Within the Spanish legal system, the regulatory framework governing bribery and corruption encompasses national legislation, enacted by state bodies, and international legislation, enacted by various European and intergovernmental institutions. In other words, it can be defined as a multi-tiered legal framework.

As regards national legislation, there are two regulatory strands: criminal law and administrative law. Law 10/1995 of 23 November on the Criminal Code (Criminal Code) , which forms the basis of this regulatory framework, specifically regulates the offences of bribery and corruption — the latter through various offences, without there being a specific offence of corruption per se — defining the objective and subjective elements that must be present for them to be considered committed, as well as the consequences of their commission.

Whilst the Criminal Code expressly criminalises conduct relating to bribery and corruption, there are various administrative laws that directly affect such conduct.

These administrative laws define the set of rules and principles to which all actions by public authorities must conform, thereby determining their legal validity. In this regard, the following laws are particularly relevant: Law 10/2010 of 28 April on the prevention of money laundering and the financing of terrorism, Law 19/2013 on transparency, access to public information and good governance, Law 40/2015 on the legal regime of the public sector and Law 9/2017 on public procurement.

Alongside national legislation, the Spanish legal framework on bribery and corruption is complemented by the United Nations Convention against Corruption (UNCAC), the OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials and the Council of Europe Criminal Law Convention on Corruption. Spain is a party to the international instruments and must ensure that its activities comply with the provisions of those texts.

In Spain, investigations are carried out by the permanent judges holding posts within the preliminary investigation divisions of each local court. Similarly, the permanent judges holding posts within the preliminary investigation division of the National High Court also have the power to investigate.

However, the Public Prosecutor’s Office, in fulfilment of its duty to bring matters to justice, may conduct investigations into offences of bribery and corruption. These investigations are carried out by the Anti-Corruption Prosecutor’s Office, and the findings are brought to the attention of the judges, who are responsible for initiating legal proceedings.

The judges of the investigating divisions or the Anti-Corruption Prosecutor’s Office have the power to initiate and direct investigations. However, to carry them out, they rely on the various specialist units of the Civil Guard and the National Police, which act in accordance with the guidelines set by the judges.

Although the Criminal Code, through its various criminal offences, sets out prohibited conduct relating to bribery and corruption, it does not provide an explicit definition of bribery and corruption; rather, these concepts are encompassed by various forms of conduct and criminal offences.

The lack of a specific definition of corruption by the legislature has meant that, over time, legal doctrine has sought to refine a definition of corruption. Thus, corruption is not defined as a single act, but as a set of acts whose common feature is the abuse of a position of power, in breach of the rules governing that activity, for personal gain.

Bribery is one of the corruption offences. It is defined as a benefit offered, requested or received by a public official with the aim of influencing the acts inherent to their office and, thereby, the proper functioning of the administration of justice. Under Spanish law, bribery constitutes the criminal offence of bribery.

However, bribery has a distinctive feature compared to other forms of corruption. Specifically, bribery can also occur in the private sector, through interference with the normal functioning of the economic market, by means of the granting of competitive advantages and benefits by directors, employees or other members of companies, according to the definition provided by la Council Framework Decision 2003/568/JHA of 22 July 2003 on combating corruption in the private sector. ‘OJEU’ No 192, 31 July 2003.

In addition to bribery, corruption encompasses other forms of conduct characterised by the receipt of financial benefit, which take the form of the following criminal offences:

• Trading in influence: Conduct described in Chapter VI, Title XIX, of ‘Offences against the Public administration, consisting of the use of a public office to influence and direct the actions of other public officials or public bodies, with the aim of obtaining a benefit.
• Misappropriation of public funds: This is regulated in Chapter VII, Title XIX, of Offences against the public administration, as the appropriation by a public official of public assets under their management, either to incorporate them into their own assets or to use them for a purpose other than that intended.
• Fraud and legal exemptions: Regulated under Chapter VIII, Title XIX, of Offences against the public administration. This refers to damage caused to the public administration’s assets by public officials acting in their official capacity. Such damage may arise through interference in public procurement procedures or the settlement of accounts; the demand for undue sums or fees; and fraud or deception.
• Prohibited negotiations and activities by public officials and abuses in the performance of their duties: This conduct is covered in Chapter XIX, Title XIX, of Offences against the public administration. Specifically, it refers to public officials facilitating their own involvement or that of third parties in matters pertaining to the administration; or making fraudulent use of information of which they have knowledge by virtue of their position.

Together with the offences mentioned above, corruption is often linked to other criminal acts that do not, in themselves, involve the obtaining of a benefit. Specifically, this includes malfeasance in office, which can only be committed by public officials, and document forgery and money laundering, which can be committed by both public officials and private individuals.

The Criminal Code draws a distinction between bribery in the public sector and bribery in the private sector, both in terms of their definition and their classification as criminal offences.

On the one hand, it punishes bribery committed within the public administration through the offence of bribery, as provided for and punishable under Articles 419 to 427 bis, Chapter V, Title XIX of Offences against the public administration. However, regarding the perpetrator of the offence, a second distinction is made, differentiating between public officials and private individuals.

In this regard, as we have explained in the previous paragraph, bribery within the public administration can be defined from two perspectives: firstly, in terms of the perpetrator of the offence, that is, the person who commits the criminal act.

We refer to passive bribery, punishable under Articles 419 to 423 of the Criminal Code, in situations where the perpetrator is a public official. Specifically, this refers to situations in which a public official solicits or receives a bribe from a private individual to interfere with the duties of their office – by performing acts within the scope of their office or delaying their performance – or to carry out an act contrary to their duties.

At this point, it is necessary to refer to Royal Legislative Decree 5/2015 of 30 October, which approves the consolidated text of the Basic Statute of Public Employees (RD 5/2015) defining a public servant as someone who “performs paid duties within the public administration in the service of the public interest.”

In turn, the Criminal Code itself sets out its own definition of a public official in Article 24.2, which states that “any person who, by direct provision of the law or by election or appointment by a competent authority, participates in the exercise of public functions shall be considered a public official”.”

Notwithstanding the theoretical definition set out in the Criminal Code, case law has clarified the objective and subjective elements that must be present for the offence of passive bribery to be deemed to have been committed.

Thus, for the offence of passive bribery to be deemed to have been committed, it is sufficient for the perpetrator to make a request, without it being necessary for what was requested to be provided.

In turn, within the context of passive bribery, we encounter a further two-fold distinction based on the legality of the act affected by the bribe:

• In cases where the bribe is intended to induce the public official to perform duties that are not inherent to the office they hold; or, to delay or interfere negatively with the performance of such duties, we are dealing with a case of bribery in a strict sense.
• Conversely, if the bribe directly affects the duties inherent to the office of the public official who requests or receives it in a positive sense is, it facilitates the official’s performance of those duties—this constitutes a case of improper bribery.

Similarly, passive bribery extends to bribes accepted in connection with one’s office or position, in accordance with the provisions of Article 422 of the Criminal Code.

On the other hand, active bribery occurs in situations where it is the private individual who offers or gives a bribe to a public official, with the intention of inducing the official to perform an act contrary to the duties inherent in their office, or of delaying the performance of an act that is part of their official duties.

As with passive bribery, the actual performance of the act is not required for the offence to be committed. The offence of active bribery shall be deemed to have been committed at the moment the private individual approaches the public authority or official “to corrupt or attempt to corrupt them by handing over a gift or by offering or promising to hand it over, without it even being necessary for the person approached to accept it.”

These same definitions also apply to foreign public officials who commit criminal acts or are affected by such acts, without distinction. Specifically, Article 427 bis stipulates that it shall apply to:

“a) Any person holding a legislative, administrative or judicial office or position in a country of the European Union or any other foreign country, whether by appointment or by election.

b) Any person performing a public function for a country of the European Union or any other foreign country, including a public body or a public enterprise, for the European Union or for another public international organisation.

c) Any official or agent of the European Union or of a public international organisation.

d) Any person who has been assigned and is performing a public service function consisting of the management, in Member States or in third countries, of the financial interests of the European Union or of taking decisions regarding those interests.”

Furthermore, the Criminal Code punishes bribery in the private sector through the offence of corruption in business, which was introduced in 2010 by Law 5/2010 , as provided for and punishable under Section IV, Chapter XI, Title XIII of Offences against property and against the socio-economic order, in Articles 286 bis to 288.

In the private sector, bribery is defined as the granting, offering and, where applicable, the acceptance by directors, employees or associates of commercial entities of unjustified advantages or benefits, with the aim of interfering with the normal functioning of the market.

Therefore, the main difference between the bribery of public officials and the bribery of private individuals lies in the scope and influence of such conduct. Whilst the former interferes with the normal functioning of the public administration, the bribery of private individuals interferes with the functioning of the market.

Liability for the commission of bribery offences does not rest solely with individuals. Since the reform of the Criminal Code, introduced by Law 5/2010, legal entities may also be held liable for the commission of offences of bribery and corruption in business, in accordance with the provisions of Articles 427 bis and 286 bis respectively of the Criminal Code, both in relation to Article 31 bis.

In this regard, legal entities shall be liable:

(a) Offences committed on behalf of such entities, and for their direct or indirect benefit, by their legal representatives or by those who, acting individually or as members of a body of the legal person, are authorised to take decisions on behalf of the legal person or hold powers of organisation and control within it.

(b) For offences committed in the course of business activities and on behalf of and for the direct or indirect benefit of such entities, by people who, being subject to the authority of the natural people referred to in the preceding paragraph, have been able to carry out the acts because those people have seriously failed in their duties of supervision, oversight and control of their activities, having regard to the specific circumstances of the case.

As can be seen, we are faced with two models which, whilst both attribute criminal liability to legal entities, do so from different perspectives.
The first model attributes liability to legal entities indirectly. Liability is transferred to the legal entity for the actions of the natural person acting on its behalf, on the understanding that the actions carried out by that person are an extension of the entity’s position, as it is the entity that is carrying out the action through its representatives.

In the second model, liability is directly attributable to the legal entity, arising from its failure to adopt the precautionary measures required of it to ensure the orderly and non-criminal conduct of its business activities.

However, it must be emphasised that for the legal entity to be held liable for the offence, as a common element to the two scenarios described in the previous paragraph, it is required that the legal entity benefits directly or indirectly from the commission of the criminal act.

The civil consequences arising from the commission of criminal acts, such as corruption offences, are established in Article 109 of the Criminal Code. Such consequences take the form of an obligation to repair the damage and losses caused because of the commission of a criminal act.

The Criminal Code itself, in Article 110, sets out how such reparation may be affected: (i) restitution; (ii) reparation of the damage; and (iii) compensation for material and moral harm.

Regarding restitution, regulated under Article 111 of the Criminal Code, this avenue is envisaged for cases in which the material object of the offence is a non-fungible item, and its application to corruption offences — the damage caused by which is primarily economic in nature — is therefore more limited.

Specifically, it refers to the obligation to restore the unlawfully obtained asset wherever possible. In cases where restitution is not possible, owing to the consumption, loss or destruction of the object in question, the victim of the offence may seek monetary compensation for the harm suffered.

Reparation of damage is regulated under Article 112 of the Criminal Code and may consist of obligations to give, to do or to refrain from doing, making it the most common avenue for repairing harm caused by corruption offences. Through this route, the aim is to restore the situation to that which existed immediately prior to the commission of the criminal act.

In relation to corruption offences, this avenue is of particular significance. In accordance with established case law, judges, applying Article 112 of the Criminal Code, have the power to restore the legal order disturbed by the offence. This may take the form of a declaration of nullity of legal acts and transactions, or their rescission.

Finally, compensation for material and moral harm encompasses the monetary reparation of losses that are a direct result of the commission of the offence.

In this respect, this avenue is the most frequently employed in corruption offences, given that the damage caused by such offences consists primarily of financial harm to the public treasury, which is remedied through the corresponding monetary compensation.

In accordance with Article 32 of the Criminal Code, three types of penalties or criminal consequences are distinguished for the commission of criminal acts: (i) custodial sentences; (ii) sentences depriving the offender of other rights; and (iii) fines.

In this regard, the conduct constituting corruption carries the following penalties individuals, which vary depending on the specific conduct carried out and the identity of the perpetrator of the offence:

• Offence of proper passive bribery (Article 419 of the Criminal Code): Custodial sentence of three to six years, a fine of twelve to twenty-four months, and special disqualification from public employment or office and from the exercise of the right to stand for election for a period of nine to twelve years.

• Offence of improper passive bribery (Article 420 of the Criminal Code): Custodial sentence of two to four years, a fine of twelve to twenty-four months, and special disqualification from public employment or office and from the exercise of the right to stand for election for a period of five to nine years.

• Bribery in consideration of office (Article 422 of the Criminal Code): Custodial sentence of six months to one year and suspension from public employment or office for a period of one to three years.

• Offence of active bribery (Article 424 of the Criminal Code): The same custodial and financial penalties as those applicable to the corrupted authority, official or person.

• Offence of trading in influence:

• Committed by a public official (Article 428 of the Criminal Code): Custodial sentence of six months to two years, a fine of the equivalent to double the benefit sought or obtained, and special disqualification for five to nine years.
• Committed by a private individual (Article 429 of the Criminal Code): Custodial sentence of six months to two years, a fine of the equivalent to double the benefit obtained, and prohibition from contracting with the public sector, as well as loss of subsidies and tax or social security benefits for a period of six to ten years.

• Offence of misappropriation of public funds:

• Appropriation of public administration assets (Article 432 of the Criminal Code): Custodial sentence of two to six years and special disqualification for six to ten years.
• Private use of public administration assets (Article 432 bis of the Criminal Code): Custodial sentence of six months to three years and suspension from office for one to four years.
• Application of public assets to purposes other than those originally intended (Article 433 of the Criminal Code): Custodial sentence of one to four years and disqualification for two to six years, or a fine of three to twelve months and disqualification for one to three years, depending on the harm caused.

• Offence of fraud and illegal exactions:

• Interference in public procurement procedures or settlement of accounts (Article 436 of the Criminal Code): Custodial sentence of two to six years and disqualification for six to ten years.
• Unlawful exactions (Article 437 of the Criminal Code): Fine of six to twenty-four months and suspension from office for six months to four years.
• Fraud against the Social Security benefits system or fraud by a public official (Article 438 of the Criminal Code): The penalties respectively applicable to such offences, in their upper half, potentially rising to the next higher degree, and special disqualification from public employment or office and from the exercise of the right to stand for election for a period of three to nine years.

• Prohibited negotiations and activities by public officials and abuses in the performance of their duties:

• Prohibited negotiations and participation in activities inherent to the administration (Article 439): Custodial sentence of six months to two years, a fine of twelve to twenty-four months, and disqualification for two to seven years.
• Use of privileged information acquired by virtue of office (Article 442): Fine of the equivalent to triple the benefit obtained and disqualification for two to four years; or custodial sentence of one to three years, fine of the equivalent to sextuple the benefit obtained, and disqualification for four to six years, depending on whether the sought benefit was obtained or not.

• Corruption between private parties:

• Where the conduct interferes with the national economic market (Article 286 bis of the Criminal Code): Custodial sentence of six months to four years, disqualification for one to six years, and a fine of the equivalent to triple the benefit obtained.
• Where the conduct interferes in the sphere of international transactions (Article 286 ter of the Criminal Code): Custodial sentence of three to six years and a fine of twelve to twenty-four months (or higher, depending on the benefit obtained).

The conduct also carries the following penalties for legal entities:

• Bribery (Article 427 bis): Fines ranging from six months to five years, or from double to quintuple the benefit obtained, depending on the gravity of the act.
• Trading in influence (Article 430 bis): Fine of six months to two years.
• Corruption between private parties (Article 288): Fines of six months to five years, or the equivalent to quintuple the benefit obtained.

There is no specific regulation imposing concrete restrictions on expenditure on hospitality, travel or entertainment that may be incurred by national public officials or foreign public officials.

However, it must be borne in mind that there is no numerus clausus in respect of the gifts or remuneration that may constitute the subject matter of a bribery offence; accordingly, benefits related to hospitality, travel or entertainment may fall within the scope of such conduct.

In this regard, both Article 54.6 of Royal Decree 5/2015 and Article 26.2(b).6 of Law 19/2013 of 9 December on transparency, access to public information and good governance (Law 19/2013) , stipulate that public officials may not accept gifts that go beyond customary, social or courtesy norms, this being the only requirement in this regard.

Since the law does not clearly define the monetary amount or type of gifts that are considered to exceed customary social, habitual or courtesy uses, it falls to the local and regional corporations themselves to establish, in their codes of conduct, the maximum value of gifts that their officials may receive.

By way of example, Galician government has set a maximum gift value of €90 for gifts to be considered an expression of social courtesy; whilst the Madrid City Council has set a limit of €50 per gift, or €150 in aggregate from a single natural person or legal entity.

For its part, the Code of Conduct for Members of the European Parliament on Integrity and Transparency establishes in Article 6.1 that Members of the European Parliament “shall refrain from accepting gifts or similar benefits with an approximate value of €150 or more”.

Political contributions are regulated by Organic Law 8/2007 of 4 July on the financing of political parties (Law 8/2007).

As set out in the preamble to that law, the financing of political parties is governed by a mixed system, encompassing both contributions made by individuals and resources provided by the public administration itself.
With regard to contributions made by citizens, Article 2 provides that such contributions may only derive, inter alia, from “donations in cash or in kind, received under the terms and conditions set out in this Law.”

In relation to monetary or in-kind donations — which are in many cases linked to corruption offences — the law, in Article 5, defines the permissible scope of such contributions in negative terms, prohibiting political parties from receiving: (a) anonymous, conditional or revocable donations; (b) donations from the same natural person where the total amount exceeds €50,000; and (c) donations from legal entities or entities without legal personality.

Failure to comply with the financing requirements established by Law 8/2007 constitutes the offence of illegal financing of political parties, as provided for and punishable under Article 304 bis of the Criminal Code, with penalties of imprisonment of six months to four years and/or a fine of triple to quintuple the amount of the infringement.

There is no express definition of the concept of facilitation payments in the Spanish jurisdiction. Nevertheless, legal doctrine understands them to be small payments or gifts made to a public official with a view to obtaining a specific benefit connected to an act inherent to the public official’s own function.

Although the Criminal Code does not classify them expressly as facilitation payments, as noted in question 4 above, Article 420 of the Criminal Code punishes as improper passive bribery the conduct consisting of the receipt of, or solicitation by, public officials of gifts or consideration in exchange for performing acts inherent to their office.

In other words, this is not a concept expressly provided for in the Spanish legal system, but rather conduct that falls within the scope of the criminal offence of bribery.

The defence mechanisms applicable to corruption offences, as with any criminal offence, are subject to a degree of variability depending on the circumstances of each case. Such defence mechanisms may be based on various aspects of the proceedings, ranging from their conformity with the applicable legal requirements to substantive matters relating to the facts under investigation and whether such conduct complies with evolving Spanish administrative or commercial legislation and case law regarding public and private contracts.

Without prejudice to the foregoing, Article 21 of the Criminal Code provides for certain mitigating circumstances that may be considered and applied across the full range of criminal offences, the concurrence of which serves to reduce the potential liability of the perpetrators of criminal acts.

More specifically and directly related to corruption offences, as shall be developed in the subsequent questions, the Criminal Code expressly provides, as a means of exemption from liability for bribery offences committed by private individuals, the disclosure of the offence to the competent authorities within a period of two months from the date of commission.

In accordance with the provisions of Articles 31 bis.2 and 31 bis.4 of the Criminal Code, the implementation of compliance programs (defined in the Criminal Code as organisational and management models) by legal entities may be taken into consideration as a ground for exemption from criminal liability or, where applicable, as a mitigating circumstance in respect of the applicable penalty.

As set out above, criminal liability may be attributed to legal entities from two perspectives: (a) in respect of acts committed by their representatives on behalf of the entity; and (b) for failure to fulfil duties of supervision, monitoring and control of their activities.

Compliance programs operate as grounds for exemption from liability in two different ways, depending on the basis upon which liability has arisen for the entity in question.

In cases where the entity’s liability arises from acts carried out on its behalf by its representatives or by authorised people, the entity may be exempt from liability if the compliance program: (i) was adopted and effectively implemented prior to the commission of the offence; (ii) its supervision was entrusted to a body of the entity with autonomous powers of initiative and control; and (iii) the criminal act was carried out by circumventing the controls in place, rather than as a result of any failure in the supervisory functions of that body.

In cases where criminal acts are committed by employees of the entity who are not acting on their behalf, the entity may also be exempt from liability. To this end, it must be demonstrated that, prior to the commission of the offence, the entity had adopted and effectively implemented a compliance program adequate to prevent offences of the nature of that which was committed, or to significantly reduce the risk of its commission.

Nonetheless, compliance programs must satisfy certain requirements, in accordance with the provisions of Article 31 bis.5 of the Criminal Code:

1. “. They shall identify the activities in the course of which the offences to be prevented may be committed.
2. They shall establish the protocols or procedures specifying the process by which the legal entity forms its will, adopts decisions and implements them in relation to such offences.
3. They shall include financial resource management models adequate to prevent the commission of the offences to be prevented.
4.  They shall impose an obligation to report possible risks and breaches to the body responsible for monitoring the functioning and observance of the prevention model.
5.  They shall establish a disciplinary system that adequately sanctions non-compliance with the measures set out in the model.
6. They shall carry out periodic verification of the model and its possible modification when significant infringements of its provisions come to light, or when changes occur in the organisation, control structure or activities carried out that make such modifications necessary.”

The volume of guidance published by the public administration in relation to compliance with anti-fraud legislation has increased in the wake of Order HFP/1030/2021 of 29 September, establishing the management system for the Recovery, Transformation and Resilience Plan ,issued by the Ministry of Finance and Public Administration (Order HFP/1030/2021).

Article 6 of Order HFP/1030/2021 regulates anti-fraud measure plans and provides, in paragraph 1, that “every decision-making or implementing entity participating in the execution of the measures under the RTRP must have an ‘Anti-Fraud Measures Plan’ enabling it to guarantee and declare that, within its respective sphere of activity, the relevant funds have been used in accordance with the applicable rules, in particular as regards the prevention, detection and correction of fraud, corruption and conflicts of interest.”

In compliance with the order, public administrations have published their respective anti-fraud plans. Of note is “Guide for the Application of Anti-Fraud Measures in the Execution of the Recovery, Transformation and Resilience Plan”, published by the National Anti-Fraud Coordination Service on 24 February 2022. This guide is complemented by the various anti-fraud plans published by the different ministries in recent years.

In addition to the anti-fraud plans referred to above, mention should also be made of the Code against Fraud and Corruption, published by the Government of Spain and updated in 2025, which, whilst not a guide as such, constitutes a compilation of existing Spanish legislation on corruption.

In Spain, there is no proper equivalent to deferred prosecution agreements or non-prosecution agreements, without prejudice to the various grounds for exemption from liability to which the perpetrators of criminal acts may avail themselves, as provided for in Article 426 of the Criminal Code in respect of bribery offences, and more generally under Article 20 of the Criminal Code.

However, provision is made for the possibility of bringing proceedings to an early conclusion through “sobreseimiento libre” — unconditional discontinuance of proceedings (Article 637) and “sobreseimiento provisional” — provisional discontinuance of proceedings — (Article 641).

In the first scenario, the closure of proceedings is final and is applied in cases where the facts do not constitute a criminal offence or where the perpetrator is exempt from liability. In the second scenario, the closure is provisional and is applied in cases where the facts have not been sufficiently established or where the perpetrator cannot be identified, without prejudice to the possibility of reopening the proceedings at a later stage.

The Spanish jurisdiction affords protection to whistle-blowers through Law 2/2023 of 20 February regulating the protection of people reporting regulatory breaches and combating corruption (Ley 2/2023), by means of which Directive 2019/1937 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 October 2019 on the protection of people who report breaches of Union law has been transposed into Spanish law.

Law 2/2023 itself provides for the possibility of granting protections to people who communicate or disclose the commission of infringements, subject to two conditions: (i) the veracity of the information or, where applicable, the existence of sufficient grounds to believe in its veracity; and (ii) that the communication is made in accordance with the provisions of the law itself.
Where those requirements are met, the protection is addressed through two types of measures:

• Measures of protection against reprisals: Article 36 of Law 2/2023 establishes a mandate addressed to legal entities, prohibiting certain forms of retaliation against the reporting person, including threats of and attempts at retaliation.
• This prohibition is further supplemented by Article 38, which provides that reporting people shall not incur any labour or administrative liability in connection with the communication of the information, nor in connection with its acquisition or access, provided that such action does not constitute a criminal offence.
• Confidentiality measures: The identity of reporting people shall in all cases be kept confidential and shall not be disclosed to the people to whom the reported facts relate, nor to any third parties.

Regarding rewards and incentives, although Law 2/2023 does not establish rewards for whistle-blowers, it does provide for certain incentives. In particular, Article 40 provides for the possibility that reporting people who are themselves authors of administrative infringements related to the information provided may have the sanction for the infringement waived or at least mitigated, provided that the following is established: (i) the cessation of the commission of the infringement at the time of communication; (ii) the identification of the remaining people involved in or who benefited from the infringement; (iii) full, continuous and diligent cooperation; (iv) that the information provided is truthful and that means of evidence have been provided; and (v) reparation of the damage caused.

Furthermore, as noted above, the Criminal Code also provides for certain incentives to which whistle-blowers may avail themselves. Where information is disclosed concerning the commission of criminal offences and the whistle-blowers are themselves the perpetrators, the confession of the act may give rise to the application of the mitigating circumstance of confession provided for in Article 21 of the Criminal Code, which results in a reduction of the applicable penalty.

Likewise, where the information provided discloses the commission of a bribery offence of which the whistle-blower is the perpetrator, in accordance with Article 426 of the Criminal Code, the whistle-blower shall be exempt from liability, provided that no more than two months have elapsed since the date of the acts. For its part, in cases of misappropriation of which the whistle-blower is the perpetrator, in accordance with Article 434, the penalty may be mitigated if the information provided facilitates the obtaining of evidence or the identification of other people responsible.

Finally, it should be noted that, in accordance with Article 31 quater of the Criminal Code, where the reporting person is a legal entity and is itself the perpetrator of the offence in question, the confession and cooperation may be considered for the purpose of mitigation of the penalty.

Spanish legislation does not strictly provide for wrongdoers to reach agreements with the prosecution service to provide evidence or information in support of an investigation or judicial proceedings. Nor is such a provision included amongst the mitigating circumstances set out in Article 21 of the Criminal Code.

However, the Criminal Procedure Law (LECRIM) , provides in Article 655 for the possibility that a person under investigation in judicial proceedings may indicate their conformity with the facts attributed to them. In cases where the offence carries a custodial sentence of less than six years, the proceedings may be dealt with more expeditiously and the accused may benefit from a reduction in their sentence.

Furthermore, pursuant to Article 21.7 of the Criminal Code, the penalty may be mitigated based on circumstances analogous to those enumerated in that provision.

In this regard, although it does not constitute a confession in the strict legal sense, case law has accepted self-incrimination and the disclosure of information as a mitigating circumstance in cases where “the cooperation provided by the statements of the accused is of great relevance for the purposes of the investigation of the facts.”

Accordingly, in a strict sense there is no possibility of reaching agreements in exchange for the disclosure of information. However, having regard to the degree of relevance of the information provided, the courts permit this circumstance to be considered as a mitigating factor in determining the applicable penalty.

It should be noted that, as set out above, investigations are carried out by judicial authorities and, where applicable, by the Anti-Corruption Prosecutor’s Office — bodies that are independent of the government authorities.

There is no register that would allow a clear determination of the number of investigations conducted annually in Spain in relation to bribery cases. However, the General Council of the Judiciary (CGPJ) publishes on an annual basis a repository of data on judicial proceedings brought in connection with public corruption.

To this end, according to the data published by the CGPJ, during 2025, corruption offences presented the following figures:

• A total of 114 natural people and 13 legal entities were charged (it being noted that being charged only implies that proceedings have been opened against such people, without those proceedings having yet been heard).
• A total of 19 sets of proceedings were referred for trial, of which 17 were heard before regional courts and 2 before the National High Court.
• Throughout the national territory, a total of 52 convictions and 16 acquittals were handed down. Of the 52 convictions (76.6% of the total), 27 were handed down based on a guilty plea, 18 without a guilty plea, and 7 were partially convicted in nature.

The Spanish Government has adopted a firmer stance in respect of investigations into corruption offences. Evidence of this includes the enactment of Law 2/2023 on the protection of whistle-blowers, complemented by Royal Decree 1101/2024 of 29 October approving the Statute of the Independent Whistle-blower Protection Authority (A.A.I.) , as well as the creation of two new specialised anti-corruption prosecutor’s offices, among other measures.

However, the most noteworthy development is the publication of the State Anti-Corruption Plan, dated 9 July 2025 . This plan represents the first anti-corruption strategy adopted by Spain and sets out a strategy of action to combat corruption.

The strategy revolves around five fundamental axes: (i) prevention of corruption; (ii) protection of whistle-blowers; (iii) effective response to detected corruption cases; (iv) recovery of assets derived from unlawful activities; and (v) promotion and fostering of an anti-corruption culture amongst citizens, businesses and public administrations.

The Spanish jurisdiction permits judicial review of acts issued and decisions adopted by any public administration body (local, regional or national). Such review is conducted through a system of appeals structured at three levels, regulated by Law 39/2015 of 1 October on the Common Administrative Procedure of the Public Administrations and Law 29/1998 of 13 July governing Administrative Judicial Review.

The first level of appeals comprises the appeal to a higher authority (“recurso de alzada”) and the appeal for reconsideration (“recurso de reposicion”). These are lodged with the superior hierarchical body (hierarchical appeal) or with the same body that issued the decision (reconsideration), depending on the nature of the act or decision being challenged. At this first level, review is carried out once again by administrative bodies.

The second level of review is initiated following the unsuccessful resolution of the foregoing appeals. It commences with the lodging of an administrative judicial review claim (“recurso contencioso-administrativo”), which initiates the contentious-administrative judicial proceeding that conclude with the delivery of a judgment. Such judgment may in turn be reviewed by the superior hierarchical body and by the Supreme Court, by means of an appeal on the merits (“recurso de apelación”) and a cassation appeal (“recurso de casación”) respectively. This therefore constitutes a review conducted within the sphere of the ordinary jurisdiction.

The third and final level of review consists of the lodging of a appeal before the Constitutional Court (“recurso de amparo”). Such review is only available in cases where the act or decision adopted by the administrative body is contrary to fundamental rights (Articles 14 to 29 of the Spanish Constitution).

It constitutes a review by the extraordinary jurisdiction, for which it is a prerequisite to have exhausted all available means of review within the ordinary jurisdiction (contentious-administrative proceedings, appeal on the merits and cassation appeal).

On 3 April 2025, Organic Law 1/2025 of 2 January on measures relating to the efficiency of the Public Justice Service entered into force , this being the most significant development of the past 12 months.

This law represents a very significant modification of the justice system, as it establishes various measures to expedite judicial proceedings, as well as a judicial reorganisation, transforming the administrative judicial review courts into sections dependent on a single court of first instance.

Without prejudice to the final wording and subsequent adoption of the relevant legislation, there are two preliminary draft laws that have a direct bearing on the fight against corruption, and which have already been approved:

• Preliminary Draft Organic Law on Public Integrity: Conceived as an instrument to drive forward the State Anti-Corruption Plan, ensuring its implementation and guaranteeing its continuity over time.
• Preliminary Draft Law on Open Government: Conceived as an essential regulatory instrument to advance transparency, integrity and citizen participation.

Spain is a party to the following international anti-corruption conventions:

• The United Nations Convention against Transnational Organised Crime, adopted in New York on 15 November 2000, has been in force since 29 September 2003.
• The United Nations Convention against Corruption, adopted in New York on 31 October 2003, has been in force since 19 July 2006.
• The Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions, adopted in Paris on 17 December 1997, has been in force since 4 March 2000.
• The Criminal Law Convention on Corruption (Council of Europe Convention No. 173), adopted in Strasbourg on 27 January 1999, has been in force since 1 August 2010.
• The Additional Protocol to the Criminal Law Convention on Corruption, adopted in Strasbourg on 15 May 2003, has been in force since 1 May 2011.
• The Civil Law Convention on Corruption (Council of Europe Convention No. 174), adopted in Strasbourg on 4 November 1999, in force since 1 November 2003.

In addition to being a party to the conventions, Spain has been an active member of the Council of Europe’s Group of States against Corruption (GRECO) since its establishment on 1 May 1999. Accordingly, Spain is subject to periodic evaluations concerning the prevention of corruption among parliamentarians, judges, prosecutors and senior government officials.

Article 542.3 of the Organic Law on the Judiciary (LOPJ) , provides that lawyers are under an obligation “to maintain professional secrecy in respect of all facts or information of which they become aware by reason of any of the forms of their professional activity, and may not be compelled to testify in relation thereto”.

In turn, the General Statute of the Spanish Advocacy (EGAE) , itself, which regulates the professional activity of lawyers, enshrines professional secrecy as one of the superior values of the practice of law and defines its material and temporal scope.

Specifically, Article 22 of the instrument provides that professional secrecy shall encompass “all facts, communications, data, information, documents and proposals of which the legal practitioner becomes aware, issues or receives in the course of their professional practice.”” . It further stipulates that this obligation is unlimited in time.

The EGAE treats professional secrecy as both a right and a duty of lawyers in the exercise of their profession. Lawyers are expressly prohibited from being compelled to testify in respect of such facts (the right), and compliance with professional secrecy is simultaneously configured as an obligation of the lawyer in the discharge of their functions (the duty).

Regarding in-house counsel, Article 39 of the EGAE establishes that they too must respect professional secrecy in the exercise of their functions. However, both Spanish and European case law have rejected the possibility that communications between in-house counsel and the company in which they provide their services are protected by professional secrecy.

The National High Court, in its Judgment rec. 345/2016 of 16 May 2018 ,declined to extend professional secrecy to documents exchanged between in-house counsel and the company, holding specifically that “the document in question is not protected by client-lawyer confidentiality, given that it does not constitute communication with an external lawyer, nor was the document prepared for the purpose of seeking advice from an external lawyer.”

Accordingly, as noted by the National Markets and Competition Commission (CNMC) in its Resolution No. R/AJ/125/24 of 6 November 2024 ,the National High Court applies the criterion established by the Court of Justice of the European Union, including in the Akzo judgment, Case C-550/07 of 14 September 2010, which states verbatim that client-lawyer confidentiality shall govern provided that the lawyer is an “independent lawyer, that is, not bound to his client by a relationship of employment” .

In other words, the emphasis is placed on the independence that governs the practice of law, which cannot in any circumstances be said to exist in an employment relationship. This is because one of the fundamental principles governing any employment relationship is precisely the dependency between the employee (in-house counsel) and the employer (the company).

For its part, the European Commission, in its Competition Policy Brief of 1 November 2025, did not include Spain amongst those countries in which professional secrecy extends to the relationship between in-house counsel and their clients, once again applying the criterion of the absence of independence.

Over the past year, the government has demonstrated notable commitment to the fight against corruption. Evidence of this includes the publication of the State Anti-Corruption Plan and the enactment of Law 2/2023, among other measures.

However, the most recent corruption cases that have come to light and that directly implicate the government have heightened the negative public perception of corruption in Spain.

The 2025 Corruption Perceptions Index, published by Transparency International, assigns Spain a score of 55 out of 100, placing Spain in 49th position out of the 182 countries analysed (and in 17th position out of the 27 analysed within the European Union), representing one of the lowest scores recorded since 2019.

Since the publication of Law 5/2010, by means of which criminal liability may be attributed to legal entities, the number of companies that have implemented compliance programs has increased. This is because, as noted above, an effective compliance system may be taken into consideration as grounds for exemption from liability.

However, there is no official register in Spain of companies that have implemented compliance programs. The most recent unofficial data available derives from a report produced by the Asociación Española de Compliance (ASCOM), which in 2020 published a study yielding the following figures:

• In 62.1% of companies, with an average of 378 employees, there is a specific Compliance function. In smaller companies, this percentage falls to 38.9%, whilst in larger companies it rises to 92.6%.

The data provided, despite focusing on companies considered to be large in terms of employee numbers, supports the conclusion that in large companies there exists a more robust and established culture of regulatory compliance.

It must also be borne in mind that these are 2020 figures, and that the trend towards implementation of compliance programs was and continues to be upward. The study itself projects that in smaller companies the percentage of those with a Compliance function will increase substantially within a five-year period, rising from 38.9% to 55.6%.

The principal challenge that corporate entities must confront during internal investigations into corruption is the possibility that such investigations may give rise to their own prosecution.

The mere existence of a compliance plan is not sufficient to operate as a deterrent to the attribution of liability. The plan must be sufficiently effective to prevent offences of the nature of that which was committed. The existence of any structural defect in the prevention mechanisms entails the attribution of liability to the entity. It is not merely the establishment of the plan that is required, but its manifestation through concrete forms of supervision and control of the conduct of its directors and employees.

Furthermore, companies must confront the reputational impact that may arise from such proceedings, in an environment that is increasingly demanding regarding transparency, good corporate governance and accountability.

The most recently published Annual Report of the Special Prosecutor’s Office against Corruption and Organised Crime (2024) identifies two clear obstacles that must be addressed while investigating these offences: (i) procedural delays; and (ii) the markedly transnational character that has increasingly defined corruption offences in recent years.

Regarding procedural delays, the Report highlights the need to provide the justice system with improved resources and the need to establish investigating and, above all, adjudicating bodies specialised in economic matters.

The State Anti-Corruption Plan addresses the difficulties identified by the Anti-Corruption Prosecutor’s Office and, amongst the package of measures to be implemented in the coming months, includes the following: (i) the creation of specialised anti-corruption and public administration offence sections within the new courts of first instance; (ii) the reinforcement of the Anti-Corruption Prosecutor’s Office with additional resources and personnel; (iii) the conferral upon the Public Prosecutor’s Office of the power to conduct criminal investigations, granting it greater autonomy and transparency; and (iv) the conferral of priority status on cases involving public officials and the extension of applicable limitation periods.

Spain addresses the transnational dimension of corruption offences through Law 23/2014 of 20 November on mutual recognition of criminal judgments in the European Union and through the various regulations enacted by the European Union. Of relevance in this context are:

• Council Regulation (EU) 2017/1939 of 12 October 2017 implementing enhanced cooperation on the establishment of the European Public Prosecutor’s Office.
• Regulation (EU) 2018/1727 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 November 2018 on the European Union Agency for Criminal Justice Cooperation (Eurojust) and replacing and repealing Council Decision 2002/187/JHA.
• Regulation (EU) 2023/1543 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 July 2023 on European Production Orders and European Preservation Orders for electronic evidence in criminal proceedings and for the execution of custodial sentences following criminal proceedings.
• Directive (EU) 2023/1544 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 July 2023 laying down harmonised rules on the designation of designated establishments and the appointment of legal representatives for the purpose of gathering electronic evidence in criminal proceedings.

At this juncture, it is necessary to note that Spain has yet to incorporate the two international instruments relating to electronic evidence into its domestic legal order. In addition, the State Anti-Corruption Plan itself identifies the fragmentation and dispersal of competences in the field of corruption — which are distributed across different bodies at both national and regional level — as a further obstacle.

In this regard, the creation, in the coming months, of an Independent Public Integrity Agency is proposed, to serve as a central body for the prevention, supervision and prosecution of corruption, functioning as the coordinating hub for the various relevant bodies.

It is therefore apparent that the priorities for the coming months in this field must be directed towards: (i) providing investigative bodies and the administration with greater resources and improved efficiency; (ii) fostering coordination among the various bodies from the outset of investigations; (iii) activating mechanisms for international cooperation from the commencement of investigations, thereby avoiding the various problems that may arise from delay; and (iv) incorporating European legal instruments into domestic law effectively and within the prescribed timescales.

Electronic evidence is an increasingly prominent phenomenon in the investigation of corruption offences. The advance of new technologies means that evidence of the commission of offences is increasingly found in electronic format, which creates significant difficulties in terms of access.

Both Spain at domestic level and the European Union at international level have addressed this situation by enacting legal instruments to facilitate access to the relevant electronic evidence and to promote international cooperation in this regard.

From a national perspective, the following instruments have been incorporated into the legal order, facilitating the justice system’s ability to obtain electronic evidence, both autonomously and through the cooperation of natural and legal people:

• Organic Law 13/2015 of 5 October, amending the Law of Criminal Procedure to strengthen procedural guarantees and regulate technological investigation measures.
• Organic Law 7/2021 of 26 May on the protection of personal data processed for the purposes of the prevention, detection, investigation and prosecution of criminal offences and the execution of criminal penalties.

For its part, the European Union has enacted the following instruments (the integration of which into the Spanish legal order remains pending):

• Regulation (EU) 2023/1543 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 July 2023 on European Production Orders and European Preservation Orders for electronic evidence in criminal proceedings and for the execution of custodial sentences following criminal proceedings.
• Directive (EU) 2023/1544 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 July 2023 laying down harmonised rules on the designation of designated establishments and the appointment of legal representatives for the purpose of gathering electronic evidence in criminal proceedings.

Furthermore, it should be noted that Spain is a party to the following Cybercrime Conventions, which facilitate the access to and exchange of electronic evidence between different states:

• Convention on Cybercrime, adopted in Budapest on 23 November 2001.
• Second Additional Protocol to the Convention on Cybercrime, relating to enhanced cooperation and disclosure of electronic evidence.
• United Nations Convention against Cybercrime; Strengthening International Cooperation for Combating Certain Crimes Committed by Means of Information and Communications Technology Systems and for the Sharing of Evidence in Electronic Form of Serious Crimes.

The principal challenges that businesses will need to address in the coming months are directly linked to the actual effectiveness of their compliance programs as appropriate instruments for the prevention and mitigation of criminal risk. As noted above, the mere formal adoption of compliance models is insufficient; those models must be sufficiently effective to mitigate criminal risks.

In this regard, one of the most significant challenges lies in the need for continuous updating of compliance systems. Legislation is constantly evolving; an increasing number of offences may give rise to criminal liability attributable to legal entities, and the standards required of internal control mechanisms by the competent authorities are becoming ever more demanding.

Equally significant is the capacity of businesses to adapt their compliance programs to new criminal phenomena and risk contexts, particularly those arising from the increasing pervasiveness of new technologies and digitalisation in society, as well as from the creation of ever more complex and transnational corporate structures.

The regulatory framework governing the Spanish legal order is sufficiently robust and possesses adequate mechanisms for the prevention, prosecution and investigation of corruption offences. The existing international regulatory framework likewise favours the prosecution of such offences in their transnational dimension.

In this context, it may be stated that the principal difficulties do not arise so much from normative insufficiency, but from the practical limitations that exist in ensuring a genuinely effective application of that regulatory framework. The problem lies not in the absence of legal tools, but in the structural and organisational difficulties that condition their effective and timely use.

Accordingly, improvements must be made to facilitate the effective application of that regulatory framework and the tools it provides. This must be pursued from two clear starting points: (i) the provision of adequate resources to the justice administration; and (ii) the specialisation of the bodies responsible for applying the regulatory framework.

First, adequate provision of human, material and technological resources to the Justice Administration and to investigative bodies is essential, as the Anti-Corruption Prosecutor’s Office itself has made clear. Corruption offences are increasingly carried out through ever more complex networks, requiring correspondingly more sophisticated and technical investigations.

Second, the specialisation of the bodies responsible for applying the anti-corruption regulatory framework must be deepened. Experience demonstrates that the investigation and prosecution of public corruption require highly specialised expertise in financial and economic matters, public procurement, accounting, taxation and international cooperation. It is therefore advisable to strengthen the specialisation of the various bodies concerned, with a view to providing an agile and rigorous response to this type of criminality.