Public procurement law in France is shaped by supranational rules, primarily those of the European Union.

As a Member State of the European Union, France has implemented Directive 2014/24/EU on public procurement, Directive 2014/25/EU on procurement by entities operating in the water, energy, transport and postal services sectors, and Directive 2014/23/EU on the award of concession contracts into national law. The French Public Procurement Code (“PPC”), in force since 1st April 2019, now constitutes the single legal framework for public procurement and concessions contracts in France.

EU law has a direct impact on French procurement rules, including the interpretation and application of national legislation, notably through the general principles of EU law and the case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union.

France is also bound by the World Trade Organization’s Agreement on Government Procurement (WTO GPA) through the European Union’s participation in that agreement. Within the scope of the EU’s commitments, the GPA applies to French procurement procedures and ensures market access for economic operators from other GPA parties. In practice, the GPA is implemented through EU legislation and the national procurement framework.

France is not subject to the UNCITRAL Model Law on Public Procurement, which has no binding effect within the EU legal order.

Public procurement in France covers a wide range of government contracts and is organised under a single, consolidated statutory framework.

The PPC applies to public contracts for works, supplies and services, as well as to concession contracts. The PPC governs contracts awarded by central government authorities, local and regional authorities, public establishments and other bodies governed by public law (Articles L.1 and L.2 of the PPC). There is no separate regime depending on the contracting authority; the same framework applies to both central and non-central government entities, subject only to specific rules applicable to certain categories of contracts laid out in other codes (i.e. public services concession contracts awarded by local entities are subject to certain rules laid out in the Code for Regional and Local Authorities).

Entities operating in regulated utilities sectors, including water, energy, transport and postal services, are subject to dedicated provisions within the PPC (Articles L.2521-1 et seq. and L.3221-1 et seq. of the PPC) These provisions reflect the specific features of those sectors while remaining aligned with the general principles of public procurement.

Defence and security contracts are also subject to distinct provisions within the PPC, allowing for specific rules and, in certain cases, exclusions where necessary to protect essential security interests.

Concession contracts, including works and public service concessions, are governed by a separate set of provisions within the same code, irrespective of whether they are awarded by central or local authorities. Local authorities are also subject to specific rules under the Code for Regional and Local Authorities

Overall, public procurement in France operates under a unified, codified system in which sector-specific rules apply to utilities, defence and concessions without requiring separate procurement statutes.

In France, public procurement law applies to all contracts regardless of their financial value. Financial thresholds determine the level of procedural requirements, not whether procurement rules apply. All contracts must respect fundamental principles: freedom of access, equal treatment, and transparency, as codified in Article L.3 of the PPC.

The system follows a proportionate approach: higher-value contracts require formal EU procedures with strict rules, while lower-value contracts benefit from simplified procedures to reduce administrative burden and ensure efficiency.

EU Thresholds – Formalised Procedures Mandatory

When contracts reach EU thresholds, contracting authorities must apply formal procedures with mandatory publication in the Official Journal of the European Union (OJEU), standardized forms, minimum deadlines, and detailed rules. The thresholds applicable from 1 January 2026 are:

Public Contracts (Marchés publics):

• €140,000 (excl. VAT) – Supplies/services for central government
• €216,000 (excl. VAT) – Supplies/services for local authorities and public bodies
•  €432,000 (excl. VAT) – Supplies/services for utilities and defence/security
• €5,404,000 (excl. VAT) – Works contracts
• €5,538,000 (excl. VAT) – Defence/security works.

Concession Contracts:

• €5,404,000 (excl. VAT) – All works/services concessions

Contract Valuation

Applicable thresholds are determined by reference to the estimated total value of the contract, excluding VAT. The estimate is made at the time the contract notice is published or, where no notice is required, when the procurement procedure is initiated. It must reflect the contracting authority’s overall requirements and include the maximum potential value of the contract, including any options or renewals.

Artificial subdivision of contracts designed to avoid the application of the relevant thresholds is strictly prohibited and can result in contract invalidity, damages, and criminal liability for favoritism.

In France, all procurement below EU thresholds remains subject to the fundamental principles of freedom of access, equal treatment, and transparency, which apply regardless of contract value. However, the level of procedural formality is adjusted proportionately to the contract’s value and characteristics.

Adapted procedures (€60,000 for services and goods or €100,000 for works (from 1 April 2026) to EU thresholds)

Contracts below EU thresholds may be awarded using adapted procedures (Article R.2123-1 of the PPC), which give contracting authorities flexibility to define procurement documents, publicity methods, and deadlines in a manner proportionate to the contract’s value and complexity. Despite this flexibility, contracting authorities must ensure an appropriate level of publicity, genuine competition, transparency in the definition and application of selection and award criteria, and equal treatment of all candidates.

Exemptions from prior publicity and competition

French law permits direct award below certain thresholds, subject to safeguards. With effect from 1 April 2026, contracts with an estimated value below €100,000 for works and €60,000 for services and goods may be awarded without prior publicity or competition. Contracting authorities must nevertheless ensure value for money and avoid systematically awarding contracts to the same supplier where alternative economic operators are available.

Concession Contracts – Simplified Procedure

A simplified procedure applies to concessions with estimated value below €5,404,000, or, regardless of value for drinking water supply, social and specific services, and passenger transport services.

The simplified procedure allows national (non-OJEU) publication, flexible deadlines, and simplified notifications to unsuccessful candidates.

For the procurement of complex contracts, French law does not provide for a specific publicity regime distinct from that applicable to other formalised procurement procedures.

In practice, contracts considered complex – typically those awarded through negotiated procedures or competitive dialogue – usually fall above the EU thresholds and are there subject to the standard publicity rules applicable to formalised procedures.

An initial contract notice must be published in the Official Bulletin of Public Procurement Notices (BOAMP) (Article R.2131-16 of the PPC) and made available on the contracting authority’s buyer profile (“profil d’acheteur”). The buyer profile serves as the electronic platform through which procurement documents are accessed and communications with bidders s are conducted.

Where the estimated value of the contract reaches the applicable EU thresholds, the contract notice must also be published in the Official Journal of the European Union using the standardized “eForms” via the TED (Tenders Electronic Daily) platform. Contracting authorities may also publish in specialized sector publications where appropriate to reach relevant economic operators.

In addition, contracting authorities may publish prior information notices to inform the market in advance and, where permitted, to reduce certain procedural deadlines.

Hence, no publication medium is reserved exclusively for complex contracts; the applicable publicity requirements depend on the procedure used and aim to ensure transparency and effective competition.

Where complex contracts involve a pre-selection stage, French law requires a structured assessment of candidates’ suitability and capacity before they are invited to submit tender documents.

In procedures typically used for complex contracts, such as restricted procedures, competitive procedures with negotiation, and competitive dialogue, the contracting authority verifies that candidates meet the required conditions of participation (Article L.2142-1 of the PPC). This assessment focuses on three categories of capacity: the candidate’s professional suitability, its economic and financial standing, and its technical and professional capacity.

Candidates whose capacities are deemed sufficient may then be selected and, where appropriate, ranked to limit the number of participants admitted to the next stage. Selection criteria typically relate to experience in comparable projects, relevant professional references, technical expertise, and the availability of appropriate resources to deliver contracts involving technical, legal or financial complexity. In any case, selection criteria must be objective, transparent, non-discriminatory, proportionate and directly linked to the subject matter of the contract.

Whilst the substantive selection criteria are the same across all sectors, certain procedural differences exist between contracting authorities operating in unregulated sectors and contracting entities operating in the utilities sectors.

A key distinction concerns qualification systems. Contracting entities in the utilities sectors may establish qualification systems (Articles R.2162-27 et seq of the PPC) under which economic operators may apply at any time to be pre-qualified for certain categories of contracts. Such systems operate on the basis of objective and transparent rules and criteria, are open on a continuous basis, and must comply with the principles of equal treatment and non-discrimination. Contracts covered by a qualification system are subsequently awarded through restricted or negotiated procedures among economic operators already qualified under that system.

By contrast, contracting authorities in unregulated sectors do not have access to qualification systems and must assess candidates’ capacities separately for each procurement procedure.

Despite these procedural differences, both contracting authorities and contracting entities are required to conduct the assessment and selection of candidates in accordance with the fundamental principles of public procurement, including objectivity, proportionality, transparency and equal treatment.

In France, the grounds for the exclusion of bidders from a public procurement procedure are set out in Articles L.2141-1 to L.2142-1 for public contracts and Articles L. 3123-1 to 3123-21 for concession contracts of the PPC. These grounds are divided into mandatory grounds or optional grounds for exclusion:

Mandatory grounds for exclusion: these are laid down in Articles L. 2141-1 to L. 2141-6-1 of the PPC for public contracts and Article L. 3123-1 to L. 3123-6-1 for concession contracts.

In such cases, the contracting authority does not have a choice but to exclude the bidder from participating in the procedure. A bidder is automatically excluded when it:

• Has been convicted of certain offenses under the French criminal code or the General Tax Code;
• Has failed to submit required tax or social security declarations, or has not paid the taxes, levies, contributions or social security contributions;
• Is subject to judicial liquidation proceedings under article L.640-1 of the French Commercial Code or an equivalent procedure governed by foreign law, or is subject to insolvency proceedings and cannot demonstrate that it has been authorized to continue its activities during the foreseeable duration of the performance of the contract;
• has been sanctioned for failure to comply with certain obligations of the French Labor or Criminal Codes.

For defence and security contracts, specific mandatory grounds of exclusion apply, such as certain violations of the Internal Security Code.

An automatically excluded bidder can only be allowed to participate if the following cumulative criteria are met:

• there are overriding reasons in the public interest;
• the contract can only be awarded to this specific bidder;
• and provided that a final judgment by a court of an EU Member state does not expressly exclude the bidder from public procurement procedures.

Optional grounds for exclusion: they are laid down in Articles L. 2141-7 to L. 2141-11 of the PPC for public contracts and Articles L. 3123-7 to L. 3123-11 for concession contracts. They allow a contracting authority to exclude a bidder at its discretion. Examples include cases where:

• A bidder, during the previous three years, has been required to pay damages, had a contract terminated or faced comparable sanctions due to a serious or persistent breach of their contractual obligations during the performance of a previous public contract;
• A bidder has attempted to unduly influence the contracting authority’s decision-making process, sought to obtain confidential information to gain an unfair advantage during the procurement procedure, or has provided misleading information that could significantly influence selection or award decisions;
• There is sufficient evidence of anti-competitive agreements with other economic operators;
• The bidder’s application creates a conflict of interest that cannot be resolved by any other means.

In case of discretionary exclusion, the contracting authority must allow the bidder to demonstrate its reliability or prove that its participation will not jeopardize the principle of equal treatment.

There is no central register of excluded suppliers in France: each contracting authority must determine, on a case-by-case basis, whether a bidder should be excluded on mandatory or discretionary grounds.

For complex contracts, French public procurement law offers the procedure with negotiation (Article L.2124-3 of the PPC), a formalised procedure that enables the contracting authority to engage in structured discussions with bidders to refine solutions and contractual terms.

The procedure unfolds in distinct phases: publication and candidate selection, submission of initial bids, negotiation, final bids and award.

Publication and candidate selection

The process begins with the publication of a contract notice, setting out the essential requirements of the contract and inviting requests to participate. Candidates are assessed on the basis of pre-defined criteria relating to professional suitability, economic and financial standing, and technical and professional capacity.

Where indicated in the contract notice, the contracting authority may limit the number of candidates invited to submit bids, provided that competition is preserved and that selection is carried out on objective and non-discriminatory grounds.

The minimum time limit for receipt of requests to participate is thirty days from the contract notice (Article R.2161-14 of the PPC), though this may be reduced to fifteen days in duly justified cases of urgency. If a prior information notice was published in accordance with prescribed conditions, the limit may be shortened to ten days.

Submission of initial offers

Selected candidates are invited simultaneously and in writing to submit initial bids. The invitation specifies the applicable deadlines, the award criteria, the required documents and access to the procurement documents. The tender documents define minimum requirements that bidders must satisfy; these requirements, together with the award criteria themselves, are not subject to negotiation.

Negotiation phase

The contracting authority negotiates with bidders on the basis of their initial bids and any subsequent revised bids. Negotiations may cover all aspects of the contract other than the minimum requirements and the award criteria. The authority may adapt technical or contractual elements during the procedure, provided that all remaining bidders are informed in writing and given sufficient and equal time to adjust their proposals.

Negotiations may be organised in successive stages, with a progressive reduction in the number of bids under consideration by applying the published award criteria, if this possibility has been announced in advance. Throughout the negotiation phase, equal treatment must be ensured and confidential information disclosed by a bidder may not be shared with others without its explicit consent. Where expressly provided for in the contract notice or invitation, the authority may also reserve the right to award the contract on the basis of the initial tenders without negotiation.

Conclusion of negotiations and award

Once negotiations are concluded, the remaining bidders are invited to submit final bids by a common deadline. The contract is awarded to the most economically advantageous tender in accordance with the pre-established award criteria.

The award decision is notified to all bidders, with reasons given for rejection. A standstill period of eleven days applies before the contract may be signed, ensuring disappointed bidders have access to effective remedies (Article R.2182-1 of the PPC). An award notice must be published within thirty days of contract signature for contracts above EU thresholds.

Applicable Principles

Throughout the procedure, the contracting authority must comply with the fundamental principles of public procurement. Equal treatment requires that all bidders receive the same information and are subject to identical deadlines and conditions. Transparency requires that the rules of the procedure, the selection and award criteria, and any material changes are clearly defined and traceable. Confidentiality protects the commercial and technical information of bidders during negotiations. Proportionality requires that procedural choices, requirements and timelines are appropriate to the nature and complexity of the contract.

Indicative Timeline

The overall duration of a negotiated procedure depends on the complexity of the contract and the scope of negotiations. By way of indication:

When a contract only marginally exceeds the EU thresholds and does not present particular technical or financial complexity, French public procurement law applies the same formal procedures as for higher-value contracts, but in practice the open procedure is typically employed as the most straightforward approach. In such cases, the contracting authority is expected to define its requirements and contractual terms with sufficient precision from the outset, making negotiation unnecessary.

The open procedure is the most commonly used approach. Any interested economic operator may submit a bid, and bids are assessed directly against the pre-established award criteria. The restricted procedure may also be used, where the authority wishes to limit participation to a shortlist of suitably qualified candidates. In both cases, no negotiation is permitted and bids are submitted on a final basis, subject only to limited clarification of ambiguities or correction of purely formal errors.

The process starts with publication of a contract notice setting out the subject matter of the contract, the selection and award criteria and the applicable deadlines. Minimum statutory time limits apply, typically around one month for the submission of bids in an open procedure, with limited scope for reduction.

Once bids are received, the authority evaluates them solely on the basis of the announced criteria, selects the most economically advantageous offer and notifies all bidders of the award decision. A mandatory standstill period then applies before the contract is signed.

In practical terms, a lower-value contract awarded through an open procedure can usually be completed within approximately three to six months from contract notice to signature. This contrasts with complex contracts awarded through a procedure with negotiation, which involve additional stages and significantly longer timeframes due to the negotiation phase.

Beyond ensuring formal compliance with the procurement rules, current best practice is generally understood as exercising judgement in how a procedure is designed and conducted, taking proper account of the nature of the contract and the market it is intended to reach.

In practice, this starts with selecting a procedure that is genuinely proportionate. Authorities with regular procurement experience tend not to default to the most complex processes unless this is clearly justified by the characteristics of the contract. Even within formalised procedures, timescales, information requirements and levels of formality are often adjusted to reflect the actual technical or organizational complexity of the procurement, rather than its value alone.

Early engagement with the market is also regarded as good practice, particularly for technically or commercially complex procurements. Non-binding market soundings and preliminary consultations are commonly used to test assumptions and identify constraints before the procedure is launched. When carried out transparently and without conferring any competitive advantage, this approach helps improve the quality of the procurement documentation and reduces the need for extensive clarification during the competition.

There is also a strong emphasis on tracking the different stages of the procedure. This is particularly important where the authority exercises discretion, for example in negotiated procedures or competitive dialogue. While the process does not need to be documented exhaustively, key decisions, procedural choices and evaluation outcomes are normally recorded in a way that would withstand external scrutiny.

Overall, best practice is less about adding procedural layers than about using the flexibility already available within the procurement framework in a disciplined and consistent way. Authorities that handle complex procurements regularly tend to focus on clarity, proportionality and predictability throughout the process.

Under French public procurement law, the evaluation of bids is governed by a set of specific rules designed to ensure transparency, equal treatment and an objective comparison of bids.

Bids must be assessed solely on the basis of the award criteria set out in advance in the contract notice or the procurement documents (Article L.2152-7 of the PPC). These criteria must be objective, non-discriminatory and directly linked to the subject matter of the contract or its conditions of performance. The contracting authority may not introduce new criteria, alter their scope or rely on undisclosed considerations once the applications and bids have been submitted.

A strict distinction must be maintained between the assessment of candidates and the evaluation of bids. Criteria relating to the technical, professional or financial capacity of economic operators may be used only at the selection stage and cannot be taken into account when assessing bids. Conversely, bid evaluation must focus exclusively on the content of the bids submitted.

The financial criterion is mandatory: it may be either the price of the supplies, goods or services, or their cost determined on the basis of a comprehensive approach which may be based on the life-cycle cost of a product, service or work, including the costs borne by the purchaser or other users and the costs attributed to environmental externalities.

One or more other criteria justified by the subject matter of the contract or its performance conditions may be added to this financial criterion, including qualitative, environmental or social aspects (quality, technical value, aesthetic or functional characteristics, innovative character, environmental protection performance, execution deadlines, etc.) and costs attributed to environmental externalities.

The contracting authority enjoys a degree of discretion in determining how the award criteria are applied and combined, including through scoring or ranking. However, the evaluation method must allow for a genuine comparison between bidders and must not neutralise the effect of any criterion. All bids must be assessed using the same methodology, applied consistently and without discrimination.

Only limited interaction with bidders is permitted during the evaluation phase. =In procedures without negotiation, bids must be evaluated as submitted: the contracting authority may only seek clarifications or explanations where necessary, but such requests may not result in a substantive modification of the bid nor confer an advantage. Bids that are late, incomplete or non-compliant with mandatory requirements must be rejected and may not be taken into account for scoring.

Article L.2152-5 of the PPC defines an abnormally low bid as “a bid whose price is clearly undervalued and likely to compromise the proper performance of the contract”. Contracting authorities are required to implement all available means to detect abnormally low bids.

Several indicators may suggest that a bid is abnormally low:

• The price itself. However, a “low” price in itself does not constitute sufficient proof that the bid is technically or financially insufficient. The contracting authority must assess the bid on a case-by-case basis, considering the requirements of the tender specifications and the submitted bids. Whether a price is abnormally low is assessed considering the overall price of the bid;
• A mathematical formula used by the contracting authority to detect an abnormally low bid, which however may only be used to establish a threshold below which the bids are suspected of being abnormally low and cannot be used to automatically exclude the bid;
• A comparison with the other bids, in case of a significant gap between them;
• A comparison with the contracting authority’s own cost estimate.

When a bid appears abnormally low, the contracting authority must require the economic operators to explain the price or costs proposed in the bid, in relation to the works, supplies or services. Explanations can relate to, among others, the economics of the manufacturing process or the services provided, the originality of the work, supplies or services, or a particular environmental, social or labour regulation where the contract is performed (article R. 2152-3 of the PPC).

The contracting authority shall assess the information provided and may only reject the bid where the evidence supplied does not satisfactorily account for the low level of price or costs proposed, or if the bid is abnormally low because it does not comply with an environmental, social or labour law (whether derived from French law, EU law, or international treaties). In such cases, the contracting authority must reject the bid.

For public contracts:

Once the bidder has been selected, the contracting authority must without delay inform the unsuccessful bidders of its choice. Under articles R. 2181-1 and R. 2181-3 of the PPC, this notification must include:

• the reasons behind the rejection of the bid;
• the date from which the contract can be signed (i.e. the “standstill period”).

Unsuccessful bidders whose bid has been deemed admissible (i.e. appropriate, regular and not unacceptable) can request additional information from the contracting authority, including their own scores, the scores of the winning bidder and the reasons behind those scores. The contracting authority has fifteen days to communicate those reasons.

For concession contracts (above EU thresholds)

Once the economic operator has been selected, this decision must be notified to the unsuccessful candidates (article L. 3125-1 of the PPC). According to Article R. 3125-1 of the PPC, this notification must be sent without delay and include:

• the reasons for the rejection of the bid;
• the name of the economic operator selected;
• the reasons behind this choice;
• and finally, the duration of the standstill period.

Hence, contracting authorities do not have to inform the unsuccessful candidates before awarding the contract. However, before signing the contract, contracting authorities usually must respect a standstill period and cannot conclude the contract before then. The standstill period allows unsuccessful bidders to challenge the procedure before the courts.

Public procurement procedures can be disputed before an administrative court. There are several disputes that can be made, depending on whether the contract has been signed yet:

Pre-contractual remedies (before contract signature):

A bidder may challenge the public procurement procedure in a pre-contractual referral (référé précontractuel). The rules regarding this type of referral are set out in Articles L. 511-1 to 12 and R.551-1 to 6 of the French Administrative Justice Code (“AJC”). This challenge may be filed by any person with an interest in signing the contract to challenge breaches of freedom of access to public procurement or equal treatment.

The contracting authority must observe a standstill period of 11 to 16 days after the notification of the unsuccessful bidders of its choice to allow them to file a claim. This standstill period does not apply to contracts below the formalised procedure thresholds, nor to concession contracts in the water sector.

Once the judge is seized, the contract cannot be signed until the decision of the court has been notified to the contracting authority (Article L. 551-4 of the AJC).

The irregularity set out in the claim must have impacted the award of the contract: for a challenge to be successful, the unsuccessful bidder must demonstrate that, without this breach of freedom of access to public procurement or equal treatment, has harmed them in the procedure or that the successful bidder would not have been selected without this breach.

Should such a breach occur, the court may annul the public procurement procedure, either ab initio or from a specific stage, to remedy the irregularity. The judge may also order the contracting authority to comply with its obligations and suspend the implementation of any decision in the public procurement procedure, unless the negative consequences of such measures outweigh their benefits (Article L. 551-2 of the AJC).

Post-contractual remedies (After contract signature):

There are several remedies available to unsuccessful bidders after the contract is signed:

-Contractual referral (référé contractuel): Governed by Articles L.551-13 to L. 551-16 of the AJC, this remedy allows a party to challenge a limited breach of contract, i.e when a person who would have an interest in signing the contract has been prevented from filing for a pre-contractual referral.

This challenge must be made either (i) 31 days after the publication or notification of the award of the contract or (ii) six months from the day the contract was signed if neither the contract award notice has been published nor the award of the contract has been notified (Article R. 551-7 of the AJC).

The judge can nullify the contract when no publicity measure has been taken (Article L. 551-18 of the AJC). The judge may also order the termination of the contract, reduce its duration or impose financial penalties (up to 20% of the contract value) (Article L. 551-19 of the AJC) if the nullification of the contract cannot be pronounced because of an imperative reason of general interest.

-A challenge to the validity of the contract: this review has been opened by French administrative case law for administrative contracts only (CE, Ass., 4 April 2014, Département du Tarn-et-Garonne, n° 358994). This review allows interested parties to contest the validity of the contract within two months from the day the contracting authority complied with the appropriate award publicity measures.

Third parties must demonstrate that their interests are likely to be harmed in a sufficiently direct and certain manner by the performance of the contract. They may only plead irregularities related to the harm suffered, or breaches so severe that the judge must raise them of his own motion.

Depending on the nature and importance of the breach, the judge may decide that the contract can still be performed after regularization. If the decision does not have a disproportionate effect on the general interest, the judge can also terminate the contract. A contract may also be nullified in case of illicit content or gross illegality, if this nullification does not have a disproportionate effect on the general public interest.

Public procurement law challenges are quite common in France, especially in front of the administrative courts. The pre-contractual referral is frequently used by bidders to challenge the award of a contract as it is usually fast and not too costly, and the most efficient procedure when their applications or bids have been wrongfully rejected by a contracting authority.

However, a bidder must have sufficient grounds for challenging the public procurement procedure and can only invoke irregularities that may have harmed them.

To file a pre-contractual referral before the Administrative Court is free: however, the party that loses must pay fees that are said to cover the fees of the other party’s lawyer. French Administrative Courts usually order the losing party to pay between 1.500 to 3.000 euros to the other party to cover these costs.

For administrative contracts, the duration of the dispute before an Administrative court depends on the challenge introduced.

In case of a precontractual referral, the dispute usually takes around three weeks, from the introduction of the dispute until the jurisdiction’s decision. Article R. 551-5 of the AJC states that the decision must be made within a period of 20 days on the application. However, there is no sanction if the ruling is rendered after this period.

The unsuccessful bidder must file the claim and notify the contracting authority accordingly. The Administrative Court will also notify the proceedings to both the contracting authority and the successful bidder. Following an exchange of written submissions, a hearing is held before the judge, where the parties may orally present their arguments. After this hearing, the judge’s decision will be notified to all parties. Decisions rendered in a precontractual referral are not subject to appeal before an Administrative Court of Appeal but may be challenged directly before the Council of State, if the contract is not signed.

In case of a challenge to the validity of the contract, the process is significantly longer, usually taking one to two years from the introduction of the challenge to the decision of the court. The process usually involves multiple rounds of written exchanges, followed by a final hearing before the court. As it is a written procedure, the Administrative Court will only hear arguments that were stated in the written exchanges. A challenge can be made to the Administrative Court of Appeal, which does not have a suspensive effect, and then to the Council of State.

Under French public procurement law, access to remedies does not depend on the nationality or place of establishment of a bidder. Any economic operator whose interests may have been harmed by a breach of procurement rules may challenge the procurement process before the administrative courts. Bidders established outside France therefore benefit, in principle, from the same remedies as bidders established within France.

Access to remedies therefore depends on participation, or a genuine possibility of participation, in the procurement procedure rather than on nationality.

The bidder’s country of establishment is mainly relevant at the stage of access to procurement procedures. Operators established in EU or EEA Member States benefit from full and non-discriminatory access under EU procurement law. Similarly, operators from countries that are parties to international agreements granting reciprocal access to procurement markets, including the WTO Agreement on Government Procurement (GPA), benefit from access to procedures covered by those agreements.

By contrast, operators from countries not covered by EU rules or applicable international agreements do not necessarily enjoy guaranteed access to French procurement markets, although, where they are allowed to participate in a procedure, they may still rely on the ordinary remedies available before French courts.

Overseas-based bidders with French subsidiaries have the same access as suppliers from the France where the procurement falls within the scope of the GPA and/or an ITA. When an overseas-based bidder has a subsidiary in France, the subsidiary has the same rights and remedies as all other French companies.

In France, there is no specialist court of tribunal exclusively dedicated to public procurement disputes.

Jurisdiction is divided between the administrative and judicial court systems, depending on the legal nature of the contract:

• Administrative courts have jurisdiction over administrative contracts. Article L.6 of the PPC states that contracts (whether public contracts or concession contracts) concluded by public bodies and governed by the PPC are administrative contracts. Depending on the challenge being made, the Administrative Court of Appeal and the Council of State (Conseil d’Etat) may also have jurisdiction in case of an appeal.
• Judiciary courts have jurisdiction over private contracts when the contracting authority is still governed by the PPC.

Post-award contract amendments and variations are strictly regulated under the PPC to ensure compliance with the principle of equal treatment and fair competition. However, modifications cannot change the global nature of the contract.

There are several types of modifications allowed:

Modifications provided for in the initial contract (Article R. 2194-1 of the PPCC for public contracts and Article R. 3135-1 for concession contracts). Modifications are allowed if they were clearly, precisely, and unequivocally anticipated in the original contract documents (so-called “review clauses” or “options”). These clauses must specify the scope, nature, and conditions for their use.

Additional works or services (Articles R. 2194-2 to R. 2194-4 of the PPCC for public contracts and Articles R. 3135-2 to R. 3135-4 for concession contracts): if additional works or services become necessary and a change of contractor is impossible for economic or technical reasons, modifications are allowed. Each modification is capped at 50% of the initial contract value for contracting authorities or concession contracts. This cap applies to each modification, even if several are made successively.

Necessary modifications due to unforeseen circumstances (Article R. 2194-5 of the PPC for public contracts and Article R. 3135-5 for concession contracts). Contracts may be modified if unforeseen circumstances arise that a diligent contracting authority could not have foreseen. This modification is again subject to the 50% cap of the initial contract value for public contracts concluded by a contracting authority and concession contracts.

A change of economic operator (Article R. 2194-6 of the PPC for public contracts and Article R. 3135-6 for concession contracts) is only permitted in cases of restructuring (e.g., merger, acquisition, insolvency: the new economic operator must demonstrate its economic, financial, technical and professional capacity to perform the contract) or if expressly provided for in the original contract. Otherwise, it is considered a substantial modification requiring a new public procurement procedure.

Non-Substantial modifications: (Article R. 2194-7 of the PPC for public contracts and Article R. 3135-7 for concession contracts). Modifications that are not “substantial” are permitted. The code only defines “substantial modifications” as:

• modifications that would have attracted other bidders or changed the outcome of the original competition;
• modifications that would change the economic equilibrium of the contract;
• modifications that would change the object of the contract;
• any changes to the economic operator that do not comply with Article R. 2194-6 of the PPC for public contracts and Article R. 3135-6 for concession contracts.

Low-value modifications: Modifications are presumed non-substantial and are allowed if they do not exceed:

• For public contracts (Articles R. 2194-8 to R. 2194-9 of the PPC): 10% of the initial contract value (for supply/services/concessions) or 15% (for works contracts), nor the relevant EU threshold. The cumulative value of all low-value modifications must be taken into account.
• For concession contracts (Articles R. 3135-8 to Article R. 3135-9 of the PPC): 10% of the initial contract value nor the relevant EU threshold. The cumulative value of all low-value modifications must be taken into account.

Amendments can be introduced by a unilateral decision of the contracting authority based on public interest grounds (in administrative contracts) or by an agreement entered by both parties.

Direct awards for complex contracts are not common in France. There are several exceptions where a complex contract could be awarded without any prior publication or competition, which are listed in Article L. 2122-1 of the PPC (applicable to all public contracts): when a previous public procurement procedure has been launched and was infructuous, i.e. no participant has presented any bid, or all bids have been excluded in a previous procedure, in case of a particular emergency, because of the contract’s object or estimated value, when prior publication or competition would be useless, impossible or contrary to the general public interest.

Direct awards are available:

• -For contracts which value is below €60,000 for services and goods or below €100,000 for works (From April 1, 2026);
• For reasons of extreme urgency resulting from unforeseeable events by the contracting entity, the deadlines concerning other procedures cannot be fulfilled: the public contract shall be limited to what is strictly necessary to face the urgency;
• When no participant has presented any bid, or all bids have been excluded in a previous open procedure or restricted procedure with pre-qualification, if the set of specifications is not substantially altered;
• When the contract can only be allocated to a specific economic operator, because the contract is for the creation or the acquisition of a work of art or an artistic event, or because there is no competition for technical reasons, or when it is necessary to protect exclusive rights (namely, intellectual property rights).

Contracting authorities can also award a contract directly for buying goods used for research purposes, experimentations, studies or development, provided that there is no objective of generating a profit or recovering research and development costs.

French public procurement law provides mechanisms enabling contracting authorities to react to situations of urgency or unforeseeable circumstances, including the use of accelerated procedures, negotiated procedures in urgent situations, and the possibility to modify contracts during performance.

These mechanisms have been widely relied upon since the Covid-19 crisis and subsequently to address supply chain disruptions and price increases linked in particular to the war in Ukraine.

In addition, temporary regulatory measures have been adopted to ease procurement procedures in certain sectors, notably through increased thresholds allowing low-value works contracts to be awarded without prior advertising or competition, with the aim of supporting economic activity and facilitating faster procurement.

Public authorities have also issued practical guidance clarifying how existing rules allow contracting authorities to modify ongoing contracts where unforeseen economic circumstances disrupt performance. In particular, contracts may be modified to adjust financial conditions or duration where necessary, and contractors may receive compensation under the well-established doctrine of imprévision, which allows temporary financial compensation where unforeseeable events seriously disturb the economic balance of the contract while performance continues.

Overall, the existing legal framework has proved sufficiently flexible to cope with recent global supply chain disruptions, although temporary regulatory adjustments and practical guidance have helped contracting authorities and economic operators make effective use of these flexibility mechanisms in an exceptional economic context.