Mexico’s competition law regime prohibits cartel agreements through a combination of constitutional mandate, statutory prohibition, and dual administrative-criminal enforcement. While the substantive rules governing cartel conduct have remained largely stable, the 2024 constitutional reform and the 2025 amendments to the Federal Economic Competition Law (FECL) have significantly transformed the institutional and procedural landscape.

The prohibition of cartel conduct in Mexico is rooted in Article 28 of the Political Constitution of the United Mexican States (Constitution), which establishes a broad ban on monopolies and anticompetitive conduct, expressly including agreements, arrangements or information exchanges that have the object or effect to restrict competition. Cartels, defined under Mexican antitrust law as absolute monopolistic practices, are considered inherently harmful to the market and prohibited per se, without the need for a case-by-case assessment of effects or efficiencies.

Article 28 of the Constitution further provides grounds for the imposition of administrative sanctions and criminal liability, thereby anchoring cartel enforcement within a dual-track system. Although the 2024 constitutional reform did not alter the substantive prohibition of cartel conduct, it fundamentally reshaped the architecture of the Mexican competition regime, including its competition authority. This included shifting from having a constitutionally autonomous competition agency, the Federal Economic Competition Commission (COFECE) created by the 2013reform, to the National Antitrust Commission (CNA or Commission), a decentralized body of the Ministry of Economics.

The FECL operationalizes this constitutional prohibition and constitutes the primary legislative instrument governing cartel conduct. As mentioned, under the statute, cartel agreements are defined as absolute monopolistic practices, encompassing conduct such as price fixing, output or supply restrictions, market allocation and bid rigging. These practices are treated as hardcore infringements subject to strict liability, reflecting the presumption that such conduct invariably harms competition.

The FECL also provides for a comprehensive sanctions regime that has been strengthened under the 2025 reform. Administrative fines, calculated as a percentage of the infringing firm’s turnover, have been increased from a maximum of 10% to 15%, and additional enforcement measures include the disqualification of individuals involved in the conduct from participating in public procurement. Civil liability mechanisms, which existed before the reform allow affected parties to seek damages reinforcing the deterrent effect of public enforcement. In this sense, the CNA may file class actions and represent consumers allegedly harmed by anticompetitive conduct.

In parallel, cartel conduct constitutes a criminal offense under the Federal Criminal Code. Individuals may be subject to imprisonment and criminal fines. Criminal proceedings may commence upon the complaint of the CNA’s Investigative Authority to the Federal General Attorney’s Office (FGR), thereby reinforcing the complementary nature of administrative and criminal enforcement.

Alongside these mechanisms, Mexico maintains a leniency program designed to incentivize self-reporting and the proactive detection of cartel conduct. The 2025 reform introduces new rules that govern eligibility and potential fine reductions depending on the timeliness of the application.
At the same time, the reform expanded private enforcement by allowing claimants to initiate damages actions once the competition authority has issued a decision, even if it is possible to challenge it, thereby lowering procedural barriers and likely increasing follow-on litigation, including collective actions.

A further distinctive feature introduced by the reform concerns the treatment of certain state-owned enterprises. The amended framework establishes that the activities carried out by such entities, particularly those operating in constitutionally defined strategic sectors, such as hydrocarbons and electricity, are not considered monopolies for purposes of competition law, as they are equated to functions reserved to the State.

A new category under Mexican law exists for Petróleos Mexicanos (PEMEX) and the Comisión Federal de Electricidad (CFE), as “public enterprises” effectively placing them outside antitrust scrutiny. This limits the application of competition rules to their activities and reinforces the constitutional distinction between competitive markets and strategic areas exclusively controlled by the State.

In addition, key changes introduced by the reform are institutional rather than substantive in the context of Mexican antitrust law. Prior to 2025, cartel enforcement fell within the mandate of to two constitutionally autonomous authorities, COFECE, with jurisdiction over most sectors, and the Federal Telecommunications Institute (IFT), responsible for telecommunications and broadcasting.

The reform abolished this dual system and replaced it with a single authority, the CNA. The CNA is vested with comprehensive jurisdiction across all sectors of the economy, including those previously overseen by the IFT. This institutional shift entails the centralization of enforcement powers in a single authority, the loss of constitutional autonomy, and the expansion of investigative and sanctioning powers, including more robust tools for evidence gathering and streamlined procedures with shorter timelines for investigations and adjudication. Despite this institutional overhaul, the core substantive framework governing cartel conduct remains unchanged. The FECL continues to treat cartels as per se violations.

In its current form, Article 28 of the Constitution and the FECL continue to provide a robust legal basis for prohibiting and sanctioning cartel conduct, while the 2025 reform marks a decisive transition toward centralized enforcement under the CNA.

Cartel conduct is defined through the statutory category of absolute monopolistic practices, as set out in the FECL, which gives concrete expression to the constitutional prohibition contained in Article 28 of the Constitution. Rather than employing the term “cartel” as an autonomous legal concept, the legislation adopts a functional approach, identifying a closed list of horizontal agreements and concerted practices between competing undertakings, or as defined under Mexican law as economic agents, that are deemed inherently anticompetitive and therefore unlawful per se. This classification reflects a legislative presumption that such conduct, by its very nature, suppresses the competitive process and harms consumer welfare, dispensing with the need for a detailed analysis of market effects or efficiencies.

Within this framework, absolute monopolistic practices encompass agreements, contracts, arrangements, combinations or information exchange between current or potential competitors with the purpose or effect of fixing, raising, coordinating or manipulating prices; restricting or limiting the production, processing, distribution or commercialization of goods or services; dividing, allocating or segmenting markets by customers, suppliers, territories or time periods; and coordinating or manipulating bids in public or private procurement procedures.

Following the reform information exchanges is particularly significant, as it extends liability beyond explicit agreements to more tacit forms of coordination, provided that the exchange reduces strategic uncertainty in a manner that enables or reinforces collusion. Moreover, an additional dimension is included to cover not only actual or current competitors but also potential competitors. These concepts are pending definition in forthcoming secondary regulations.

The FECL makes clear that liability may arise not only from formal contracts but also from informal arrangements, tacit understandings or any form of coordinated conduct that reveals a concurrence of wills among competitors. In this sense, the concept of agreement is interpreted expansively, encompassing both explicit and implicit coordination, and focusing on the economic reality of the interaction rather than its legal form. At the same time, the requirement that the conduct take place between actual or potential competitors underscores the horizontal nature of cartel behaviour, distinguishing it from vertical restraints or unilateral conduct, which are assessed under different legal standards.

A defining characteristic of cartel conduct under Mexican law is its treatment as a per se infringement as mentioned. Once the existence of an agreement or coordinated practice falling within one of the statutory categories is established, the authority is not required to demonstrate anticompetitive effects, market power or consumer harm. Nor are defendants permitted to invoke efficiency justifications or procompetitive benefits as a defence.

Finally, the definition of cartel conduct must be understood in conjunction with the broader enforcement framework, which attaches severe administrative and criminal consequences to participation in such practices. The classification of these behaviours as absolute monopolistic practices signals their status as the most serious infringements of competition law, justifying heightened sanctions, the availability of leniency mechanisms to detect and destabilize them, and the possibility of follow-on civil liability. In this way, the legal definition of a cartel in Mexico is not merely descriptive but also normative, reflecting a clear policy choice to treat horizontal collusion as conduct that is inherently incompatible with the constitutional commitment to free and competitive markets.

Consistent with the characterization of cartel conduct under Mexican law as absolute monopolistic practices, the establishment of an infringement does not require proof of actual effects on the market. This follows directly from the per se nature of the prohibition derived from the CNA’s and the federal courts’ interpretation of article 28 of the Constitution and the FECL, under which, as stated previously, certain forms of horizontal coordination are deemed inherently anticompetitive. As a result, once conduct falls within one of the statutory categories, such as the ones mentioned in the previous answer, the legal inquiry does not extend to an assessment of its actual or potential impact on market outcomes.

In line with the definition of cartels as agreements, concerted practices between competitors that reveal a collusive object, the evidentiary burden rests on demonstrating the existence of coordination and its correspondence with one of the prohibited forms of conduct. The CNA, following the 2025 reform, is not required to establish that the conduct produced measurable effects such as increased prices, reduced output, or diminished consumer welfare, nor to engage in a counterfactual analysis of competitive conditions. Similarly, there is no requirement to define the relevant market or prove market power as a condition for liability in the context of absolute monopolistic practices.

This strict approach also precludes using efficiency justifications or procompetitive defences, as the legal framework presumes that the practices in question are, by their very nature, harmful to the competitive process. The absence of an effects-based inquiry thus reflects a normative judgment embedded in the legislation, according to which the mere existence of the agreement is sufficient to distort competition. In this sense, the concept of “object” operates as the central criterion for establishing liability, aligning the Mexican regime with the specific treatment of hardcore cartels in other leading jurisdictions.

Accordingly, and in continuity with the definition of cartels as per se unlawful forms of coordination, Mexican competition law maintains that the existence of the agreement itself is both necessary and sufficient to establish an infringement, rendering proof of actual effects on the market unnecessary even under the post-reform framework.

The territorial reach of the regime is not confined to conducts that occur within national borders. Rather, the FECL adopts an effects-based approach to jurisdiction, under which the law applies to acts, agreements or practices that, although executed wholly or partially abroad, produce or can produce effects within the Mexican territory. This principle reflects the economic nature of competition law enforcement, which prioritizes the impact of conduct on domestic markets over the geographic location of the parties involved or the place where the agreement was concluded.

Accordingly, the CNA may investigate, and sanction cartel conduct undertaken outside Mexico if it may have actual or potential effects on competition in Mexican markets. This includes, for example, international price-fixing arrangements, bid-rigging schemes involving cross-border procurement, or coordination among foreign competitors that influences prices, output or market conditions in Mexico. A key consideration is to assess whether the conduct has the object or effect of restricting competition within Mexico, rather than where the conduct formally occurred.

This extraterritorial application is expressly contemplated in the FECL and has been consistently recognized in enforcement practice, aligning Mexico with other major jurisdictions that apply competition law based on the “effects doctrine.” In practical terms, this allows the authority to assert jurisdiction over foreign firms, provided that due process requirements are met and that there is a demonstrable connection between the conduct and the Mexican market. Investigative tools such as information requests, cooperation with foreign competition authorities, and the use of leniency applications further support the effective enforcement of the law in cross-border scenarios.

The 2025 reform does not alter this jurisdictional principle but may enhance its practical reach through the consolidation of enforcement powers within a single authority and the strengthening of investigative mechanisms. In particular, the centralized structure of the CNA and its expanded powers may facilitate coordination with international counterparts and streamline the pursuit of complex, multi-jurisdictional cartel cases. At the same time, the increased emphasis on private enforcement may expose foreign undertakings to follow-on damages actions in Mexico where their conduct has affected domestic markets.

In line with the institutional reconfiguration introduced by the 2024 constitutional reform and the subsequent 2025 amendments to the FECL, and as mentioned in previous sections, the competent authority to investigate cartel conduct in Mexico is the CNA.

Under the current framework, the CNA is vested with comprehensive powers to investigate, prosecute and sanction absolute monopolistic practices across all markets. Within the CNA, investigations are conducted by its Investigative Authority, an administrative unit with functional separation from the decision-making body, thereby preserving a degree of internal procedural autonomy between the investigative and adjudicative stages.

The investigative powers of the CNA are extensive and have been further strengthened by the 2025 reform. These powers include the ability to conduct unannounced inspections (dawn raids), request information and documents from companies, summon individuals for testimony, and employ various evidentiary tools aimed at detecting and substantiating cartel conduct. The authority may also rely on information obtained through the leniency program, which continues to serve as a key mechanism for detecting collusive arrangements. In addition, the CNA is empowered to cooperate with other domestic authorities and international competition agencies in cases involving cross-border conduct, reflecting the increasingly global nature of cartel enforcement.

Although the CNA is the primary authority responsible for investigating cartels, its actions may intersect with the Federal General Attorney. As mentioned, once the Investigative Authority collects sufficient evidence of an alleged cartel conduct, it may refer the matter to the FGR for the initiation of criminal proceedings against the individuals involved, in accordance with the Federal Criminal Code. This underscores the complementary relationship between administrative and criminal enforcement in the Mexican system, while preserving the CNA’s central role in the investigative phase.

There are three main sources for competition authorities to learn of potential cartel conduct: i) Formal complaints, ii) Leniency applications, and iii) Proactive detection.

Formal complaints have specific procedural and substantial requirements under the FECL that need to be satisfied for the Investigative Authority to decide to start a cartel investigation. These include providing elements that sustain the existence of the potential collusive agreement and that the parties engaging in the suspected agreement are competitors. If these requirements are not met, the complaint may be dismissed.

Leniency applications, described previously, are a key tool for Investigative Authority to start ex officio investigations. In this sense, any undertaking that may have engaged in a cartel may approach the Investigative Authority and request leniency from criminal liability and a reduced fine.

Additionally, the Investigative Authority has developed its proactive detection capabilities during the last decade, resulting in an increased number of ex officio investigations. The Intelligence General Directorate monitors priority markets identified as such by CNA under its Strategic Plan. This unit leverages a combination of data science, economic analysis, tactical-operational intelligence, technology and strategic market analysis to detect indications of anticompetitive conduct that would result in probable cause to start an investigation.

Referring to cartels, these may result from applying screening (both behavioural and structural) to datasets to identify flags of suspected collusive conduct. These may be related to price-specific patterns, for example, similar or exact prices of goods and services, or non-pricing factors, such as the behaviour of undertakings in relation with their competitors.

It is important to note that most of the competition agencies at this stage have pursued strengthening their proactive detection capabilities, with most results being notable in areas or markets that have a good degree of availability and quality of publicly available information. Thus, the sectors in which detection work has been effective are mostly in public procurement or regulated activities with public information.

Some other detection tools may include data and tech-based mechanisms to monitor market behaviour by gathering, processing and analysing large volumes of information. In addition, the CNA also has an anonymous reporting mailbox which allows the public to reach out to the competition agency and provide leads on potential anticompetitive conduct without the need to file a formal complaint.

As it was the case with the former COFECE, it is possible to consider that the focus of ex officio enforcement work will be related with specific sectors that are deemed as strategic.

It is also possible that information that ensues from different proceedings at CNA can lead to cartel cases. For example, if during a merger review or an economic study there are indications of possible collusion, these are referred to the Investigative Authority for its consideration.

It could be argued that there is a significant degree of discretion by Investigative Authority in determining on which cases it exercises its investigative powers related to ex officio enforcement. Even though the Strategic Plan is supposed to provide some degree of guidance for proactive enforcement work, there is no publicly available guidance for the selection of cases under this approach.

For the Investigative Authority to exercise its powers it must have a probable cause (causa objetiva) which provides a reasonable indication of the existence of a cartel under Article 53 of the FECL. In this sense, the Investigative Authority must have at least preliminary signs of an anticompetitive agreement (written, oral, or otherwise) between competitors aimed at or with the effect of fixing prices, restricting supply, segmenting markets, coordinating in public tenders or exchanging information for such purposes.

After the previous stage, the Investigative Authority formally conducts the process under the following rules:

• Investigations for cartel conduct can last up to four periods of maximum 120 business days each, potentially reaching 480 business days for a single proceeding.
• After issuing the formal commencement of the investigation through a non-public document known as Acuerdo de Inicio, the proceedings will be kept confidential for the first period. At the beginning of the second period, the Investigative Authority publishes an extract providing general details on the market subject to investigation on the Official Gazette of the Federation.
• Throughout the investigation, the Investigative Authority can use different tools that range from dawn raids, information requirements, compulsory interviews, inspections, among others, to gather both direct and indirect evidence that proves the existence of the cartel. It is important to highlight that at this stage, the Investigative Authority will not indict and adjudicate any responsibility for alleged conduct.

Once the Investigative Authority decides to close the investigation it will order its formal conclusion (Acuerdo de Conclusión) and if determine there is sufficient evidence on the existence of the cartel, it will issue a Statement of Probable Responsibility (SPR or Dictamen de Probable Responsabilidad). In this case, the SPR will be presented to the Board of Commissioners for the next stage in the process, which is the trial-like process (PSFJ). On the contrary, it will issue a statement proposing the close of the investigation due to the lack of sufficient evidence.

During the trial-like phase in which the accused undertakings and, if any, the individuals, identified as alleged offenders are formally notified of the charges and granted access to the file of evidence. They are given the opportunity to defend themselves by submitting arguments and additional evidence and may also be heard in an oral hearing.

After the specific procedural stages of the trial-like process take place, the Board of Commissioners will deliberate and issue a final resolution, either finding an infringement and imposing sanctions or closing the case if evidence is insufficient. The entire process can be lengthy, as complex cartel cases often take one to two years from initiation to final decision, given the extensive fact-finding and procedural safeguards.

It is relevant to highlight that throughout the investigation, there is a statute of limitations of sorts: the CNA cannot initiate an investigation more than 10 years after the cartel conduct ceased.

The recent reforms to Mexican antitrust law have been characterized by granting enhanced investigative powers to the competition authority. In some cases, these powers are comparable to those used by law enforcement agencies in other fields. Key investigative tools include:

• Requests for information and documents

The Investigative Authority can compel any person or entity (companies, executives, third parties) to submit relevant information, such as emails, business records, data and communications. These requests are legally enforceable, and non-compliance can lead to fines for obstruction. Importantly, the CNA’s jurisdiction to gather evidence extends to foreign entities if the information is necessary – the FECL explicitly allows the Investigative Authority to seek assistance from or request documents through foreign authorities. In some cases, there are collaboration agreements in place between agencies that facilitate implementing coordination in the use of investigative powers. Multinational companies under investigation often face parallel requests in multiple jurisdictions.

It is also possible for the agency to request submissions of relevant digital files in case these were not successfully collected during dawn raids (see below). The rise of messaging apps and remote work has presented challenges which have been solved by CNA by acquiring devices and requesting individuals to provide information held in external servers. Failure to comply with an information request or any attempt to obstruct access to data can result in procedural sanctions such as fines.

• Dawn raids

Perhaps CNA’s most powerful tool is the ability to conduct surprise on-site searches of business premises to copy information, in both digital and physical formats, that could be used as evidence of a cartel. The system provided by the FECL, specifically Article 75, allows the Head of the Investigative Authority to issue the dawn raid order and conduct it without the need for a court warrant.

With the relevant dawn raid order, Investigative Authority officers can enter and search the premises of the companies subject to investigation. During the raid, investigators can access any physical space (office, files) or digital storage (computers, servers, and other media) to copy information relevant for the investigation. The officers may also ask employees or representatives of the company questions on matters useful for their investigation.

Since 2014, the Investigative Authority has been using IT forensics to gather relevant information from digital devices. There are different methods and tools for such purposes. For example, acquiring full forensic images of hard drives or other devices, a bit-to-bit copy, by using software or hardware-based methods. It is also possible to acquire just relevant files or information stored in digital devices by generating a partial forensic copy.

During the last decade, the Investigative Authority has enhanced its capabilities to acquire digital information during dawn raids from diverse types of infrastructure arrangements. This may even include the possibility of accessing information stored remotely, both on servers and offsite computers, when there is a connection from the premises covered by the dawn raid order. For instance, if employees use cloud-based email or document services, CNA may copy those materials during the raid.

However, the law places some limits. CNA cannot seize original documents or devices, nor can they detain individuals during a dawn raid. Despite an existing provision within FECL that refers to the possibility of ordering administrative arrests, there is no specific guidance that has been given on the matter nor any previous situation in which CNA has successfully used this tool.

It is important to highlight that dawn raids must relate to the investigation’s defined scope – only evidence relevant to the suspected cartel should be collected not of any conduct or matter of interest-. It is also worth noting that dawn raids have been one of the most important investigative tools for CNA, since it provides the agency with the possibility of acquiring direct evidence to determine the probable existence of a cartel.

• Compulsory interviews and testimony:

During an investigation, the Investigative Authority can summon individuals (such as company executives, employees, or other witnesses) to appear and give testimony under oath. These compulsory interviews allow the antitrust agency to question people about facts and documents gathered throughout the investigation.

Interviewees must answer truthfully or face penalties for making false statements. While interrogations usually occur in person at CNA’s offices, in recent times they can be arranged virtually as well if formalities are observed. FECL empowers the Commission to take sworn statements, which can be crucial firsthand evidence of a cartel’s operation. Usually, the strategy used by the agency includes a combination of gathering potential evidence in digital documents of the cartel and then confronting individuals during these interviews with the findings. Thus, there is a complementary approach to the use of both tools.

The Investigative Authority’s investigative toolkit is quite broad, enabling it to find indications and evidence even in well-hidden cartels. The agency has become increasingly adept at using these powers over the past decade. In addition, there have been major developments during the last 3 to 5 years due to the expanding use of economic and data analytics in ongoing cartel cases as in Mexico there is also the possibility to sustain a cartel allegation by using indirect evidence.

Through investigations, CNA must respect the attorney-client privilege, which covers communications between a company and, only, its external lawyers. Historically, Mexican law did not expressly codify attorney-client privilege in competition cases, but the extinct COFECE issued guidelines and regulatory provisions to protect privileged documents.

Nevertheless, since the 2025 reform the protection to legal privilege is enshrined directly in Mexican antitrust law. This means that if during a dawn raid documents are identified as attorney-client communications, the law mandates the CNA to exclude them from the evidence file until a specific qualification of the nature of the document to confirm whether it may be considered as privileged is conducted.

Companies can invoke the privilege to withhold or seal documents that contain legal advice. The onus is on the company to assert privilege when a document is collected. In case of disputes, courts have reinforced that privileged documents should not be accessed by CNA’s investigators.

It bears noting, however, that legal privilege has its limitations under FECL. One key element with noting is that communications with in-house lawyers are not covered by legal privilege, only external legal advice. Factual business communications (even if copied to a lawyer) are not protected, the privilege must cover actual legal counsel.

Full leniency (immunity from fines and class actions brought by CNA, and disqualification and criminal liability for individuals) is available to the first cartel member that applies for said benefit. Under the reformed framework, the company must provide the Investigative Authority with sufficient evidence to allow to initiate an investigation.

Typically, this means revealing the cartel’s participants, activities, and relevant records (emails, meeting notes, etc.). The applicant must also cease involvement in the cartel immediately and commit to ongoing full cooperation. The latter, unless the Investigative Authority instructs the applicant to continue in the alleged conduct to collect additional relevant elements.

A formal admission of wrongdoing is inherent in the process – the applicant confesses its participation (although legally the admission is contained in confidential leniency statements). The timing is important: to get full leniency, the immunity applicant must come in before an investigation has begun, if no one else has already applied. Unlike some jurisdictions, Mexico does not bar leniency just because an investigation is underway; the first applicant can still get immunity so long as they beat their co-conspirators to apply for leniency.

As mentioned, other cartel participants who are not first applicants can still benefit from reduced fines, immunity from class actions brought by CNA, and, for individuals, disqualification and criminal liability. The FECL program provides a sliding scale of fine reductions for the maximum applicable in the following order: the second applicant may get up to a 50% reduction, the third up to 30%, and later ones up to 20%.

To qualify, each subsequent applicant must provide “added value” evidence beyond what CNA already has. In practice, once one applicant has laid out the core evidence, later applicants often supplement it with additional documents or testimony strengthening the case or broadening the understanding of the cartel’s scope. They too must cease their conduct and cooperate fully.

It is important to note that subsequent applications must be submitted before the publication of Investigative Authority’s determination extending the investigation period for the third time.

CNA operates a marker system, allowing an applicant to reserve their place in line. An applicant can approach the Investigative Authority’s leniency contact (via phone or email to a dedicated contact in the Cartels General Directorate) and request a marker indicating their intention to apply. If granted, the applicant then has a brief period to gather information and perfect the application. This system helps because it can be a tight race between conspirators once one leaks. The aforesaid leniency point of contact is available 24/7 and keeps the identity of applicants strictly confidential.

The application itself can be made in writing or orally and must contain basic details of the cartel and evidence. From that point, the CNA will typically interview the applicant and review evidence in proffer sessions. A conditional leniency determination is then signed, laying out the obligations of the applicant.

To qualify for the leniency programme, the applicant must acknowledge its participation in the cartel and cease the conduct, unless the Investigative Authority expressly requires continued participation temporarily to gather evidence (with a formal determination).

It should also provide all relevant documents and evidence timely and truthfully, including any additional information that becomes available. Also, there is a prohibition on falsifying, destroying or hiding evidence.

The applicant must facilitate the cooperation of related persons (individuals or entities) within the same economic interest group. Lastly, during the trial-like phase, applicants must not deny their participation, must present further evidence if useful, and allow procedural actions by authorities.

Moreover, if cooperating entity or individual fails to cooperate, the Board of Commissioners may revoke the conditional leniency removing the benefits of the program for that person. Regarding confidentiality, as a rule both the Commission and applicants are required to maintain confidentiality throughout the process, including the actual application and documents submitted.

A significant feature of Mexico’s leniency system is that it covers criminal liability for individuals as well. Cartel conduct in Mexico can lead to criminal charges (imprisonment of 5 to 10 years) for the individuals involved, under the Federal Criminal Code.

Recognizing that this threat could deter companies and especially individuals from coming forward, the law provides that all leniency applicants (first-in and even subsequent ones) receive immunity from criminal prosecution.

In practice, this means if a company obtains leniency, the individuals from that company who admit involvement will not be referred for prosecution. Even second or subsequent applicants’ cooperating individuals are protected from criminal charges – an important incentive for them to cooperate rather than stay silent out of fear of jail.

As previously mentioned, the CNA coordinates with the FGR to ensure that leniency beneficiaries are not criminally prosecuted. Indeed, since 2014, the requirement of a final resolution for criminal action was removed, giving the CNA more flexibility to refer cases early, but it also strengthened the need to assure leniency applicants will not be prosecuted.

The former COFECE filed only a couple of criminal complaints for cartels, and those did not involve leniency applicants. At this stage in Mexico there have not been any convictions resulting from these criminal complaints and the matters are still in progress at the FGR.

Unlike some jurisdictions, FECL does not have a settlement or plea-bargaining procedure for cartel cases that allows an investigated party to simply admit liability and obtain a reduced penalty. The concept of a negotiated settlement (short of full leniency) is absent in CNA’s cartel enforcement. The FECL explicitly prohibits cartels and treats them as void and subject to sanction, leaving no room for a consensual resolution other than through leniency. In fact, the law provides only one route to avoid a sanction in a cartel case, which is the leniency program explained above.

Mexican antitrust law does not provide mechanisms to expedite the Commission’s final decision or offer a settlement procedure. Therefore, if the CNA deems it necessary, the full investigation and trial-like procedure must be completed before a final resolution is issued. Moreover, the Mexican competition agency cannot conclude a cartel investigation by accepting commitments or entering a settlement agreement as it is possible before European or US authorities. This is different in abuse of dominance cases, where the CNA may negotiate commitments to resolve the investigation without a finding of liability, subject to certain conditions. However, such commitments are not available in cases involving cartels.

This reflects the gravity of cartels and the fact that these are considered to be harmful to competition per se. Therefore, having a formal decision and resulting sanctions, if the conduct is proven, is required to ensure deterrence. Parties to a cartel investigation therefore have a binary choice: either fight the case or confess through leniency (if they are eligible and early enough). There is no intermediate settlement procedure to simply agree on the facts and receive a negotiated fine discount outside the leniency context.

As mentioned earlier, Mexico does not have a legal mechanism for settlement or plea bargaining in cartel cases. The FECL does not permit parties to negotiate reduced fines or avoid a full infringement decision through admission of liability. As such, the only structured avenue for mitigating liability is through the leniency programme, which operates under a separate legal framework and is available only under strict conditions.

The absence of a settlement mechanism imposes certain procedural and strategic consequences. On the one hand, the CNA’s decisions result in detailed public resolutions, that reinforce deterrence and aim to create binding legal precedents. Each case culminates in a formal, reasoned decision, which promotes transparency and avoids any perception of backroom deals or selective enforcement. This can enhance institutional credibility and public confidence in the agency’s independence and rigour.

However, the absence of a settlement mechanism also presents significant challenges. For both the CNA and the investigated parties, the process can be lengthy and resource intensive. Companies under investigation must engage in a full defence, incurring significant legal costs and operational disruption, even where they might otherwise be willing to acknowledge wrongdoing.

The CNA, in turn, must devote substantial resources to prosecute each case through to its conclusion—an issue that has become more pressing in light of recent budgetary constraints. Moreover, without a settlement, there is no procedural pathway to achieve early resolution or procedural economy. Investigated firms also face heightened exposure to follow-on private damages claims, as the final infringement decision will typically contain detailed factual and legal findings that may assist civil claimants.

The former COFECE was characterized by actively cooperating with other authorities both domestically and internationally. The CNA is expected to continue with this trend leveraging domestic and international cooperation facilitated by statutory provisions, enforcement cooperation, and formal agreements. In addition, the FECL authorizes the Investigative Authority to request assistance or information from any other public agency (federal or local) that may help its investigation.

In cartel cases, this often means working with sector regulators, procurement authorities, or law enforcement bodies. For example, the former COFECE had memoranda of understanding with agencies like the Ministry of Economy, the Central Bank, the Consumer Protection Agency, among other local and federal government agencies. Under the new structure, the CNA has started to establish agreements of similar nature with relevant authorities.

Through these MOUs, the Mexican antitrust authority can obtain data or expertise (such as market statistics, audit reports, or market monitoring findings) to support its investigations. A concrete illustration is the former COFECE’s coordination with the now extinct Ministry of Public Administration (Secretaría de la Función Pública) to tackle bid-rigging in government contracts an agreement that in 2019 established protocols for sharing information on suspicious procurement patterns.

Similarly, the CNA may rely on the Federal Audit Office or other oversight bodies to flag collusion risks in public spending. During dawn raids, the CNA has the legal power to request police support to ensure safety and to secure premises.

In the global aspect, cartels frequently transcend borders, and the CNA has developed solid cooperation frameworks with foreign competition authorities. Mexico is a party to cooperation agreements via trade deals like USMCA (formerly NAFTA) and other bilateral accords that include competition chapters. Under these agreements, continued by the CNA, the Mexican antitrust agency exchanges information and coordinates with counterparts, particularly the United States (US) Department of Justice (DOJ), Federal Trade Commission (FTC), and Canada’s Competition Bureau.

In global cartel investigations the Mexican competition authority has liaised with the DOJ and the Competition and Markets Authority (UK). While Mexican law allows sharing confidential information with foreign enforcers only with appropriate safeguards (often requiring waivers from leniency applicants or parties due to confidentiality rules), in practice, companies involved in multi-jurisdictional cartels often grant such waivers so that authorities can coordinate.

This can lead to coordinated leniency: a company might apply for leniency in several countries around the same time. The CNA recognises leniency markers from other jurisdictions as a prompt to act quickly, for example, if a cartel is detected in the U.S. and it affected Mexico, the CNA would expect a leniency application soon or might proactively reach out through liaison channels.

The CNA is also an active member of the International Competition Network (ICN) and the OECD’s Competition Committee, through which it exchanges enforcement techniques and experiences. In fact, the current CNA Chairwoman, Andrea Marván, was unanimously elected to serve as Chair of the ICN for the 2026-2028 period.

These forums promote convergence on cartel enforcement practices. Informally, CNA officials maintain relationships with colleagues in Europe, South America, and Asia, which can be useful if a cartel investigation requires informal information exchange (subject to legal boundaries). For instance, the former COFECE coordinated with authorities in several countries during the investigation of an international maritime transportation cartel (car carrier cartel), ensuring a degree of consistency in approach.

On the other hand, when a cartel has been sanctioned in other jurisdictions, Mexican antitrust law does not automatically excuse it in Mexico, as it each jurisdiction’s enforcement is independent. However, a settlement or leniency in another country can indirectly assist the CNA. If a firm settled in the EU or the US, it might have admitted facts that the Mexican antitrust agency could later use.

Moreover, companies often opt to apply for leniency in Mexico if they have done so elsewhere, to maximize global protection. The CNA will generally treat a foreign leniency (or settlement) as no bar to its own action, the company must apply for leniency separately in Mexico.

Cartel conduct, once established by CNA, carries severe administrative penalties. The reformed FECL enables the authority to impose a fine of up to 15% of the annual revenue of the given company for incurring in a cartel.

This cap is calculated based on the company income, typically its turnover in the year prior to the resolution. In practice, the CNA will assess the harm and size of the cartel to set the fine, but it cannot exceed 15% of each company’s annual turnover. In addition, individuals (such as managers or directors) who participated in the cartel on behalf of a company can be fined up to an amount indexed to currency, equal to 300,000 times the Measurement and Updating Unit (UMA).

The CNA also has the power to impose disqualification sanctions on individuals: an executive who engaged in cartel behaviour can be banned from serving as a director or officer of any company for up to 5 years. This disqualification is an additional penalty meant to personally deter corporate decision-makers. Although used sparingly so far, it signals to executives that their career may be on the line if they collude.

For recidivists, the FECL allows even harsher measures: if a firm repeats a cartel offence, the fine can be double the normal percentage (i.e. 30% of turnover) and even the CNA can order the divestiture of assets if needed to eliminate market power. Even though the CNA’s fines in practice vary depending on factors like the duration of the cartel, the damage caused, the market share of participants, and any mitigating or aggravating circumstances.

However, in many domestic cartels (especially those involving smaller enterprises), fines have been more modest – often a few tens of millions of pesos – reflecting the smaller size of those actors and markets. The law’s 15% cap has not yet truly been tested against a giant multinational in a large market; one could imagine, for instance, if a tech or energy cartel were found, the 15% of a huge turnover would be enormous, but so far cases have been more moderate in scope.

On top of administrative penalties, individuals who participate in a cartel may face criminal exposure under Article 254 bis of the Federal Criminal Code. This provision makes collusion a crime punishable by 5 to 10 years in prison for individuals who enter, order or execute a cartel agreement Fines under the Criminal Code can also be imposed (ranging from 1,000 to 10,000 times the UMA) but the prison term is the more consequential aspect. As it has been mentioned, criminal enforcement in Mexico requires a separate process: CNA must formally refer the case to the FGR after it has sufficient evidence, usually around the time it issues the Statement of Probable Responsibility.

The FGR then conducts its own investigation and prosecution in the criminal courts. Because of this two-track system, criminal sanctions have been extremely rare. In fact, since criminalization was introduced in 2011, the extinct COFECE has only referred to three cases, two of them related to bid-rigging in public health sector tenders, for criminal prosecution and none has yet resulted in a completed criminal verdict.

This shows that while the threat of imprisonment is in books, and can be a deterrent in theory, enforcement has primarily been via administrative fines. One reason is that up until 2014, a final decision was required before pressing charges, causing delay, that requirement was removed to expedite criminal cases, but the FGR still faces challenges like lack of specialized competition prosecutors.

The Commission issues detailed calculations in its decisions, however, clear criteria to calculate and impose fines are yet to be issued by the Commission. Nevertheless, the CNA considers the gravity of the offence, size of the market, the profits earned from the cartel (if estimable), and each offender’s financial capacity.

Some aggravating factors include being the cartel ringleader, coercing other firms to participate, or obstructing the investigation. Mitigating factors could include if the firm ceased the infringement when the investigation started, if it cooperated beyond legal requirements (outside leniency, e.g. promptly complying with requests), or if it has an effective compliance programme.

The 2025 FECL reform introduced a new mechanism where it is possible to certify an antitrust compliance program. A certified compliance program, according to the law, is a mitigating factor that may reduce fines. However, the specific rules under which a compliance program will be certified have not yet been issued by the CNA.

In terms of magnitude, fines for cartels in Mexico have at times reached substantial levels, though still generally lower than EU or US fines in absolute terms. The highest cartel fine on record by the extinct COFECE was MXN 1.1 billion (around $54 million USD) imposed in 2017 on a group of financial institutions engaged in a pension fund cartel.

Other notable fines include about MXN 580 million in total against several global shipping companies for a car-carrier shipping cartel, and MXN 437 million in 2024 against a network of gasoline retailers who fixed fuel prices.

Finally, it is worth noting that any collected fines do not go to CNA’s budget, they go to the federal treasury, so the agency has no direct financial incentive to levy higher fines.

A question that often arises in international contexts is whether parent companies are liable for cartel conduct of their subsidiaries. In Mexico, there is no explicit doctrine of “single economic entity” or automatic parental liability as in the EU. The CNA’s practice is to sanction the legal entities directly involved in the cartel.

Typically, these will be the operating companies that participated (e.g. the Mexican subsidiaries or local business units that fixed prices). If a parent company in Mexico directly colluded (through its officers), it could be named as an undertaking and fined. Moreover, the FECL’s definition of “economic agent” is broad – it encompasses corporations, groups of persons, or any entity that participates in the economy.

This means CNA could treat a corporate group as one economic agent in theory. However, in practice, the Commission must fine the specific company that engaged in the conduct and does not automatically extend liability to parent companies unless evidence shows the parent exercised control over or was complicit in the collusion.

There is not a formal joint liability regime making a parent pay the fine of its subsidiary by default. If multiple related entities in a conglomerate each played a role (say manufacturing arm and distribution arm both agreed to a scheme), the CNA might sanction each. But a purely holding company that was not involved would not be fined just because it owns the offender.

On the other hand, if the CNA finds that the collusion was effectively directed by the corporate group’s central management, they might name the parent as a party. The FECL does not mirror the EU approach where parent companies can be fined for their subsidiaries’ conduct based on presumption of control – any such liability in Mexico would require demonstrating the parent’s involvement, and while the CNA can’t simply reach into a foreign parent’s deep pockets without cause, it will not hesitate to fine all domestic affiliates that took part in a cartel.

As discussed above, in Mexico, a person can claim damages before specialized antitrust courts once the CNA issues its resolution determining that an absolute monopolistic practice has been committed.

On the other hand, Mexico introduced class action mechanisms in 2012, and competition law infringements were included as a ground for class actions. Under the Federal Code of Civil Procedure, CNA itself, or the federal consumer protection agency (PROFECO), or a group of at least 30 affected consumers, can initiate a collective action on behalf of consumers injured by a cartel. In fact, the extinct COFECE for the first time in its history filed a class action in 2022 on behalf of consumers against a cartel. It is important to highlight that damages can only be claimed once a resolution has been issued.

In Mexico, an opting-in system was adopted, i.e., any person who does not join a class action, despite having suffered some damage derived from an anticompetitive conduct, will not be able to obtain any compensation from the exercise of the class action.

Although, persons who have not joined the class action may still claim damages individually, the small amount of compensation often available on an individual basis can serve as a disincentive to pursue legal action against the economic agent declared liable by the competition authority.

Mexican law allows successful plaintiffs to recover actual damages (loss or impairment suffered in one’s assets due to the failure to fulfil an obligation) and lost profits caused by the cartel. This may include the overcharge paid (the difference between the price actually paid and what the competitive price would have been absent the cartel), or any consequential losses (for example, if a company lost sales because it had to pass on high input costs to its customers, those lost profits could be claimed).

Notably, punitive or treble damages are not available under current Mexican law, but, the Mexican Supreme Court has ruled in cases regarding non-material damages, that the defendant may be ordered to pay punitive damages. Taking into consideration the above, there is a possibility that economic agents that have participated in a cartel may be ordered to pay punitive damages.

Quantifying damages in cartel cases can be complex, typically requiring expert economic evidence to establish the but-for price and the volume of commerce affected. While courts will rely heavily on the findings in the CNA’s decision (which may describe price effects or harm in qualitative terms), the plaintiff must still prove the causal link between the cartel conduct and the alleged damages, as well as the amount of harm suffered.

The CNA has 10 years to initiate an investigation of an anticompetitive practice, counted from the date the practice was committed or ceased.

On the other hand, to initiate a claim for damages, there is a period of 2 years from the issue of CNA’s resolution. However, the Supreme Court of Justice in civil cases of damage claims has stated that the limitation period will initiate from when the affected party became aware of the existence of said damage.

Companies and individuals penalized by CNA have the right to appeal the final decision. The only appeal mechanism is the amparo trial, before federal courts (district courts) specialize in economic competition, broadcasting and telecom matters, providing expertise in these complex cases. An amparo in this context is akin to a combined appeal on the merits and a constitutional review. The appellant can challenge the entirety of CNA’s resolution (liability finding and sanctions).

Typical grounds include: lack of due process (for instance, if the defendant was not properly notified or given access to the file), insufficient evidence or incorrect assessment of facts (arguing that CNA did not meet the burden of proof to establish a cartel agreement or participation of the appellant), misapplication of law (e.g. claiming the conduct was not actually a per se violation or fell under an exemption), or disproportionality of the fine.

The courts can review whether the fine was calculated in accordance with the law and guidelines, and sometimes fines have been adjusted on appeal. However, appeals do not re-try the whole case with new evidence; the review is based on the record from CNA’s proceedings, examining whether the decision was constitutional, lawful and reasonably supported by evidence.

In cartel cases, appellants often argue that CNA did not sufficiently prove the existence of an agreement or their involvement in it – disputing the merits. They may also argue that the behaviour was not intended to restrict competition or had no effect (though lack of effect is not a legal defence, sometimes it is used to persuade judges that CNA overreached). Another ground could be that certain evidence was obtained illegally (for example, if they allege a raid was conducted without following legal formalities, they might seek to nullify that evidence).

Once a resolution is notified, the appealing party has a maximum of 15 business days to file an amparo lawsuit against CNA, before an antitrust specialized court.

An amparo proceeding is a constitutional remedy used to determine whether an act of authority (i.e., a decision by the CNA or a general regulation) infringes upon the fundamental rights recognized in the Federal Constitution or in international treaties to which Mexico is a party. The amparo court examines the case and will issue a judgment which can: uphold CNA’s decision or annul it in whole or part.

Once the lawsuit is filed, the fine imposed by the CNA need not to be paid until the CNA’s decision is unappealable.

Often, if the court finds fault with CNA’s reasoning or procedure, it will annul the decision and send it back to CNA for re-determination consistent with the court’s findings. Sometimes only the fine is recalculated on court order, if the liability is upheld but the sanction deemed improper. Both the petitioner (company or individual) and CNA can appeal the district court’s amparo ruling to a Collegiate Circuit Court (an appellate panel) for review (this is called an ‘amparo en revisión’). A case could even reach the Supreme Court if there are issues novel constitutional issues arise, though that is uncommon in routine cartel appeals.

Once appeals are exhausted, CNA’s decision (as upheld or modified by the judiciary), becomes final.

(i) Recent notable cartel cases (limited to one or two key examples, with a very short summary of the facts, decision and sanctions/level of fine);

It is currently not possible to provide examples of recent notable cartel cases. This is due to the institutional transition from the Federal Economic Competition Commission (COFECE) to the National Antitrust Commission (CNA), which resulted in the suspension of all competition law investigation proceedings.

On July 16, 2025, the Decree amending the Federal Economic Competition Law was published, the Fourth Transitory Article of which ordered the suspension of all deadlines for investigation files, pending complaints, and leniency program proceedings.

The CNA formally began operations on October 17, 2025, the date on which its Board was fully constituted. However, due to operational matters related to the transfer of case files and systems, procedural deadlines did not run during the first days of operation of the new authority.

Considering that the suspension of deadlines extended for approximately three months (July to October 2025), and the time required to conclude ongoing investigations, it is estimated that there will be no publications of relevant cartel resolutions until after the first half of 2026.

(ii)  Key recent trends (e.g. in terms of fines, sectors under investigation, any novel areas of investigation, applications for leniency, approach to settlement, number of appeals, impact of hybrid working in enforcement practice – e.g. dawn raids of domestic premises, ‘hybrid’ in-person/virtual dawn raids and interviews, access to personal devices and instant messaging apps, prevalence of private class actions etc.); and

In 2026, the CNA published its yearly work plan, in which it outlined the priority sectors for said period. To identify these sectors and actions, the CNA analyzed their key role in boosting inclusive economic development, the strengthening of regional economies, and their impact on the disposable income of the most vulnerable.

As a result, the outlined sectors included financial, agrifood, energy, health, telecommunications and broadcasting, transport and logistics, and public procurement. Additionally, the Commission highlighted the monitoring of markets related to manufacturing and internet services for the investigation of abuses of market power and concentrations.

Investigations into cartel practices are strategically focused on sectors with a high impact on family welfare, such as basic basket products, healthcare services, transportation, financial services (such as internet-based services), and public procurement. The CNA prioritizes combating illegal agreements that reduce the population’s disposable income to cover essential needs.

Furthermore, the Commission is established as a modern authority that firmly utilizes all its legal tools to prevent, investigate, and combat monopolies and anticompetitive practices. To this end, the Investigative Authority possesses technical and management autonomy, allowing it to decide on its operations and resolutions independently from the unit that adjudicates the cases.

In the exercise of its investigative and sanctioning powers, the CNA ensures due process and legal certainty, guaranteeing that all involved parties can present arguments and evidence. Likewise, the Commission has the mandate to verify that sanctioned companies and individuals cease illegal practices and correct behaviors that affect competition.

Recently, the legal framework has strengthened the authority’s capacities to protect the population against economic distortions. In this context, the CNA has implemented a strategy to facilitate citizen complaints and anonymous reports, seeking active society participation in detecting practices that affect common well-being.

(iii)  Key expected developments over the next 12 months (e.g. imminent statutory changes, procedural changes, upcoming decisions, etc.).

The most immediate change is not likely to be legislative, but institutional. With the CNA now fully operational and the new judiciary in place, the coming year is likely to focus on consolidation rather than further structural reform. However, enforcement policy may evolve in practice.

First, we anticipate a more assertive use of investigative tools, particularly in sectors considered socially sensitive or strategically relevant. The CNA has inherited a strengthened statutory framework, including higher maximum fines and decisions that produce legal effects while subject to judicial review, in addition to a well-established array of technical and staff capabilities. As the authority gains confidence under its new institutional design, investigative intensity may increase.

Second, secondary regulation – including updated guidelines or internal criteria – may be issued to clarify the authority’s approach to leniency, evidence handling and compliance evaluation. This would provide greater predictability but could also formalise stricter expectations for undertakings. There are concerns that broader provisions related to the consideration of information exchanges as cartels and potential competitors being subject to scrutiny will result in heightened risk. Criteria and guidelines are required for said aspects to provide legal certainty.

For companies, the key effect will be heightened exposure. Even if the number of cases does not immediately rise, the consequences of adverse findings are materially greater. Companies should therefore prioritise early risk detection, preparedness for investigations and the robustness of their compliance frameworks in anticipation of a more demanding enforcement cycle.