– In Ukraine, the fight against bribery and corruption is governed by a comprehensive legal framework.

The main legislative and regulatory acts include:

• the Constitution of Ukraine – the foundational legal act ensuring the principles of legality and accountability in public service;
• the Criminal Code of Ukraine (CCU) – defines criminal offences related to bribery, abuse of office, and other corruption-related crimes;
• the Criminal Procedure Code of Ukraine (CPC) – regulates the investigation, prosecution, and adjudication of corruption offences;
• the Code of Ukraine on Administrative Offences (CAO) – establishes administrative liability for certain types of corrupt conduct;
• the Law of Ukraine “On Prevention of Corruption” – a key piece of legislation that sets out preventive measures, including financial disclosure, conflict of interest rules, and whistleblower protections.

Ukraine’s anti-corruption norms are also set out in specialized laws and regulations that define civil servants’ conduct, disciplinary liability, and procedures for corruption checks and investigations.

Additionally, Ukraine complies with a number of international treaties and anti-corruption standards, including those set by the UN, OECD, and Council of Europe (GRECO).

– Ukraine has several specialised law enforcement and prosecutorial authorities empowered to investigate and prosecute bribery and corruption-related offences. Their jurisdiction is determined primarily by the status of the suspect (e.g., high-ranking officials) and the nature and gravity of the offence.

The key authorities include:

• National Anti-Corruption Bureau of Ukraine (NABU)

NABU is the primary investigative body responsible for:

– Preventing, detecting, terminating, and investigating corruption-related criminal offences committed by top officials (e.g., ministers, members of parliament, judges of the Supreme Court, heads of state enterprises).

– Its jurisdiction is limited to top-tier officials, as defined in the Law of Ukraine on the NABU and Criminal Procedure Code.

• State Bureau of Investigation (SBI)

The SBI is responsible for investigating:

– Corruption and related crimes committed by senior public officials, law enforcement officers (in particular bribery committed by NABU and Specialised Anti-Corruption Prosecutor’s Office (SAPO) employees), and judges, as well as persons in category “A” positions under civil service legislation.

– NABU has exclusive jurisdiction over certain high-level cases; therefore, the SBI handles only those that fall outside NABU’s authority.

• Economic Security Bureau of Ukraine ( ESBU)

The Economic Security Bureau of Ukraine is a law enforcement agency,
responsible for preventing, detecting, and investigating offenses that affect.
The functioning of Ukraine’s national economic security. In accordance with its mandate, the ESBU performs law enforcement, analytical, economic, and information-related functions, aimed at safeguarding economic security and ensuring the proper functioning of public finance and business environments.

The Economic Security Bureau of Ukraine conducts pre-trial investigations of criminal offenses attributed by law to its jurisdiction, predominantly in the fields of the economy, public finances, and taxation.

In particular, the Bureau focuses on offences such as tax evasion and tax fraud, illicit enrichment involving economic assets, and the misuse or misappropriation of public funds in the course of business or administrative activities.

• National Police of Ukraine (NPU)

The National Police performs pre-trial investigations into:

– Corruption-related crimes not falling under the jurisdiction of NABU, SBI, ESBU.

– It acts as the default investigative body for general corruption offences, particularly those involving mid-level and local officials or private individuals.

• Specialised Anti-Corruption Prosecutor’s Office (SAPO)

– an independent structural unit within the Office of the Prosecutor General of Ukraine, primarily responsible for procedural supervision over pre-trial investigations conducted by the National Anti-Corruption Bureau of Ukraine (NABU) and for supporting and representing the prosecution in court in profile corruption cases.

• High Anti-Corruption Court of Ukraine (HACC)

The High Anti-Corruption Court (HACC) is a specialized court established in 2019 to hear high-profile corruption cases investigated by the National Anti-Corruption Bureau of Ukraine (NABU) and prosecuted by the Specialized Anti-Corruption Prosecutor’s Office (SAPO).

The High Anti-Corruption Court consists of a court of first instance and an Appeals Chamber.

Article 1 of the Law of Ukraine “On Prevention of Corruption” provides the following definitions:

– “Corruption” is the use by a person of the authority and powers granted to them, and the related opportunities, for the purpose of obtaining an undue advantage or accepting such an advantage or a promise/offer of such an advantage for themselves or for others.

– “Undue benefit“ means money or other property, benefits, privileges, services, intangible assets, or any other benefits of non-material or non-monetary nature that are promised, offered, provided or received without legal grounds.

– “Corruption offence“ means an act that contains signs of corruption and is committed by a person referred to in Part 1 of Article 3 of this Law, for which criminal, disciplinary and/or civil liability is established by law.

– Corruption-related offence refers to an act that does not contain signs of corruption, but violates the requirements, prohibitions, or restrictions established by this Law, committed by a person specified in Part 1 of Article 3 of this Law, and for which criminal, administrative, disciplinary and/or civil liability is provided by law.

Criminal Code of Ukraine

The term “bribe” is not formally used in the Criminal Code of Ukraine, but in practice, it refers to the acts provided under the following articles:

– Article 354 – Bribery of an employee of an enterprise, institution or organisation;

– Article 364 – Abuse of authority or office;

– Article 364-1 – Abuse of power by an official of a legal entity of private law, regardless of the organisational and legal form;

– Article 365- 2 – Abuse of power by persons providing public services;

– Article 368 – Accepting an offer, promise or receiving an improper advantage by an official;

– Article 368-3 – Bribery of an official of a legal entity of private law, regardless of the organisational and legal form;

– Article 368-4– Bribery of a person providing public services;

– Article 368 -5– Unlawful enrichment;

– Article 369 – Offer, promise, or provision of an undue advantage to an official.

– Article 369-2 – Abuse of influence.

– Article 370 – Provocation of bribery.

Key Distinctions

– «Corruption» is a broader concept that includes not only bribery but also other forms of abuse of office or authority.

– «Bribery» is a type of corruption offence, which involves the receipt or offering of an undue advantage.

Under the United Nations Convention against Corruption (UNCAC) and the Council of Europe Criminal Law Convention on Corruption, the concept of a bribe is captured by the term “undue advantage” (Articles 15–18, 21 and 25 of the UNCAC; Articles 2, 3, 7, 8, 12 of the Council of Europe Convention).

The term “bribe” appears in the titles of certain articles of the Council of Europe Convention, but is used synonymously with “undue advantage” throughout the text.

– Ukrainian legislation clearly differentiates between bribery (offering/receiving undue advantage) involving public officials and private individuals, and establishes specific definitions and legal consequences for each category.

The Criminal Code of Ukraine (CCU) establishes distinct offences depending on whether the conduct involves a public official or a private individual, in particular:

– Article 368 CCU – accepting an offer, promise or receiving an improper advantage by an official;

– Article 369 CCU – proposal, promise or providing an improper advantage to an official;

– Articles 368-3 and 368-4 CCU – bribery of an official of a legal entity of private law, regardless of the organisational and legal form, Bribery of a person providing public services;

– Article 354 CCU –bribery of an employee of an enterprise, institution or organisation.

Thus, Ukrainian law distinguishes between public and private corruption, with different legal elements and penalties applicable to each.

How is the term “civil servant” defined?

Criminal law in Ukraine uses the broader term “official”, which includes civil servants.

According to Note 1 to Article 364 of the CCU, an official is a person who:

– Permanently, temporarily, or by special authority performs functions of a representative of state or local government;

– Holds a position in state authorities, local governments, state or municipal enterprises, institutions, or organisations;

– Exercises organisational, administrative, or economic functions, or does so by special authority granted by a competent public or local body, court, or law.

Officials shall also mean officials of foreign states (persons holding positions in the legislative, executive or judicial body of a foreign state, including jurors, other persons performing state functions for a foreign state, in particular for a state body or state enterprise), as well as foreign arbitrators, persons authorised to resolve civil, commercial or labour disputes in foreign states in an alternative court order, officials of international organisations (employees of an international organisation or any other person authorised by such organisation to act on its behalf), members of international parliamentary assemblies Ukraine is a party to, and judges and officials of international courts.

The term “civil servant” is defined in Article 1 of the Law of Ukraine “On Civil Service” as a person who:

• Is a citizen of Ukraine;
• Holds a civil service position in a state body or its secretariat;
• Receives a salary from the state budget;
• Exercises powers established for the position that are directly related to the execution of tasks and functions of the respective state body;
• Adheres to the principles of civil service.

Does Ukrainian law distinguish between a civil servant and a foreign public official?

Ukrainian legislation recognises the concept of a foreign public official, particularly in the context of international conventions (e.g. the UN Convention against Corruption, ratified by Ukraine).

For example, Article 2 of the UN Convention against Corruption defines:
“Foreign public official” means any person holding a legislative, executive, administrative or judicial office of a foreign country, whether appointed or elected; and any person exercising a public function for a foreign country, including for a public agency or public enterprise.

Are there different definitions of bribery for public officials and private individuals?

Yes, both definitions and sanctions differ:

Category	Criminal Code Article	Subject	Description	Maximum Penalty
Public sector bribery	Article 368/ 369 CCU	Public official (official)	Receipt or offering of undue advantage linked to official functions	Up to 12 years of imprisonment + seizure
Private sector bribery	Article 354 (and related provisions)	Employee of private entity	Offering/receiving undue benefit for influence or actions in private context	Up to 2 years of imprisonment or restraint

Both natural persons and legal entities may be held liable. According to Article 96-3 of the Criminal Code of Ukraine, legal entities may be subject to a special form of criminal-legal measures for offences committed by their authorised representatives on behalf of and in the interests of such legal entities.

Civil liability for the commission of a corruption offense shall be borne by a civil servant or any other person authorized to perform state functions, for instance, in cases where such person causes physical, moral, or property damage to natural or legal persons.

Invalidation of transactions

Pursuant to the Civil Code of Ukraine (Articles 203, 215, 228), transactions concluded under the influence of corrupt actions (e.g., provision of a bribe for concluding a contract) may be declared null and void by a court if they are executed for purposes contrary to the interests of the state and society.
Example: A public procurement contract concluded as a result of bribery of an official may be annulled.

Compensation for damages

Persons who have suffered damages as a result of corrupt actions (e.g., a company that lost a contract due to corrupt collusion between competitors and officials) have the right to seek compensation for the damages incurred through judicial proceedings (Civil Code of Ukraine, Articles 1166, 1177).
Additionally, the State may claim reimbursement from the liable persons for damages caused to the State budget.

Confiscation of assets / recovery in favor of the State
Under specific legislation (e.g., the Law of Ukraine “On Prevention of Corruption”), assets acquired through corruption may be recovered in favor of the State through civil claims.

In Ukraine, there is a procedure for declaring assets to be unjustified and for their confiscation as state revenue, as provided for in the Civil Procedure Code of Ukraine, which enables the seizure of assets from officials without a criminal conviction where their unlawful origin is established.

Claims by the Specialized Anti-Corruption Prosecutor’s Office (SAP) and the Office of the Prosecutor General (PGO).

The SAP and OPG are authorized to file claims seeking recognition of assets as unjustified and their recovery in favor of the State.

Restraint of liberty is imposed for a term of 2 to 5 years;

Imprisonment is possible for 2 to 12 years. The most severe penalty for obtaining/providing an undue advantage is up to 12 years’ imprisonment.

Examples of such crimes include:

– Article 368 of the Criminal Code of Ukraine – аccepting an offer, promise or receiving an improper advantage by an official;

– Article 369 of the Criminal Code of Ukraine – proposal, promise or providing an improper advantage to an official;

– Article 369-2 of the Criminal Code of Ukraine – abuse of influence.

The penalty depends on the circumstances: the amount of the benefit, the participation of an organised group, repetition, etc.

Fines

– Fines range from UAH 17,000 to more than UAH 68,000, and in some cases are much higher.

– They may be applied together with other sanctions or instead of imprisonment, depending on the nature of the offence.

Deprivation of the right to hold positions or engage in certain activities

– The court may prohibit a person from working in government or holding a managerial position for up to 3 years.

Confiscation of property

– Confiscation of property is when all or part of a person’s property is forcibly and gratuitously seized from him or her in favour of the state. In the case of special confiscation, property used for or as a result of a crime (e.g., a bribe) is confiscated, meaning that not only the property of the convicted person but also that of other persons may be confiscated.

Inclusion in the Register of Corrupt Practitioners

– Information about a convicted person is entered into the Unified State Register of Persons Who Committed Corruption Offences, which;

– Makes it impossible to hold positions in the civil service;

– Causes reputational damage;

– Impedes participation in tenders, grants, etc.

Additional consequences for officials:

– Loss of special title, rank, awards (e.g., civil servant or judge).

– Cancellation of a certificate to practice law or notary.

– Correctional labour, which citizens can perform from six months to 2 years at their place of primary employment. 10-20% of the earnings from such work goes to the state. This punishment cannot be imposed on pregnant women, military personnel, judges, prosecutors, lawyers, local government officials, civil servants, etc.

Ukrainian law establishes comprehensive restrictions on the provision and acceptance of hospitality, travel, and entertainment-related benefits in the context of engagement with public officials, including foreign public officials.

The Law of Ukraine “On Prevention of Corruption”(Article 23. Restrictions on receiving gifts) prohibits public officials from accepting any gifts or benefits—including hospitality, entertainment, or travel—if:

– If they could affect the objectivity or impartiality of decision-making;

– They serve as remuneration for actions already taken;

-Their value exceeds legally established thresholds.

Monetary Limits (as of 2026):

– A public official may accept a gift not exceeding the living wage for employable persons (currently UAH 3,328) per gift, established as of the date when the gift was received, a gift was accepted once, and the aggregate value of gifts received from one person (group of persons) within the year does not exceed two subsistence minimums established for able-bodied persons as of 01 January of the year when the gift was accepted, and no more than two such gifts annually from the same source.

– The aggregate value of gifts from one individual (or group) within a calendar year must not exceed four living wages (UAH 13,312 in 2026 figures).

– Gifts must not be related to official duties or come from subordinates.

Permitted Exceptions:

Under Part 2, Article 23 of the Law:

– Permitted items include publicly available discounts, bonuses, prizes, and awards.

Gifts from close relatives are allowed regardless of value.

– Managers of institutions are prohibited from accepting gifts from subordinates, even within general limits.

Еxcept as provided by part 1of this Article, if the value of such gifts does not exceed the subsistence minimum for able-bodied persons, established as of the date when the gift was received, a gift was accepted once, and the aggregate value of gifts received from one person (group of persons) within the year does not exceed two subsistence minimums established for able-bodied persons as of 01 January of the year when the gift was accepted.

Foreign Public Officials:

There are no separate monetary limits for expenses involving foreign public officials. However:

– Offering, promising, or giving undue benefits to a foreign public official in order to influence their actions or decisions constitutes a criminal offence under Articles 369 and 369(2) of the Criminal Code of Ukraine, with penalties including imprisonment and asset confiscation.

– Ukraine is a signatory to the UN Convention against Corruption and the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention, both of which require states to prevent and punish bribery of foreign officials, including through hospitality and related expenses.

In summary, while reasonable hospitality is permitted within defined limits, any expenses that could be interpreted as undue influence—especially in dealings with public officials—are strictly regulated and may lead to criminal liability under anti-corruption legislation.

The political contributions in Ukraine are regulated by a legal framework, which includes specific limitations and oversight mechanisms.

The key legal instruments governing political contributions include

• The Law of Ukraine “On Political Parties in Ukraine”;
• The Law of Ukraine “On Prevention of Corruption”;
• The Electoral Code of Ukraine;
• The Criminal Code of Ukraine, specifically Article 159-1 (“Violation of the procedure for financing a political party, election or referendum campaigning”).

These laws set restrictions on the sources and amounts of political donations, introduce disclosure obligations, and provide for criminal liability in case of unlawful financing.

All forms of facilitation payments are considered acts of corruption under Ukrainian law, regardless of their amount, and are subject to criminal liability.

According to Articles 368 and 369 of the Criminal Code of Ukraine, offering or receiving any undue benefit—including money, gifts, services, advantages, or privileges—with the intent to influence the actions or decisions of a public official constitutes a criminal offense. This applies irrespective of the payment’s size or purpose.

Ukrainian law does not provide any exemptions for so-called facilitation payments, even if they are intended to expedite or simplify administrative procedures to which a person is otherwise legally entitled.

In Ukraine, there is no separate or exhaustive statutory list of defences specifically applicable to bribery and corruption offences. Instead, defendants rely on general principles of criminal and criminal procedural law.

In practice, the most common defence strategies include:

• Absence of the elements of the offence: The defence may challenge whether all mandatory elements of a corruption offence are established, including the existence of an undue benefit, the use or abuse of official position, and a causal link between the conduct and the alleged advantage.
• Lack of intent: Corruption offences generally require direct intent. Demonstrating that the accused did not act knowingly or intentionally may exclude criminal liability.
• Entrapment by law enforcement authorities: If the offence was instigated or provoked by law enforcement without prior intent on the part of the accused, this may constitute entrapment. In line with the case law of the European Court of Human Rights, evidence obtained through such conduct may be deemed inadmissible.
• Procedural violations: Breaches of procedural rules—such as unlawful searches, improper authorisation or conduct of covert investigative measures, or mishandling of evidence—may lead to the exclusion of evidence.
• Expiry of the statute of limitations: Criminal liability may be excluded where the applicable limitation period has expired, depending on the classification and severity of the offence.

In practice, defence strategies in bribery and corruption cases are primarily focused on challenging the admissibility and reliability of evidence, as well as establishing the absence of intent.

Under the current legislation, Compliance Programmes are not considered as a mitigating factor in determining liability for corruption offences.

– In Ukraine, the government has issued various forms of guidance on compliance with anti-bribery and anti-corruption legislation, although such guidance is not consolidated in a single comprehensive document.

The key role in this area is performed by the National Agency on Corruption Prevention (NACP), which is responsible for developing and implementing state anti-corruption policy. The NACP provides methodological support, recommendations, and model documents aimed at assisting both public authorities and private entities in complying with anti-corruption requirements.

In particular, the NACP has developed:

Model anti-corruption programmes for legal entities, which outline key elements of effective compliance systems, including risk assessments, internal controls, and reporting mechanisms;

Methodological recommendations on the application of anti-corruption legislation, including conflict of interest rules and related restrictions;

Guidance and tools for whistleblowers, explaining reporting procedures and available protections;

The Anti-Corruption Strategy and State Anti-Corruption Programme, which set out national priorities, compliance expectations, and practical measures for preventing corruption.

In addition, Ukrainian legislation (in particular, the Law of Ukraine “On Prevention of Corruption”) requires certain public bodies and high-risk entities to adopt internal anti-corruption programmes aligned with state policy, while the NACP provides oversight and further guidance in this respect.
Overall, while Ukraine does not have a single codified compliance manual, there is a well-developed framework of official guidance, recommendations, and model documents issued primarily by the NACP, which together form the basis for anti-corruption compliance in practice.

Ukrainian law does not provide for Deferred Prosecution Agreements (DPAs) or Non-Prosecution Agreements (NPAs) as understood in common law jurisdictions.

Instead, similar mechanisms exist:

• plea agreements between the prosecutor and the suspect/accused (with reduced punishment, subject to court approval);
• exemption from liability in case of voluntary disclosure and assistance in the investigation;
• for legal entities — cooperation, compliance measures, and remedial actions are taken into account when determining sanctions.

Overall, these instruments partially perform functions similar to DPAs/NPAs, but in a more formalised and limited form.

Ukrainian law provides a relatively comprehensive framework for the protection of whistle-blowers in the area of corruption.

Under the Law of Ukraine “On Prevention of Corruption”, a whistle-blower (i.e. a person who reports possible facts of corruption or corruption-related offences) is entitled to a range of legal safeguards. These include:

• Confidentiality and anonymity: the identity of a whistle-blower is protected, and anonymous reporting channels are permitted;
• Protection against retaliation: whistle-blowers are protected from dismissal, disciplinary action, harassment, or other adverse consequences related to their report;
• State protection measures: in certain cases, whistle-blowers may benefit from measures similar to those applied to participants in criminal proceedings (e.g. personal security measures);
• Access to free legal aid and psychological support.

In addition, Ukrainian legislation provides for financial incentives in certain cases. A whistle-blower may be entitled to a reward if:

• the reported corruption offence involves significant amounts (generally exceeding a statutory threshold);
• the information provided leads to the detection of the offence and a final court conviction.

The amount of the reward may be up to 10% of the monetary value of the object of the offence or the damage caused, subject to the limits laid down by law.

In practice, the National Agency on Corruption Prevention (NACP) plays a key role in administering whistle-blower protection policies, including maintaining reporting channels and providing methodological guidance.

Overall, Ukraine has developed a legal framework that combines protective measures with financial incentives, although the practical effectiveness of these mechanisms continues to evolve.

Ukrainian law provides for the possibility for offenders to cooperate with the investigation in exchange for leniency or other procedural benefits. Such cooperation is regulated by the Criminal Procedure Code of Ukraine (CPC) and other legal acts.

• Plea agreement ‘plea deal’ (Articles 468-476 of the CPC of Ukraine)

A form of procedural compromise between the prosecutor and the suspect or accused, whereby a person voluntarily admits his or her guilt in committing a criminal offence in exchange for an agreed punishment. This mechanism allows the accused to receive a more predictable and likely lighter sentence.

Possible in corruption and bribery cases, provided that:

– The suspect/accused fully admits guilt;

– The parties agree to a specific penalty;

– The agreement is approved by the court;

This mechanism:

– Allows to reduce the timeframe for consideration of the case;

– Often used in investigations;

Does not exempt a person from liability, but may provide for a suspended sentence or a fine without imprisonment.

• Cooperation agreement with the investigation

Cooperation agreement – may result in a plea agreement. The suspect, in addition to admitting his or her actions, provides the investigation with certain information or testimony. This allows the investigation to bring to justice a greater number of persons who are accomplices in the crime.

In my view, if effectiveness is assessed by the number of cases opened, anti-corruption agencies in Ukraine demonstrate a high level of activity. However, if we evaluate outcomes, the overall situation remains largely unchanged. Despite a significant number of ongoing proceedings and convictions, the question of the actual impact of anti-corruption measures on the overall level of corruption remains a subject of public and professional debate. This indicates that, despite institutional progress, deeper structural reforms and consistent political will are still required to achieve sustainable change.

While corruption exists in various forms in many countries. In the professional community, there are different approaches to balancing the effectiveness of anti-corruption law enforcement and the procedural safeguards of participants in criminal proceedings. In practice, this often manifests not as impartial enforcement, but as a targeted campaign with arrests and disregard for due process or legal argumentation. In the practice of certain high-profile cases, the defense has expressed concerns regarding an overly active role of the court in examining evidence and in the procedural management of the case. Such practices severely undermine the principles of adversarial justice and judicial neutrality.

Among the trends of recent years, one can note the strengthening of the role of specialized anti-corruption institutions, an increase in the number of criminal proceedings against high-ranking officials, and the active use of financial control.

Every country probably has and has had corruption, but in our country we are not fighting corruption, but rather turning into a country of expediency with arrests and dismissing any arguments. Moreover, judges in similar circumstances are so inventive in helping the prosecution, which they are pulling by the ears, that it is not even funny! We have cases where, right during the hearing, the presiding judge instructs the prosecution on how best to conduct the pre-trial investigation, what else they should do to prove guilt.

In Ukraine, there is a clearly regulated procedure for judicial review of actions, omissions and decisions of state authorities. It is carried out within the framework of administrative proceedings regulated by the Code of Administrative Procedure of Ukraine (CAPU).

The following may be challenged in administrative proceedings:

– regulatory legal acts (e.g. orders, resolutions, instructions, etc.);

– individual decisions of state authorities;

– actions or omissions of officials;

– refusal to perform certain actions (e.g., issue a permit, accept an application, etc.).

Who has the right to go to court?

– Individuals or legal entities whose rights or interests have been violated.

– In some cases, the prosecutor’s office or other authorised entities (for example, the Ukrainian Parliament Commissioner for Human Rights).

Which court should I apply to?

– Administrative courts of first instance (district administrative courts) – consider cases against public authorities.

– The Administrative Court of Cassation within the Supreme Court – considers cases against public authorities, including as a court of first instance.

Appeal procedure: key stages

1. Preparation and filing of an administrative claim:

– Within the statutory period from the moment when the person learned or could have learned of the violation of his/her rights (the law sets individual time limits for different categories of claims);

– the form of the claim is in writing, with attachments and copies of documents.

2. Consideration of the case in the court of first instance:

– the court has the right to request evidence, summon witnesses, and examine documents;

– cases are usually considered within a reasonable time (up to several months).

3. Appeal:

– must be filed within 30 days from the date of receipt of the decision.

4. Cassation appeal to the Supreme Court:

– allowed after the appeal;

– grounds – incorrect application of the law or violation of the process.

Available judicial remedies:

• Declaring a decision or action unlawful;
• cancellation of the act or obligation of the authority to take certain actions;
• Suspension of the decision (used as an interim remedy);
• compensation for damage caused by unlawful actions of state authoritie.

Despite the significant number of legislative changes and institutional reforms, the assessment of their practical effectiveness remains mixed. While laws are amended, new regulations are adopted, and additional institutions are created, the underlying system remains largely unchanged. Attempts to combat corruption without dismantling the existing corrupt mechanisms often result in making those mechanisms more sophisticated and costly, rather than eliminating them.

Legislation always looks good on paper. In every country, it is adopted to regulate the relationship between citizens, business and the state. The success of any anti-corruption policy depends not so much on the texts of regulations as on how these laws work in practice.

I often hear the opinion that Ukraine’s problem is imperfect legislation. But this is not true. We have no worse laws than, say, Switzerland. Moreover, Ukrainian anti-corruption legislation formally complies with European standards. But there is a nuance: it is not enforced here. And even if it is, it is implemented selectively.

Ukraine is a party to several key international anti-corruption and related instruments that form an integral part of its national legal framework, including:

The United Nations Convention against Corruption (UNCAC): Ratified by Law No. 251-V of 18 October 2006, this treaty entered into force for Ukraine on 1 January 2010. It provides a comprehensive framework for preventing corruption, promoting international cooperation, and facilitating asset recovery.

The Criminal Law Convention on Corruption (Council of Europe, ETS No. 173): Ratified by Ukraine on 18 October 2006. It requires the criminalisation of a wide range of corruption offences, including bribery, trading in influence, and money laundering.

The Civil Law Convention on Corruption (Council of Europe): Ratified by Law No. 2476-IV of 16 March 2005. It establishes mechanisms for compensation of damage caused by corruption and the invalidation of contracts resulting from corrupt practices.

The Additional Protocol to the Criminal Law Convention on Corruption (ETS No. 191): Ratified by Ukraine on 18 October 2006. It extends criminal liability to additional categories of persons and conduct, including acts involving arbitrators and jurors.

The United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime (UNTOC): Ratified by Ukraine on 4 February 2004, together with its Protocols.

Ukraine has been a member of the Group of States against Corruption (GRECO) since 2006 and actively participates in evaluation processes aimed at strengthening the fight against corruption in accordance with Council of Europe standards.

Thus, in Ukraine, there is an institution of legal privilege that provides guarantees of confidentiality of communication between a lawyer and a client, in particular in the context of investigations conducted by lawyers.

Legal basis:

1. The Law of Ukraine ‘On the Bar and Practice of Law’

Article 22: ‘Attorney-client privilege’ is any information that became known to an advocate in the course of his or her professional activities, including:

– legal positions;

– content of consultations, documents, correspondence;

– any other materials related to the performance of the assignment of the Practice of Law.

The advocate shall not be interrogated regarding the professional secrecy without the written consent of the client.

– Article 23: During the search or inspection of the advocate’s home or other property, the premises where he or she carries out the practice of law, temporary access to the advocate’s belongings and documents shall be granted to a representative of the regional bar council

2. The Criminal Procedure Code of Ukraine

– Article 161: data constituting the legal privilege shall not be disclosed.

The legal privilege applies to:

– Advocate’s files, analytical materials, documents;

– Correspondence of the advocate with the client (paper and electronic);

– Information received by the advocate during an internal investigation;

– Legal advice, including oral advice.

The legal privilege does not apply to:

– to the activities, in particular, of legal advisers of companies (i.e. in-house lawyers without the status of an attorney)

– documents that do not contain signs of confidential communication (e.g., financial statements, internal company orders, etc.).

You can fight corruption all your life, or you can live without corruption. Look, is there corruption in Switzerland, for example? Well, perhaps there is, but it is very small. In other words, the experience of individual countries shows that the level of corruption depends not only on the severity of criminal prosecution, but also on the overall level of institutional development, the digitalisation of public services and the transparency of public administration. Obviously, it is not the severity of punishment that prevents corruption, but certain institutional changes. That is, when you take away some powers from the state.

For example, when an official can’t decide anything, and a computer does everything, or something is transferred to private hands. Then corruption itself disappears and it is very effective. But in our country, corruption does not become less, not because someone is working badly or well, but because an official with great powers is on a meagre salary. And they are constantly exposed, but we, as citizens, are interested in the result – is it there or not?

And obviously, there is no result, because new corruption cases are emerging. That is, if there are no institutional changes, we can increase the staff of these bodies, we can create new ones or remove them altogether, we will not achieve results. You know, fighting corruption by creating new bodies is like extinguishing a fire by adding fuel to it, it makes no sense. That is why I am always worried about the creation of special bodies, that it is a process for the sake of a process, and if we do not change something systematically, it will take 50 or 100 years, and we will still be talking about the effectiveness of the fight against corruption, but we want to remove it altogether.

In Ukraine, corporate organisations are increasingly taking bribery and corruption prevention more seriously, especially in large companies, international corporations and enterprises that work with the public sector or attract foreign investment.

Companies with foreign capital and large holdings usually implement developed compliance systems, integrity policies, channels for anonymous whistleblowing, and conduct regular trainings for employees. This is driven by both international standards and expectations from partners and investors.

Domestic companies, especially those involved in public procurement or interacting with regulators, are increasingly paying attention to the risks of criminal prosecution and reputational damage. Such companies are introducing anti-corruption policies, codes of ethics, and internal audits.

Small and medium-sized businesses tend to take a less systematic approach to anti-corruption measures, in particular due to limited resources and less involvement in public processes. At the same time, the understanding of risks is growing, especially among companies seeking cooperation with international donors or investors.

Public companies and companies with state participation are under increased scrutiny by both government agencies and the public, and therefore have to pay more attention to the formal side of anti-corruption policy. However, the effectiveness of such measures largely depends on the managerial will of the management.

In general, Ukrainian businesses are gradually realising that corruption prevention is not only a legal requirement, but also a tool for sustainable development, reputation protection and strengthening trust from customers and partners. At the same time, the problem lies in the actual implementation of the declared policies, effective risk monitoring and disciplinary liability for their violation.

The key challenges for legal entities in bribery and corruption cases in Ukraine can generally be divided into operational constraints, evidentiary difficulties, and the risk of liability.

Firstly, investigative actions often result in the disruption or complete suspension of business operations. The seizure of assets and bank accounts pursuant to Article 170 of the Criminal Procedure Code of Ukraine effectively blocks a company’s financial activity. At the same time, searches and the seizure of equipment or documents may halt operations and lead to the partial loss of critically important data.

Secondly, companies face significant limitations in collecting and presenting evidence. Under Article 290 of the Criminal Procedure Code of Ukraine, access to the prosecution’s evidence is granted only after the completion of the pre-trial investigation, which restricts the defense’s ability to timely assess and challenge the prosecution’s position. This issue is particularly acute in cases involving covert investigative (search) actions, where verifying the legality and reliability of evidence becomes substantially more complex.

Thirdly, there is a direct risk of liability for legal entities. Ukrainian legislation provides for the possibility of imposing sanctions on companies for corruption offenses committed by their officials, including substantial fines, confiscation of assets, and even compulsory liquidation.

In addition, companies suffer reputational damage, which often leads to the loss of counterparties, termination of contracts, and increased scrutiny from financial institutions. Internal governance conflicts may also arise, particularly regarding representation of the company’s interests and the determination of its legal strategy.

Finally, the unjustified length of pre-trial investigations creates a state of ongoing legal and commercial uncertainty, increasing pressure on businesses and limiting their ability to operate effectively.

In fact, this is more of a question for me as a lawyer, as a lawyer, as a defence lawyer, so I would like to express my opinion from a professional point of view.

In my opinion, this system is dominated by expediency. That is, 3 institutions have been created – HACC, NABU, SAPO. From time to time, members of the legal profession raise concerns about an insufficient institutional balance between investigative authorities, the prosecution, and the judiciary in high-profile anti-corruption proceedings. And in fact, this is not a classic system where there is a court that checks compliance with certain human rights requirements, as it should be, but they compete with the bar, shaping public opinion in such a way that they are like lawyers working for corrupt officials’ ‘dirty money’ so that corrupt officials do not receive punishment, but they are on the side of the state. This is not acceptable for the professional environment, for lawyers. We understand that this is our job, like a surgeon, who doesn’t ask who this person is, he is fighting the disease, and we are protecting the rights of the individual.

Because whoever he is, if it is a European state with laws and a Constitution, he has his own rights that cannot be violated. Our procedural opponents do not like this, and they ‘play’ on public opinion and use, in my opinion, methods that are somewhat similar to Soviet methods that should have remained in the past.

For example, a person is detained and his or her story is immediately posted on the NABU and SAPO websites with the materials of covert investigative investigative actions. And immediately there is a public outcry – they were caught red-handed, and at the bottom there is a small note ‘under Article 62, a person is not considered guilty until a court verdict is reached’, but no one reads this note anymore. The opinion has already been formed and this is actually pressure on the court.

The court, when we do not pay attention to obvious procedural errors, to violations that should lead to the inadmissibility of evidence, says, well, look at the damage caused to the state. Well, yes, if so, then there is no need for a court or a bar at all.

Representatives of the legal profession have periodically expressed concerns about the impact of information campaigns surrounding high-profile anti-corruption cases on public perception of the presumption of innocence and the right to defense.

Everyone says no, we are a European country, human rights must prevail. So we pay lip service to being European, but in reality we are doing what we used to do, and this is a big conflict.

Our society, unfortunately, does not understand the simple truth that while a person with a lot of money can hire the best lawyers and even they have a hard time defending their rights, no one will even talk to ordinary people when some trouble happens to them. Because human rights, regardless of whether it’s an oligarch or an ordinary person, either exist or not.

And this is the big problem. There was hope that the court would be a model of justice, but it has turned into a tool for the anti-corruption fight.

Ukrainian law enforcement authorities are responding to the rapid growth in electronic data in corruption investigations by expanding procedural tools, actively using digital forensics, and enhancing institutional and technological capabilities. At the same time, these developments are accompanied by risks of violations of procedural safeguards.

From a procedural perspective, the Criminal Procedure Code of Ukraine provides mechanisms for accessing electronic evidence, including temporary access to items and documents (Articles 159–166), searches involving the seizure of digital media and servers (Article 234), and the use of covert investigative (search) actions (Chapter 21), including interception of communications and monitoring of correspondence.

In practice, the role of digital forensics is increasing, particularly through the creation of forensic images of data storage devices as an alternative to their physical seizure, as well as the analysis of large volumes of data from mobile devices, messaging applications, and cloud services. Specialized software is used for data recovery, processing, and filtering.

At the institutional level, authorities such as the National Anti-Corruption Bureau of Ukraine and the Bureau of Economic Security of Ukraine have strengthened their analytical units and integrated access to state registers and electronic databases. Law enforcement agencies also actively use data from the National Agency on Corruption Prevention, including electronic declarations and lifestyle monitoring.

International cooperation also plays an important role, particularly through mutual legal assistance mechanisms (MLAT requests), as well as interaction with global technology companies such as Google and Meta to obtain electronic evidence.

At the same time, the state is expanding regulatory compliance requirements. Financial institutions apply enhanced KYC/AML procedures, generating significant volumes of transactional data, while businesses are required to ensure the preservation of electronic records, including logs and communications.

Despite these developments, challenges remain in ensuring compliance with the principle of proportionality in investigative actions, the protection of personal data, and the safeguarding of legal professional privilege, particularly in the context of large-scale collection and analysis of digital information.

Over the next 18 months, businesses in Ukraine are likely to face several significant bribery and corruption-related challenges shaped by ongoing regulatory reform, wartime conditions, and increased enforcement activity.

1. Intensified enforcement and investigative activity

Anti-corruption enforcement remains a key priority for Ukrainian authorities, particularly the National Anti-Corruption Bureau of Ukraine (NABU), the Specialised Anti-Corruption Prosecutor’s Office (SAPO), and the National Agency on Corruption Prevention (NACP). Businesses may face increased scrutiny in relation to public procurement, defence-related contracts, and reconstruction projects, with a continued focus on high-risk sectors.

2. Heightened risks in public procurement and reconstruction projects

The large-scale reconstruction agenda creates significant exposure to corruption risks, including procurement irregularities, conflicts of interest, and intermediary arrangements. Companies participating in public tenders will need to ensure robust compliance frameworks and enhanced due diligence on partners and subcontractors.

3. Compliance pressure and alignment with EU standards

Ukraine’s EU integration process is driving further alignment with EU anti-corruption and corporate governance standards. Businesses, particularly multinational groups and local subsidiaries, will face increasing expectations to implement effective compliance systems, internal controls, and whistle-blower mechanisms consistent with EU practice.

4. Operational risks linked to wartime conditions

The ongoing armed conflict continues to create structural risks, including emergency procurement procedures, rapid regulatory changes, and increased reliance on discretionary decision-making by public officials. These conditions may elevate exposure to both actual and perceived corruption risks.

5. Increased liability for legal entities and individuals

Ukrainian law continues to develop the regime of criminal-law measures applicable to legal entities. Companies may face growing exposure to fines, confiscation measures, and reputational consequences arising from employee misconduct, particularly where compliance systems are assessed as insufficient.

6. Cross-border enforcement and cooperation risks

Greater cooperation with international partners and anti-corruption bodies increases the likelihood of parallel investigations and information sharing, particularly in cases involving foreign investors, development funds, or international procurement chains.

This is a very complex issue, in my opinion. Each case is unique. For example, you say that you were caught taking a bribe, but this can only be said after the court verdict. For example, there may be an acquittal in the case, or it may be closed due to time limits, etc.

Our system is generally very ‘impatient’, and this is how public opinion is formed: let’s pass sentences faster. Then the system is not needed at all. If this is a real procedure, when there is a defence, when it examines all the evidence, when every argument of one and the other side is checked, when issues related to the provocation of the crime are checked, etc.

This, of course, takes a lot of time, and it is theoretically impossible to speed it up. Well, it’s impossible to hire a million judges and hear cases every day. Neither lawyers nor prosecutors will be able to work like this – no one will be able to withstand such a load.

I believe that in this matter, the expectations of society are unjustified, as they form the opinion that everything should happen at once – today something happened, tomorrow there will be a verdict.

Moreover, this opinion is precisely shaped by such bodies as the NABU and the SAPO with their publications, because they will show something and assure that everything is obvious and clear, lawyers will now do some tricks, but we all understand that the crime took place and we will prove it. But in practice, you see that not everything is so obvious and unambiguous.

And what is provocation? Why do I see a very big problem here, first of all, a moral and ethical problem for society? Of course, if we are talking about provocation, it means that the crime took place, but someone provoked it, and if it were not for the provocation, there would be no crime.

I am sorry to say that our procedural opponents are doing this systematically, creating provocations. That is, they find a person who is somehow dependent on the NABU or the SAPO, for example, who has done something themselves, and motivate them to ‘expose’ someone.

For example, the person was not actually extorted, but he or she creates such conditions. In my practice, there was a case when a man came to his classmate and begged for help, allegedly because he was sick, his wife was also sick, he had problems at work, and thus persuaded the person to take certain actions and gave him some money for help. And he was arrested for corruption.

Is this acceptable or unacceptable? In my understanding, instead of fighting corruption, we are creating more such crimes. Well, it’s like handing out guns on the street to anyone and then watching when a person uses them illegally.

In my opinion, the problem is not in the legislation, but in the fact that the state is too actively interfering in economic and social processes. Where there is state control, there is corruption. Tax, customs and public procurement are systems that create opportunities for abuse. Where the state takes on too many functions (road construction, service administration, business control), corruption risks arise. We don’t have to look far for examples: let’s take the state post office and private logistics businesses. One works efficiently, the other does not. Why? Because where there is real competition and responsibility of the owner, the system works. The same applies to other areas. We need to transfer more functions to private hands.