Tanzania has a mandatory and suspensory merger control regime. For Mainland Tanzania, the principal legislation is the Fair Competition Act, Chapter 285, as amended in 2024, together with the Fair Competition Commission Procedure Rules 2018, the merger notification threshold order and the applicable fee rules. The Fair Competition Commission (FCC) administers the regime. Zanzibar has a separate competition regime and regulator and should be analysed separately where a transaction concerns a Zanzibar business or assets.

A transaction is notifiable to the FCC where it results in a direct or indirect acquisition of control over an asset, business or part of a business in Mainland Tanzania and the applicable turnover or asset threshold is met. Notification is mandatory, and the parties must not implement the transaction before clearance. The parties should allow for FCC clearance in the transaction timetable and make it a condition of completion.

The national threshold is currently TZS3.5 billion, calculated by reference to the combined annual turnover or value of assets of the merging firms. The rules can capture an offshore acquisition where the transaction produces a direct or indirect change of control over a Tanzanian business or asset. Minority investments may also be caught where contractual rights, vetoes or other arrangements confer control.

The substantive test changed in 2024. The FCC now asks whether a merger is likely to substantially lessen competition, rather than focusing only on whether it creates or strengthens dominance. The FCC may nevertheless approve an otherwise problematic merger where substantial public benefits outweigh the competitive harm. Relevant benefits include efficiency, technical or economic progress, skills transfer, employment, exports, the rescue of a failing firm, regional competitiveness and the position of small businesses.

The EAC regime may also apply. From 1^st  November 2025, qualifying mergers with a cross-border effect in at least two East African Community Partner States are notifiable to the East African Community Competition Authority (EACCA). The EAC framework is intended to operate as a one-stop filing for qualifying regional transactions, so the allocation of jurisdiction between the FCC and EACCA should be checked at the outset.

Notification is compulsory where the transaction amounts to a merger within the statutory control test and meets the applicable threshold. The filing obligation is not limited to transactions between competitors and may apply to horizontal, vertical and conglomerate transactions.

For qualifying cross-border EAC transactions, notification to EACCA is also compulsory. Parties should check EACCA jurisdiction before assessing whether an FCC filing is required. There is no voluntary notification procedure for transactions that are clearly outside the applicable definition and thresholds, although parties may seek informal guidance in a genuinely uncertain case.

Yes. Tanzania applies a standstill obligation. A notifiable merger must not be implemented before it has been notified and cleared. This covers the transfer of shares or assets and may also catch preparatory conduct that gives the purchaser control or material influence before clearance, including premature integration, control over ordinary-course decisions or the transfer of commercial risk.

Public bids are not exempt from the standstill obligation. Transaction documents should therefore make completion conditional on clearance and should restrict pre-closing covenants to measures reasonably required to preserve the target’s value and business.

Tanzanian law does not set out a clear procedure for permission to close a notifiable merger early. A proposed carve-out or warehousing arrangement should be discussed with the FCC before closing, especially if an overseas transaction may still change control of the Tanzanian business. Where EAC merger rules apply, the parties must also wait for regional clearance.

A merger includes the acquisition, whether within or outside Tanzania, of shares, a business or other assets where the acquisition results in a direct or indirect change of control over an asset, business or part of a business in Tanzania. The concept is broad enough to cover share acquisitions, asset acquisitions, amalgamations, joint ventures and changes from joint to sole control.

Control is assessed in substance. It may arise through ownership, voting rights, the right to appoint or remove directors, contractual arrangements, veto rights over strategic commercial decisions or any other means that confer the ability to exercise decisive influence. The shareholding percentage alone does not settle the question.

A genuine internal reorganisation that leaves the same ultimate controller in place should not ordinarily result in a change of control. The steps should be examined closely where the transaction changes joint-control arrangements, introduces a new shareholder with strategic veto rights or transfers a business between independently managed branches of a wider group.

A minority acquisition is notifiable where it confers control or decisive influence and the financial threshold is met. There is no general statutory safe harbour below 50%, and no percentage below which control can be ruled out without examining the surrounding rights and ownership structure.

Control may arise from vetoes over the budget, business plan, senior management, material investments, financing or other decisions that determine the target’s commercial strategy. Protective rights designed only to preserve the value of a minority investment, such as consent over changes to constitutional documents or the issue of new shares, are less likely to confer control when they do not extend to ordinary strategic decisions.

De facto control is also possible. The FCC may consider voting patterns, dispersed ownership, shareholder attendance and whether other shareholders act together. There is no reliable published minimum shareholding that can be treated as establishing control in every case. The rights as a whole, and how the target is governed in practice, matter more than the percentage acquired.

For FCC notification, the current threshold is TZS3.5 billion, measured by the combined annual turnover or combined value of assets of the merging firms. The FCC applies this as a global financial threshold. It is expressed as an alternative test: the transaction may be caught by turnover or assets. The acquirer and target are the relevant parties; the seller’s turnover or assets are not ordinarily included merely because it is the seller.

The statutory wording does not prescribe a separate target-side minimum. In principle, the combined threshold may therefore be reached principally through one party. A filing is not triggered by size alone, however. The transaction must also produce a direct or indirect change of control over an asset, business or part of a business in Mainland Tanzania. In practice, the necessary Tanzanian nexus will usually come from the target business or assets, including indirect control of a Tanzanian subsidiary.

Turnover and assets are ordinarily assessed using the latest audited financial statements and on a group basis for the businesses participating in the concentration. The threshold is not limited to revenue in the overlapping product market. The FCC threshold does not vary by industry. A separate sector approval or licence consent may be required, depending on the business and the transaction.

For the EAC regional regime, a cross-border transaction is notifiable where the combined EAC turnover or assets, whichever is higher, is at least USD35 million and at least two undertakings each have EAC turnover or assets of at least USD20 million, subject to the two-thirds allocation rule. This regional test applies only where the transaction affects at least two EAC Partner States.

Turnover is normally taken from the most recent audited annual financial statements and excludes taxes directly related to sales and intra-group sales, so that the figure reflects revenue earned from third parties. Asset value is taken from the most recent audited accounts using the relevant book value, subject to any clarification required by the FCC. The financial threshold is assessed on the combined global figures of the merging firms, while the transaction must separately satisfy the Tanzanian change-of-control nexus. Where audited accounts do not provide a reliable current picture, the parties should explain the methodology and provide management accounts or other supporting material.

The TZS3.5 billion threshold is a fixed monetary amount and is not linked to the minimum wage or another index. Turnover and assets should be considered for the undertakings concerned and their relevant corporate groups. Where a transaction concerns only a distinct business or division, the financial information should identify the turnover and assets attributable to that business, while also presenting the group information requested in the notification form.

For foreign groups, the filing should present the global figures used for the threshold and separately identify turnover generated from customers in Mainland Tanzania and assets located or registered there, including sales into Tanzania from abroad. Exports from Tanzania are generally attributed to the destination market rather than treated as domestic sales, although the FCC may request the figures separately. The filing should state the allocation method and apply it consistently.

Market share is not a jurisdictional threshold under the current FCC regime. It remains central to the substantive assessment and must be supported by a reasonable product and geographic market definition. There is no requirement to obtain advance confirmation of market shares from the FCC, but the parties should explain the data sources, estimates and assumptions used.

The legislation does not prescribe a single exchange rate or a mandatory averaging method for converting foreign turnover or assets. The parties should use an objective and consistently applied rate, normally a Bank of Tanzania published rate. For turnover, an annual average rate for the relevant financial year is generally the most representative; for balance-sheet assets, the rate at the relevant financial year-end is generally appropriate.

The filing should identify the source, date or averaging period and calculation. As an indication for the most recent completed calendar year, published annual data for 2025 gives an average of approximately Tshs. 2,548.62 to USD 1 and Tshs. 2,893.72 to EUR 1. These figures are illustrative and not statutory conversion rates and should be regularly checked against the Bank of Tanzania data used for the filing.

Joint ventures are subject to the ordinary merger rules where their creation, restructuring or acquisition produces a change of control and the applicable threshold is met. This includes a new jointly controlled business, the acquisition of joint control over an existing business, a move from sole to joint control and, conversely, a move from joint to sole control.

There is no separate national threshold for joint ventures. The analysis considers the parents and the joint venture within the relevant groups. A purely greenfield joint venture with no Tanzanian business, assets, sales or planned activity should not be caught by the FCC regime merely because its foreign parents are large; the national definition still requires a change of control over a business or asset in Tanzania. The parties should document the position where a parent already operates in Tanzania or the joint venture is expected to enter the Tanzanian market.

The national legislation does not use the EU concept of a full-function joint venture as an express jurisdictional test. A joint venture that does not amount to a concentration may still require assessment under the rules on anti-competitive agreements, particularly where it coordinates the competitive conduct of its parents.

For a qualifying regional joint venture, the EAC rules must be considered separately. A joint venture with cross-border effects in at least two Partner States may be notifiable where the EAC thresholds are met.

Inter-related steps that form a single, inseparable acquisition of control will generally be presented as one concentration, particularly where they are interdependent, documented together and directed to the same commercial result. The parties should explain the full series of steps in a single filing.

Separate filings may be required where distinct stages independently confer control, are not conditional on one another, involve different acquirers or targets, or are separated in time and commercial purpose. This can arise in grouping transactions, break-up bids, staged acquisitions or a sequence in which an investor first obtains joint control and later sole control. Each separately notifiable concentration may attract its own filing fee.

There is limited guidance on when linked steps will be aggregated. Parties should seek early guidance where transaction sequencing may materially affect jurisdiction or fees and should avoid structuring steps primarily to circumvent notification.

Also, if the jurisdictional thresholds in your jurisdiction are capable of catching transactions with no nexus to your jurisdiction – i.e. transactions involving a target or joint venture with no sales, assets, presence or activities in your jurisdiction (e.g. because the jurisdictional thresholds are met solely by the parents of an extra-territorial joint venture) – please provide some commercial advice for businesses about the risks of not filing in these circumstances, including the authority’s record of enforcement against such “no nexus” transactions and the possible availability of any effects test under the relevant legislation.

The national thresholds do not change for foreign-to-foreign transactions. An offshore transaction may be notifiable where it causes a direct or indirect change of control over a business or asset in Mainland Tanzania and the financial threshold is met. A common example is the acquisition of a foreign parent that owns a Tanzanian subsidiary.

A transaction involving a foreign target with no Tanzanian subsidiary, assets, sales or business activities should not ordinarily satisfy the required local nexus under the FCC regime merely because the purchaser has an existing Tanzanian business. The facts need closer examination where the target sells into Tanzania, owns registered rights or assets there, or the transaction changes control of a local distribution or operating arrangement.

The FCC has shown that it is prepared to investigate completed and unnotified transactions, including transactions identified through public announcements, regulatory filings and cooperation with other authorities. Parties should not assume that an offshore signing or closing will escape scrutiny.

Since 1^st November 2025, a foreign-to-foreign transaction may instead fall within the EACCA regime if it has cross-border effects in at least two EAC Partner States and meets the regional thresholds. The EAC framework is intended to avoid duplicate national filings for the same qualifying regional transaction. Where the allocation of jurisdiction is unclear, early engagement with the authorities is advisable.

This is not applicable. Tanzania operates a mandatory notification regime for transactions that satisfy the control and threshold tests.

The FCC assesses whether the proposed merger is likely to substantially lessen competition in a market in Mainland Tanzania. The analysis may address horizontal overlaps, vertical links and conglomerate effects, including unilateral and coordinated effects, barriers to entry and expansion, countervailing buyer power, access to inputs or customers, potential competition and the likelihood of foreclosure.

The FCC may clear the transaction unconditionally, approve it subject to conditions or prohibit it. Following the 2024 amendments, the FCC may also approve a merger that raises competition concerns where substantial public benefits outweigh the likely harm. There is no separate general substantive test for regulated sectors, but sector regulators may apply their own licensing, ownership, prudential or public-interest criteria and may provide views to the FCC.

EACCA applies a substantially-lessening-competition test at Community level for qualifying regional transactions. The parties should assess national, regional and sector requirements together.

Yes. The 2024 amendments expressly permit the FCC to weigh substantial public benefits against competitive harm. The statutory factors include more efficient allocation of resources; technical or economic progress and skills transfer; improvements in production, distribution or services; rescue of a business facing actual or imminent failure; increased exports or employment; effects on a particular sector or region; the ability of Tanzanian industries to compete regionally and internationally; and the competitiveness of small businesses.

Claims of public benefit require evidence. Parties relying on public benefits should quantify them where possible, explain when and how they will arise, demonstrate that they are transaction-specific and address whether less restrictive alternatives could achieve the same result.

The FCC’s merger clearance does not provide a general exemption for every restraint contained in the transaction documents. A restriction that is directly related and objectively necessary to implement the transaction may be treated as ancillary, but the parties remain responsible for ensuring that it is proportionate in duration, geographic scope, subject matter and the interests protected.

There is no fixed statutory maximum for a seller non-compete. In practice, a period of up to two years is more readily defensible where goodwill is transferred, and up to three years may be supportable where both goodwill and material know-how are transferred. Longer periods require transaction-specific justification. Non-solicitation, supply, licensing and transitional arrangements should be assessed on the same necessity and proportionality principles. If a restraint goes beyond what is required to transfer the business, it may be examined separately under the rules on restrictive agreements.

There is no separate statutory number of days after signing within which an FCC notification must be made. The controlling requirement is that a notifiable merger must be notified and cleared before implementation. A short letter does not replace the prescribed notification form or stop any procedural period from running.

The filing should be made promptly after the parties have a sufficiently settled transaction and the information required for a complete filing. The transaction documents should contain a condition precedent and a long-stop date that accommodates the review timetable.

Under the EAC regime, notification is made upon conclusion of the merger agreement and the transaction must remain unimplemented until it is declared compatible with the Common Market.

An FCC filing is ordinarily made once the parties have reached a sufficiently concrete agreement and can provide the signed transaction document, the identity of the parties, the structure of the transaction and the information required by the notification form. The rules do not establish a formal procedure for notifying a purely hypothetical transaction.

Where timing is sensitive, the parties may engage informally with the FCC before signing, but the formal notification is generally filed after execution of the principal transaction agreement or another binding document that evidences the proposed acquisition of control. Parties should avoid provisions that transfer control, economic ownership or strategic influence before clearance.

Parties may engage with the FCC before filing, particularly where there is uncertainty about control, notification requirements or the treatment of an overseas transaction. They may also request an FCC legal opinion on a specific question, such as whether the transaction is notifiable. Neither step is mandatory for every filing, and a legal opinion should not be treated as merger clearance.

There is no prescribed timetable for these preliminary steps. The time needed depends on the question and the information provided. They should be allowed for separately in the transaction timetable, as they do not start the formal merger review period.

Within five business days after receipt of the merger notification, the FCC issues a notice stating whether the filing is complete or incomplete. Once a complete-filing notice has been issued, the FCC has an initial 14 calendar days to decide whether to clear the transaction without further examination or to commence a detailed examination.

If the FCC opens a detailed examination, it may prohibit implementation for 90 calendar days while it conducts its assessment. The examination period may be extended by a further 30 calendar days. The maximum statutory sequence is therefore commonly described as five business days for completeness, followed by 14 calendar days for initial review and, where a detailed examination is opened, up to 120 additional calendar days.

Straightforward transactions can be cleared during the initial review, but parties should not assume that the shortest statutory period will be achieved. Time should also be allowed for payment, submission logistics and responses to information requests.

An incomplete filing prevents the substantive review period from beginning. The FCC’s notice will identify the missing information and may specify a period for supplying it. The review clock begins only after the FCC accepts the filing as complete.

During the review, the FCC may request further information from the parties or third parties. A late or inadequate response can delay the assessment and may lead the FCC to treat the record as incomplete or to use the extended examination period. Material inaccuracies or omissions may expose the parties to separate sanctions and can jeopardise a clearance decision.

If a detailed examination is opened, the 90-calendar-day period may be extended once by up to 30 calendar days. Remedy discussions and market testing will normally occur within the available review period and may make use of that extension. Third-party intervention does not automatically reset the timetable, but it may increase the information required and the time needed to complete the review.

There is no formal fast-track or statutory procedure under which the parties can require the FCC to shorten the review period. A straightforward transaction may be cleared during the 14-calendar-day initial review, and complete, well-organised submissions can reduce avoidable delay.

Where there is a genuine urgency, the parties may explain it to the FCC and seek administrative expedition, but the FCC retains discretion and will not normally compromise consultation or substantive review. The transaction timetable should allow for the statutory periods.

The acquiring undertaking is responsible for notifying the merger. In practice, the notification requires detailed information from both the acquirer and the target, and the parties usually coordinate the filing and confidentiality claims through local counsel.

Where two or more parties acquire joint control, the filing should be made jointly or on behalf of all acquiring controllers, with each party providing the information and authorisations required for the filing. For a new joint venture, the parents that will acquire joint control are the notifying parties. Liability will depend on the conduct and the applicable statutory provisions, but an acquirer should not assume that contractual allocation of filing responsibility removes regulatory exposure.

The prescribed notification form requires a detailed description of the parties and their groups, the transaction structure and rationale, the businesses and products concerned, Tanzanian turnover and assets, ownership and control, relevant markets, competitors, customers and suppliers, market shares, entry conditions, vertical relationships and any efficiencies or public benefits relied upon.

The FCC may request additional information where the filing is incomplete or the initial review identifies competition concerns. Requests may cover internal transaction documents, business plans, pricing, customer and competitor data, market studies, capacity, import conditions and the factual basis for efficiencies or failing-firm arguments.

There is no established short-form filing for transactions that meet the threshold but appear unproblematic. The parties should submit the prescribed form, while presenting the information proportionately and identifying issues that are not applicable. EACCA uses its own prescribed regional notification form for transactions within its jurisdiction.

The filing is normally accompanied by the executed transaction documents; corporate registration and articles of association documents for the relevant parties; group structure charts; recent audited financial statements or annual reports; board or shareholder approvals where available; and documents supporting turnover, assets, market shares and the transaction rationale. The FCC may also request internal presentations, market studies or reports prepared for the transaction.

The notification should be signed by an authorised representative. Where external counsel signs or files on behalf of a party, a power of attorney or written authority should be provided. Foreign corporate documents and powers of attorney are generally submitted as certified copies. Apostille or consular legalisation is not routinely required by the procedure rules, but the FCC may ask for further authentication where the document’s status is unclear.

Documents should be in English. A document in another language should be accompanied by an English translation, preferably certified where the content is material. There is no general statutory age limit for corporate documents, but current registry extracts and the latest audited accounts should be used. The parties should also provide confidentiality claims in the prescribed manner and, where requested, a non-confidential version.

Yes. The FCC filing fee is charged on a sliding scale by reference to the higher of the parties’ combined annual turnover or combined asset value in their latest audited financial statements. The prescribed fee ranges from TZS25 million to TZS100 million. The applicable band should be confirmed against the fee rules and the financial information used in the filing before payment.

For qualifying EAC filings, the regional fee bands are USD 45,000 where the relevant EAC turnover or assets are USD 35,000,000  to USD 50,000,000; USD 70,000 where they exceed USD 50,000,000 but do not exceed USD100,000,000; and USD 100,000 where they exceed USD100,000,000.

Yes. The FCC ordinarily publishes a notice stating that it has received a merger notification and commenced its review. The notice generally identifies the parties, describes the transaction in broad terms and invites interested persons to submit comments within a stated period. Publication may occur on the FCC website and through other channels selected by the FCC.

The parties should expect that the existence of the filing and the basic transaction details will become public. Sensitive information should be clearly identified and supported by a properly reasoned confidentiality claim.

Yes. The FCC may invite submissions from customers, competitors, suppliers, trade associations, sector regulators and other stakeholders. Public notices commonly invite comments even where the transaction appears unlikely to raise material competition concerns.

Consultation usually takes place during the initial review or detailed examination. For straightforward cases, the FCC may rely principally on the public notice and targeted checks. In more complex cases, it may issue questionnaires, interview market participants, seek information from regulators and test the parties’ market definition, competitive assessment or proposed remedies.

The FCC generally publishes the fact of notification, basic details of the parties and transaction, and its final decision or a public notice of the outcome. It may disclose non-confidential information to third parties where this is required for consultation or the exercise of its statutory functions.

The full notification, supporting documents and responses to information requests are not ordinarily published wholesale. The parties may claim confidentiality for trade secrets and other commercially sensitive information, but the claim must be specific and justified; marking an entire filing confidential is unlikely to be sufficient. The FCC may require a non-confidential version.

The authority is expected to protect information accepted as confidential, subject to statutory disclosure powers and procedural fairness. However Parties should notify FCC of confidential information through a prescribed form of genuinely sensitive information.

Yes. The FCC cooperates with sector regulators, other national competition authorities and regional bodies. It participates in regional and international competition networks and may exchange experience and, where legally permitted, case-related information.

Regional cooperation has become more important since EACCA began accepting cross-border merger notifications on 1st November 2025. The EAC framework contemplates coordination between EACCA and national competition authorities and is intended to avoid duplicate review of the same qualifying regional transaction. EACCA has also entered into cooperation arrangements with other competition bodies, including the COMESA Competition Commission and the Competition Authority of Kenya.

Confidential information remains subject to the applicable statutory safeguards. Parties may be asked to provide waivers to facilitate authority-to-authority discussions. Refusal to grant a voluntary waiver is not, by itself, a separate merger offence, but it may slow the review or limit the authorities’ ability to reconcile factual submissions made in different jurisdictions.

The FCC may accept structural or behavioural remedies where they are clear, proportionate, capable of implementation and sufficient to address the identified competition concern. Structural remedies may include divestiture of a business, assets, shares, licences or capacity. Behavioural remedies may include access, supply, non-discrimination, information-barrier, pricing or reporting commitments.

The FCC has flexibility and has used behavioural conditions in transactions where ongoing obligations can address the concern without requiring a divestiture. The choice depends on the market and the enforceability of the commitment; there is no published rule that behavioural remedies are exceptional.

For a divestiture, the FCC may require approval of the purchaser and may insist on an up-front buyer or a fix-it-first structure where there is substantial uncertainty about the viability or saleability of the divestment business. A suitable purchaser must be independent, financially and operationally capable, and unlikely to create a fresh competition concern.

The parties normally propose remedies after the FCC identifies a competition concern, although the FCC may also indicate the type of condition it considers necessary. There is no rigid statutory deadline for offering commitments, but they should be submitted early enough for assessment, consultation and revision within the review period.

Conditions can in principle be accepted during the initial review where the issue and solution are straightforward. More complex remedies are likely to require a detailed examination and use of the extended timetable. The proposal should explain the concern addressed, implementation steps, timing, monitoring and consequences of non-compliance.

The FCC may market-test a remedy by consulting customers, competitors, regulators or potential purchasers. A remedy accepted in another jurisdiction may be relevant, particularly in a regional or global transaction, but it does not automatically bind the FCC. The parties must show that it addresses the Tanzanian concern and can be monitored and enforced locally.

Failure to notify, late notification and implementation before clearance expose the parties to significant financial and transactional risk. The FCC may impose a fine of between 5% and 10% of the offender’s annual turnover derived from Mainland Tanzania. The FCC may also make compliance or compensatory orders and may require divestment, declare an unlawful acquisition void or require shares or assets to be transferred back and the consideration refunded.

Where the offender is a company, a director, manager or officer may be joined in the same proceedings and deemed liable unless that person proves that the offence occurred without their knowledge or that they exercised due diligence to prevent it. The general merger penalty provision does not prescribe a custodial sentence; the principal exposure is the turnover-based fine and the FCC’s corrective powers.

The statutory exposure is not confined to a direct domestic acquisition. The FCC has pursued completed transactions and can investigate an indirect change of control arising from an offshore deal. The 2024 amendments also removed the previous intention or negligence wording from the merger offence, reinforcing a strict-compliance approach.

For a qualifying regional transaction, implementation without EACCA notification and clearance has no legal effect and is void. EAC law also permits a penalty of up to 10% of the undertaking’s preceding-year turnover in the EAC.

If parties identify a missed filing, they should stop further integration, preserve the businesses’ operational independence, assess whether control has already passed, approach the relevant authority promptly and make a complete corrective filing. A local carve-out should not be relied on without advice and, where appropriate, advance engagement with the authority.

A filing that is materially incomplete will not be accepted as complete, so the review timetable will not begin. The FCC may require correction or additional information and may draw adverse conclusions where information is withheld.

Knowingly or negligently providing false or misleading information may constitute a separate offence and may attract fines and corrective orders. Clearance obtained on the basis of incorrect, false or misleading information may be revoked. The parties should therefore verify the notification against source documents, explain estimates, update material changes promptly and correct any error as soon as it is identified.

Under the EAC regime, the notifying undertaking is responsible for the accuracy of the filing, and EACCA may revoke an approval obtained through incorrect, false or misleading information or deceit.

Yes. A person with a pecuniary and material grievance arising from an FCC decision may appeal to the Fair Competition Tribunal within 28 calendar days after notification or publication of the decision. This standing test can include a merging party and, in an appropriate case, an affected third party that can demonstrate the required grievance.

The Tribunal may affirm, set aside or vary the FCC’s decision, or direct the FCC to reconsider the matter. An appeal does not now produce an automatic stay; the Tribunal may grant a stay on application.

Following the 2024 amendments, a person aggrieved by a decision of the Tribunal may appeal to the High Court within 30 calendar days of the Tribunal’s decision. The High Court sits as a panel of three judges for that appeal. There is no dependable statutory estimate for the duration of an appeal; timing will depend on the record, complexity and Tribunal or court diary, and parties should expect the process to take several months or longer.

The 2024 amendments moved the substantive test from creation or strengthening of dominance to whether a merger substantially lessens competition. This permits a more effects-based assessment of horizontal, vertical and conglomerate transactions.

Public interest now has an express and broader role. The FCC may approve a merger with competition concerns where substantial public benefits outweigh the harm. Parties are consequently giving more attention to employment, exports, efficiencies, technology and skills transfer, regional competitiveness, failing-firm evidence and the position of small businesses. These claims need credible evidence rather than general assurances.

Enforcement risk around non-notification remains real. The FCC uses public information and regulatory cooperation to identify completed transactions and has pursued parties for missed filings. The removal of the intention or negligence qualification from the merger offence supports a stricter compliance approach.

The regional regime has also changed. Since 1^st November 2025, EACCA has accepted notifications for qualifying mergers with cross-border effects. Transaction teams must now decide early whether the correct route is an EAC filing or an FCC filing.

The immediate development is implementation of the EAC cross-border merger regime, which commenced on 1^st November 2025. Practice will continue to develop on the division of responsibility between EACCA and national authorities, the two-thirds rule, information sharing, review timing and the operation of the regional one-stop filing.

At national level, practice under the 2024 amendments is still developing, particularly the application of the substantially-lessening-competition test and the evidential standard for substantial public benefits. Further procedural guidance or revised merger guidelines would be helpful, but no specific additional national reform should be treated as enacted until it is formally published.

Businesses should monitor FCC and EACCA notices and guidance, and confirm the filing route, thresholds and fees against the rules in force when the transaction is signed.