United States: Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters

The United States is not a signatory to any convention or treaty that governs the recognition or enforcement of non-US court judgments in US courts. Thus, the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments in the United States is a matter of state law – either statutory and common law.  

While this guide does not address international arbitration awards, it is worth noting that the United States is a party to multilateral conventions that bear on the enforcement of international arbitration awards: the UN Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards 1958 (New York Convention) and the Inter-American Convention on International Commercial Arbitration 1979 (Panama Convention). Typically, due to the United States’ status as a signatory to the New York and Panama Conventions, foreign arbitration awards issued pursuant to those conventions face an easier path to recognition and enforcement in US courts than foreign judgments. 

The United States is also party to the multilateral Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States and Nationals of Other States 1965 (ICSID Convention). Arbitral awards falling under the ICSID Convention are to be treated by signatory states as though they were enforcing domestic court awards. 

Not applicable for foreign judgments. 

Yes, recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments in the United States is governed by individual state statutes or, where this is no state statute, by state common law. There is no federal statutory provision governing the recognition or enforcement of foreign judgments on a nationwide level. See Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law § 481 (1987) (“Since Erie v Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 . . . (1938), it has been accepted that in the absence of a federal statute or treaty or some other basis for federal jurisdiction, such as admiralty, recognition and enforcement of foreign country judgments is a matter of State law, and an action to enforce a foreign country judgment is not an action arising under the laws of the United States.”).  

Given this state-by-state approach, there have been efforts throughout the years to bring some clarity and uniformity to the foreign judgment recognition and enforcement laws in the United States. The 1962 Uniform Foreign Money-Judgments Recognition Act (the 1962 Model Act) sought to generally codify the general principles set forth in Hilton v Guyot, 159 US 113 (1895), a seminal US court case in this area of law. The 1962 Model Act was drafted in significant part to help address a concern that foreign courts were refusing to recognise US judgments due to serious inconsistencies in US recognition and enforcement law. The 1962 Model Act was eventually adopted in substantial part by 31 states, the District of Columbia, and the US Virgin Islands. 

The 1962 Model Act was updated in 2005 and renamed the Uniform Foreign-Country Money Judgments Recognition Act (the 2005 Model Act). This updated model act has since been adopted by 29 states and the District of Columbia. Most recently, legislators in Rhode Island, New York, and Nebraska adopted and enacted the 2005 Model Act in 2021, and legislators in Maine did so in 2022. Other US states have legislation pending seeking to adopt the 2005 Model Act.  

Therefore, presently, some US states follow a version of the 1962 Model Act, some follow a version of the 2005 Model Act, and some continue to address foreign judgment recognition and enforcement issues through common law principles reflected in case law. A United States map showing the current state of affairs for the recognition and enforcement law governing each of the US states can be found here.

Typically, subject to certain requirements, US courts are willing to entertain the recognition and enforcement of foreign civil judgments for a sum of money, excluding foreign judgments for fines, penalties or taxes. Additionally, the United States generally adheres to the rule that the courts of one nation will not enforce the penal laws of another nation. See Huntington v Attrill, 146 US 657, 673-674 (1892).  

The question of whether a statute of a particular nation is a penal law depends on whether the statute’s purpose is to punish an offence against the public justice of the state, or to afford a private remedy to a person injured by the wrongful act. See Plata v Darbun Enterprises, Inc, 2014 WL 341667, *5 (Cal App 2014): 

‘[T]he issue whether a monetary award is a penalty within the meaning of the [Recognition Act] requires a court to focus on the legislative purpose of the law underlying the foreign judgment. A judgment is a penalty even if it awards monetary damages to a private individual if the judgment seeks to redress a public wrong and vindicate the public justice, as opposed to affording a private remedy to a person injured by the wrongful act.’ 

Further, for a foreign civil judgment for a sum of money, the typical starting point for recognition by a US court is a judgment that is final, conclusive and enforceable. See section 3(a)(2) of the 2005 Model Act and section 3 of the 1962 Model Act. ‘Enforceable’ in this particular context means that the foreign judgment can presently be enforced in the country where it was rendered.   

The ‘finality’ requirement is not usually interpreted by US courts to mean that the foreign judgment is no longer subject to any appeals in the foreign jurisdiction.  However, if a foreign judgment is still subject to appeal in the issuing forum, most US courts will formally stay a related US recognition action, pending resolution of the appeal in the foreign issuing forum. See PJSC Credit-Moscow Bank v Khairoulline, 2016 WL 4454208 (ED Pa 24 August 2016) (finding that, under Pennsylvania’s recognition statute, the court had jurisdiction to decide the recognition of five Russian judgments that had been appealed in Russia, but ultimately issuing a discretionary stay, as permitted under Pennsylvania’s recognition statute, pending the outcome of the Russian appellate proceedings). 

Not applicable. 

As noted previously, the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments in the United States is addressed on a state-by-state basis, although the law in almost all of the US states – whether statutory or common law – can be traced back to the principles set forth in the US Supreme Court case Hilton v Guyot, 159 US 113 (1895). 

A foreign judgment that is final, conclusive, and enforceable in the country where rendered can be submitted by the judgment creditor to a US state or federal court for recognition, usually under a state’s recognition statute. That foreign judgment can then be recognized by the US court so long as it meets the requirement of the local law, unless the judgment debtor successfully establishes one of the statutory grounds for non-recognition of a foreign judgment. States that have not adopted one of the model acts will proceed with their own common law principles and apply their own recognition requirements and defences. 

Importantly, despite sharing origins in the Hilton case, US state law approaches to the recognition of foreign judgments sometimes display significant differences, including the way they address reciprocity with the foreign jurisdiction as a prerequisite to recognition of the judgment, and the way they analyse some of the particular grounds (defences) for non-recognition of a foreign judgment. 

Most US states require the party seeking recognition and enforcement of a foreign judgment to file an action in a court that has an adequate basis to exercise jurisdiction over the alleged judgment creditor. Recognition and enforcement actions may be brought in a state court or a federal court, depending on procedural rules. However, a federal court sitting in diversity jurisdiction (a type of subject-matter jurisdiction) will generally apply the substantive law of the state in which it sits, based on principles emerging from Erie RR Co v Tompkins, 304 US 64 (1938). Federal common law principles may be applied in specialised cases. 

Additional formal procedural requirements for a foreign judgment recognition proceeding vary on a state-by-state basis, but states, for example, typically include a requirement that a foreign judgment issued in a foreign language must be accompanied by a certified English translation. 

Importantly, in addition to certain procedural requirements, US states also require certain mandatory characteristics of the foreign judgments sought to be recognized in the United States. Specifically, in states that follow the 1962 and 2005 Model Acts, a foreign judgment cannot be recognized and enforced in the United States if any of the following is true: 

• the judgment was rendered under a judicial system that does not provide impartial tribunals; 
• the judgment was rendered under a judicial system that does not provide procedures compatible with the requirements of due process of law; 
• the foreign court did not have personal jurisdiction over the defendant; or 
• the foreign court did not have jurisdiction over the subject matter. 

For further information, see section 4(a) of the 1962 Model Act and section 4(b) of the 2005 Model Act.  US states that have not adopted one of the model acts are governed by common law principles, which also tend to provide for certain mandatory non-recognition grounds similar to those listed above. There are additional grounds for denying recognition to a judgment, which are discussed below.

Here, it is important to note that recognition and enforcement are separate processes in US courts. Notably, a foreign judgment cannot be enforced in the United States until the judgment is recognised by a US court. As previously noted, the 1962 and 2005 Model Acts deal with the recognition of foreign judgments. See Electrolines, Inc v Prudential Assurance Co, 677 NW 2d 874, 882 (Mich Ct App 2003): 

‘[A] foreign country money judgment cannot be enforced until it has been recognized and . . . the [Recognition Act] is not an enforcement act. The [Recognition Act] only serves the purpose of providing a court with a means to recognize a foreign money judgment.’ 

Once a judgment has been recognised by a US court and is no longer subject to appellate review, the judgment creditor can commence the enforcement process. 

The timing of an initial recognition process for a foreign judgment will vary state-by-state, and will also depend on many case-specific factors – the nature of the foreign judgment, the reputation of the issuing country, the forum court for the recognition action, the availability and strength of any non-recognition defences, the use of expert witnesses, the existence of a US appeal of the recognition decision, etc. Additionally, depending on the nature of the case and the foreign judgment, courts in the United States have discretion to grant additional time for parties to conduct discovery or to schedule hearings or even a trial.  

Some US states do make available certain types of summary, expedited proceedings for the attempted recognition of a foreign judgment. For example, New York permits expedited summary proceedings (‘motion for summary judgment in lieu of complaint’) for certain basic foreign judgments that clearly meet on their face all of the NY statutory requirements: ‘When an action is based upon an instrument for the payment of money only or upon any judgment, the plaintiff may serve with the summons a notice of motion for summary judgment and the supporting papers in lieu of a complain.’ NY CPLR § 3213. ‘If the motion is  denied, the moving and answering papers shall be deemed the complaint and answer, respectively, unless the court orders otherwise.’ Id. 

Importantly, New York’s CPLR § 3213 is ‘intended to provide a speedy and effective means of securing a judgment on claims presumptively meritorious . . . [and where] a formal complaint is superfluous and even the delay incident upon waiting for an answer and then moving for summary judgment is needless.’  Interman Indus. Products, Ltd. v. R.S.M. Electron Power, Inc., 37 N.Y.2d 151, 154 (1975) (emphasis added).  Additionally, no matter the type of procedural mechanism or procedural posture, all US states, including New York, provide for both mandatory and discretionary grounds for non-recognition. Thus, even in recognition cases proceeding in an ‘expedited’ manner, the judgment debtor will have an opportunity to avail itself of defences to push back against the recognition of the foreign judgment.

This issue is also dealt with on a state-by-state basis in the United States. Some US states allow a judgment creditor to seek interim relief when the recognition action commences and while the action is pending. For example, if they can satisfy certain stringent standards, a judgment creditor can obtain an attachment of the judgment debtor’s in-state assets. However, this type of ‘pre-judgment’ attachment is seen as a drastic remedy by US courts. 

In such cases, states usually require, among other things, that the judgment creditor show a probability that it will succeed on the merits of the recognition action and that a statutory ground for the attachment of the judgment debtor’s assets exists. In addition, the judgment creditor usually has to show an identifiable necessity for the requested attachment, such as a risk that the judgment debtor will not be able to satisfy the judgment.   

The 2005 Model Act expressly provides that ‘[a]n action to recognize a foreign-country judgment must be commenced within the earlier of the time during which the foreign-country judgment is effective in the foreign country or 15 years from the date that the foreign-country judgment became effective in the foreign country’.  

However, as with other issues, the statute of limitations for seeking to recognize a foreign judgment varies according to state law in jurisdictions that have not adopted the 2005 Model Act. The 1962 Model Act, unlike the 2005 Model Act, does not directly address the question of a statute of limitations and leaves this issue to state law. 

Depending on the US state in which the recognition action is filed, judgment debtors may avail themselves of specific defences recognised by common law or enumerated in the 1962 or 2005 Model Acts, or both.  

In states that follow the 1962 and 2005 Model Acts, a foreign judgment cannot be recognized and enforced in the United States if any of the following is true (these are known as the ‘mandatory’ grounds for non-recognition): 

• the judgment was rendered under a judicial system that does not provide impartial tribunals; 
• the judgment was rendered under a judicial system that does not provide procedures compatible with the requirements of due process of law; 
• the foreign court did not have personal jurisdiction over the defendant; or 

• the foreign court did not have jurisdiction over the subject matter. 

Additionally, states that follow the 1962 and 2005 Model Acts also provide for several additional ‘discretionary’ grounds for non-recognition:  

• the defendant in the proceeding in the foreign court did not receive notice of the proceeding in sufficient time to enable the defendant to defend; 
• the judgment was obtained by fraud that deprived the losing party of an adequate opportunity to present its case; 
• the judgment or the cause of action [claim for relief] on which the judgment is based is repugnant to the public policy of the state or of the United States; 

• the judgment conflicts with another final and conclusive judgment; 
• the proceeding in the foreign court was contrary to an agreement between the parties under which the dispute in question was to be determined otherwise than by proceedings in that foreign court; or 
• in the case of jurisdiction based only on personal service, the foreign court was a seriously inconvenient forum for the trial of the action. 

States following the 2005 Model Act recognise two additional discretionary defences that are not available in states following the 1962 Model Act: 

• the judgment was rendered in circumstances that raise substantial doubt about the integrity of the rendering court with respect to the judgment; or 

• the specific proceeding in the foreign court leading to the judgment was not compatible with the requirements of due process of law. 

States that do not follow either of the model acts usually have mandatory and discretionary grounds for non-recognition that are similar in nature to those listed above.   

Moreover, US courts – even those that follow the model acts – will also consider and apply defences grounded in US common law principles, particularly if a foreign judgment runs contrary to US constitutional principles. See Osorio v Dole Food Co, 665 F Supp 2d 1307 (SD Fla 2009), aff’d sub nom Osorio v Dow Chem Co, 635 F3d 1277 (Eleventh Circuit, 2011) (court refused to recognise the foreign judgment on multiple independent grounds, including lack of impartial tribunals, lack of due process and various conflicts with US and state public policy issues (at 1352). See also William E Thomson and Perlette Michèle Jura, US Chamber Institute for Legal Reform, Confronting the New Breed of Transnational Litigation: Abusive Foreign Judgments (2011), available at www.instituteforlegalreform.com/resource/confronting-the-new-breed-of-transnational-litigation-abusive-foreign-judgments. 

Additionally, as noted above, the United States adheres to the rule that it will not recognize and enforce judgments for fines, penalties or taxes. Also, US courts will not enforce the penal laws of another nation. See Huntington v Attrill, 146 US 657, 673-674 (1892). The question of whether a statute of a particular nation is a penal law depends on whether the statute’s purpose is to punish an offence against the public justice of the state, or to afford a private remedy to a person injured by the wrongful act. See Plata v Darbun Enterprises, Inc, 2014 WL 341667, *5 (Cal App 2014). 

US courts, like many courts worldwide, will strive to avoid relitigating the merits of a foreign case in the context of a foreign judgment recognition action. However, as the Supreme Court cautioned in Hilton v Guyot, that goal must be balanced with the need to protect US citizens and their rights in the administration of justice. See Hilton, 159 US at 163-64: 

‘“Comity,” in the legal sense, is neither a matter of absolute obligation, on the one hand, nor of mere courtesy and good will, upon the other. But it is the recognition which one nation allows within its territory to the legislative, executive or judicial acts of another nation, having due regard both to international duty and convenience, and to the rights of its own citizens, or of other persons who are under the protection of its laws.’ 

See also Laker Airways Ltd v Sabena, Belgian World Airlines, 731 F 2d 909, 937 & n 104 (DC Circuit, 1984) (‘authorities have recognized that the obligation of comity expires when the strong public policies of the forum are vitiated by the foreign act’).   

Additionally, as noted above, the states following the 2005 Model Act provide that a judgment can be denied recognition where (1) the judgment was rendered in circumstances that raise substantial doubt about the integrity of the rendering court with respect to the judgment; or (2) the specific proceeding in the foreign court leading to the judgment was not compatible with the requirements of due process of law. Both of these case-specific grounds for non-recognition require a close analysis of the underlying proceedings that can sometimes overlap with merits issues.  

Yes.  They will consider both personal jurisdiction and subject matter jurisdiction.  A judgment debtor in a US recognition action may seek to defeat recognition of the foreign judgment on the basis that the foreign tribunal lacked personal jurisdiction over the defendant. A foreign judgment is not conclusive in a US court if the foreign forum court did not have personal jurisdiction over the defendant. See Bank of Montreal v Kough, 430 F Supp 1243, 1246-47 (ND Cal 1977); CIBC Mellon Trust Co. v. Mora Hotel Corp., 296 A.D.2d 81, 96 (N.Y. App. Div. 2002), aff’d, 100 N.Y.2d 215 (Ct. App. 2003).  

On this issue, given its fundamental nature, many US courts analyse both whether the foreign court properly exercised jurisdiction under its own laws and whether it properly exercised personal jurisdiction as understood using US due process principles. See EOS Trans, Inc v Agri-Source Fuels LLC, 37 So 3d 349, 352-53 (Fla Ct App 2010) (holding that ‘in assessing whether the exercise of personal jurisdiction is proper under the [1962 Model] Act, the trial court must determine whether the exercise is proper under both the law of the foreign jurisdiction and under US Constitutional Due Process requirements’); and Nippon Emo-Trans Co v Emo-Trans, Inc, 744 F Supp 1215 (EDNY 1990) (finding that New York law does not require that a foreign court’s determination of a jurisdictional challenge be given preclusive effect; if the foreign or US standards for personal jurisdiction are not satisfied, the judgment will not be recognised in a US court) 

That said, there are certain ways in which the defence of lack of personal jurisdiction can be waived, and that is specifically enumerated in the model acts. See, for example, the 2005 Model Act, section 5 (noting that a defence of lack of personal jurisdiction is waived if, among other things, the defendant was personally served in the foreign country, the defendant had agreed to submit to the jurisdiction of the foreign court, the defendant was domiciled in the foreign country at the time the lawsuit was commenced, etc). 

A judgment debtor may also seek to defeat the recognition of a foreign judgment on the basis that the foreign court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over the action. Both model acts provide that lack of subject-matter jurisdiction is a defence against recognition of a foreign judgment. See 1962 Model Act § 4 (a)(3); 2005 Model Act § 4(b)(3); see also Osorio, 665 F Supp 2d at 1326 (holding that defendants invoked their opt-out rights under local law, thereby divesting the local trial court of jurisdiction and preventing recognition and enforcement of foreign judgment under Florida law). It is also possible to argue under common law rules that the foreign court did not have the power to render the decision in the case. See Hilton, 159 US at 166-67 and section 482, comment c of the Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations (1987) (‘A court in the United States need not recognize a judgment of the court of a foreign state if . . . the court that rendered the judgment did not have jurisdiction of the subject matter of the action.’). 

In general, the guiding principle in determining whether a litigant in the foreign action had notice of the proceedings so as to allow the US recognition of the foreign judgment is whether a reasonable method of notification was employed and a reasonable opportunity to be heard was afforded to the person or entity affected. See Somportex Limited v Philadelphia Chewing Gum Corp, 453 F 2d 435, 443 (Third Circuit, 1971); Batbrothers LLC v. Paushok, 172 A.D.3d 529 (N.Y. App. Div. 2019) (‘Defendant’s voluntary participation in multiple rounds of appeals in the Russian courts, in which he raised arguments about personal jurisdiction and the merits of the bona fides of the judgments, is fatal to his argument that he did not receive adequate notice or due process in Russia’); and Gardner v Letcher, 2014 WL 3611587, *1 (D Nev 2014): 

‘Here it is undisputed that no summons was served and that the “Summary of the Document to be Served” form was not completely filled out. There is also no evidence that service was accomplished by other means that would have satisfied the Hague Convention. Therefore, service under the Hague Convention was void and the Swiss court did not have personal jurisdiction over Defendant.’  

See also section 4(b) of the 1962 Model Act – a foreign judgment need not be recognised if ‘the defendant in the proceedings in the foreign court did not receive notice of the proceedings in sufficient time to enable him to defend’ – and section 4(c) of the 2005 Model Act (same). 

As noted previously (response to question 11 above), US courts have the option to analyse and apply various discretionary non-recognition grounds in deciding the possible recognition of a foreign judgment.  

As noted previously (response to question 4 above), subject to certain requirements, US courts are willing to entertain the recognition and enforcement of foreign civil judgments for a sum of money, excluding judgments for fines, penalties or taxes.  

Additionally, as noted previously (response to question 11), US courts have the discretion to analyse and apply various discretionary non-recognition grounds in deciding the possible recognition of a foreign judgment.  Among these, US courts can deny recognition to a foreign judgment if the judgment and/or a cause of action [claim for relief] on which the judgment is based are repugnant to the public policy of the state or of the United States.

A final, conclusive and enforceable judgment is the usual starting point for recognition by a US court. However, unlike in some countries, this ‘finality’ requirement is not usually interpreted by US courts to mean that the foreign judgment is no longer subject to any appeals in the foreign jurisdiction. But, in many US courts, if a foreign judgment is still subject to appeal in the issuing forum, a related US recognition action will be stayed pending resolution of the appeal in the foreign forum. See PJSC Credit-Moscow Bank v Khairoulline, 2016 WL 4454208 (ED Pa 24 August 2016).

Yes. Judgment debtors have the right to appeal a US court decision regarding the recognition and enforcement of a foreign judgment.

Interest in this particular context is a matter of state law. For example, in California, under state law principles, ‘a foreign-country money judgment entered in this state bears post-judgment interest at the California rate of 10% from the date of the judgment recognizing the foreign judgment.’ Hyundai Securities Co, Ltd, 232 Cal App 4th 1379, 1392 (2015).

Conversion-related rules in the context of foreign judgments are also governed by state law, and the conversion analysis will depend on the particular US state. US courts apply varying standards to determine the date of conversion, which will affect the exchange rate between US dollars and the foreign currency in which the judgment was rendered.  

The ‘breach-day’ rule fixes the exchange rate at the date the foreign judgment was rendered. The ‘judgment-day’ rule applies the date of the US judgment. Recently, other approaches have been adopted or encouraged, such as the ‘payment-day’ rule (fixing at the date the judgment is satisfied) and the Restatement (Third) Foreign Relations Law’s less rigid standard that permits courts to award payment in whichever way will best make ‘whole’ the prevailing party (see section 423 of the Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law (1987)).

This is an issue of state law and will depend on the US court forum in which the recognition action is proceeding. Typically attorneys’ fees are not recoverable in a recognition and enforcement action.

Such arrangements do exist, and third parties, for the most part, are allowed to fund a recognition and enforcement action in US courts. However, the contours of the specific rules governing and/or limiting such arrangements in this recognition context is an issue of state law and will depend on the US court forum in which the recognition action is proceeding.

Given the United States’ state-by-state approach for recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments, it is important to note that the strong trend has been for US states to move toward adopting the 2005 Model Act as the basis for their recognition and enforcement laws. More than half of all US states have adopted the 2005 Model Act. New York adopted the 2005 Model Act in mid-2021, which is an important development given the traditional popularity of New York as a forum for recognition actions involving foreign judgments. 

As described above, the trend toward the broad adoption of the 2005 Model Act means that judgment debtors are afforded additional defences that relate to the specific underlying proceeding and/or the specific court from which the judgment issued. Such case-specific defences allow a US court to delve more deeply into how the case was litigated and how the case proceeded in the foreign forum. This expanded discretion to look closely at the specific foreign court that issued the judgment and the proceeding itself – not just the country’s legal system as a whole – is particularly important when a US court is confronted with recognition defences involving charges of partiality, fraud, lack of due process, etc. 

In the past, the tendency had been for judgment creditors to feel quite confident that the US recognition process would involve a relatively quick and limited review of the foreign legal system and the foreign judgment, but as explained in the above responses, that is no longer the case in practice. We expect US courts will continue engaging in a more comprehensive analysis of the mandatory and discretionary grounds for non-recognition and will factor in their care and concern for the rights of US citizens, even in cases where the judgment creditor opts for a summary process.

The United States has not ratified this convention, and there is no indication it will do so in the near future.

The United States has not ratified this convention, and there is no indication it will do so in the near future.