Lessons Learnt From Essar Insolvency Resolution - (Video)

Insolvency and arbitration have traditionally occupied separate spaces: one collective and court-supervised, the other private and consent-based. That separation is breaking down. Across Asia, distressed companies are parties to ongoing arbitral proceedings, arbitral awards are being pursued against insolvent entities, and restructuring moratoria are colliding with arbitral proceedings in ways that neither the law of insolvency nor the law of arbitration has cleanly resolved.

The Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 (“IBC”)1 represents a watershed in India’s corporate insolvency framework. It seeks to consolidate laws relating to insolvency and ensure time-bound resolution of distressed entities while protecting the value of assets and promoting equitable treatment of creditors. Parallel to the IBC regime, the Reserve Bank of India (“RBI”) regulates the manner in which banks and financial institutions treat non-performing assets in their books of account.

A critical issue that has arisen in recent jurisprudence is whether, and to what extent, the NCLT can examine allegations of fraud in the insolvency process. While the IBC aims at swift resolution, the presence of fraudulent intent in initiating or conducting insolvency proceedings challenges this efficiency

A May 2026 ruling has clarified that corporate guarantees backed by security qualify as 'financial debt' under Section 5(8) of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code. This article analyses the legal reasoning, its implications for resolution applicants, financial creditors, and corporate groups, and the broader impact on insolvency restructuring and credit markets in India.

The Supreme Court of India delivered a landmark judgment reaffirming the primary objective of local development authorities as public welfare, striking down penalty claims that threaten the completion of stalled housing projects.

A common misconception holds that insolvency moratoriums protect everyone associated with a distressed company, but the Supreme Court's ruling in the Mantri Manyata Energia Project case clarifies that Section 14 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code protects only the corporate debtor itself. What happens when promoters, directors, personal guarantors, and landowners face separate proceedings while the company undergoes Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process, and how do courts determine whose obligations

In a significant ruling dated May 5, 2026, the Supreme Court of India in Alpha Corp Development Private Limited v. Greater Noida Industrial Development Authority reinforced the legal principle that a corporate debtor’s subsidiaries may not always be treated as legally distinct entities during the Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process (“CIRP”) under the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 (“IBC”). The Court’s reasoning was anchored not only in established doctrine but also in a pointed evaluation of the conduct of a statutory authority that failed to engage with the CIRP process in any meaningful way.

The Bombay High Court recently addressed a critical question regarding the temporal application of Section 96(4) of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, which removed the interim moratorium protection for personal guarantors of corporate debtors. The ruling clarifies whether this amendment applies only to fresh applications filed after its enactment or extends to insolvency proceedings that were already pending when the law changed. This decision has significant implications for creditors seeking to pursue p

The Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 (“IBC”) was introduced as a path-breaking legislation to provide a time-bound and creditor-driven process for the resolution of corporate insolvency in India.

The Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code (“IBC”), enacted in 2016, has been a landmark reform in India’s insolvency regime. It sought to streamline the process of resolving distressed companies, reduce delays, and protect creditor rights. Over time, however, some structural and procedural shortcomings have surfaced delays in resolution, fragmentation in group insolvencies, weak cross-border mechanisms, and skewed rights among stakeholders.