The key financial crime offences applicable to both companies and individuals are as follows:

General offences related to fraud:

• Fraud (“escroquerie”) – Article 313-1 et seq. of the Penal Code

Fraud consists in deceiving a person by use of a false name, false capacity, or fraudulent manoeuvres in order to induce the delivery of funds or the provision of a service.

It is punishable by up to 5 years’ imprisonment and a €375,000 fine (€1,875,000 for legal persons). Aggravated forms (e.g., committed by an organised criminal group) carry up to 10 years and €1,000,000 (€5,000,000 for legal persons).

• Forgery (“faux”) and used of forged documents (“usage de faux”) – Articles 441-1 et seq. of the Penal Code

Forgery consists in any fraudulent alteration of the truth, likely to cause harm and carried out by any means whatsoever, in a written document or any other medium of expression of thought which has as its object or which may have as its effect the establishment of proof of a right or a fact having legal consequences.

The basic form of forgery and/or use of forged documents is punishable by up to 3 years’ imprisonment and a fine of €45,000 (€225,000 for legal persons); aggravated forms may carry up to 10 years and €150,000 (€750,000 for legal persons) when dealing with official records (up to 15 years and €225,000 when the perpetrator is a public agent).

• Embezzlement (“abus de confiance”) – Articles 314-1 et seq. of the Penal Code

Embezzlement is the act by a person of misappropriating, to the detriment of another, funds, securities or any property which has been entrusted to him and which he has accepted on the condition of returning it, accounting for it or using it for a specific purpose.

It is punishable by up to 5 years’ imprisonment and a €375,000 fine (€1,875,000 for legal persons). Aggravated forms (e.g., committed by an organised criminal group) carry up to 7 years and €750,000 (€3,750,000 for legal persons).

• Receipt (“recel”) – Articles 321-1 et seq. of the Penal Code

The offence of “receipt” is the act of concealing, possessing, or transferring an item, or acting as an intermediary in its transfer, knowing that the item is the proceeds of a crime or offense. Knowingly benefiting, by any means, from the proceeds of a crime or offense also constitutes “receipt”.

• Money laundering (“blanchiment”) – Articles 324-1 et seq. of the Penal Code

Money laundering consists in facilitating, by any means, the false justification of the origin of assets or income belonging to the perpetrator of a felony or misdemeanour, or in assisting the placement, concealment or conversion of the direct or indirect proceeds of such offences.

The basic offence carries 5 years’ imprisonment and a €375,000 fine (€1,875,000 for legal persons); aggravated laundering (e.g., committed in a habitually or in an organised gang) carries up to 10 years and €750,000 (€3,750,000 for legal persons). In both cases, the fines may be increased up to half the value of the goods or funds involved in the money laundering operations.

Specific offences related to corporate management:

• Misuse of corporate assets (“abus de biens sociaux”, also referred to as “ABS“) – Articles L.241-3 and L.242-6 of the Commercial Code

This specifically French offence makes it a criminal act for directors and corporate officers to use company’s assets or credit in bad faith in a manner contrary to the company’s interests, for personal gain or to favor another company or business in which they have a direct or indirect interest.

It carries 5 years’ imprisonment and a €375,000 fine. The sanctions are aggravated by up to 7 years’ imprisonment and €500,000 when the offence is committed or facilitated by means of either accounts opened or contracts entered into with organisations established abroad, or by the interposition of natural or legal persons or any organisation, trust or comparable institution established abroad.

• Presentation or publication of inaccurate or misleading financial accounts (“Présentation ou publication de comptes annuels inexacts ou infidèles”) – Articles L.241-3 and L.242-6 of the Commercial Code

This offence makes it a criminal act to intentionally provide to shareholders or publish inaccurate or misleading annual financial accounts (balance sheet and income statement). It carries 5 years’ imprisonment and a €375,000 fine.

• Fraudulent insolvency (“banqueroute”) – Articles L.654-2 et seq. Commercial Code:

This offence applies to directors of companies in judicial liquidation who committed specified acts (e.g., fictitious expenditure, fraudulent concealment of assets, failure to file for insolvency). It carries 5 years’ imprisonment and a €75,000 fine.

Specific offences related to corruption and affiliated behaviours:

• Corruption – Articles 432-11 et seq., 433-1 et seq., 434-9 et seq., 435-1 et seq., 445-1 et seq. of the Penal Code

A bribe can be generally defined as any offer, promise, donation, gift or reward unlawfully offered or requested that will induce or reward the performance or the non-performance by a person of an act pertaining to their position.

French criminal law criminalises bribery of:

• domestic public officials (Articles 433-1 and 432-11 of the Penal Code)
• domestic judicial staff (Article 434-9 of the Penal Code)
• domestic private individuals (Articles 445-1 and 445-2 of the Penal Code)
• foreign or international public officials (Articles 435-1 and 435-3 of the Penal Code)
• foreign or international judicial staff (Articles 435-7 and 435-9 of the Penal Code).

Active and passive bribery are both criminalised:

• Active bribery is the act of (a) unlawfully offering directly or indirectly to a public or private agent for the benefit of that person (or a third party) in order to induce this agent to perform or refrain from performing any act pertaining to their position, duties, mandate or activities (or facilitated thereby), or (b) accepting the proposal of a person who unlawfully requests any such advantages in exchange for these acts ;
• Passive bribery is the act whereby a public or private agent unlawfully accepts or requests advantages on their own or a third party’s behalf in order to perform or refrain from performing any act pertaining to their position, duties, mandate or activities (or facilitated thereby).

• Influence peddling (“traffic d’influence”) – Articles 432-11 et seq., 433-1 et seq., 434-9-1 et seq., 435-2 et seq. of the Penal Code

Influence peddling is when a private or public agent, who has real or apparent influence on the decision-making of an authority, exchanges this influence for an undue advantage.

Active and passive influence peddling are both criminalised, whether the intermediary is a public or private agent, where the decision-maker is:

• a domestic public authority (Articles 432-11, 433-1 and 433-2 of the Penal Code)
• a domestic judicial official (Article 434-9-1 of the Penal Code)
• a judicial official from an international court (Article 435-8 and 435-10 of the Penal Code)
• a public official from a foreign State (Articles 435-2 and 435-4 of the Penal Code)

• Unlawful taking of interests (“Prise illégale d’intérêt”) – Article 432-12 and 432-13 of the Penal Code

This offence criminalises two different types of behaviours:

• Interference (“délit d’ingérence”): it is the act, by a public agent or official, of knowingly taking, receiving or retaining, directly or indirectly an interest, which impairs their impartiality, independence or objectivity, in a business or operation which they are, at the time of the act, wholly or partly responsible for overseeing, administering, liquidating or paying (Article 432-12 of the Penal Code).
• Revolving door (“délit de pantouflage”): it criminalises the fact, for a public agent or official, who has been charged, as part of his public functions, with either ensuring the supervision or control of a private company, or concluding contracts of any kind with a private company or formulating an opinion on such contracts, or directly proposing to the competent authority decisions relating to operations carried out by a private company or formulating an opinion on such decisions, to take or receive a participation by work, advice or capital in one of these companies before the expiry of a period of three years following the cessation of his public functions (Article 432-13 of the Penal Code).

Offences related to public procurement:

• Favouritism (“favoritisme”) – Article 432-14 of the Penal Code

It criminalises the fact, for public agent or official, who procures or attempts to procure for another an unjustified advantage by an act contrary to the legislative or regulatory provisions intended to guarantee freedom of access and equality of candidates in public procurement and concession contracts.

• Receipt in relation to favouritism (“recel de favoritisme”) – Articles 321-1 et seq. of the Penal Code

This is a specific application of the general offence of “receipt” (see supra), sanctioning the entity/person who wilfully unfairly benefits from the award of a public contract, due to the commission of an offence of favouritism.

Offences related to tax fraud:

• Tax fraud (“fraude fiscale”) – Article 1741 of the General Tax Code

Tax fraud consists in fraudulently evading or attempting to fraudulently evade the assessment or payment of taxes (in whole or in part), whether by willfully failing to make a return within the prescribed time limits, by willfully concealing a portion of the sums subject to tax, by organizing insolvency or obstructing the recovery of tax by other maneuvers, or by acting in any other fraudulent manner.

It is punishable by up to 5 years’ imprisonment and a €500,000 fine (€2,500,000 for legal persons), or up to 10 years and a €3,000,000 fine (€15,000,000 for legal persons) – it being noted that the amount of the fine can be increased to twice the proceeds of the offence – if aggravated, e.g., organised gang, use of foreign accounts, fictitious entities.

• VAT fraud – Article 313-1 of the Penal Code

This is a specific application of the general offence of “fraud” (see supra).

• Money laundering of tax fraud – Articles 324-1 et seq. of the Penal Code

This is a specific application of the general offence of “money laundering” (see supra).

Specific offences related to financial markets:

• Insider trading (“délit d’initié”) – Articles L.465-1 of the Monetary and Financial Code
• Spreading of false or misleading information (“diffusion de fausse information”) – Article L.465-3-1 of the Monetary and Financial Code
• Market manipulation (“délit de manipulation de marché”) – Articles L.465-3-1 of the Monetary and Financial Code

France applies a dual (criminal/administrative) enforcement system in this area, which means that these behaviours may both virtually fall within the scope of administrative sanctions delivered by the Financial Market Authority (“Autorité des Marchés Financiers” or “AMF”) according to the Regulation (EU) no. 596/2014 (“Market Abuse Regulation” or “MAR”) and of criminal offences punishable by criminal courts according to French criminal law.

However, in accordance with the ne bis in idem principle (see ECHR, 2^nd sec., 4 March 2014, no. 18640/10, “Grande Stevens v. Italy”), French law provides rules allowing for the distribution of proceedings between the administrative authority and the criminal court in such a way as to prevent a joint application of administrative and criminal sanctions (Article 465-3-6 of the Monetary and Financial Code).

Yes. Legal persons (other than the State) may be held criminally liable for offences committed on their behalf by their organs or representatives (Article 121-2 of the Penal Code).

It is important to note that the criminal liability of legal persons does not exclude per se that of natural persons (e.g. corporate directors and officers) as co-perpetrators or accomplices.

Companies may face the same fines as individuals multiplied by five (Article 131-38 of the Penal Code), as well as additional penalties (dissolution, prohibition from public procurement, court supervision, etc.) (Article 131-39 of the Penal Code).

See the criminal offences listed under question 1.

In France, each criminal court is staffed with a public prosecutor (“procureurs de la République”) and a team of deputy prosecutors (« substituts du procureur »), responsible for investigations and prosecutions within that territorial jurisdiction. These judicial magistrates are assisted by the police for the purpose of the criminal investigations.

In the event of a particularly complex economic and financial offence, it should be noted that the case may be handled by the National Financial Prosecutor Office (“Parquet national financier” or “PNF”), as opposed to a local public prosecutor office. Created in 2014, the PNF is a specialised prosecutor’s office with nationwide jurisdiction over serious and complex financial crime, including large-scale corruption, market abuse, major tax fraud, and cases of particular national interest. The PNF is currently made of 20 judicial magistrates based in Paris.

The investigations led by the public prosecutors are referred to as “police investigations” (“enquête de police”). This legal framework enables the public prosecutor and the police to perform a certain number of coercive actions for the purpose of the investigations (custody, search and seizures, request of information, etc.). If the particularity and complexity of the case require longer and much coercive investigations, the prosecuting authority has the possibility to initiate a formal “judicial investigation” (“information judiciaire” or “instruction”) by referring the matter to an investigating judge (“juge d’instruction” ou “magistrat instructeur”), who is also a judicial magistrate but with greater statutory independence and powers.

Please note that certain facts are likely to be investigated and prosecuted both administratively and criminally (e.g. tax fraud, market abuses, etc.). Specific rules apply to determine to what extent the same facts may be investigated concurrently or alternatively by judicial authorities (i.e. public prosecutors and investigating judges) and administrative bodies (e.g. the Financial Market Authority (“AMF”), the tax authorities, etc.).

Please also note that, since June 2021, the European Public Prosecutor’s Office (EPPO) is now responsible for investigating and prosecuting perpetrators and accomplices of criminal offences affecting the financial interests of the EU, which are provided for in Directive (UE) 2017/1371 and include: (i) misappropriation of EU funds, (ii) active and passive of bribery of EU agents, (iii) transnational VAT fraud when at least two EU member States are involved and more than EUR 10 million are at stake, (iv) EU custom offences and related money laundering.

Financial crime cases are heard by professional judges sitting in a criminal court (“tribunal correctionnel”). Cases are heard by a panel of three professional judges (or a single judge for minor cases), with no jury.

If an appeal is brought against the decision delivered by the criminal court (whether by the defendant or the public prosecutor; the victim also has the possibility to bring an appeal but only regarding the requested damages), the case is heard before a court of appeal.

A ruling issued by a court of appeal may be brought to the Supreme Court (“Cour de cassation”) but only in the event of an error of law (as opposed to an error regarding to the facts of the case).

Investigations may be initiated by the public prosecutors:

• As a result of police reporting a criminal offence.
• As a result of a complaint (“plainte”) by a victim: any person who considers themselves a victim of a financial offence may file a complaint with the police or directly before the public prosecutor office (or, if the public prosecutor’s office does not respond favorably, before the senior investigative judge).
• As a result of a referral by any public body (e.g. the tax authorities, the financial market authority, etc.) or public agent: indeed, by public authority, public official, or civil servant who, in the course of their duties, becomes aware of a criminal offence is required to report it immediately to the public prosecutor and to provide that official with all relevant information, reports, and documents (Article 40 of the Code of Criminal Procedure).
• As a result of public information (news article, etc.).

Once investigations are initiated, whether under the legal framework of “police investigations” or “judicial investigations” (see supra, Q4), a certain number of coercive investigative actions may be initiated by the judicial authority (judicial police / public prosecutor / investigative judge), including:

• Dawn raids/searches (“perquisitions”) and seizures (“saisies”), it being noted that both physical and electronic searches are permitted. They are frequent in major financial crime investigations and may be conducted simultaneously at multiple locations.
• Document production orders (“requisitions judiciaires”) are regularly issued to financial institutions, companies, and professionals.
• Exploitation of telephone data (“exploitation des données téléphoniques”).
• Wiretapping (“interceptions judiciaires” or “écoutes téléphoniques”).
• Interviews of victims, witnesses and suspects.
• Arrest (“interpellation”) and police custodies (“garde à vues”).

Police, under the supervision of the judicial authority (i.e. either the public prosecutor or the investigating judge – See supra, Q4), can conduct the interview of a person suspected of having committed an offence or having attempted to commit an offence under one of the two following regimes:

• Either under the regime of free interview (“audition libre”): this is a non-coercive interview, which basically means that the person is not brought to the police station by force and may leave the interview at any time (Articles 61-1 and 76-1 of the Code of Criminal Procedure).
• Or under the regime of police custody (“garde à vue”): this is a coercive interview, which means that the person can be arrested and maintained under police custody up to an initial duration of 24 hours (which can be extended up to 48 hours, or even 96 hours in cases of organized crime).

This measure must be the sole means of achieving at least one of the following objectives: (i) to enable the investigations requiring the presence or participation of this person; (ii) to ensure the person is brought before the public prosecutor/investigating judge so that this magistrate can determine the appropriate course of action for the investigation; (iii) to prevent the person from altering evidence or physical clues; (iv) to prevent the person from exerting pressure on witnesses or victims, as well as on their families or close associates; (v) to prevent the person from colluding with other individuals who may be their co-perpetrators or accomplices; (vi) to guarantee the implementation of measures intended to stop the crime or offense (Articles 62-2 and 77 of the Code of Criminal Procedure).

Individuals against whom there is no plausible reason to suspect that they have committed or attempted to commit an offence are interviewed by investigators as witness without being subject to coercive measures. However, if the needs of the investigation so require, these persons may be maintained under constraint for the time strictly necessary for their hearing, without this period exceeding 4 hours. If during the interview of a witness it appears that there are plausible reasons to suspect that this person has in fact committed or attempted to commit an offence, that person must be questioned pursuant to the regime of “free interview” or under police custody (see above) (Articles 62 and 78 of the Code of Criminal Procedure).

When a formal judicial investigation procedure is initiated (See supra, Q4), the investigating judge has the possibility to interview the victim(s), the witness(es), and the suspect(s) either personally or through the police.

When he/she considers that there are “serious or consistent indications” allowing to consider that the suspect has participated as a perpetrator or as an accomplice in the commission of the offences under investigations, the investigative judge has the possibility, after personally hearing this person at a dedicated interview (“interrogatoire de première comparution” or “IPC”), to formally indict this suspect. This indictment (“mise en examen”) triggers a certain number of rights and constraints for the indicted person (see below, Q8). Once indicted, the suspect can only be further interviewed by the investigating judge (as opposed to the police).

If needed, the investigating judge has the possibility to deliver a warrant for the suspect’s arrest, so that this person is interviewed under the police custody regime (“mandat de recherche”) or personally by the investigative judge (“mandat d’amener” and “mandat d’arrêt”).

The suspect being interviewed by the police under the regime of “free interview” or police custody (See Q7) has especially the following rights:

• (i) Right to be informed of his/her status and rights (as listed below);
• (ii) Right to be informed of the alleged nature, date and location of the offense that he/she is suspected of having committed or attempted to commit;
• (iii) Right to be assisted by a lawyer (which includes the right to be assisted by a lawyer during the interviews and, in case of police custody, to privately consult a lawyer for 30 minutes before the first interview as well as in case of extension of the duration of the measure);
• (iv) Right to be assisted by a translator;
• (v) Right to make statements, to answer to questions, and/or to keep silence;
• (vi) In case of police custody: right to be examined by a doctor;
• (vii) In case of police custody: right to have a person of his/her choice (i.e. a person with whom he/she usually lives, one of his/her direct relatives, one of his/her siblings, or any other person he/she designates), his/her employer, his/her consular authorities (when he/she is a foreigner), notified by telephone of the police custody measure;

When the person is interviewed under the “free interview” regime (as opposed to the police custody regime), he/she can leave the interview at any moment.

Whether he/she is interviewed under the “free interview” regime or under police custody, the interviewee has no access to the case file.

When the suspect is interviewed by the investigating judge (See Q7), he/she has the following rights:

• (i) Pre-interview disclosure: the right to have access to the case file before the “first appearance interview” (“interrogatoire de première comparution” or “IPC”) and then at any time during the formal investigating procedure;
• (ii) Right to be informed of the alleged nature, date and location of the offense that he/she is suspected of having committed or attempted to commit;
• (ii) Right to be assisted by a lawyer;
• (iii) Right to be assisted by a translator;
• (iv) Right to make statements, to answer to questions, and/or to keep silence;

Whether it is carried out by the police or the investigating judge, interviews are always transcribed. The interviews of a person under police custody are recorded when the investigations deal with felonies (“crimes”, i.e. criminal offences sanctioned by more than 10 years’ imprisonment) and/or when he/she is under 18.

As a general rule, French criminal law applies to and French judicial authorities have jurisdiction over:

Financial crimes committed on French territory (the “principle of territoriality”). It should be noted that an offence is deemed to have been committed on French territory as soon as one of its constituent acts took place on that territory (Article 113-2 of the Penal Code).

Building on this rule, case law has been able to infer, specifically in matters of financial crime (e.g. bribery of foreign public officials; misappropriation of corporate assets), that a financial crime was reputed to be committed on French territory, for example, when:

• The corrupt agreement was in fact decided and organized on French territory (i.e. at the level of the parent company, rather than at the level of its foreign subsidiary — particularly where the latter proves to be a mere legal vehicle), and the amount of the secret commission had been paid on that territory (See for example: Cass. Crim., 14 March 2018, n°16-82.117); or when
• The acts of bribery committed abroad form an “indivisible whole” with criminal acts committed on French territory (See for example: Cass. Crim., 11 Oct. 2017, 17-80.258).

Financial crimes committed outside French territory, when:

• • This offence was committed by a French individual or a French legal entity, provided that this offence is also punishable in the country where it was committed (the “principle of active personality”) (Article 113-6 of the Penal Code).

It should be noted that, with respect specifically to the offence of bribery of public officials, this principle is substantially relaxed, since, in that particular scenario, the mere fact that such acts are committed by a French national or “a person habitually residing or carrying out all or part of their economic activity on French territory” triggers the applicability of French criminal law (Article 435-6-2 of the Criminal Code).

• • This offence is committed against a French individual or a French legal entity (the “principle of passive personality”) (Article 113-7 of the Penal Code).

France recognises legal professional privilege, i.e. the confidentiality of the private (oral and written) exchanges between the client and his/her lawyer (“avocat”), as a fundamental principle of the right to a fair trial (Article 66-5 of the Law n°71-1130 of 31 December 1971 on the legal profession; Preliminary Article of the Code of Criminal Procedure).

Accordingly, correspondence between a lawyer and his/her client “relating to the exercise of the right of defence” (e.g. consultations, attendance notes, memoranda, emails) are protected from seizure by judicial authorities and the police in the context of criminal investigations. Consequently, when a search is conducted at a client’s premises, documents claimed to be privileged may not be definitively seized without the authorisation of a specific judge. When a search takes place at a law firm, the “Bâtonnier” (the president of the bar) or his/her representative must be present (Articles 56-1 and 56-1-1 of the Code of Criminal Procedure).

Please note that in France, in-house lawyers (“juristes d’entreprise”) do not benefit from legal professional privilege in the specific context of criminal investigations. Legal advice prepared by in-house counsel is therefore susceptible to be seized by judicial authorities in the context of criminal proceedings. This principle is not called into question by the Law n°2026-122 of 23 February 2026 establishing the confidentiality of consultations with in-house counsel.

Data protection is ruled in France by the General Data Protection Regulation (Regulation (EU) 2016/679, generally referred to as the “GDPR”) and the French Data Protection Act (“Loi Informatique et Libertés”, as amended).

In the context of a financial crime investigation, the applicability of GDPR obligations depends on whom conduct the investigation:

• When it is conducted by the judicial authorities, their investigations are largely exempt from the GDPR obligations;
• When it is conducted by a company in the context of an internal investigation (“enquête interne”), this company should fully comply with GDPR obligations, including informing data subjects (unless an exception for law enforcement cooperation applies), appointing a DPO, and respecting data minimisation and retention principles.

Yes. Under current law, the criminal liability of the absorbed company passes to the absorbing company, regardless of the corporate form of the entity involved in the merger (see Cass. Crim., 25 Nov. 2020, n°18-86.955; Cass. Crim., 13 April 2022, n°21-80.653; Cass. Crim., 22 May 2024, n°23-83.180).

It should be noted that this state of the law is recent. Until 2020, the French Supreme Court held that a merger by absorption caused the absorbed company to cease to exist and brought any criminal proceedings against it to an end. In so doing, the Court of Cassation relied on a strict interpretation of the principle of individual criminal liability (Article 121-2 of the Penal Code), under which the dissolution of the absorbed company upon completion of the merger extinguished its legal personality and terminated any public prosecution brought against it. However, by two decisions dated 25 November 2020 and 13 April 2022, the French Supreme Court effected a significant reversal of its case law, now accepting that the criminal liability of an absorbed company may be transferred to the absorbing company.

French prosecutors apply the principle of opportunity of prosecution (“opportunité des poursuites” – Article 40-1 CPP), which means that they enjoy broad discretion in deciding whether to charge / to drop the case / to resort to alternative measures, having regard to:

• Sufficiency of evidence: whether there is sufficient evidence to support a reasonable prospect of conviction;
• Seriousness of the offence: the gravity of the alleged conduct and its impact on public order, the economy or the financial system;
• Personal circumstances of the suspect: the individual’s criminal record, personal situation, and degree of involvement;
• Availability of alternative measures: whether an alternative resolution mechanism (e.g. CJIP) would better serve the public interest (see Q17); and/or
• Public interest: the general interest in prosecution, deterrence, and the protection of victims.

French prosecutors apply the principle of opportunity of prosecution (“opportunité des poursuites” – Article 40-1 CPP), which means that they enjoy broad discretion in deciding whether to charge / to drop the case / to resort to alternative measures, having regard to:

• Sufficiency of evidence: whether there is sufficient evidence to support a reasonable prospect of conviction;
• Seriousness of the offence: the gravity of the alleged conduct and its impact on public order, the economy or the financial system;
• Personal circumstances of the suspect: the individual’s criminal record, personal situation, and degree of involvement;
• Availability of alternative measures: whether an alternative resolution mechanism (e.g. CJIP) would better serve the public interest (see Q17); and/or
• Public interest: the general interest in prosecution, deterrence, and the protection of victims.

In French criminal proceedings, any person suspected or prosecuted is presumed innocent until proven guilty (Preliminary article of the Code of Criminal Procedure). This implies that the burden of proof of guilt rests with the public prosecutor.

Conviction by a criminal court requires “inner conviction” (“intime conviction”) that the accused committed the offence. In this respect, the principle of free evaluation of evidence (“liberté de la prevue”) applies in French criminal proceedings: all means of proof are admissible, subject to the rules of lawful gathering and fair trial guarantees (Article 427 of the Code of Criminal Procedure).

Yes. For most financial crime offences, the limitation period is six years from the date of the offence (Article 8 of the Code of Criminal Procedure).

It is important to note that the starting date of the limitation period may be postponed in case of hidden offences (“infractions occultes”) or concealed offences (“infractions dissimulées”): where the offence could not be detected given the clandestine nature of the offence or due to fraudulent concealment, the limitation period only begins to run from the date of discovery of such offence (Article 9-1 Code of Criminal Procedure). Nonetheless, in any event, prosecution against such offences is reputed time-barred 12 years after the date on which the offence was committed.

France has developed several alternative resolution mechanisms, the most significant being the “CRPC” and “CJIP”:

• The guilty plea procedure (“comparution sur reconnaissance préalable de culpabilité”, or more commonly referred to as“CRPC”) – Articles 495-7 et seq. CPP

The CRPC is available to individuals and legal entites for criminal offences punishable by up to 5 years’ imprisonment. The prosecutor proposes a sentence; if accepted by the suspect and their lawyer, it is validated by the court. It is commonly used in financial crime cases to resolve proceedings against individuals expeditiously.

• The judicial public interest agreement (“convention judiciaire d’intérêt public”, or more commonly referred to as “CJIP”) – Article 41-1-2 of the Criminal Procedure Code

The CJIP is France’s equivalent of the deferred prosecution agreement (DPA). It is available to legal persons (not individuals) for offences of corruption, influence peddling, tax fraud, money laundering of these offences, and environmental offences. Under a CJIP, the company agrees to: (i) pay a public interest fine of up to 30% of average annual turnover; (ii) implement or improve a compliance programme under AFA supervision for up to 3 years; and/or (iii) compensate victims. The CJIP is validated by the president of the relevant court in a public hearing. Unlike the CRPC, it does not constitute a criminal conviction. Individual liability is not extinguished.

France does not have a fully developed plea-bargaining system in the Anglo-American sense. However, the CRPC (see Q17) constitutes a form of simplified guilty plea procedure. Prosecutors have the discretion to propose a sentence negotiation, but the court must validate the arrangement. The CRPC is increasingly used in financial crime cases and typically results in a shorter, definitive sentence compared to full trial proceedings.

For legal persons, the CJIP (see Q17) serves a similar function, but does not involve a guilty plea or formal conviction.

Cooperation with the prosecution (including cooperation against co-defendants) may be taken into account by the prosecutor in the exercise of their discretion and by the court in sentencing (see Q20).

There is no general corporate obligation on companies and individuals to self-report discovered misconduct to prosecuting authorities. However, voluntary disclosure and cooperation with authorities are material factors in:

• Eligibility for a CJIP: the guidelines published by the PNF (2019, updated 2022) specifically consider whether the company self-reported the misconduct and cooperated during the investigation as factors favouring a CJIP and the level of the public interest fine (see Q17).
• Sentencing mitigation: voluntary disclosure and cooperation are mitigating circumstances before the court (see Q20).

Please note that France imposes mandatory reporting obligations to:

• Auditors (“commissaires aux comptes”): they are legally required to report to the public prosecutor any criminal offences discovered in the exercise of their duties (Article L.821-10 of the Commercial Code).
• AML-regulated entities: are required to file suspicious transaction reports with TRACFIN, i.e. the French administrative body in charge of tracking money laundering, clandestine and terrorism financing, and tax, social and customs fraud (Articles L.561-15 et seq. CMF).

According to the principle of individualization of sentences (“principe d’individualisation des peines”), criminal courts have broad discretion power in determining the nature, the quantum and the regime of the penalties they impose to a convicted person, from among those penalties provided for by law (prison, fine, confiscation, etc.) and subject to the applicable maximum for the considered offence(s). The courts must do so “according to the circumstances of the offence and the personality of the perpetrator as well as his material, family and social situation“(Article 132-1 of the Penal Code) and, more specifically with regard to the penalty of a fine, “taking into account the resources and expenses of the perpetrator of the offence” (Article 132-20 of the Penal Code).

The nature, the quantum and the regime of the applicable penalties may especially vary considering:

• Aggravating circumstances (e.g. commission in an organized gang (“bande organisée”), use of foreign accounts, recidivism (“récidive”), etc.), which legally aggravate the applicable penalties; and
• Mitigating circumstances (e.g. criminal records, degree of participation, cooperation of authorities, voluntary reparation of harm, etc.), which may be taken into account by the court to reduce the penalties it will impose to the convicted person.

Please note that there is no formal French equivalent of the US leniency programme for individuals. However, Article 132-78 of the Penal Code provides for the status of repentant (“statut de repenti”), allowing a participant in certain offences to benefit from an exemption or a reduction of sentence in the event that he/she has avoided the judicial or administrative authorities from the existence of the facts (Article 132-78 of the Penal Code). In financial crime, this status may be applied to reduce the sentence in case of tax fraud (Article 1741 of the General Tax Code), corruption and influence peddling (Articles 432-11-1, 433-2-1, 435-6-1 and 435-11-1 of the Penal Code), or money laundering (Article 324-6-1 of the Penal Code).

Since the “Sapin II” Act (2016), compliance programmes have become central to French white collar crime enforcement, by making compulsory for companies with more than 500 employees and consolidated turnover exceeding €100 million to implement an 8-pillar compliance programme (code of conduct, whistleblowing system, risk mapping, third-party due diligence, accounting controls, training, disciplinary procedures, and internal audit).

To enforce and oversee the implementation of these compliance programs, the Sapin II Act created the French Anti-Corruption Agency (“AFA” or “Agence française anticorruption”) with broad authority to audit both the existence, quality and effectiveness of anti-corruption compliance programs required by the law and the proper execution of CJIP (see Q17).

The Sapin II Act also empowers the AFA to promulgate guidelines to assist the entities falling within the scope of this legislation in establishing effective compliance programs which meet the legal requirements. While these guidelines are not legally authoritative, they are highly instructive for covered entities wishing for more concrete guidance from the AFA with respect to the implementation of their compliance program.

When negotiating a CJIP (see Q17), the National Financial Prosecutor Office (“PNF” or “Parquet national financier”) (see Q4) assesses the quality and effectiveness of the company’s compliance programme. A robust programme at the time of the offence may mitigate liability; conversely, a deficient programme is an aggravating factor.

Best practices for businesses: companies falling within the scope of Sapin II should conduct regular anti-corruption risk assessments; implement a robust whistleblowing system; provide regular anti-corruption training; maintain adequate accounting controls; and frequently update the compliance program especially in light of the evolution of the risk mapping. In the event of discovered misconduct, companies should conduct prompt and thorough internal investigations (with independent counsel), preserve relevant evidence, and consider early engagement with counsel to assess voluntary disclosure options.

See the criminal penalties applicable to each criminal offence listed under question 1.

Companies may face the same fines as individuals multiplied by five (Article 131-38 of the Penal Code), as well as additional penalties (dissolution, prohibition from public procurement, court supervision, etc.) (Article 131-39 of the Penal Code).

See the criminal offences listed under question 5.

The public prosecutor and/or the defendant can bring an appeal against a decision handed down by the criminal court within 10 days of the decision. The victim (“partie civile”) has also the possibility to bring an appeal against such decision, but only regarding the requested damages.

It is important to note that, in principle, an appeal against a decision suspends the effects of that decision. As an exception, the court may decide to enforce its decision provisionally (“exécution provisoire”), provided that this decision is expressly and specifically justified based on arguments presented in adversarial proceedings concerning the proportionality of the infringement on the rights and freedoms of the convicted person whose sentence has not yet been finalized (Articles 471 and 506 of the Code of Criminal Procedure; See also decision n°2025-1175 QPC of 5 dec. 2025 delivered by the French Constitutional Court).

Lastly, a ruling issued by a court of appeal may be brought to the Supreme Court (“Cour de cassation”) but only in the event of an error of law (as opposed to an error regarding to the facts of the case).

The criminalization of business law in France over the last decade has significantly reinforced the reactivity of the French authorities in tackling financial crime, especially through:

(i) the concentration and specialization of judicial and enforcement authorities: the PNF (the National Financial Prosecutor Office) (see Q4) now leads most major integrity and white-collar cases, supported by highly specialized investigative units (e.g. the OCLCIFF for probity offences and, since 2024, the newly created ONAF for tax and customs fraud). These authorities are deeply familiar with financial mechanisms, corporate structures and key players, and have at their disposal specific legal tools designed to encourage corporate cooperation — most notably the CJIP (see Q17 and below);

(ii) the rise of criminal risk prevention within organizations. This especially takes two forms:

• • On the public side, the “HATVP” (the High Authority for Transparency in Public Life) conducts prior reviews of senior civil servants moving into the private sector, to prevent conflicts of interest.
  • On the corporate side, companies are increasingly implementing compliance programs covering risk mapping, codes of conduct, internal whistleblowing mechanisms, audits and corrective measures. This culture of prevention, enshrined in French law by the Sapin II Act of 2016, has now reached full maturity — not only among companies legally required to comply (500+ employees and €100M+ turnover), but also among smaller firms voluntarily adopting anti-corruption programs as a best practice.

(iii) a growing tension between negotiated justice and trial-based justice (see Q17). CJIPs and CRPCs allow companies and their executives to contractualize criminal risk by negotiating a public interest fine and remediation measures with the prosecutor, in exchange for avoiding trial — a particularly attractive option for companies seeking to protect their reputation or avoid ancillary penalties such as debarment from public procurement. However, negotiated justice is not always the right answer: when the terms of offer are unsatisfactory, trial remains the proper forum for the defence of rights. In that regard, it is worth noting that the PNF’s acquittal rate in 2024 stood at 40%.

Criminal investigations relating to financial crimes are notoriously lengthy. The overall duration from complaint to final judgement (including appeals) may exceed 10 years in the most complex case. To limit the duration of criminal investigations, the French legislator limited, in 2021, the duration of police investigations to a maximum period of 2 years from the date of the first investigative act; however, this period can still be extended beyond, if necessary and with the authorization of the Public Prosecutor, to reach up a maximum of 5 years (or 7 years in case of organized crime) (Article 75-3 of the Code of Criminal Procedure).

See Q24 above and Q26 below. The last five years have especially been marked by particularly significant activity on the part of the PNF (the National Financial Prosecutor Office), which has resulted in a number of high-profile cases, relating to the political class, as well as to financial or industrial institutions.

For reference, the number of cases dealt by the PNF was 211 in 2014 (date of creation), 601 in 2020, and 771 in 2025. In 2025, the cases handled by the PNF were distributed as follows: 45.53% probity offenses (corruption, influence peddling, favouritism, unlawful taking of interests), 47.73% offenses against public finances (tax fraud, custom fraud, public aid fraud), 5.45% offenses against financial markets, 0.91% offenses against competition, and 0.39% for other offenses.

The criminalization of business law has especially led to the development of ESG and environmental crime (increased focus on greenwashing, environmental compliance failures, and supply chain due diligence), as well as enforcement activity in crypto-asset related money laundering and fraud.

Among the most notable cases in the past year:

• The “CumCum” case, in which numerous banks in France and across Europe have been implicated in connection with a dividend arbitrage practice deemed fraudulent. In this investigation opened by the PNF in 2021, significant developments occurred in the past year, with the CJIP signed by Crédit Agricole with the PNF in September 2025 providing for a €88.2 million penalty. This shift in the banks’ defence strategy was then followed by HSBC, which in turn signed a CJIP with the PNF in January 2026 providing for a €267,5 million penalty. Further CJIPs are likely to follow.
• The Lafarge case: for the first time in France, a legal entity was prosecuted for terrorism financing, following a complaint filed in November 2016 by NGO Sherpa and former Syrian employees. The French cement giant Lafarge was accused of paying jihadist groups, including the Islamic State, to keep a Syrian cement plant operating despite the civil war, between 2013 and 2014. On 13 April 2026, Lafarge and former executives were found guilty by the criminal court of Paris of financing terrorist groups. Former CEO Bruno Lafont was sentenced to six years in prison with immediate effect, and seven other former managers received sentences ranging from 18 months to seven years. The court found that the company had established “a genuine commercial partnership with ISIS“.
• The “Libyan financing” case, in which former President Nicolas Sarkozy was accused of having struck a secret deal with the Gaddafi regime to fund his victorious 2007 presidential campaign in exchange for diplomatic favours. The trial opened on 6 January 2025, with thirteen defendants including three former ministers. On 25 September 2025, at the conclusion of over ten years of investigation, the former president was sentenced to five years in prison for criminal conspiracy, the court finding an agreement designed to prepare corruption at the highest level of the State. He was however acquitted of illegal campaign financing and passive corruption charges, for lack of direct evidence. The case is currently on appeal before the Paris Court of Appeal.

This historic case implicating a former head of state for offences committed before his election to the Élysée illustrates the growing influence of the PNF and the strength of French anti-corruption justice.

Several significant legislative and regulatory developments are anticipated, including:

• Restatement of the Code of Criminal Procedure: As a result of Ordinance n° 2025-1091 of 19 November 2025, the entire legislative part of the Code of Criminal Procedure has been rewritten and restructured with a view to clarifying its drafting and improving its readability. This restated version of the Code of Criminal Procedure will come into force on 1 January 2029.
• Transposition in French law of the EU Anti-Corruption Directive (Directive (EU) 2026/1021 of 29 April 2026 on combatting corruption), by 1^st June 2028. This new directive aims at introducing a harmonized regulatory framework for acts of corruption, accompanied by a system of strict sanctions (especially for legal entities in case of failure to supervise or exercise control), while strengthening cooperation mechanisms between national and European authorities.
• Bill n° 2208 of 9 December 2025, seeking to provide internal investigations with a proper legislative framework (bill currently under examination at the French National Assembly):
  Today, internal investigations (“enquêtes internes”) are essentially governed by methods derived from practice, subject to scattered mandatory provisions (social law, GDPR, criminal procedure, etc.). This bill aims at providing a proper legislative framework to internal investigations, including: (i) a definition of the internal investigation in the Labour Code (“An internal investigation means a formal process conducted within a private or public organisation, aimed at verifying whether alleged facts or suspicions of violations of law or of the organisation’s internal rules are established.”); and (ii) the insertion of a dedicated section on internal investigations into the Code of Criminal Procedure, applicable where an internal investigation is conducted into the same facts as ongoing criminal proceedings (right of the person summoned in the context of internal investigations, legal privilege regarding documents arising from the internal investigations, etc.).

Areas for improvement in the financial crime legal framework may specifically include:

• (i) Clarification of the articulation between corporate criminal liability and the personal liability of company officers: To date, no clear rules govern the relationship between these two forms of liability – in particular, whether they must necessarily be cumulative, or whether they may operate as alternatives. In the absence of defined criteria, the question is in practice resolved on a case-by-case basis, at the discretion of the prosecuting authority, in the exercise of its broad power of prosecutorial discretion (“opportunité des poursuites”). Greater clarity in this area would significantly improve the readability and predictability of French white collar criminal law.
• (ii) Extension of the CJIP to natural persons (see Q17 above): Extension of the CJIP mechanism to natural persons: under the current legal framework, the CJIP is exclusively available to legal persons, which may give rise, within the same case, to a significant asymmetry of treatment between the company and the associated natural persons (directors, employees, etc.). While the company may enter into a CJIP with the public prosecutor – thereby avoiding any criminal conviction – the associated individuals may either be referred to the criminal court for trial or be required to acknowledge their guilt through a CRPC. This disparity in procedural position, within proceedings arising from the same underlying facts, represents a structural incoherence that the extension of the CJIP to natural persons would remedy.
• (iii) Rights of individuals heard before parliamentary inquiry committees (“commissions d’enquête parlementaire”) in the context of parallel criminal proceedings: A significant gap concerns individuals summoned before a parliamentary inquiry committee (commission d’enquête parlementaire) while they are, or may become, implicated in concurrent criminal proceedings. Under the ordinance of 17 November 1958, witnesses summoned before a parliamentary inquiry committee are placed under oath and legally obliged to testify, failing which they incur criminal liability — yet French law provides no express mechanism for reconciling these obligations with the right to silence, the right not to self-incriminate, or the right to be assisted by counsel guaranteed in criminal proceedings. The conditions under which parliamentary testimony may subsequently be relied upon in criminal proceedings are equally undefined, raising legitimate concerns in terms of fair trial. Legislative intervention or authoritative judicial guidance is needed to clarify this interface. To this end, the Paris bar adopted on 5 May 2026 a report, calling for a reform of the parliamentary inquiry committees.

 

This Q&A has been prepared by Fédida Associés for inclusion in The Legal 500’s Country Comparative Guide on White Collar Crime 2026. The information provided is accurate as at May 2026 and is intended as a general overview only. It does not constitute legal advice.