The Act of 10 February 1999 on the punishment of corruption has introduced the regulations regarding antibribery and corruption into the Belgian Criminal Code. Embezzlement, extortion, and conflict of interests by persons exercising a public office are currently punished by articles 240-245 of the Criminal Code. Bribery of persons exercising a public office is currently criminalised by articles 246-253 of the Criminal Code (public bribery), while bribery of non-public persons is covered by articles 504bis-504ter of the Criminal Code (private bribery).

However, as of 1 September 2026, a New Criminal Code will enter into force in Belgium. From that date onwards, embezzlement, extortion, and conflict of interests by persons exercising a public office will be criminalised by articles 634-637 of the New Criminal Code, public bribery will be addressed by articles 638-639 of the New Criminal Code and private bribery will be covered by article 487 of the New Criminal Code.

In what follows, both regulatory frameworks will be outlined. As regards their practical application, it should be noted that, in respect of offences committed before 1 September 2026 but adjudicated thereafter, it will be necessary to determine which set of provisions provides for the more lenient penalty, in which case those provisions will apply. Offences committed after 1 September 2026 will, in principle, be governed by the new provisions.

In Belgium, one has to make a distinction between two types of investigations. On the one hand, the investigations led by the Public Prosecutor, and, on the other hand, those led by the Investigating Judge. Both types of investigations can concern the same offences, such as bribery and corruption. The most important difference between the two above-mentioned types of investigations is that certain investigative acts are exclusively reserved for the Investigating Judge (e.g. dawn raid and telephone tapping). In general, the latter thus investigates the more severe cases. When conducting an investigation, both the Public Prosecutor and the Investigating Judge will be assisted by the police, and in particular by the specialised anti-corruption service of the federal judicial police, namely the Central Anti-Corruption Service (Centrale Dienst ter Bestrijding van Corruptie/Office Central pour la Répression de la Corruption). Although both the Investigating Judge and the Public Prosecutor can investigate bribery and corruption, only the Public Prosecutor can prosecute criminal offenses. Furthermore, should the bribery and/or corruption affect the EU budget, it then can be investigated and prosecuted by the European Public Prosecutor’s Office.

Under both the current regulatory framework and the framework that will apply as of 1 September 2026, there is the distinction between public and private bribery, as well as between active and passive bribery. Passive bribery is the act where a person directly or through intermediaries, on its own behalf or that of a third party, requests, accepts or receives an offer, a promise, or a benefit of any kind to perform certain acts or to refrain from performing certain acts. Active bribery consists in proposing, directly or through intermediaries, to a person an offer, promise or benefit of any kind on its own behalf or on behalf of a third party to have certain acts performed or to refrain from certain acts. Depending on the capacity of the person one tries to bribe or who is actually bribed, there will be public or private bribery.

Corruption, being considered as the fraudulent conduct of a public official, includes different criminal offences. It covers embezzlement, extortion, and conflict of interests by persons exercising a public office. Under the current regulatory framework, embezzlement consists of the misappropriation by a public official of public or private funds, monetary instruments, documents, securities, or tangible assets, which he has in his possession by force or by virtue of his office (art. 240, of the Criminal Code). Under the new Criminal Code, the scope of this offence is somewhat broadened, with a more general reference to “tangible and intangible movable property” (Article 637 of the new Criminal Code). (art. 637, of the New Criminal Code). Extortion is currently defined as a public official ordering the collection taxes, income, or interest, or claiming or receiving such amounts, knowing that they are not due or exceed the amount due (art. 243, of the Criminal Code). Here too, the wording of the new Criminal Code is broader, referring more generally to “rights or funds” (art. 636, of the New Criminal Code). Lastly, the conflict of interests concerns the situation in which a public official, either directly or through intermediaries or sham acts, takes or accepts any interest, whatever it may be, in the transactions, tenders, contracts or works under direction over which he had total or partial management or control at the time of the act (art. 245, 1st paragraph, of the Criminal Code and art. 637, of the New Criminal Code). Nevertheless, it should be stressed that there is no criminal offence when, under the given circumstances, they were unable to promote their private interests through their position and acted transparently (art. 245, 2nd paragraph, of the Criminal Code and art. 637, § 2, of the New Criminal Code).

Under Belgian law, a distinction is indeed made between bribery of a public official (“public bribery”) and bribery of private persons (“private bribery”).

Both types of bribery target conduct whereby a person either offers (“active bribery”) or requests, accepts, or receives (“passive bribery”) an offer, promise, or benefit of any kind, in order for the person to whom the advantage is offered, or who requests, accepts, or receives it, to perform or refrain from performing certain acts.

Articles 504bis-504ter of the Criminal Code (art. 487, of the New Criminal Code) cover both active and passive private bribery. Passive private bribery is the act of a person, in his capacity as director or manager of a legal entity, or trustee or appointee of a legal entity or a natural person requesting, accepting or receiving an offer, promise or benefit of any kind, directly or through intermediaries, on his own behalf or on behalf of a third party, in order to induce him to perform or refrain from performing an act falling within the scope of his responsibilities, or made easier by his position, without the authorisation of and without informing his board of directors, the general shareholders’ meeting, the principal or the employer. Active private bribery is the act of making an offer or promise, or offering a benefit of any kind to a director or manager of a legal entity or a trustee or appointee of a legal entity or a natural person, directly or through intermediaries, on his own behalf or on behalf of a third party, in order to induce that person to perform or refrain from performing an act falling within the scope of his responsibilities, or made easier by his position, without the authorisation of and without informing his board of directors, the general shareholders’ meeting, the principal or the employer.

Public bribery is currently punishable pursuant to articles 246-249 of the Criminal Code. Passive public bribery is the act where a person exercising a public office, directly or through intermediaries, on his own behalf or that of a third party, requests, accepts or receives an offer, a promise, or a benefit of any kind in order to conduct one of the acts mentioned in article 247 of the Criminal Code. Active public bribery consists in proposing, directly or through intermediaries, to a person exercising a public office an offer, promise or benefit of any kind on his own behalf or on behalf of a third party in order to conduct one of the acts in article 247 of the Criminal Code. In accordance to article 247 of the Criminal Code different criminal sanctions apply depending on the purpose of the bribery: a) with the purpose of inducing the person exercising a public office, to perform a lawful act that is not subject to payment of his office (art. 247, § 1, of the Criminal Code); b) with the purpose of inducing the person exercising a public office, to perform an unlawful act in the exercise of his office or to induce such person to refrain from performing an act that is part of his duties (art. 247, § 2, of the Criminal Code); c) with the purpose of inducing the person exercising a public office, to commit an offence in connection with the exercise of his office (art. 247, § 3, of the Criminal Code); d) with the purpose of inducing the person exercising a public office, to use their established or possible influence acquired by virtue of his office to obtain the performance or omission of an act of a public authority or a public administration (art. 247, § 4, of the Criminal Code). Articles 246 and 247 of the Criminal Code cover all categories of persons exercising any public office, and irrespective of their status: federal, regional, community officials, provincial or municipal officers or officials, elected representatives, public officers, persons who temporary or permanently exercise a part of the public authority, and even private persons charged with a public service mission. The group of people targeted by this last subcategory is very large and even includes persons who aren’t charged explicitly with a public service mission but can affect the decision-making of such public services anyway (e.g. financial consultants). Persons who are assimilated to a person exercising a public office are: persons who are a candidate for a public office; persons who give the impression that they will hold a public office; persons who, by making use of false capacities, make believe that they exercise a public office. Specific sanctions are provided for when the act of bribery concerns a police officer, an officer of judicial police or member of the public prosecution (art. 248 Criminal Code), an arbitrator (art. 249, § 1, Criminal Code), a judge-assessor or a member of a jury (art. 249, § 2, Criminal Code), or a judge (art. 249, § 3, Criminal Code). Article 250 of the Criminal Code extends the bribery offences set out in Articles 246–249 of the Criminal Code to the bribery of persons exercising a public office in a foreign country, as well as to the bribery of persons exercising a public office within an international public organisation. In cases of bribery of a foreign public official, more severe penalties apply.

As of 1 September 2026, public bribery will be punishable pursuant to Articles 638–639 of the new Criminal Code. The definitions of active and passive public bribery in the new Criminal Code largely mirror those in the current Criminal Code, albeit formulated in a clearer and more accessible manner. Furthermore, the New Criminal Code provides for the following statutory definition of “persons exercising a public office”:

(a) any person who, on the basis of a law, regulation, or judicial decision:

– is responsible for maintaining public order;
– is entrusted with monitoring compliance with certain rules or decisions of a public authority; or
– is empowered to enforce compliance with certain rules or decisions of a public authority;

(b) any person who performs a public service or public mandate, the acts of whom are determined and regulated by a law, regulation, or judicial decision.

Furthermore, shall be treated as equivalent to a person exercising a public office:

1° a person exercising a public office in a foreign State or within an international public-law organisation;
2° any person who has applied for such a position, who makes it appear that they will exercise such a position, or who, by the use of false pretences, makes it appear that they are exercising such a position;
3° an arbitrator.

(Also) under the New Criminal Code, the involvement of a person exercising a public office in a foreign country or within an international public organisation constitutes an aggravating circumstance.

Both individuals and corporate entities can be held criminally liable for bribery. The criminal liability of private legal entities and public legal entities has been introduced respectively by the Act of 4 May 1999 and the Act of 11 July 2018. The liability of the legal entity is autonomous: it must be demonstrated by the Public Prosecutor that the company itself was willing to commit the offence and that it was linked (intrinsically) to its purpose or the preservation of its interests or was committed on its behalf. The mere fact that one of its employees or directors committed a criminal offence, cannot give rise to its liability.

Furthermore, legal entities and natural persons may be prosecuted and convicted simultaneously for the same facts.

A person who suffered damages resulting from bribery or corruption can seek relief before the court; the victim can choose to direct himself to a civil or to a criminal court. If a criminal case is initiated prior to or during civil proceedings, such civil proceedings are suspended until the finalisation of the criminal proceedings. The Act of 20 March 1991 on the approval of contractors provides for the possibility of refusing or suspending the recognition of a contractor if they commit certain acts of public bribery. The person convicted of public bribery cannot apply for public contracts according to the Act of 17 June 2016 on Public Procurement.

Bribery and corruption offences may give rise to various sanctions, the most common of which are fines (for both legal entities and natural persons) and imprisonment (for natural persons). Confiscation of the illicit benefit is also frequently imposed. Both under the current and the new Criminal Code, sanctions are substantial in order to ensure a deterrent effect. In this regard, several factors, including the actual performance of the intended act, the status of the persons involved, and any international dimension of the facts, may have a significant impact on sentencing.

In addition, a number of other penalties may be applicable, although a comprehensive discussion thereof falls outside the scope of this guide.

Finally, it should be noted that convictions of both natural and legal persons are recorded in their criminal records, which may affect any subsequent convictions, as well as participation in, inter alia, public procurement procedures.

As outlined above, under Belgian law, a bribe can constitute an offer, promise or benefit of any kind. Due to this broad scope of application, it includes hospitality, travel, and entertainment expenses. In principle, every offer, promise or benefit, regardless of its value, could lead to criminal prosecution (in case all of the other conditions have been united), without differentiating according to the involvement of Belgian or foreign public officials. For the sake of completeness, it should be noted that in certain sectors specific legislation regulating this aspect exists, such as the Act of 25 March 1964 regarding the pharmaceutical products.

Political contributions are governed by the Act of 4 July 1989 on the limitation and control of election expenses engaged for the election of the House of Representatives, as well as funding and open accounting of political parties. According to article 16bis of that Act only natural persons (and no legal entities or natural persons who act as an intermediary for a legal entity) are allowed to give gifts to political parties, to electoral lists, to candidates and to political mandates. According to this Act, political parties, electoral lists, candidates, and political mandates can receive a maximum contribution of 500 EUR or its equivalent per year from the same natural person. Natural persons may contribute up to a maximum total annual amount of 2,000 EUR or its equivalent to political parties, electoral lists, candidates, and political mandates. Any gift of 125 EUR and above must be transferred electronically by wire transfer, a payment order, or a bank or credit card. The total amount of cash gifts from the same person may not exceed 125 EUR per year. Anyone who makes or accepts a donation in breach of the aforementioned rules may be subject to criminal fines.

The Belgian Criminal Code does not provide an exception of liability in case of facilitation payments. Facilitation payments fall within the scope of corruption and bribery and are therefore prohibited under Belgian law.

There is no specific defence for bribery, embezzlement, or extortion; the defence will depend on the factual context of the case. With regard to conflict of interests, the law provides that one cannot be prosecuted (and thus convicted) if they could not promote their private interests through their employment and acted openly (art. 245, 2nd paragraph, of the Criminal Code and art. 637, § 2, of the New Criminal Code). In all other cases, again, the defence will depend on the factual context.

The impact of the compliance programs is not regulated by the (New) Criminal Code. However, a legal entity can put forward, as part of its defence, that it has a compliance program in place. The legal entity will then have to show it has compliance guidelines and procedures (e.g., on which gifts can be accepted or given and who then has to be informed) in place as well as their effectiveness. Therefore, it is advised that a legal entity also has operational anti-bribery and anti-corruption structures in place. Such programs and structures might however, depending on the specific circumstances of the case, still be insufficient to escape conviction.

In 2016, an anti-corruption guide for Belgian enterprises overseas has been drafted. This guide can be found on the website of the Federal Public Service Economy (https://economie.fgov.be/nl/publicaties/anticorruptiegids-voor). In this guide, which is also useful for Belgian entities who (only) do business in Belgium, advice is provided regarding the elements constituting a compliance program. The compliance program must comprise three actions: prevent, detect, and respond. This guide also refers to the ICC Rules on Combating Corruption (2011)24 – nowadays there is a more recent version, from 2023 – as guideline for an effective compliance program.

In principle, it is possible in Belgium to enter into a DPA, including for corruption and bribery, as long as certain conditions are met (art. 216bis of the Code of Criminal Proceedings). Both the Public Prosecutor’s Office and the accused person are free to enter into negotiations or not. In practice, the Public Prosecutor’s Office sometimes refuses to do so on principle for bribery and corruption. A DPA is subject to a number of conditions and can be concluded only if the criminal court has not yet pronounced a final judgment in first instance, and the (alleged) offender (i) is willing to pay a lump sum, (ii) has acknowledged in writing their civil liability for the damaging event and (iii) has compensated the uncontested part of the harm that was suffered by the victim of this event. The lump sum cannot exceed the maximum fine imposed by the law for the offence in question. If a DPA is reached, a criminal court has to verify that all conditions were met and homologate it before it enters into force.

Furthermore, and in accordance with article 216 of the Code of Criminal Proceedings, an offender can admit their guilt in exchange for an agreed-upon sentence, provided that certain conditions are met (“plea bargaining”). If so, the Public Prosecutor’s Office can propose a lower penalty than it would have claimed if the offender had not acknowledged their guilt; or a (wholly or partly) suspended penalty, whether or not subject to the fulfilment of certain conditions. If the offender agrees with the proposed penalty, an agreement is concluded. This agreement must be approved by the criminal court. This mechanism, introduced in 2016, has not been used very often in Belgium to date (in general).

It should be noted that, although these mechanisms are provided for by law and such agreements may in principle be concluded in cases of bribery and corruption, the Public Prosecutor’s Office is increasingly (as a matter of principle) reluctant to do so in practice. No legal remedy is available against such a (principled) refusal.

Finally, Belgian law does not provide for a NPA mechanism.

Belgian law indeed provides protection to whistle-blowers.

The Act of 28 November 2022 on the protection of reporters of breaches of Union or national law discovered within a legal entity in the private sector implemented the EU Whistle-blower Directive (2019/1937) into Belgian law for the private sector (the Whistle-blower Act). An Act of 8 December 2022 did the same for the federal public sector and a Flemish Decree of 18 November 2022 for the Flemish public sector, whilst the regional legislators in Wallonia and Brussels are also working on legislative proposals to implement the aforementioned EU Whistle-blower Directive at regional level in the public sector.

Based on the Whistle-blower Act, whistle-blowers in the private sector who made a report on information that they became aware of in a work-related context (or outside of a work-related context if the report relates to legislation on financial services, products and markets or anti-money laundering and terrorism financing) are protected against retaliation provided that (i) they had reasonable grounds to believe that the information they reported on was correct, (ii) they made a report with respect to one of the domains that fall in scope of the Whistle-blower Act, and (iii) they reported the information through one of the available reporting channels, i.e. an internal reporting channel, an external reporting channel or public disclosure.

The criterion of ‘reasonable grounds’ will be assessed in light of a person who would be placed in a similar situation and who would have similar knowledge.

It must be noted that protection against retaliation will only be offered to whistle-blowers who made use of public disclosure if they had (i) first reported their concern internally and externally (or directly externally) but no appropriate action was taken, or (ii) reasonable grounds to believe that the breach may constitute an imminent or manifest danger to the public interest, or there is a risk of retaliation or low prospect of the breach being effectively addressed.

Victims of retaliation are entitled to compensation of between 18- and 26-weeks’ remuneration, if they are employees, or actual damages if they are not bound by an employment agreement. Moreover, if the report relates to violations of legislation on financial services, products and markets or anti-money laundering and terrorism financing, the compensation will be equal to up to 6 months’ remuneration (or actual damages if the victim was not bound by an employment agreement). In the latter case, if the whistle-blower was an employee and the act of retaliation consisted of a dismissal, the whistle-blower can ask to be reintegrated into the organisation.

Victims of retaliation can also file a complaint with the federal coordinator who will initiate an extrajudicial procedure to verify the existence of retaliation. The burden of proof that no retaliation had taken place will rest on the company. In case there is a reasonable suspicion of retaliation, the federal coordinator will first ask the highest executive of the legal entity to demonstrate that no retaliation has taken place. If it appears that there is a reasonable suspicion of retaliation, he will subsequently give recommendations within 20 days following receipt of the answer (in the form of a duly justified report) from the highest executive of the company, make recommendations to reverse the retaliation or remedy the harm that was caused. The highest executive then has 20 days to accept or reject these recommendations.

As already mentioned, similar protection is provided to whistle-blowers in the public sector. The Act of 8 December 2022 provides that all statutory officials and all other persons working within or with federal public institutions will be protected as a whistle-blower, when they report or disclose information they received in a work-related context on possible integrity violations of the public institution. They also need to have reasonable grounds too to believe that the information is correct and falls within the scope of the whistle-blowing act. Such integrity violation is any threat to or violation of the public interest and is either a (i) violation of legislation, (ii) a risk to life, health or safety of persons or environment or (iii) a serious deficiency in professional duties or in good governance.

Protection is offered to whistle-blowers, but also to facilitators, third parties and legal entities linked to the whistle-blowers.

Finally, no particular rewards or incentives are offered to individuals to make reports.

The Public Prosecutor may provide an undertaking to a person who delivers substantial, revealing, sincere, and complete statements concerning the involvement of third parties and, where applicable, their own involvement in certain (serious) committed or attempted criminal offenses. Such an undertaking may be made in the context of criminal prosecution, the execution of the sentence, or pre-trial detention, provided that the investigation requires it and that other investigative methods appear insufficient to uncover the truth (Articles 216/1 to 216/8 of the Code of Criminal Proceedings).

As explained above under Question 2, bribery investigations are led by the Public Prosecutor or by the Investigating Judge and not by government authorities. However, please note that the Minister of Justice has a positive right of injunction, meaning that the Minister can oblige the Public Prosecutor to investigate a case. Nevertheless, this does not entail that the Minister of Justice can carry out investigation acts.

Whereas an internal report in 2019 on the Central Anti-Corruption Service showed that the investigations and enforcement of corruption were not optimal due to a lack of resources and especially the investigation of private corruption did not seem to be a priority, this approach seems to be changing. Following the inclusion of corruption in the National Security Plan 2022–2025, the Minister of Justice and the Minister of Internal Affairs approved, in March 2026, the National Security Plan 2026–2029 (Nationaal Veiligheidsplan / Plan National de Sécurité). This plan identifies the security priorities requiring particular attention from the police over the next four years and once again designates corruption as one of those priorities. In this context, particular emphasis is placed on corrupt public officials and individuals who abuse their position within the logistical entry points to the country.

Furthermore, Public Prosecutors are increasingly disinclined to resolve corruption-related proceedings through deferred prosecution agreements, with a view to sending a strong signal to society. This approach is consistent with an announcement made in April 2025, in which the Public Prosecutor’s Office stated that it would intensify its efforts to combat corruption among public officials and politicians.

The legal provisions regarding the investigation and prosecution of bribery or corruption do not foresee decisions or actions by a government authority.

No, although a new Criminal Code was published in 2024 and will enter into force in September 2026, its impact on the fight against public and private bribery appears to be limited.

In principle, the aforementioned Criminal Code will enter into force in April 2026, which will primarily impact sentencing. For offences committed prior to the entry into force of this new Criminal Code but judged afterwards, it will always be necessary to determine whether the old or the new penalty is the least severe one, since it will be this least severe penalty that will have to be imposed.

In addition, the implementation of the new EU Directive on Combating Corruption may lead to an increase in the penalties that can be imposed for bribery, although it remains to be seen within what timeframe this will occur.

Belgium signed the following Conventions that entered into force: Convention on the fight against corruption involving officials of the European Communities or officials of Member States of the European Union (Council of the European Union, 26 May 1997); Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions (OECD, 17 December 1997); Criminal Law Convention on Corruption (Council of Europe, 27 January 1999); Civil Law Convention on Corruption (Council of Europe, 4 November 1999); Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime (UN, 15 November 2000), and the Convention against Corruption (UN, 31 October 2003).

In Belgium, the concept of legal privilege exists. Its violation is criminally sanctioned (Art. 458 of the Criminal Code). Legal privilege is considered to be fundamental to the legal order of Belgium and a fundamental pillar of the right of defence. Legal privilege includes attorney-client privilege (i.e. the confidentiality of the documents and information exchanged while providing legal assistance). The specific provisions of (and the exceptions to) the legal privilege are set out in the Codex Deontology for Lawyers (The European Deontology Codex (CCBE) also foresees the concept of legal privilege). In Belgium, an internal audit is often carried out by auditors who also have a legal privilege.

Article 5 of the Act of 1 March 2000 establishing the Institute for In-house counsels provides that advice provided by an in-house counsel to his employer in his capacity of legal advisor is confidential. This confidentiality also extends to internal correspondence containing a request for an opinion, internal correspondence concerning that request, draft opinions and internal documents prepared in preparation for the opinion. Depending on the nature of the internal investigation, it could be argued that the internal investigation was conducted in that regard and that the documents prepared relate to the drafting of an opinion. It should be noted, however, that there is debate in (Belgian and European) case law about the scope of the legal privilege of in-house counsel. Therefore, there might be a risk that it would ultimately be ruled by a court that the internal investigation carried out by the in-house counsel and the documents drafted are not covered by this legal privilege.

Furthermore, it should be stressed that unless the investigation is aimed at investigating company processes and procedures, without being focused on certain persons, the Act of 18 May 2024 regarding Private Investigations applies to the investigation.

The importance of the fight against corruption seems to increase in Belgium. First of all, and as explained under Question 18, the National Security Plan 2026-2029 that has been adopted in March 2026 shows that corruption is one of the security themes that require special attention from the police over the next four years. Furthermore, practice shows that after an investigation is completed, severe sanctions are asked before the Court by the Public Prosecutor. When the bribery or corruption is considered to have been perpetrated, the courts often apply those severe sanctions. In addition, as also indicated above, Public Prosecutors (sometimes) refuses to conclude DPA with the (alleged) perpetrators of corruption, as a matter of principle.

We are aware that companies doing business in countries listed rather high on the Corruption Perceptions Index of Transparency International, give extensive attention to undertaking the necessary measures to prevent bribery and corruption (in 2025, Belgium was ranked 21st out of the 180 countries according to that index. It is an indicator of public sector corruption where number 1 is considered the least corrupt country and number 180 is considered the most corrupt country). In addition, the prevention of bribery and corruption is an important point of attention for companies that derive a significant part of their turnover from public work contracts. Trainings and a code of conduct with specific provisions regarding bribery and corruption are usually foreseen in these companies.

This does not alter the fact that, given that the implementation of an anti-corruption policy within companies is not mandatory in Belgium, it rarely constitutes a priority for them.

In addition, it should be noted that, pursuant to the Act of 3 September 2017 on the disclosure of non-financial and diversity information by certain large companies and groups, certain companies are required to disclose, on an annual basis, material information relating, inter alia, to their policies on anti-corruption and bribery, as well as the outcomes of those policies. This does constitute an additional incentive to adopt and comply with such policies.

The biggest risk for the legal entities is being found criminally liable themselves when there is bribery and corruption within their organisation. Therefore, it is recommended to implement an effective anti-corruption compliance programme, even when one is not legally obliged to implement such programme.

Furthermore, pursuant to the Act of 18 May 2024 on Private Investigations, certain measures must now be implemented before internal investigations can be conducted, non-compliance with which may have particularly far-reaching consequences for the admissibility of the evidence gathered. Companies are therefore strongly advised to seek appropriate guidance on this matter.

A lack of investment in the relevant services continues to result in insufficient resources to systematically combat white collar crime, and particularly corruption and bribery.

Furthermore, it must also be noted that when cross-border elements and/or (rather complex) cyber aspects are involved, investigations often become more difficult. Where possible, foreign authorities and/or specialized cybercrime investigation units will be called upon, but in practice, their heavy workload often hampers the efficiency of the investigative process.

Nevertheless, the authorities will use the available resources as much as possible to investigate and prosecute corruption and public bribery, even if this may come at the expense of addressing other (types of) offences.

Within the police forces there are specialized computer crime units, which can assist other investigators as needed when investigations involve electronic data and related difficulties. In practice, however, these units are found to be understaffed and overworked, so investigations may suffer significant delays as a result and/or be conducted incompletely. In the context of actual prosecution, (the increase of) electronic data does not really lead to problems.

In the absence of a legal framework imposing obligations on companies to implement specific (preventive) measures in the fight against bribery and corruption, insufficient initiatives are sometimes taken in this regard. As a result, in practice, companies may find it difficult to demonstrate that they have taken all reasonable steps to prevent such offences and are therefore not implicated in the acts in question. Precisely because no such obligation exists, companies are often insufficiently aware of the importance of adopting an appropriate policy and actively ensuring compliance, which may place them in a vulnerable position, even where they are wrongfully prosecuted.

Another practical obstacle is that, pursuant to the Act of 18 May 2024 regarding Private Investigations, certain measures must now be implemented before internal investigations can be conducted. Companies are strongly advised to seek appropriate guidance on this matter as well.

A sufficient legal framework exists in Belgium for the investigation (by the authorities) and prosecution of bribery and corruption cases. Nevertheless, due to a lack of available resources (mainly personnel) the investigation and prosecution of bribery and corruption lacks efficiency and efficacy. We therefore advocate for an improvement in this regard. Furthermore, we would establish a legal framework for the prevention of corruption, introducing an obligation for (all) legal entities to establish an anti-corruption compliance programme. Finally, we would advocate for an amendment to the Act of 18 May 2024 on Private Investigations, with a view to adjusting certain requirements that are at times excessive and that may unduly complicate internal investigations.