The Anti-Monopoly Law (“AML”), as amended in 2022, does not expressly define the term “cartel”, but instead regulates “monopoly agreements”, which refer to agreements, decisions or other concerted practices that eliminate or restrict competition. For the purposes of this article, the definition of cartels adopts the view that it includes both horizontal and vertical monopoly agreements.

The Provisions on Prohibition of Monopoly Agreements promulgated by the State Administration for Market Regulation (“SAMR”) in March 2023 further refines the regulation rules for cartels. In December 2025, the SAMR amended the Provisions to formally establish a safe harbour regime for vertical monopoly agreements. Under this regime, for agreements falling within Article 18(1)(1) and (2) of the AML (i.e., resale price maintenance), the undertaking is required to demonstrate that both it and its trading counterparty each have a market share in the relevant market below 5% in each year during the term of the agreement, and that the annual turnover of the products involved is below RMB 100 million in each year during the term of the agreement. For agreements falling within Article 18(1)(3) of the AML (i.e., vertical restrictions other than resale price maintenance), the undertaking is required to demonstrate that both it and its trading counterparty each have a market share in the relevant market below 15% in each year during the term of the agreement. Agreements satisfying these thresholds and other conditions may be exempted from prohibition. The amendments have entered into force on 1 February 2026.

In addition, in 2024, the Supreme People’s Court issued judicial interpretations on anti-monopoly civil cases, further clarifying the standards for determining monopoly agreements and the rules on civil liability, including damages.

Besides, the Price Law, the Law on Tendering and Bidding and other laws are also applicable to certain special types of cartels.

In addition to the above-mentioned laws and regulations, five anti-monopoly guidelines, namely Anti-Monopoly Guidelines for Automobile Industry, Anti-Monopoly Guidelines for the Field of Intellectual Property Rights, Guidelines on the Application of the Leniency Program to Cases Involving Horizontal Monopoly Agreements, Guidelines on the Undertakings’ Commitments in Anti-Monopoly Cases, and Anti-Monopoly Guidelines on the Platform Economy were formulated by the Anti-Monopoly Commission of the State Council, and three anti-monopoly guidelines, namely Anti-Monopoly Guidelines for Trade Associations, Anti-Monopoly Guidelines for the Pharmaceutical Sector, and Anti-Monopoly Compliance Guidance for Undertakings were formulated by the Anti-Monopoly and Anti-Unfair Competition Commission of the State Council (formerly known as the Anti-Monopoly Commission of the State Council). In addition, the SAMR issued the Anti-Monopoly Compliance Guidelines on Companies’ Overseas Operation and the Anti-Monopoly Guidelines on Standard Essential Patents. Additionally, at the local level, Beijing Municipality, Shanghai Municipality, Jiangsu Province, Tianjin Municipality, Hebei Province and Shandong Province, among others, have also released anti-monopoly compliance guidebooks. Although these anti-monopoly guidelines or guidebooks are not legally enforceable, the provisions on cartels contained therein have important reference value for the law enforcement agencies in their cartel enforcement practice and for undertakings in their compliance efforts.

In addition, with respect to potential defences and exemptions, apart from the above-mentioned safe harbour regime, Article 20 of the AML provides for statutory exemptions for monopoly agreements under certain circumstances, such as where the agreement is entered into for the purposes of improving technology or developing new products, or for enhancing the operational efficiency and competitiveness of small and medium-sized undertakings. Furthermore, Article 69 of the AML provides that it does not apply to concerted conduct of agricultural producers and rural economic organisations in the course of production, processing, sale, transportation or storage of agricultural products.

As noted above, the AML does not expressly define the term “cartel”, but instead regulates “monopoly agreements”, which refer to agreements, decisions or other concerted practices that eliminate or restrict competition.

Monopoly agreements may take the form of agreements or decisions, which can be concluded in written or oral form. In addition, “other concerted practices” refer to situations where undertakings have not entered into any explicit agreement or decision but, in substance, engage in coordinated conduct.

The law distinguishes between horizontal and vertical monopoly agreements. Horizontal monopoly agreements refer to arrangements between competing undertakings, including, among others, fixing or changing commodity prices, restricting the output or sales of a commodity, dividing a sales market or raw material procurement market, restricting the purchase of new technologies or equipment, or the development of new technologies or products, and boycotting transactions. Vertical monopoly agreements refer to arrangements between undertakings and their trading counterparties, including , among others, fixing resale prices and restricting minimum resale prices.

Article 16 of the AML provides that “monopoly agreements refer to agreements, decisions or other concerted practices that eliminate or restrict competition”. Meanwhile, Articles 17 and 18 of the AML enumerate five typical types of horizontal monopoly agreements (including fixing or changing commodity prices, restricting the output or sales of a commodity, dividing a sales market or raw material procurement market, restricting the purchase of new technologies or equipment, or the development of new technologies or products, and boycotting transactions) and two typical types of vertical monopoly agreements (including fixing resale price and restricting minimum resale price).

(i) Agreements other than the abovementioned typical monopoly agreements would be deemed to be monopoly agreements and prohibited only if there is evidence to prove that the agreements eliminate or restrict competition.

(ii) For the two typical vertical monopoly agreements, if an undertaking can prove that they do not have the effect of eliminating or restricting competition, they will not be prohibited. In addition, under the “safe harbour” regime, certain vertical monopoly agreements that meet the relevant market share thresholds and other conditions will not be prohibited.

(iii) With respect to the five typical horizontal monopoly agreements, the relevant laws and regulations have not clarified whether they must have the effect of eliminating or restricting competition so as to constitute monopoly agreements. According to previous cases, AML enforcement authorities (“AMEA”) tend to consider that any of the above agreements cause damage to the market and are illegal per se, while allowing such agreements to be exempted if they meet certain conditions set out in Article 20. Article 20 also applies to vertical monopoly agreements. In contrast, the courts, in view of the definition of a monopoly agreement in the AML, tend to analyze the illegality of cartels, i.e., whether they have the effect of eliminating or restricting competition , on a case-by-case basis.

Article 2 of the AML stipulates jurisdiction over extraterritorial monopolistic conduct, provided that such conduct eliminates or restricts competition within China. In the past decade, numerous cases have shown that, despite occurring outside the territory of China, such conduct is still subject to regulation by the Chinese AMEA.

Before 2018, the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) and the State Administration for Industry and Commerce (SAIC) were in charge of price-related cartels and non-price-related cartels respectively. After the implementation of the Chinese government’s institutional reform in 2018, SAMR is responsible for AML enforcement.

In November 2021, China inaugurated the State Anti-Monopoly Bureau under the SAMR. Meanwhile, SAMR established three new departments for anti-monopoly enforcement, namely the Anti-Monopoly Enforcement Department I, the Anti-Monopoly Enforcement Department II and the Department of Competition Policy Coordination. Such institutional adjustment is an important effort to strengthen China’s anti-monopoly regulation and law enforcement. Among the three departments mentioned above, the Anti-Monopoly Enforcement Department I is in charge of anti-monopoly law enforcement against monopoly agreements.

At the local level, according to the Provisions on Prohibition of Monopoly Agreements, provincial Administrations for Market Regulation (the “provincial AMRs”) are authorized to take charge of the cartels enforcement work within their administrative regions. The Provisions on Prohibition of Monopoly Agreements also requires that the provincial AMRs file for record with the SAMR within 7 working days after a case is initiated. Before making decisions with regard to no administrative penalty, suspension of investigation, resumption of investigation, termination of investigation, or before issuing an advance notice of administrative penalty, provincial AMRs shall report to the SAMR. Provincial AMRs shall file the relevant documents to the SAMR for record within 7 working days after serving their decision of not to impose an administrative penalty, suspending an investigation, resuming an investigation, terminating an investigation or decision on administrative penalty to undertakings under investigation. SAMR may entrust provincial AMRs to conduct case investigations. Similarly, provincial AMRs may also entrust other subordinate AMRs to conduct case investigations. The entrusted authorities can only conduct investigations in the name of the entrusting authority, and may not further entrust other administrative authorities, organizations or individuals to conduct investigations. Provincial AMRs may also consult other provincial AMRs to assist in the investigation as required.

(ⅰ)How do authorities typically learn of the existence of a potential cartel?

Generally, the market regulation authorities in China may discover the existence of a cartel and initiate antitrust enforcement ex officio or through various channels, such as whistleblower reports, referrals or assignments by higher-level authorities, transfers from other authorities, reports from lower-level authorities, or voluntary submissions by undertakings.

(a) Whistleblower reports. Reports from third parties such as enterprises, consumers, or insiders are an important source for detecting cartel conduct. According to Article 25 of the Provisions on Prohibition of Monopoly Agreements, if a report is submitted in writing with relevant facts and evidence, the antitrust enforcement authority shall conduct a necessary investigation. A written report shall generally include information about the whistleblower, the reported party, relevant facts and evidence of the suspected monopoly agreement, and a statement on whether the same matter has been reported to other administrative authorities or brought before a people’s court. Other forms of reporting, such as oral submissions, are also permitted.

(b) Ex officio investigations. These are less frequent and often triggered by incidental findings, with a focus on sectors under public scrutiny or those closely tied to people’s livelihoods. For example, according to published enforcement cases, an investigation in Chongqing was initiated based on television news reports.

(c) Referrals or assignments by higher-level authorities, transfers from other authorities, and reports from lower-level authorities. These are also common means of initiating investigations. For instance, in the case involving three pharmaceutical companies including Tianjin Tianyao Pharmaceutical Co., Ltd. that had reached and implemented a monopoly agreement, the case was assigned by the SAMR to the Tianjin Municipal Administration for Market Regulation. In another case in Zhejiang Province, involving 21 concrete companies in the Xiaoshan District of Hangzhou that had reached and implemented a monopoly agreement, the People’s Court of Yuhang District uncovered potential cartel conduct while adjudicating a gang-related case and referred the leads to the Zhejiang Administration for Market Regulation.

(d) Voluntary reports by undertakings. Under China’s leniency regime established by the Anti-Monopoly Law and related regulations, voluntary reporting by undertakings is also a possible channel for enforcement authorities to initiate investigations, although such cases are relatively rare in practice.

(ⅱ)To what extent do authorities have discretion over the cases they open?

Except for investigations initiated ex officio, enforcement authorities generally have limited discretion in determining whether to open a case. Cases assigned by higher-level authorities, transferred by other authorities, or reported by lower-level authorities, especially those assigned by higher authorities, usually require investigation.

Additionally, for whistleblower reports, Article 25(1) of Provisions on Prohibition of Monopoly Agreements stipulates that if a report is submitted in writing along with relevant facts and evidence, the antitrust enforcement authority shall conduct a necessary investigation. Therefore, written reports with supporting facts and evidence must be investigated. In practice, considering the current enforcement philosophy of “responding to complaints upon receipt”, even reports made through oral or other non-written forms are often followed up with investigations by the enforcement authority.

The investigation of a cartel case mainly includes steps such as finding clues, initiating a case, conducting investigations, making preliminary conclusions, and making final conclusions.

Firstly, the AMEA searches for clues of monopolistic conduct ex officio, through whistleblower reports, assignments by higher authorities or transfers from other agencies. After necessary investigation, it will decide whether to initiate the case. Before formally initiating a case, it may issue a Reminder and Urging Letter or a Notice of Interview to undertakings or relevant administrative authorities, alerting them of risks and requesting corrective measures. Failure to take corrective measures may lead to a formal investigation.

Secondly, if it is necessary to initiate a formal case, the AMEA initiates a case by issuing a Notice of Case Investigation to the investigated parties.

Thirdly, the AMEA conducts investigations according to law, and the investigated parties have the obligation to cooperate with the investigation.

Fourthly, the AMEA makes a preliminary conclusion based on the evidence obtained from the investigation, and issues an Advance Notice of Administrative Penalty (Statement of Objection) to the investigated party. The investigated party has the right to state opinions, submit a defense, and apply for a public hearing if necessary.

Lastly, after considering the facts of the case and the opinions of the investigated party, the AMEA makes a final punishment decision and issues an Administrative Punishment Decision (Final Decision) to the investigated party, or, in cases involving an administrative authority, an Administrative Recommendation.

According to Article 47 of the AML, the AMEA have the following investigative powers:

(i) conducting on-premise inspections of the place of business of the investigated undertakings or other relevant places;

(ii) questioning the undertakings, interested parties or other relevant entities or individuals, and asking for information about the situation;

(iii) inspecting and duplicating related documents, contracts, account books, business correspondences, electronic data and other relevant documents or materials of the undertakings, interested parties or other relevant entities or individuals under investigation;

(iv) sealing up and detaining relevant evidence;

(v) enquiring into the bank accounts of the undertakings.

Although the AML does not specify, the AMEA may enter the business premises of business operators or other relevant places for unannounced inspections in accordance with Article 47(1)(1) of the AML. During the unannounced inspection, the AMEA also have the power to inspect and seize relevant evidence such as certificates, agreements, account books, business correspondences and electronic data (such as data in office computers, mobile communications, historical data on servers and access to the cloud).

Article 62 of the AML stipulates the legal liabilities of investigated parties for refusing to provide materials or information relevant to the investigation to the AMEA or providing false materials and information or otherwise refusing or obstructing the investigation of the AMEA by concealing, destroying or transferring evidence, etc. For a company, a fine of up to 1% of the sales of the previous year may be imposed; if there is no sales of the previous year or it is difficult to calculate the sales of the previous year, a fine of up to RMB 5 million may be imposed; for an individual, a fine of up to 500,000 CNY may be imposed. In addition, the AML also established a multiple penalties mechanism for investigated parties who refuse to cooperate with the anti-monopoly investigation. Under Article 63, for those who refuse to cooperate with the anti-monopoly investigation, if the violation is serious, and result in exceptionally serious impacts and grave consequences, the AMEA may impose a fine of not less than two times but not more than five times the amount of the fine prescribed in Article 62. Article 67 of the AML stipulates that “If a violation of this Law constitutes a crime, criminal liabilities shall be pursued in accordance with law.”

According to Article 50 of the AML, The investigated party has a duty to cooperate with the AMEA, unless the AMEA have procedural defects in the investigation process, such as less than two law enforcement officers being present, or the law enforcement officer cannot verify their identity. In addition, the investigated party may require registering and copying documents obtained by the AMEA. For some documents that are not suitable for submission, they have the right to submit legitimate copies or request the AMEA to return the pieces when necessary.

According to Articles 39 and 49 of the Provisions on Prohibition of Monopoly Agreements, the conditions for a granting full immunity are as follows:

(i) The undertaking is the first to apply for exemption from penalty;

(ii) The undertaking voluntarily reports the situation of the monopoly agreement to the AMEA;

(iii) The undertaking provides material evidence, which refers to evidence not yet in the possession of the AMEA, and which may play a key role in the initiation of an investigation or the determination of a monopoly agreement; and

(iv) The undertaking does not play a leading role in reaching a monopoly agreement, does not coerce other undertakings to participate in reaching or implementing a monopoly agreement, and does not obstruct other undertakings from ceasing their illegal conduct.

As mentioned above, the evidence that the applicant needs to provide is the material evidence described in condition (iii), i.e., evidence not yet in the possession of the AMEA and which may play a key role in initiating an investigation or determining a monopoly agreement.

According to Article 7 of the Guidelines on the Application of the Leniency Program to Cases Involving Horizontal Monopoly Agreements (the “Guidelines on Leniency”), if the first undertaking to apply for exemption from penalty submits a report and important evidence on the monopoly agreement to the AMEA, the AMEA shall issue a written receipt to the undertaking, specifying the time of receipt and a list of materials.

In addition, Article 49(3) of the Provisions on Prohibition of Monopoly Agreements explicitly provides that the leniency program is applicable to the personal liability of legal representatives, persons in charge and directly responsible persons. That is, if these persons voluntarily report the relevant details of the monopoly agreement and provide important evidence to the AMEA, the penalties imposed on them may be reduced by 50% or entirely exempted.

According to Article 49(1) of the Provisions on Prohibition of Monopoly Agreements, for the second applicant, the penalty may be reduced by 30% to 50%; for the third applicant, the penalty may be reduced by 20% to 30%. In addition, according to the Guidelines on Leniency, for subsequent applicants in later order of application, the penalty may be reduced by no more than 20%.

According to Articles 39 and 49 of the Provisions on Prohibition of Monopoly Agreements, the eligibility conditions for subsequent applicants are as follows:

(i) The undertaking voluntarily reports the situation of the monopoly agreement to the AMEA;

(ii) The undertaking provides material evidence; and

(iii) The undertaking does not play a leading role in reaching a monopoly agreement, does not coerce other undertakings to participate in reaching or implementing a monopoly agreement, and does not obstruct other undertakings from ceasing their illegal conduct.

Article 7 of the Guidelines on Leniency has established a clear and transparent marker system:

(i) If the first undertaking to apply for exemption from penalty submits a report and important evidence on the monopoly agreement to the AMEA, the AMEA shall issue a written receipt to the undertaking, specifying the time of receipt and a list of materials.

(ii) If the report submitted to the AMEA by the first undertaking to apply for exemption from penalty does not meet the requirements, the AMEA will not issue a written receipt.

(iii) If the report submitted to the AMEA by the first undertaking to apply for exemption from penalty meets the requirements, but no evidence is provided or the evidence is incomplete, the AMEA may register the application and issue the written receipt referred to in (1) above, and require the undertaking to supplement relevant evidence within a prescribed time limit. If the undertaking submits relevant evidence within the time limit required by the AMEA, the AMEA will regard the time it receives the report as the time of applying for leniency; if the undertaking fails to submit relevant evidence as required within the time limit, the AMEA will cancel its registration.

(iv) After being disqualified from registration, the first undertaking that applied for exemption from penalty can still complete the relevant evidence and apply to the AMEA for exemption, provided that no other undertakings have applied for leniency; if other undertakings have applied for leniency before the first undertaking reapplies for exemption, the disqualified undertaking may apply for a reduction of the penalty.

(v) If the undertaking applying for the exemption from penalty is disqualified from registration, the first undertaking that has applied for a reduction of the penalty will automatically be elevated to the applicant for exemption from the penalty.

According to Article 10 of the Guidelines on Leniency, undertakings may obtain leniency only if they submit reports and evidence in accordance with the requirements set out in the Guidelines and meet all of the following conditions:

(i) Ceasing the alleged violation immediately after applying for leniency, except where the law enforcement authorities require the undertakings to continue the aforesaid practice in order to ensure the smooth progress of the investigation. Undertakings that have applied for leniency to overseas law enforcement authorities and are required to continue such practice shall report this to the law enforcement authorities;

(ii) Cooperating with the law enforcement authorities in the investigation in a prompt, continuous, comprehensive and sincere manner;

(iii) Properly preserving and providing evidence and information, and not concealing, destroying or transferring evidence, or providing false materials or information;

(iv) Not disclosing the leniency application without the approval of the law enforcement authorities; and

(v) Not engaging in any other conduct that may affect the anti-monopoly law enforcement investigation.

As of today, there is no individual criminal exemption for cartels. The AML does not provide for criminal liability for cartels (whether for individuals or undertakings), but only provides in Article 67 that if a violation of the AML constitutes a crime, criminal liability shall be pursued in accordance with law. The Criminal Law only provides for the offence of collusive tendering in relation to cartels. In the future, China may establish criminal liability for cartels other than collusive tendering. However, whether such criminal liability would be subject to the aforementioned leniency or exemption system remains to be clarified by corresponding provisions.

In China, there is no settlement or plea-bargaining system equivalent to those in the European Union and the United States. However, under PRC law, the AMEA may suspend an investigation upon acceptance of commitments from the undertaking under investigation, and may terminate the investigation after the undertaking has fulfilled the commitments.

Article 53 of the AML provides the legal basis for the AMEA to accept commitments made by undertakings. In addition, it should be noted that although the commitment system may be applied to both monopoly agreements and abuse of dominant market position, it is, in practice, mainly used in cases involving abuse of dominant market position. The Guidelines on the Undertakings’ Commitments in Anti-Monopoly Cases (the “Guidelines on Commitments”) provides that, in cases of horizontal monopoly agreements involving fixing or changing commodity prices, restricting the output or sales of a commodity, or dividing a sales market or raw material procurement market, the AMEA shall not accept commitments.

To date, the vast majority of committed measures are behavioural measures, while it cannot be ruled out that the AMEA may require structural measures in the future. The Guidelines on Commitments provides that “the measures committed by undertakings may be behavioural, structural or a hybrid of the two. Behavioural measures include adjusting pricing strategies, cancelling or modifying transaction restrictions, opening up infrastructure such as networks or platforms, and licensing patents, technical secrets or other intellectual property rights. Structural measures include divesting tangible assets, intangible assets (including intellectual property rights), or related rights and interests.”

Finally, decisions to suspend or terminate an investigation do not require court approval. Accordingly, such decisions do not preclude other undertakings or consumers from filing civil suits against the suspected monopolistic conduct, and should not be regarded as evidence of the existence of monopolistic conduct. This is also stipulated in Article 3 of the Guidelines on Commitments.

The benefits for undertakings to voluntarily make commitments to the AMEA include:

(i) Avoiding administrative penalties: a decision to suspend an investigation is not an administrative penalty decision. The undertaking under investigation can therefore temporarily avoid the administrative penalties under Articles 56 and 63 of the AML. If the undertaking fulfills its commitments, the AMEA may decide to terminate the investigation, and the undertaking will thus avoid administrative penalty in full.

(ii) Ending the investigation procedure as quickly as possible: in cases where monopolistic conduct exists or where such conduct causes harmful consequences, commitments made by the undertaking may lead to the suspension and termination of the investigation procedure at an early stage, thereby reducing uncertainty and avoiding continuous impact on the operation and management of the undertaking, or reducing the impact on its contemplated mergers and acquisitions or capital market operations.

(iii) Tailoring to undertakings’ own capabilities: the committed measures are proposed by the undertaking itself according to its own circumstances and are therefore more practicable.

Depending on the circumstances of individual cases, possible disadvantages may include the following:

(i) The application for suspension of an investigation and the decision to suspend the investigation shall set forth the facts of the suspected monopolistic conduct and the possible effects thereof. Notwithstanding that Article 3 of the Guidelines on Commitments clarifies that neither a decision to suspend an investigation nor a decision to terminate an investigation constitutes a determination of whether the conduct of an undertaking amounts to monopolistic conduct or serves as evidence for such determination, the commitments, in which the undertaking admits the existence of suspected monopolistic conduct, may trigger or encourage other undertakings or consumers to file civil lawsuits.

(ii) The AMEA’s acceptance of the commitments and its decisions to suspend or terminate the investigation do not constitute a determination of whether the conduct of the undertaking amounts to monopolistic conduct. The AMEA may conduct investigations into other similar conduct of the undertaking and impose administrative penalties in accordance with law.

(iii) The application for suspension of an investigation is voluntarily submitted by the undertaking. Therefore, the undertaking cannot apply for administrative reconsideration or initiate administrative litigation against the specific measures it proposed in the application and committed to thereafter.

(iv) The decision to suspend the investigation, including the contents of the commitments, will be made public. The undertaking will thus be subject to public supervision in addition to the supervision of the AMEA.

(i) Cooperation between domestic administrative agencies

Firstly, at the level of law enforcement, other government agencies which find clues or receive materials about suspected monopolistic conduct should transfer such clues or materials to the AMEA, and the evidence and materials collected by these agencies can be used by the AMEA as evidence. For example, in the monopoly agreement case of motor vehicle testing companies in Shuozhou in 2022, the case clues were discovered by the Shuozhou Municipal Public Security Bureau and transferred to the Shuozhou Municipal AMR, which subsequently transferred the case to the Shanxi Provincial AMR.

Secondly, during investigations, the AMEA may seek opinions from relevant authorities in charge of the industry concerned, such as the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology, the Ministry of Transport, the People’s Bank of China, the China National Intellectual Property Administration, and the National Financial Regulatory Administration (formerly the China Banking and Insurance Regulatory Commission).

(ii) Cooperation with investigating authorities from other jurisdictions

Since the entry into force of the AML in 2008, China has entered into more than 50 cooperation agreements or memoranda of understanding with competition regulatory authorities of more than 30 countries and regions, including the US, the EU, Singapore, and Russia. For example, on December 29, 2021, China and Singapore signed a Memorandum of Understanding regarding cooperation in the field of competition law; on December 19, 2023, the Minister of the SAMR and the Head of the Federal Anti-monopoly Service of the Russian Federation jointly signed a Memorandum of Understanding for 2024-2025; on June 7, 2024, the Minister of the SAMR and Pakistan’s Ambassador to China signed a Memorandum of Understanding on antitrust cooperation between the two countries; and in April 2025, the SAMR and the competition authority of Vietnam signed a Memorandum of Understanding on cooperation in the field of competition law.

Article 2 of the AML stipulates that “this Law shall apply to monopolistic acts outside the People’s Republic of China that have the effect of eliminating or restricting competition in the domestic market.” The investigations and penalties imposed by the AMEA are independent from those of foreign authorities. An undertaking which has submitted leniency applications or reached settlement agreements outside China would not automatically be exempted from investigation or penalties in China, and should submit leniency applications or propose to make commitments to the AMEA separately.

Firstly, according to Article 56 of the AML, the administrative penalties imposed on cartelists under the AML include ① confiscation of illegal gains, and ② administrative fines. This is shown in the table below.

Secondly, on the criminal liability of cartels, monopoly agreements which are reached through collusion bidding are also subject to sanctions under the Law on Tendering and Bidding and the Criminal Law. Specifically, according to Article 53 of the Law on Tendering and Bidding, the collusion bidder shall be fined not less than 0.5% but not more than 1% of the value of the bid it won, and the persons who are directly in charge and other persons who are directly responsible shall be fined not less than 5% but not more than 10% of the fine imposed on the bidder. In serious situations, the bidder may be disqualified from bidding for a project subject to bidding as required by law for one to two years and the disqualification shall be announced, or the business license of the entity may be revoked by the AIC. Further, according to Articles 223 and 231 of the Criminal Law, where (i) bidders act in collusion with each other in offering bidding prices and thus jeopardize the interests of bid-inviters or of other bidders, and the circumstances are serious or (ii) bidder and bid-inviter act in collusion with each other in bidding and thus jeopardize the lawful interests of the State, the collective or citizens, the bidders (and bid-inviters) shall be sentenced to fixed-term imprisonment of not more than three years or criminal detention and shall also, or shall only, be fined. Where the offence is committed by an entity, the entity shall be sentenced to a fine and the person in charge and other persons directly responsible for the offence shall be punished in accordance with the foregoing provisions.

Lastly, on the civil liability of cartels, Article 60 of the AML provides that “where an undertaking implementing any monopolistic act causes any loss to others, it shall assume the civil liability in accordance with the law; where an undertaking implementing any monopolistic act damages the public interests of society, the People’s Procuratorate at or above the level of cities with subordinate districts may institute civil public interest litigation at the People’s Court in accordance with the law.” Therefore, the parties who suffer losses due to the cartel may request the cartelists to assume the corresponding civil liability; the People’s Procuratorate at or above the level of level of cities with subordinate districts  may institute civil public interest litigation where the cartel harms the public interest of society.

As mentioned above, whether the monopoly agreement has been implemented would significantly impact the amount of fines. According to Article 56 of the AML, if the monopoly agreement has been implemented, the undertaking involved in shall be fined not less than 1% but not more than 10% of its sales in the previous year, and under the circumstance where the undertaking had no sales in the previous year, the fine shall be no more than 5,000,000 CNY. On the other hand, if such monopoly agreement has not been implemented, the undertaking involved in shall be fined not more than 3,000,000 CNY.

Meanwhile, according to Article 59 of the AML, to determine the specific amount of the fine, the factors to be considered by the AMEA in determining the amount of fines include the nature, extent and duration of the violation, the status of the elimination of the consequences of the violation, etc.

Under Chapter 5 of the Antitrust Compliance Guidelines for Undertakings, an effective corporate compliance program may serve as a statutory mitigating factor that affects the final amount of the fine. Specifically, the mitigating effect of a compliance program is reflected in three aspects: (1) prior to the investigation, if the undertaking has already voluntarily ceased minor antitrust violations, its compliance efforts may serve as evidence of “timely rectification,” and thus no administrative penalty shall be imposed in accordance with the law; (2) during the investigation, an undertaking that voluntarily reports the violation and provides key evidence, while also demonstrating the existence of an effective compliance program, may be eligible for a greater reduction of the fine within the scope of the leniency program; and (3) before the penalty decision is made, even if the undertaking does not obtain leniency, its proactive efforts to improve the compliance program and effectively mitigate the consequences may be taken into account for a discretionary lighter or mitigated penalty.

No existing law explicitly requires parent companies to bear joint liability for their subsidiaries’ monopolistic practice. In practice, in the Yangtze River Pharmaceutical Group case in 2021, the decision on administrative penalty mentioned that the Yangtze River Pharmaceutical Group Co., Ltd. was the core and center of the Yangtze River Pharmaceutical Group (the Yangtze River Pharmaceutical Group Co., Ltd. together with its subsidiaries), and acted as the decision-maker, implementer and supervisor in the conclusion and implementation of the monopoly agreement. The pharmaceutical manufacturing and sales subsidiaries of the Yangtze River Pharmaceutical Group Co., Ltd. participated in the monopolistic practice to varying degrees, followed the unified leadership and deployment of the Yangtze River Pharmaceutical Group Co., Ltd. with respect to the decision-making and implementation of the monopolistic practice, without their independent will. […] The above significantly showed that the will of the subsidiaries participating in the monopolistic practice has the nature of subordination. Therefore, the AMEA identified the parent company as the party that committed the violation, and regarded the subsidiaries’ monopolistic practice as the practice of the parent company. This shows that if the AMEA has evidence to prove the parent company participates in the relevant monopolistic practice and has decisive influence on the aforesaid monopolistic practice, the parent company will be held liable, and the sales revenue of the parent company will be used as the base amount of fines for calculation.

It is provided in Paragraph 1 of Article 60 of the AML that the undertakings which commit cartels and cause losses to others shall bear civil liability according to law. In addition, Pursuant to Article 1 of the Interpretation of the Supreme People’s Court on Several Issues Concerning the Application of Law in the Trial of Civil Disputes over Monopoly (the “Judicial Interpretation Concerning Monopoly Disputes”), which came into effect on July 1, 2024, natural persons, legal persons, or unincorporated organizations that have suffered losses due to monopolistic practices, as well as those that have disputes arising from the content of contracts or the articles of association, resolutions, decisions, or similar documents of business operators’ groups that violate the AML, are entitled to initiate civil actions in the people’s courts in accordance with the AML.

The Representative Action System of China stipulated in the Civil Procedure Law of China is relatively similar to the class action system in the United States of American and other judicial jurisdictions. However, there are great differences between the two systems in terms of the appointment and scope of authority of the litigation representative, and whether or not the judgment rendered by courts is binding on all parties concerned.

According to the Civil Procedure Law of China, institutions and relevant organizations designated by law may initiate legal actions in court against acts that jeopardizing public interest such as causing environmental pollution, or infringing upon customers’ legitimate rights. In particular, the Law on the Protection of the Rights and Interests of Consumers provides that China Consumers Association and its branches at provincial level may file a lawsuit at court against conducts that harm mass consumers’ legitimate interests and rights. Besides, Paragraph 2 of Article 60 of the AML provides that where a monopolistic practice carried out by an undertaking infringes the public interest of the society, the People’s Procuratorate at or above the level of cities with subordinate districts may file a civil public interest lawsuit in the people’s court pursuant to the law.

In 2024, Chinese People’s Procuratorates filed 16 anti-monopoly civil public interest lawsuits.

China has not yet established opt-out class actions in the field of antitrust. Civil litigation in China primarily relies on the systems of “representative actions” and “joint actions,” which typically require victims to expressly opt in.

According to Paragraph 1 of Article 60 of the AML, the undertakings which commit cartels and cause losses to others shall bear civil liability according to law. According to Article 43 of the Judicial Interpretation Concerning Monopoly Disputes, where a defendant commits monopoly conducts and causes losses to the plaintiff, the court may, in light of the plaintiff’s claims and the ascertained facts, order the defendant to bear civil liabilities, including ceasing the infringement and compensating for losses. If ordering the defendant to cease the alleged monopolistic practices remains insufficient to eliminate the effects of excluding or restricting competition, the people’s court may, based on the plaintiff’s claims and the specific circumstances of the case, order the defendant to undertake necessary actions to restore competition. The AML formulates a compensatory compensation system. No law nor regulation empowers the infringed party with statutory rights to claim beyond its actual damage.

According to Article 45 of the Judicial Interpretation Concerning Monopoly Disputes, courts may include the reasonable costs arising from investigation and prevention of monopoly conducts in the scope of compensation. For example, in a dispute over vertical monopoly agreement between Beijing Ruibang Yonghe Technology & Trade Co., Ltd. (Rui Bang) and Johnson & Johnson Medical (China) Co., Ltd. (Johnson & Johnson) in 2013, the court of appeal held that Johnson & Johnson should compensate Rui Bang for the economic losses that had direct causal link to the monopoly agreement. In a contractual dispute and horizontal monopoly agreement dispute between Yan ‘an Jiacheng Concrete Co., Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as “Jiacheng”) and Fujian Sanjian Engineering Co., Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as “Sanjian”) in 2022, since ten concrete companies in Baota District, Yan’ an City of Shaanxi Province (including Jiacheng) reached and implemented a horizontal monopoly agreement in respect of raising price of concrete, Sanjian, which bought concrete provided by Jiacheng, filed a lawsuit with the court to claim compensation for its losses. The court held that if the price increase agreement reached by the undertakings has caused damage to the trading counterparties, they shall bear the corresponding civil liability. With regard to goods that are difficult to obtain outside the local market, or that are highly depend on technical support, the damage caused by the horizontal monopoly agreement shall be calculated as the difference between the price fixed by the monopoly agreement and the price previously agreed between parties in free market.

Under the Civil Code of the People’s Republic of China and the Interpretation of the Supreme People’s Court on Issues Concerning the Application of Law in the Trial of Civil Disputes Arising from Monopolistic Conduct, the statute of limitations for filing a civil lawsuit against cartel conduct is three years, commencing from the date on which the right holder knows or should have known that his/her rights and interests were harmed and that the obligor is responsible. The maximum period for the protection of rights is 20 years from the date on which the right was harmed.

According to Article 65 of the AML, where a party is dissatisfied with the administrative penalty decision made by the AMEA concerning monopoly agreement, such party may apply for administrative reconsideration or file administrative litigation.

Moreover, Article 77 of the Administrative Litigation Law of the People’s Republic of China (the “ALLC”) provides that if an administrative penalty is “obviously inappropriate”, or if there are errors in determining or calculating the amount involved in other administrative acts, the court may rule to modify the decision.

In an appeal against a finding of infringement, the party may challenge substantive issues such as whether a monopolistic agreement exists, whether the evidence is sufficient, and whether the law has been correctly applied.
In an appeal against the amount of a fine, the party may challenge circumstances where the administrative penalty is manifestly improper — for example, where the fine is clearly disproportionate to the nature, circumstances, and harmfulness of the violation — or where there is a clear error in the determination or calculation of the amount.

The party could submit the administrative reconsideration application regarding the penalty decision made by the AMEA in respect of the monopoly agreement within 60 days from the date of receipt of the administrative penalty decision. The administrative reconsideration authority shall render its decisions within 60 days after accepting such application. The period of reviewing the application could be extended up to 30 days upon approval. The party still enjoy the right to file an administrative litigation if such party is unsatisfied with the decision made by administrative reconsideration authority.

At present, the AMEA for monopoly agreement cases is the SAMR and the provincial AMRs. The provincial AMRs is responsible for the anti-monopoly law enforcement within its administrative regions and cases authorized by the SAMR. If the administrative penalty decision is made by SAMR, and the party is unsatisfied with such decision, the application for administrative reconsideration shall be submitted to SAMR, which shall act as the administrative reconsideration authority. If the administrative penalty decision is made by provincial AMRs, and the party is unsatisfied with such decision, the application for administrative reconsideration may be submitted to the provincial people’s government or to SAMR, subject to the discretion of the applicant.

In 2016, Shaanxi Provincial Price Bureau made administrative penalties to the Shaanxi Vehicle Inspection Association and more than 30 vehicle inspection agencies for concluding and implementing price monopoly agreements. Some of the agencies challenged the decision by submitting application for administrative reconsideration to Shaanxi provincial’s people’s government. The administrative reconsideration authority review the case and upheld the original administrative penalty decisions.

In addition, the party could file an administrative suit before the competent court against the penalty decision rendered by the AMEA in respect of the monopoly agreement within six months from the date of receipt of the administrative penalty decision.. If the party apply for administrative reconsideration at first and disagrees with the administrative reconsideration decision, the party may file a suit in court within 15 days after receiving the reconsideration decision. In case where the administrative reconsideration authority upholds the original administrative penalty decision, the party may bring a lawsuit against the AMEA making the previous penalty decision concerning the monopoly agreement and the administrative reconsideration authority as co-defendants.

When applying ordinary procedures to hear an administrative case at first instance, the court shall make judgment within six months after the case is filed. If the time limit for trial needs to be extended under special circumstances, the extension shall be approved by the high people’s court; if the high people’s court needs to extend the time limit for trial of an administrative case of first instance, the extension shall be approved by the Supreme People’s Court. If the summary procedure is applied to an administrative case of first instance, the court shall conclude the case within 45 days of the date of filing the case. The time limit for trial through summary procedure shall not be extended.

In order to challenge the judgment rendered by the court of the first instance, the party shall appeal to the upper level court within 15 days after receiving the judgment; and the time limit for appealing to the upper level court against a first instance verdict shall be 10 days after receiving the verdict. According to the Provisions of the Supreme People’s Court on Several Issues concerning the Intellectual Property Tribunal, appeals filed against the judgments of first-instance civil cases concerning monopoly and first-instance administrative cases involving administrative penalties imposed on monopoly shall be heard by the Intellectual Property Tribunal of the Supreme People’s Court. When hearing administrative appeal cases, the court shall make final judgment within three months after receiving the appeal. If there are special circumstances that require an extension of the time limit, the extension procedure shall be the same as the first instance.

Under the Civil Procedure Law of the People’s Republic of China and other relevant legal provisions, the statutory period for filing an appeal in a monopolistic dispute case is 15 days, commencing from the date of service of the judgment or ruling. Monopolistic dispute cases are subject to a special “leapfrog appeal” mechanism, whereby the second instance is directly heard by the Intellectual Property Court of the Supreme People’s Court. According to the Measures for the Payment of Litigation Costs, the litigation costs shall be borne by the losing party, unless the prevailing party voluntarily assumes them. In the event of a partial victory and partial defeat, the people’s court shall determine the amount of litigation costs to be borne by each party based on the specific circumstances of the case.

(i) Recent notable cartel cases (limited to one or two key examples, with a very short summary of the facts, decision and sanctions/level of fine);

One notable recent horizontal monopoly agreement case is the first case in which China’s anti-monopoly enforcement agency imposed a fine on an individual. On March 19, 2025, the Shanghai Municipal Administration for Market Regulation issued a penalty decision against Shanghai Xinyi United Pharmaceutical Co., Ltd., Henan Runhong Pharmaceutical Co., Ltd., Chengdu Huixin Pharmaceutical Co., Ltd., and Guo Suning, who bore individual responsibility, finding that they had reached and implemented a monopoly agreement to fix or change commodity prices and to divide the sales market.The enforcement agency disgorged the illegal gains of Xinyi United, Runhong Pharmaceutical, and Huixin Pharmaceutical in the amounts of RMB 115,471,142.40, RMB 15,174,313.07, and RMB 10,631,753.85, respectively. Regarding fines: Xinyi United was fined at a rate of 2% of its 2023 sales, but after applying an 80% leniency reduction, the actual fine was RMB 50,335,849.29; Runhong Pharmaceutical was fined at a rate of 4% of its 2023 sales, amounting to RMB 27,540,836.48; and Huixin Pharmaceutical was also fined at a rate of 4% of its 2023 sales, amounting to RMB 3,843,871.13. In addition, Guo Suning, who bore individual responsibility, was fined RMB 500,000. According to the penalty decision, the three companies were found to have reached and implemented a horizontal monopoly agreement to fix or change commodity prices and to divide the sales market, in violation of Articles 17(1) and 17(3) of the Anti-Monopoly Law. In this case, Guo Suning, on behalf of Xinyi United, continuously communicated, negotiated, and implemented the monopoly agreement with Runhong Pharmaceutical and Huixin Pharmaceutical, thereby facilitating the implementation of the monopoly agreement.

Another notable horizontal monopoly agreement case is the first instance in which China’s anti-monopoly enforcement agency imposed a statutory maximum fine on a natural person for organizing a monopolistic agreement. In April and June 2025, the Tianjin Municipal Administration for Market Regulation issued penalties against four manufacturers of dexamethasone sodium phosphate active pharmaceutical ingredients (APIs) and the organizer, Guo Xiangguo, finding that they had reached and implemented a monopoly agreement to fix prices and coordinate price increases. Since 2021, Guo Xiangguo had organized the four companies to hold multiple meetings and discussions to raise prices, driving the price up to over RMB 13,000 per kilogram, and ensured the implementation of the agreement through backstop procurement by affiliated companies. The enforcement agency disgorged the illegal gains of the relevant companies and imposed fines at a rate of 8% of each company’s preceding year’s sales, with the total amount of disgorgement and fines reaching RMB 362 million. Guo Xiangguo was fined RMB 5 million, the statutory maximum. Additionally, the general managers and legal representatives of the four companies, as directly responsible individuals, were each fined RMB 600,000.

(ii) Key recent trends (e.g. in terms of fines, sectors under investigation, any novel areas of investigation, applications for leniency, approach to settlement, number of appeals, impact of hybrid working in enforcement practice – e.g. dawn raids of domestic premises, ‘hybrid’ in-person/virtual dawn raids, access to personal devices, etc.);

• Overview of 2025 Monopoly Agreement Cases

In 2025, market supervision authorities at all levels concluded a total of 22 monopoly cases, with fines and disgorgement totaling RMB 653 million. Over the course of the year, 8 horizontal monopoly agreement cases, 3 abuse of dominance cases, and 2 cases involving the refusal or obstruction of investigations were prosecuted. These cases were primarily concentrated in livelihood-related sectors such as pharmaceuticals, motor vehicle inspection, driving training, telecommunications, and blasting equipment. No vertical monopoly agreement cases were publicly prosecuted in 2025.

• Horizontal monopoly agreement cases: 8 in total

• Vertical agreement cases: 0
• Suspension or Termination of Investigation in 2025 Monopoly Agreement Cases

The above monopoly agreement cases were all closed with penalties, and no cases were suspended or terminated. According to the AML, the law enforcement agencies may decide to terminate the investigation if a business operator undertakes to adopt specific measures to eliminate the consequences of its act within the time limit and the law enforcement agencies may decide to terminate the investigation if the business operator performs its undertaking. However, there is no requirement on law enforcement agencies to publish the decision of suspending or terminating the investigation. Therefore, subject to the limitation of incomplete publicity, the data may be incomplete.

• Application for Leniency Program in 2025 Monopoly Agreement Cases

In the neostigmine methylsulfate injection monopoly case, the enforcement agency applied the leniency program. Shanghai Xinyi United Pharmaceutical Co., Ltd., as the first-rank applicant that voluntarily reported the relevant circumstances concerning the conclusion of the monopoly agreement to the enforcement agency and provided key evidence, had its fine ratio reduced from 10% to 2% (a reduction of 80%).

In the dexamethasone sodium phosphate active pharmaceutical ingredient monopoly case, the enforcement agency applied the leniency program. During the course of the investigation conducted by the enforcement authority, Tianjin Jinyao Pharmaceutical Co., Ltd., which voluntarily reported its participation in the monopoly agreement and submitted key evidentiary materials, was granted an 80% reduction of its fine.

• Key Industries of Monopoly Agreement Enforcement: People’s Livelihood

In 2025, anti-monopoly enforcement agencies continued to advance anti-monopoly enforcement efforts with a sustained focus on livelihood-related sectors. The monopoly agreement cases investigated and concluded throughout the year were primarily concentrated in key livelihood industries such as pharmaceuticals and motor vehicle inspection. In the pharmaceutical sector, following the issuance of the Anti-Monopoly Guidelines for the Pharmaceutical Sector in 2024, the neostigmine methylsulfate injection monopoly case marked the first instance in which an individual bearing personal responsibility for concluding a monopoly agreement was fined. In the dexamethasone sodium phosphate active pharmaceutical ingredient monopoly case, the anti-monopoly enforcement agency imposed, for the first time, the statutory maximum fine on a natural person who organized a monopoly agreement and also, for the first time, pursued the personal liability of corporate executives. These developments signify that anti-monopoly enforcement in the pharmaceutical sector has entered a new phase of “full-chain accountability.”

(iii) Key expected developments over the next 12 months (e.g. imminent statutory changes, procedural changes, upcoming decisions, etc.).]

• In Administrative Law Enforcement

In 2025, market supervision authorities concluded a total of 22 monopoly cases, with fines and disgorgement totaling RMB 653 million. Livelihood-related sectors remained the focus of anti-monopoly enforcement, with attention directed to industries closely related to the public welfare, including pharmaceuticals, water, electricity, gas and heating, and motor vehicle driving training. In 2025, enforcement agencies applied the personal liability provisions for the first time in horizontal monopoly agreement cases within the pharmaceutical sector, imposing fines on individuals bearing personal responsibility for concluding a monopoly agreement and on natural persons who organized a monopoly agreement.

Looking ahead to 2026, livelihood-related sectors, particularly pharmaceuticals and public utilities, will continue to be the focus of anti-monopoly enforcement. In January 2026, the SAMR announced an investigation into Ctrip Group for suspected abuse of market dominance, signaling continued enforcement focus on the platform economy. Additionally, the revised Provisions on Prohibiting Monopoly Agreements, which were amended in December 2025, took effect on February 1, 2026. The practical effect of the “safe harbor” rule for vertical monopoly agreements warrants close attention.

• In Judicial Practice

In 2025, the Supreme People’s Court concluded its first case of a consumer v. platform abuse of market dominance (the Alibaba case). After nearly four years of litigation, the plaintiff prevailed but was awarded only RMB 10,000 in reasonable expenses, reflecting the institutional challenges faced by private antitrust litigation. Meanwhile, the Intellectual Property Court of the Supreme People’s Court clarified the criteria for determining repetitive claims in monopolistic dispute cases in multiple rulings, providing important guidance for antitrust judicial practice. The Interpretation of the Supreme People’s Court on Issues Concerning the Application of Law in the Trial of Civil Disputes Arising from Monopolistic Conduct, issued on June 24, 2024, continues to play a guiding role, and the rules designed to reasonably reduce the plaintiff’s burden of proof have gradually been implemented in practice.

Looking ahead to 2026, antitrust litigation will continue to focus on livelihood-related sectors, advancing the adjudication of complex cases in areas such as platform economy, technological innovation, and pharmaceuticals. A number of guiding cases are expected to emerge. Therefore, it is recommended that businesses pay close attention to cartel-related antitrust litigation and extract key antitrust compliance lessons therefrom. This will not only help businesses improve their antitrust compliance efforts but also enhance their awareness and ability to use the Anti-Monopoly Law to protect their legitimate rights and interests.