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Introduction
Competition authorities worldwide have increasingly focused on labour market infringements under competition law, issuing new regulations and guidance in recent years.
Notable examples include the U.S. Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission’s joint guidance, the Japanese Fair Trade Commission’s Report of the Study Group on Human Resource and Competition Policy, the UK Competition and Markets Authority’s Guidance for Employers on Avoiding Anti-Competitive Behaviour, and the Canadian Competition Bureau’s Enforcement Guidelines on Wage-Fixing and Non-Solicitation Agreements.
Similarly, the Turkish Competition Board (‘Board’) has intensified its scrutiny on labour market practices and commenced issuing significant decisions. Most recently, the Guidelines on Competition Infringements in Labour Markets (‘Guidelines’) were published on the Turkish Competition Authority’s (‘Authority’) website on 3 December 2024. These Guidelines provide a structured framework for assessing competition in labour markets and address principal concerns raised by stakeholders.
One of the principal topics concerning competition in labour markets may be regarded as non-solicitation agreements, which typically arise when competitors agree not to hire or solicit each other’s employees. Such agreements are considered to carry the risk of hindering competition in the relevant labour markets.
In light of the foregoing, the European Commission (‘EC’) rendered its first decision in which it found a cartel in the labour market, which is expected to be the foundational one of many more to follow.[1]
In this article, we provide a summary of the EC’s decision and examine contemporary developments in the Turkish landscape of competition in labour markets with a focus on non-solicitation agreements.
1. EC’s Delivery Hero – Glovo Decision
On 2 June 2025, the EC imposed an aggregate fine of EUR 329 million on Delivery Hero SE and Glovoapp23 SA for participating in a cartel that distorted competition in the online food delivery market throughout the European Economic Area. The infringement, which lasted from July 2018 to July 2022, comprised:
- A mutual agreement not to solicit each other’s employees;
- The exchange of commercially sensitive information; and
- The allocation of geographical markets.
The EC found that these practices constituted a single and continuous infringement pursuant to Article 101 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and Article 53 of the European Economic Area Agreement.
This case is particularly noteworthy as it marks the EC’s first labour market cartel finding and the first sanction involving anti-competitive conduct facilitated through a minority shareholding. Delivery Hero’s gradual acquisition of shares in Glovo enabled access to sensitive information and strategic influence, replacing competition with collusion. Whilst minority shareholdings are not inherently anti-competitive, this case highlights the risks associated with such an ownership.
The investigation was initiated following market monitoring, whistleblower reports, and unannounced inspections in 2022 and 2023. The fines were calculated pursuant to the EC’s 2006 Guidelines, considering the duration, scope, and intensity of the infringement. Both companies received a 10% reduction pursuant to the 2008 Settlement Notice for acknowledging their participation and liability.
This determination underlines the EC’s commitment to preserving competition in digital markets and ensuring fair labour conditions, whilst also demonstrating the effectiveness of its settlement and leniency programmes.
2. Turkish Competition Authority’’s Enforcement in No-Poach Agreement
The Authority commenced addressing anti-competitive labour market practices, including non-solicitation agreements, in the early 2020s, earlier than many of its global counterparts. Several principal decisions and the issuance of the 2024 Guidelines reflect the Authority’s evolving approach to the matter.
a. Private Schools in Kocaeli Decision
In a case involving private schools in Kocaeli[2], the Board found that schools had jointly determined tuition and meal fees and entered into non-solicitation agreements to prevent employee transfers. Coordination occurred through WhatsApp groups and meetings, with schools agreeing not to hire each other’s teachers and to jointly determine salaries.
The Board concluded that these practices constituted wage-fixing and non-solicitation agreements in contravention of Article 4 of Law No. 4054 on Protection of Competition (‘Law No. 4054’). On-site inspections revealed systematic efforts to restrict teacher mobility, including documented refusals to hire teachers at the request of other schools. These actions were praised within the group, indicating a coordinated and sustained effort.
The Board emphasised that such conduct restricts labour market competition and deprives employees of better job opportunities and fair compensation. Some of the implicated institutions admitted to the allegations and settled the case with a discounted administrative monetary fine, whilst others were fully fined as a result of the investigation.
b. Private Hospitals Decision
In another case, the Board investigated private hospitals[3] in Bursa for gentlemen’s agreements and coordinated wage-setting practices. Hospitals agreed not to hire each other’s personnel and jointly determined salary increase ranges.
The Board found that these practices infringed Article 4 of Law No. 4054 by object, irrespective of their actual impact. The conduct was classified as a cartel, and substantial administrative fines were imposed.
c. Guidelines on Competition Infringements in Labor Markets
As noted above, the Guidelines represent a step forward in an effort to clarify the legal framework for assessing non-solicitation and wage-fixing agreements.
Key points include:
Definition: Non-solicitation agreements are defined as arrangements, direct or indirect, whereby undertakings agree not to solicit or hire each other’s employees.
Scope: These agreements may apply to both current and former employees. Practices requiring mutual approval for employee transfers also fall within this scope.
Legal Basis: Such agreements are assessed pursuant to Article 4 of Law No. 4054 as market allocation restrictions and are treated as cartels.
Third Parties: The Guidelines emphasize that these agreements do not need to be direct; coordination through third parties may also constitute an infringement, and such third parties may be held liable depending on the circumstances.
3. Conclusion
The increasing focus of competition authorities on labour market practices reflects a growing recognition that anti-competitive conduct in employment relationships can distort not only product markets but also the fundamental rights of workers to seek better opportunities and fair compensation. The EC’s Delivery Hero/Glovo determination and the Board’s recent enforcement actions demonstrate a clear shift towards treating non-solicitation and wage-fixing agreements with the same severity as traditional cartels.
The Authority’s proactive stance exhibited by its early investigations and the issuance of comprehensive Guidelines positions it amongst the frontrunners in addressing labour market competition concerns, including non-solicitation agreements. By clarifying the legal framework and signalling a zero-tolerance approach to anti-competitive coordination, the Authority clearly indicated that its response to such practices will be strict.
Going forward, undertakings must ensure that their human resources practices comply with competition law, particularly in relation to hiring, wage-setting, and employee mobility. Internal compliance programmes should be updated to reflect the evolving legislation and enforcement landscape, and companies should remain vigilant against informal or indirect arrangements that may restrict competition in labour markets.
This article was authored by Erdem & Erdem Managing Associate Anıl Acar
[1] European Commission. (2025, June 2). Antitrust: Commission sends statement of objections to company XYZ for abuse of dominant position [Press release]. https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_25_1356
[2] Board decision dated 03.10.2024 and numbered 24-40/948-407.
[3] Board decision dated 24.02.2022 and numbered 22-10/152-62.