Malta’s gaming industry has long served as a laboratory for the European Union’s grand experiment in reconciling national regulation with market integration. Over the past two decades, the island transformed itself from a small, tourism-dependent economy into one of the EU’s foremost hubs for online gaming and digital services. At the heart of this transformation lies a deliberate alignment of Malta’s domestic legal order with the principles of the internal market: freedom of establishment, freedom to provide services, and proportionality in regulation. The twin 2025 judgments of the Maltese Civil Court, TSG Interactive Gaming Europe Ltd v Gerhard Posch and European Lotto & Betting Ltd v Philipp Wahl, demonstrate how deeply these principles have become embedded in Malta’s legal fabric. By refusing to recognise and enforce Austrian refund judgments grounded in a monopolistic national gambling regime, the Maltese Court reaffirmed that European public policy, as incorporated into Maltese law and practice, protects lawful cross-border enterprise rather than suppressing it. When read together with the Malta Gaming Authority’s 2024 Annual Report, the judgments present a coherent portrait of a jurisdiction that combines business friendliness with principled regulatory discipline, a model of lawful competitiveness within the EU.
The factual matrix of both cases was straightforward but legally charged. The respondents, Austrian consumers, had secured judgments before Austrian courts ordering repayment of their gambling losses by Maltese-licensed operators. The Austrian courts concluded that online gambling offered from abroad without Austrian authorisation was unlawful, rendering the contracts void. They thus ordered restitution of all amounts lost. The Maltese companies TSG Interactive Gaming Europe Ltd (Pokerstars) and European Lotto & Betting Ltd (Lottoland) sought to resist enforcement of those Austrian judgments in Malta under the Brussels I Recast Regulation (Regulation (EU) 1215/2012). Their central claim was not factual but quasi-constitutional: that the Austrian monopoly contravened Article 56 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, which guarantees the freedom to provide services, and that recognising such judgments would violate both Maltese and European ordre public.
The First Hall of the Civil Court, presided over by Judge Francesco Depasquale, upheld the operators’ arguments in both cases. In reasoned judgments delivered on 27 February 2025, the Court found that recognition of the Austrian rulings would be “manifestly contrary to Maltese and European public policy,” within the terms of Article 45(1)(a) of the Brussels I Recast Regulation. The Court observed that the Austrian system excluded foreign-licensed operators purely to protect a domestic monopoly, an approach inconsistent with the internal market’s foundational freedoms. Enforcing such judgments in Malta would compel a Maltese court to give effect to a breach of EU law.
This reasoning was neither parochial nor protectionist. It was an affirmation that ordre public européen encompasses the freedoms guaranteed by the Treaties themselves.
The Court’s analysis is deeply rooted in the jurisprudence of the Court of Justice of the European Union. Since van Binsbergen (1974) and Cowan v Le Trésor Public (1989), the CJEU has interpreted the freedom to provide services as directly effective, conferring enforceable rights on individuals and companies. In Gambelli (2003) and Placanica (2007), the Court stated that licensing regimes that imposed discriminatory or disproportionate restrictions on foreign gaming operators are contrary to European Law and principles. Member States may indeed regulate gambling for legitimate public-interest reasons such as consumer protection, prevention of fraud, and preservation of public order, but only if the measures are consistent, necessary, and proportionate. Where a state simultaneously restricts foreign operators while encouraging its own domestic gambling activities, its moral or consumer-protection justifications collapse. It was this logic that underpinned Judge Depasquale’s conclusion: Austria’s monopoly, like others previously censured by the CJEU, could not be justified within the meaning of Article 56 TFEU. Austria restricted the provision of services from companies from foreign Member States, whilst at the same time taxing such services and promoting its own monopoly……
…..“Here, the Court makes reference to what has already been reproduced above in paragraph 86, where in the ‘Gambling Case Laws’ published by the European Commission, the following is stated: The CJEU has also repeatedly recognized EU countries’ rights to restrict the cross-border supply of certain gambling services where necessary to protect public interest objectives such as the protection of minors, the fight against gambling addiction, and the prevention of crime and fraud.
168. Admittedly, once the Austrian tax authorities considered the applicant company’s activity to be taxable, that means that the “public interest objectives” which are listed above, and which could be taken into account when a service such as that provided by the applicant company is restricted and limited, cannot be considered as existing in the granting of the monopoly.”
This rendered the judgment unenforceable, and most fundamentally, Judge Depasquale held that enforcing such a foreign judgment upholding monopolistic principles would breach both EU law and Maltese ordre public. Recognition and/or enforcement of a foreign judgment could not compel a Maltese court to give effect to a decision based on a legislative regime which the Court found to be manifestly incompatible with a fundamental freedom enshrined in the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, namely the freedom to provide services under Article 56 TFEU…..
……“here we are dealing not only with a question of restriction on the freedom to provide services but also with a licence legally issued by a competent Authority of a Member State not being recognised in another country of the European Union, and this in breach of the European Treaties”.
The Maltese court went further by situating this reasoning within its own context. It relied on Article 56A of Malta’s Gaming Act (Cap. 583), enacted in 2023, which explicitly prohibits the recognition or enforcement in Malta of foreign judgments that question the legality of gaming activities authorised under an MGA licence. Rather than creating a conflict with EU law, this provision codifies the principle of sincere cooperation in Article 4(3) TEU, that Member States must ensure the full effectiveness of EU law within their jurisdictions. The law ensures that Maltese-licensed operators acting lawfully under EU principles are not penalised by contradictory national regimes elsewhere in the Union. The Civil Court thus transformed a statutory safeguard into a legal statement: the freedom to provide services, as guaranteed by EU law, is part of Maltese public policy.
The significance of this express outlining of ordre public cannot be overstated. Traditionally, the exception has been invoked to shield domestic legal orders from alien norms. Malta, by contrast, invoked it to defend the supranational order itself. Public policy became a mechanism for preserving the integrity of EU law rather than an escape from it. This approach represents a subtle but profound shift: the European internal market is not external to national public order but an integral component of it. When a Maltese court refuses to enforce a judgment that infringes Article 56 TFEU, it is acting to uphold European legality, not merely national interest.
The jurisprudence’s practical implications become clear when viewed against the economic landscape described in the Malta Gaming Authority’s 2024 Annual Report. The data portray a sector that is not peripheral but foundational to Malta’s economy. In 2024, the gaming industry contributed €1.386 billion in gross value added, accounting for 6.7 per cent of national GDP or over 10 per cent when indirect effects are included. The sector currently employs circa 18,000 people, representing 6.2 per cent of the national workforce, and generated €82.4 million in revenue through licence and compliance contributions. There were 315 active companies holding 323 licences. These numbers reveal not only the sector’s scale but also its maturity: Malta’s gaming economy is characterised by stability and capitalisation. The presence of an able, English speaking work force is also a foundational pillar.
This maturity is underpinned by a regulatory architecture designed in harmony with EU law. The Gaming Act of 2018 replaced a fragmented set of rules with a single, technology-neutral statute that enshrines transparency, proportionality, and consumer protection. Licensing is open, rule-based, and subject to fitness and properness; it is neither arbitrary nor protectionist. Malta’s system together with the discussed judgments, contemplates the E-Commerce Directive (2000/31/EC), which embodies the “country-of-origin” principle10 — the notion that a provider lawfully established in one Member State may offer online services throughout the Union, subject primarily to its home-state regulation. This shows that the discussed Maltese judgments were not exceptional but contextual and consistent with EU digital-market law. In fact, the court also stated that:
“Here, the Court cannot help but dwell on what it has already expressed earlier in this judgment, namely that one of the crucial and essential elements on which the operation and success of the internal market of the European Union is based is that in the field of services, namely the freedom of establishment of services and the freedom to provide services in all Europe, what in English we commonly refer to as “the free movement of services”
Beyond the structural framework, Malta’s regime integrates horizontal EU standards that ensure consumer and financial integrity. The Consumer Rights Directive (2011/83/EU) and the Unfair Commercial Practices Directive (2005/29/EC) guarantee contractual clarity, withdrawal rights, and fair marketing —The 4th and 5th Anti-Money Laundering Directives ((EU) 2015/849 and (EU) 2018/843), transposed through the Prevention of Money Laundering Act (CAP 373) and implementing procedures specifically related to the gaming sector, subject gaming operators to stringent due-diligence obligations, verified by both the MGA and the Financial Intelligence Analysis Unit. The General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) ensures that player data are processed lawfully, transparently, and securely. This network of instruments provides the backdrop to Maltese online gambling legislation, which functions in harmony with the EU Acquis Communautaire.
Against this background, the Austrian judgments appeared doubly illegitimate. They not only violated Article 56 TFEU but also disregarded the existence of a comprehensive, EU-aligned regime in the operator’s home state. For the Maltese court, enforcing such judgments would be tantamount to recognising a legal fiction — a claim that consumer protection could be achieved only through exclusion, when it may indeed be better achieved through proportionate regulation. In refusing enforcement, the Court affirmed that political protectionism cannot trump fair market practices, promoting competition between operators and between jurisdictions within the European Union, alike.
The MGA’s 2024 Annual Report illustrates how Malta’s alignment with EU values yields tangible benefits. Eighty per cent of respondents affirmed the availability of skilled labour, while 87 per cent cited strong ethical standards. The report also recorded a 3.5 per cent growth in the sector, demonstrating resilience despite global volatility. The industry’s average equity-to-turnover ratio of 16.4 per cent (and 25 per cent for top operators) attests to solid capitalisation. These figures confirm that a regulated, EU-compliant market is compatible with — indeed conducive to — sustained growth.
Institutionally, the MGA has evolved into a modern supervisory authority that reflects EU administrative best practice. Its risk-based supervision model prioritises entities of systemic significance, mirroring the European Supervisory Authorities’ proportional-oversight philosophy. In 2024, the MGA issued €367,772 in administrative fines, double the previous year, signalling credible enforcement rather than regulatory indulgence. Simultaneously, it launched the ESG Code of Good Practice, encouraging operators to publish sustainability and governance data.
This synthesis of regulation and responsibility demonstrates how legislation within a cross-border context can drive growth, whilst still maintaining accountability. Hence the Court’s conclusion that enforcing Austrian judgments would not only contravene national policy but distort the very market equilibrium the EU seeks to preserve, by ignoring and/or failing to recognise the local MGA license.
From an institutional perspective, the 2025 judgments illustrate how national courts participate in the enforcement of EU law. Under Simmenthal and Costa v ENEL, national courts must disapply conflicting provisions of domestic law; by extension, they must also refuse to give effect to foreign judgments that contradict EU law. Malta’s judiciary demonstrated here that affiliation with the Union’s institutional order need not erode national sovereignty; rather, it redefines it as the capacity to govern confidently within a shared European system.
The economic and social context magnifies the importance here. The gaming industry sustains not only employment but also innovation and fiscal revenue. Revenues generated finance infrastructure, education, and technological initiatives that, in turn, reinforce Malta’s human-capital base. The MGA’s training initiatives, partnerships with local trade schools and universities, and support for fintech integration, reflect a deliberate strategy of endogenous development — growth through knowledge rather than deregulation. Growth through the creation of niche industry, rather than a focus on finite resources. In this sense, the Maltese model exemplifies the “dynamic equilibrium” of the internal market: diversity within unity, where national regulation coexists with transnational principles.
The 2025 judgments also have doctrinal resonance beyond gaming. They articulate a general principle applicable to all sectors characterised by digital cross-border trade: that Member States may not externalise their protectionist policies through the mechanism of judgment enforcement. As online services proliferate from fintech, ride hailing, content creation to cloud computing, the tension between national regulatory autonomy and EU market freedoms will intensify. Malta’s approach offers a template: defend domestic legality by appealing to the supranational order, not by ring-fencing national laws or retreating from it. In this way, small Member States can exercise “normative leverage,” shaping the evolution of EU law through principled jurisprudence. Competition should be championed over prohibition. Mutual trust and recognition over alarmism.
The MGA’s forward-looking initiatives reinforce this projection of influence. Its newly implemented Minimum Capital Requirements Policy has further codified prudential thresholds for licensees, ensuring solvency and investor confidence. The Authority’s international outreach, cooperation with the Financial Intelligence Analysis Unit, participation in the European Forum of Gaming Regulators, and engagement in EU expert groups, situates Malta at the centre of the continent’s policy dialogue on gaming. This ecosystem of judicial and regulatory coordination transforms the island’s small size into an advantage: agility paired with credibility.
Equally noteworthy is the philosophical coherence of Malta’s approach. Its legal framework reflects European principles but also retains the pragmatic efficiency rooted in its common law heritage, where rules are clear and red tape is kept to a minimum.
Viewed in comparative perspective, Malta’s experience contrasts sharply with the inward-looking tendencies of certain Member States. Where others respond to digital disruption by reinforcing national monopolies or imposing prohibitive barriers, Malta has chosen integration and supervision. Its success suggests that competitiveness and compliance are not contradictory. The MGA’s statistics — consistent growth, high employment, and increasing ESG participation — demonstrate that legal certainty attracts responsible investment. The Civil Court’s jurisprudence ensures that this certainty is not undermined by inconsistent foreign rulings.
In theoretical terms, the Maltese approach advances the concept of federal pluralism within the EU. It recognises that while Member States retain regulatory autonomy, that autonomy must be exercised within a shared constitutional framework. By invoking ordre public européen to defend Article 56 TFEU, Malta has given concrete expression to this pluralism. The result is a model of “autonomy through alignment”: sovereignty exercised by applying, rather than contesting, supranational law. This model, increasingly relevant in fields like digital finance, and the digital transformation of short-term tourist lettings and ride hailing applications, positions Malta as a thought leader in the Union’s evolving constitutional economy.
Ultimately, the Maltese gaming judgments and the 2024 MGA report converge on a single narrative. The courts articulate the normative commitment — implementation of EU law as an element of national identity (public policy) — while the regulator demonstrates the operational capacity to sustain it. Together they illustrate that the most enduring form of competitiveness is legality. A jurisdiction that adheres to clear, consistent, and proportionate rules will attract investment, foster innovation, and command respect within the Union.
Malta’s experience proves that small states can wield disproportionate influence through normative clarity. By fusing economic pragmatism with constitutional principle, it has established itself not only as Europe’s gaming capital but also as a case study in the successful Europeanisation of public policy. The 2025 judgments, far from being isolated legal episodes, are the culmination of a twenty-year experiment in lawful market governance. They demonstrate that public policy, properly understood, is not the antithesis of business freedom but its precondition.
As the EU continues to grapple with the regulation of digital markets, financial technologies, platforms and cross-border services, the Maltese paradigm offers a viable template: a system where the rule of law, economic openness, and social responsibility are mutually reinforcing. The Civil Court’s invocation of ordre public européen in defence of Article 56 TFEU encapsulates that equilibrium. It affirms that European integration thrives not through uniformity but through the lawful coexistence of diverse, competent jurisdictions. In that sense, Malta’s 2025 gaming judgments mark not merely a domestic victory for its licensees but a reaffirmation of the constitutional logic of the Union itself — the idea that freedom, law, prosperity and healthy economic competition are inseparable.