In Japan, the Act on Prohibition of Private Monopolization and Maintenance of Fair Trade (Act No. 54 of April 14, 1947, the “AMA”) is the primary legislation that prohibits cartel conduct and provides for sanctions against such conduct.

Under the AMA, cartel conduct may be subject to (i) administrative orders by the Japan Fair Trade Commission (the “JFTC”) against enterprises that engage in cartel conduct, namely (a) a cease and desist order under Article 7; and/or (b) a surcharge payment order under Article 7-2, and/or (ii) criminal penalties imposed on enterprises and/or their individuals (i.e., directors, officers and/or employees) under Articles 89 and 95. Cartel conduct may also give rise to civil actions by private parties (i.e., competitors or consumers) who have suffered damages as a result of such conduct. With regard to cartel conduct subject to a cease-and-desist order issued by the JFTC, cartel participants bear strict liability for damages to cartel victims pursuant to Article 25 of the AMA. In addition, cartel victims may also file civil lawsuits based on general tort law pursuant to Article 709 of the Civil Code.

Although the AMA generally applies cartel prohibitions uniformly across industries, there are specific laws that permit certain industry-specific exemptions from such application (e.g., Article 28 of the Marine Transportation Act, Article 110 of the Civil Aeronautics Act, and Article 101 of the Insurance Business Act). The AMA also provides for cartel exemptions for joint economic activities conducted within a certain scope by associations established under the law for the purpose of mutual support among small-scale businesses, subject to certain requirements.

Yes. Under the AMA, it must be established that cartel conduct results in a substantial restraint of competition in the relevant market. Accordingly, cartel conduct is not formally treated as per se illegal in Japan. In practice, however, hardcore cartels, such as price fixing, output restriction, market allocation, and bid rigging, are typically considered to constitute a substantial restraint of competition.

Yes. Although the AMA does not have specific provisions on extraterritorial application, it is generally understood that the AMA applies extraterritorially where cartel conduct that is formed outside of Japan has substantial anti-competitive effects on the Japanese market.

On December 12, 2017, the Supreme Court of Japan held that the AMA may apply to cartel conduct that was carried out outside of Japan if such conduct infringes on the order of the free-competition economy in Japan.

The JFTC and the Public Prosecutors Office are authorized to investigate cartel cases. Investigations into cartel cases are conducted either through administrative procedures (administrative investigation) or through criminal procedures (criminal investigation),  Administrative investigations are conducted by the JFTC. Separately, the JFTC also conducts “voluntary investigations,” in which it does not exercise its administrative investigative authority but instead seeks voluntary cooperation from the subjects of the investigation.

Criminal investigations are conducted with a view to filing a criminal accusation and are conducted by the JFTC in cases involving malicious and serious conduct that is considered to have a significant impact on the national economy or the lives of the general public, or in cases involving enterprises that repeatedly commit violations etc. In such cases, the JFTC may file a criminal accusation with the Prosecutor General. The Public Prosecutors Office decides whether to institute prosecution; however, prosecution may be initiated only where a criminal accusation has been filed by the JFTC.

The JFTC obtains information concerning suspected violations of the AMA through its own investigations conducted ex officio, reports from the general public, leniency applications, and/or requests for action from the Small and Medium Enterprise Agency. Where, based on such information obtained, the JFTC determines that there are facts sufficient to suspect a violation of the Antimonopoly Act, the JFTC conducts further investigations, including investigations conducted pursuant to the AMA (formal investigations) and investigations based on voluntary cooperation (voluntary investigations).

As described below, the procedures differ between administrative investigations and criminal investigations; however, administrative procedures are mainly used.

1. Administrative investigations

(i) On-site inspection

In administrative investigations conducted by the JFTC, the typical first step is an on-site inspection, in which JFTC investigators enter the offices or other business premises of enterprises suspected of engaging in violations and inspect books, records, and other relevant documents and materials (including electronic data). Such on-site inspections, commonly referred to as “dawn raids,” are conducted pursuant to Article 47 of the AMA.

In addition, the JFTC may order the holders of books, records, and other relevant documents (including electronic data) that it considers necessary for the investigation of the case to submit such documents and materials and may retain them pursuant to Article 47 of the AMA.

These on-site inspections are procedures accompanied by indirect compulsory force, in the sense that enterprises may be subject to criminal penalties if they refuse, without justifiable grounds, to comply with an on-site inspection.

With respect to the copying of submitted materials—including not only photocopying but also copying by means of electronic devices such as digital cameras or scanners—such copying is permitted to the extent that it does not hinder the investigation.

The attendance of legal counsel during an on-site inspection is permitted to the extent that it does not interfere with the smooth conduct of the inspection. However, enterprises are not permitted to request that the commencement of the on-site inspection be delayed until their legal counsel arrives.

(ii) Interview

Interviews are conducted with officers and employees of the enterprises who are related to the suspected facts. There are two types of interviews: voluntary interviews based on the interviewee’s voluntary cooperation, and compulsory examinations accompanied by indirect compulsory force.

As a general rule, voluntary interviews based on the voluntary cooperation of the interviewee are conducted. Where such voluntary cooperation cannot be obtained, the JFTC may conduct a compulsory examination accompanied by indirect compulsory force, under which criminal penalties may be imposed for refusal without justifiable grounds.

During an interview, the attendance of legal counsel is not permitted, and audio or video recording is also not allowed. In the course of interviews, written statement records are prepared. However, the interviewee is not permitted to take notes during the interview, nor is the interviewee provided with a copy of the written record of the interview.

However, where the interviewee is an officer or employee of an enterprise that has reported relevant facts and submitted materials in connection with an application for leniency, and where the interviewee so requests, the interviewee is permitted, immediately after the conclusion of the interview and at the interview location, to prepare a memorandum on the contents of his or her statements. In such cases, the interviewee may also ask questions to the JFTC investigators to the extent necessary for preparing such memorandum.

(iii) Order to Report, etc.

The JFTC may require officers and employees of an enterprise that has allegedly committed a violation, as well as third parties (witnesses), to report information necessary for the investigation of a case. Such reporting may be requested either on the basis of voluntary cooperation or by means of an order to report accompanied by indirect compulsory force.

(iv) Prior Procedures for orders

Where a cease-and-desist order or a surcharge payment order is to be issued, the JFTC, prior to issuing such order, notifies the enterprise that will be the addressee of the order of the contents of the draft of order, the facts as found by the JFTC, and the applicable laws and regulations, etc. The enterprise is thereby given an opportunity to submit opinions and evidence. In addition, from the date of such notice until the conclusion of the hearing of opinions, the enterprise may inspect and copy the evidence forming the basis of the order.

2. Criminal Investigation

The JFTC may, pursuant to a warrant issued in advance by a judge, conduct on-site inspections, searches, or seizures. In addition, the JFTC may request a criminal suspect or witness to appear before the JFTC and question him or her, and inspect an object possessed or abandoned by, or retain an object voluntarily submitted or abandoned by, a criminal suspect or witness.

See above

Although it differs from the typical “attorney-client privilege,” a procedure was introduced in 2020 under which, even if ordered to be submitted in the course of the JFTC’s administrative investigation procedures, documents that record the contents of communications conducted in confidence between an enterprise and its legal counsel concerning legal advice relating to alleged conduct subject to the leniency program (the “Specified Communications”), and that satisfy certain requirements—such as being clearly identified as recording the contents of Specified Communications and being stored separately from other materials—shall be promptly returned to the enterprise without the investigators accessing their contents. However, this procedure does not apply to criminal investigation procedures.

The leniency program provides (i) a reduction rate based on the order of application and (ii) a reduction rate based on the degree of cooperation with the investigation. In order to be granted full immunity, an applicant must file an application as the first-ranked applicant before the date on which the JFTC commences its investigation (i.e., the date on which an on-site inspection or search is conducted, or the date on which prior notice of the alleged violation is given).

An application for leniency is made by first submitting the prescribed form (Form No. 1) by e-mail. The information required to be stated in Form No. 1 is limited to a minimum, and once the application is accepted by the JFTC, a provisional ranking and a deadline for submitting a detailed report will be set. By the deadline for the detailed report, the applicant must submit a detailed report and relevant materials in accordance with Form No. 2, upon which the applicant will receive a notification from the JFTC that the application has been formally accepted, and, unless the applicant becomes disqualified from leniency, will be able to secure its ranking. Except for group companies that satisfy certain requirements, applications must be filed on an individual basis.

As described above, the leniency program provides (i) reductions based on the order of application and (ii) additional reductions based on the degree of cooperation with the investigation, whereby the surcharge amount is reduced by a certain percentage. There is no cap on the number of applicants.

The additional reduction based on the degree of cooperation with the investigation is a system under which the surcharge is reduced on the basis of an agreement reached through discussion between the applicant and the JFTC, taking into account the applicant’s level of cooperation with the investigation. The applicant discusses with the JFTC regarding the scope of its cooperation and the applicable reduction rate, and, where an agreement is reached, submits documents and other materials to the JFTC in accordance with such agreement. Based on such cooperation, when issuing a surcharge payment order, the JFTC applies, in addition to the reduction rate based on the order of application, the agreed reduction rate reflecting the degree of cooperation.

(i) Applications Filed Before the Commencement of the Investigation
Where an application is filed before the commencement of the investigation, applicants ranked second or lower are granted a reduction of 5% to 20% depending on their order of application. In addition, an extra reduction of up to 40% may be added depending on the degree of cooperation with the investigation.

(ii) Applications Filed After the Commencement of the Investigation

Where an application is filed after the commencement of the investigation, a reduction of 5% to 10% is granted depending on the order of application, and an additional reduction of up to 20% may be added depending on the degree of cooperation with the investigation.

* Provided that the overall ranking, including pre‑investigation applicants, need to be within the top five (5).

If a leniency applicant wishes to know their ranking, it may contact the JFTC by telephone and provide sufficient details regarding the nature of the violation and the relevant goods or services—enough for the JFTC to verify whether other companies have already reported the same violation—in which case the JFTC will inform the applicant of the ranking as estimated at that time. However, since other companies may file applications for reduction or exemption of fines after the inquiry, the rank indicated at that time is not guaranteed.

As described above, a leniency applicant may secure its ranking by filing an application using Form No. 1 and then submitting a detailed report in accordance with Form No. 2 by the designated deadline. However, the applicant may be disqualified from leniency if the reported facts or submitted materials contain false statements, or if the applicant fails to report necessary facts or submit required materials, etc.

Even after filing a leniency application, the applicant may be requested by the JFTC to provide additional reports or submit additional materials, and failure to comply with such requests may result in disqualification from leniency. Further, where the applicant has reached an agreement with the JFTC to cooperate with the investigation, the applicant may be disqualified from leniency if it fails to cooperate in accordance with such agreement. Accordingly, after filing a leniency application, the applicant remains under an obligation to cooperate with the JFTC.

Further still, if a leniency applicant discloses to a third party, without justifiable grounds, the fact that it has filed a leniency application or the fact that it has entered into, or engaged in discussions regarding, an agreement on reduction based on cooperation with the investigation, the applicant may be disqualified from leniency. Therefore, the applicant is subject to a confidentiality obligation.

Yes. The JFTC states in its guidelines that, with respect to the first-ranked applicant that files a leniency application before the commencement of the investigation, the JFTC will not file a criminal accusation.

There are no settlement procedures for cartels in Japan under the AMA. With respect to plea bargaining, Japan has a similar but distinct system under which a public prosecutor may enter into an agreement with a suspect or a defendant in a criminal case involving specified crimes (including violations of the AMA). Under this system, the suspect or defendant provides statements or other forms of cooperation for the purpose of providing evidence regarding the criminal conduct of another person, such as a co‑conspirator, and the prosecutor may, taking such cooperation into favorable consideration, agree to measures such as non‑prosecution or seeking a lighter sentence.

It should be noted that no mitigation is granted merely by admitting one’s own criminal conduct. Rather, the system allows a suspect or defendant to enter into an agreement with the prosecutor regarding mitigation of punishment in relation to the suspect’s or defendant’s own offense only by cooperating to provide evidence regarding criminal conduct committed by another person.

As stated above, there is no settlement procedure for cartels in Japan.

In Japan, as a general rule, only the JFTC has the authority to enforce the AMA and other investigating authorities do not possess such authority. Consequently, the JFTC does not cooperate with other investigating authorities regarding the enforcement of the AMA within Japanese territories. However, in the course of criminal investigations aimed at filing criminal accusations, it is possible for prosecutors responsible for prosecution following the filing of charges joint investigations with JFTC examiners.

On the other hand, the JFTC actively cooperates with foreign competition authorities in the investigation and enforcement of cartel conduct, reflecting the increasingly cross-border nature of antitrust enforcement. Such international cooperation is conducted through a combination of bilateral agreements, multilateral frameworks, and informal coordination mechanisms.

Japan entered into bilateral cooperation agreements with the United States (1999), the European Union (2003) and Canada (2005). Japan also signed economic partnership agreements that include a competition policy related section with some countries, including Singapore, Mexico, Malaysia, Chile, Thailand, Indonesia, the Philippines, Switzerland, and India.

Under Article 43-2 of the AMA, the JFTC may share information that is deemed helpful and necessary for the execution of performance of the foreign competition authority’s duties that are equivalent to those of the JFTC under the AMA with such foreign competition authorities. In addition, the JFTC entered into inter-agency cooperation memorandums /arrangements with various foreign competition authorities: the Competition and Markets Authority of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the Bangladesh Competition Commission, the Competition Commission of India, the Competition Commission of Singapore, the Fair Trade Commission of the Republic of Korea, the State Administration for Market Regulation of the People’s Republic of China.

Leniency applications and settlement outcomes in other jurisdictions do not automatically produce legal effects under the Japanese leniency system. However, as a practical matter, the JFTC takes into account international enforcement developments when conducting investigations.

Civil sanctions:

Cartel participants may be subject to civil liabilities. See Question 7.1 for more details.

Administrative sanctions:

The JFTC may issue a cease and desist order and/or a surcharge payment order against cartel participants.

In a cease and desist order, the JFTC may order the relevant enterprise to cease and desist the subject act(s), to transfer a part of the relevant enterprise’s business, or to take any other measures necessary to eliminate the act in violation of the provisions.

A surcharge payment order orders the subject party to pay a surcharge calculated pursuant to a statutory formula under the AMA. The surcharge amount is calculated by applying the surcharge calculation rate to the relevant party’s sales figures for the product or service in question during the period of the violation (up to a maximum of ten years from the start of the investigation). The surcharge calculation rate is 10% in principle, but 4% if the violating company and its group companies are all small- and medium-sized enterprises.

Additionally, if the violator receives financial benefits from an accomplice (e.g., by colluding with them in a bid), these benefits are considered when calculating the violator’s surcharge. If the company is a “repeat offender” or took a leading role, the surcharge amount can be increased by up to 50%. If the company is a repeat offender and took a leading role, the total surcharge amount can be doubled.

Criminal sanctions:

Companies that engage in cartel activities may be subject to a criminal fine of up to JPY 500 million. Individuals (such as company officers, directors, or employees) who engage in cartel activities with respect to a company’s business or property may be subject to a criminal fine of up to JPY 5 million and/or imprisonment of up to five years.

Although the amount of surcharge is calculated based on the statutory formula under the AMA set out in Question 6.1 above, the JFTC maintains a certain amount of discretion to grant a reduction of the surcharge amount for leniency applicants, depending on the degree of cooperation with the investigation. See Questions 3.1 and 3.2 for more details.

Unlike in the other jurisdictions such as in the United States, the existence of an effective corporate compliance strategy has little impact on calculations of the amount of surcharge in Japan.

On March 30, 2023, the JFTC ordered Chugoku Electric Power, Chubu Electric Power, Kyushu Electric Power, and two other companies to pay a total of 101 billion yen in surcharges for violating the AMA in relation to the cartel case involving major power companies concerning the supply of electricity to businesses. This is the highest amount per case since the surcharge payment system was introduced in 1977.

For other recent cartel cases, see Question 9.

No.

Anyone who suffered damages in relation to cartel activities can pursue private enforcement actions against cartel participants for compensation of damages. Such private enforcement actions for compensation of damages include a tort claim under Article 709 of the Civil Code and a strict liability claim under Article 25 of the AMA.

Neither class actions nor opt-out class actions are available in Japan. Please note that, under the Consumer Contract Act, qualified consumer organizations are entitled to file injunction demands. Additionally, there is another collective redress system which enables certain consumer organizations qualified by the Japanese government to file a lawsuit seeking compensation for damages under consumer contracts. However, these systems have not been used to address the infringement of Japan’s cartel rules.

Although anyone, including direct and indirect purchasers, may file an action, punitive and triple damages are not available. The plaintiffs bear the burden of proving the amount of damages. However, the court will not automatically dismiss the case, even if the plaintiffs have difficulty in proving the amount of damages. According to Article 248 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the court may decide on a reasonable amount of damages based on all the arguments presented by the parties involved and the results of the evidence examination.

For tort claims under Article 709 of the Civil Code, the right to file a claim expires if it is not exercised within five years of when the victim or their legal representative became aware of the damage and the tortfeasor, or within 20 years of when the tort was committed.

For strict liability claims under Article 25 of the AMA, plaintiffs can only file a claim after the JFTC’s administrative order (cease and desist order and/or surcharge payment order) becomes final and binding. Additionally, a strict liability claim under Article 25 of the AMA is subject to a three-year statute of limitations from the date when the administrative orders become final and binding.

A party that receives a JFTC administrative order (cease and desist order and/or surcharge payment order), can appeal the order based on various grounds. These grounds include errors in the findings of fact, errors in the interpretation and/or application of laws, and the amount of the surcharge.

In criminal cases, a defendant who is found guilty by a competent district court may appeal to high court based on violations of laws during the court proceedings, errors in applying laws, an unreasonable sentence, or errors in the findings of fact.

A party who receives a JFTC administrative order (cease and desist orders and/or surcharge payment orders) must appeal before the Tokyo District Court within six months from the date of such orders. The judgment of the Tokyo District Court can be appealed before the Tokyo High Court within 14 days after the Tokyo District Court’s judgment, and then before the Supreme Court within 14 days after the Tokyo High Court’s judgment. Generally, the losing party is liable for the costs of the proceedings. Each party is generally responsible for their own attorney’s fees. Therefore, if the appeal is unsuccessful, the party does not have to pay the opposing party’s attorney’s fees.

For a criminal case, if the competent district court finds the defendant guilty, such judgment can be appealed before the competent high courts within 14 days after the date of the judgment, and then before the Supreme Court within 14 days after the date of the high courts’ judgment.

(i)Recent notable cartel cases (limited to one or two key examples, with a very short summary of the facts, decision and sanctions/level of fine);

On June 23, 2025, the JFTC issued a cease and desist order, and also ordered seven companies, including the largest advertising agency, Dentsu, and the second-largest, Hakuhodo, to pay a total of 3.3 billion yen in surcharges for violating the AMA in a bid-rigging scandal surrounding the operational management of the Tokyo Olympic and Paralympic Games.

On September 24, 2025, the JFTC issued a cease and desist order and a surcharge payment order totalling over 5.9 billion yen in a price fixing case where four manufacturers of truck-mounted equipment had agreed to raise sales prices.

(ii) Key recent trends (e.g. in terms of fines, sectors under investigation, any novel areas of investigation, applications for leniency, approach to settlement, number of appeals, impact of hybrid working in enforcement practice – e.g. dawn raids of domestic premises, ‘hybrid’ in-person/virtual dawn raids and interviews, access to personal devices and instant messaging apps, prevalence of private class actions etc.); and

See below.

(iii) Key expected developments over the next 12 months (e.g. imminent statutory changes, procedural changes, upcoming decisions, etc.).]

There will be no amendments to the cartel regulations in Japan over the next 12 months.

In a New Year’s message issued in January 2026, the Chair of the JFTC stated that the JFTC would strictly enforce the AMA against unreasonable restraints of trade, including price cartels, particularly in sectors with a significant impact on the public’s daily lives. Based on this message, as illustrated in the below case, there is a possibility that cartel investigations by the JFTC will become more active.

In March 2026, the JFTC and the Public Prosecutors Office of Japan initiated a criminal investigation against eight petroleum product distributors about suspected price fixing (cartel) practices in the sale of diesel fuel to transport companies in Tokyo. If the JFTC files a criminal accusation, this would mark one of the most serious antitrust cases in Japan since the Tokyo Olympics bid-rigging scandal in 2023.