Mirroring Article 101 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), Article 2 of Law No. 287/1990 (the Law) renders null and void and expressly prohibits all restrictive agreements, concerted practices, and decisions by associations of undertakings whose object or effect is the appreciable restriction of competition within the national market or a significant part thereof. The Italian Competition Authority (ICA) is empowered to apply Article 101 TFEU and Article 2 of the Law concurrently.

Article 4 of the Law reflects Article 101(3) TFEU by envisaging the possibility of exempting from the prohibition under Article 2 those restrictive agreements that satisfy certain cumulative conditions demonstrating that their pro-competitive benefits outweigh their anticompetitive effects. Companies wishing to avail themselves of this exemption must conduct a self-assessment to determine whether their agreement qualifies for individual exemption. Cartel arrangements and other hard-core restrictions of competition typically do not qualify for this exemption, since they are by their very nature anti-competitive and – by common experience – unsuitable to produce countervailing efficiencies.

Pursuant to Article 1(4) of the Law, the ICA is required to interpret and apply national competition rules in full conformity with EU antitrust principles. ICA decisions therefore routinely draw on EU case law, decisional practice, and related guidelines. To date, the ICA has not issued any block exemption regulation of its own, therefore the EU block exemption regulations directly apply in Italy where Article 101(1) TFEU governs the conduct in question, while equivalent rules and criteria are applicable by analogy – pursuant to Article 1(f) of the Law – to local conduct that is solely subject to Article 2 of law 287/90 because of no cross-border effects on commerce an competition.

From a procedural standpoint, Presidential Decree No. 217/1998 lays down the procedural rules applicable to antitrust proceedings before the ICA. In addition, Law No. 689/1981 lays down general rules and principles on administrative sanction proceedings that may apply where Presidential Decree No. 217/1998 does not cover a specific situation. Further, Legislative Decree No. 24/2023, implementing EU Directive 2019/1937 on the protection of whistleblowers, also introduced a set of provisions designed to protect individuals who report infringements, including protection against dismissal.

The Law does not include sector-specific procedural or substantive rules for cartel investigations in specific industries.

In August 2023, newly introduced legislative provisions endowed the ICA with novel investigative “superpowers”, also referred to as the “new competition tool” to (see Article 1(5) of Decree Law No. 104/2023, converted into Law No. 136/2023). Specifically, the ICA may now: (i) identify ‘structural risks’ to competition – such as market failures or competitive bottlenecks – in a relevant market as well as across a specific sector that cannot be effectively remedied through the traditional antitrust tools (Articles 101, 102 TFEU, merger control); and (ii) impose, even in the absence of any wrongdoing, structural and behavioural remedies that it considers proportionate and necessary to address the competition concerns identified during he sector investigation. This law does not expressly set out any specific limitation to the type of behavioural or structural remedies that the ICA may impose. Notably, these new powers may theoretically lead to prohibit or materially amend arrangements that fall short of constituting a cartel or other infringement of Article 101, yet they are found to cause or be the result of structural bottlenecks of failure of competition in a certain sector. This reform is therefore likely to significantly influence and widen the ICA’s scope for intervention targeting agreements in problematic industries and supply chains (e.g., airlines; transportation; agri-food; fuel distribution; etc).

Over time, the ICA has issued notices and guidelines about national enforcement of antitrust rules, including on cartel conduct. The latest update of its notices occurred in February 2025 and concerned the following three notices: (i) the notice on the quantification of fines for antitrust infringements (including cartels); (ii) the revised leniency notice; and (iii) the notice on the compliance programme, which sets out the conditions under which a compliance programme may be taken into account as a mitigating factor when calculating cartel fines.

The definition of a cartel under Italian law is fully consistent with settled EU law. Under Article 2(1)(l) of Legislative Decree No. 3/2017, which transposed Directive 2014/104/EU (the Damages Directive) into Italian law, cartels are understood as restrictive agreements or concerted practices between competing undertakings that involve one or more of the following: (i) fixing of prices; (ii) limitation of output; (iii) restrictions on imports or exports; (iv) allocation of markets or customers; (v) bid rigging; or (vi) boycotts.

Consistently with Article 101 TFUE, Article 2 of the Law captures restrictive agreements and practices that have as their object or effect the prevention, restriction or distortion of competition. Accordingly, where conduct is anticompetitive by object — as is ordinarily the case with cartels — proof of actual market effects is not required in order to establish an infringement.

Consistent with the EU’s well-established ‘effects doctrine’, the ICA is entitled to apply Article 2 of the Law and Article 101 TFEU to conduct occurring outside Italy, provided that such conduct produces restrictive effects within the Italian market or a significant part thereof.

Under the Law, the ICA is the competent authority responsible for the investigation of cartels. In addition, public prosecutors and the national anti-corruption agency (ANAC) can investigate bid-rigging conduct as a crime in the context of public tenders.

The ICA may initiate an investigation in any of the following ways: (a) on its own initiative, as a result of its market monitoring activities, following sector-wide inquiries, or upon receiving information from regulators or public authorities with which it has entered into cooperation protocols (including, inter alia, the public prosecutor’s offices in Rome and Milan, the Guardia di Finanza [Italian tax police], the national anti-corruption agency [ANAC], the national drug agency [AIFA], and sector-specific regulators for energy [ARERA], telecoms and media [AGCOM], banking [Banca d’Italia], insurance [IVASS] and transports [ART]); (b) following the submission of a leniency application (see questions 10 to 14); and (c) upon receipt of a complaint lodged by a third party (whether a legal entity or a natural person), including anonymously through the whistleblowing platform available on the ICA’s website. Since the launch of this platform, the ICA has received over 100 complaints (however none in 2025), which have led to several ongoing exchanges with anonymous complainants and to the opening of a number of cartel investigations.

The ICA enjoys broad discretion in determining whether to open a formal investigation and such decisions are subject to limited judicial review by the administrative courts (on the ground of lack of reasoning or excess of power).

(a) Pre-investigation

This phase encompasses all activities carried out by the ICA to determine whether to open formal antitrust proceedings (see question 6). The pre-investigation is conducted independently by the ICA and the parties have no right of participation. The undertakings whose conduct is under scrutiny may indeed be unaware that such a phase is underway, unless they receive one or more requests for information.

The Court of Justice of the EU recently held (Case C-511/23 — Caronte & Tourist) that the 90-day time limit for initiating a formal investigation, established under Article 14 of Law No. 689/1981, is incompatible with EU law. Nevertheless, the ICA remains bound by the general EU law principle requiring that administrative proceedings be conducted within a reasonable timeframe.

(b) Opening of the formal investigation

Following its assessment of the information gathered during the pre-investigation, the ICA may decide to open a formal investigation. The opening decision, which is published on the ICA’s website, identifies the undertakings involved, the relevant markets affected, and the principal issues of the case. It also designates the case handler, fixes a deadline for the final decision, activates stronger investigative powers (e.g. the ICA can carry out dawn raids simultaneously with the notification of the opening decision), and triggers the procedural safeguards designed to protect the rights of defence of the investigated parties. The ICA operates without a fixed timeframe for closing the proceedings or issuing a cease-and-desist order: administrative courts have in a few occasions established mandatory limitations to the overall duration of the investigation proceedings, though in practice the ICA may extend the initial deadline multiple times, provided there are objective reasons for doing so. The ICA’s power to impose a fine (or a periodic penalty payment) is, however, time-barred five years from the date on which the infringement ceased.

Following the opening of the investigation, the procedure may follow one of three paths: (1) the ordinary procedure; (2) the commitments procedure; or (3) the settlement procedure.

(c1) Ordinary procedure

Statement of Objections

At the conclusion of the formal investigation, the ICA communicates its findings to the parties through a Statement of Objections (SO), which summarises the investigative results, the input provided by the parties and the perimeter of the contested infringement, to allow the parties to provide their conclusive defences before issuance of the final decision. The SO is addressed to all parties at least 30 days before the formal end of the investigation and identifies the date on which that phase will close. Parties may submit written replies to the SO up to five days before that date and may request a final hearing before the ICA’s board members.

End of the investigation

The formal end of the investigation normally coincides with the date of the final hearing. The final decision is typically published within a matter of weeks following that hearing. Where the ICA issues an infringement decision, it may adopt a cease-and-desist order and impose a fine of up to 10% of the worldwide turnover achieved by the infringing undertaking in the preceding financial year.

(c2) Commitments procedure

Within three months of the opening decision, the parties may offer commitments to address the ICA’s preliminary concerns (Article 14-ter of the Law). The statutory three-months term is mandatory, though in exceptional circumstances the ICA has accept commitments submitted after the expiry of the statutory period. If the ICA provisionally concludes that the commitments offered are not manifestly inadequate, it publishes them on its website and in its weekly official bulletin for market testing purposes. Third parties have 30 days within which to submit observations on the commitments. Following the market test, the party that offered the commitments has a further 30 days to comment on those observations and to propose any amendments to the original commitments. If satisfied with the market test outcome, the ICA may render the commitments binding for a specified period and close the proceedings without any finding of infringement.

(c3) Settlement procedure

See question 15.

During proceedings, the ICA holds the following investigative powers:

(a) Requests for information

The ICA may issue written requests for information and documents to undertakings and any other natural or legal person. Until 2022, such requests could only be made once a formal investigation had been opened. Since 2022, however, the ICA may issue requests ‘at any point in time’, including before the decision to formally open the investigation. Requests must: (i) afford the addressee a reasonable period in which to reply, having regard to the complexity of the information sought (which, in any event, may not exceed 60 days, unless extended following a reasoned request); (ii) identify the legal basis on which they are founded and be proportionate; and (iii) not compel the addressee to acknowledge any competition law infringement.

(b) Interviews

The ICA may summon and hear any person who may possess useful information for the investigation, irrespective of whether that individual works for an undertaking under investigation. Directors and/or employees may accordingly be heard in person or remotely, where they are considered to hold relevant information.

(c) Inspections (dawn raids)

The ICA is empowered to access and inspect all business premises, land, or vehicles belonging to the parties under investigation. Under the provisions introduced by the ECN+ Decree (Legislative Decree No. 185/2021, implementing the ECN+ Directive), the ICA may also inspect the private premises of directors, managers, and other members of staff. Such inspections of private premises require prior judicial authorisation, which may only be granted where there are reasonable grounds to suspect that evidence relevant to proving an infringement is held at those premises. Inspections are normally carried out without prior notice.

During an inspection, the ICA may review business documents including electronic documents (including those stored on the cloud) and take copies (not originals). The ICA may also seek explanations concerning the facts and documents under review, and may make oral requests for information and documents, which are recorded — together with the corresponding oral replies — in written minutes.

Dawn raids are generally conducted with the assistance of the Guardia di Finanza (Italian tax police).

Where an inspection extends beyond a single day (an uncommon occurrence), the ICA may seal any business premises, records, and IT systems until the inspection is concluded.

(d) Expert reports

Following the changes introduced by the ECN+ Decree, the ICA has the power to commission expert reports and/or economic and statistical analyses, as well as to arrange consultations with external experts. This new power is particularly significant given the growing importance of economic analysis in increasingly complex cartel cases.

(e) Non-cooperation fines

Where an undertaking fails to cooperate with or comply with investigative measures, the ICA may impose a fine of up to 1% of total worldwide turnover for unjustified refusal or failure to: (i) supply the required information or documents; (ii) appear at a formal hearing; or (iii) submit to an inspection. Periodic penalty payments of up to 5% of average daily turnover may additionally be imposed for each day of delay in complying with an ICA request.

The ICA’s sanctioning powers also extend to individuals. Pursuant to Article 14(7) of the Italian Competition Law, the ICA may impose fines of between €150 and €25,823, as well as periodic penalty payments of the same range, on individuals who: (i) obstruct an ICA inspection; (ii) provide inaccurate, incomplete, or misleading information in response to an ICA request for information — or fail to provide such information within the deadline without a valid reason — where the requested information could establish their liability for an infringement punishable by an administrative fine or criminal sanction; or (iii) fail to appear at a formal hearing convened by the ICA.

The Law does not expressly provide for the protection of legal professional privilege. In competition proceedings, the ICA applies the principles established by EU case law, pursuant to which such protection is subject to two cumulative conditions: (i) the communication must have been made for the purposes and in the interests of the client’s rights of defence; and (ii) it must originate from an independent lawyer — that is, a lawyer not bound to the client by an employment relationship — duly authorised to practise within the EU. Consequently, in-house counsel does not benefit from legal professional privilege.

Undertakings are entitled to object to any request for, or seizure of, materials protected by legal professional privilege. The ICA should recognise privilege in respect of: (i) all written communications with external counsel (whether addressed to or received from such counsel for the purposes of obtaining or providing legal advice); (ii) internal notes prepared by the undertaking incorporating the content or records of communications with external counsel; and (iii) internal preparatory documents drafted by the undertaking exclusively for the purpose of seeking legal advice from external counsel, including documents not yet transmitted to external counsel. Where privilege is disputed, a copy of the document in question is placed in a sealed envelope and the ICA subsequently determines whether it should be incorporated into the case file or, if found to be privileged, returned to the undertaking.

Pursuant to Article 15-quater of the Law, the following general conditions must be met by any applicant seeking either full immunity or a reduction in the fine: (a) the applicant must terminate its participation in the alleged secret cartel no later than immediately upon filing the leniency application, unless the ICA requests or consents to a different arrangement; (b) the applicant must cooperate with the ICA sincerely, fully, continuously, and without delay throughout the entire duration of the investigation; and (c) prior to the formal submission of the application, the applicant must not have destroyed, falsified, or concealed any relevant evidence, nor disclosed to any person (other than other competition authorities) its intention to file a leniency application or the content of such an application.

Full immunity may only be granted to the first applicant, subject to the following cumulative conditions: (a) disclosure of its participation in the secret cartel; and (b) provision of evidence that: (i) enables the ICA, at the time it receives the application, to conduct a targeted inspection in relation to the cartel, provided the ICA does not already possess sufficient evidence to carry out such an inspection or has not already done so; or (ii) is, in the ICA’s assessment, sufficient to establish the existence of a secret cartel, provided the ICA does not yet have sufficient evidence to determine the infringement and no other undertaking has previously been granted immunity in respect of the same cartel.

Undertakings that coerced others into joining or remaining in the cartel are ineligible for full immunity.

Applicants must supply the ICA with all evidence in their possession or to which they have access relating to the cartel. This must include, in particular: (i) the applicant’s name and address; (ii) the names and addresses of all other undertakings participating in the cartel; (iii) a detailed description of the secret cartel, covering the goods or services involved, its geographic scope and duration, as well as the nature of the conduct, the objectives pursued, and the manner of implementation; and (iv) details of any other applications for immunity or reduction of fines already submitted or intended to be submitted to other competition authorities in relation to the same cartel.

Leniency applications may be submitted in writing or orally. The ICA notifies the applicant of whether immunity has been granted or refused. Where an immunity application is rejected, the applicant may request the ICA to assess its application instead as one for a reduction in the fine.

As at the EU level, the size of any reduction in the fine granted to subsequent applicants is determined by two criteria: (a) the timeliness of the cooperation; and (b) the evidentiary value of the evidence provided (the so-called ‘significant added value’ standard).

In 2025, the ICA adopted a revised leniency notice aimed at strengthening the incentives for companies to come forward at an early stage (see ICA Resolution No. 31467 of 25 February 2025, which entered into force on 10 March 2025 and applies to proceedings initiated after that date). Under that notice, the level of the potential fine reduction is tied to the timing of the application. Specifically: (a) the first undertaking to provide significant added value may receive a fine reduction of between 30% and 50%; (b) the second undertaking to provide significant added value may receive a reduction of between 20% and 30%; and (c) further undertakings providing significant added value may receive a reduction of up to 20%.

Under Article 15-sexies of the Law, immunity applicants may request the ICA to reserve their position by granting a marker, together with a deadline by which the leniency application must be completed by submitting all required evidence. Undertakings applying only for a reduction in the fine are not entitled to request a marker.

The request must be adequately reasoned, and the ICA retains full discretion as to whether or not to grant it.

When requesting a marker, the undertaking must supply the ICA with at least the following information: (a) its own name and address; (b) the names and addresses of the other undertakings participating in the secret cartel; (c) a description of the secret cartel, specifying the goods and services covered, its geographic scope and duration, as well as the nature of the conduct, the objectives pursued, the manner in which it was implemented and indicative locations were further evidence of the cartel may be stored and found; and (d) details of any other applications for immunity or reduction of fines already submitted or intended to be submitted to other competition authorities in connection with the same cartel.

Leniency applicants are required to cooperate with the ICA in a genuine, complete, continuous, and prompt manner throughout the entire duration of the proceedings. Specifically, undertakings must: (a) provide the ICA without delay with all relevant information and evidence in their possession; (b) remain accessible to the ICA and respond promptly to any request made; (c) make every effort to ensure that, where necessary, current and former directors, managers, and employees (to the extent practicable with respect to former employees) are made available for interviews by the ICA; and (d) refrain from destroying, altering, or concealing any relevant information or documents.

In addition, applicants are prohibited from disclosing to any person (other than other competition authorities) the existence or content of the leniency application until the ICA has served its Statement of Objections.

The immunity conferred by the ICA is conditional upon the applicant’s continued compliance with the general requirements for favourable treatment throughout the investigation. Accordingly, any breach of these obligations may lead to the revocation of the immunity granted.

Pursuant to Article 31-quater of the Law, current and former directors, managers, and employees of an immunity applicant are shielded from any criminal penalties that might otherwise be imposed in connection with their participation in the secret cartel covered by the immunity application. This protection from criminal liability is subject to the following conditions: (a) a valid immunity application must have been submitted to the ICA, the European Commission, or another national competition authority (NCA); (b) the individuals concerned must actively cooperate with the relevant competition authority and the public prosecutor, providing information useful to prove the offence and to identify other persons responsible; and (c) the application must have been submitted before the applicant became aware that criminal proceedings had been opened in respect of the same facts.

This provision is without prejudice to the right of victims to claim full compensation for any harm suffered.

The settlement procedure was incorporated into Italian competition law by the Annual Competition Law of 8 August 2022, which introduced Article 14-quater into the Law. On 22 May 2023, the ICA published a Settlement Notice setting out more detailed procedural rules.

The Italian settlement procedure closely follows the EU framework and consists of five principal stages: (i) following the expiry of the deadline for offering commitments and before the notification of the SO, the ICA may issue a written communication to all parties inviting them to indicate in writing whether they are willing to participate in settlement discussions (parties may also informally approach the ICA to express their interest in the procedure); a declaration of interest does not constitute an admission of the infringement; (ii) where only some of the parties express willingness to settle, the ICA may conduct bilateral discussions exclusively with those parties; hybrid settlements are therefore permissible; in the course of discussions, the ICA will inform each party of the allegations it intends to raise, the evidence relied upon, and the range of potential fines; upon request, the ICA may also grant access to a non-confidential version of documents in the case file, to enable the requesting party to assess its position; (iii) if discussions lead to a positive outcome, the ICA may set a deadline by which the relevant undertakings must submit their written settlement proposals reflecting the results of the discussions; each proposal must include an acknowledgment of the infringement and specify the maximum fine the party is prepared to accept; by submitting the proposal, the parties also waive their right of access to the file, their right to submit written defences, and their right to request a final hearing before the ICA’s board members; (iv) if the ICA accepts the parties’ proposals, it issues an SO consistent with the agreed terms, which the parties are then required to confirm; and (v) the ICA issues the final settlement decision in accordance with the agreement reached with the parties; no judicial approval is required to conclude the procedure.

The ICA may revert to the ordinary procedure at any stage. In such circumstances, any admissions made by the parties are deemed withdrawn and may not be used as evidence.

The Italian settlement procedure differs from the EU procedure in two notable respects. First, unlike the EU framework, it applies not only to infringements of Article 101 TFEU but also to infringements of Article 102 TFEU (and the corresponding Articles 2 and 3 of the Law). Second, the available fine reduction varies from 10% for secret cartels to 20% in other cases.

There are several reasons why a party might choose to enter into a settlement with the ICA. On the positive side, a successfully completed settlement results in a reduction of the fine. The discussions leading to the settlement decision may also provide the parties with an informal opportunity to influence the ICA’s assessment of certain aspects of the allegations. Furthermore, the settlement procedure affords greater confidentiality to the case file, thereby reducing the risk that relevant documents will be deployed in follow-on damages actions. Additionally, since settlement decisions tend to be shorter and less detailed, they may leave fewer grounds for follow-on claims. Finally, settlements facilitate a more expeditious administrative process, with consequent savings in legal costs.

However, it cuts both ways and certain drawbacks warrant consideration. Since settling requires an admission of liability, it may carry adverse reputational consequences and could trigger further investigations or weaken an infringer’s position in follow-on actions, depending on the potential outcome of a fully-fledged investigation. The settlement process also entails a restriction on the exercise of defence rights. Finally, an accelerated administrative process is not always advantageous for infringers, as it may lead to earlier payment of fines and accelerate the onset of follow-on litigation.

At the domestic level, the ICA may correspond with all public administrations and bodies governed by public law and may seek their cooperation in the exercise of its functions. For example, Law No. 262/2005 governs the relationship between the ICA and Italian financial sector regulators (such as Banca d’Italia and Consob), providing for cooperation — including information sharing — and for the coordination of their respective actions, including through memoranda of understanding. The ICA may also exercise its powers in connection with the investigative activities of the Guardia di Finanza (Italian tax police).

At the EU level, the ICA participates in the cooperative framework established by EU law, including the ECN+ Directive as implemented by the ECN+ Decree. Italy is a particularly pro-active and influential member of the European Competition Network created by Regulation No. 1/2003, which mandates cross-border cooperation between the European Commission and national competition authorities, including the ICA.

In January 2025, the Italian Authority was appointed to lead the ICN Secretariat, also in recognition of its enduring commitment to the network. In that capacity, the Authority is responsible for crucial functions such as: (i) the management of governance processes, including the selection of the Chair and the Steering Committee, as well as the coordinators of the Working Groups; (ii) the coordination of the Steering Committee’s activities and the management of communications and documentation; (iii) the coordination of the Working Groups’ activities, while also ensuring the circulation of information and relevant documents among ICN members.

At the broader international level, the ICA is also member of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, and the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development.

Three categories of sanctions may arise where cartel activity is established: administrative, civil, and criminal.

Administrative sanctions: The ICA may order cartel participants to bring the infringing conduct to an end (theoretically, it may also impose structural and behavioural remedies), as well as financial penalties. Only legal entities may be held liable for an antitrust infringement. Natural persons are not subject to personal administrative fines, save for failure to cooperate with or comply with investigative measures.

Civil sanctions: Any agreement, decision, or concerted practice infringing the prohibition on cartels is automatically null and void by operation of law, pursuant to Article 1418 of the Italian Civil Code.

Criminal sanctions: Criminal liability for anticompetitive conduct is confined to bid rigging in the context of public procurement. Hypothesis of fraud have been considered and are theoretically conceivable in connection with cartel conduct in rather exceptional circumstances, however there is no confirmed precedent in this respect.

Fines must fulfil the dual purpose of punishing the anticompetitive conduct and deterring its recurrence. The ICA therefore calibrates the fine to reflect both the gravity and the duration of the infringement. The basic amount of the fine is computed as follows: the ICA first identifies the undertaking’s annual sales of the products affected by the infringement; a percentage of up to 30% is then applied to that figure based on the gravity of the infringement; and the resulting amount is subsequently multiplied by the duration of the infringement expressed in years, months, and days. The ICA may also add an ‘entry fee’ in the form of a supplementary fixed amount of between 15% and 25% of the relevant turnover.

The basic amount may be adjusted upwards or downwards considering aggravating or mitigating circumstances. The fine may be increased, for example, where the company played a decisive or leading role in the cartel. Conversely, the fine may be reduced where the company’s involvement was limited or (up to 10%) where it had implemented an effective compliance programme consistent with national and European best practices. In this last respect the ICA updated its antitrust compliance guidelines in February 2025. The fine may also be raised by up to 50% for deterrence purposes where the infringing undertaking had a particularly high worldwide turnover relative to the value of sales of the goods or services concerned, or where it forms part of a group of significant economic standing.

Specific reductions are available for leniency applicants and for companies that furnish evidence of a new infringement distinct from the one under investigation.

In all cases, the fine imposed on an undertaking may not exceed the statutory cap of 10% of its total turnover in the last complete financial year preceding the adoption of the decision. In accordance with the relevant ICA Guidelines on the setting of fines, the basis for calculating the maximum statutory fine is the total worldwide turnover achieved in the last financial year by each undertaking involved in the infringement. Where the calculated fine exceeds this cap, it must be reduced accordingly.

A parent company may be held liable for the anticompetitive conduct of a subsidiary where it exercises decisive influence over that subsidiary. In line with EU case law, such control is presumed where the subsidiary is wholly owned by the parent.

Both private actions and class actions are available under Italian law for infringement of the cartel rules.

Private enforcement — principally in the form of individual or group actions — has grown considerably in recent years, following the adoption of the Damages Directive and its transposition into Italian law through Legislative Decree No. 3/2017. Follow-on actions (i.e. actions founded on a prior finding of a competition law infringement by the Commission or the ICA) are the most common form of private enforcement, although standalone actions (i.e. actions in which the claimant must independently prove the competition law infringement) are also possible.

Class actions were historically reserved for consumers and their organisations, but a recent legislative reform (Law No. 31/2019) has extended standing to bring class actions to businesses as well. As far as we are aware, however, no class action has been brought in Italy to date in respect of cartel infringements.

In Italy, litigation funders are active in promoting and initiating actions.

Italian law does not set out an exhaustive list of recoverable heads of damage. In practice, compensation typically encompasses actual loss (damnum emergens), loss of profit (lucrum cessans), and interest. Furthermore, the damages ultimately awarded may be uplifted to account for monetary devaluation. The overarching principle is that successful claimants should be placed in the position they would have occupied had the competition law infringement not occurred, i.e. claimants are only entitled to compensatory damages, whilst punitive damages are not admitted in Italy.

Damages are generally quantified by an independent expert appointed by the court, who is tasked with responding to a series of questions formulated by the court after hearing the parties and relating to the assessment of the harm suffered. The parties may appoint their own experts, who participate in the process by attending meetings with the court-appointed expert, submitting data, and filing written observations and replies.

There is no standardised methodology for quantifying cartel damages, though the approaches set out in the Commission’s Practical Guide on Quantifying Antitrust Harm in Actions for Damages (SWD(2013) 205, 11 June 2013) are commonly relied upon.

Courts are empowered, under certain conditions, to assess damages on the basis of equitable principles. In complex competition law cases, however, this approach is uncommon and is generally confined to minor ancillary aspects of the assessment or to adjustments to the court-appointed expert’s estimates.

Pursuant to Article 8(1) of Legislative Decree N. 3/2017 (implementing the EU antitrust damages directive in Italy), the limitation period to bring a claim for compensation of damages against a cartel or anti-competitive agreement is 5 years as of the infringing conduct is ceased and the claimant had a reasonable opportunity to know its essential elements, and namely: (a) the conduct and the unlawful nature; (b) the fact that it caused a damage; (c) the identity of the infringer(s). The publication of the summary of the ICA’s decision that established the infringement may typically be deemed sufficient to this end.

However, pursuant to Article 8(2) of the same law, the limitation period is suspended from the initiation of investigative actions by the ICA until one year after the decision has become final for consummation or expiration of all means of appeal (or after the investigation was otherwise closed for any reasons).

Final and interim ICA decisions may be challenged before the administrative courts, namely the Regional Administrative Court of Lazio (TAR Lazio) at first instance and the Council of State on appeal.

The grounds on which ICA decisions may be contested include: (i) violation of the law or defective reasoning; (ii) lack of competence; and (iii) excess of power. On these grounds, appellants may raise arguments concerning, for example: (i) the factual findings made by the ICA; (ii) compliance with procedural requirements; (iii) the legal characterisation of the conduct; and (iv) the level of the fine imposed. With regard to the fine, both the TAR Lazio and the Council of State have full jurisdiction to review it, meaning they may directly re-determine the amount originally set by the ICA.

Filing an appeal does not automatically suspend the enforceability of the ICA decision. Parties must comply with the decision (including by paying any fines imposed) unless they obtain a suspension order on the ground of imminent risk of irreparable harm, in which case they may be required to provide a bank guarantee.

An appeal against an ICA decision must be filed before the TAR Lazio within 60 days of the decision’s notification to the undertaking. The appeal must first be notified to the ICA and to any other interested party (e.g. the immunity recipient). Within 15 days of that notification, the appeal must then be formally filed with the TAR Lazio.

Once the TAR Lazio has scheduled the hearing on the merits, the parties may submit: (i) documents up to 20 days before the hearing; (ii) written submissions up to 15 days before the hearing; and (iii) reply briefs up to 10 days before the hearing.

Following the hearing, the TAR Lazio should deliver its judgment in a few days, theoretically with no delay, though it is also common to wait longer before the judgement is delivered. Judgments are often issued two to three months after the hearing. A longer timeframe may arise where the judgment is suspended pending a referral to the Court of Justice of the EU or an in-depth procedural investigation, both of which are uncommon.

Judgments of the TAR Lazio may be appealed to the Council of State within 30 days of notification, or within three months of publication in the absence of notification. The procedure before the Council of State follows the same rules as that before the TAR Lazio.

Council of State rulings may in principle be challenged by way of an extraordinary application for revocation before the same court for material errors on undisputed facts or arguments, or — on grounds of jurisdiction only — before the Italian Supreme Court. Both proceedings require very specific conditions to be met and are very rarely invoked or upheld in practice.

An extraordinary means of direct appeal to the President of the Italian Republic is also theoretically possible and must be lodged within 120 days of notification of the ICA decision.

In September 2025 the ICA concluded proceedings I864 concerning a cartel investigation on bio-fuel prices. The relevant affected market is that for the sale of automotive fuel and the cartel conduct occurred at the stage of petroleum logistics, where fossil fuels are stored and blended with biofuel according to relatively recent statutory obligations. The parties involved are six oil companies active in Italy in this market. The cartel concerned the coordination of the value of the biofuel component incorporated into the price of automotive fuel during the period 1 January 2020 to 30 June 2023. The investigation revealed a complex mechanism of public announcements made principally through the trade publication Staffetta Quotidiana, which both facilitated the implementation of the cartel and served as a monitoring tool enabling the parties to verify compliance with the agreed arrangements. The Authority imposed fines to each company, totalling EUR 936,659,087 in aggregate. The investigation was initiated following a whistleblower disclosure. According to the ICA, the public price announcements published in Staffetta Quotidiana provided cartel participants with precise benchmark figures for the biofuel component and constituted a price signalling and monitoring mechanism that facilitated behavioural alignment and ensured the stability of the cartel.

In October 2025, the ICA concluded, accepting commitments, proceedings I872 (MSC/Moby–GNV) concerning the market for short-sea passenger and freight Ro-Pax and Ro-Ro maritime transport on specific routes between Genoa and Civitavecchia and the northern ports of Sardinia, as well as on the Naples–Palermo route. The proceedings were initiated against SAS Shipping Agencies Services Sàrl (SAS), Moby S.p.A. and Grandi Navi Veloci S.p.A. (GNV, a subsidiary of SAS). The Authority took the view that, in concentrated markets characterised by high barriers to entry, the creation of a strong structural link between Moby and GNV — arising from SAS’s acquisition of a 49% stake in Moby and from a substantial loan granted by SAS to Moby — could have facilitated the coordination of the two companies’ commercial policies, with potential adverse effects on capacity and pricing, in breach of Article 101 TFEU. The proceedings were closed without a finding of infringement since the ICA accepted binding commitments offered by the parties, comprising: the divestiture to Onorato Armatori of SAS’s 49% shareholding in Moby; the waiver of the pledge over the remaining 51% of Moby’s shares; repayment of the loan through a competitive sale of a vessel portfolio; and a monetary reimbursement to customers on the affected routes. This case is notable because it is a first in Italy targeting pure structural links through minority shareholdings and financing relationship between competitors in the context of a pure Article 101 investigation, leading to structural remedies (albeit by means of a commitment decision).

On 17 March 2026, the ICA closed proceedings I876 finding that Morellato S.p.A. had implemented a vertical agreement restricting competition, in violation of Article 101(1) TFEU, having as its object the fixing of resale prices and the prohibition on the use of marketplaces and third-party intermediation platforms within its selective distribution system. A fine of €25,895,043 was imposed on Morellato for the RPM practice, which was found to constitute a hardcore restriction within the meaning of the VBER, rendering the block exemption inapplicable to the entire agreement, including the marketplace restriction. The latter restriction was found to be strictly linked and functional to the RPM conduct, however it was also assed individually and separately from the RPM conduct as a by effect restriction, finding it was in breach of Article 101(1) and unlikely to meet the conditions for individual exemption under Article 101(3) because it was applied discriminatorily, in contrast with the Metro criteria, thus ineligible for the application of the Coty safe harbour. Noteworthy, the ICA relied on an email exchange between the CEO and the head of legal of Morellato expressing disbelief that the marketplace ban could fall within the Coty safe harbour, on which Morellato sought to rely. However, the ICA acknowledged it was a first case of finding of infringement with respect to a marketplace restriction in the context of selective distribution and thus only calculated the fine with respect to the RPM conduct.

On April 15, 2026 the ICA imposed a fine totalling 23,298,147 euro on snacks producers Amica Chips S.p.A. (8,239,210 euro), Pata S.p.A. (7,555,387 euro) and Preziosi Food S.p.A. (7,503,550 euro) for a single, complex and continuous market-sharing cartel in relation to the supply of savoury snacks manufactured on behalf of large-scale retailers and sold through the latter’s own distribution network as private label products, by coordinating their respective commercial strategies. The Authority applied its leniency guidelines and granted Pata and Amica Chips a reduction in fines, considering the evidence they provided, which was significant in establishing the infringement.  Moreover, the ICA resorted to the settlement procedure under article 14-quater of Law 287 of 10 October 1990 for the first time. The successful outcome of that procedure resulted in a further reduction in fines for all three companies.

Key recent trends

In 2025, the ICA concluded a total of 6 investigations under Article 101 TFEU (and national equivalent). Out of the total 6 concluded investigations, 2 were closed with a finding of infringement (and a fine), 2 were closed with the imposition of binding commitments (and no fines), and 2 were closed without any finding of infringement or binding commitments. The 2 cases of sanctioned cartels concerned the oil industry and the steel & metallurgy industry, totalling fines of €1,006,921,425.

Main developments in the field of cartel enforcement in Italy concern the targeting of structural links and minority shareholdings (see case I872 illustrated above) and the increased severity in sanctioning vertical restrictions within selective distribution systems, with a focus on RPM conduct and online restrictions (see case I876 above).

Key expected developments over the next 12 months

A key area of investigation and intervention in 2026 (and onwards) may be the use of price signalling and other sophisticated and automated systems to monitor and align prices with competitors or distributors, e.g. by means of algorithms and tracking software to this purpose. Further, relationships and agreements in the supply chain of products or services in industries affecting sustainability, green transition and energy prices (e.g. EV recharging; transports; agri-food; waste management) are likely to be closely scrutinized by the ICA. Besides, restrictive agreements and concerted practices in the pharmaceuticals and healthcare services as well as in the energy and telecommunications will remain areas of prioritized intervention going forward.

Notably, the ICA is currently carrying out sector-wide inquiries in (i) large-scale retail distribution and agri-food supply chain (investigation opened in December 2025); (ii) quantum computing (investigation opened in March 2026).