The most commonly used corporate business entity in Singapore is a company limited by shares incorporated under the Singapore Companies Act (CA). Such a company may be a private company, which has a maximum 50-shareholder limit (excluding employees) and restrictions on share transfers, or a public company. Companies seeking to list on the Singapore Exchange (SGX) would be public companies. A company must have at least one shareholder and one director, and must always have at least one director who is ordinarily resident in Singapore. There is no statutory maximum number of directors, but limits can be stipulated in the company’s constitution (Constitution). Subject to the Constitution, a company generally has full capacity to carry on or undertake any business or activity, do any act or enter into any transaction, and full rights, powers and privileges for such purposes. Companies can also be limited by guarantee, but such companies are generally used for not-for-profit purposes. Other business forms in Singapore include Limited Liability Partnerships (LLP), Limited Partnerships (LP) and Variable Capital Companies (VCC).

An LLP is a body corporate and has a legal personality separate from its partners and perpetual succession. It can sue and be sued and hold property in its own name. A partner of an LLP can be held personally liable for claims from losses resulting from his own wrongful act or omission, but will not be held personally liable for such wrongful acts or omissions of other partners or for business debts incurred by the LLP. LLPs are commonly used for small businesses or professional organisations such as accounting or legal firms. In contrast, an LP is not a separate legal entity from its partners. An LP cannot sue, or be sued, or own property in its own name. It is a partnership consisting of a minimum of two partners, comprising at least one general partner and one limited partner. The general partner is liable for all debts and obligations of the LP. Both LLPs and LPs are not liable to tax at the entity level. Each partner is taxed on its share of income from the LLP or LP.

The VCC is a corporate structure for investment funds that was introduced in 2020. A VCC has a variable capital structure that provides flexibility in the issuance and redemption of its shares. It can also pay dividends out of capital, which gives fund managers flexibility to meet dividend payment obligations.

A key focus of corporate governance in Singapore continues to be sustainability and in particular, mandatory climate reporting in line with Singapore’s national agenda on sustainable development. In November 2023, the Accounting and Corporate Regulatory Authority (ACRA), the regulator of companies in Singapore, issued a Financial Reporting Practice Guidance to guide directors (in particular, audit committees) in assessing the accounting implications of climate risks. The Climate Reporting Review 2024, a study by Singapore Exchange Regulation (SGX Regco), the frontline regulator of companies listed on the SGX, and the Centre for Governance and Sustainability at NUS Business School, found that while 97% of the 529 SGX-listed companies reviewed made at least one disclosure based on the Task Force on Climate-related Financial Disclosures (TCFD) recommendations, only 28% fully adopted all recommended disclosures. Further, while disclosure of Scope 1 and 2 GHG emissions is high across all SGX listed companies reviewed, reporting of Scope 3 GHG emissions remains limited among small SGX listed companies with market capitalisation of less than S$300 million, underscoring the need for continued capability-building.

In August 2025, based on the uncertain global economic landscape and industry feedback encouraging greater consideration of the varying levels of resources and readiness in climate reporting, ACRA and the Singapore Exchange Regulation announced that they had extended the timelines for implementing climate reporting to support SGX-listed companies and large non-SGX-listed companies. The reporting of Scope 1 and 2 greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions will remain mandatory for all SGX-listed companies from financial year 2025 (FY2025). However, only Straits Times Index (STI) constituent companies will be required to report on other International Sustainability Standards Board (ISSB) based climate-related disclosures (CRDs) (beyond Scope 1, 2 and 3 GHG emissions) from FY2025 and will be required to report on Scope 3 GHG emissions from financial year 2026. For other non-STI constituent SGX-listed companies, reporting on Scope 3 GHG emissions will be voluntary, while ISSB based CRDs will become mandatory from financial year 2028 for those with a market capitalisation of at least S$1 billion, and financial year 2030 (FY2030) for those below that threshold. For non-listed companies, large companies with annual revenue of at least S$1 billion and total assets of at least S$0.5 billion will also be required to report Scope 1 and 2 GHG emissions and other ISSB-based CRD from FY2030, while reporting on Scope 3 GHG emissions will remain voluntary.

ACRA has launched the Sustainability Reporting Body of Knowledge (SR BOK) in May 2025, which is designed to equip professionals with technical skills and competencies in GHG emissions accounting and sustainability reporting. This initiative is in connection with the dedicated working group under the Green Skills Committee (GSC), led by ACRA and Enterprise Singapore, which was set up in 2023 to develop a capacity building and skills plan for sustainability reporting and assurance. In acknowledging the challenges that companies may face in navigating the new reporting requirements, various initiatives have been launched to support companies such as the launch of the Sustainability Reporting Grant to offer financial support to companies to produce their first ISSB-aligned sustainability report, the development by the Infocomm Media Development Authority of digital sustainability solutions under the Advanced Digital Solutions Scheme to help eligible enterprises measure, monitor and manage their GHG emissions and the development of the Singapore Emission Factors Registry, which provides localised Singapore-specific emission factors data for businesses to track and report their GHG emissions more easily and accurately. Directors of SGX-listed companies are also required to undergo mandatory sustainability training. With the increased focus on sustainability disclosures, board of directors (Board) should also be cognisant of the risk of greenwashing.

Another key focus is diversity in the boardroom. This goes beyond gender diversity which continues to remain the most oft-discussed diversity metric. The Code of Corporate Governance 2018 (CG Code) states that the Board should have diversity of thought and background in its composition to enable it to make decisions in the best interests of the company, and that having an appropriate balance and mix of skills, knowledge, experience, and other aspects of diversity such as gender and age will help avoid groupthink and foster constructive debate. To this end, SGX-listed companies are required to maintain a board diversity policy addressing relevant aspects of diversity and to disclose in their annual reports objectives and progress made towards implementing the policy and achieving diversity. The 2025 Singapore Board Diversity Index, which is developed by the Singapore Institute of Directors, WTW and James Cook University (Singapore Campus), to chart the progress of around 600 SGX-listed entities across eight dimensions of board diversity as of 30 September 2024, have reflected improvements in key areas such as gender, board independence, and industry and domain expertise. In relation to gender diversity, Singapore does not impose a mandatory gender ratio for Boards. According to the Council of Board Diversity (CBD), as at 31 December 2024, the CBD’s interim target of 25% of the Boards for the 100 largest primary-listed companies on the SGX being women by end-2025 has been met a year ahead of schedule, with the next target being the achievement of 30% women board representation by 2030. According to the Singapore Directorship Report 2025, the percentage of board seats held by women in SGX-listed companies has increased to 18.3% (up from 14.9% in 2023) and SGX-listed companies with at least one woman director on the board has increased significantly over the last decade, with 93.5% of large-cap SGX listed companies having at least one woman director (up from 49% in 2014). In addition, across all SGX-listed companies, 310 first-time directors were appointed in 2024, the largest cohort since at least 2015. Such growth exhibits greater value being placed on the skills, expertise and potential of a new board member, over prior directorship experience. Directors should also note that Singapore had on 8 January 2025 passed a new Workplace Fairness Bill, which forms part of the Workplace Fairness Act expected to take effect in end-2027, prohibiting discrimination by employers based on certain protected characteristics, which include gender, age, race and nationality, amongst others. As diversity in the workforce improves, this will hopefully help to provide a ready pipeline of candidates with diverse attributes for the future boardroom.

There has also been a shift towards a less prescriptive and more disclosure-based, market driven SGX listing regime. This follows recommendations of the Equities Market Review Group (Review Group) which was established by the Monetary Authority of Singapore (MAS) to recommend measures to enhance the development of Singapore’s equities market, for a more pro-enterprise approach to regulation, alongside measures to strengthen investor confidence. The Review Group has recommended various measures in February 2025, July 2025 and further new initiatives with its final report in November 2025. Some key new measures include the establishment of a dual-listing bridge between the Singapore Exchange and Nasdaq, the launch of a S$30 million “Value Unlock” Package, and various trading and market structure enhancements and measures to streamline the regulatory framework for new listings on the SGX. Various of these initiatives are at public consultation stage (at the time of publication) and expected to be rolled out incrementally.

To complement the Review Group’s efforts, the Corporate Governance Advisory Committee (CGAC) is also reviewing the CG Code to offer more context-specific guidance and practical examples on the implementation of CG Code provisions by companies of different sizes and industries, while exploring additional provisions or guidance on corporate culture, board effectiveness, and risk management in emerging areas such as artificial intelligence (AI).

Another key corporate governance development is the increasing expectation on boards to scrutinise cyber security risks alongside traditional financial, operational and regulatory risk, as cyber-crimes, such as ransomware attacks and AI-enhanced tactics like phishing, vishing and deepfakes, grow in frequency and sophistication. In 2025, the Singapore Institute of Directors issued the Cyber Resilience Guide for Boards (Guide), providing practical frameworks and processes for embedding cyber resilience into corporate strategies. Among other things, the Guide provides that board members should be involved in the governance and oversight of cyber security in their organisation and boards should consider having directors with specific cyber security experience. The increased adoption of AI by businesses also raises risks such as financial losses from AI performance failures, operational disruption due to unexpected behaviours in AI systems, security vulnerabilities and data leakage, and the management of such risks by boards is a key corporate governance issue. As mentioned above, the CGAC is exploring inserting new provisions on AI risk management in the CG Code and in November 2025, MAS issued a consultation paper on a set of proposed guidelines for AI risk management for financial institutions (FIs) to manage AI risks, setting out MAS’ expectations on the board and senior management of FIs in establishing and overseeing robust frameworks, policies and procedures to support AI risk management across the FI.

The CA provides that the business of a company is to be managed by, or under the direction or supervision of, the directors, and that the directors may exercise all the powers of a company (except any power that the CA or the Constitution requires the shareholders to exercise in general meeting). Typically, the Constitution confers on the Board wide powers over the management and affairs of the company.

Please see response to 3. above. Shareholders’ decisions are generally taken by a vote on resolutions tabled at general meetings. Subject to certain prescribed conditions, the CA also permits companies (other than listed public companies) to seek shareholders’ approval by obtaining their signatures to resolutions in writing, which are circulated to all shareholders who are entitled to vote on that resolution at a general meeting. The CA also provides companies the option to conduct general meetings in a fully virtual or hybrid (i.e. both physical and virtual) manner. SGX-listed companies however, are only permitted under the SGX listing rules (SGX-LR) to hold either physical or hybrid general meetings.

The CA and its subsidiary legislation form the principal source of Singapore law stipulating how companies are to be governed. The Securities and Futures Act (SFA) and its subsidiary legislation regulate, among others, activities in the securities industry such as market conduct and insider trading. As a common law jurisdiction, although the Singapore courts do not make law at their own discretion, they are able to interpret legislation for the purposes of deciding cases brought before them. Judge-made law cannot conflict with either the Constitution of Singapore or laws passed by the Singapore Parliament. SGX-listed companies also have to abide by the SGX-LR. The CG Code (and accompanying Practice Guidance) sets out corporate governance best practices for SGX-listed companies. Compliance with the Principles of the CG Code is mandatory, while its Provisions apply on a ‘comply or explain’ basis.

Singapore companies have a single-tier Board. The Board may be empowered by the Constitution to constitute sub-committees to oversee specific delegated responsibilities. The Board may by resolution authorise or appoint specific officers to undertake certain actions for and on behalf of the Board and the company, or appoint a person to act as the company’s attorney. The Board has the power to delegate authority for day-to-day management to one or more individuals (e.g. the chief executive officer (CEO)), but retains a non-delegable duty of supervision and oversight over persons to whom it has delegated responsibilities and actions.

Directors may generally be appointed or removed by shareholders in general meeting. The Constitution will usually prescribe the procedure for director appointments and may provide that the Board has power to appoint additional directors, or to appoint a director to fill a casual vacancy (but typically will also state that any director so appointed is subject to retirement and re-election at the next annual general meeting (AGM)).

Subject to meeting certain qualifications e.g. a director must be at least 18 years old, not an undischarged bankrupt and not convicted of certain money-laundering offences under the Corruption, Drug Trafficking and Other Serious Crimes (Confiscation of Benefits) Act 1992, private companies are generally left to regulate their own Boards and determine their own directors. SGX-listed companies’ Boards must have at least two non-executive directors (NEDs) who are independent and free of any material business or financial connection with the company, and independent directors (ID) must comprise at least one-third of the Board. Foreign-incorporated SGX-listed companies must have at least two Singapore-resident IDs. The criteria for when a director of an SGX-listed company may be considered ‘independent’ is generally found in the CG Code as well as the SGX-LR. In particular, the SGX-LR prescribes when a director is deemed non-independent e.g. if he is or has in any of the past three financial years been an employee of the listed company or its related corporation, or if he has served for an aggregate of more than nine years on the Board. SGX-listed companies are required to subject every director to re-nomination (and re-appointment, if applicable) every three years. Certain industry-specific regulations or licensing regimes also prescribe additional requirements or restrictions regarding director qualifications. Other than as described, there are no limits on director tenures, or maximum age limits. Principle 4 of the CG Code requires the Board to have a formal and transparent process for appointment and re-appointment of directors, taking into account the need for progressive board renewal. Board refreshment and succession are generally considered part of the Board’s responsibilities. SGX-listed companies must maintain a board diversity policy and disclose their targets and progress towards achieving diversity on the Board. Please see response to 2. above regarding diversity.

The CG Code recognises that the Board has the role of setting strategic direction. The execution of strategy is typically delegated to the CEO and management under the Board’s direction. The CA does not dictate how companies and Boards are to set and change corporate strategy. However, Boards are increasingly cognisant of the need to address climate-related risks and opportunities, cyber security risks and AI risks in formulating company strategies. The description of climate-related risks and opportunities and impact of such risks and opportunities on the organisation’s strategy is one of the pillars of the TCFD framework which forms a core part of the ISSB standards, and the Cyber Resilience Guide for Boards launched in 2025 by the Singapore Institute of Directors offers a structured eight-step process for embedding cyber resilience into corporate strategies.

The CA provides that a company must not provide or improve emoluments for directors in respect of such office, unless this is approved by separate shareholders’ resolution (generally tabled at AGMs). This applies to directors’ fees, expenses allowance insofar as this is charged to income tax in Singapore, contributions paid under pension schemes, and non-cash benefits received (for example, a company car or parking privileges). It is also generally unlawful for a company to make payments to directors by way of either compensation for loss of office as an officer of the company or of its subsidiary or as consideration for or in connection with retirement from such office, or in connection with the transfer of whole or part of the undertaking or property of the company, subject to certain limited exceptions. Save for the foregoing, companies are otherwise generally free to set the level or mode of directors’ compensation. SGX-listed companies’ Constitutions are required to provide that fees payable to NEDs shall be by a fixed sum and not a commission on or a percentage of profits or turnover, and salaries payable to executive directors may not include a commission on or a percentage of turnover. It is quite customary for SGX-listed company directors’ remuneration to include a non-cash component, e.g. share-based incentives (which for executive directors customarily carry performance conditions). SGX-listed companies are required to disclose the exact amount and breakdown of the remuneration paid to their CEO and directors in their annual reports. Such breakdown must include (in percentage terms) base or fixed salary, variable or performance-related income or bonuses, benefits in kind, stock options granted, share-based incentives and awards, and other long-term incentives. The Corporate Governance Advisory Committee also issued a Statement on Remuneration Disclosure in December 2023, recommending that companies provide qualitative disclosures (e.g. explain the remuneration framework and disclose objectives and key performance metrics used to determined the year’s variable or performance-related remuneration) alongside the mandatory quantitative disclosures to address concerns of misleading comparisons across issuers of different industries and sizes and potential poaching of personnel as a result of the mandatory disclosures. In addition, the SGX-LR provides that ‘golden handshake’ or retirement pay-outs to directors of SGX-listed companies are additionally subject to separate requirements under the ‘interested person transactions’ rules under the SGX-LR.

A director owes fiduciary duties to the company. He must act in the best interests of the company, and cannot put himself in a position of a conflict of interests. Any such conflict must be declared to the Board. Where a company is financially solvent, this duty is generally satisfied by acting in the best interests of the shareholders. Where a company is imminently likely to be unable to discharge its debts, the court will examine the subjective bona fides of the director having regard to the potential benefits and risks that the relevant corporate transaction might bring to the company. However, where insolvency proceedings are inevitable, the focus shifts to the interests of creditors and directors are prohibited from authorising corporate transactions exclusively benefiting shareholders or themselves at the expense of the company’s creditors.

The CA further provides that a director must at all times act honestly and use reasonable diligence in the discharge of his duties, and must not make improper use of his position, or any information acquired by virtue of his position, to gain an advantage for himself or any person, or to cause detriment to the company. A breach of these provisions could render the director liable to the company for any profit made by him or for damage suffered by the company as a result, and also guilty of an offence. A director could also be sued by the company for breach of fiduciary duties under common law and liable to compensate the company.

Under the CA, any provision that purports to exempt a director from any liability that would otherwise attach to him in connection with any negligence, default, breach of duty or breach of trust in relation to the company is void. A company also cannot directly or indirectly provide an indemnity in favour of a director against any liability attaching to him in connection with any negligence, default, breach of duty or breach of trust in relation to the company, subject to certain exceptions, among which is that the company is not prevented from purchasing and maintaining directors’ and officers’ liability insurance. It is quite customary for SGX-listed companies to purchase such insurance for directors.

SGX-listed companies are required to establish a nominating committee which is responsible for making recommendations to the Board on, among others, the process and criteria for evaluation of the performance of the Board, its board committees and directors. Boards may also enlist the help of an external evaluator to facilitate the Board and director evaluation process, and this is perceived as providing an additional element of independence and encouraging candour. ACRA has wide disciplinary and enforcement powers. Other than prosecuting errant directors in court, ACRA’s various other regulatory tools include seeking court orders to disqualify directors, issuing debarment orders to prevent directors from assuming further directorships, requiring directors to attend mandatory outreach training sessions, issuing private warnings, etc. ACRA works with and refers breaches to other appropriate law enforcement agencies. The SGX Regco also has wide-ranging regulatory tools under the SGX-LR, and also refers serious matters to regulatory authorities e.g. ACRA or MAS.

Under the CA, a company must hold an AGM after the end of each financial year. For private companies, this can be waived by shareholders. SGX-listed companies with a primary listing on the SGX must hold their AGM at a physical venue in Singapore unless a waiver has been granted by the SGX Regco on the basis that this contravenes the corporation’s law of incorporation or regulations thereunder. In 2024, SGX Regco, together with the Securities Investors Association (Singapore) (SIAS) and Singapore Institute of Directors, released the Guide on Best Practices for Shareholder Meetings of Listed Companies (Second Edition), to encourage a positive climate for robust and open discussions between the Board and shareholders at general meetings. The Guide addresses, among other things, issues of how participants should maintain themselves and ask questions and issues that the Board, particularly, the Chairman, should be aware of, with the aim of ensuring a more conducive meeting where divergent interests of various stakeholders can be addressed. The Guide states that Board and management should be present and interact with shareholders before and after the meeting. For companies with large shareholder base or a significant number of shareholders outside Singapore or where resolutions relate to non-routine matters, it may be appropriate for a hybrid meeting to be organised with shareholders being allowed to ask questions “live” where a hybrid meeting is conducted.

All shareholders are entitled to attend and to vote at the AGM (though for SGX-listed companies, certain shareholders may be required to abstain from voting if they are interested in a particular resolution). The voting results of every general meeting must be promptly announced via the SGX website. Please also see response to 20. below. The CG Code provides that companies should publish minutes of general meetings on their corporate websites, which should record substantial and relevant shareholders’ comments or queries relating to the agenda and responses from the Board and management. It also provides that companies should have in place an investor relations policy to actively engage and promote regular, effective and fair communication with shareholders. Companies should provide shareholders with the opportunity to communicate their views on matters affecting the company, and to participate effectively in and vote at general meetings. All directors should attend general meetings. The SGX-LR requires SGX-listed companies to prepare an annual report to its shareholders containing enough information for a proper understanding of the performance and financial conditions of the company and its principal subsidiaries, and including certain prescribed information. They are also required to publish annual sustainability reports.

The Review Group has also proposed initiatives to encourage SGX-listed companies to communicate their strategic plans and updates to investors more proactively, effectively and consistently. Such initiatives include working with relevant stakeholders to organise more investor outreach events and platforms, and the SGX Regco will be reviewing how SGX-listed companies can do more to disclose policies on areas such as dividends and investor relations. The SGX Regco has also issued guidance aimed to facilitate SGX-listed companies’ engagement with investors through the use of voluntary earnings or forward guidance (which if issued, must be carefully prepared and substantiated).

Companies have flexibility in how they wish to structure their own share capital, and under the CA, shares can carry different rights relating to voting, dividends, liquidation preference, etc., with such rights to be specified in the Constitution. Venture capital companies and startups are often structured with multi-class capital structures tailored to meet their commercial needs and those of their investors. For SGX-listed companies, the SGX-LR provides for dual-class capital structures which meet various requirements and safeguards for the protection of shareholders.

Unless exempted, every company must file audited financial statements and lodge an annual return containing prescribed particulars (e.g. share capital details, and company officers’ particulars) with ACRA. This is generally accessible by the public for a prescribed fee. In addition, SGX-listed companies are required to post their annual report (containing audited financial statements and other prescribed or relevant information on its business, operations, corporate governance, etc. – please see response to 14. above) and annual sustainability report on the SGX website, which is publicly accessible. Under the SGX-LR, SGX-listed companies are also required to make immediate announcements via the SGX website of a range of matters, such as trade-sensitive or materially price-sensitive information, half-yearly financial statements, significant transactions, appointment or cessation of directors or other key persons, etc.

Under the CA, shareholders who meet the requisite minimum shareholding requirements may requisition for an extraordinary general meeting (EGM) to be convened by the Board, or may call an EGM. Shareholders who meet the requisite minimum shareholding requirements may also requisition for a resolution to be proposed at the next AGM.

In the case of SGX-listed issuers, SGX Regco has observed that requisitionists may be constrained in their ability to satisfy the procedural requirements necessary to convene and conduct a shareholder-requisitioned meeting or when the Board does not cooperate in convening a general meeting upon a shareholders’ requisition. In light of this, SGX Regco published a consultation paper in 2024 on facilitating shareholder-requisitioned meetings, proposing to amend the SGX-LR to require issuers to provide assistance reasonably necessary to shareholders to facilitate the convening of a general meeting where procedural thresholds in the relevant laws and regulations governing the issuer in its place of constitution and its constitution have been met or to apply to court for a ruling where it disputes the validity of the requisition notice, in each case as soon as practicable within 21 days upon deposit of the requisition notice. Areas in which SGX Regco envisages that issuers can provide assistance to requisitionists include releasing announcements and documents (such as notices, circulars and proxy forms) on SGXNet, sending the relevant documents to shareholders and instructing its agents, including its share registrar and company secretary, to provide any necessary assistance such as preparing the mailing labels for the purposes of sending documents to shareholders and attending the shareholder-requisitioned meeting.

Shareholders may commence legal action in the name of the company in a derivative action against a director, subject to the relevant requirements. Remedies are also available for minority shareholders to bring an action on the grounds of minority oppression. In general, shareholders do not have direct recourse against the directors of the company.

In cases of market misconduct, investors can seek compensation for losses by commencing a private action in Court under section 234 of the SFA or applying to the Court for compensation after the offender is convicted or a civil penalty is made against him (referred to as a piggyback action). However, evidential hurdles, high costs and limitations of the piggyback action present challenges in investors being able to effectively pursue legal action. As Singapore’s regulatory approach shifts more decisively towards a more disclosure-based regime, MAS recognises the need to enhance investor recourse avenues against market misconduct. In October 2025, MAS published a consultation paper seeking views on proposed enhancements to strengthen the investor recourse regime in three key areas, namely (1) facilitating self-organisation by providing an option for an independent party to be appointed as a designated representative to bring legal action on behalf of investors in market misconduct cases; (2) providing access to funding by establishing a grant scheme to co-fund meritorious investor actions; and (3) reducing legal barriers to civil action by, among others, simplifying the process to claim compensation under the piggyback provision and expanding the scope of the piggyback provision to include civil penalty settlements, default judgements and consent orders.

Shareholder activism, while uncommon in the past has become increasingly prevalent. Recent examples include shareholders requisitioning for replacement of incumbent directors due to dissatisfaction with corporate performance, or shareholders rallying other shareholders through channels such as social media to vote down corporate proposals or takeover offers which they perceive to be disadvantageous. In 2023, the SGX Regco issued a regulator’s column making clear its expectations of Boards of SGX-listed corporations in relation to shareholder requisitions for meetings, so as to ensure that the interests of shareholders as a whole are protected. The SGX Regco’s view is that parties involved should aim to work together as a public dispute would not serve the interests of the listed corporation or its shareholders as a whole, and exhorts Boards to seek to find common ground with the requisitionists. The SGX Regco’s consultation paper in 2024 on facilitating shareholder-requisitioned meetings (please see response to 17. above) acknowledged the increasing level of shareholder activist campaigns and looked to address the procedural constraints faced by shareholders in requisitioning meetings to directly engage with the Board. Other ways in which shareholders exert influence include amassing higher ownership stakes in companies, engaging in private dialogue with the Board, reaching out to investor lobby groups like the SIAS for assistance, posing questions to the Board and management at general meetings, and writing letters of complaint to the regulators.

Please see response to 14. and 17. above. All shareholder meetings of a company other than the AGM are referred to as EGMs.

As for the timing of the AGM, SGX Regco encourages SGX-listed issuers to avoid scheduling their AGMs around busy periods, which are typically the two weeks immediately preceding the deadline for holding of AGMs. To reduce clustering of AGMs by large issuers that are STI constituents, the SGX Regco maintains a calendar of the AGMs of such issuers and will require the issuer to select another date or time period where a conflict arises.

Unless exempted, a company must lay before its shareholders at the AGM its audited financial statements, together with the independent auditors’ report and a prescribed directors’ statement thereon. Routinely tabled AGM resolutions include approval of directors’ fees and appointment or re-appointment of directors and auditors.

Various international proxy advisory firms provide such coverage.

While the Board is principally responsible for the corporate governance of the company, each set of stakeholders would play their part in holding the company and Board accountable, debt-holders by holding the company to its corporate governance obligations in their debt documentation, the government and regulators in setting best practice standards and imposing them on companies which they regulate, employees and other workers by putting into practice a corporate culture of good governance, and business partners and communities by setting expectations of good governance and holding the company accountable for its environmental, social and governance (ESG) commitments. The Review Committee has emphasised that the move towards a more disclosure-based equities market will require key stakeholders in the ecosystem to exercise their respective areas of expertise and/or responsibility. Other than the listed company, IPO professionals such as issue managers, lawyers and auditors, must uphold high standards of professional conduct and ensure the accuracy and completeness of material disclosures. Further, research analysts and financial journalists are expected to scrutinise issuers’ disclosures and highlight deficiencies, while regulators are expected to enhance surveillance and act promptly against false or misleading disclosures or corporate malfeasance.

Principle 13 of the CG Code requires the Board to adopt an inclusive approach by considering and balancing the needs and interests of material stakeholders, as part of its overall responsibility to ensure that the company’s best interests are served. The company should have arrangements to identify and engage with its material stakeholder groups and to manage its relationships with them.

Please see responses to 2. and 23. above.

Shareholders generally do not owe fiduciary or corporate governance obligations to the companies in which they invest. The Singapore Stewardship Principles (SSP) for Responsible Investors was developed with the support of the MAS and SGX, but does not carry force of law. As Singapore moves more decisively toward a more disclosure-based equities market, the Review Committee has noted that investors, in particular institutional investors, should step up constructive engagements of investee companies and hold them accountable, and ensure they have good governance practices and deliver shareholder value.

Following the financial crisis of 2008, the Code of Corporate Governance 2012 emphasised long-term success and sustainable shareholder value, and this has continued into the CG Code.