framework described above changed significantly in October 2026. Effective 2 October 2026, the PO was abolished and replaced by the Public Prosecution Office (“PPO”) and the Serious Crimes Investigation Agency (“SCIA”), pursuant to the Public Prosecution Office Act and the Serious Crimes Investigation Agency Act. Investigations into MRFTA violations now fall within the jurisdiction of the SCIA, while the PPO is responsible for bringing the resulting indictments.

Under the amended MRFTA, for types of violations subject to criminal penalties, the KFTC must refer a matter to the Commissioner of the SCIA where it finds that the violation is objectively clear and serious and substantially harms the competitive order (Article 129(2) of the MRFTA). In addition, the right to request a criminal referral, previously vested solely in the Prosecutor General, is now vested in either the Prosecutor General or the Commissioner of the SCIA (Article 129(3) of the MRFTA). It is generally understood, however, that where such a request is made, the KFTC will make a referral to the Commissioner of the SCIA. Under the regulations governing the organization of the SCIA and its affiliated agencies, competition-related investigations are handled by the Antitrust Investigation Bureau of the Seoul Regional Office of the SCIA. Specifically, the Bureau is responsible for (i) investigating and handling fair trade and corporate crime cases, as well as directly related cases assigned by the Commissioner of the SCIA; (ii) examining and researching related criminal methods and coordinating cooperations in such matters; and (iii) collecting and managing related information and materials. According to press reports, the Bureau is expected to have approximately 120 investigators across four divisions. Given this substantially expanded organization and headcount, more aggressive investigations are expected going forward.

By contrast, the rights of the Chairperson of the Board of Audit and Inspection of Korea, the Minister of SMEs and Startups, and the Administrator of the Public Procurement Service to request that the KFTC make a criminal referral have remained unchanged following the reforms that took effect in October 2026.
Meanwhile, there is a movement to reform the KFTC’s exclusive right to make criminal referrals. The abolition or reform of this exclusive right has been the subject of ongoing debate, caught between concerns over passive enforcement arising from the KFTC’s monopoly on criminal referrals and concerns over the potential abuse of criminal sanctions if such referral authority were expanded. The KFTC outlined its preliminary plans for reforming the exclusive criminal referral system in its Work Plan for the second half of 2026. In its Work Plan, the KFTC announced that it would end its exclusive authority over the referral power by granting a direct right to file criminal complaints to a prescribed number of citizens, central government agencies, and metropolitan governments, while requiring each such body to operate a “complaint review committee” to ensure that the power is exercised responsibly. However, this reform has not yet been enacted into law.

The KFTC has the authority to identify potential cartels on its own initiative through independent data collection and market monitoring and may launch investigations ex officio. In cases involving public sector bidding, the KFTC may also request the submission of relevant bidding materials from public institutions under the MRFTA.

In addition to ex officio investigations, the KFTC may also become aware of cartel activities through voluntary reports by participating undertakings, complaints from interested parties, or tips from third parties. Under the MRFTA, undertakings that voluntarily report their involvement in a cartel and meet certain conditions may be eligible for reductions or exemptions from remedial orders and/or administrative surcharges (i.e., leniency programme). Over the past five years, 159 out of 229 cases in which the KFTC imposed administrative surcharges for cartel conduct, or approximately 70%, involved leniency applications. In particular, the leniency application rate reached 94% both in 2024 and in the first five months of 2025, indicating that the KFTC’s reliance on leniency in cartel cases is substantial.

For third parties not involved in the cartel, a reward may be granted under the Enforcement Decree of the MRFTA if they are the first to report the conduct and provide evidence sufficient to substantiate the cartel activity (the “whistleblower reward programme”). Executive officers and employees of businesses that violate the law may also be eligible for such rewards. Previously, the reward was capped at KRW 3 billion. However, in June 2026, the KFTC amended its administrative notice (“Regulations on the Payment of Rewards to Whistleblowers of Violations of the MRFTA and Other Laws”) to abolish the cap on rewards and to allow rewards of up to 10% of the administrative surcharge imposed for the relevant violation. In addition, the payment procedure for whistleblower rewards was revised. Whereas rewards were previously paid within three months from the date of the resolution or ruling, a base reward will now be paid within three months following payment of the administrative surcharge. Any remaining reward will be paid within three months after the surcharge amount is finally determined upon conclusion of any appeal proceedings.

Item	Current	Amendment
Standards for Calculation of Base Reward	Sum of tiered rates by bracket of administrative surcharge	Uniformly 10% of the total administrative surcharge
Cap on Monetary Reward	KRW 10 million–KRW 3 billion (per violation)	Abolished
Procedure for Payment of Monetary Reward	Paid within 3 months from the date of the KFTC’s resolution	Base reward paid within 3 months from the payment of the administrative surcharge; remaining reward paid after finalization of the surcharge amount upon completion of any appeal proceedings

In announcing the amendment, the KFTC—citing large-scale cartels as an example—stated that it expects the amendment to promote internal reporting, which may serve as a deterrent to cartels and unfair trade practices. Accordingly, it is anticipated that cases involving the whistleblower reward programme will increase in the period ahead.

Whether to initiate a formal investigation based on suspicions identified ex officio is at the KFTC’s discretion. In the case of complaints, however, the KFTC must conduct a preliminary review and decide within 30 days (excluding any period for supplementary documentation requests) whether to proceed with a formal investigation. According to the KFTC’s Statistical Yearbook for 2025, between 2023 and 2025, the KFTC initiated investigations into a total of 615 cartel cases, of which 332 were triggered ex officio and 283 were based on reports (including leniency applications and reports by third parties).

The KFTC also uses information held by other agencies or generated through other proceedings as leads for its investigations. In the public procurement area, the KFTC analyses bid-related information submitted by procuring entities through the Bid Rigging Indicator Analysis System (“BRIAS”) and may initiate an investigation if the system identifies suspicious indicators. By amending the Enforcement Decree of the MRFTA in December 2023, the KFTC expanded the range of institutions required to submit bid-related information. In addition to central government agencies, local governments, and public enterprises, the requirement now covers quasi-governmental organisations, other public institutions, and local public enterprises. According to KFTC data, the number of bid-rigging cases detected has increased significantly since the introduction of BRIAS. In particular, there has been a substantial increase in cases involving tenders conducted not only by public institutions but also by private enterprises. More recently, the KFTC has also investigated foreign undertakings for alleged cartel conduct in connection with tenders conducted by Korean companies.

The KFTC may conduct on-site investigations, obtain documents (especially from request for information), and interview employees. Key steps in the process include:

On-site Investigations and Evidence Collection: The KFTC collects evidence through on-site inspections, RFIs (requests for information), and interviews.
Examiner’s Report: After reviewing the evidence, the KFTC issues an examiner’s report (“ER”) outlining the allegations and supporting evidence. Respondents generally have six weeks from receipt of the ER to submit a written response in cases heard by a three-member Chamber, and eight weeks in cases heard by the Plenary Session before all commissioners. The KFTC may grant an extension in complex cases or where the respondent’s parent company is located overseas.

Hearing (Deliberation): A hearing can be scheduled several months after receipt of the written response. KFTC commissioners then make a final decision.

Decision: The final decision is documented in writing, typically issued within weeks to months after the hearing.

There is no uniform statutory time limit within which the KFTC must complete a cartel investigation. However, under the MRFTA, the KFTC is generally barred from imposing remedial orders or administrative surcharges more than five years after commencing an investigation. If no investigation has been commenced, the corresponding limitation period is seven years from the date on which the violation is terminated. These periods do not establish target timelines for processing cases; rather, they represent the ultimate deadlines by which the KFTC may exercise its enforcement authority.

The KFTC possesses extensive powers to enforce the MRFTA, reliant on the cooperation of those under investigation. These powers are outlined below. Meanwhile, any refusal, obstruction or evasion of an investigation through verbal abuse or assault or intentionally obstructing or delaying the KFTC’s entry to the site can lead to imprisonment of up to three years and/or criminal fines of up to KRW 200 million. Any refusal, obstruction or evasion of an investigation through concealment, destruction, denial of access, or forgery or alteration of data during the investigation can lead to imprisonment of up to two years or criminal fines of up to KRW 150 million. The KFTC has also announced plans to strengthen its investigative powers by introducing new administrative surcharges and substantially increasing periodic penalty payments, thereby enhancing the economic sanctions for failure to cooperate with its investigations. Under the current law, sanctions include administrative fines for refusing, without justifiable grounds, to appear for questioning, as well as periodic penalty payments of up to 0.3% of average daily turnover (or KRW 2 million per day where turnover is unavailable or difficult to calculate) for failure to comply with an order to submit reports, documents or other materials. Under the proposed reform, obstruction of a KFTC investigation could be subject to a new administrative surcharge of up to 1% of the company’s turnover for the immediately preceding fiscal year. The ceiling for periodic penalty payments for failure to comply with the investigations would also be increased to 5% of the company’s average daily turnover for the immediately preceding fiscal year. However, these proposed reforms have not yet been enacted into law.

RFI (Information Requests): The KFTC can demand the submission of documents or items necessary for investigation from businesses, executives, or employees. This applies both to investigated undertakings and to third parties, such as competitors and customers.

Dawn Raids: The KFTC has the authority to inspect business premises for documents, electronic data, and other materials without prior notice, with the company’s consent. While these dawn raids do not require a court warrant, the KFTC has recently clarified the details and limits of its investigative rights through various efforts, such as by specifying alleged violations in its notice of investigation (alleged violations need not be specified in the case of cartels), establishing investigation standards for its compliance support department, and requiring the reasons for any extension of an on-site inspection to be stated in the extension notice.

Interviews: The KFTC has the right to summon and hear from accused parties, witnesses, or other interested parties. Failure to comply without just cause can result in an administrative fine of up to KRW 100 million for entities or KRW 10 million for individuals. In practice, the KFTC may conduct interviews via video conferencing in exceptional cases—such as when it is necessary to question employees of foreign companies and in-person investigation is not feasible.
Expert Witnesses: It may appoint expert witnesses to provide insights during investigations.

For the PO, its powers align with general criminal procedures, including arrests and search and seizure, contingent on obtaining court-issued warrants.

Korean law has not historically recognized attorney-client privilege (“ACP”). As a result, a company under investigation generally could not refuse to produce materials requested by the KFTC solely on the ground that they were privileged. This position, however, is now changing.

The amended Attorney-at-Law Act, promulgated in February 2026, introduced ACP into Korean law. Under the new provision, an attorney and the attorney’s client (or prospective client) may refuse to produce or disclose (i) confidential communications exchanged between them for the purpose of seeking or providing legal advice, and (ii) documents or materials prepared by the attorney, in connection with a retained matter in anticipation of litigation or a criminal or administrative investigation. This protection is subject to certain statutory exceptions, including where: (i) the client consents to disclosure; (ii) disclosure is justified by a compelling public interest, such as where the attorney acted as an accomplice or participated in unlawful conduct (e.g., destruction of evidence), or where the relevant communications, documents, or materials were used or intended to be used to facilitate unlawful conduct; (iii) disclosure is necessary for the attorney to exercise or defend the attorney’s own rights; or (iv) another statute provides otherwise. Although the amended Act takes effect on 20 February 2027, its supplementary provisions extend the protection to communications exchanged and materials created before the effective date. On this basis, it has been interpreted that ACP protection may already be asserted with respect to qualifying attorney-client communications and materials, not only in investigations by law-enforcement and other authorities but also in KFTC investigations.

The MRFTA’s leniency programme grants the first applicant that provides decisive evidence of a cartel full immunity from remedial orders and administrative surcharges; in practice, the KFTC also generally exercises its discretion not to make a criminal referral. To qualify for first-priority leniency, the applicant must:

• be the first participant to exclusively provide evidence necessary to prove the existence of a cartel;
• voluntarily submit the evidence before the KFTC comes into possession of any or enough information to substantiate the existence of a cartel;
• cooperate fully with the KFTC’s investigation by sharing all relevant facts and documents;
• cease cartel participation immediately upon applying for leniency; and
• not have coerced others into the cartel or been a repeat participant in cartels.

Disclosure of leniency applications to third parties without KFTC’s consent or providing false information during the investigation may result in revocation of leniency status. Also, if a leniency applicant’s statement during litigation appealing the KFTC’s disposition is different from that provided to the KFTC during the investigation process, reduction or exemption from remedial orders or administrative surcharges that the leniency applicant has received may be cancelled.

Leniency applications must generally be in writing and may be submitted to the KFTC in person or by email or fax. While oral submissions may sometimes be permitted, they cannot be made over the phone.

The PO offers a leniency programme known as the Criminal Leniency Programme. This programme largely mirrors the KFTC Leniency Programme but is tailored to target hardcore cartels under the MRFTA (e.g., price fixing, output restrictions, market allocation), and certain bid-rigging conduct. The Criminal Leniency Programme is open to individuals and businesses. The first-priority applicant under the Criminal Leniency Programme is eligible for exemption from indictment. And the first-priority applicant is protected from search and seizure, arrest, detention, and other compulsory investigations, except in exceptional circumstances.

Meanwhile, there is currently no formal legal mechanism for coordinating the leniency rankings or determinations made by the KFTC and the PO. Accordingly, each authority independently determines an applicant’s ranking and eligibility for leniency based on the applications filed with it. As a result, even where a company files leniency applications with both authorities at the same time, the ranking recognized by the KFTC may not necessarily be recognized by the PO.

Both authorities are aware of this issue, and there have in fact been cases where the same applicant received different leniency rankings from the KFTC and the PO. It will therefore be important to monitor whether and how this issue is addressed following the launch of the SCIA, as discussed above.

The leniency programme has also drawn public criticism over its potential for abuse, and the KFTC has been pursuing reforms in response. In April 2026, the KFTC announced its “Measures to Eradicate Repeated Collusion,” stating that it would pursue legislative amendments under which a company previously sanctioned for cartel conduct would be ineligible for any surcharge reduction, even if it voluntarily self-reports, if it engages in cartel conduct again within five years of the prior sanction.

Further, in September 2026, the KFTC announced a comprehensive overhaul of the leniency programme, issuing pre-announcements of proposed amendments to (i) the Guidelines on Unfair Collaborative Acts in Bidding and Requests for Restriction of Bidding Eligibility; and (ii) the Enforcement Decree of the MRFTA and the Notification on Implementation of Cartel Leniency Programme.

Although these measures have not yet taken effect, they are particularly noteworthy because they would significantly change the existing regime. Their key features are summarized below. First, the surcharge reduction available to a leniency applicant would depend on whether it self-reports before or after the KFTC commences its investigation. Under the current rules, a first-priority applicant receives a full exemption from the administrative surcharge regardless of whether it self-reports before or after the investigation commences, while remedial orders are exempted where the application is made before the investigation and may be reduced or exempted where it is made afterwards (Article 51 of the Enforcement Decree of the MRFTA). The KFTC has stated, however, that an application filed after it has already become aware of the suspected cartel and commenced an investigation contributes less to the resolution of the case, and that it will therefore also differentiate surcharge benefits according to whether the application is made before or after the investigation commences. Accordingly, even a first-priority leniency applicant that self-reports after the commencement of a cartel investigation would be eligible for a maximum surcharge reduction of only 75%, rather than the current 100%.

Second, the KFTC stated that it would retain the surcharge and criminal-referral benefits for leniency applicants but eliminate the reduction of, or exemption from, remedial orders. It should therefore be noted that, unlike under the current regime, even a first-priority leniency applicant that is exempted from surcharges or criminal referral could still be subject to remedial orders, such as independent price re-determination order.

Third, the current rules exclude from leniency “any person who, having been ordered to take remedial orders or to pay an administrative surcharge for violating Article 40(1) of the MRFTA, commits again a cartel conduct in violation of the said remedial orders within five years from that date.” However, the KFTC has announced that it will replace the phrase “commits again a cartel conduct in violation of the said remedial orders” with “newly violates Article 40(1) of the MRFTA.” Under this change, a person will be excluded from leniency not only when it repeats the same cartel conduct that was the subject of the remedial orders, but also when it commits, within 5 years, a type of cartel conduct that differs from its past violation.

Fourth, under the current rules, an undertaking that engages in cartel conduct more than five years after receiving a remedial order or administrative surcharge for prior cartel conduct may receive leniency benefits without any particular restriction, provided that it satisfies the leniency requirements. Going forward, however, an undertaking that engages in repeat collusion more than five but within 10 years would be eligible for only 50% of the surcharge reduction or exemption that would otherwise have been available through leniency.

In addition, the proposed amendments expressly exclude from leniency benefits any person that has succeeded to a business related to the cartel conduct through a merger, demerger, demerger-merger, business transfer or similar transaction.

<Comparison of Restrictions on Leniency Benefits: Current Rules vs. Proposed Amendments>*

Category		Current		Amendments
		Requirement	Effect	Requirement	Effect
Repeat Offenders	Within 5 years	Again engages in cartel conduct   in violation of the relevant remedial order	Excluded from reduction of or  exemption from remedial orders and surcharges	New Violation of Article 40(1) of the MRFTA	Exclude from reduction of or exemption from remedial orders and surcharges
	More than 5 but within 10 years	No specific provision		New Violation of Article 40(1) of the MRFTA	50% of the surcharge reduction or exemption otherwise available through leniency
Business Successors		No specific provision		Succeeds to the business related to the cartel conduct through a merger, demerger, demerger-merger, business transfer or similar	Excluded from reduction of or exemption from remedial orders and surcharges

Fifth, the KFTC stated that all types of cartel conduct would henceforth be subject to requests for restriction on bidding eligibility. In addition, the look-back period for prior violations considered in deciding whether to make such a request would be extended from five to 10 years, and the demerit-point threshold would be lowered from more than five points to four points or more. Under the proposed amendments, an undertaking that receives two remedial orders could therefore become subject to a request for restriction of its bidding eligibility.

Finally, the government and the ruling party announced plans to amend the MRFTA. The amendment would empower the KFTC to request that the heads of the relevant administrative agencies cancel the registration of, or suspend the business of, undertakings that engage in cartel conduct two or more times within five years. This would apply to 17 industries in the safety, energy, environment, and transportation sectors. The 17 relevant industry-specific statutes would also be amended to add a KFTC request as a ground for registration cancellation or business suspension. If enacted as planned, these amendments could bar repeat colluders from conducting the relevant business altogether.

Given this planned overhaul of the leniency programme, developments in Korean cartel enforcement in 2027 and beyond warrant particularly close attention.

The second applicant for leniency may qualify for a 50% reduction in the administrative surcharge and potential exemptions from remedial orders and criminal referral to the PO. To attain second-priority leniency status, the applicant must fulfil the same conditions outlined for first-priority leniency status, with the exception of being the second to provide evidence. If the cartel involves only two participants, second-priority leniency status is not available. To qualify, the applicant must cooperate fully, cease participation in the cartel, refrain from coercion or illegal conduct, and be the second to exclusively provide evidence within two years of the first applicant’s filing. Meanwhile, the second-priority applicant under the Criminal Leniency Programme is eligible for a 50% reduction in the sentence sought by the prosecution. (Unlike the KFTC Leniency Programme, the Criminal Leniency Programme does not provide second-priority leniency applicants with exemption from indictment.)

Markers (i.e., simplified applications) are available. An applicant that submits its identity and a brief overview of the cartel will be deemed to have filed its application on that date. The applicant is initially provided a 15-day period to supplement its application and an extra 60 days may be provided if a valid reason for extension is presented. An extension of more than 60 days may be granted if the KFTC finds that additional time would be needed to collect relevant evidence and obtain statements (e.g., international cartel cases). Therefore, ensuring that the most important content is submitted in the initial 15-day period is crucial. A full application is expected to be submitted by the end of the period for supplementation.

However, there are certain limits regarding supplementation, both in terms of timing and content. For instance, if the leniency application needs to include a new entity, like an affiliate of the original applicant, this addition must be made within a 75-day window.

Similarly, the Criminal Leniency Programme offers markers. However, for marker supplementation, a 30-day period is provided, which may be extended up to 60 days if deemed necessary by the PO, especially in cases involving international cartels.

The KFTC’s Leniency Programme requires applicants to cooperate continuously until the investigation concludes in order to maintain their priority status. The KFTC assesses cooperation based on:

• whether the applicant provided related information to the best of their knowledge without delay;
• whether all related materials in possession of the applicant or that the applicant could obtain were submitted promptly;
• whether the applicant promptly responded to the KFTC’s requests for information and cooperated with its requests;
• whether the applicant used its best efforts to have its employees cooperate with the KFTC’s investigation in good faith; and
• whether there was any evidence that was destroyed, damaged, forged or concealed by the applicant.

A leniency applicant that discloses the fact that it applied for leniency to third parties, including participants of the cartel, before the conclusion of the KFTC’s deliberation and without the KFTC’s approval, will be deemed to have failed to meet the good-faith cooperation requirement. Also, if a leniency applicant’s statement during litigation appealing the KFTC’s decision is different from that provided to the KFTC during the investigation process, or the leniency applicant provides false information, its leniency status will be revoked. Specifically, this applies where the applicant (i) denies, in whole or in part, material aspects of the statements it made or the materials it submitted during the investigation or other proceedings; (ii) is found at trial to have given false statements or submitted false materials during the investigation or other proceedings; (iii) declines, without justifiable grounds, to give evidence at trial as to the facts of the cartel conduct; (iv) fails, without justifiable grounds, to appear at trial; or (v) brings an action seeking to deny the illegal cartel conduct in respect of which it applied for leniency.

The standards under the Criminal Leniency Programme are largely identical. Under this Programme, leniency benefits may be revoked in whole or in part where circumstances arise that make it difficult to maintain the leniency decision, such as where the applicant reverses its prior statements during the related criminal proceedings.

The KFTC’s leniency programme is limited to “undertakings”, with no provision for current or former employees and directors to apply for leniency. However, when an undertaking applies for leniency and meets the requirements, in practice, the KFTC does not refer its current or former employees and directors to the PO for criminal prosecution. Yet it is worth noting that bid-rigging conduct that violates the Criminal Act or the Framework Act on the Construction Industry, may still result in prosecution, regardless of leniency granted by the KFTC.

In contrast, the PO’s leniency programme is open to both “undertakings” and “individuals”. When an undertaking applies for leniency, it must list current and former executive officers and employees who seek immunity from prosecution. Notably, first-priority leniency granted by the PO covers violations of the Criminal Act, the Framework Act on the Construction Industry, or the MRFTA, providing comprehensive immunity from prosecution for eligible individuals.

There is no plea bargaining or settlement system for cartel cases in Korea. In addition, the consent decree procedure does not apply to cartel cases. However, as noted above, Korea’s criminal justice system has undergone significant changes, and it remains to be seen whether plea bargaining will be introduced in the future.

N/A (There are no settlement procedures regarding cartel cases)

(1) Inter-agency cooperation: When deemed necessary for enforcement of the MRFTA, the KFTC may ask the head of the relevant administrative agency or other institution or organization to conduct the necessary investigation or to share necessary information. In fact, with regard to bid-rigging cartel monitoring, the KFTC is strengthening cooperation with major organizations by holding meetings with the government, municipalities, public enterprises, quasi-governmental organizations, public institutions, local public enterprises and related organizations that provide bid-related information to the KFTC’s BRIAS. The KFTC also notifies relevant government agencies of the outcome of its competition law enforcement cases. This practice principally relates to the right of the Administrator of the Public Procurement Service and the Minister of SMEs and Startups to request that the KFTC make a criminal referral, as well as the KFTC’s obligation to make such a referral upon receiving a request.

The KFTC may also request procuring agencies, such as the Public Procurement Service, to restrict an undertaking that has violated the MRFTA from participating in public tenders. In principle, the KFTC must make such a request where an undertaking has accumulated more than five demerit points for bid-rigging violations during the preceding five years.

Co-operation with foreign enforcement agencies: The KFTC actively collaborates with foreign enforcement agencies to investigate international cartels. This cooperation involves various channels and agreements with jurisdictions such as the EU, Brazil, Russia, China, Japan, and the US. Additionally, Korea is also an active member of the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development’s Competition Committee and the International Competition Network (ICN) and has attended the East Asia Top-level Officials’ Meeting on Competition Policy every year since 2008.

Investigations of international cartels by the competition authorities of the EU and the US will likely lead to an investigation in Korea. The KFTC keeps a close watch on foreign competition authorities and how cases are penalized overseas. In some cases, the KFTC shares information on suspected violations and investigation progress with the DG Comp of the EU, US FTC or the US DOJ.

It may also conduct dawn raids simultaneously with other competition authorities worldwide, if required, and jointly organize seminars and conferences. However, even during such cross-border collaborations, competition authorities typically do not directly exchange evidence acquired from the subjects of the investigation. For reference, the KFTC’s International Cooperation Division and the International Cartel Investigation Division are responsible for cross-border collaborations.

(1) Criminal sanctions: The MRFTA provides that a person who engaged in cartel activity may be subject to a term of imprisonment of up to three years or a criminal fine of up to KRW 200 million, or both. Companies that engaged in cartel activity may be subject to a criminal fine of up to KRW 200 million. If the company is a corporation, criminal penalties may also be imposed on the representatives of the corporation as well as the individuals concerned.

A person who engages in bid-rigging prohibited under the Criminal Act may be punished by a term of imprisonment of up to two years or a criminal fine of up to KRW 7 million. A person who engages in bid-rigging prohibited under the Framework Act on the Construction Industry may be punished by a term of imprisonment of up to five years, or by a criminal fine of up to KRW 200 million. The sentences imposed by the court vary depending on the details of the case. While courts tended to impose criminal punishment only on corporations that participated in illegal cartels in the past, recently there has been an increase in the number of cases where the employees or executives directly involved in the cartel were subject to criminal punishment.

According to the KFTC’s most recent Statistical Yearbook, out of 692 cartel cases concluded between 2023 and 2025, the KFTC referred 22 cases for criminal prosecution in addition to imposing remedial orders or administrative surcharges.

(2) Administrative sanctions: Undertakings that participated in cartel activity may be subject to sanctions such as remedial orders and/or administrative surcharges. In most cases, the KFTC imposes both a remedial order and a surcharge.

According to the KFTC’s most recent Statistical Yearbook, out of 692 cartel cases concluded between 2023 and 2025, the KFTC imposed remedial orders or administrative surcharges in 263 cases.

Under current law, an administrative surcharge of up to 20% of the relevant revenue may be imposed for cartel conduct, with differentiated rates applied depending on whether the conduct is classified as a very grave, grave, or less grave violation. Where no relevant revenue has been generated or the relevant revenue is difficult to calculate, a surcharge of up to KRW 4 billion may be imposed, again varying according to the same three-tier classification.

However, for conduct that ended before 30 December 2021 (to which the pre-amendment MRFTA applies), the surcharge may not exceed 10% of the relevant revenue or, where no revenue has been generated, KRW 2 billion.

The KFTC has recently signalled its intention to substantially strengthen surcharge levels for cartels and other MRFTA violations. The amendments to the Notification on Penalty Surcharges, which took effect on 30 April 2026, significantly raised both the lower and upper bounds of the base rate for surcharge imposition in cartel cases, while narrowing the KFTC’s discretion in setting the application rate.

Illegal Cartel Conduct	Current	As amended
Very grave violation	10.5% ~ 20.0%	18.0% ~ 20.0%
Grave violation	3.0% ~ 10.5%	15.0% ~ 18.0%
Less grave violation	0.5% ~ 3.0%	10.0% ~ 15.0%

In addition, where an undertaking has been subject to an administrative surcharge payment order for cartel conduct even once during the preceding ten years, the base amount of the surcharge may now be aggravated by up to 100%. The aggregate reduction for cooperation during the investigation and deliberation stages has been cut from 20% to 10%, and the reduction for voluntary correction has been reduced from a maximum of 30% to 10%, together resulting in a marked increase in the surcharge levels actually imposed.

When setting an administrative surcharge, the KFTC considers various factors including the details and severity of the violation, the duration and frequency of the violation, the profits gained from it, whether collusion was carried out, cooperation with investigations, voluntary correction of the issue, the defendant’s ability to pay, market and economic conditions, and the impact of the violation on the market.

Meanwhile, in June 2024, the MRFTA was amended to provide a legal basis for certain incentives to adopt compliance programmes (“CPs”). Under its Guidelines on Imposition of Administrative Surcharges, the KFTC operates a system under which undertakings that maintain a CP meeting a certain grade may receive a reduction in administrative surcharges of up to 20%. However, this reduction does not apply to cartel cases. That said, the operation of an effective CP may still serve as an important reference factor in determining the level of sanctions (for example, as a qualitative consideration in deciding whether to make a criminal referral or in setting the base surcharge rate). There is therefore a strong practical need for undertakings to establish a CP in advance.

(1) International cartel case: In September 2018, nine Japanese capacitor manufacturers and sellers faced administrative surcharges totalling KRW 36 billion (approximately USD 26.6 million) from the KFTC as well as criminal referrals for colluding to hike and sustain product prices over a 14-year period from 2000. The KFTC found that the companies had colluded to increase the prices of aluminium and tantalum capacitors supplied globally, including to Korea, from July 2000 to January 2014. At meetings among their CEOs and managers, the companies developed strategies to avoid international price competition, sharing detailed information and tactics to execute planned price hikes and uphold minimum prices among companies serving the same customers. The KFTC found that this collusion negatively impacted the supply prices of capacitors exported to Korea, totalling approximately KRW 736.6 billion (approximately USD 545.2 million) during the collusion period.

(2) Domestic cartel case: In July 2025, the KFTC imposed administrative surcharges totalling KRW 96.3 billion on Korea’s three major mobile carriers. The KFTC alleged that, in November 2015, the carriers reached an agreement to prevent any imbalance in the net number of subscribers gained or lost through number portability across the three companies. According to the KFTC, the carriers implemented this agreement by adjusting their conduct whenever such imbalances occurred, thereby ensuring that no single carrier gained or lost a disproportionate number of subscribers. The KFTC concluded that this cartel restrained competition in the mobile telecommunications market by limiting competitive efforts to acquire subscribers following the agreement.

In 2026, the KFTC focused its enforcement on cartels in the food ingredients market closely tied to consumers’ daily lives, such as sugar, flour, and starch sugar (syrup), imposing large administrative surcharges. In April 2026, the KFTC imposed administrative surcharges totalling approximately KRW 396 billion on three sugar manufacturers for colluding on sugar prices. The KFTC applied a 15% base surcharge rate. In July 2026, the KFTC imposed administrative surcharges totalling approximately KRW 671 billion on seven flour-milling companies for agreeing on flour prices and supply volumes on 24 occasions over approximately six years. A 15% base rate was applied to the principal participants, while a 10% rate was applied to three smaller participants found to have played relatively limited roles in the cartel.

In July 2026, the KFTC imposed administrative surcharges totalling approximately KRW 747.6 billion on four starch-syrup companies for colluding on prices over approximately seven years. The KFTC applied a 15% base surcharge rate. At the time, this was the largest administrative surcharge ever imposed by the KFTC in a single cartel case. These cases illustrate that administrative surcharges can reach the scale of hundreds of billions of Korean won, depending on the relevant revenue, the duration and seriousness of the violation, and the applicable surcharge rate.

In addition, in January 2026, the KFTC found that Korea’s four major commercial banks had restrained competition by exchanging and utilizing information on Loan-to-Value (“LTV”) ratios, a key term of real estate-secured lending, over a prolonged period. As the first case applying the MRFTA’s information-exchange cartel provisions, the KFTC imposed administrative surcharges totalling KRW 272 billion. In April 2026, the KFTC found that six paper manufacturers had agreed on printing-paper prices and discount reductions on seven occasions between February 2021 and December 2024, raising their average sales prices by approximately 71%. It imposed administrative surcharges totalling KRW 338.3 billion and filed criminal referrals against two corporate entities.

A distinctive feature of the KFTC’s recent enforcement in cartel cases is that its sanctions have consisted not only of administrative surcharges and simple cease-and-desist orders, but have been accompanied by a variety of remedial orders. These include: independent price re-determination orders, requiring undertakings to re-set prices at levels that would restore the pre-cartel competitive order; price-change reporting orders, requiring periodic reporting to the KFTC of price changes over a specified future period; employee training and reporting orders, requiring the regular provision of anti-cartel training to officers and employees; self-audit and reporting orders, requiring undertakings to conduct ongoing self-investigations of possible cartel conduct over a specified period and report the results; and disciplinary-rule establishment and reporting orders, requiring the introduction of new internal disciplinary provisions for cartel participants and the reporting of resulting outcomes. In particular, the independent price re-determination order is an exceptionally rare remedy: it was first imposed in the 2006 flour cartel case and was not imposed again until the paper-manufacturer case nearly 20 years later. However, since the latter case, the KFTC has imposed such orders in a succession of cases, including the flour cartel case and the starch-sugar cartel case. Furthermore, to address the absence of a clear legal basis for independent price re-determination orders, the KFTC has decided to introduce an express provision in the MRFTA. This type of remedial order is therefore expected to be used more frequently going forward.

No, there is no system in place that automatically holds parent companies accountable for administrative, civil, or criminal charges stemming from their subsidiaries’ cartel activities. This differs from Europe, where, if an undertaking in an economic entity is proven to have committed an Article 101(1) TFEU infringement, the undertakings in that economic entity are treated as having committed an Article 101(1) TFEU infringement, and the undertakings comprising the economic entity at the time of the infringement are jointly and severally liable for the infringement.

A person who suffers damage from illegal cartel conduct may file a lawsuit to claim damages against those who engaged in such practice.

The Korean legal system does not allow class actions for antitrust claims. However, multiple victims may jointly bring a private action seeking damages for an antitrust violation. Any judgment in such an action is legally binding only on the parties to that action. In subsequent damages actions brought by other victims arising from the same conduct, however, the courts may take the earlier judgment into account, although they are not bound by it.

That said, legislative efforts to introduce a general class action mechanism have continued in Korea. Discussion on this issue accelerated sharply following the large-scale personal-data breach at Coupang in November 2025, and a number of class action bills were introduced in the first half of 2026. The core of the leading bill is to introduce a general opt-out class action mechanism, applicable across all damages claims, under which one or several of numerous injured parties may litigate as the representative party and the resulting judgment binds all injured parties who have not opted out. Accordingly, if enacted, this bill could also apply to damages claims arising from cartel violations. This bill, along with the other pending class action bills, has not yet been passed, and the ruling party is continuing to deliberate on class action legislation with this bill as the focal proposal.

Meanwhile, in April 2026, the KFTC announced a plan to expand the scope of the consumer organisation action regime so that it would also permit damages claims arising from cartel conduct. Such an action would be brought by a qualified consumer organisation and should therefore be distinguished from an opt-out class action brought by a representative plaintiff on behalf of a defined class. The underlying statute (the Framework Act on Consumers) has not yet been amended to give effect to this proposal.

Previously, compensation was limited to the actual damages suffered by the claimant. However, an amendment to the MRFTA introduced a punitive damages provision allowing treble damages for harm caused by cartel conduct committed on or after 19 March 2019. Accordingly, a cartel participant may be held liable for damages not exceeding three times the actual damages suffered by the injured party.

In determining damages resulting from cartel conduct, the court measures the difference between cartel price and the “but-for” price that would have prevailed absent the collusion (the “hypothetical competitive price”). This hypothetical price is estimated by removing only the price increase attributable to the cartel while holding other price-determining factors constant. Because the price is hypothetical, it must be estimated using the most objective and rational method available, such as an econometric model (regression analysis).

Claims for damages arising from cartel conduct are subject to the limitation periods for tort claims under the Korean Civil Act. Accordingly, such a claim becomes time-barred three years after the injured party or their legal representative becomes aware of both the damages and the identity of the wrongdoer, or ten years from the date on which the tortious act was committed. An injured party is deemed to have become “aware” when the injured party has actual and specific knowledge of the facts constituting the tort, including the occurrence of the damage, the existence of the unlawful conduct causing that damage, and the adequate causal relationship between the conduct and the damage. The precise date on which the injured party acquired such knowledge depends on the facts and circumstances of each case.

If the alleged violator believes that the KFTC’s decision contains a factual or legal error, it may file an objection with the KFTC or bring an administrative action before the Seoul High Court. In such an action, the plaintiff may seek cancellation of the KFTC’s decision by challenging its factual or legal grounds or, alternatively may accept the KFTC’s finding of illegality while disputing only the calculation of the administrative surcharge. To appeal the Seoul High Court’s judgment to the Supreme Court, the appellant must establish a legal error, i.e., a violation of the Constitution, statutes, orders or, regulations that affected the Seoul High Court’s judgment. Objections filed with the KFTC are rarely upheld, except in cases of simple and obvious errors such as numerical errors.

(1) Administrative Sanctions: If the KFTC issues a remedial order or administrative surcharge due to cartel conduct, within 30 days of receiving the KFTC’s decision, the affected party can either (i) file an objection with the KFTC or (ii) initiate an administrative lawsuit with the Seoul High Court. The party has the discretion to choose between these two options but can only pursue one of them. After submitting an objection to the KFTC, if a decision is made, the affected party can file a lawsuit with the Seoul High Court and such a lawsuit must be filed within 30 days of the date the decision is rendered.

(2) Criminal Sanctions: If the PO indicts an accused for violating the MRFTA, the proceedings follow the ordinary criminal procedure in Korea. The accused undergoes a three-tier trial process (district court, high court, and Supreme Court) after indictment by the PO. If the accused disagrees with the court’s ruling, they can appeal based on factual or legal errors.

2026 was a year of significant change in Korean competition law, particularly in the area of cartels, where the institutional framework has shifted substantially. Below, we review recent notable cases and then discuss key trends.

1. Recent notable cartel cases (limited to one or two key examples, with a very short summary of the facts, decision and sanctions/level of fine);

(i) Commercial banks’ case

In 2023, the KFTC launched an investigation into four major Korean banks for allegedly sharing their respective Loan-to-Value (LTV) ratio data, which are used in calculating real estate-backed loans based on region and property type. A hearing on the case was held in November 2024, but the KFTC was unable to reach a conclusion and instructed the examiner to conduct a further investigation.

The KFTC ultimately found that, by exchanging competitively sensitive information concerning their LTV ratios, the banks had avoided competition on LTV terms and reduced commercial uncertainty. The KFTC also found that borrowers had suffered reduced choice because the LTV ratios offered by the major banks had remained at similar levels. On that basis, the KFTC imposed administrative surcharges totalling approximately KRW 272 billion (approximately USD 200 million). The banks have appealed the KFTC’s decision.

This case marks the first application of the new provision on information-exchange cartels introduced in the 2021 amendment to the MRFTA and is expected to have a significant impact on how such provisions are interpreted and enforced going forward.

(ii) Food sector cases: sugar, flour, and starch sugar (syrup) cases

As part of its efforts to eradicate cartels and stabilise the prices of essential consumer goods, the KFTC has focused its enforcement on collusion in the food sector. It has uncovered cartels involving manufacturers of sugar, flour, and starch sugar (syrup) and imposed substantial administrative surcharges. An overview of each case is set out below.

– Sugar case: The KFTC found that three sugar manufacturers, together holding approximately 90% of the sugar market, had reached eight agreements concerning sugar price increases over the course of approximately four years. The KFTC imposed remedial orders together with administrative surcharges totalling approximately KRW 400 billion (approximately USD 280 million) on those manufacturers.

– Flour case: The KFTC found that seven flour manufacturers, together holding approximately 87% of the flour market, had reached a total of 24 agreements concerning flour prices and supply volumes over the course of approximately six years. The KFTC imposed remedial orders together with administrative surcharges totalling approximately KRW 670 billion (approximately USD 470 million) on those manufacturers. Notably, the KFTC imposed an independent price re-determination order in this case—a remedy that it had revived after a 20-year hiatus in the immediately preceding printing-paper price-fixing case. By intervening directly in the price-setting mechanism, this remedy reflects the KFTC’s firm commitment to price stability. As part of a broader package of remedial measures, the KFTC also imposed a price-change reporting order, an order to conduct and report on officer and employee training, a self-audit and reporting order, and an order to establish and report on internal disciplinary rules applicable to officers and employees who participated in the cartel.

– Starch sugar (“Syrup”) case: The KFTC found that four companies, together holding approximately 86% of the syrup market, had reached 13 agreements concerning syrup price increases over the course of approximately seven years, and imposed remedial orders together with administrative surcharges totalling approximately KRW 750 billion (approximately USD 530 million). This is the largest administrative surcharge ever imposed by the KFTC in a single cartel case. As in the flour case, the KFTC also imposed on the syrup manufacturers new types of remedial orders, including an independent price re-determination order—requiring them to reset their prices at a level that restores the competitive conditions that had prevailed prior to the cartel—and a price-change reporting order.

2. Key recent trends (e.g. in terms of fines, sectors under investigation, any novel areas of investigation, applications for leniency, approach to settlement, number of appeals, impact of hybrid working in enforcement practice – e.g. dawn raids of domestic premises, ‘hybrid’ in-person/virtual dawn raids and interviews, access to personal devices and instant messaging apps, prevalence of private class actions etc.); and

The predominant theme of recent cartel developments in Korea has been a clear and pronounced tightening of the enforcement stance. Both the new President and the new KFTC Chairperson, who both took office in 2025, have expressed a strong commitment to eradicating cartels and have emphasized that the level of sanctions will be calibrated to significantly exceed any profits derived from collusion. Consistent with this stance, the KFTC sanctioned a total of 174 cartel cases in 2025, and in the first half of 2026 alone imposed administrative surcharges totalling more than KRW 2 trillion (approximately USD 1.5 billion) in major cartel matters. The PO has likewise been pursuing cartel cases actively, including through criminal investigations conducted independently of, or in parallel with, KFTC proceedings. In its recently announced Work Plan for the second half of 2026, the KFTC further indicated that it will intensify its scrutiny of collusion in sectors such as petroleum, chemicals, and paints. In addition, the KFTC has signalled stepped-up monitoring of cartels involving algorithms, generative AI, digital and platform markets, and bid-rigging in public procurement. Enforcement developments in these areas warrant close attention.

At the National Assembly audit held in October 2026, the KFTC reaffirmed its commitment to more aggressive cartel investigations. As neither the ruling nor the opposition party has expressed any notable disagreement, this enforcement stance is expected to continue into 2027.

Two trends in recent Korean cartel practice merit particularly close attention.

First, the level of sanctions has risen considerably compared with the past, including through the imposition of substantial administrative surcharges and new types of remedial orders, and this trend is expected to intensify.

– Significantly heavier sanctions in individual cases: The amount of the administrative surcharges actually imposed is increasing rapidly, while institutional reforms designed to strengthen sanctions are also underway. In the first half of 2026, the KFTC imposed over KRW 2 trillion (approximately USD 1.5 billion) in administrative surcharges in major cartel cases. In a number of those cases, including the food-sector cases discussed above, the KFTC applied a significantly high base surcharge rate of 15% to the relevant turnover.

– Enhanced administrative surcharges for cartels: The KFTC has amended its guidelines on the imposition of administrative surcharges to substantially raise the lower bound of the base rate applied to cartel cases. The lower bounds, which had previously been set at 0.5%, 3%, and 10.5% depending on the severity of the violation, have now been increased to 10%, 15%, and 18%, respectively. As a result, administrative surcharges are expected to increase materially even in less-severe cartel matters compared to prior practice. The amended guidelines further provide that, where an undertaking has been subject to an administrative surcharge for cartel conduct on at least one prior occasion within the preceding ten years, the surcharge may be increased by up to 100%. The KFTC also plans to raise the ceiling of the base surcharge rate to 30% (a bill to this effect has been introduced in the National Assembly and is currently under discussion).

– Comprehensive overhaul of the leniency programme: Leniency remains an important enforcement tool in cartel matters. However, negative public sentiment has been forming around the perception that cartel instigators may effectively escape sanctions through the leniency programme, and changes to the regime are anticipated. Indeed, this concern was raised repeatedly during the 2026 National Assembly audit, and reform of the leniency regime is therefore expected to proceed quickly. In particular, it should be noted that even a first-priority leniency applicant may in future be subject to administrative surcharge payment orders and remedial orders. Given the scale of the anticipated changes, companies should closely follow the final form of the reforms.

– Expansion of whistleblower rewards: The KFTC has amended its regulations to remove the cap on whistleblower rewards (previously set at approximately USD 2 million) and to permit rewards of up to 10% of the administrative surcharge imposed on the undertaking concerned. This development may increase the incentives for individuals with knowledge of suspected cartel conduct to report it to the KFTC, increasing the likelihood that the KFTC will become aware of and investigate such conduct.

– New types of remedial orders: The KFTC has also begun to impose new types of remedial orders that were not commonly used in the past. These include: (i) an independent price re determination order, requiring the parties to re-set their prices at a level that restores the competitive conditions that had prevailed prior to the cartel; (ii) a price-change reporting order, requiring the parties to report price changes to the KFTC for a specified period; (iii) an officer and employee training and reporting order, requiring the parties to conduct periodic anti-cartel compliance training for their officers and employees and report on its implementation; (iv) a self-audit and reporting order, requiring the parties to periodically conduct internal audits for potential cartel conduct over a specified period and report the results to the KFTC; and (v) a disciplinary rules adoption and reporting order, requiring the parties to adopt new disciplinary rules applicable to officers and employees who participated in the collusion and to report the adopted rules to the KFTC.
Second, significant changes are expected in cartel enforcement authorities.

– Reorganisation and expansion of the KFTC: The KFTC has established a dedicated unit, the Focused Investigation Planning Group, to handle large-scale, complex cases that affect consumers’ daily lives and cause nationwide consumer harm. In October 2026, the Group launched its first investigation, targeting major food companies, and the outcome of this first case warrants close attention. In addition, following a large-scale staffing increase beginning in October 2026, the KFTC’s authorised headcount has grown by approximately 400 compared with 2025. Given this substantial reinforcement of both organisation and personnel, KFTC investigations are expected to differ markedly from past practice in both speed and intensity.

– Overhaul of the criminal justice system: Criminal exposure in cartel cases has also been increasing alongside KFTC investigations and enforcement. The PO has recently been conducting aggressive searches and seizures and, in a number of matters, has detained relevant employees or exercised its statutory right to request that the KFTC file a criminal referral, even before the KFTC has itself issued a decision in the same case. Recent cases illustrate this shift: in connection with cartel investigations involving flour, sugar, and electrical equipment, the PO brought charges against 52 defendants, comprising 16 companies and 36 individuals, including CEOs and senior executives. In the flour and sugar cases, the PO sought criminal referrals from the KFTC before the KFTC had completed its investigation. Accordingly, companies increasingly need to assess and respond to potential criminal exposure in parallel with KFTC investigations.

As discussed above, the criminal justice system has also changed substantially, and since October 2026, cartel-related criminal investigations have been handled by the SCIA (specifically, the Antitrust Investigation Bureau, Seoul Regional Office of SCIA). Given that it is a newly launched authority, the SCIA is expected to pursue cartel investigations actively as it seeks to establish itself as a new cartel-related criminal investigative authority. Companies should therefore develop their response strategy from the outset of an investigation with an eye not only to the KFTC proceedings but also to potential criminal exposure.

Taken together, higher surcharges, stronger incentives for whistleblowers, and more active criminal enforcement make early strategic assessment increasingly important when potential cartel conduct with a Korean nexus is identified. Companies should consider at an early stage how the matter should be investigated internally, what steps are needed to preserve relevant evidence, whether and when to engage with the Korean authorities, and, where appropriate, whether to seek leniency under the separate KFTC and criminal leniency regimes. For companies operating across multiple jurisdictions, potential Korean exposure should also be factored into the company’s broader cross-border response from the outset.

Private enforcement in cartel matters has been expanding, although a general class action regime has not yet been introduced in Korea. Any person who suffers loss as a result of a cartel may bring a damages action if it can establish a causal link between the cartel and the loss and may seek damages of up to three times the amount of actual loss. A particularly noteworthy development is that, under legislation which entered into force in March 2026, constitutional complaints may now be brought against final and conclusive judgments, including judgments of the Supreme Court. Accordingly, significant cartel damages cases may increasingly be subject, in effect, to an additional layer of judicial review even after the Supreme Court has rendered its judgment.

3. Key expected developments over the next 12 months (e.g. imminent statutory changes, procedural changes, upcoming decisions, etc.).

In August 2026, the KFTC reported its Work Plan for the second half of 2026 to the President. With respect to cartel enforcement, the KFTC Chairperson stated that the KFTC would pursue the introduction of registration-cancellation and business-suspension measures against repeat cartel offenders and would seek to extend the limitation period applicable to the KFTC’s sanctioning authority in cartel cases, thereby facilitating more effective investigations. The Chairperson also indicated that the leniency regime would be reformed to prevent its abuse. In this context, the KFTC has expressed its intention to enhance the broader framework for effective cartel enforcement, and the following statutory amendments and procedural changes are either scheduled or anticipated in the near term:

– Increase in maximum administrative surcharges for cartels: The KFTC has introduced a bill amending the MRFTA to increase the maximum administrative surcharges for cartel conduct from 20% to 30% of the relevant revenue. The bill is currently pending before the National Assembly. If enacted and brought into effect, this amendment is expected to result in significantly higher surcharges, materially increasing the sanctions risk in cartel cases.

– Modification of leniency benefits: The KFTC has announced plans to limit the maximum surcharge reduction available to a first-priority leniency applicant that self-reports after the commencement of an investigation to 75%, rather than the current 100%. This would make it even more important for an undertaking seeking leniency to apply before an investigation begins.

– Sanctions for failure to cooperate with investigations: Legislative proposals are being pursued that would (i) codify in the MRFTA the obligations to submit to on-site investigations, to produce materials on request, and to appear when summoned, and (ii) introduce a new administrative surcharge of up to 1% of the undertaking’s annual revenue in the immediately preceding business year where the undertaking fails to cooperate with such investigations without justifiable cause.

The most closely watched matter in the second half of 2026 is expected to be the KFTC’s ongoing investigation into ten securities firms and five banks designated as primary dealers in the government bond market. They are alleged to have engaged in bid rigging by exchanging information on bid rates, quantities, and other terms during government bond auctions. The principal issues will be whether the communications among the primary dealers constituted an unlawful exchange of competitively sensitive information, and whether such exchanges affected the bidding outcomes. The KFTC’s decision is expected to serve as an important precedent regarding its enforcement approach to information exchange in financial markets.

Finally, ACP has recently been introduced in Korea, and companies should therefore ensure a thorough understanding of the new regime and make appropriate use of it in responding to cartel investigations. In January 2026, the National Assembly passed an amendment to the Attorney-at-Law Act, establishing for the first time a statutory basis for ACP in Korea; the amendment is scheduled to take effect in February 2027. Notably, ACP will apply retroactively to attorney-client communications that took place prior to the effective date. Under the amendment, both attorneys and clients may refuse to disclose confidential communications exchanged for the purpose of seeking or providing legal advice, as well as certain materials prepared in anticipation of litigation or a criminal or administrative investigation. Companies should therefore consider carefully how the new ACP regime may be used in responding to cartel investigations.