The Applicable Legislation on Arbitration in Singapore

Singapore law distinguishes between international and non-international arbitrations (hereafter referred to as “domestic arbitrations”), and provides separate statutory frameworks to govern the same.

With respect to international arbitrations, the applicable statutory framework is set out in the International Arbitration Act 1994 (the “IAA”). The IAA provides that the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (“UNCITRAL”) Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration 1985 (the “Model Law”), as set out in the First Schedule of the IAA, has the force of law in Singapore subject to a few amendments contained in the IAA itself.[1]

It should be noted that the version of the Model Law which applies in Singapore by virtue of the IAA is the version set out in the First Schedule of the IAA, i.e. the Model Law as adopted by UNCITRAL on 21 June 1985. The IAA does not directly incorporate subsequent amendments to the Model Law (such as those implemented in 2006), although certain provisions of the IAA have been amended to keep pace with these developments.

Section 5(1) of the IAA provides that the IAA applies where (i) an arbitration is an international arbitration; or (ii) the parties to a domestic arbitration agree in writing that either the IAA or Model Law applies to the arbitration.

Pursuant to Section 5(2) of the IAA, an arbitration is international (and falls within the scope of the IAA) if any of the following apply:

i. one of the parties had at the time of the arbitration agreement a place of business outside Singapore;

ii. the place of arbitration is outside the state in which the parties have their places of business;

iii. the place where a substantial part of the commercial obligations is to be performed is outside the state in which the parties have their places of business;

iv. the place with which the subject-matter of the dispute is most closely connected is outside the state in which the parties have their places of business; or

v. the parties have expressly agreed that the subject-matter of the dispute is in relation to more than one (1) country.

The IAA (via Part III of the IAA) also gives effect to the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (1958) (the “New York Convention”), as set out in the Second Schedule of the IAA.

In contrast, domestic arbitrations fall within the scope of the Arbitration Act 2001 (the “AA”), which does not incorporate the provisions of the Model Law.

Mandatory Laws

Certain aspects of the IAA are expressed in mandatory terms, meaning neither the parties nor the tribunal can derogate from them. The IAA expressly provides that the parties are free to adopt institutional rules only to the extent that they are not inconsistent with those parts of the IAA or the Model Law which are mandatory.

There is no exhaustive list as to which parts of the IAA or the Model Law are considered “mandatory”, and it would be a question of statutory interpretation to determine whether any specific provision was intended to have mandatory effect.

Importantly, no inconsistency arises simply because the rules chosen by the parties provide for something on which the IAA or the Model Law is silent. Likewise, no inconsistency arises simply because the IAA or the Model Law provides for something on which the rules chosen by the parties are silent.

There are clear provisions which are not mandatory, generally expressed as provisions which apply “unless the parties have otherwise agreed”.

Some key provisions which are generally understood to be mandatory are:

i. That an arbitration agreement must be in writing;

ii. The arbitrator’s duty to treat the parties with equality;

iii. The exclusion of liability for an arbitrator’s negligence or any mistake in law, fact or procedure;

iv. That the Limitation Act 1959 and the Foreign Limitation Periods Act 2012 apply to arbitration proceedings seated in Singapore. Any arbitration agreement that provides that, for the purposes of limitation, the cause of action will not accrue until after an award is made shall have no effect, and the cause of action will be deemed to have accrued as if no such agreement was in place; and

v. That a dispute may not be determined by arbitration if it is contrary to public policy to do so. Case law has explained that a dispute must be arbitrable under the public policy of Singapore (as the law of the seat) and under the public policy of the law of the arbitration agreement (where this law is not Singapore law).

[1] This includes (but is not limited to) (1) an expanded definition of “international arbitration” compared to Article 1(3) of the Model Law; (2) additional grounds for setting aside an award; (3) default rules for the appointment of arbitrators; and (4) exclusion of Chapter VIII of the Model Law. Please refer to the response to Question 4 (“Is the law governing international arbitration in your country based on the Model Law? Are there significant differences between the two?”) for more information.

Yes, Singapore ratified the New York Convention, and the relevant national legislation is Part III of the IAA.

Singapore has made the reciprocity reservation in respect of the New York Convention.[1] This means that the Singapore courts will only enforce awards made in the territory of another contracting state to the New York Convention.[2]

Otherwise, and pursuant to section 46(3) of the AA, arbitral awards made in non-contracting states to the New York Convention can be enforced in accordance with the procedure for enforcement of a domestic arbitral award.

[1] Please see the 1958 New York Convention Guide at https://newyorkconvention1958.org/index.php?lvl=cmspage&pageid=11&menu=843&opac_view=-1.

[2] For the full list of contracting states to the New York Convention, please refer to https://www.newyorkconvention.org/contracting-states.

Singapore is a party to forty-five (45) Bilateral Investment Treaties / Investment Guarantee Agreements which are in force.

Singapore is also a party to twenty-six (26) Free Trade Agreements (whether bilateral or multi-party) currently in force which contain chapters on investment protection.[1] Recent additions to this list include the Pacific Alliance-Singapore Free Trade Agreement, which came into force on 3 May 2025 and the MERCOSUR-Singapore Free Trade Agreement, which came into force on 1 February 2026.

Singapore is also a contracting state of the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (“ICSID”) Convention. The ICSID Convention facilitates the conciliation and arbitration of investment disputes between contracting states and nationals of other contracting states to the ICSID Convention.[2]

[1] https://www.mti.gov.sg/Trade/International-Investment-Agreements

[2] https://icsid.worldbank.org/rules-regulations/convention

Yes, the IAA expressly incorporates the Model Law (the 1985 version, as set out in the First Schedule of the IAA) and gives the same the force of law in Singapore, subject to very few amendments contained in the IAA itself.

Some of these amendments are as follows:

i. Expanded definition of “international arbitration”. The IAA expands the definition of “international arbitration” contained in Article 1(3) of the Model Law, and includes:

a. Where at least one of the parties has its place of business outside Singapore at the time the arbitration agreement was concluded;

b. Where the place of arbitration, the place where a substantial part of the parties’ obligations are to be performed, or the place to which the subject matter of the dispute is more closely connected, falls outside the country in which the parties have their place of business; and

c. Where the parties have expressly agreed that the subject matter of the arbitration agreement relates to more than one country.

ii. Additional grounds for setting aside. The IAA adds two grounds for setting aside an award – (i) where the award was procured by fraud or corruption; or (ii) where the award was made in breach of the rules of natural justice, provided this breach prejudiced the rights of a party.

iii. Default rules for appointment of arbitrators. The IAA departs from the default rules in the Model Law, by providing that the default number of arbitrators is a single arbitrator, as opposed to three arbitrators.

Where the arbitration is to be heard by three (3) arbitrators, the claimant (or claimants) must appoint an arbitrator on or before sending their request for arbitration. The respondent (or respondents) must appoint an arbitrator within thirty (30) days after receiving the request for arbitration.

iv. Exclusion of Chapter VIII of the Model Law. The IAA gives the Model Law the force of law in Singapore, except for Chapter VIII on recognition and enforcement of awards. However, the courts in Singapore have recognised that, notwithstanding the exclusion of Chapter VIII, the basis for refusing enforcement of a Singapore arbitration award under section 19 of the IAA includes the grounds contained in Article 36(1) of the Model Law, whereas the grounds for refusing enforcement of a foreign award are set out in the New York Convention.[1]

Amendments to the IAA are being actively discussed. In 2024, the Singapore Ministry of Law commissioned a report by the Singapore International Dispute Resolution Academy (“SIDRA”) to consider the extent to which the IAA remains state-of-the-art, and what amendments may be necessary to continue Singapore’s position as a leading destination for international arbitration.[2] SIDRA’s report was published on 21 November 2024 and a public consultation period took place between March and May 2025 to consider SIDRA’s recommendations for reform.

SIDRA recommended various reforms to the IAA, but it remains to be seen which, if any, will be adopted. Some of SIDRA’s proposed reforms are:

i. To enact an express provision empowering the courts to re-apportion (but not vary) the costs of arbitration proceedings where the award is successfully set aside. In exceptional circumstances, the issue may be remitted to the Tribunal;

ii. To require parties to obtain leave from the appellate court to bring an appeal against decisions made in setting aside or enforcement applications;

iii. To allow the courts to extend the three (3) month time limit for setting aside applications involving fraud or corruption under Section 24(a) of the IAA;

iv. To allow parties to opt-in to a right to appeal to the court on points of law;

v. To enact a new statutory law approach in respect of determining the law applicable to an arbitration agreement. SIDRA’s proposal is that the applicable law should be (1) the law expressly chosen to govern the arbitration agreement; (2) if no such choice is made, the applicable law of the contract; or (3) where no applicable law is expressly designated, the law of the seat. Where the parties have not (expressly or by default) determined the law of the seat of the arbitration, the courts will be empowered to determine the seat of the arbitration having regard to the circumstances of the case, including the convenience of the parties; and

vi. To empower tribunals to summarily dispose of matters by way of an award, unless the parties expressly exclude this power.

[1] See PT First Media TBK (formerly known as PT Broadband Multimedia TBK) v Astro Nusantara International BV and others and another appeal [2014] 1 SLR 372 at [84], where the Singapore Court of Appeal held that “the most efficacious method of giving full effect to the Model Law philosophy would, in our view, be to recognise that the same grounds for resisting enforcement under Art 36(1) are equally available to a party resisting enforcement under s 19 of the IAA.”

[2] https://sidra.smu.edu.sg/research-program/review-of-the-singapore-international-arbitration-act-2024/agenda

The two main arbitration centres in Singapore are the Singapore International Arbitration Centre (“SIAC”) and the Singapore Chamber of Maritime Arbitration (“SCMA”).

The 7^th Edition of the SIAC Arbitration Rules (the “SIAC Rules 2025”) came into force on 1 January 2025, which was a timely update to the 6^th Edition in force since 1 August 2016 (the “SIAC Rules 2016”) aimed at addressing cost and efficiency concerns, particularly in relation to smaller claims.

Some key updates in the SIAC Rules 2025 include:

i. Introduction of the Streamlined Procedure: The SIAC has built upon its implementation of fast-track arbitrations by implementing a new Streamlined Procedure applicable to claims which do not exceed S$ 1,000,000, unless otherwise agreed (or excluded) by the parties.[1] Claims brought under the Streamlined Procedure are heard by a sole arbitrator on a documents-only basis. Unless otherwise determined by the arbitrator, claims under the Streamlined Procedure will be determined without expert or witness evidence, without document production, and without a hearing. The final award under the Streamlined Procedure is to be issued within three (3) months from the constitution of the Tribunal and the Tribunal and SIAC’s fees are capped at 50% of the applicable limits in the SIAC’s Schedule of Fees.[2]

ii. Expansion of the Expedited Procedure: Under the SIAC Rules 2016, parties could make an application for disputes under S$ 6,000,000 to be determined under the Expedited Procedure. With the implementation of the Streamlined Procedure for smaller claims, the SIAC Rules 2025 provide that the Expedited Procedure will apply to claims between S$ 1,000,000 and S$ 10,000,000. By default, proceedings under the Expedited Procedure are to be heard by a sole arbitrator and are to be decided on a documents-only basis, but the parties and the arbitrator may request that a hearing take place. Any such hearing is to be held virtually unless otherwise agreed by the parties or determined by the Tribunal. The sole arbitrator is also empowered to refuse any document production requests and limit the scope and length of written submissions and written witness evidence. Any award issued under the Expedited Procedure is to be issued within six (6) months of the constitution of the Tribunal.

iii. Empowering Emergency Arbitrators to grant preliminary, ex parte relief: The SIAC Rules 2025 build upon the Emergency Arbitrator procedures implemented in 2010. Notably, Emergency Arbitrators are now empowered to grant preliminary interim relief, on an ex parte basis, which must be determined within 24 hours of the Emergency Arbitrator’s appointment. The party who obtains such relief must serve the preliminary order, and all documents filed with the SIAC, within 12 hours of the order’s issuance and provide a statement to the Registrar and the Emergency Arbitrator that it has done, or attempted to do, so. The preliminary order will expire fourteen (14) days after its issuance. This power may be contractually excluded by the parties.

The current 4^th edition of the SCMA Arbitration Rules came into force on 1 January 2022.

Beyond the SIAC and SCMA, there are other arbitral institutions in Singapore, including:

• The International Court of Arbitration of the International Chamber of Commerce (“ICC”). The current version of the ICC Rules of Arbitration (the “ICC Rules”) came into force on 1 January 2021.
• The Permanent Court of Arbitration (“PCA”). The PCA Arbitration Rules 2012 is the current version and came into force in December 2012.
• The International Centre for Dispute Resolution (“ICDR”). The ICDR International Dispute (2021) Rules came into force on 1 March 2021, revising its previous 2014 arbitration rules of the ICDR.
• The World Intellectual Property Organization (“WIPO”) Arbitration and Mediation Center. The 2021 WIPO Arbitration Rules are made effective from 1 July 2021.
• The Beihai Asia International Arbitration Centre (“BAIAC”). The BAIAC 2019 Arbitration Rules are in force as of 1 October 2019.

Despite the above, other arbitral institutions, notably the London Court of International Arbitration, routinely administer Singapore-seated arbitrations as well.

[1] See Rule 13 of the SIAC Rules 2025

[2] See Paragraphs 11, 12, 15 and 16 of Schedule 2 of the SIAC Rules 2025

There is no specialist arbitration court in Singapore. The IAA designates the General Division of the High Court of Singapore (“GDHC”) as the specified authority for the purposes of Article 6 of the Model Law. As such, virtually all arbitration-related proceedings are commenced before the GDHC.

The GDHC is well-equipped and well-versed in handling international arbitration matters. These matters may be heard at first instance by (i) the Companies, Insolvency, Equity & Trusts and Arbitration (“CITA”) docket of the GDHC; or (ii) the Singapore International Commercial Court (“SICC”), which is itself a division of the GDHC.

The CITA docket of the GDHC comprises Singapore judges specialising in hearing arbitration matters.[1] The SICC’s panel of judges comprises both local and international judges, and foreign-qualified lawyers may appear before the SICC to submit on foreign law, provided the relevant registration requirements have been complied with.[2]

Appeals from both the CITA docket and the SICC in international arbitration matters are heard by the Court of Appeal of Singapore. The panel of judges in the Court of Appeal may include international judges where the appeal arises from a decision of the SICC.

[1] https://www.judiciary.gov.sg/who-we-are/role-structure-supreme-court/role

[2] Order 3, Rule 1 of the Singapore International Commercial Court Rules 2021; Section 36P of the Legal Profession Act 1966

An arbitration agreement must be in writing to be valid. This means that it must be recorded in any form, regardless of whether it forms part of a written contract. In this regard, both the IAA and the AA adopt Option 1 of Article 7 of the 2006 Amendments to the Model Law.

An arbitration agreement is defined as an agreement by the parties to submit to arbitration all or certain disputes which have arisen or which may arise between them in respect of a defined legal relationship, whether contractual or not.

In determining whether an arbitration agreement is valid or not, the Singapore Courts treat the issue as a matter of contractual interpretation, and will strive to give effect to the parties’ intentions. Where parties have evinced a clear intention to settle a dispute by way of arbitration, the Singapore Courts will strive to give effect to such intention, notwithstanding that “the agreement may be ambiguous, inconsistent, incomplete or lacking in certain particulars”.^[1]

Singapore law recognises and adopts the doctrine of kompetenz-kompetenz and a policy of minimal curial intervention in international arbitration proceedings. As a result, where the validity of an arbitration agreement is called into question (for example, in the context of seeking a stay of court proceedings in favour of arbitration), an applicant need only show a prima facie case that there is a valid and binding arbitration agreement applicable to the dispute, and that this agreement is not void, inoperative, or incapable of being performed.

Where these requirements are established, the Singapore Courts will treat the arbitration agreement as presumptively valid and refer the matter to arbitration, where the issue may be finally determined by the tribunal.

[1] Observations of the Singapore Court of Appeal in Insigma Technology Co Ltd v Alstom Technology Ltd [2009] 3 SLR(R) 93 at [30] – [31], and recently applied in Re Shanghai Xinan Screenwall Building & Decoration Co, Ltd [2022] 5 SLR 393.

Yes.

In respect of international arbitrations (as defined by section 5(2) of the IAA), and pursuant to Article 16(1) of the Model Law (which is conferred the force of law by section 3(1) of the IAA), the arbitral tribunal may rule on its own jurisdiction, including any objections with respect to the existence or validity of the arbitration agreement.

For both international and domestic arbitrations, an arbitration clause which forms part of a contract shall be treated as an agreement independent of the other terms of the contract. Accordingly, a finding that the contract is null and void does not automatically invalidate the arbitration agreement.

Separability will not, however, preserve an arbitration agreement where the alleged defect impeaches the arbitration agreement itself, for example where it is alleged that no agreement was ever concluded, that a party’s signature was forged, or that the person signing lacked authority to bind the party. In such cases, the challenge is directed at the arbitration agreement as well as the main contract, and the tribunal (and ultimately the court) will need to determine whether a valid arbitration agreement exists.

Where there is more than one national law which is potentially applicable to the arbitration agreement, the Courts of Singapore will seek to determine which law parties intended to apply to the agreement, and determine the arbitration agreement’s validity under that applicable law.

Where the parties’ express or implied intentions cannot be determined by the Court, the Court will apply the law with which the arbitration agreement has the closest and most real connection.

Within this framework, the Courts of Singapore have considered, but not yet applied, two formulations of the validation principle. The first is a “negative” formulation, which raises a presumption that a law which would render the arbitration agreement invalid would not have been intended by the parties to be the applicable law of the arbitration agreement.

The second formulation is a “positive” one, which provides that an arbitration agreement will be upheld as valid if it is substantively valid under one of the laws which is potentially applicable to it.

In BNA v BNB [2019] SGHC 142 (“BNA (HC)”), both formulations of the validation principle were rejected on the basis that they were too instrumental. This decision was eventually overturned by the Court of Appeal in BNA v BNB [2020] 1 SLR 456 (“BNA (CA)”), albeit on different grounds.

The more recent case of Medipas LLC v Erdenet Mining Corp SOE [2026] SGHC 97 (“Medipas”) appears to have interpreted the Court of Appeal decision in BNA (CA) as leaving the door open for the application of the “negative” formulation of the principle.

However, and consistent with the Court’s aims of determining the intentions of the parties,  any such application would require a showing that the parties were, at the very least, aware that the choice of proper law of the arbitration agreement could have an impact on the validity of the arbitration agreement.

As such, there is no principle under Singapore law which would find an arbitration agreement to be valid so long as it was valid under a potentially applicable law. Instead, the Courts will seek to identify which law is the applicable law, and determine the issue of validity under that law.

In this context, where a Court is presented with more than one law which may potentially be applicable to an arbitration agreement, the invalidity of the agreement under one of those laws may be considered within the existing framework – i.e. to determine the parties’ intentions or the law with the closest and most real connection to the arbitration agreement.

For example, in Anupam Mittal v Westbridge Ventures II Investment Holdings [2023] 1 SLR 349 (“Westbridge”) the Court of Appeal, at first, found that Indian law was the implied choice of law applicable to the arbitration agreement. However, this implication was negated by the fact that, under Indian law, the subject-matter of the dispute would not have been arbitrable. For this reason, the Court of Appeal found that the parties would not have intended for Indian law to apply to the arbitration agreement. Instead, the Court of Appeal found that Singapore law governed the arbitration agreement as it had the closest connection to the arbitration agreement by virtue of the parties’ agreement for the arbitration to be seated in Singapore.

Yes.

Asymmetric arbitration clauses are valid and enforceable provided they fall within the definition of an arbitration agreement set out at Section 2A of the IAA and the arbitration clause is not null and void, inoperative, or incapable of being performed.

In the High Court decision of Dyna-Jet Pte Ltd v Wilson Taylor Asia Pacific Pte Ltd [2017] 3 SLR 267 (“Dyna-Jet”), the Court highlighted that whether or not an asymmetric arbitration clause was an enforceable arbitration agreement would depend on whether the parties are contractually obliged to arbitrate, even if such an obligation only comes into being upon one party’s election.[1]

However, the Court in Dyna-Jet held that, where the electing party elects to commence proceedings by way of litigation, the right to arbitrate the underlying dispute is lost and the arbitration agreement becomes incapable of being performed.[2] On appeal, the Court of Appeal further held that where such an election was made, the dispute in respect of which litigation had been commenced no longer fell within the scope of the arbitration clause, and accordingly could not be stayed pursuant to Section 6(1) of the IAA.[3]

[1] Dyna-Jet at [41]

[2] Dyna-Jet at [159] – [160]

[3] Wilson Taylor Asia Pacific Pte Ltd v Dyna-Jet Pte Ltd [2017] SGCA 32 at [24]

In general, the Singapore courts refrain from “extending” an arbitration agreement to third parties or non-signatories in the absence of consent between such parties. This approach is based on the notion that arbitration is based upon the principle of consent. Accordingly, any extension of the scope of application of the arbitration agreement must have a voluntary basis.

Decisions made by the Singapore courts have fallen in line with this principle of consent.

For instance, in the recent High Court judgment of CJD v CJE [2021] 4 SLR 734, the court found that the mere fact that a parent company was a party to the arbitration agreement was not, in and of itself, sufficient to signal consent in writing (of which there was none) that the parent company agreed to be joined in an arbitration between its subsidiary and an unrelated party. In doing so, the High Court further noted the idea of a forced joinder in the context of arbitration to be a drastic one.

As a corollary, the principle of consent operates to even find that a third party may be a party to an arbitral award even if no signed contract or arbitration agreement had been concluded with the third party. In the Court of Appeal judgment of COT v COU and anor [2023] SGCA 31, the court found at [61] that a valid contract had been formed between all the parties because “the exchange of correspondence and the parties’ conduct during the [negotiations] lead to the necessary inference that a contract was concluded between [all the parties]”.

Yes. In the 2023 Court of Appeal judgment of Westbridge, the Singapore Court of Appeal applied at [62] the three-stage test laid down in BCY v BCZ [2017] 3 SLR 357, which is reproduced below:

• Stage 1: Whether parties expressly chose the proper law of the arbitration agreement.
• Stage 2: In the absence of an express choice, whether parties made an implied choice of the proper law to govern the arbitration agreement, with the starting point for determining the implied choice of law being the law of the contract.
• Stage 3: If neither an express choice nor an implied choice can be discerned, which is the system of law with which the arbitration agreement has its closest and most real connection.

The court in Westbridge adopted the following analysis in relation to each of the stages:

At Stage 1, the initial query is whether the parties expressly chose the proper law of the arbitration agreement. Such express choice of law for an arbitration agreement can only be found where there is explicit language stating so in no uncertain terms. Therefore, in Westbridge at [66], the Court of Appeal found that there was no express choice of law for the arbitration agreement, even though the agreement in question stated that Indian law was “in all respects” the governing law of the agreement and its performance.

At Stage 2, in determining the implied choice of law of the arbitration agreement, the court may presume the governing law for the agreement as a whole as the choice of law of the arbitration agreement. However, this presumption could be negated by circumstances such as the parties’ intention. In Westbridge at [70] to [74], the Court of Appeal found that Singapore law was the implied choice of law despite Indian law being the governing law of the agreement in question. This is because parties had intended to arbitrate all their disputes, and this would be at odds with Indian law, in which oppression claims are non-arbitrable.

At Stage 3, in determining the law with the most “real and substantial connection with the arbitration agreement” in the agreement, the Court of Appeal in Westbridge at [75] found that Singapore law fit the bill, as the arbitration was to take place in Singapore, and Singapore was the seat of the arbitration.

Notwithstanding the above, the Ministry of Law appears to be considering amendments to the IAA which would establish a statutory mechanism for determining the law applicable to an arbitration agreement where the parties have not expressly provided for the same.

Singapore law does not prescribe specific choice of law rules which would be applicable to arbitration proceedings. For example, there is no provision which stipulates that a Singapore-seated arbitration must apply Singapore law, or even Singapore choice of law rules. Accordingly, the appropriate choice of law analysis falls to be determined by the arbitral tribunal itself unless the parties agree otherwise.

The SIAC Rules 2025 expressly provide that the tribunal must apply the law designated by the parties as applicable to the substance of the dispute, failing which it shall apply the law that it determines to be appropriate, subject to the terms of the underlying contract.

With respect to the substance of the dispute, the parties’ choice of law will prevail over the law of the seat.

However, Singapore law may be applicable, in a jurisdictional sense, to determine whether the subject matter of the dispute is capable of resolution by way of arbitration. As such, even if the subject matter of the dispute is arbitrable under the law chosen by the parties, a Singapore-seated tribunal would lack jurisdiction if the matter is not arbitrable under Singapore law.

Singapore law does not impose any limits on the parties’ autonomy to select arbitrators.

Where the parties have expressly agreed that an arbitrator should possess certain qualifications, his appointment may be challenged by the parties pursuant to Article 12(2) of the Model Law if those qualifications are not met.

No, this power has been delegated to the President of the SIAC Court of Arbitration under section 8(2) of the IAA.

However, and pursuant to section 8(3) of the IAA, the Chief Justice of Singapore may, if he or she thinks fit, appoint any other person to exercise the powers of the President of the SIAC Court of Arbitration conferred by section 8(2) of the IAA.

Yes, the appointment of an arbitrator can be challenged. Pursuant to Article 12(2) of the Model Law (and, for domestic arbitrations, section 14(3) of the AA), the two grounds for challenging an arbitrator’s appointment are:

i. circumstances exist which give rise to justifiable doubts as to the arbitrator’s impartiality or independence; or

ii. the arbitrator does not possess the qualifications agreed to by the parties.

Article 13(1) of the Model Law allows parties to agree on a procedure for challenging arbitrators.

Absent such an agreement, Article 13(2) of the Model Law provides the default procedure:

i. The challenging party must, within fifteen (15) days of becoming aware of the constitution of the tribunal or after becoming aware of any of the two above circumstances, furnish a written statement to the arbitral tribunal containing the reasons for such challenge.

ii. If the challenged arbitrator does not thereafter withdraw from his or her appointment as arbitrator, then the arbitral tribunal shall decide on the challenge.

There have been several cases of note in Singapore regarding an arbitrator’s duty of independence and impartiality.

In the SICC judgment of CFJ and another v CFL and another and other matters [2023] 3 SLR 1 (“CFJ”), the applicant sought the removal of the presiding arbitrator of an SIAC tribunal, alleging doubts over his impartiality. The basis of this challenge was that the defendant was a state-owned entity, and the arbitrator had been appointed to a panel of experts constituted by the highest court of that state. Further, the presiding arbitrator had not disclosed this appointment to the parties.

In CFJ, the SICC set out at [51] the test for finding apparent bias, being whether there exist facts and circumstances that give rise to a reasonable suspicion or apprehension of bias in the fair-minded and informed observer. This is a fact-specific and objective inquiry. The application was dismissed, as the SICC found that the “fair-minded and informed observer” would understand that the state’s court and government are distinct entities. With respect to the non-disclosure, the SICC observed at [75] that “an arbitrator does not have to disclose every single appointment to the parties”, and that an arbitrator only needs to disclose appointments and matters which would cause the reasonable observer to conclude that there was a real possibility of a lack of impartiality.

More recently, the SICC judgment of The Tata Power Co Ltd v Kleros Capital Partners Ltd [2026] SGHC(I) (“Tata”) dealt with a challenge against two of three arbitrators appointed to a Singapore-seated Tribunal. One of the parties to the proceedings was being funded by a third-party litigation funder.

The grounds of the challenge were (i) non-disclosure of previous appointments in unrelated proceedings by one of the parties’ counsel; (ii) non-disclosure of previous appointments in arbitral proceedings where the same third-party funder was involved; and (iii) non-disclosure of a close personal and professional relationship by one of the arbitrators with a member of the third-party funder’s investment committee.

The SICC dismissed the application, finding that these grounds did not give rise to apparent bias and that “the degree of likelihood of bias must be substantial and not merely imagined”. Importantly, the SICC placed some weight on the fact that the IBA Guidelines were not directly on point for any of the alleged non-disclosures.

Finally, in DJP v DJO [2025] 1 SLR 576 (“DJP”), the Court of Appeal upheld the SICC’s decision to set aside an arbitral award on the basis that it was made in breach of the rules of natural justice. In that case, the presiding arbitrator had also been the presiding arbitrator in two parallel arbitrations involving the respondent. All three arbitrations involved materially the same claims against the respondent.

The Final Award was found to have included 212 (out of 451) paragraphs which were reproduced from the awards issued in the parallel arbitrations, and the Court of Appeal found (among other things) that the allegations of apparent bias had been made out because a fair-minded and reasonable observer would have been left with a reasonable suspicion that the tribunal had not kept an open mind. Importantly, the Court of Appeal observed that so long as one of the tribunal members was found to be tainted by actual or apparent bias, the entire award could be liable to be set aside.

Arbitrators are immune from liability arising out of negligence and/or errors. Section 25 of the IAA expressly excludes an arbitrator’s liability for (i) negligence in respect of any act or omission done in the capacity of an arbitrator; and (ii) any mistake in law, fact or procedure made in the course of arbitral proceedings or in the making of an arbitral award.

Yes. Article 16(1) of the Model Law confers the arbitral tribunal’s ability to determine its own jurisdiction, including any objections with respect to the existence or validity of the arbitration agreement.

This ability is caveated by section 10(3) of the IAA, which provides that any party may, within thirty (30) days after having received notice of the arbitral tribunal’s ruling on jurisdiction, apply to the General Division of the High Court to decide the matter.

The powers of the Singapore courts differ in relation to international and domestic arbitrations.

Under the IAA, the courts must order a stay of domestic court proceedings if they are commenced in breach of an operable arbitration agreement. Under the AA, the courts have some discretion as to whether a stay of proceedings should be granted. However, the court will ordinarily stay domestic proceedings in favour of arbitration.

In relation to proceedings commenced in foreign jurisdictions, the courts of Singapore will generally grant an injunction to restrain proceedings commenced in breach of an arbitration agreement if:

i. the proceedings have, prima facie, been commenced in breach of an arbitration agreement; and

ii. there are no strong reasons to allow the court proceedings to continue, such as the subject matter of the dispute being incapable of resolution by way of arbitration because it would be contrary to public policy to do so. In this regard, the relevant public policy would be the policy of the law governing the arbitration agreement and the law of the seat.

Singapore law does not compel a respondent to take part in arbitration proceedings.

Article 25(b) of the Model Law provides that where “the respondent fails to communicate his statement of defence in accordance with Article 23(1), the arbitral tribunal shall continue the proceedings without treating such failure in itself as an admission of the claimant’s allegations.”

In line with the above, the Singapore Court of Appeal judgment of Rakna Arakshaka Lanka Ltd v Avant Garde Maritime Services (Pte) Ltd [2019] 2 SLR 131 has also observed that neither the UNCITRAL Model Law nor the IAA imposes a duty on a respondent to participate in arbitration proceedings. In particular, the judgment explained in [73] that:

“… The law does not compel a respondent against whom arbitration proceedings have been started to take part in those proceedings and defend his position. If the respondent believes that the arbitration tribunal has no jurisdiction, for one reason or another, he is perfectly entitled to sit by and do nothing in the belief that either the proceedings will not result in a final award against him or that, if an award is made, he will have valid grounds to resist enforcement. … If the respondent is mistaken in his belief, then the arbitration which proceeds without his participation will end in an award which will be enforceable against him …”

Joinder is generally governed by procedural law or the institutional rules of the arbitration institution.

For instance, under Rule 18 of the SIAC Rules 2025, a party or non-party to the arbitration may apply for one or more additional parties to be joined in a pending arbitration as either claimant or respondent, provided that:

i. the additional party to be joined is prima faciebound by the arbitration agreement; or

ii. all parties, including the additional party to be joined, have consented to the joinder of the additional party.

Where an application for joinder is made prior to the constitution of the Tribunal, it shall be decided by the SIAC Court. Where it is made after the Tribunal is constituted, it is to be decided by the Tribunal. If the application is initially dismissed by the SIAC Court, a fresh application may be made to the Tribunal once constituted.

Yes, both the tribunal and the courts are empowered to make orders to grant an interim injunction or any other form of interim relief, and the tribunal may award any relief that may be granted by the High Court in civil proceedings.

The tribunal may grant this relief without the assistance of a court, although the enforcement of the tribunal’s order would require the court’s assistance. If the court grants permission to enforce the tribunal’s order as if it were an order of court, then non-compliance with such an order may give rise to criminal liability for contempt of court.

The court may grant interim measures in support of an ongoing arbitration, including the following:

i. the preservation, interim custody or sale of any property which is or forms part of the subject matter of the dispute;

ii. the taking of samples, making of observations, or carrying out of experiments on any property which forms part of the dispute;

iii. the preservation and interim custody of any evidence for the purposes of the proceedings;

iv. securing the amount in dispute;

v. preventing the dissipation of assets;

vi. an interim injunction or any other interim measure; and

vii. enforcing any obligation of confidentiality.

However, the court may not grant this relief unless the tribunal is not empowered to do so, or the tribunal is unable, for the time being, to act effectively.

The court’s exercise of this power would not affect the jurisdiction of the tribunal. Any relief granted by the court in support of an arbitration will cease to have effect if the tribunal (provided it has the power to do so) makes an order expressly relating to the same subject matter.

Courts in Singapore will generally grant interim relief in support of an arbitration if the tribunal is unable to do so. In respect of anti-suit injunctions, Singapore is a pro-arbitration jurisdiction and courts will generally enforce agreements to arbitrate so long as they are capable of being performed.

If a party to an arbitration agreement commences proceedings before the Singapore courts in breach of the arbitration agreement, any other party to the arbitration agreement may apply for a stay of the court proceedings in favour of arbitration.

Under the IAA, international arbitration agreements must be enforced (i.e. the application for a stay of proceedings must be granted) unless the arbitration agreement is null and void, inoperative, or incapable of being performed.

Under the AA, the court has broader discretion to allow the court proceedings to continue in spite of a domestic arbitration agreement. However, the court will generally enforce the arbitration agreement if:

i. there is no sufficient reason why the matter should not be referred to arbitration in accordance with the arbitration agreement; and

ii. the party seeking to enforce the arbitration agreement was (when proceedings in court were commenced) and remains, ready and willing to do all things necessary to the proper conduct of the arbitration.

If a party to an arbitration agreement commences proceedings before the courts of a foreign jurisdiction, and the arbitration agreement provides for the arbitration to be seated in Singapore, the Singapore courts have the power to grant an anti-suit injunction to restrain foreign proceedings.

In determining whether or not an anti-suit injunction should be granted in order to restrain foreign court proceedings, the court will first consider whether the proceedings have been commenced in breach of the arbitration agreement – i.e. whether the dispute in the foreign jurisdiction falls within the scope of the arbitration agreement between the parties.

If the proceedings were commenced in breach of the arbitration agreement, the court will generally grant an anti-suit injunction unless there are strong reasons not to do so, provided that the application was brought promptly such that the foreign proceedings have not been allowed to reach an advanced stage.

The Singapore courts will readily hold parties to their agreement to arbitrate, provided the said agreement is operable.

The threshold for granting an anti-suit injunction is relatively low where the parties are seeking to enforce an arbitration agreement. A court will ordinarily grant anti-suit relief if:

i. The party seeking the injunction can show, on a prima facie basis, that the foreign proceedings have been commenced in breach of a valid arbitration agreement; and

ii. There are no strong reasons for refusing the grant of an injunction, provided that the application was brought promptly.

An arbitral tribunal has broad powers to determine its own procedure, including rules of evidence. Unless the parties have agreed otherwise, the Model Law expressly confers the tribunal with the power to determine the admissibility, relevance, materiality, and weight of any evidence.

As such, unless the parties have agreed otherwise, there are neither prescriptive nor proscriptive rules of evidence applicable to Singapore-seated arbitrations.

Parties commonly adopt the IBA Rules on Taking of Evidence for the purposes of arbitral proceedings. However, unless the parties have expressly agreed to their application, or the tribunal determines that they be applicable, the IBA Rules are not binding and serve only as guidance.

The IAA expressly empowers the High Court to order the attendance of a witness or the production of documents.

The IAA makes a distinction between an order for discovery and an order for the production of documents. An order for discovery is broader than an order for production, and may include documents leading to a train of inquiry which may assist a party in the arbitration. Such an order may only be granted by an arbitral tribunal.

In contrast, an order for production is a request for the delivery of specific documents, which the High Court is empowered to grant.

If a witness is in Singapore, the court may also grant an order to compel a witness to give evidence and/or produce specified documents before an arbitral tribunal.

The requirements of the Legal Professional (Professional Conduct) Rules 2015 are applicable to Singapore-qualified counsel in arbitral proceedings governed by the IAA or the AA. These are the same ethical rules which govern the conduct of counsel in proceedings before the Singapore courts.

However, these rules do not apply to foreign counsel acting in a Singapore-seated arbitration.

The SIAC also applies a Code of Ethics for arbitrators which further supplements the above requirements.

The Singapore courts have recognised that there is an implied obligation of confidentiality in respect of arbitral proceedings. This is a common law rule, which generally co-exists with confidentiality requirements of the rules applicable to the arbitration, but will generally apply where there is no express agreement as to confidentiality.

However, the scope of the common law obligation of confidentiality is not uniform. It will depend on the context of each case, and may attach differently to different types of documents and proceedings. For example, a recent decision has recognised that arbitrator’s deliberations are confidential, even if there is no statutory provision which protects them from disclosure.

The courts have also recognised a non-exhaustive list of exceptions to the obligation of confidentiality, as follows:

i. where there is express or implied consent by the parties to disclosure;

ii. where disclosure is permitted by the arbitral tribunal or by the court;

iii. where disclosure is reasonably necessary for the protection of a legitimate interest of a party, including enforcement proceedings; and

iv. where the interests of justice or public interest require disclosure. This exception includes disclosure to relevant authorities where there are reasonable suspicions of criminal conduct, but does not extend to disclosure to the public at large.

Further, court proceedings relating to applications under the IAA are, by default, to be heard in private unless the court (on its own motion or on the application of a party), orders otherwise. The IAA also empowers the court to determine what, if any, information may be published in relation to these proceedings. The court may not permit information to be published unless all parties agree, or it is satisfied that the information published may be done in a manner which would not reveal any confidential matter, including the identity of the parties.

Where a court is of the view that the grounds of its decision should be published, parties may request that steps be taken to preserve confidential information, for example, by anonymising the names of the parties.

The IBA guidelines are not directly applicable (unless agreed by the parties), but are commonly adopted by both Courts and Tribunals to inform the extent of an arbitrator’s disclosure obligations, for example, under Rule 20 of the SIAC Rules 2025.

The Courts of Singapore have treated the guidelines as a useful guide to delineate an arbitrator’s disclosure obligations when considering applications to set aside awards for breach of natural justice.

In BYL v BYN [2020] 4 SLR 1, the SICC considered that given the IBA Guidelines’ relatively ubiquitous nature,  a reasonable observer would be aware of the disclosure obligations they set out, and accordingly a failure to comply with the same may give rise to a justifiable suspicion of bias.

Similarly in Tata (addressed in question 17 above) the SICC held that there had not been any non-disclosure which would give rise to apparent bias by the arbitrators. One of the considerations in this finding was that none of the IBA Guidelines on disclosure were directly on point.

There have been no reported cases relating specifically to developments under the 2024 IBA Guidelines, social media conduct, due diligence obligations, or the UNCITRAL Code of Conduct for Arbitrators.

A tribunal has broad discretion with respect to an award for costs, which may include the tribunal’s fees and hearing costs. Where costs are awarded but are not fixed by the tribunal, they are assessable by the Registrar of the Singapore International Arbitration Centre, who may issue a certificate which forms part of the award.

In practice, a tribunal will often award costs to a successful party, provided those costs were reasonably incurred in light of the circumstances of the case. These costs may include legal fees, expert costs and costs of securing the attendance of witnesses. However, no party is entitled to costs as of right, and the tribunal retains the discretion to consider the parties’ conduct in the arbitration in determining the appropriate award for costs.

Section 20 of the IAA gives tribunals broad discretion in respect of pre- or post-award interest. The tribunal is expressly empowered to award simple or compound interest, at the rate, and for the period, that the tribunal considers appropriate.

The outer bounds of the tribunal’s discretionary power are likely only limited by the scope of the parties’ agreement to arbitrate and issues of public policy.

Pursuant to Section 12(a) of the IAA, Tribunals are empowered to make an order for security for costs. However, the IAA excludes the Court’s powers to do so in respect of an international arbitration.

An arbitral tribunal is granted significant latitude to grant or refuse an application for security for costs. Under Rule 48 of the SIAC Rules 2025, the tribunal may order any party asserting a claim, counter-claim, or cross-claim to pay security for costs.

There are a broad range of considerations a tribunal may take into account when determining an application for security for costs. However, such applications will generally not be granted for the sole reason that the counterparty is not in Singapore.

Instead, a tribunal will likely consider, as a threshold issue, whether there is a risk that the counterparty will be unable or unwilling to satisfy an adverse costs order. This threshold may be crossed where there is evidence that the counterparty is impecunious (provided such impecuniosity is not caused by the applicant) or has previously failed or refused to satisfy orders against it.

If this threshold is crossed, the tribunal may then determine whether an order for security for costs is appropriate or necessary, taking into account the prima facie strength of the parties’ cases, the complexity of the case and the likely costs which will be incurred by the parties, and whether an order for security for costs is likely to stifle a party’s claim.

A recent example where an order for security for costs was granted was the case of DRL v DRK [2026] 4 SLR 1. In that case, the basis of the order was that international sanctions had been imposed on the claimant, rendering it unable to satisfy any costs orders which may have been made against it. As discussed in question 43 below, the claimant’s failure to comply with the said order resulted in the termination of the arbitral proceedings.

Singapore courts are pro-arbitration and will readily enforce arbitration awards unless there is a basis to refuse enforcement under the IAA or the New York Convention.

An arbitral award may be enforced by making an application for leave to enforce the award, either under section 19 of the IAA (for awards in Singapore-seated arbitrations) or section 30 of the IAA (for foreign awards). This application for leave may be made ex parte and must be supported by an affidavit.

The affidavit in support of the application must:

i. exhibit the arbitration agreement and original award, or duly authenticated copies of the same. If these documents are not in English, a certified English translation must be provided. This translation must be done by a sworn translator, or by an official or consular agent of the country in which it was made;

ii. state the name and usual or last place of residence of the party seeking enforcement, and the party against whom enforcement is sought; and

iii. if applicable, a statement that the award has not been complied with (in whole or in part) as of the date of the enforcement application.

There is no independent step for recognition of a foreign award if it is made in a country which is party to the New York Convention. An award which is enforceable is automatically found to be final and binding as between the parties.

A party seeking to resist enforcement may resist the application for leave to enforce, or may apply to set aside any enforcement order which is granted.

Regarding requirements that an award be reasoned, Article 31(2) of the UNCITRAL Model Law requires an award to “state the reasons upon which it is based, unless the parties have agreed that no reasons are to be given”, or the award is an award based on an agreed settlement under Article 30 of the UNCITRAL Model Law.

Notwithstanding the above, an award cannot be refused enforcement on the mere basis of uncertainty or ambiguity. The Court of Appeal in CEF and another v CEH [2022] 2 SLR 918 found at [43]  that “uncertainty or ambiguity” is not a basis to set aside an award under Article 34(2)(a)(iv) of the Model Law.

The recognition and enforcement of most arbitral awards in Singapore will take between one (1) and three (3) months. However, this is only an estimated guideline as the exact timeframe will not only depend on the merits of each case but also if the award has been challenged to be set aside. If the respondent does not challenge the enforcement of the award, the time taken for proceedings can be significantly shortened.

An application for the recognition and enforcement may be brought ex parte. Order 48 rule 6(1) of the Rules of Court 2021 provides that ‘[a]n application for permission to enforce an award may be made without notice …’

Generally, there is no difference in respect of the enforcement of domestic or international awards.

While the recognition and enforcement of a domestic award is governed by the AA and that of a foreign award is governed by the IAA, the provisions and procedure for enforcing both are similar.

Section 46 of the AA and section 19 of the IAA both state that an award, with permission of the General Division of the High Court, may be enforced in the same manner as a judgment or order of the Court to the same effect. Where permission is so given, judgment may also be entered in terms of the award.

Pursuant to section 29 of the IAA, foreign awards may similarly be enforced in a court either by action or in the same manner as an award made in Singapore which is enforceable under section 19 of the IAA.

Pursuant to section 46(3) of the AA, arbitral awards that are made in non-New York Convention jurisdictions can be enforced in accordance with the procedure for enforcement of a domestic arbitral award.

An international arbitration award governed by the IAA may not be appealed to the courts in Singapore.

However, parties may appeal a tribunal’s ruling on its own jurisdiction. Such an appeal may be made on a preliminary ruling that the tribunal does have jurisdiction, or a ruling (at any stage) that the tribunal does not have jurisdiction.

Such an appeal must be made to the General Division of the High Court within 30 days after receiving notice of the tribunal’s ruling. The filing of an appeal does not automatically stay the arbitral proceedings unless the courts order otherwise.

An arbitral award made in a Singapore-seated arbitration may only be challenged on the limited grounds set out in the IAA read with the Model Law. Importantly, the courts of Singapore may not review the substantive merits of an arbitral award.

These limited grounds are:

i. Where a party to the arbitration agreement was under some incapacity;

ii. Where the arbitration agreement is invalid under the law governing it (or absent an indication of the governing law of the arbitration agreement, the laws of Singapore);

iii. Where the award goes beyond the scope of the dispute submitted to arbitration;

iv. Where the composition of the arbitral tribunal or the arbitral procedure was not done in accordance with the parties’ agreement (unless such an agreement was contrary to the Model Law), or absent such agreement, in accordance with the Model Law;

v. Where the subject matter of the dispute is non-arbitrable under the laws of Singapore;

vi. Where the award conflicts with the public policy of Singapore;

vii. Where the making of the award was induced by fraud or corruption; or

viii. Where there has been a breach of natural justice in the making of the award, and the rights of a party have been prejudiced by such a breach.

The standard for refusing enforcement of an arbitral award on the basis of public policy is a high one. The courts have suggested that the standard for refusing enforcement on the grounds of public policy would be the same as the standard applied in setting aside applications on that ground.

The court will generally not disturb the finality of an arbitral award without good reason, and will have to be satisfied that some form of reprehensible or unconscionable conduct of sufficient gravity had contributed, in a material way, to procuring the award.

For example, the courts have recognised that fraud (including procedural fraud), would be a basis to refuse enforcement of an award, even if that award had not been set aside on that basis. However, strong and cogent evidence would have to be adduced in support of the allegation, and the courts will not make an inference of fraud.

Neither the IAA nor the Model Law clearly state whether any grounds for setting aside an award may be contractually excluded by the parties. At present, there has been no decision by the courts of Singapore as to whether this would be possible.

However, it is unlikely that an agreement to exclude certain grounds for a challenge will be effective given the nature of the grounds set out above. For example, if a party was under an incapacity and could not enter into an arbitration agreement in the first place, it would likely be incapable of agreeing to exclude grounds for setting aside an eventual award.

Similarly, if the arbitration agreement itself is invalid under the applicable law, then any agreement to exclude grounds for setting aside will likely be affected by the same invalidity.

Importantly, the IAA does not provide that any grounds may be excluded. This can be contrasted with s 49(2) of the AA, which allows parties to contractually exclude their right to appeal domestic awards to the courts of Singapore. Accordingly, it appears unlikely that parties can agree to exclude any ground for setting aside an arbitral award.

A third party or non-signatory can be bound by an award where the rights which give rise to the award have been validly transferred to the third party. In the Singapore Court of Appeal judgment of National Oilwell Varco Norway AS (formerly known as Hydralift AS) v Keppel FELS Ltd (KFELS) [2022] 2 SLR 115, the claimant commenced arbitration proceedings against its contractual counterparty.

However, by the time the arbitral tribunal was constituted, the named respondent had undergone a merger with a third party, no longer existed as a separate entity, and the third party had assumed all the assets, rights, obligations and liabilities of the original respondent. This third party appeared in the arbitration in the name of the original respondent and asserted a counterclaim. The third party was ultimately successful.

The issue before the Court of Appeal was whether the award could be enforced by the third party against the claimant. The Court of Appeal found that it could be enforced even if the award was in the name of the original respondent because the third party and the original respondent were, for all intents and purposes, the same entity. The Court of Appeal held that, if the parties had not been a single legal entity, the award would not be enforceable by the third party because it would have been made in favour of another entity.

Third-party funding is permitted in arbitration proceedings and arbitration-related proceedings before the courts in Singapore provided that the funding comes from a qualified third-party funder.

In order to qualify, the funder’s principal business must be the funding of dispute resolution proceedings to which they are not a party, and must have a paid-up share capital, or manage assets, of not less than S$ 5 million or its equivalent in foreign currency.

Several professional third-party funders are now active in the Singapore market.

The SIAC Rules 2025 have now imposed disclosure requirements, where parties must disclose the existence of any third-party funding agreement and the identity and contact details of the third-party funder at the earliest opportunity (including in the Notice of Arbitration or Response thereto).

This is a continuing obligation and any changes in the third-party funding agreement must be promptly disclosed.  Further, the Tribunal may order the disclosure of the details of the third-party funding agreement (including the funder’s interest and any commitments as to adverse costs orders).

However, the SIAC Rules 2025 prohibit parties from entering into a third-party funding agreement after the constitution of the Tribunal if such agreement gives rise to a conflict of interest with any member of the Tribunal. If such an agreement is entered into after the Tribunal has been constituted, the Tribunal may direct the relevant party to withdraw from the said agreement.

The availability of emergency arbitrator relief depends on the applicable institutional rules. For example, the SIAC Rules 2025 expressly provide for emergency arbitrator relief. Decisions rendered under this procedure are readily enforceable.

Section 2(1) of the IAA defines “arbitral tribunal” to include “an emergency arbitrator appointed pursuant to the rules of arbitration agreed to or adopted by the parties including the rules of arbitration of an institution or organisation”, and defines “award” to mean a “decision of the arbitral tribunal on the substance of the dispute and includes any interim, interlocutory or partial award but excludes any order or direction made under section 12 [of the IAA]”.

Likewise, the AA includes similar definitions for “arbitral tribunal” and “award” under section 2(1).

It is noted that section 2(1) of the IAA does not apply to Part III of the IAA, which concerns foreign awards. However, the recent High Court judgment of CVG v CVH [2023] 3 SLR 1559 has confirmed that the terms “arbitral award” and “foreign award” in section 27(1) of the IAA includes awards by emergency arbitrators. Consequently, section 29 of the IAA allows for foreign awards by emergency arbitrators to be enforced.

Yes. The SIAC Rules 2025 have implemented both the Streamlined Procedure and the Expedited Procedure in respect of smaller claims. These procedures may also apply to any dispute (regardless of value) where the parties have so agreed in writing.

Streamlined Procedure

The Streamlined Procedure is set out in Schedule 2 of the SIAC Rules 2025 and is applicable, by default, to disputes valued below S$ 1,000,000 unless (i) expressly excluded by the parties in writing; or (ii) the President of the SIAC Court determines, upon application by one of the parties, that the Streamlined Procedure will not apply.

Where the Streamlined Procedure is applicable, the parties are deemed to have agreed that it shall take precedence over any inconsistent terms in the arbitration agreement (including with respect to the appointment of the Tribunal).

Under the Streamlined Procedure:

i. A sole arbitrator shall be appointed. The parties may jointly nominate this arbitrator within three (3) days of being notified that the Streamlined Procedure will apply, failing which the President of the SIAC Court will make the appointment.

ii. Unless the Tribunal determines otherwise, the arbitration shall be decided based on written submissions and documentary evidence and no requests for production will be allowed. The parties do not have a right to present any fact or expert witness evidence, and by default, no hearing will be held.

iii. The final award shall be issued within three (3) months from the constitution of the Tribunal unless the Registrar grants an extension of time for the issuance of the same.

iv. The costs of the arbitration are capped at 50% of the applicable limits set out in the SIAC Schedule of Fees.

The SIAC’s annual report states that 60 arbitrations proceeded under the Streamlined Procedure in 2025.[1]

Expedited Procedure

Where the amount in dispute is:

i. between S$ 1,000,000 and S$ 10,000,000; or

ii. below S$ 1,000,000 but the President of the SIAC Court has determined that the Streamlined Procedure shall not apply,

either party may file an application for the Expedited Procedure set out in Schedule 3 to apply. If these requirements are not met, an application may also be made where the circumstances of the case warrant the application of the Expedited Procedure. Any application in respect of the Expedited Procedure must be made prior to the constitution of the Tribunal.

As with the Streamlined Procedure, the parties are deemed to have agreed that the Expedited Procedure (if applicable) will take precedence over any inconsistent or contrary terms in their arbitration agreement.

Under the Expedited Procedure:

i. A sole arbitrator shall be appointed unless the President of the SIAC Court determines otherwise;

ii. The dispute shall be determined on the basis of written submissions and documentary evidence, and a hearing will only be held if requested by any party or the Tribunal determines that a hearing would be appropriate. Any such hearing, by default, is to be held virtually; and

iii. The final award is to be issued within six (6) months from the constitution of the Tribunal unless the Registrar grants an extension of time.

The Expedited Procedure has been in place since 2010, with just over 1,000 Expedited Procedure applications being filed since then. Of these, just under 600 have been accepted.[2] In 2024, 143 such applications were filed with the SIAC, with 66 of these being accepted.[3]

[1] The Annual Report 2025 of the SIAC, page 25, which can be retrieved at https://siac.org.sg/wp-content/uploads/2025/09/SIAC-Annual-Report-2025.pdf

[2] The Annual Report 2025 of the SIAC, p 25, which can be retrieved at https://siac.org.sg/wp-content/uploads/2025/09/SIAC-Annual-Report-2025.pdf

[3] The Annual Report 2025 of the SIAC, p 25, which can be retrieved at https://siac.org.sg/wp-content/uploads/2025/09/SIAC-Annual-Report-2025.pdf

In the Singapore High Court decision of CZD v CZE [2023] 5 SLR 806, the defendant had raised the argument, among others, that an arbitral award should be set aside on the basis that the award had been fully and/or effectively satisfied in enforcement proceedings commenced in China. The court rejected this argument at [44] to [45] of the judgment, and one of its reasons for doing so was that “the fact that an Award has been satisfied is not a recognised ground of challenge under s 31 of the IAA, which provides an exhaustive list of grounds for refusal of enforcement”.

At the outset, section 24(a) of the IAA allows the General Division of the High Court to set aside the award of the arbitral tribunal if the making of the award was induced or affected by fraud or corruption.

In Lao Holdings NV v Government of the Lao People’s Democratic Republic and another matter [2021] 5 SLR 228, the SICC found at [153] that arbitral tribunals have a duty to consider corruption (which includes illegal conduct, bribery and fraud) and be proactive in doing so. Such duty arises not only where the arbitral tribunal has to deal with allegations of corruption in the dispute between the parties, but also where the evidence in the case indicates possible corruption. Further, the SICC held that no agreement between the parties can prevent the arbitral tribunal from reviewing and, where appropriate, admitting any evidence of corruption which a party seeks to put before the arbitral tribunal.

The SICC further upheld (at [400]) the arbitral tribunal’s decision in this case that illegality required “clear and convincing evidence” and adopted a standard of a “balance of probabilities” for bad faith allegations. Further, the party alleging corruption bears the burden of proof.

In relation to setting aside awards for fraud or corruption, the Singapore Court of Appeal in Bloomberry Resorts and Hotels Inc and another v Global Gaming Philippines LLC and another [2021] 1 SLR 1045 held at [82] that Article 34(3) of the UNCITRAL Model Law applies such that an application for setting aside an award may not be made after three (3) months have elapsed from the date on which the party making that application had received the award, even if the application is based on new evidence of fraud or corruption.

Singapore is not a contracting party or signatory of the Energy Charter Treaty.

Yes, this issue has arisen in at least two recent cases.

First, in the SICC decision of DNZ v DOA [2026] SGHC(I) 1 (“DNZ”), a state applied to set aside an investor-state decision issued by the PCA in relation to the Energy Charter Treaty (“ECT”) in favour of UK-based investors. The arbitration was seated in Singapore.

In DNZ, the relevant state argued that insofar as Article 26 of the ECT provided for investor-state arbitration, it was invalid and/or inapplicable where the dispute was an “Intra-EU Dispute” which was instead governed by EU law. The Court found that the ECT remained an international treaty, and was governed by international law in the courts of third States like the SICC. The SICC held that, under international law, Article 26 of the ECT had not been superseded by EU law by virtue of subsequent treaties.

Accordingly, the state’s argument on Intra-EU disputes was rejected and the application to set aside the award was dismissed.

The second case is the High Court decision in NextEra Energy Global Holdings BV v Kingdom of Spain [2026] SGHC 43, which related to the registration of an ICSID award against Spain by Dutch investors, where the claim arose out of the ECT.

The ICSID award had been successfully registered in Singapore, and Spain applied to set the registration order aside on grounds of state immunity and by raising what was defined as an “Intra-EU Objection”. The Intra-EU Objection advanced by Spain was that there could not be a valid arbitration agreement between an EU Member State and the national of another EU Member State.

Relying on the SICC’s analysis in DNZ, the High Court dismissed Spain’s application.

Remote or virtual hearings have been utilised by both the courts and Singapore-seated arbitral tribunals for a relatively long time. There is no restriction on a tribunal’s discretion to hold hearings by way of virtual conferencing.

From a time and costs perspective, particularly where the parties, tribunal, and witnesses are located in disparate locations, virtual hearings are often preferred, particularly for procedural or administrative hearings. For example, under both the Streamlined Procedure and Expedited Procedure of the SIAC Rules 2025, virtual hearings are to be used by default if any such hearing is held.

While this approach has been relatively commonplace for some years in respect of arbitral proceedings, it gained widespread adoption in the courts during and after the COVID-19 pandemic. As both advocates and tribunals have gained comfort with the prospect of virtual hearings, its adoption has continued such that it may be difficult to justify the use of physical hearings unless strictly necessary.

In light of the above, physical hearings are more commonly reserved for evidentiary hearings, as both parties and tribunals may maintain a preference for cross-examinations to be conducted in person.

There have not been any recent disputes relating to climate change and/or human rights in Singapore.

Nonetheless, there are developments in addressing climate change in the sphere of corporate governance. As of 2025, listed companies on the Singapore Exchange (“SGX”) must comply with mandatory climate-related disclosures, with large non-listed companies (defined as those with at least S$1 billion in revenue and S$500 million in assets) following suit starting in 2027.[1]

This announcement follows other recent measures taken by Singapore to reduce the impact of climate change, such as SGX’s introduction in 2022 of climate reporting requirements on a “comply or explain” basis for all listed companies,[2] and the incremental raising of carbon taxes from S$5 per tonne to S$25 per tonne currently and S$50 to S$80 per tonne by 2030.[3]

[1] Please refer to https://www.sgxgroup.com/media-centre/20240228-climate-reporting-help-companies-ride-green-transition for more details.

[2] Please refer to https://www.sgxgroup.com/media-centre/20211215-sgx-mandates-climate-and-board-diversity-disclosures for more details.

[3] Please refer to https://www.nccs.gov.sg/singapores-climate-action/mitigation-efforts/carbontax/ for more details.

Singapore generally does not impose its own sanctions regime and primarily implements United Nations Security Council sanctions through domestic legislation, including the United Nations Act 2001. The Monetary Authority of Singapore is responsible for implementing and enforcing relevant sanctions requirements within the financial sector.

A notable exception is Russia. Following the invasion of Ukraine in 2022, Singapore introduced its own targeted measures against Russia. These include export controls on items that could be used as weapons, implemented under the Strategic Goods (Control) Act 2002, as well as financial measures restricting dealings with designated Russian banks and entities and certain fundraising activities benefiting the Russian government.

To the best of our knowledge, Singapore has not otherwise adopted the EU sanctions regimes as its own. Nevertheless, EU, UK and US sanctions may have practical implications for Singapore-seated arbitrations, depending on the parties involved, their banking arrangements and the applicable sanctions exposure of tribunal members and other relevant participants.

The High Court case of DRL v DRK [2026] 4 SLR 1 was a case where the imposition of international sanctions on one of the parties made the continuation of proceedings impossible.

In that case, the claimant in the arbitration had commenced Singapore-seated proceedings against the respondent. Subsequently, the claimant was made the subject of international sanctions by several countries.

The claimant initially sought and obtained a two-month stay of proceedings from the arbitral tribunal to address issues arising from the sanctions, which prevented it from receiving or making payments, including payments necessary to progress the arbitration and satisfy any future award or costs order.

When a request for a further stay of proceedings was rejected, the respondent sought and obtained an order for security for costs against the claimant. A condition of this order was that the respondent could apply to terminate the arbitral proceedings if the security (in the amount of S$ 1.3 million) was not paid.

The claimant failed to comply with the tribunal’s order, and on the application of the respondent, the proceedings were terminated by way of a final award on the grounds that the continuation of the arbitration had become impossible within the meaning of Article 32(2)(c) of the Model Law.

The claimant applied to the High Court to set aside this award. The High Court rejected the application and found that the challenge to the award was an impermissible appeal against the Tribunal’s finding that it was impossible for the proceedings to continue.

In dismissing the application, the High Court observed that a party to arbitration proceedings did not have an absolute or unqualified right to a hearing of the merits. This right was qualified by mandatory provisions of the lex arbitri (i.e. Singapore law, including the IAA and the Model Law), which empowered the tribunal to terminate the proceedings without a determination of the merits.

The Court also found that the termination of an arbitration extinguished the tribunal’s duty to consider the essential issues and arguments raised by the parties on the merits, and the tribunal did not act so irrationally or capriciously in granting the termination order as to warrant intervention by the Court.

There are no rules or regulations regarding AI which are specifically applicable to international arbitration.

However, the Supreme Court has published a Guide on the Use of Generative Artificial Intelligence Tools by Court Users (Registrar’s Circular No. 1 of 2024), which provides that generative AI may be used by both litigants and lawyers, provided they take full responsibility for all materials placed before the Courts.

In particular, lawyers have a professional obligation to ensure that any materials placed before a Court or Tribunal (whether generated by AI or not) have been verified and are accurate.

In various recent proceedings before the Courts, personal costs orders were issued against counsel who had filed written submissions containing AI “hallucinations”, even where these hallucinations had no bearing on the outcome of the application.

There are no legal, institutional, or procedural frameworks which specifically apply to the arbitration of digital asset or blockchain-related disputes.  

However, on 16 March 2026 the GDHC created a specialized list of judges for disputes relating to the digital economy, who will be appointed to hear matters relating to AI, distributed ledger technology, digital assets, and smart contracts.  

Singapore has developed a robust body of case law relating to digital assets. Singapore law treats digital assets such as cryptocurrency and non-fungible tokens (“NFTs”) as being no different from any other type of personal property. Specifically, the Singapore Courts have held that crypto assets satisfied the indicia of property identified in National Provincial Bank v Ainsworth [1965] 1 AC 1175, and the Rules of Court 2021 specifically identify cryptocurrencies or other digital currencies as “moveable property” which may be the subject of an enforcement order.  

In light of this, Singapore Courts have recognised that crypto assets such as USDT are things in action and capable of being held on trust. In the case of ByBit Fintech Ltd v Ho Kai Xin and others [2023] 5 SLR 1746, the High Court found that an institutional constructive trust had arisen in respect of digital assets which had been fraudulently acquired. The Court recognised these assets as being stolen property, and found that the claimant was entitled to trace the stolen assets.  

Similarly, in DVA v DVC [2026] SGHC(I) 4, the SICC granted a proprietary injunction over cryptocurrency assets which were allegedly transferred by mistake.  

Singapore Courts have also handled matters relating to contracts which are formed and/or performed without human intervention.  In Quoine Pte Ltd v B2C2 Ltd [2020] 2 SLR 20 (“Quoine”), the Court of Appeal upheld an SICC decision finding that a contract could be formed between parties using algorithmic trading where no human intervention was required. In that case, the relevant algorithm had caused 13 trades to take place at approximately 250 times the going market rate.  

The Court of Appeal found that a valid contract could be formed by way of the parties’ deterministic algorithms, as the relevant parties had decided to use them to form contracts and would be content to abide by what the relevant algorithms did, so long as the algorithm acted within its set parameters. 

In addressing the defence of unilateral mistake, the Court of Appeal found that the relevant state of mind for the purposes of mistake or unconscionability was the state of mind of the programmers of the algorithms at the time of programming.  

While there have been no reported decisions regarding the validity of arbitration agreements contained in smart contracts, the decision in Quoine suggests that parties will be bound by any agreement formed by way of an automated program, provided the parties willingly employed the automated program and the program operated within its set parameters.  

Finally, Singapore Courts will generally treat arbitration agreements contained in digital asset terms in the same manner as an arbitration agreement contained in standard terms relating to any other transaction – i.e., the Court will assess whether the clause has been properly incorporated and whether the relevant users are given actual or constructive notice of the clause.  

In Beltran, Julian Moreno and another v Terraform Labs Pte Ltd [2024] 4 SLR 674, an application was made in the High Court by a cryptocurrency platform to restrain proceedings in favour of arbitration, where the relevant arbitration clauses were contained in the terms of use hyperlinked on the platform’s website.  

The High Court found that there was a prima facie case that the claimants had actual or constructive notice of the arbitration agreement, which would have been sufficient to justify a stay of Court proceedings until the issue could be determined by the arbitral tribunal. However, the Court dismissed the application for a stay on the basis that the platform had taken steps in the Court proceedings by filing a defence on the merits, asserting a counterclaim, and taking out interlocutory applications which went beyond a mere jurisdictional challenge.