Qatar is a civil law jurisdiction with a codified legal system, and it is a state party to the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (the ‘New York Convention’) by virtue of Decree No. 29 of 2003 Ratifying the Accession of the State of Qatar to the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards. At constitutional level, article 29 of the Permanent Constitution of the State of Qatar (the ‘Constitution’) provides that natural wealth and its resources are the property of the State, which shall preserve and exploit them in accordance with the law. Qatar’s non-hydrocarbon extractive activity is centred mainly on quarrying and construction materials—particularly soil, sand, marl and related building and road materials—rather than a mature metallic-mining sector.

For non-hydrocarbon resources, the principal statute is Law No. 3 of 2007 on the Exploitation of Natural Resources (the ‘Natural Resources Law’). Article 1 of the Natural Resources Law defines ‘natural resources’ broadly as all natural, non-living materials, whether metallic or non-metallic, occurring on, in or beneath the soil surface, territorial waters, the continental shelf or the exclusive economic zone, and expressly includes minerals, precious and decorative stones, soil, sand, marl and materials used in building construction, road construction and filling. Article 1 defines “The Minister” for the purposes of the Natural Resources Law as the Minister of Energy and Industry, a role now performed by the Minister of State for Energy Affairs following subsequent governmental restructuring.

Article 2 confirms that all-natural wealth and resources are deemed to be owned by the State and may not be exploited, transferred or traded except within the scope of the Natural Resources Law, while article 4 expressly carves out petroleum and other hydrocarbons and leaves them to the separate hydrocarbons’ regime. The Natural Resources Law was subsequently amended by Law No. 8 of 2015, including in relation to ministerial and institutional references.

Qatar is not generally regarded as a mature metallic-mining jurisdiction. In practical terms, the framework is more relevant to quarrying, aggregates, industrial minerals and construction materials than to a developed hard-rock mining sector. The legal regime is therefore better understood as the Natural Resources Law supplemented by Decree-Law No. 30 of 2002 Promulgating the Law of the Environment Protection (the ‘Environmental Protection Law’), land and state-property rules, industrial licensing, company law, foreign investment law, labour law, customs law and tax law. Under article 3 of the Natural Resources Law, concession rights for natural resources other than petroleum, soil, sand and related construction materials are granted by ministerial decision approved by the Council of Ministers. Articles 5 and 6 establish a separate licensing track for soil, sand, marl and similar construction materials with permissions from Minister of Municipal Affairs and Agriculture, while articles 7, 8 and 11 provide for reconnaissance, exploration and mining rights, with eligibility conditions and procedures to be set by the Council of Ministers. The statute does not identify a single modern regulator labelled as a mining authority; rather, authority is split between the Minister of State for Energy Affairs, the Council of Ministers and, in practice, sectoral bodies such as the Ministry of Environment and Climate Change, which currently plays an important role in environmental approvals, quarry and crusher oversight, and enforcement.

The institutional landscape has evolved since the Natural Resources Law was enacted. The original text of articles 5, 6 and 12 conferred soil, sand and construction-materials licensing functions on the Ministry of Municipal Affairs and Agriculture. Following subsequent governmental restructurings, those functions are now resting with the Ministry of Environment and Climate Change and, for certain operational aspects, with the Public Works Authority (Ashghal). The 2015 amendment under Law No. 8 of 2015 updated certain institutional references but did not comprehensively overhaul the regime. In addition, the broader legal environment includes Law No. 11 of 2015 Promulgating the Commercial Companies Law (as amended by Law No. 8 of 2021), which governs the corporate vehicles through which mining activities would be conducted, and Law No. 22 of 2004 Promulgating the Civil Code, which provides the background rules on property, assignment of rights and obligations, and contractual capacity.

Qatar does not have a dedicated critical or strategic minerals policy of the type adopted in jurisdictions seeking to prioritise domestic supply chains for lithium, rare earths, cobalt or similar commodities. The published legal framework is framed more broadly around non-hydrocarbon natural resources and, in practical terms, around quarrying, industrial minerals and construction materials extraction.

Qatar has shown strategic interest in the mining and metals sector through overseas investment activity. Qatar Mining Company, which is wholly owned by the State of Qatar, states that it was established to undertake targeted, value-accretive investments in the mining and metals sector and to contribute to diversification and increasing non-hydrocarbon revenues through mineral projects in different jurisdictions. That evidences state interest in the sector, but it is not the same as a published domestic critical minerals policy.

More recently, in November 2025, the Qatar Investment Authority entered into a memorandum of understanding with Ivanhoe Mines Ltd, a Canadian mining company, to collaborate on the further exploration, development and mining of critical minerals, particularly in Africa. Separately, in 2025 the Qatar Investment Authority acquired approximately 4 per cent of Ivanhoe Mines through a private placement of approximately USD 500 million. Those transactions are consistent with Qatar’s broader sovereign wealth strategy of securing exposure to copper, nickel, platinum group metals and other critical minerals essential for the global energy transition, and they align with Qatar National Vision 2030’s objective of economic diversification. However, the emphasis remains on overseas investment in the sector rather than the establishment of a domestic critical minerals extraction industry or the promulgation of domestic critical minerals legislation.

The Qatari legal framework does not establish a publicly articulated mining-specific domestic subsidy regime comprising grants, concessional finance or revenue support mechanisms for non-hydrocarbon extraction. However, the legal framework does contemplate certain forms of support. Under article 25 of the Natural Resources Law, the Council of Ministers may, upon the proposal of the minister, decide that the State bears part of the tax burden on behalf of the concessionaire, authorised person, licensee or holder of mining rights.

In addition, the general foreign investment framework provides for possible incentives such as land allocation, customs exemptions and tax benefits for qualifying projects. The relevant statute is Law No. (1) of 2019 On Regulating Non-Qatari Capital Investment in the Economic Activity (the ‘Foreign Investment Law’). Article 25(1) of the Foreign Investment Law excludes companies and persons assigned to extract, utilise or manage natural resources under a concession or special contract, to the extent that the terms of that concession or special contract do not contradict the law and provides for the licensing requirements to be met. Accordingly, the availability of general investment incentives for mining projects cannot be assumed without qualification. Qatar Mining Company is best characterised as evidence of state participation and overseas strategic investment interest rather than proof of a developed domestic mining-support regime.

The foreign investment position in Qatar requires the Foreign Investment Law and the Natural Resources Law to be read together. At general level, article 2 of the Foreign Investment Law permits non-Qatari investors to invest in all economic sectors, even up to 100 per cent capital ownership, in accordance with the executive regulations, subject to article 4 and other applicable legislation. Articles 8 to 15 of the Foreign Investment Law further address land allocation, imports, tax and customs incentives, expropriation protection, repatriation and transfer of investment ownership. The current regime replaced the earlier Law No. 13 of 2000 on Regulating Non-Qatari Capital Investment in the Economic Activity, which article 26 of the Foreign Investment Law expressly abrogated. The Ministry of Commerce and Industry has also published business activity guidance for non-Qatari investment, but that guidance does not alter the sector-specific position applicable to upstream natural resource rights. However, the upstream extractive position is narrower. Article 8 of the Natural Resources Law provides that licences for reconnaissance, exploration, production and mining rights may not be granted to non-Qataris except pursuant to special agreements concluded by the minister in accordance with rules and conditions specified by the Council of Ministers. In addition, article 25(1) of the Foreign Investment Law excludes from its scope companies and persons assigned to extract, utilise or manage natural resources under a concession or special contract, to the extent the terms of that concession or special contract do not contradict the law. Read together, those provisions indicate that the liberalised general foreign investment regime does not override the sector-specific restrictions governing upstream natural resource rights.

The clearest application of the restriction is to the grant of statutory reconnaissance, exploration, production and mining rights. Where a transaction involves the transfer or indirect control of such rights, ministerial and possibly higher-level approval is likely to be relevant. Whether a minority equity investment in a Qatari company holding such rights would, without more, be caught by the Natural Resources Law is not expressly addressed in the published framework and would require transaction-specific analysis. Likewise, asset acquisitions would need to be examined by reference to whether they amount, in substance, to a transfer of concessionary or statutory resource rights. A published proposal specifically aimed at amending the foreign investment rules as they apply to the mining sector is not evident from the materials reviewed.

A further consideration is the interplay with the Commercial Companies Law (Law No. 11 of 2015, as amended). Where a foreign investor seeks to participate in a mining venture through a Qatari corporate vehicle, the formation and governance of that vehicle will be subject to the Commercial Companies Law. Law No. 8 of 2021 introduced amendments to the Commercial Companies Law addressing, among other matters, beneficial ownership transparency and anti-money laundering compliance, which may be relevant to the due diligence requirements for any corporate structure holding natural resource rights. In addition, practitioners should be aware that the Qatar Financial Centre (“QFC”) offers a separate regulatory regime under which entities may be established with 100 per cent foreign ownership, although the QFC regime is principally designed for financial services, professional services and technology activities, and the holding of upstream natural resource rights through a QFC entity would require careful analysis of the QFC’s regulatory scope.

At general level, article 14 of the Foreign Investment Law provides that non-Qatari investors may transfer all amounts relevant to their investment from and to any external destination without delay, including investment revenues, sale or liquidation proceeds, dispute-settlement amounts and expropriation compensation, in any convertible currency at the prevailing exchange rate. The legislation does not impose general exchange controls specific to the mining sector. Compliance with Law No. 24 of 2018 Promulgating the Income Tax Law (the ‘Income Tax Law’) would also be required where applicable.

The position should be qualified in the extractive context. Because natural resource concession and special contract arrangements are treated separately under article 25(1) of the Foreign Investment Law, concession-specific or special-agreement terms could still affect the position for upstream projects. Subject to that qualification, the legislation does not impose a mining-specific statutory restriction on repatriation.

Qatari laws do not impose a mining-specific ban on the export of non-hydrocarbon minerals or metals. The more visible regime is the general customs and trade framework, together with the permit and environmental framework applicable to extraction, transport and handling of materials.

For soil, sand, stone and similar construction-related materials, practical restrictions are more likely to arise through licence conditions, transport permitting and environmental controls than through a standalone mineral-export code. The published legal framework do not set out a local beneficiation requirement specific to the mining sector.

The Qatari legal framework does not establish a mining-specific tariff regime applying uniquely to minerals and metals. Imports and exports are instead governed by the general customs framework. In practical terms, Qatar applies the Gulf Cooperation Council common external tariff, which generally imposes a standard five per cent customs duty on imported goods, subject to applicable exemptions.

The Foreign Investment Law also provides customs exemptions for imported machinery and equipment needed for project establishment and, under article 11, for imported raw and half-manufactured materials needed for production where those materials are not available on the domestic market. The practical application of those exemptions to projects structured through natural resource concessions or special contracts would need to be reviewed against the relevant concession terms and the carve-out in article 25(1) of the Foreign Investment Law.

There is no rule of general application imposing mandatory local equity participation across the entire mining value chain. However, the upstream regime remains closely controlled by the State. Under article 8 of the Natural Resources Law, non-Qataris may only obtain reconnaissance, exploration, production and mining rights through special agreements concluded by the minister in accordance with Council of Ministers rules and conditions.

There is no universal local participation requirement of general application. However, upstream rights are not freely available to foreign investors and may in practice require bespoke governmental arrangements.

Under article 29 of the Constitution and article 2 of the Natural Resources Law, natural wealth and its resources are owned by the State. The Natural Resources Law further provides that no exploitation, transfer or trade of natural resources may occur except within the scope of that law. Private parties therefore do not acquire ownership of minerals in situ; rather, they may obtain concession rights, licences, discovery certificates or mining rights in accordance with the statutory framework.

Foreign investors may participate in projects in Qatar under the general investment regime, but the holding of upstream statutory resource rights remains subject to the special-agreement mechanism in article 8 of the Natural Resources Law. It is therefore more accurate to distinguish between ordinary corporate ownership and ownership of concessionary or statutory extractive rights. The published legislation is not framed as imposing an express across-the-board joint venture requirement, but upstream rights are not freely available to foreign investors as of right.

Mining tenure appears conceptually separate from land tenure. State ownership of natural resources under article 29 of the Constitution and article 2 of the Natural Resources Law does not, by itself, determine ownership or use rights over the surface land, which remain subject to the wider framework of Law No. 10 of 1987 regarding Public and Private State Property, real-estate rules, planning rules, municipal approvals and licensing requirements. To the extent access to privately owned land were required, broader constitutional principles concerning deprivation of property for public benefit and fair compensation under article 27 of the Constitution would also be relevant.

The Natural Resources Law does not contain a detailed publicly visible code on surface-owner compensation and access comparable to those found in mature mining jurisdictions. It does, however, give an exploration licensee substantial statutory entry and operational rights within the licensed area. In particular, article 13 entitles the licensee to enter the relevant area with agents and workers, carry out surveys and drilling, construct roads, install equipment, construct buildings and establish water infrastructure. In practice, land access and project siting would likely need to be addressed through a combination of state-land allocation, municipal approvals, environmental permissions and, where relevant, industrial land arrangements.

A further practical consideration is the interaction between mining tenure and water rights. Mining operations commonly require access to groundwater for processing, dust suppression and operational purposes. Law No. 1 of 1988 Regulating Groundwater Well Drilling (as supplemented by subsequent regulations and, more recently, Law No. 23 of 2025 on Water Resources) requires a separate drilling licence for any well drilled for agricultural, drinking, industrial or other purposes. Article 18 of Law No. 1 of 1988 confirms that groundwater is owned by the State, and extraction is subject to the licensing conditions set by the competent authority, including maximum permitted withdrawal rates and well-spacing requirements. The penalties for unlicensed well drilling or exceeding permitted withdrawal rates are significant. Accordingly, any mining project would need to obtain water-related permissions in addition to the mining right itself, and water availability and licensing should be factored into project feasibility assessments from the outset.

The Natural Resources Law clearly establishes a statutory architecture for reconnaissance and exploration. Under article 7, the minister may grant licences to natural or legal persons for reconnaissance and exploration of natural resources, other than petroleum, in accordance with the rules and conditions stipulated by the Council of Ministers. The statute therefore recognises a formal exploration stage rather than leaving the matter entirely to contract.

The Natural Resources Law also sets out the substantive scope of an exploration licence. Under article 13, the licensee may enter the area with agents and workers, carry out topographical and geological survey work, drill and take samples, construct roads, install equipment, construct and maintain buildings, collect explored and produced materials from agreed areas, and build water and sewage infrastructure. The right is limited to the relevant minerals within the licensed area.

The principal qualification is that the publicly available statute leaves much of the operational detail to later decisions. Article 11 provides that a decision of the Council of Ministers shall determine the necessary conditions and procedures to be fulfilled by those entitled to receive these licences, and article 12 provides that the Council of Ministers shall determine the applicable fees. The statutory architecture is therefore clear, but a fully transparent public set of detailed secondary rules dealing comprehensively with application process, term, extension, standard conditions, timelines and costs is not addressed.

The transition from exploration to mining is addressed expressly. Articles 14 and 15 provide that a discovery certificate holder may apply for mining rights within two years, failing which the minister may grant the mining right to another person, subject to financial compensation rules specified by the Council of Ministers. In that sense, the statute does establish a path from exploration to exploitation, but the level of security of tenure that ultimately attaches to that path appears to depend heavily on compliance with statutory conditions and on the implementing decisions that are not fully visible in the public domain.

Mining rights may be granted by the minister to a natural or legal person who has obtained a discovery certificate and submitted an application within the statutory two-year period, in accordance with the conditions stipulated by the Council of Ministers. Under article 16 of the Natural Resources Law, the holder of mining rights is entitled, in addition to the rights of exploration, to exploit minerals in the relevant area in accordance with rules specified by a decision of the Council of Ministers.

The Natural Resources Law imposes reporting and technical-compliance obligations. Under article 17, the holder of mining rights must submit plans, drawings and technical working-method sketches in accordance with ministerial conditions and procedures, and must submit annual technical and financial reports covering, among other matters, production, workforce data, the programme for the following year, and financial and production-cost information. Articles 18 and 21 provide a statutory basis for suspension and cancellation in the event of breach, and article 21 also provides for an appeal to the Council of Ministers. In that sense, the regime does provide a measure of security of tenure, but that security is conditional rather than absolute and remains closely tied to ongoing compliance.

However, the published law is clearer on the existence of mining rights than on the full licence package. There is no consolidated public set of implementing rules fully addressing matters such as duration, renewal mechanics, standard financial-security requirements, detailed application process or model licence terms. The statutory framework is in place, but the detailed implementation rules are not fully tested.

The Natural Resources Law clearly contemplates a royalty and fee regime. Under article 3, concession rights to exploit natural resources, together with their scope and royalty, are to be granted by ministerial decision approved by the Council of Ministers. Article 12 further provides that the Council of Ministers shall determine the fees applicable to licences for exploration and discovery, certificates of exploration, mining rights and the proceeds of mining production, while the relevant minister determines fees applicable to licences concerning soil, sand, marl and related construction materials.

A consolidated, readily accessible published schedule of mining royalties and fees is not evident from the published materials in the way commonly seen in more developed mining jurisdictions. Qatar’s law clearly provides for royalties and fees, but the detailed economic terms depend on secondary decisions and, potentially, project-specific arrangements.

It is also worth noting the interaction between the royalty regime and the broader tax framework. Under article 9 of the Income Tax Law, the default corporate income tax rate is 10 per cent of taxable income. A higher rate of not less than 35 per cent applies to petrochemical agreements and petroleum operations, and pre-existing government agreements may carry their own agreed rate or, if silent, default to 35 per cent. On the published text, non-petroleum mining operations would ordinarily fall under the general 10 per cent rate, absent a concession, special agreement or other bespoke fiscal arrangement. Article 25 of the Natural Resources Law nevertheless leaves room for the State to bear part of the tax burden in specific cases.

Assignment is expressly addressed. Article 19 of the Natural Resources Law provides that royalties, mining rights, exploration permits or licences and discovery certificates granted in accordance with the law may not be assigned to others unless with the consent of the granting authority. Assignment is therefore possible in principle, but it is not a freely transferable regime.

By contrast, the current legislation does not set out a detailed mining-specific regime dealing expressly with the grant of security over such rights. Any security analysis would therefore require case-specific review of the nature of the right, the consent requirement in article 19, and the wider civil and corporate law framework.

Qatar does not have a mining-specific indigenous-rights or free, prior and informed consent comparable to those found in certain other jurisdictions. The Constitution, the Natural Resources Law and the Environmental Protection Law do not frame extraction projects through that lens.

This should not be read as excluding broader public-law constraints. In practice, projects may still need to navigate environmental approvals, state-land controls, reserve protections and other public-interest restrictions. The position is therefore not one of community-rights regulation in the classic mining-law sense, but rather one of broader administrative and environmental control.

Environmental regulation is likely to be one of the most important practical pillars of any mining or quarrying project in Qatar. The principal statute is the Environmental Protection Law, together with its executive bylaw. The Environmental Protection Law establishes an environmental approval and environmental impact assessment framework for projects likely to affect the environment and empowers the competent authority to impose conditions, require mitigation and take enforcement action where necessary. In particular, article 10 empowers the competent authority to withhold or cancel environmentally harmful activities and impose technical or operational restrictions and conditions, while articles 11, 13 and 14 set out the core environmental impact assessment and approval framework, including a 30-day period for the authority’s decision on a completed study.

Current Ministry of Environment and Climate Change materials reinforce the practical weight of that regime. The ministry’s Environmental Assessment and Permit Department states that it studies applications for environmental permits, reviews environmental impact assessment and environmental risk studies, issues approvals, and issues operating permits once environmental requirements are met. Environmentally significant extraction and processing projects should therefore be expected to pass through a formal environmental approval and operating-permit process.

For quarrying and construction-material extraction in particular, current ministry materials indicate that the ministry monitors quarries and crushers, detects violations of permit conditions, suggests sites for extraction of soil, mud, sand and stone materials, and issues permits for quarries, crushers, extraction and transport of landfill materials in coordination with the competent authorities. In practice, environmental and quarry/crusher permitting may therefore be at least as important as the formal mining-right structure in the statute for the kinds of projects most likely to arise in Qatar.

As to rehabilitation bonds, guarantees and mine-closure obligations, the published framework does not disclose a mining-specific code comparable to the detailed closure and financial-security regimes seen in major mining jurisdictions. The safer formulation is therefore that environmental permits, operating conditions, remediation obligations, and general enforcement powers under the Environmental Protection Law are likely to play the central role, but the published framework does not presently disclose a mining-only closure-and-bonding regime in comparable detail. Projects may also be affected by the broader environmental and reserve-protection framework, even though the published mining-specific materials do not set out a separate protected-areas code for mining.

Qatari legislation does not set out a standalone mining-specific health and safety code equivalent to specialist mine-safety regimes elsewhere. Instead, the relevant framework appears to be the general labour, occupational safety, environmental, industrial-operating and civil-defence framework. In addition, the Natural Resources Law itself contemplates inspection and enforcement powers in relation to mines and mining activities.

In practical terms, quarry, crusher and mineral-processing operations are likely to manage health and safety compliance through a combination of Law No. 14 of 2004 Promulgating the Labour Law, as amended (the ‘Labour Law’), permit conditions, environmental requirements, industrial licensing conditions and emergency-response requirements rather than a dedicated mining health and safety code.

The Labour Law contains specific provisions on occupational health and safety that would apply to mining operations. Articles 99 to 106 require employers to: inform workers of workplace risks and preventive measures on commencement of work (article 99); take all precautionary measures to protect workers from occupational injury, disease, accident, fire and equipment defects, at the employer’s expense (article 100); and provide hygiene, ventilation, potable water and sanitation at the workplace (article 103). Article 100 further provides that where an employer fails to take adequate precautions or where a danger threatens workers’ health or safety, the matter may be referred to the minister, who may order partial or total closure of the worksite or suspension of machinery, with the employer remaining liable for full remuneration during the closure period. Where an establishment employs more than 500 workers, it must maintain a clinic with at least one physician and medical nurse (article 104). Periodic medical examinations are required for workers exposed to occupational disease risks (article 105). Additionally, article 22 of the Natural Resources Law confers inspection powers on designated officials to investigate the condition of mines, their ventilation and all aspects relating to the safety and health of persons working therein, and to evaluate the conditions of storage of dynamite. Taken together, these provisions create a dual compliance obligation for mining operators: under the general Labour Law and under the sector-specific inspection regime of the Natural Resources Law.

The legislation does not establish a mining-specific climate-risk disclosure regime applying uniquely across the mining value chain. The more relevant framework lies in the listed-company and capital-markets sphere. The Qatar Financial Markets Authority has published sustainability guidance and indicated a roadmap for phased mandatory sustainability reporting beginning from 2027 for listed companies and, in some cases, certain non-listed companies.

Accordingly, any climate-risk disclosure obligations are presently better characterised as horizontal or market-based rather than mining-specific. Their relevance will depend on whether the relevant entity is listed, capital-markets regulated or otherwise brought within the developing sustainability reporting framework.

In this regard, it is relevant to note that Qatar ratified the Paris Agreement under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change and submitted its enhanced Nationally Determined Contribution (NDC), pledging a 25 per cent reduction in greenhouse gas emissions by 2030 relative to a business-as-usual scenario. Qatar’s most recent NDC (NDC 3.0), submitted in 2025, increases this ambition by targeting mitigation actions equivalent to 42 million metric tonnes of CO2 equivalent of greenhouse gas emission reductions by 2040, with mitigation outcomes expected across the oil and gas, power and water, industry and construction, transport and waste sectors. While these commitments do not impose direct obligations on individual mining operators, they signal the direction of future regulatory development and may influence the environmental conditions attached to mining permits and concessions.

The legislation does not impose a mining-specific statutory decarbonisation obligation on operators across the mining value chain in Qatar. The more visible framework is policy-driven. Qatar National Vision 2030 is an overarching development framework built on human, social, economic and environmental development, and it emphasises sustainable development and harmony between economic growth and environmental protection; however, it does not amount to a mining-specific legislative code.

Decarbonisation is part of Qatar’s broader environmental and policy direction, but no published mining-only mandatory decarbonisation code has been identified. Nor is a published proposal specifically directed at extending mining-specific decarbonisation obligations evident from the materials reviewed.

Beyond the points above, the main climate-related relevance for mining-type activities appears to come from the general environmental and permitting framework, national sustainability policy, and, where relevant, listed-company governance and disclosure rules. The broader policy context includes Qatar National Vision 2030 and subsequent national development strategies, which frame environmental development and sustainable growth as part of Qatar’s long-term development model.

Qatar does not operate a carbon tax or a mining-sector-specific carbon-pricing mechanism.

The published framework does not impose unusual mining-specific taxes of general application beyond the royalty and fee concepts already contemplated by the Natural Resources Law. The main published fiscal framework appears to be the general tax and customs regime, together with sector-specific royalties, fees or project terms as may be set under article 3, article 12 and article 25 of the Natural Resources Law or under applicable concessionary arrangements. Relevant general legislation includes Law No. 24 of 2018 Promulgating the Income Tax Law (the ‘Income Tax Law’) and Law No. 40 of 2002 Promulgating the Customs Law (the ‘Customs Law’).

The Natural Resources Law is nevertheless notable in expressly allowing the Council of Ministers, upon ministerial proposal under article 25, to decide that the State bears part of the tax burden on behalf of the concessionaire, authorised person, licensee or holder of mining rights. This reinforces the point that Qatar’s framework is potentially flexible, but not fully transparent in published detail.

A significant recent development is Qatar’s implementation of the OECD Pillar Two global minimum tax framework. Law No. 22 of 2024 introduced the Income Inclusion Rule and a Domestic Minimum Top-Up Tax, effective for fiscal years beginning on or after 1 January 2025. On 12 February 2026, the Council of Ministers issued Resolution No. 2 of 2026 setting out detailed implementing rules. The framework applies to multinational enterprise groups with consolidated revenues of EUR 750 million or more and imposes a minimum effective tax rate of 15 per cent. This is particularly relevant for mining projects structured through entities in the Qatar Free Zones or the Qatar Financial Centre, where preferential tax regimes currently exist, as those entities may face a top-up tax if their jurisdictional effective tax rate falls below 15 per cent. Multinational mining groups contemplating investment in Qatar should factor the Pillar Two framework into their fiscal planning.

Qatar should not be approached as a conventional high-volume metallic-mining jurisdiction. The published framework is real, but relatively compact, and much of the practical project pathway appears to run through environmental approvals, quarry/crusher permitting, land and industrial approvals, and close governmental control over upstream rights, particularly where foreign participation is contemplated. That position is consistent both with the statutory framework and with the available market-facing materials, which describe the sector as centred more on quarrying, industrial minerals and construction demand than on a broad metallic-mining industry.

A second notable feature is the coexistence of domestic regulatory restraint with outward-facing strategic interest. Qatar Mining Company demonstrates state participation in international mining investments, while the domestic public framework remains cautious, permit-heavy and closely tied to public-law and environmental controls. At policy level, Qatar National Vision 2030 supports economic diversification, industrial development and environmental sustainability, although it does not amount to a mining-specific legislative framework for non-hydrocarbon extraction.