Abuse of dominant position in the energy sector – Gazprom case / Antitrust proceedings / Upstream gas supplies in Central and Eastern Europe
 	Background to the investigation
The Gazprom case, registered under No. AT.39816 / Upstream Gas Supplies, is one of the most complex and sensitive cases ever examined by the European Commission under Article 102 TFEU.
The investigation illustrates the intersection between competition law and the European Union's foreign and energy policy, in a context dominated by the historical dependence of Central and Eastern European countries on Russian gas and the vertically integrated structure of the Russian company Gazprom.
At that time, Gazprom had the world's largest natural gas reserves and was the only company authorised to export natural gas through pipelines from Russia. In 2016, Gazprom produced approximately 420 billion cubic meters of natural gas, of which approximately 180 billion cubic meters were exported to Europe, making Gazprom Europe's main supplier of natural gas.
Between 2011 and 2015, the Commission carried out a series of ex officio investigations into the gas markets in Central and Eastern Europe, conducting on-site inspections pursuant to Article 20(4) of Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 and requesting information from Gazprom, its customers, and other market participants. The formal investigation was launched in 2012 following several complaints from competition authorities and companies in Poland, Lithuania, Latvia, and Bulgaria.
The formal investigation was launched in 2012 following several complaints from competition authorities and companies in Poland, Lithuania, Latvia, and Bulgaria. They accused Gazprom of fragmenting the internal market, imposing discriminatory prices, and using energy infrastructure as a tool for political pressure.
In its 2015 Statement of Objections (hereinafter "SO"), the Commission's preliminary assessment raised suspicions of abuse of a dominant position on three different levels, namely:
 	Gazprom allegedly included territorial restrictions in all its gas supply agreements, such as clauses on the destination of gas and export bans, for wholesale customers and certain industrial consumers. In addition, Gazprom allegedly prevented cross-border gas sales through measures with the same effect, namely by imposing metering requirements and a restrictive policy on changes to gas delivery points.
 	Gazprom allegedly applied an unfair pricing policy, charging wholesale customers in Central and Eastern Europe (Bulgaria, Estonia, Lithuania, Latvia, and Poland) prices that may have been excessive compared to Gazprom's costs or benchmark prices, , using, among other things, oil-indexed pricing formulas.
 	Gazprom allegedly exploited its dominant position by making gas supplies and gas prices in Bulgaria and Poland conditional on obtaining certain undue infrastructure commitments.
The case was closed in 2018 with a commitment decision pursuant to Article 9 of Regulation (EC) No 1/2003, under which Gazprom accepted a complex set of measures, hereinafter referred to as "Commitments," aimed at restoring fair competition in the market and restoring balance for customers who had accepted unfavorable gas supply conditions in view of Gazprom's dominant position.
This was, symbolically, the first competition decision with direct implications for the Union's energy security and demonstrated that competition law can and should be used as a strategic tool for economic integration and geopolitical protection, to ensure fair and free competition throughout the Union.
 	Legal basis
As of December 1, 2009, Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty establishing the European Community became Articles 101 and 102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union ("TFEU"). The two sets of provisions are essentially identical. For the purposes of this decision, which also covers a transitional legislative period, references to Articles 101 and 102 TFEU should also be understood as references to Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty establishing the European Community, where appropriate. The TFEU has also introduced natural terminological changes, such as replacing the term Community with Union and the terminology of common market with internal market. Where the meaning remains unchanged, TFEU terminology is used consistently in this decision.
The Commission's analysis concerns potential infringements of Article 102 TFEU, namely the abuse of Gazprom's dominant position on the natural gas market in Central and Eastern Europe.
Article 102 – formerly Article 82 TEC
Any abuse by one or more undertakings of a dominant position on the internal market or on a substantial part of it shall be incompatible with the internal market and prohibited insofar as it may affect trade between Member States.
Such abusive practices may in particular consist in:
a) directly or indirectly imposing unfair purchase or selling prices or other unfair trading conditions;
b) limiting production, marketing, or technical development to the detriment of consumers;
c) applying dissimilar conditions to equivalent transactions with other trading parties, thereby placing them at a competitive disadvantage;
d) making the conclusion of contracts conditional on the acceptance by partners of additional services which, by their nature or according to commercial usage, have no connection with the subject matter of such contracts.
 
The Decision to implement the Commitments was issued pursuant to Article 9 of Council Regulation (EC) No. 1/2003 of 16 December 2002 on the implementation of the rules on competition laid down in Articles 81 and 82 of the EC Treaty (now Articles 101 and 102 TFEU), as follows:
Article 9 – Commitments 
(1) Where the Commission intends to adopt a decision requiring that an infringement be brought to an end and undertakings offer commitments to meet the concerns expressed by the Commission in its preliminary assessment, the Commission may, by decision, make those commitments binding on the undertakings. Such a decision may be adopted for a limited period and may conclude that there are no longer grounds for action by the Commission.
(2) The Commission may, on request or on its own initiative, reopen the procedure:
(a)
 where there is a material change in any of the facts on which the decision was based;
 
(b)
if the undertakings concerned act contrary to the commitments they have given; or
 
(c)
 if the decision was based on incomplete, inaccurate, or misleading information provided by the parties.
 
 	Gazprom's dominant position
For the purposes of applying Article 102 TFEU, since it is necessary to establish a dominant position, the Commission first defined the relevant geographic markets for the supply of natural gas in eight countries: Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia, and Hungary.
According to the definition established in United Brands (C-27/76), a dominant position is considered to exist where "economic power enables an undertaking to prevent effective competition from being maintained and to behave to an appreciable extent independently of competitors, customers, and consumers."
The analysis showed that each of these markets was highly isolated from the rest of the Union and dependent on Russian imports due to (i) the lack of functional cross-border interconnections, (ii) the absence of alternative sources of supply, and (iii) long-term bilateral contracts concluded exclusively with Gazprom.
Gazprom was, de facto, the only supplier capable of meeting the total demand in these markets. In addition, the company exercised direct or indirect control over the transport infrastructure, either through local subsidiaries or through preferential agreements with national operators.
 	The product market
While there is a common market for oil and gas exploration, gas supply is a distinct market from oil supply. Oil and gas have different characteristics and are subject to different cost and pricing constraints, and therefore belong to distinct product markets.
Oil is mainly used for transport, while gas is mainly used for electricity generation and in industry.
The supply market is limited to what is actually consumed in a given geographic market, comprising domestic production and imports. Furthermore, the gas supply market does not include gas transiting through that geographical area. The Commission did not make any further distinction in the market based on gas quality (e.g., between high-calorific and low-calorific gas).
The wholesale supply market can be divided into an upstream and downstream market. In the upstream wholesale market, producers and exporters sell large quantities of gas to wholesale traders and importers, as well as indirect sales where gas is sold by the producer/exporter to the wholesale trader/importer on a hub platform or through intermediaries[1] .
The downstream supply market refers to subsequent sales by wholesalers and importers to retailers or other downstream wholesalers (i.e., distribution companies). This market is not relevant to the Commission's current analysis.
The Commission also analyzed the retail market, considering that Gazprom supplied industrial customers directly in certain parts of Central and Eastern Europe, but it was not considered relevant for this analysis.
 	Geographic market
According to established case law and Commission practice, the relevant geographic market comprises an area in which the undertakings concerned are involved in the supply and demand of the relevant products or services, in which the conditions of competition are similar or sufficiently homogeneous and which can be distinguished from neighbouring areas where the conditions of competition are significantly different.
Although in some previous cases the Commission has considered that the geographic market for upstream supply can be defined at EEA level, the Commission's analysis in those cases was carried out solely from the demand side perspective, without taking into account supply constraints related to gas transportation.
Thus, taking into account the supply side perspective on the upstream supply market, the Commission analyzed the market definition and reported on the limited interconnection infrastructure between markets or the lack of available cross-border capacity, concluding that the definition could also be made at the national level.
The Commission's conclusion was therefore that the markets are national in nature, since:
 	the upstream wholesale gas supply markets are characterized by the fact that there is generally a single large national distributor, which is a different entity for each of the CEE countries mentioned, and Gazprom has concluded gas supply contracts with each of these existing national distributors.
 	the contractual clauses contained territorial restrictions combined with take-or-pay obligations, which often corresponded exactly to national demand. This led to no or very little cross-border gas sales.
 	The technical transport capacity and the number of interconnection points between the gas networks of the CEE countries investigated at the time of the infringement were insufficient to allow the free flow of gas across borders, so as to offer customers alternative sources of supply from neighbouring gas markets.
 
 	Dominant position
Gazprom thus holds a dominant position in each of the national markets relevant to the analysis in the CEE countries, namely Estonia (80-100%), Latvia (70-100%), Lithuania (100%), Poland (40-65%), the Czech Republic (75-100%), Slovakia, Hungary (50-70%) and Bulgaria (80-100%)[2] .
Gazprom plays a key role in all the markets concerned, which means that, in the absence of its supplies in the short and medium term, customers risk being unable to meet their gas demand. At the same time, due to its large natural gas reserves, Gazprom can be considered an unavoidable trading partner for a large part of the national consumption of CEE countries.
 	The Commission's preliminary assessment
The Commission's preliminary assessment, as set out in the SO, is that the relevant markets should be defined as the national markets for upstream wholesale natural gas supply.
Gazprom holds a dominant position in all eight markets in Central and Eastern Europe for upstream wholesale gas supply, which has enabled Gazprom to prevent the free flow of gas throughout the CEE region, fragmenting and isolating the markets investigated.
The Commission concluded that market segmentation and restrictions on the free flow of gas were implemented through explicit contractual export prohibitions and destination clauses, as well as other contractual and non-contractual means with an equivalent effect. This restriction of the free flow of gas across CEE borders allowed Gazprom to charge prices above the fair competitive price level in other similar markets. In addition, preventing the free flow of gas across Central and Eastern European borders facilitated Gazprom's position as the main gas supplier to this region and thus enabled it to make its supplies conditional on obtaining infrastructure-related advantages from its customers.
 	Territorial restrictions in the form of contractual export bans or destination clauses and other contractual or non-contractual restrictions having equivalent effect
The first suspicion of abuse of a dominant position by Gazprom, as presented by the Commission in the SO, consists in the fragmentation of the internal market through various forms of territorial restrictions contrary to Article 102 TFEU.
Gazprom's gas supply contracts contained clauses preventing wholesalers from reselling gas outside their country (re-export prohibitions or resale restrictions), as well as destination clauses, which required wholesalers to use the gas only in their own country or, in some cases, to sell only to certain customers in their own country.
Some gas supply contracts contained clauses which, without constituting an explicit export ban or destination clause, could have the effect of preventing the re-export of gas, having an effect equivalent to explicitly restrictive clauses. This market segmentation could also be achieved by Gazprom's refusal to change the gas delivery points or the location where the gas is metered.
Territorial restrictions on resale constitute a violation of EU competition law. Commission Regulation (EU) No. 330/2010, specifically Article 4(b), classifies restrictions on the territory in which a buyer may sell the contract goods as restrictions under Article 101 TFEU. Furthermore, the case law of the CJEU[3] , classifies the imposition of restrictions on the use to which the goods may be put or the territory in which the goods may be resold as a restriction of competition contrary to Article 101 TFEU.
Furthermore, the Court of Justice has ruled that a clause prohibiting exports, i.e. an obligation to sell only on the domestic market, by its very nature constitutes a restriction of competition[4] , as such a clause is intended to segment markets within the Union, contrary to Article 101 TFEU.
Such anti-competitive conduct has also been sanctioned in the past, in the Suiker Unie case, where the Commission concluded that a dominant sugar refinery had infringed Article 102 TFEU by threatening to stop supplying sugar if distributors did not comply with its restrictive export policy.
Market segmentation can also be achieved by indirect means, but what is essential in determining the anti-competitive object of a measure is whether, by artificially altering the conditions of competition, it is clearly capable of inducing economic operators to give priority to the domestic market over exports, in contrast to the economic interpretations pursued by the Treaty. Furthermore, the possible argument that an agreement with an anti-competitive object also pursues other legitimate aims is irrelevant to the assessment of the anti-competitive nature of the agreement. It is also irrelevant on whose initiative the clause was adopted and whether it was strictly applied.
The Court confirmed that an agreement that has been found to have an anti-competitive object and that affects trade between Member States constitutes, by its nature and independently of any actual effect it may have, a significant restriction of competition.
Among the clauses identified in Gazprom's contracts, we mention, by way of example:
 	an extension clause whereby Gazprom has the right to increase the minimum annual quantities of gas under the take-or-pay obligation if the customer re-exports part of the annual quantity of gas, the increase corresponding to the quantity of gas re-exported by the customer.
 	a clause making re-export conditional on Gazprom's consent, in the sense that Gazprom's agreement is required for the use of certain gas metering points each time gas is exported from the country.
In conclusion, the Commission's preliminary assessment indicates that all territorial restrictions in the eight CEE Member States may have had an anti-competitive object, consisting in the fragmentation and isolation of the relevant gas markets in Central and Eastern Europe.
 	Charging excessive prices
The second suspicion of abuse of a dominant position by Gazprom, as presented by the Commission in the SO, consists in pursuing unfair pricing policies, charging prices in Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland that may have been excessive in comparison with Gazprom's costs, as well as in comparison with other relevant competitive price benchmarks.
Gazprom applied oil-indexed pricing formulas in its supply contracts, which contributed to excessive pricing. In addition, the Commission found another factor contributing to unfair prices, namely the absence in the price review clauses of a well-defined, competitive and publicly available price benchmark, such as prices in competitive gas hubs.
Article 102(a) TFEU prohibits the direct or indirect imposition of unfair purchase or selling prices or other unfair trading conditions. The Court of Justice has ruled that the application of an excessive price that has no reasonable connection with the economic value of the product supplied constitutes such an abuse of a dominant position[5] .
In practice, the CJEU has proposed a two-step test[6] to assess the link between price and economic value and to determine the existence of unfair prices. According to this cumulative test , the Commission must assess (i) whether the difference between the actual costs incurred and the actual price charged is excessive and (ii) whether a price has been imposed that is unfair in itself or in comparison with competing products.
With regard to the first stage of the test, neither the courts nor the Commission have determined what level of price difference can be considered unfair, as this depends very much on the product and the market in question. For example, in the Deutsche Post decision, case COMP/C-1/36.915, the Court ruled that a price 25% higher than the company's estimated costs is unfair.
With regard to the second stage of the test, a comparison could be made, for example, with the price charged by the same company for the same product in different geographical markets considered to be competitive. Alternatively, a comparison could be made with the prices charged for the same product sold by competitors in the same geographical market or in other similar geographical markets.
In the first stage of the test, the Commission carried out the comparison for the years 2009-2013, showing that Gazprom's average prices, net of export taxes, in the five CEE countries significantly exceeded costs, with a weighted average cost mark-up of over 170%.
In the second stage of the test, the Commission selected two price benchmarks: Gazprom's long-term contract prices in Germany and prices on European hubs.
Although price differences vary from country to country, Gazprom's long-term prices in all five CEE countries significantly exceeded Gazprom's long-term prices in Germany during the period analyzed, averaging between 9% and 24% over the period 2009-2014. The Commission considered that these price differences indicated unfair pricing, particularly given that the gas supplied by Gazprom to Germany and the five CEE countries is perfectly homogeneous, and that the transport costs for gas supplied to the five CEE countries, as well as the standard of living in those countries, are lower.
The Commission found that the prices of long-term contracts in the five CEE countries are significantly and persistently higher than the prices on the Dutch TTF hub, on average between 22% and 40% higher between 2009 and 2014.
With regard to oil indexation, all long-term supply contracts concluded by Gazprom with the five CEE countries contain a price formula that indexes the price of gas to the price of oil and diesel.
Although the contracting parties have the option of indexing contract prices to the prices of other products, and this clause is not considered abusive in itself, it may be considered an unfair term in the context analyzed. Thus, as demand and supply for oil and gas have become largely independent over the years (with prices evolving largely separately), when oil prices reached a higher level, indexation to oil artificially increased gas prices in the five CEE countries, regardless of the characteristics of demand and supply.
Thus, by indexing prices to oil, Gazprom's natural gas prices in the five CEE countries significantly and persistently exceeded competitive price benchmarks over the period 2009-2014.
In addition, the Commission indicates that the absence of a well-defined, competitive, and publicly available price benchmark in the price review clauses may be one of the main factors that led to Gazprom's high prices in the five CEE countries.
In conclusion, the Commission's preliminary assessment indicates that Gazprom was able to pursue an unfair, anti-competitive pricing policy in the five CEE countries by imposing excessive prices, indexing prices to oil and failing to identify a well-defined price benchmark in the price review clauses.
 	Gas supplies conditional on infrastructure commitments in Bulgaria
The third suspicion of abuse of a dominant position by Gazprom, as presented by the Commission in the SO, consists in exploiting its position as the dominant gas supplier in Bulgaria to obtain from the Bulgarian gas operator, Bulgarian Energy Holding (hereinafter BEH), a commitment to participate in the South Stream project led by Gazprom.
Thanks to its dominant position, Gazprom was able to make gas supplies and gas prices conditional on BEH's commitment to invest in the South Stream project, which was subsequently abandoned. The Commission considered this conditioning of gas supplies and prices on additional obligations by imposing unfair commercial conditions to be anti-competitive.
Article 102(d) TFEU applies when the dominant undertaking forces customers to accept other types of additional distinct obligations or unfair commitments in order to obtain the product or service for which the supplier is dominant. This imposition may concern products, services, commitments, investments, or obligations[7] .
Specifically, in Bulgaria, Gazprom made the conclusion of a new gas supply contract and the application of lower gas prices conditional on the additional, distinct and unrelated obligation for BEH to participate in the South Stream infrastructure project. Gazprom used BEH's dependence on its gas supplies to ensure progress in the various stages of South Stream, thus forcing it to accept these conditions, despite the fact that BEH incurred significant financial obligations in addition to its existing financial difficulties.
From its analysis, the Commission concluded that, in order to achieve the objective of constructing the South Stream pipeline, it was neither necessary nor proportionate for Gazprom to impose the commitment on BEH. Thus, the conditionality allowed Gazprom to obtain benefits that it would not have been able to obtain under conditions of effective competition for gas supplies in Bulgaria.
 	Lack of objective justification or competitive efficiency argument
Conduct that at first glance constitutes an abuse of a dominant position may escape the prohibition laid down in Article 102 TFEU if the dominant undertaking is able to provide an objective justification for its conduct or can demonstrate that this conduct generates efficiencies that offset the negative effect on competition.
The burden of proof for such an objective justification or efficiency defense lies with the dominant undertaking. The company will have to demonstrate, to the standard of proof required by law, that the conditions for applying such a defense are met[8] .
In addition, dominant undertakings may submit evidence that the exclusionary effects resulting from their apparently anti-competitive behavior are counterbalanced or outweighed by efficiency gains that ultimately benefit consumers[9] .
The Commission's preliminary assessment is that Gazprom has not provided sufficient evidence that its anti-competitive attitude and conduct could be objectively justified or that it is necessary to achieve efficiency gains that are likely to outweigh the negative effects on competition without eliminating effective competition.
 	Effect on trade between Member States
The Court of Justice has ruled that Article 102 TFEU does not require proof that abusive conduct has actually affected trade between Member States, but that it is sufficient that it is capable of having that effect[10] .
Thus, European Union law covers any agreement or practice that is capable of threatening the freedom of trade between Member States in a way that could affect the achievement of the objectives of a single market between Member States, in particular by isolating domestic markets or affecting the structure of competition in the internal market.
The Commission's preliminary conclusion is that, to the extent that Gazprom may raise artificial barriers to trade and inhibit the free flow of gas in the gas markets of Central and Eastern Europe, Gazprom's conduct may be considered to have a negative, anti-competitive effect on trade between Member States.
 
 	Commitments made by Gazprom
 	Initial commitments regarding market segmentation
Gazprom has committed to refrain from using (and not to introduce in the future) export bans, destination clauses or any contractual or non-contractual measures with equivalent effect in gas sales contracts, including those concluded through tenders, which could directly or indirectly limit or prohibit the customer's ability to resell all or part of the gas purchased from Gazprom or to move it to another territory.
Gazprom has undertaken to amend the relevant gas supply and transport contracts to allow the conclusion of interconnection agreements at the interconnection points between Bulgaria and other EU Member States, as well as to allow the adaptation of the current gas allocation method (allocation according to measurement) to the modern gas allocation method (allocation according to nomination).
Gazprom has committed to offer its relevant customers in CEE countries the possibility to request that all or part of their contractual gas volumes delivered to certain delivery points in CEE be delivered to Bulgaria or the Baltic States. Gazprom has committed to offering this swap operation as long as the customer is unable to ensure the transportation of gas from the relevant contractual delivery point to Bulgaria or the Baltic States. As a gas swap is a commercial transaction for which the supplier charges a fee, Gazprom will be entitled to charge a fixed and transparent fee for this service, in line with the tariffs it normally applies on the market for such services.
 	Initial commitment on excessive prices
Gazprom has committed to propose either the introduction of a price review clause in contracts with its customers that do not already contain such a clause, or to amend existing price review clauses, with a view to ensuring competitive natural gas prices on the markets in Bulgaria, Estonia, Lithuania, Latvia, and Poland.
The new price review clause would allow each contracting party to request a review of gas prices if economic circumstances in European gas markets have changed and/or the contract price does not reflect, among other things, the evolution of border prices in Germany, France, and Italy and/or the evolution of gas prices at liquid hubs in continental Europe.
The review may be requested by each party every two years, plus one extraordinary price review every five years. Finally, the commitment provides that, in the absence of agreement on the price review within 120 days, either party may submit the dispute to arbitration.
 	Initial commitment to condition gas supplies on infrastructure commitments in Bulgaria
Gazprom has committed to allow its Bulgarian partners to withdraw from the South Stream project without incurring any liability for damages. In the context of the announced cancellation of the South Stream project, Gazprom has agreed that neither it nor any of its subsidiaries will claim damages on the basis of this cancellation.
Gazprom has also committed not to seek reimbursement of the price reductions granted to its Bulgarian customer for participation in the South Stream project.
 	Effectiveness of the commitments
The purpose of the commitments is to bring Gazprom's market behavior into line with EU competition law and to ensure that businesses and consumers in CEE can benefit from increased competition between different gas suppliers and sources of supply. Such competition already benefits consumers in Western Europe, particularly in markets where there is access to liquid and competitive gas hubs, such as Germany or the Netherlands.
The Commission considers that the Commitments, in addition to strictly prohibiting certain types of conduct (i.e. territorial restrictions), also impose positive obligations on Gazprom to facilitate the free flow of gas in Central and Eastern Europe (i.e. the delivery point switching mechanism).
Furthermore, the Commitments aim to ensure that the price of gas under oil-indexed contracts in Central and Eastern Europe remains in line with competitive price benchmarks, in particular those of Western European gas hubs.
In conclusion, the Commission considers that the Commitments effectively remove the competition concerns and comply with the principle of proportionality. Thus, by adopting a decision pursuant to Article 9(1) of Regulation (EC) No 1/2003, the Commission renders binding on Gazprom the commitments offered by it to meet the concerns expressed by the Commission in its preliminary assessment. The Commitments, as finalized, form an integral part of the decision.
Recital 13 of the preamble to Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 states that such a decision does not determine whether there has been or still is an infringement and anti-competitive conduct, and is not punitive in nature.
In view of the commitments offered, the Commission considers that there are no longer grounds for action on its part and, without prejudice to Article 9(2) of Regulation (EC) No 1/2003, the proceedings in this case will therefore be closed. However, the Commission reserves the right to investigate and initiate proceedings under Article 102 TFEU in respect of practices not covered by this decision. However, the Commission reserves the right to investigate and initiate proceedings under Article 102 TFEU in respect of practices not covered by this decision.
 
Noemi Cădariu, Managing Associate – Bradu, Neagu & Associates
www.bradulex.com
[1] Indirect sales may occur in supply chains, for example when a producer sells gas to a wholesaler, who in turn sells the entire quantity of gas to the national wholesaler serving various customers. This situation is considered an indirect sale by the producer/exporter to the national wholesaler and is part of the definition of the upstream supply market.
[2] The percentages are applicable for the period 2004-2013.
[3] C-319/82, Societe de vente de ciments v. Kerpen & Kerpen
[4] C-19/77, Miller v Commission
[5] Case C-27/76, United Brands v Commission
[6] Idem
[7] For example, in British Sugar v. Napier Brown, the dominant company made the sale of sugar conditional on the use of its transport services to deliver the sugar to its final destination.
[8] Case C-209/10, Post Danmark
[9] Case C-95/04, British Airways v Commission
[10] Case C-322/81, Michelin v Commission
Bradu Neagu & Associates - November 4 2025