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Conflict Resolution through the Public Prosecutor’s Office in Brazil: An In-Depth Overview

The 1988 Federal Constitution, often referred to as the “Citizen Constitution,” brought significant transformations to Brazil’s legal framework, establishing a robust structure for the defense of the democratic regime and fundamental rights. Among its most notable innovations was the strengthening of the Public Prosecutor’s Office (Ministério Público), which was endowed with broad and essential powers to protect diffuse, collective, and social interests. The Public Prosecutor’s Office was enshrined as a permanent institution, essential to the judicial function of the State, with the mission to defend the legal order, the democratic regime, and the indisputable social and individual rights. Since 1988, the Public Prosecutor’s Office has taken on the responsibility of acting as a guardian of collective and diffuse interests, covering crucial areas such as environmental protection, the defense of economic order, and the safeguarding of the rights of indigenous populations and minorities. This new configuration gave the Public Prosecutor’s Office a central role in promoting social justice, making it an active agent in defending citizenship and ensuring the enforcement of laws. Its judicial and extrajudicial actions aim to guarantee that fundamental rights are effectively protected, promoting social inclusion and equity, and strengthening democracy in Brazil. The Role of the Public Prosecutor’s Office in Conflict Resolution The Public Prosecutor’s Office in Brazil has developed a comprehensive and multifaceted approach to conflict resolution, utilizing various judicial and extrajudicial mechanisms that prioritize efficiency, restorative justice, and the protection of public interests. These mechanisms include leniency agreements, non-prosecution agreements, plea bargains, terms of adjustment of conduct, terms of commitment, and administrative settlements. Each of these tools plays a specific role in resolving disputes while upholding the principles of justice and democracy. Leniency Agreements (Acordos de Leniência) Leniency agreements are essential in the fight against corruption and anti-competitive practices. They allow companies involved in illegal activities, such as cartel formation or corruption, to cooperate with investigations in exchange for reduced penalties. These agreements are critical in revealing complex schemes that threaten economic order and public trust. Procedure: A company voluntarily discloses its involvement in illegal activities and collaborates with authorities, providing information that aids in broader investigations. In return, penalties are reduced, and the company may avoid sanctions such as debarment from public contracts. Impact: Leniency agreements have been pivotal in major investigations like Operation Car Wash, enabling the dismantling of extensive corruption networks and reinforcing the rule of law. Non-Prosecution Civil Agreements (Acordos de Não Persecução Civil) Non-prosecution civil agreements serve as a means to resolve civil disputes without the need for litigation, particularly in cases involving public administration and collective rights. These agreements are instrumental in swiftly addressing harm caused to public assets or interests. Procedure: The Public Prosecutor’s Office negotiates with the involved party to agree on compensatory measures or corrective actions. The agreement precludes the need for a civil lawsuit, provided that the agreed terms are fulfilled. Impact: Such agreements reduce the judiciary’s caseload, facilitate the restitution of public interests, and ensure that justice is delivered efficiently. Non-Prosecution Penal Agreements (Acordos de Não Persecução Penal) Non-prosecution penal agreements are alternatives to traditional criminal prosecution, particularly in cases involving minor offenses. These agreements emphasize restorative justice, focusing on reparation and community service rather than incarceration. Procedure: The accused agrees to fulfill certain conditions, such as compensating the victim or performing community service, in exchange for the Public Prosecutor’s Office refraining from pursuing criminal charges. Impact: These agreements help reduce prison overcrowding, promote rehabilitation, and focus on restoring harm done to victims and communities. Plea Bargains (Colaborações Premiadas) Plea bargains, or “colaborações premiadas,” are agreements where defendants provide substantial information about criminal activities in return for reduced sentences. This mechanism is particularly effective in cases involving organized crime, corruption, and complex financial crimes. Procedure: The defendant cooperates with the investigation by providing crucial evidence or testimony, leading to the prosecution of other criminals or the dismantling of criminal organizations. In exchange, the defendant receives a reduced sentence or other legal benefits. Impact: Plea bargains have been crucial in uncovering large-scale corruption, especially within political and corporate sectors, significantly contributing to the enforcement of justice. Terms of Adjustment of Conduct (Termos de Ajustamento de Conduta - TAC) Terms of Adjustment of Conduct (TACs) are extrajudicial agreements designed to resolve disputes involving violations of public or social rights. TACs are widely used in environmental, consumer protection, labor law, and public health cases. Procedure: The Public Prosecutor’s Office negotiates with the violator to agree on actions necessary to remedy the situation. The TAC is legally binding, and non-compliance can lead to judicial enforcement. Impact: TACs offer a flexible and effective means to resolve disputes without resorting to litigation, ensuring that public interests are protected and compliance with the law is achieved. Terms of Commitment (Termos de Compromisso) Terms of Commitment are agreements similar to TACs, often used in regulatory compliance, particularly concerning public administration and environmental issues. These terms are negotiated between the Public Prosecutor’s Office and the party responsible for the potential harm. Procedure: The involved party agrees to take specific actions to prevent or correct harm, often within a set timeframe. Compliance with these terms can prevent further legal action. Impact: Terms of Commitment encourage proactive compliance with laws and regulations, helping to prevent damage before it occurs and promoting a culture of accountability. Administrative Settlements (Transações Administrativas) Administrative settlements resolve disputes or infractions at the administrative level without resorting to the judiciary. These settlements are often used in regulatory or economic matters where the Public Prosecutor’s Office and the involved party agree on terms to resolve the issue. Procedure: The Public Prosecutor’s Office and the infringing party reach an agreement, often involving the payment of fines, cessation of illegal activities, or implementation of corrective measures. The settlement is formalized through an administrative act. Impact: Administrative settlements provide a quicker resolution of disputes, reducing the need for prolonged legal or administrative procedures and ensuring that regulatory frameworks are respected. Conclusion The Public Prosecutor’s Office in Brazil has developed a comprehensive and multifaceted approach to conflict resolution, utilizing a variety of judicial and extrajudicial mechanisms that prioritize efficiency, restorative justice, and the protection of public interests. Through the use of leniency agreements, non-prosecution agreements, plea bargains, TACs, and other tools, the Public Prosecutor’s Office plays a vital role in upholding justice, promoting social inclusion, and strengthening democracy. These mechanisms not only alleviate the burden on the judiciary but also foster a culture of compliance and accountability across different sectors of society. As Brazil continues to navigate complex legal and social challenges, the role of the Public Prosecutor’s Office in conflict resolution remains crucial, adapting to meet the evolving demands of justice and public interest in a dynamic legal landscape.  

The Consolidation of Sanctioning Administrative Law in Brazil: Exclusive Interview with Fábio Medina Osório

By Fabio Alberici de Mello, journalist Over the past 25 years, Fábio Medina Osório has been a central figure in the consolidation of Administrative Sanctioning Law in Brazil. His work, Direito Administrativo Sancionador, originally published in 2000, was the first monograph on the subject in the country and introduced a new concept of administrative sanction, allowing the Judiciary to also impose sanctions of this nature. This innovative doctrine, strongly influenced by the European tradition, was fundamental for the principles of Criminal Law to be applied to the field of administrative sanctioning, providing greater legal certainty and protection to defendants in administrative proceedings. The relevance of this work is reflected in the tenth edition of the book, recently released by the editor of Revista dos Tribunais, consolidating its impact on the legal market. In addition, it was Medina Osório who introduced, for the first time in Brazil, the subject of Administrative Sanctioning Law in the master's and doctoral courses of the Law School of the Federal University of Rio Grande do Sul (UFRGS), in 2004, boosting the academic study of the subject. Over the decades, his doctrine has influenced the jurisprudence of higher courts, especially the Superior Court of Justice (STJ) and the Federal Supreme Court (STF), and was essential for the reform of the Administrative Misconduct Law (Law 14,230/2021). The new legislation expressly incorporated the legal regime of the Sanctioning Administrative Law for administrative misconduct, consolidating an interpretation that Medina Osório had defended since 1999, when he published an article in the Spanish Public Administration Journal. In this exclusive interview, Medina Osório analyzes the evolution of Administrative Sanctioning Law in Brazil, the impact of the reform of the Improbity Law, the role of the STF and the Inter-American Court of Human Rights and the challenges of fighting corruption in the era of artificial intelligence. The evolution of Administrative Sanctioning Law in Brazil: from theory to jurisprudence Fábio Alberici de Mello, journalist: Dr. Medina Osório, you were a pioneer in the introduction of Administrative Sanctioning Law in Brazil. How do you evaluate the evolution of this area since the publication of your first article in 1999, through the launch of your work in 2000 and the introduction of the discipline at UFRGS in 2004? Fábio Medina Osório: When I published my first article on the subject in 1999 and, the following year, I launched Direito Administrativo Sancionador, Brazil still did not recognize the existence of its own sanctioning regime within Administrative Law. Administrative sanctions were applied in a dispersed manner, without a clear set of principles that guaranteed legal certainty and respect for fundamental guarantees. The introduction of this discipline in the master's and doctoral courses at UFRGS in 2004 was a milestone, as it brought to the academic debate the need to apply the principles of Criminal Law to Administrative Sanctioning Law, ensuring due process, presumption of innocence, strict legality and proportionality. Over time, this doctrine directly influenced the case law of the STJ and STF, which began to recognize that administrative misconduct and corporate infractions must follow a sanctioning regime based on constitutional guarantees. This movement culminated in Law 14,230/2021, which reformed the Administrative Misconduct Law and expressly adopted this regime, consolidating an interpretation that I had already defended since 1999. Furthermore, this evolution in Brazil followed an international trend, especially in the case law of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) and the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (IACHR), which began to directly influence the decisions of Brazilian higher courts. The STF and the retroactivity of the new Improbity Law Fábio Alberici de Mello, journalist: The reform of the Administrative Misconduct Law incorporated the Administrative Sanctioning Law regime, but there is still controversy over its retroactive application. How do you assess the STF's position on this issue? Fábio Medina Osório: The STF has a decisive role in consolidating the reform, but it has adopted a restrictive interpretation in some fundamental aspects. The Inter-American Court of Human Rights has already established that more beneficial sanctioning norms must always be retroactive, since the retroactivity of more favorable laws is an internationally recognized fundamental right. However, when judging the general repercussions of the statute of limitations on misconduct (Topic 1,199), the STF understood that the statute of limitations is not a matter of substantive law, denying its retroactivity. This position contradicts the case law of both the Inter-American Court and the European Court of Human Rights, which treat the statute of limitations as an essential right of the accused person. Another point of concern was the restriction of retroactivity for cases that have already been finalized. The Supreme Court ruled that, if the sanction has already been applied and the case concluded, the new, more beneficial law cannot be retroactive. This interpretation needs to be revised so that Brazil is fully aligned with the guarantees enshrined in the inter-American system. The fight against corruption and the role of artificial intelligence Fábio Alberici de Mello, journalist: Some claim that the reform of the Improbity Law would have weakened the fight against corruption. Do you agree with this view? Fábio Medina Osório: No. The fight against corruption cannot depend solely on a repressive model. It requires a more sophisticated approach, based on integration between control bodies, the use of artificial intelligence and the expansion of the State's investigative capacity. Technologies such as machine learning and predictive data analysis are essential tools for detecting patterns of corruption before damage is done. In addition, it is essential to strengthen cooperation between oversight bodies and improve information sharing to make the system more efficient. The reform of the Administrative Misconduct Law brought greater legal certainty to the sanctioning process, without compromising the fight against corruption. The challenge now is to improve investigation mechanisms and modernize methods for preventing and repressing illicit activities. The future of Sanctioning Administrative Law in Brazil Fábio Alberici de Mello, journalist: Finally, what are the next challenges for Administrative Sanctioning Law in Brazil? Fábio Medina Osório: The main challenge is to definitively consolidate the sanctioning legal regime within Administrative Law, ensuring that it does not suffer setbacks in the STF and that it increasingly aligns with the jurisprudence of the Inter-American Court and the European Court of Human Rights. Furthermore, it is essential to advance in the standardization of the regulation of the Anti-Corruption Law (Law 12.846/2013), avoiding legal uncertainty and divergent interpretations among federative entities. Brazil is on the right path, but it needs to strengthen these guarantees so that Administrative Sanctioning Law continues to evolve in a fair, safe and efficient manner. The unconstitutionality of culpable misconduct and the limits of legislative conformity Fábio Alberici de Mello, journalist: Dr. Medina Osório, the Supreme Federal Court, in a recent ruling, declared the unconstitutionality of negligent misconduct, reaffirming the requirement of intent to constitute an improper act. The decision generated intense debates, especially regarding the scope of the reform promoted by Law 14,230/2021 and the possibility that the legislator, in the future, will resume the provision of sanctions for negligent conduct. How do you evaluate this decision by the Supreme Federal Court? Fábio Medina Osório: The reform of the Administrative Misconduct Law was fully constitutional and falls within the freedom of legislative conformation that the democratic principle grants to the legislator. What Law 14,230/2021 did was to delimit the concept of administrative misconduct, removing the negligent modality to ensure greater legal certainty and align the sanctioning regime for misconduct with the fundamental principles of Criminal Law and Administrative Sanctioning Law. However, it is important to understand that the removal of culpable misconduct from legislation does not mean that the legislator is prevented from reintroducing it in the future. The democratic principle itself that allowed the revocation of culpable types also allows the legislator, if he considers it necessary, to once again enshrine culpable misconduct within the limits of the freedom of legislative conformation. There is no constitutional prohibition that prevents the existence of culpable types in the sanctioning legal system. The Penal Code itself provides for types such as culpable embezzlement, and no one has ever stated that this classification would be unconstitutional. Likewise, if the legislator understands that there is a need for sanctions for culpable acts that cause serious harm to the public treasury or compromise administrative morality, he may reintroduce culpable misconduct through a new legislative debate. Fábio Alberici de Mello, journalist: But from the point of view of the constitutional regime of improbity, would there be any material limitation to this reintroduction of the types of culpable misconduct? Wouldn't the STF, by removing culpable improbity, be setting an interpretative limit for the legislator Fábio Medina Osório: I do not see this decision by the STF as an absolute obstacle to the legislative establishment of administrative misconduct. What the Court did was to interpret Law 14,230/2021 within the context of the current sanctioning regime, reinforcing that the requirement of intent, at the moment, arises from the will of the legislator and the principle of strict legality. This, however, does not mean that a future law that provides for negligent misconduct would automatically be unconstitutional. The crucial point here is to understand that administrative misconduct has a sanctioning nature, but is not identical to Criminal Law. The legislator has a wide margin of discretion to define administrative offenses and the respective liability regimes. The Constitution requires that administrative misconduct be combated, but does not impose a single model for classification Therefore, if tomorrow the legislator decides that certain culpable behaviors represent an unacceptable risk to administrative probity and deserve sanction, it may create new legal types, as long as constitutional principles are respected. What cannot be allowed is that this decision by the STF be interpreted as an insurmountable barrier, under penalty of hindering the normative evolution of Sanctioning Administrative Law. Fábio Alberici de Mello, journalist: This leads us to a broader debate about the limits of freedom of legislative formation. Administrative misconduct has been a subject of strong judicialization, especially in the Supreme Federal Court, which is frequently called upon to interpret the compatibility of sanctioning norms with the Constitution. Do you believe that there is a risk of hyperjudicialization, in the sense that the Judiciary may end up excessively restricting the legislator's scope of action in this matter? Fábio Medina Osório: Without a doubt. This is one of the greatest challenges for Administrative Sanctioning Law in Brazil. The STF has a fundamental role in guaranteeing the constitutional order, but the control of constitutionality cannot become an undue limitation of legislative capacity. The freedom to shape legislation is a pillar of the Democratic State of Law, and its excessive restriction can lead to a weakening of the legislative function, generating legal instability and institutional insecurity. The risk of hyperjudicialization occurs when the Judiciary begins to review legitimate legislative choices, without there being a clear violation of the Constitution. In the case of administrative misconduct, caution must be taken not to transform the STF into a body that ultimately defines the content of sanctioning laws, when this is a prerogative of the National Congress. If there is a democratic debate that leads to the reintroduction of culpable misconduct, and if this reintroduction is done within constitutional parameters, there is no reason for the Judiciary to invalidate this option. The risk is that, in the face of a new law providing for culpable types, there will be a wave of judicialization again, with arguments that today's STF decision would have established a definitive understanding on the need for intent. This would be a mistake, because the current decision is limited to interpreting the current legislation, and not establishing an absolute constitutional principle. Fábio Alberici de Mello, journalist: Given this scenario, what recommendations would you make for legislators to act more safely, avoiding new challenges in the STF? Fábio Medina Osório: The legislator must act with solid technical and reasoning. If there is a movement to reintroduce negligent misconduct, it will be essential that the legislative debate be well structured, based on technical studies and parameters already consolidated in Comparative Law. The reasoning must demonstrate that the provision of negligent types serves a legitimate public interest and respects the guarantees of the Administrative Sanctioning Law. Furthermore, it is important that Congress establish objective criteria for characterizing gross negligence, preventing the rule from being interpreted broadly and imprecisely. The more clearly defined the rule is, the lower the risk that the Supreme Court will consider it unconstitutional for violating the principle of legal certainty. Another crucial point is the dialogue between the branches of government. The legislator must pay attention to the discussions in the STF and in the legal community in order to create rules that are legally sound and can withstand any challenges. This involves a qualified debate with jurists, academics and legal professionals, ensuring that the legislation is formulated in a way that avoids unnecessary conflicts of interpretation. Fábio Alberici de Mello, journalist: Do you believe that this dialogue between the powers is occurring satisfactorily in Brazil, or is there a disconnect between what the legislator proposes and what the Judiciary decides? The right to legally tolerable error and the impact of the reform of Law No. 14,230/2021 Fábio Alberici de Mello, journalist: Dr. Medina Osório, since your first work on administrative misconduct, published in 1997, you have argued that misconduct was a qualified illegality and that public administrators should have a legally tolerable margin of error. You have always compared this thesis with the functioning of the justice system itself, highlighting that judges can make mistakes and have their sentences overturned, members of the Public Prosecutor's Office can formulate inept petitions or complaints, and, similarly, public administrators should not be punished for common mistakes. Law No. 14,230/2021 adopted this thesis by eliminating negligent misconduct and requiring specific intent for liability. However, gross error, which was previously a differentiating criterion, was abolished. How do you assess this change and the impacts of the requirement of specific intent for the configuration of misconduct? Fábio Medina Osório: The reform of the Administrative Misconduct Law represented a significant step forward in recognizing that not all illegalities can be treated as administrative misconduct. Since the beginning of the doctrinal debates on the subject, I have always argued that administrative misconduct could not be confused with a mere error in public management. A public agent, in the exercise of his or her functions, must have a space to act that allows him or her to make complex decisions without the permanent fear of automatic liability. Law No. 14,230/2021 adopted this view by eliminating the negligent form of misconduct and establishing specific intent as an essential requirement for liability. This change is fundamental because it prevents public officials from being punished for technical or administrative decisions that, although possibly erroneous, were made without bad faith. Before the reform, the existence of gross error was used as an intermediate criterion for establishing misconduct. With the new law, gross error is no longer an independent basis for liability, which reinforces the need to prove specific intent. This means that the mere violation of rules or the practice of an erroneous administrative act are no longer sufficient to characterize misconduct. Fábio Alberici de Mello, journalist: This change also directly impacts the way in which misconduct lawsuits are structured, especially with regard to the initial claim and the need to describe the specific intent. How does this requirement affect the dynamics of the lawsuits? Fábio Medina Osório: The requirement of specific intent has profound implications for the way in which misconduct actions should be conducted. Before the reform, it was common for actions to be filed based on a generic formulation, simply alleging that a certain public agent had acted with the intention of violating norms. Now, that is no longer enough. The initial claim for an action for misconduct must describe, in detail, the specific intention of the public agent. Generic intent, that is, the mere intention to commit an act contrary to the law, is no longer enough. It is necessary to demonstrate the illicit purpose intended by the agent, what his real intention was in committing the act. If a lawsuit is filed without such a precise description of the specific intent, the judge must order the amendment of the initial claim. If the claim is not amended, it must be dismissed. This represents a strategic shift in the narrative of wrongful conduct, as it requires the plaintiff to present a detailed description of the agent’s intent from the outset of the lawsuit. Furthermore, this requirement also applies to actions for compensation to the public treasury. It is no longer possible to file actions of this nature without demonstrating specific intent. This means that the mere fact that a public manager has caused harm to the public treasury is not enough for him to be held liable for misconduct. It is necessary to prove that he acted deliberately to harm the public coffers. Fábio Alberici de Mello, journalist: This distinction between generic intent and specific intent revives a debate that has long permeated Criminal Law and now assumes a central role in Administrative Sanctioning Law. In practical terms, how do you see this distinction influencing the conduct of misconduct proceedings? Fábio Medina Osório: The distinction between generic intent and specific intent has always been a fundamental theme in Criminal Law, and now it has become a central element in Administrative Sanctioning Law. In the context of administrative misconduct, this distinction is crucial because it directly affects the classification of improper acts and the way in which the accusation should be formulated. Generic intent, which was limited to the mere intention of failing to comply with regulations, can no longer be used as the basis for an action for misconduct. Now, the prosecution must demonstrate that the public agent had a specific purpose in carrying out the act, which requires a much greater level of detail in the description of the facts. This makes the accusation more technical and prevents actions from being based on subjective inferences about the manager's intention. This change provides greater legal certainty for public officials and prevents the trivialization of administrative misconduct. For a long time, there was a tendency towards excessive criminalization of public management, in which any wrong decision was subject to liability. With the requirement of specific intent, liability now depends on a more rigorous analysis of the agent's intentions and the specific circumstances of the case. Fábio Alberici de Mello, journalist: And how do you see the practical application of this change by the courts? Are the Public Prosecutor's Office and the Judiciary prepared for this new requirement? Fábio Medina Osório: The application of this change by the courts is still in the adaptation phase, and I believe that a transition period will be necessary for all actors involved – Public Prosecutor's Office, judiciary and lawyers – to adjust their procedural practices to this new reality. The Public Prosecutor's Office, for example, will have to reformulate its approach when filing lawsuits, as it will no longer be able to base accusations on generic inferences about the conduct of public officials. More detailed investigation and evidentiary work will be required to demonstrate the existence of specific intent. Judges will also need to adopt a more rigorous criterion when analyzing initial petitions, requiring that the specific intent be duly described before accepting the action. If this requirement is not met, the action should not even be admitted. This is a reflection of the sanctioning logic itself, which requires a higher level of precision and predictability so that the right to defense is fully ensured. Furthermore, the case law of the higher courts should consolidate more objective parameters for the characterization of specific intent, ensuring that the new requirement is not interpreted in a restrictive or expansive manner that is at odds with the legislator's intention. This will be a crucial phase for the consolidation of the reform and for the improvement of the administrative misconduct regime in Brazil.

Fábio Medina Osório Reappointed to the Prestigious Council of Brazil's Movement for the Defense of Advocacy (MDA)

São Paulo, March 10, 2025 – The Movimento de Defesa da Advocacia (MDA), one of Brazil's most influential legal institutions dedicated to safeguarding the prerogatives of the legal profession and strengthening the rule of law, has elected its new board of directors. In a unanimous decision, Rodrigo Jorge Moraes was appointed as the new president, succeeding Eduardo Salusse, whose exemplary leadership was celebrated by the organization's Council for his transformative contributions to Brazil's legal landscape. Among the eminent legal experts continuing in the MDA's governance, Dr. Fábio Medina Osório, founding partner of Medina Osório Advogados, has been reappointed as a Council member, reinforcing his unwavering commitment to defending legal professionals' rights and championing institutional integrity across Brazil's justice system. "I am deeply honored to renew my mandate with the MDA, an institution that stands as a crucial pillar in safeguarding the independence and dignity of the legal profession in Brazil," stated Medina Osório. "I extend my sincere congratulations to Rodrigo Jorge Moraes on his well-deserved election and express my profound gratitude to Eduardo Salusse for his exceptional leadership. The MDA will continue to be at the vanguard of legal advocacy, ensuring that the fundamental principles of justice and due process remain inviolable in our democracy." About the MDA The Movimento de Defesa da Advocacia (MDA) is a prestigious non-profit association established in Brazil to protect the professional rights of lawyers and promote the rule of law. The MDA is dedicated to fortifying democratic institutions by ensuring that legal practitioners can operate with complete independence and integrity. The organization serves as a vital forum for legal professionals to address critical issues affecting the justice system and advocates for robust policies that uphold justice, fairness, and legal security for all Brazilians. For further information, please contact: [email protected] Medina Osório Advogados https://www.medinaosorio.com.br/ #LegalExcellence #JusticeAdvocates #BrazilianLaw #LegalInnovation #RuleOfLaw #LegalLeadership #MedinaOsorioAdvogados #MDA #TopLawyers #LegalIntegrity

Materiais Legal 500

AGU Call for Papers: Superior School of the AGU Opens Submissions for the 'Sanctioning Administrative Law' Collection – Fábio Medina Osório as One of the Coordinators The journal Publicações da Escola Superior da AGU (Advocacia-Geral da União – Office of the Attorney General of the Union) has announced the opening of submissions for the collection Sanctioning Administrative Law, which will gather original articles on the topic. The project is coordinated by João Carlos Souto (National Treasury Attorney), André Augusto Dantas Motta Amaral (General Counsel of the Union), and Fábio Medina Osório, partner at Medina Osório Advogados and one of the leading references on the subject, both nationally and internationally. The technical organization is led by Henrique Augusto Figueiredo Fulgêncio, General Coordinator of Postgraduate Studies at the Superior School of the AGU. The call for submissions is open to PhDs, PhD candidates, Masters, and Master’s candidates in Law or related fields, as well as members of the AGU’s legal career. All articles will be reviewed by a specialized editorial committee before the final selection. Interested authors can submit unpublished works exclusively through the journal’s website (https://revistaagu.agu.gov.br/index.php/EAGU/about/submissions), where more information about the submission process and evaluation criteria is also available. FGV FGV Open Lecture: Administrative Sanctioning Law, with Fábio Medina Osório The FGV Rio Law Program is pleased to announce a special Open Lecture on Administrative Sanctioning Law, featuring Dr. Fábio Medina Osório as the keynote speaker. The lecture will be part of the opening conference of the FGV Law LLM in Rio de Janeiro. At the invitation of Dr. Thaís Marçal, Coordinator of the lato sensu postgraduate courses at FGV Direito Rio, and Dr. Sérgio Guerra, Director of the institution, Dr. Fábio Medina Osório—President of the International Institute for the Study of State Law (IIEDE), PhD from Universidad Complutense de Madrid, and Head of Medina Osório Advogados—will share his expertise on the fundamental aspects of Administrative Sanctioning Law. This event presents a unique opportunity to engage with one of the leading legal scholars in the field, gain insights into the learning methodology of the LLM program, and explore key topics that are central to the course’s curriculum.   Event Details: Date & Time: April 2 | 7:00 PM – 8:00 PM Location: FGV Direito - RJ | Praia de Botafogo, 190 - Room 907 Registration: Participation is free, but prior registration is required through the official website: FGV Event Registration Organized by: FGV Rio Law Program We invite legal professionals, academics, students, and all those interested in Administrative Law to attend this insightful session and engage in high-level discussions on the evolving landscape of Administrative Sanctioning Law.            

Brazilian Law and the Impact of Globalization

As an attorney familiar with both common law and civil law systems, observing the evolution of Brazilian law through the lens of globalization provides unique insights into the dynamic interplay between domestic legal traditions and international influences. While Brazil’s legal framework remains firmly rooted in the civil law tradition, characterized by codified statutes and the primacy of legislative enactments, recent developments indicate a gradual convergence with global legal standards, especially those prominent in common law jurisdictions like the United States. The Civil Law Tradition in Brazil Brazil’s legal system is historically grounded in the civil law tradition, which originated from Roman law and was further developed through Napoleonic codifications. In this tradition, codified statutes and comprehensive legal codes serve as the principal sources of law, leaving the judiciary with a more constrained role in legal interpretation compared to their counterparts in common law systems. Judges are primarily tasked with applying the written law, and legal certainty is maintained through the strict adherence to legislative texts. The Brazilian Civil Code, Penal Code, and Code of Civil Procedure exemplify this legislative dominance, providing detailed frameworks that guide legal relations and the administration of justice. This model parallels many European civil law systems, particularly in France, Italy, and Germany, where judicial discretion is similarly limited, and legal interpretation tends to follow a literal or doctrinal approach. However, Brazil has progressively evolved its civil law system to address the complexities of modern legal challenges, particularly in the context of a globalized economy. The Emergence of Precedent in Brazil A significant shift in Brazilian law, brought about by the influence of global legal trends, particularly from common law jurisdictions, is the increasing reliance on judicial precedent. Traditionally, Brazilian courts did not place much weight on prior judicial decisions, adhering instead to the legislative text. However, with the enactment of the 2015 Civil Procedure Code reforms, a new emphasis was placed on the doctrine of stare decisis, or the binding effect of judicial precedents, particularly from higher courts. Under this framework, decisions from Brazil’s Supreme Federal Court (STF) and Superior Court of Justice (STJ) have acquired greater authority in shaping the interpretation and application of laws across the judiciary. The adoption of mechanisms like súmulas vinculantes (binding precedents) and the resolution of repetitive appeals (recurso repetitivo) underscores Brazil’s shift toward a more unified and predictable legal system, echoing the role of precedents in common law systems such as the United States. This development enhances legal certainty by ensuring that lower courts adhere to established interpretations from superior tribunals, reducing disparities in judicial decision-making. Comparison with the United States’ Common Law Despite this move towards the integration of precedents, Brazil’s legal system still diverges from the common law tradition as practiced in the United States. In American jurisprudence, the doctrine of stare decisis is foundational, with judicial decisions, particularly from appellate courts, shaping the trajectory of legal principles over time. U.S. courts, especially the Supreme Court, often engage in the development of legal norms, filling gaps in statutory law and adapting principles to novel circumstances through case law. In contrast, Brazilian courts are more restrained in their interpretative function, as statutes remain the primary source of law. While precedents are gaining significance, particularly through the binding authority of higher courts, judges in Brazil generally do not have the same latitude to create law as their American counterparts. The legislative branch remains the dominant force in shaping legal frameworks, and judicial activism is more constrained in comparison to the U.S. legal system. Globalization and Legal Harmonization The impact of globalization on Brazilian law is perhaps most evident in the increasing harmonization of legal standards across borders. Brazil’s integration into international trade agreements, participation in global regulatory bodies, and adherence to international treaties have compelled the country to adapt its legal system to meet global standards. This is particularly evident in areas such as corporate governance, financial regulation, and human rights, where international norms play an influential role in shaping domestic legislation. For instance, in corporate and commercial law, Brazil has embraced international arbitration and adopted standards consistent with global business practices, allowing for greater cross-border legal certainty. Additionally, Brazil’s courts have increasingly recognized and enforced foreign judgments and arbitral awards, further integrating the country into the global legal framework. The convergence of legal systems is also seen in the influence of international human rights law on Brazilian jurisprudence. Brazilian courts, especially the STF, have cited international human rights conventions and decisions from supranational bodies in their rulings, reflecting a willingness to engage with international norms to protect fundamental rights. This mirrors a broader trend in civil law countries toward incorporating international legal principles into domestic legal reasoning. Challenges of Legal Pluralism Despite the advances brought about by globalization, Brazil faces challenges in reconciling its traditional legal system with emerging global trends. Legal pluralism—where multiple sources of law, including domestic codes, international treaties, and judicial precedents, coexist—can create tensions within the judiciary. While the move towards a greater reliance on precedents fosters predictability, it also requires Brazilian courts to balance these precedents with legislative statutes and international norms, all while preserving the civil law system’s core principles. Moreover, the global influence on Brazilian law has led to debates about the appropriate role of the judiciary. Critics argue that the increasing emphasis on precedents risks undermining the legislature’s authority, while proponents contend that judicial precedents provide necessary clarity in an evolving and complex legal landscape. Conclusion Brazil’s legal system is at a pivotal moment of transformation, driven by the forces of globalization and the cross-pollination of legal traditions. While rooted in the civil law tradition, Brazil’s courts are increasingly adopting elements of common law, particularly through the expanded use of precedents. This shift reflects a broader trend toward legal harmonization in a globalized world, where national legal systems must adapt to meet international standards and respond to global economic and social challenges. As Brazilian law continues to evolve, the country’s legal system will need to navigate the tensions between maintaining its civil law heritage and embracing the flexibility and adaptability that common law principles, such as stare decisis, offer. In this globalized legal landscape, Brazil stands as an example of how legal systems can adapt to new realities while preserving their foundational principles. Author: Fábio Medina Osório

OABRJ to host landmark debate on the future of administrative misconduct law

Rio de Janeiro, 27 August 2025 – The Sylvio Capanema Chamber at the Escola Superior de Advocacia of the Brazilian Bar Association (OABRJ) will stage a high-level forum, “The Contemporary Landscape of Administrative Misconduct Law”, convening some of Brazil’s leading jurists and practitioners to discuss the evolving contours of one of the most pivotal areas of public law. Opening Keynote – Fábio Medina Osório The conference will open with a keynote address from Fábio Medina Osório, founding partner of Medina Osório Advogados, Doctor of Administrative Law (Complutense University of Madrid), former Attorney General of Brazil, and current Chair of the Special Commission on Administrative Sanctioning Law at the Federal Council of the Brazilian Bar Association. Dr Medina Osório will trace the dogmatic and institutional evolution of administrative misconduct law, focusing on the delicate balance between ensuring accountability for misconduct and safeguarding fundamental rights and constitutional guarantees. Special Lecture – Vanessa Cerqueira Reis The programme continues with a special lecture from Vanessa Cerqueira Reis, partner at Medina Osório Advogados, State Attorney of Rio de Janeiro, and Vice-Chair of the Administrative Sanctioning Law Commission of the OABRJ. Her talk, “Contemporary Debates on Administrative Misconduct”, will deliver a critical analysis of the legislative and jurisprudential shifts brought by Law No. 14,230/2021, which redefined liability regimes for both public officials and private entities, reshaping Brazil’s legal and institutional landscape. A forum for institutional dialogue and democratic values Far from being a purely academic exercise, the event is positioned as a strategic forum for reflection, dialogue, and institutional strengthening. It underscores the role of law in consolidating democratic principles, reinforcing the rule of law, and promoting legal certainty—elements essential to transparent governance. The organisers highlight: “Our aim is to cultivate a collective dialogue that aligns integrity in public administration with the protection of individual rights.” ⸻ Why this event matters Relevance to practitioners: Offers critical updates on the interpretation of Law No. 14,230/2021. Thought leadership: Showcases insights from two of Brazil’s foremost authorities in administrative sanctioning law. Institutional significance: Hosted by OABRJ, reinforcing the Bar’s role in shaping the future of public law. ⸻ Press & Media Enquiries: Communications Office, Medina Osório Advogados www.medinaosorio.com.br  

Fábio Medina Osório to speak at the First Seminar on Administrative Sanctioning Law at ESAGU

On 18 September 2025, Fábio Medina Osório will take part in the First Seminar on Administrative Sanctioning Law, organised by the Higher School of the Office of the Attorney General of the Union (ESAGU), in Brasília/DF. The event will also be broadcast live on ESAGU’s official YouTube channel. The programme will feature leading authorities and experts, with Medina Osório contributing at two key moments: Opening Session | 9:00 – 9:30 Opening Lecture | 10:15 – 11:15 Theme: “Constitutional Principles of Administrative Sanctioning Law” The seminar, convened by ESAGU, will bring together jurists and members of the Public Advocacy to discuss the foundations, principles and contemporary challenges of Administrative Sanctioning Law. Medina Osório expresses his gratitude to the Attorney General of the Union, Minister Jorge Messias, and to the Director of ESAGU, João Carlos Souto, for the invitation to speak. He also commends them for organising a seminar of such strategic importance for the advancement of this field in Brazil. Event Details: Date: 18 September 2025, 9:00 – 18:00 Venue: Auditorium of the Higher School of the AGU, Brasília/DF Live Broadcast: ESAGU YouTube Channel – www.youtube.com/watch?v=6dyNXXpYGyY

Fábio Medina Osório to speak twice on 24 September: online opening lecture for Universidad Nacional de La Pampa followed by in‑person closing conference at FGV Direito Rio

On Wednesday, 24 September, Brazilian jurist and author Fábio Medina Osório will deliver two engagements in sequence: an online opening lecture for the Universidad Nacional de La Pampa in the afternoon, followed by an in‑person closing conference at FGV Direito Rio in the evening. Online Opening Lecture of the Postgraduate Diploma in Ibero-American Disciplinary Law — National University of La Pampa (online) Time: 16:00–17:00 (UTC−3) Platform: Microsoft Teams (downloading the app is recommended for best performance). Join: [Access via Microsoft Teams](https://teams.microsoft.com/l/meetup-join/19%3ameeting_ZWJlNWY4ZWMtNjM1NS00YzI4LTg0YzAtYWUzY2M0MDc3ODZj%40thread.v2/0?context=%7b%22Tid%22%3a%22cf220266-9c62-44d0-b587-798332d696f6%22%2c%22Oid%22%3a%22fa0709a0-a955-468e-8aa9-f69e1aaa82ba%22%7d) Meeting ID: 297 799 653 315 5 Access code: Yw3MR6yk Audience: A focused cohort of approximately 16–17 legal professionals, ranging from first‑qualification practitioners to master’s‑level specialists, active in the Judiciary and Public Administration, with many serving as disciplinary investigators. Format: Open class; invitees with the link will be admitted to the session.   Closing Conference of the course “Administrative Improbity” — FGV Direito Rio (Botafogo Campus) Time: 19:00–22:00 (BRT / UTC−3) — in person Host: Professor Thaís Marçal Venue: FGV Direito Rio — Unidade Botafogo, Rio de Janeiro Drawing on a focused thematic cut of Medina Osório’s classic treatise Teoria da Improbidade Administrativa, the conference will revisit foundational concepts, recent jurisprudence and practical implications for integrity, compliance and public‑sector accountability.   Timetable (24 September, chronological) 16:00–17:00 (UTC−3) — Online Opening Lecture of the Postgraduate Diploma in Ibero-American Disciplinary Law — National University of La Pampa (Microsoft Teams). 19:00–22:00 (BRT / UTC−3) — Closing Conference of the course “Administrative Improbity” — FGV Direito Rio (Botafogo Campus), in-person.   About Fábio Medina Osório Partner at Medina Osório Advogados. PhD in Administrative Law from the Complutense University of Madrid, Spain. Master’s in Public Law from the Federal University of Rio Grande do Sul (UFRGS). Former Attorney General of Brazil. President of the International Institute for Studies of State Law (IIEDE).

Medina Osório Advogados highlights the 1st Petrobras Seminar on Administrative Sanctioning Law

Medina Osório Advogados is pleased to record the holding of the 1st Petrobras Seminar on Administrative Sanctioning Law, an initiative of great institutional relevance for strengthening integrity, governance and compliance in Brazil. The event will bring together public authorities, Petrobras executives, judges and leading jurists, consolidating itself as a plural and highly qualified forum for dialogue. The opening panel will feature Petrobras’ President, Magda Maria de Regina Chambriard; the Chair of the Board of Directors, Bruno Moretti; Petrobras’ General Counsel, Wellington Cesar Lima e Silva; the Director of Governance and Compliance, Ricardo Wagner de Araujo; Petrobras’ Chief Inspector General, Edson Leonardo Dalescio Sá Teles; the Chair of the Public Ethics Commission, Manoel Caetano Ferreira Filho; and the Executive Secretary of the Office of the Comptroller General (CGU), Eveline Martins Brito. We are proud to highlight that the opening lecture will be delivered by our founding partner, Fábio Medina Osório, a jurist whose career has consolidated Administrative Sanctioning Law as a scientific and applied field in Brazil. Among the speakers, special mention should be made of the President of IBDA, Cristiana Fortini, and the Vice-President of IDASAN, Alice Voronoff, alongside names such as Judge Rogério Tobias de Carvalho (TRF-2), Luiz Fernando Delazari (Itaipu Binacional), Fernanda Alvares da Rocha (CGU), Antônio Carlos Vasconcellos Nóbrega (Ministry of Finance) and Bruno Espiñeira Lemos (Public Ethics Commission). This seminar reinforces the importance of integrating institutional experience, academic thought and legal practice in addressing the contemporary challenges of public ethics and Administrative Sanctioning Law.

Fábio Medina Osório to Speak at the X International Congress on Insurance Law – IBDS

The recent enactment of Complementary Law 213/2025 has introduced significant changes to Brazilian Insurance Law, creating new challenges that require careful interpretation and practical application. Beyond the realm of legal hermeneutics, these innovations raise issues that affect regulatory structures, the insurance market, and the protection of citizens. Against this backdrop, Fábio Medina Osório, Founding Partner at Medina Osório Advogados, will take part in the panel “Innovations in Complementary Law 213/2025”, scheduled for 17 October from 16:30 to 18:00, during the X International Congress on Insurance Law of the Brazilian Institute of Insurance Law (IBDS). This year, the Congress will be held in São Paulo, with sessions taking place at two of the city’s most iconic venues – the São Paulo Museum of Art (MASP) and the Theatro Municipal. The event has established itself as one of the leading international forums for debate and reflection in the field of Insurance Law, convening leading academics, practitioners, regulators and representatives of public institutions to discuss the key issues shaping the sector. The X International Congress on Insurance Law – IBDS will take place from 16 to 18 October 2025, consolidating its position as a forum for open, plural and high-level dialogue on the future of Insurance Law in Brazil and beyond.  

The Due Process of Law and Its Influence on Brazilian Law: A Comparative Analysis Based on American Substantive Due Process

Introduction The principle of due process of law is at the core of constitutional rights both in the United States and Brazil. Although the expression was adopted in Brazil’s 1988 Federal Constitution, its origin dates back to the English Magna Carta of 1215, and its contemporary application in the United States has directly influenced the protection of fundamental rights in various Western democracies. This article aims to analyze the impact of the concept of substantive due process, developed by the U.S. Supreme Court, on Brazilian law, emphasizing its relevance for the protection of fundamental rights and the limitation of state arbitrariness. The analysis will be based on the concept of substantive due process as presented by Erwin Chemerinsky, one of the leading authorities in American constitutional law. Chemerinsky’s work is crucial for understanding the evolution of this principle in the United States and its potential impact on other jurisdictions, such as Brazil. Due Process of Law in the United States: Substantive Aspects In American law, the concept of due process of law is divided into two main aspects: procedural due process, which pertains to formal procedural guarantees, and substantive due process, which refers to material guarantees for the protection of fundamental rights. Both aspects are enshrined in the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution, which ensure that no one will be deprived of “life, liberty, or property without due process of law.” As Erwin Chemerinsky explains, substantive due process plays a crucial role in protecting against state arbitrariness. He argues that the government cannot irrationally interfere with rights deemed fundamental, even when formal legal procedures are followed. Throughout history, the U.S. Supreme Court has used substantive due process to protect rights that are not explicitly stated in the constitutional text but are considered essential to human dignity. Examples of these rights include the right to privacy, established in Roe v. Wade (1973), and the right to same-sex marriage, recognized in Obergefell v. Hodges (2015) (CHEMERINSKY, 2023). Substantive Due Process and Its Application by the U.S. Supreme Court The U.S. Supreme Court has historically played a central role in defining and expanding fundamental rights, particularly through substantive due process. This doctrine has been applied in cases involving individual and economic liberties, as well as in protection against laws that unduly restrict fundamental rights. Substantive due process thus emerges as a tool to ensure that the government does not use its authority in a manner that violates implicit but fundamental rights. Chemerinsky explains that, in applying substantive due process, the Supreme Court uses different levels of scrutiny depending on the importance of the right in question. In cases involving fundamental rights, such as freedom of speech and the right to privacy, the court applies what is known as “strict scrutiny,” requiring the government to demonstrate that its action serves a compelling public interest and that no less restrictive means are available to achieve it (CHEMERINSKY, 2023). This concept also allows the U.S. judiciary to assess the substance of certain laws, meaning that even if the government follows all the required formal procedures, a law may still be declared unconstitutional if it unjustifiably violates fundamental rights. This approach has significantly expanded the protection of rights in the United States, leading to the recognition of liberties that, while not explicitly stated in the constitutional text, are essential to democracy. The Influence of American Due Process on Brazilian Law Although the Brazilian legal system follows a civil law tradition, it has been heavily influenced by the American doctrine of due process of law, especially after the promulgation of the 1988 Federal Constitution. Article 5, section LIV, of the Brazilian Constitution provides that “no one shall be deprived of liberty or property without due process of law.” As in the American model, due process in Brazil has both formal and substantive dimensions. In the Brazilian context, substantive due process is related to judicial review of government acts that, while meeting formal legal requirements, may violate fundamental rights. The application of this principle in Brazil is mainly manifested through the concepts of reasonableness and proportionality, which are frequently used by the Brazilian Supreme Court (STF) to assess the constitutionality of laws and administrative acts. Examples of the application of substantive due process in Brazil can be seen in decisions involving the protection of social and economic rights. In various cases, the STF has declared laws unconstitutional that, while formally correct, disproportionately restricted access to fundamental rights, such as the rights to health and education. This approach is clearly influenced by American substantive due process, which allows the judiciary to go beyond a strictly procedural analysis and evaluate the substance of the laws in question. Final Considerations The doctrine of substantive due process, as developed by the U.S. Supreme Court and explained by Erwin Chemerinsky, has had a profound impact on the interpretation of fundamental rights in both the United States and Brazil. While in the U.S. this doctrine has evolved to protect implicit rights such as privacy and personal autonomy, in Brazil, substantive due process is used by the STF to ensure that laws and government acts respect fundamental rights in their essence. The influence of the American model in Brazil is evident, particularly regarding the scrutiny of the reasonableness and proportionality of state actions. However, it is important to note that due process in Brazil has its own specificity, derived from its constitutional context and legal tradition, while constantly engaging in dialogue with foreign doctrinal and jurisprudential developments. References CHEMERINSKY, Erwin. Substantive Due Process. [PDF]. 2023. Constituição da República Federativa do Brasil de 1988. Available at: https://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/constituicao/constituicao.htm. Author: Fábio Medina Osório

Fábio Medina Osório, Managing Partner at Medina Osório Advogados, to Speak at the XXVI National Congress of the Brazilian Public Prosecution Service (CONAMP)

Fábio Medina Osório, Managing Partner at Medina Osório Advogados, former Public Prosecutor, and former Advocate General of the Union of Brazil, will be a speaker at the XXVI National Congress of the Brazilian Public Prosecution Service (CONAMP), taking place from 11 to 14 November 2025 at the Ulysses Guimarães Convention Centre in Brasília (DF). He will participate in the Dialogue Forum entitled: “Governance, Compliance and Integrity – The Fundamental Right to Good Public Administration” Date: 13 November 2025 Time: 4:45 p.m. – 6:00 p.m. Venue: Main Auditorium The session will be chaired by Romão Ávila, Attorney General of the State of Mato Grosso do Sul, and will feature contributions from: ● Justice André Mendonça (Federal Supreme Court); ● Professor Nicolás Rodríguez García (University of Salamanca, Spain), an internationally recognised scholar in Criminal Law and Public Governance; ● Prosecutor Luciana Ásper y Valdés (Federal District); ● Prosecutor Maurícia Marcela Cavalcante Mamede Furlani (Ceará); ● Prosecutor Adriano Marcus Brito de Assis (Bahia); and ● Fábio Medina Osório (OAB), lawyer, professor, and author of leading works on Administrative Sanctioning Law and Public Integrity. Medina Osório currently serves his third term as President of the National Commission on Administrative Sanctioning Law of the Brazilian Bar Association (Federal Council), which he originally founded. The Opening Ceremony of the Congress will take place on Tuesday, 11 November, at 7:00 p.m., and will feature the Keynote Lecture by Prosecutor General Paulo Gonet. Bringing together more than 3,000 members of the Brazilian Public Prosecution Service, the Congress is regarded as the most significant national forum of the profession, fostering high-level debate on institutional development, democratic governance, public policy design, and innovation within the justice system. The full programme is available at: https://www.conamp.org.br/imprensa/noticias/9541-programacao-xxvi-congresso-nacional-do-ministerio-publico.html

Which Artificial Intelligence Regulation Best Promotes Technological Advancement and Economic Growth? An Analysis of Models from the United States, European Union, and Brazil

Abstract: This article provides a comparative analysis of artificial intelligence regulatory frameworks established by the United States, the European Union, and Brazil. It evaluates each jurisdiction’s approach from a practical standpoint, focusing on the economic impact and technological progression facilitated by their respective regulatory models. The aim is to determine which framework may best foster an environment conducive to both innovation and the protection of fundamental rights, specifically in the context of Brazil’s growing tech ecosystem. Introduction The proliferation of artificial intelligence (AI) has sparked widespread economic interest, prompting numerous nations to enact specific regulatory frameworks aimed at balancing safety and innovation. The United States, European Union, and Brazil offer divergent approaches that reflect their unique economic and social priorities. This paper examines these regulatory models with an emphasis on identifying which has the highest potential to drive technological advancement and economic development, with particular attention to Brazil’s innovation ecosystem. As global demand for AI-driven activities rises—accelerated by the adoption of generative AI platforms—businesses are increasingly integrating AI to enhance productivity across industries. In this context, it becomes imperative to understand the regulatory pathways that various nations are pursuing to simultaneously stimulate innovation and ensure responsible AI usage. The transformative potential of AI across fields necessitates a critical examination of the newly implemented regulatory frameworks in the U.S. and EU, which serve as potential models for Brazil. The “fourth industrial revolution” represents a strategic opportunity for Brazil to achieve significant economic and technological gains by tapping into these evolving AI markets. To cultivate a regulatory environment that promotes creativity among innovators while ensuring effective fundamental rights protections, Brazil stands to benefit from a measured approach that combines flexibility with legal certainty. Accordingly, this article intends to provide a practical assessment of the recently established regulatory frameworks in the U.S. and EU and to evaluate Brazil’s own legislative efforts, specifically the Draft Bill No. 2,338/2024 currently under consideration in Congress.   United States: A Model of Regulatory Flexibility and Innovation Incentives The 2023 U.S. Executive Order on Artificial Intelligence adopts a broad, flexible framework to encourage innovation and competitiveness, while promoting safety in critical sectors. This model creates a regulatory environment that directly supports economic growth and technological development by implementing policies that minimize regulatory burdens, particularly in emerging and highly competitive industries. The American regulatory model offers several practical benefits to economic growth and technological advancement: Regulatory Flexibility: The absence of rigid restrictions enables startups and innovative companies to experiment with new AI applications without excessive regulatory barriers. This flexibility promotes agility, attracting investment and facilitating the rapid development of technological solutions. For Brazil, adopting a similar approach could invigorate the tech sector by fostering an environment conducive to continuous testing and evolution. Incentives for Innovation and Competitiveness: The Executive Order promotes growth within the AI workforce and aims to attract foreign talent, ensuring that the U.S. retains its position of leadership in AI. These policies can serve as a blueprint for Brazil, where efforts to attract talent and foreign investment in AI remain limited. The American approach enhances economic growth by encouraging small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) to participate actively in the AI sector, fostering a diverse and innovative economy. Emphasis on Security for Critical Sectors: While the American model is flexible in low-risk sectors, it maintains rigorous standards in areas such as defense and critical infrastructure. Emulating this approach could enable Brazil to support AI development in less sensitive sectors with minimal regulation, without compromising security in high-risk areas. European Union: Strict Protection and Compliance The European Union's AI Act is the first attempt at risk-based AI regulation, offering a formal, comprehensive framework focused on fundamental rights protection. This model emphasizes security and transparency, but its rigid compliance structure may impact the pace of innovation and economic growth. Challenges of the EU model for technological progress and economic development: Innovation Bureaucracy Risks: The strict compliance approach and mandatory audits for high-risk systems require financial and time resources that may discourage small businesses. Startups and small companies face greater difficulties meeting compliance demands, which can slow innovation and reduce competitiveness in the AI sector. In Brazil, adopting a similar model could hinder the growth of startups, which already struggle with bureaucracy and compliance costs. High Penalties for Violations: The AI Act imposes strict fines for infractions, encouraging accountability but also raising the risks for companies developing AI in regulated sectors. These sanctions aim to protect users but may deter new entrants into the AI market, particularly smaller companies without the capital to face hefty fines. In Brazil, such a model could significantly impact the economy, especially in a scenario where startups need a more welcoming regulatory environment to thrive. Transparency and Ethics as Priorities: The AI Act's requirements for bias audits and continuous compliance are positive in terms of rights protection but increase development costs and reduce companies' agility. While transparency and ethics are crucial, a more practical approach, like the U.S. model, might be more viable for promoting AI growth in Brazil, where tech companies face cost and efficiency challenges. Bill 2338/2023 in Brazil: A Hybrid Approach with Growth Potential Brazil's Bill 2338/2023 proposes regulation inspired by European and U.S. models, establishing a National Artificial Intelligence Authority (ANIA) to oversee the sector. The Brazilian proposal aims to balance innovation stimulus with rights protection but requires adjustments to maximize economic development and technological progress. For technological progress, the Brazilian model has characteristics that, with adjustments, could foster economic growth: Adaptable Flexibility: The bill lacks specific guidelines for audits and risk classification, but this initial flexibility could be advantageous, allowing regulations to evolve as the sector matures. This approach would enable Brazil to learn from challenges observed in other jurisdictions and adapt rules to the local AI market dynamics, encouraging economic growth with fewer entry barriers. Ethical Compliance with a Civil Rights Focus: The bill incorporates LGPD data protection, ensuring basic rights protection without the EU model's bureaucracy. This benefits startups by maintaining ethical responsibility without overburdening companies with complex compliance audits. For Brazil, a simplified but ethically guided approach could balance rights protection with AI growth. Need for Innovation and Competitiveness Incentives: While innovation is mentioned as a principle, the bill lacks clear policies to foster AI development, particularly for small and medium enterprises. Brazil could benefit from including financial and fiscal incentives, as well as training programs and talent attraction policies, similar to the U.S. model. Robust incentive policies are crucial to strengthening Brazil's AI sector and ensuring its significant contribution to the economy. 5) Pragmatic Comparison: Which Model Most Promotes Economic Growth United States: Innovation and Flexibility: High. Enables experimentation and adaptation. Rights Protection: Moderate-High. Focus on bias mitigation and civil rights audits. Competitiveness: High. Incentives for startups and talent attraction. Bureaucracy Risk: Low. Flexible guidelines in non-critical sectors. European Union: Innovation and Flexibility: Moderate. Strict restrictions limit flexibility. Rights Protection: High. Focus on ethics and transparency, with audits and penalties. Competitiveness: Low-Moderate. Rigid regulatory structure impacts agility and new entrants. Bureaucracy Risk: High. Significant compliance costs and bureaucracy. Brazil: Innovation and Flexibility: Moderate-High. Flexible model but lacks clear incentives. Rights Protection: Moderate. Based on LGPD, with less burdensome ethical compliance. Competitiveness: Moderate. Needs incentives and talent attraction policies. Bureaucracy Risk: Moderate. Still lacks regulatory clarity. 6) Conclusion: Which Model Allows Greater Technological Progress and Economic Development? Assessing the regulatory models of the U.S., EU, and Brazil, the practical analysis suggests the U.S. model offers the most significant potential for technological progress and economic development. Its regulatory flexibility and clear incentives for business growth allow companies to innovate rapidly while maintaining global AI competitiveness. The EU provides a robust protection system, but its strict compliance may hinder economic progress, especially for smaller businesses. Meanwhile, Brazil, with Bill 2338/2023, presents an opportunity to create a hybrid model but needs specific policies to encourage innovation and competitiveness. Adding financial and educational incentives to the bill could make Brazil an attractive hub for AI development, balancing security with economic progress. Ultimately, for Brazil to strike a balance between protection and growth, a pragmatic approach inspired by the U.S. model, complemented by ethical standards and local development incentives, would be the most promising path to fostering a robust and economically viable AI sector. Author: Fábio Medina Osório

The Constitutionalization of Administrative Law in Brazil: A Substantive and Material Perspective

Introduction The 1988 Brazilian Constitution represents a turning point in the history of administrative law, embedding it firmly within the constitutional framework and redefining its role in the governance of public administration and the protection of constitutional values. This transformation did not occur in isolation but was preceded by intense scholarly reflection and advocacy for a broader conceptualization of administrative law. Among the most significant voices in this dialogue was Miguel Seabra Fagundes, whose work underscored the urgency of integrating administrative law into the constitutional order as a substantive and material discipline. Seabra Fagundes’s reflections, published during the preparatory period leading up to the drafting of the Constitution, highlighted the interplay between constitutional law and administrative law. While constitutional law establishes the foundational principles and structure of the state, administrative law operationalizes these principles in the daily interactions between the state and its citizens. He argued that administrative law, when viewed solely as a procedural mechanism, failed to fulfill its potential as a tool for promoting accountability, safeguarding public assets, and protecting individual rights against the excesses of state power. This perspective aligned with the aspirations of the 1988 Constitution, which sought to dismantle the remnants of authoritarianism and establish a legal framework grounded in democratic principles, social justice, and the rule of law. By incorporating administrative law directly into the constitutional text, the framers of the Constitution elevated its status from a mere technical instrument to a central pillar of constitutional governance. The work of Seabra Fagundes served as a critical foundation for this paradigm shift. His emphasis on the importance of constitutionalizing administrative law resonates throughout the 1988 Constitution, which enshrined principles such as legality, impersonality, morality, publicity, and efficiency as binding norms for all public administration. These principles are more than formal requirements; they represent substantive commitments to transparency, fairness, and the effective use of public resources. In addition, Seabra Fagundes advocated for a broader understanding of administrative law as a mechanism for safeguarding public integrity. He emphasized the need for clear accountability mechanisms, including shared responsibility between public servants and the state in cases of misconduct. His proposals for the creation of deliberative bodies and his defense of meritocratic public service hiring processes were prescient contributions to the debates that shaped the constitutional framework. The constitutionalization of administrative law under the 1988 Constitution reflects both the theoretical insights of scholars like Seabra Fagundes and the practical need to reform Brazil’s public administration. The Constitution did not merely codify procedural rules; it also imbued administrative law with a material dimension, allowing it to serve as a vehicle for protecting constitutional values, promoting social justice, and ensuring the proper functioning of public administration. This article examines the constitutionalization of administrative law from a contemporary perspective, recognizing its formal and material dimensions and its evolution into a substantive branch of constitutional governance. The discussion begins by analyzing the foundations laid by thinkers like Seabra Fagundes, whose ideas helped shape the role of administrative law in the constitutional order. It then explores the dual dimensions of administrative law—formal and material—highlighting their significance in regulating public administration and protecting constitutional values. Finally, the article delves into the principles governing public administration, demonstrating how they contribute to a modern and effective legal framework that transcends traditional boundaries and responds to the challenges of contemporary governance. The Foundations of Administrative Law in the Constitutional Order Administrative law’s elevation in the 1988 Constitution is a testament to its critical role in modern governance. By embedding principles such as accountability, legality, and efficiency into the constitutional text, the framers ensured that administrative law would serve as both a framework for regulating public administration and a mechanism for safeguarding public interests. These principles, enshrined in Article 37 of the Constitution, serve as a foundation for a legal system that balances state authority with the protection of individual rights and the promotion of collective welfare. The Constitution also introduced innovative mechanisms for ensuring accountability in public administration, including provisions for addressing administrative improbity (Article 37, §4º). These mechanisms demonstrate the substantive dimension of administrative law, allowing it to function as a guardian of constitutional values and a deterrent against misconduct. Through this framework, administrative law has become an essential tool for achieving the Constitution’s broader goals of transparency, social justice, and the rule of law. It operates not only as a regulatory instrument but also as a protector of the public interest, ensuring that public administration aligns with the principles and values enshrined in the constitutional order. Author: Fábio Medina Osório

Brazil’s Infrastructure Financing: The Role of BNDES and Bond Market Opportunities

The Brazilian infrastructure bond market has increasingly gained prominence as a critical source of financing for large-scale projects,particularly in the areas of urban mobility, sanitation, and sustainable energy. In 2023, the National Bank for Economic and Social Development (BNDES) emerged as one of the key players in this space, with a 44% increase in approved credit compared to the previous year, reaching R$ 218.5 billion. This growth is in line with the recent introduction of Law No. 14.801/24 and Decree No. 11.964, which regulate incentivized bonds and promise greater flexibility and liquidity in the market BNDES plays a pivotal role in structuring these projects, providing long-term credit tailored to the unique demands of infrastructure initiatives, which often involve protracted bidding and construction phases. The institution's capacity to inject capital during times of economic stress, without the pressure to quickly reallocate funds to more profitable ventures, underscores its position as a vital partner in fostering sustainable development. In 2023, 70% of the bonds structured by BNDES were certified as sustainable, earning the bank international accolades, including the "Bond Arranger of the Year" award for Latin America. One of the primary challenges identified in the Brazilian infrastructure sector is the significant investment gap. Brazil’s infrastructure stock accounts for only 34% of its GDP, compared to 76% in China and 58% in India. To bridge this gap, Brazil needs to invest approximately R$ 450 billion annually in infrastructure, yet actual investment in 2023 reached only R$ 213 billion. In this context, infrastructure bonds emerge as a key solution, channeling private capital to complement public financing and mitigate the infrastructure deficit. The structuring of these bonds involves ongoing dialogue between issuers and investors. During the pre-completion phase, construction risks dominate, requiring robust guarantees and a thorough analysis of project complexities. Post-completion, the risks shift to operational and political variables, making financial guarantees a vital condition for investors' decision-making. In this regard, BNDES plays a fundamental role by taking on completion risks, providing an additional layer of security for investors. From the issuer’s perspective, contractual flexibility is crucial for the success of infrastructure bonds. This flexibility allows for adjustments throughout the project cycle as risks are mitigated and market conditions evolve. Recent Brazilian legislation permitting the issuance of bonds abroad with tax benefits, such as "infrastructure bonds," creates new opportunities for issuers to access international markets and attract additional capital. Environmental, social, and governance (ESG) criteria have become an essential factor in investment decisions, particularly in infrastructure projects. Brazil, with its vast natural resources, renewable energy potential, and sophisticated financial market, is well-positioned to become a global hub for sustainable capital. The combination of renewable energy, agribusiness, and extensive waterway networks offers Brazil a competitive advantage, attracting investors seeking to align financial returns with sustainability goals. In conclusion, BNDES, with its extensive history of supporting Brazil’s economic development, remains a strategic partner for issuers and investors in the infrastructure bond market. The recent regulatory changes, coupled with the bank’s expertise in long-term projects, have the potential to transform the Brazilian market, expanding investment opportunities and promoting sustainable development across the country. Author: Fábio Medina Osório

Spain's Expanding Role in Brazil: Trade and Investment Insights

Spanish trade and investments in Brazil have grown significantly, solidifying Spain's position as a major foreign investor in the country. In 2022, Spain ranked fourth among foreign direct investment (FDI) contributors to Brazil, with an FDI stock of approximately US$52.3 billion. Spanish investments in Brazil span multiple sectors, including infrastructure, energy, and financial services, with notable examples such as Banco Santander’s extensive branch network expansion and investments in renewable energy projects like the Marlim Azul gas power plant and the Ribeirão Gonçalves solar energy complex. The close economic ties between Spain and Brazil are also evident in trade relations. Spain has become one of Brazil's most important European trading partners. In 2023, bilateral trade reached US$11.8 billion, with Brazilian exports to Spain concentrated in commodities like crude petroleum, soy, and corn. Spanish imports from Brazil are highly reliant on oil, which accounted for 40.6% of the total imports in 2023, largely due to the increased demand caused by the disruption of Russian oil supplies following the conflict in Ukraine. Other products such as sugar and soy derivatives also saw significant growth during this period. Brazil’s export basket to Spain, while focused on commodities, has shown resilience and potential for diversification. The conclusion of the Mercosur-EU trade agreement could further enhance Brazil's access to the European market, particularly in agriculture, providing opportunities for growth in other sectors. However, challenges remain. Brazil must navigate evolving regulatory frameworks such as the European Union’s new deforestation law (EUDR), which will restrict imports from deforested areas, potentially affecting Brazilian exports of soy, beef, and other agricultural products. In terms of investment projects, Spanish companies have played a pivotal role in Brazil’s energy and infrastructure development. Repsol, a key player in the energy sector, has engaged in multi-billion-dollar investments in Brazil's offshore gas fields, while Neoenergia, another Spanish company, has established itself as a leader in renewable energy. These projects are crucial for Brazil's energy transition and infrastructure expansion, further reinforcing Spain’s role as a strategic investor in Brazil. Beyond traditional industries, the Brazilian government has emphasized its commitment to innovation and regulatory modernization, launching initiatives to foster a more favorable environment for foreign investors. Recent discussions between Brazilian and Spanish officials have highlighted the potential for increased collaboration, particularly in areas like renewable energy, digital transformation, and infrastructure development . As both countries explore these synergies, the framework for Spanish investments in Brazil is set to strengthen further, benefiting from shared interests and strategic partnerships. Fábio Medina Osório, the founding partner of Medina Osório Advogados and former Attorney General of Brazil, is a specialist in regulatory law and corporate compliance. He holds a Ph.D. in administrative law from Complutense University of Madrid and has been actively involved in organizing events alongside key financial institutions and telecom giants to discuss regulatory trends, infrastructure, and risk management strategies for companies looking to execute large-scale infrastructure projects or investments in Brazil. His expertise and leadership are essential for navigating Brazil’s complex regulatory landscape.  

Administrative Misconduct and Sanctioning Administrative Law: Reflections on ADI 4295 in Light of Constitutional Jurisprudence

Introduction Brazil’s Administrative Misconduct Law (Law 8.429/92), which was significantly reformed by Law 14.230/2021, remains one of the primary tools of the Brazilian State in the fight against corruption, public mismanagement, and violations of the principles governing public administration. However, the concept of administrative misconduct, as we have argued in our scholarly works and reflections, goes far beyond mere acts of corruption or illicit enrichment. It is a mechanism that encompasses severe dishonesty and gross inefficiency, analyzed from a constitutional perspective, within a broader framework of sanctioning administrative law. In this article, we propose an analysis of the decision by the Brazilian Supreme Court (STF) in ADI 4295, which reviewed the constitutionality of several provisions of Law 8.429/92, emphasizing the role of sanctioning administrative law in the misconduct regime. Based on our interpretation, we examine the decision in light of constitutional jurisprudence and its interaction with the principles of morality, legality, and efficiency, which are the central focuses of administrative misconduct in Brazil. The Constitutional Concept of Misconduct and the 2021 Reform Administrative misconduct, as set out in Article 37, §4º of the Brazilian Federal Constitution, requires public officials to conduct themselves with administrative probity and respect for the principles governing public administration, such as legality, impartiality, morality, publicity, and efficiency, with heightened standards. The concept of misconduct is not limited to corruption in its strict sense but also includes acts that, while not directly harming the public treasury, violate these principles and erode public trust in government institutions. The legislature has discretion to determine whether culpable acts should be penalized or not. The reform introduced by Law 14.230/2021 sparked controversy by eliminating the culpable forms of administrative misconduct, focusing instead on intentional conduct. In our view, this reform reflects a legitimate choice by the legislature within a democratic framework, prioritizing the punishment of more serious, intentional misconduct over negligent acts that, while harmful to the treasury, do not involve bad faith or direct intent on the part of the public official. The STF, when ruling on ADI 4295, upheld the constitutionality of this legislative choice, emphasizing that the Constitution allows the legislature the flexibility to define the scope of misconduct offenses. Therefore, by excluding culpable misconduct, the Brazilian legislature followed a trend of strengthening legal certainty and the strict principle of legality in sanctioning law. Sanctioning Administrative Law: Origin and Application in Administrative Misconduct Since the 1990s, we have advocated for the treatment of administrative misconduct as an offense within the scope of sanctioning administrative law. This branch of law, which has primarily developed in Europe and gained traction in Brazil through jurisprudential evolution, legislative reforms, and the strengthening of oversight mechanisms, seeks to punish administrative violations under a distinct legal regime, separate from criminal law, but governed by similar protective principles, such as proportionality, legality, and specificity. Sanctioning administrative law aims to protect values like morality, efficiency, and legality in public administration through the application of penalties that may be imposed directly by the judiciary or executive authorities, with strict adherence to principles that are symmetrical with criminal law. Administrative misconduct, although not necessarily a crime, falls within this framework, as it demands a strong state response to ensure the proper functioning of public administration and to maintain public trust in public officials. The 2021 reform reaffirms the administrative nature of misconduct offenses, consolidating the understanding that penalties for misconduct fall within the framework of sanctioning administrative law, even though procedurally they are handled in civil jurisdiction. The STF, in ADI 4295, reinforced this view by confirming the independence of administrative and criminal spheres, highlighting that misconduct penalties may be applied autonomously without the need for a criminal conviction. This further underscores the punitive-administrative nature of administrative misconduct. The Constitutionality of Penalties: Analysis of the ADI 4295 Ruling In ADI 4295, the STF examined the constitutionality of provisions in Law 8.429/92 that allow for the application of severe penalties, such as removal from office, suspension of political rights, and prohibition from contracting with the government, even without proof of financial damage to the public treasury. The STF was clear in affirming that the protection of administrative morality goes beyond safeguarding public finances; it also involves upholding the principles that govern public administration, particularly legality, impartiality, morality, and efficiency. In the opinion of Justice Marco Aurélio, the rapporteur, it was made explicit that penalties for administrative misconduct, contrary to the arguments made by the petitioner, do not necessarily depend on proof of harm to the public treasury. Misconduct, above all, is a violation of administrative principles, and its punishment serves to protect broader public interests, including public confidence in the State’s administrative apparatus. Additionally, the ruling reinforced the idea that the penalties provided for in Law 8.429/92 are independent of other legal domains, such as criminal and civil law. This means that even if the public official has not been convicted of a crime, they can still be sanctioned for administrative misconduct based on the criteria set forth in the law. The STF’s affirmation of this independence of spheres is one of the pillars of sanctioning administrative law, ensuring a swift and effective response to serious violations of official duties. Of course, this independence does not disregard the principle of non bis in idem. The Role of the Public Prosecutor and Judicial Oversight in Administrative Misconduct Another significant aspect of the ADI 4295 ruling was the discussion concerning the role of the Public Prosecutor’s Office in overseeing administrative misconduct cases. Law 8.429/92 provides that the Public Prosecutor’s Office, along with the Courts of Accounts, has the right and duty to oversee both administrative and judicial processes involving the investigation of misconduct, and may even initiate legal action and assist in investigating damages. The petitioner in this case argued that this provision violated the separation of powers by allowing the Public Prosecutor’s Office to intervene in administrative processes. However, the STF categorically affirmed that the involvement of the Public Prosecutor is a fundamental safeguard for ensuring impartiality and objectivity in fact-finding, even in administrative proceedings. According to the rapporteur, this oversight by the Public Prosecutor’s Office does not violate the separation of powers but rather strengthens control and transparency in the application of misconduct penalties. The involvement of the Public Prosecutor in misconduct cases is essential to ensure that investigations and sanctions are based on legal and technical criteria, thus mitigating the risk of political interference or arbitrary decisions. Judicial oversight was also reaffirmed as an important safeguard to ensure that sanctioning administrative law is applied fairly and proportionally, in accordance with constitutional principles. Extending Penalties to Legal Entities: Preventing Fraud and Protecting Public Assets ADI 4295 also raised an important issue regarding the application of misconduct penalties to legal entities controlled by public officials. Law 8.429/92 provides that companies in which a public official is a majority shareholder may be penalized with the prohibition of contracting with the government or receiving tax and credit benefits if the official has been convicted of misconduct. The constitutionality of this provision was challenged, but the STF upheld it as a legitimate and necessary measure to prevent fraud and ensure the effectiveness of misconduct penalties. The Court highlighted that applying penalties to companies controlled by public officials is essential to prevent these officials from using private companies as tools to circumvent the legal consequences imposed by law. The STF’s decision ensured that penalties are applied effectively and proportionally, protecting public assets against fraudulent schemes, without compromising the importance of the non bis in idem principle. One of the significant contributions of the reform brought by Law 14.230/2021 was the consolidation of the independence of administrative penalties from criminal law, while respecting the non bis in idem principle. By reaffirming the administrative nature of misconduct offenses and their autonomy from other legal spheres, the reform promoted by Law 14.230/2021 represented a major advancement, as it consolidated the independence of administrative and criminal spheres. The recognition that penalties for administrative misconduct are materially administrative and procedurally civil was reaffirmed by the Supreme Court in ADI 4295, strengthening the autonomy of sanctioning administrative law in relation to criminal law. This independence is essential to ensure that misconduct penalties are applied efficiently and swiftly, without depending on the outcome of criminal proceedings, which often take years to resolve. Sanctioning administrative law, as an autonomous branch of public law, aims to protect public administration from serious offenses that compromise the morality, legality, and efficiency of public services, without the need for criminal liability to be established. The STF’s ruling in ADI 4295 confirmed that administrative misconduct may be penalized autonomously, without the need for a prior criminal conviction. This is crucial for the effective functioning of control mechanisms in public administration, ensuring that public officials who violate the duties of probity are held accountable proportionately and promptly, regardless of the outcome of any related criminal proceedings. Furthermore, ADI 4295 reaffirmed that administrative penalties are not criminal in nature, even if they may have similar effects, such as removal from office and suspension of political rights. These penalties are intended to protect public interests and maintain the integrity of public administration, in accordance with the principles of sanctioning administrative law. The Elimination of Culpable Misconduct in the Administrative Misconduct Law and Its Implications One of the most significant changes introduced by Law 14.230/2021 was the exclusion of culpable forms of administrative misconduct. Prior to the reform, Law 8.429/92 allowed for the punishment of negligent acts, where public officials acted without intentor bad faith, but with negligence, imprudence, or incompetence. However, the new law limits administrative misconduct penalties to intentional (dolous) actions, excluding culpable (negligent) acts, which has sparked debate in both legal doctrine and jurisprudence. The justification for this change lies in the principle that administrative misconduct penalties should be reserved for the most serious offenses, those that involve a conscious violation of the duties of probity, morality, and efficiency. The legislature recognized that punishing public officials for mere negligence, without intent, could create legal uncertainty and potentially discourage public officials from making decisions in complex or high-risk public policy areas. While the exclusion of culpable misconduct has been criticized, particularly on the grounds that serious inefficiency should also be subject to penalties, the STF upheld this legislative choice as constitutional. The Court emphasized that the Brazilian Federal Constitution grants the legislature the discretion to define the scope of misconduct offenses, including the ability to limit penalties to intentional actions. In the STF’s view, the choice to punish only intentional misconduct does not violate the principle of administrative morality. Moreover, the legislature may, in the future, reintroduce penalties for culpable misconduct if deemed necessary, much like the continued existence of the crime of “culpable embezzlement” (peculato culposo) under the Penal Code. What is crucial, as we see it, is that the punishment of administrative misconduct aligns with the principles of proportionality and legal certainty, avoiding disproportionate or arbitrary types of penalties that could compromise the principles of legality, legal security, or the dignity of the individual. Proportionality of Penalties and Due Process of Law Another central point highlighted by the STF is the reaffirmation of the principle of proportionality as one of the cornerstones of sanctioning administrative law. The Court consistently emphasizes that penalties for misconduct must be applied in proportion to the severity of the offense, taking into account the specific circumstances of the case and the extent of the harm caused to public administration. In this regard, the Court noted that the penalties provided in Law 8.429/92, such as removal from office, suspension of political rights, and prohibition from contracting with the government, are severe and, therefore, should be applied with caution, always respecting due process of law. The STF reaffirmed that due process not only ensures the right to defense and an adversarial proceeding, but also guarantees that penalties are imposed fairly and in a balanced manner, without excesses or arbitrariness. The decision in ADI 4295 also reiterated the importance of the principle of strict legality in sanctioning law. The principle of legality requires that offenses be clearly defined by law, ensuring that public officials know precisely what conduct is considered misconduct and what penalties may be applied in case of violation. This principle is fundamental for legal certainty and for the predictability of state actions within the sanctioning framework. The Constitutionality of Penalties Without Proof of Damage Another relevant point addressed in the STF’s decision in ADI 4295 was the analysis of whether penalties for misconduct can be imposed without proof of financial damage to the treasury. The Court emphasized that the defense of administrative probity is not limited to protecting public finances in their financial dimension. Administrative misconduct is, first and foremost, aimed at safeguarding the fundamental principles governing public administration, such as legality, morality, and efficiency. In this sense, the STF reaffirmed that it is possible to impose penalties for misconduct even in cases where there is no evidence of material harm to the public treasury, as long as it is proven that the public official has gravely violated the principles of public administration. The Court ruled that the defense of administrative morality and the prevention of improper conduct are legitimate objectives of the State, justifying the imposition of penalties regardless of direct financial loss. This interpretation is consistent with the logic of sanctioning administrative law, which is not limited to punishing conduct that causes financial harm, but also seeks to sanction acts that compromise the ethical and functional integrity of public administration. The focus, therefore, is on ensuring compliance with the duties of probity, morality, and efficiency, which are essential pillars for the proper functioning of the State. Final Considerations: The Legacy of ADI 4295 for Brazilian Administrative Law The judgment of ADI 4295 by the STF represents a significant milestone in consolidating the legal framework for administrative misconduct in Brazil. The decision reaffirmed the constitutionality of key provisions of the Administrative Misconduct Law, validating the legislative choice to limit penalties to intentional misconduct and recognizing the autonomy of sanctioning administrative law in relation to criminal law. ADI 4295 also reinforced the importance of the Public Prosecutor’s Office and the Courts of Accounts in overseeing misconduct cases, ensuring that investigations are conducted impartially and based on legal and technical criteria. The participation of these oversight bodies is crucial to ensuring that penalties for misconduct are applied fairly and proportionally, always in defense of the public interest. Another important legacy of the decision was the recognition that misconduct penalties can be imposed independently, without the need for proof of financial harm to the public treasury, as long as the public official has gravely violated the principles of public administration. This understanding strengthens the preventive and ethical dimensions of the Administrative Misconduct Law, which aims to protect not only the financial assets of the State but also the moral and functional integrity of public administration. Finally, ADI 4295 consolidated the understanding that sanctioning administrative law is an effective and necessary instrument for preserving morality, legality, and efficiency in public administration. By reaffirming the independence of spheres and the proportionality of penalties, the STF contributed to the strengthening of mechanisms for controlling and combating corruption in Brazil, ensuring that public administration operates in accordance with the highest standards of ethics and responsibility. The decision also highlighted the importance of continually improving the legal framework surrounding administrative misconduct, respecting constitutional limits and fundamental guarantees, while maintaining an unwavering commitment to defending morality and efficiency in public administration. In this way, the judgment of ADI 4295 represents a significant advancement for Brazilian administrative law and a strengthening of the country’s democratic institutions. Author: Fábio Medina Osório

The Normative Revolution of ADPF 854: Transparency and Budget Traceability in the Supreme Federal Court

Abstract The monocratic decision rendered by Minister Flávio Dino in ADPF 854 marks a significant legal milestone by establishing parameters for transparency and traceability in the handling of parliamentary amendments in Brazil. However, the decision also raises questions about its practical implementation, the limits of judicial intervention in budgeting, and the challenges of aligning normative requirements with political realities. This article explores the constitutional foundations, practical implications, and potential challenges of this historic decision. Introduction Budget management in Brazil has historically been plagued by opacity and inefficiency, particularly regarding the execution of parliamentary amendments. ADPF 854, culminating in an innovative decision by the Supreme Federal Court (STF), directly confronts these distortions by declaring the unconstitutionality of practices associated with the so-called "secret budget" and establishing rigorous parameters for executing parliamentary amendments. While the STF's solution is legally robust, it faces significant political and institutional challenges. Implementing new rules—such as the requirement for full traceability and the limitation of parliamentary amendment growth—necessitates structural changes in a political system historically resistant to reform. Foundations and Advancements of the Decision 2.1. Transparency and Traceability The decision reinforces the constitutional principles of transparency and traceability, ensuring that the use of public funds is thoroughly documented and accessible. These principles, enshrined in Articles 37 and 163-A of the Federal Constitution, are essential for: Preventing corruption and mismanagement. Facilitating public oversight of budget execution. Strengthening the legitimacy of public expenditures. The STF mandated that all parliamentary amendments be meticulously documented, identifying the requesting parliamentarian and the ultimate destination of funds. Requiring this information to be published on the Transparency Portal represents undeniable progress. 2.2. Limits on Legislative Power The decision also underscores the principle of separation of powers by imposing limits on the Legislature's influence over the public budget. The expansion of parliamentary amendments in recent years—particularly RP 8 (committee amendments) and RP 9 (rapporteur amendments)—has led to a legislative overreach, weakening the Executive's capacity to plan and execute public policies. By capping the growth of parliamentary amendments in line with the discretionary expenses of the Executive or the spending cap, the STF rebalances powers and reinforces fiscal responsibility. A Critical Perspective: Potential Challenges and Uncertainties Despite its merits, the ADPF 854 decision is not without criticism. Certain practical and theoretical issues remain unresolved, requiring critical reflection. 3.1. Feasibility of Implementation While the new rules set a high standard of control, their implementation will depend on collaboration among various institutional actors, such as the National Congress, the Federal Court of Accounts (TCU), and the Office of the Comptroller General (CGU). The historical political resistance to budgetary reform raises doubts about the feasibility of such profound change in the short term. Key questions include: How can it be ensured that all information is accurately entered into the Transparency Portal, particularly in a system with thousands of municipalities benefiting from amendments? Is there sufficient technical capacity in oversight bodies to monitor compliance with the new requirements? 3.2. Judicialization of the Budget The decision also expands the STF's role in overseeing the public budget. While necessary to address identified unconstitutional practices, this could be seen as excessive judicial intervention. Judicial involvement in budgetary matters, traditionally reserved for the Executive and Legislative branches, could lead to political tensions and impair governance. This raises questions about: The legitimate scope of STF involvement in budgetary matters. Risks of excessive centralization of decision-making power within the Judiciary. 3.3. Limits on Parliamentary Amendments While necessary, imposing limits on the growth of parliamentary amendments faces significant political resistance. Legislators are likely to oppose measures that constrain their autonomy in allocating resources, especially in Brazil's highly fragmented political system. Reflections and Recommendations The ADPF 854 decision is a necessary milestone, but its effectiveness will depend on complementary adjustments and a well-defined implementation strategy. Measures that could enhance the decision's impact include: Strengthening inter-institutional governance: Establishing a permanent mechanism for dialogue among the Executive, Legislative, Judiciary, and oversight bodies to monitor the implementation of new rules. Technological enhancement: Investing in modernizing the Transparency Portal and systems like Transferegov.br to ensure all information is easily accessible and verifiable. Capacity building for public agents: Offering training for managers and officials, particularly at the municipal level, to ensure compliance with new standards. Conclusion The decision issued by Minister Flávio Dino in ADPF 854 represents significant progress in promoting transparency, traceability, and efficiency in budget management. However, the practical implementation of these directives will face political and technical challenges that cannot be ignored. While the decision reaffirms the STF's role as the guardian of the Constitution and republican principles, it also highlights the inherent tensions of judicializing public budgeting in a fragmented political system like Brazil's. The success of this reform will depend on joint efforts among the branches of government, cultural shifts in public resource management, and robust public engagement. If properly implemented, ADPF 854 could herald a new era of fiscal responsibility and integrity in public administration. However, the path to this future demands constant vigilance, institutional commitment, and, above all, strong societal engagement. Author: Fábio Medina Osório References Federal Constitution of 1988 Complementary Law No. 101/2000 (Fiscal Responsibility Law) Complementary Law No. 210/2024 Monocratic decision by Minister Flávio Dino in ADPF 854, dated December 2, 2024

ADMINISTRATIVE INFRACTIONS AND SANCTIONS IN COMPLEMENTARY LAW Nº 213/2025. NEW PARADIGMS OF SANCTIONING ADMINISTRATIVE LAW IN THE INSURANCE MARKET

SUMMARY This article analyzes the legislative changes that were introduced by Complementary Law No. 213/2025 in the private insurance system in Brazil, especially in Decree-Law No. 73/1966 and related legislation. These changes modernized the regulatory framework, covering topics such as the regulation of insurance cooperatives, which beforewere restricted to the agricultural, health and work accident sectors,and the formalization of mutualist asset protection operations, in addition to expanding the powers of the Superintendence of Private Insurance (SUSEP). Insurance cooperatives began to be regulated with clear requirements for governance, oversight and asset independence. Mutualist asset protection emerged as an alternativeto the insurance, based on the sharing of costs among participants. The sanctioning regime was reinforced with strict penalties, greater accountability of managers and criminalization of illicit behavior, aiming to guarantee market stability and greater protection for consumers. The article concludes that these changes have the potential to transform the insurance and asset protection sector in Brazil, promoting inclusion, legal certainty and alignment with international standards, although they present operational and adaptation challenges for regulated entities and regulators. KEYWORDS Administrative sanctioning law; Insurance cooperatives; Mutual Asset Protection; Susep; Insurance companies. ABSTRACT The article analyzes the legislative changes introduced by Complementary Law No. 213/2025 to the private insurance system in Brazil, particularly to Decree-Law No. 73/1966 and related legislation. These changes modernized the regulatory framework, covering topics such as the regulation of insurance cooperatives and the formalization of mutual property protection operations, as well as expanding the powers of the Superintendence of Private Insurance (SUSEP). Insurance cooperatives are now regulated with clear requirements for governance, oversight, and asset independence. Mutual property protection has emerged as an innovative alternative to traditional insurance, based on cost-sharing among participants. The sanctioning regime has been strengthened with stricter penalties, increased accountability for managers, and the criminalization of irregular practices, aiming to ensure market stability and greater consumer protection. The article states that these changes have the potential to transform the insurance and property protection sector in Brazil, promoting inclusion, legal certainty, and alignment with international standards, although they pose operational and adaptation challenges for conclusive regulated entities and regulators. KEYWORDS Sanctioning Administrative Law; Insurance Cooperatives; Mutualist Asset Protection; Susep; Superintendence of Private Insurance; Insurers.   Introduction The insurance sector in Brazil plays an essential role in economic development and in protecting the assets of individuals and companies. The evolution of this market is directly associated with the creation of a robust regulatory framework capable of meeting the demands of a dynamic economic environment. This market has expanded, both in Brazil and worldwide, in the post-globalization and post-pandemic scenario, with technological advances and the perception of increased risks. In this scenario, it is important to reflect on the principle of legal certainty and the irradiation of its effects within the scope of the sanctioning administrative law that governs the state's actions in this area. In this sense, administrative infractions in the insurance market, when committed by managers of insurance companies, have common and universal characteristics, reflecting the need to regulate the conduct of managers in this sector, which is highly sensitive to the public interest. These infractions are often associated with the violation of corporate governance standards, such as the lack of effective internal controls, or admit negligence in supervising critical operations. In any scenario, subjective liability is required. Furthermore, regulatory systems seek to hold managers accountable for both direct acts and omissions that compromise the solvency of the insurer or harm consumers. It should be noted that violations are linked to the principles of administrative sanctioning law, requiring that prohibited conduct and sanctions be previously defined in regulations and, above all, be previously delimited by law in a predictable manner in their minimum cores. The applicable sanctions include fines, disqualification from management positions and, in serious cases, restrictions on the company's operations. Finally, the application of these rules is guided by the principles of proportionality and reasonableness, in addition to the individualization and personality of the penalty, ensuring that the penalties are appropriate to the seriousness of the violation. This uniformity reflects the global commitment to the protection of consumers, investors and the stability of the insurance market. As José Inácio Ribeiro Lima de Oliveira rightly points out, “such is the importance attributed to private insurance and pension activities of a complementary nature that the Federal Constitution of 1988 itself provides that it is the responsibility of the Union to supervise insurance and private pension operations (art. 21, VIII) and to privately legislate on civil law and insurance policy (art. 22, I and VII, respectively), as well as outline the main line of private pensions of a complementary nature (art. 202)”[1]. On January 15, 2025, Complementary Law number 213/2025 was approved, originating from Complementary Bill number 143/2024, which has on cooperative insurance companies and mutualist asset protection operations, as well as on the commitment term and the administrative sanctioning process within the scope of the Superintendence of Private Insurance. This new legislation must be interpreted from the perspective of constitutionalized administrative sanctioning law and, above all, by the jurisprudence of the Federal Supreme Court and the Superior Court of Justice, which has followed a path of respect for the constitutional guarantees of those administered and under its jurisdiction, as can be seen from the vast jurisprudence produced on this subject.[2]. Regarding the recent regulatory changes brought about by Complementary Law No. 213 of 2025, it is imperative to highlight the implications arising from the revisions promoted in Decree-Law No. 73/1966 and related legislation, which, in turn, introduced significant innovations in the scope of insurance cooperatives and mutualist asset protection. In fact, the new regulatory guidelines aim tor egularize a social phenomenon by bringing into legislation a market currently operating irregularly, providing greater robustness to legal security and optimizing regulatory efficiency. Delegalization, characterized by the transfer of legislative matters to sub-legal norms, is a practice that, although useful in some circumstances, can compromise legal certainty, especially in regulated sectors such as the insurance market. The legislation for the sector in Brazil, traditionally based on Decree-Law No. 73/1966, delegated broad regulatory powers to the Superintendence of Private Insurance (SUSEP) and the National Council of Private Insurance (CNSP).. Professor Eduardo García de Enterría defines delegalization as “the operation carried out by a law that, without entering into the material regulation of the subject, until then regulated by a previous law, opens such subject to the availability of the regulatory power of the Administration. Through the principle of contrarius actus, when a subject is regulated by a certain law, what we call a 'freezing of the hierarchical level' of the regulations that regulate the subject occurs, so that only by another contrary law can such regulation be innovated. A delegalization law operates as contrarius actus of the previous law of material regulation, however, not to directly innovate this regulation, but to formally degrade its hierarchical level so that, from then on, it can be regulated by simple regulations. In this way, simple regulations can innovate and, therefore, revoke previous formal laws, an operation that, obviously, would not be possible if the degrading law did not previously exist.”[3]. However, the Supreme Federal Court has consolidated its position that the constitutional legitimacy of delegalization is contrasted by the possibility of prohibiting or freezing the hierarchical level based on the reservation of treatment of certain matters by law of the same hierarchical level. This is what is seen in the precedent established by ARE No. 1401225 RJ[4], when Justice Rosa Weber highlighted that the STF “has already had the opportunity to affirm the constitutional legitimacy of delegalization in the judgment of RE No. 140.669-1 PE, in which the Rapporteur Justice Ilmar Galvão, adopting the lessons of JJ Canotilho, asserted that “the principles of legality, freezing of the hierarchical level and precedence of the law do not prevent, except in matters reserved to the law (taxes and crimes), the adoption of greater flexibility through the delegalization or degradation of the hierarchical level. In this case, a law, without entering into the regulation of the matter, formally lowers its normative level, allowing this matter to be modified by regulations.” Complementary Law No. 213/2025, in the universe of Brazilian sanctioning administrative law,update the administrative sanctioning process, prevented delegalization and transformed the national regulatory framework, acting as an inhibitor of the phenomenon of delegalization in matters related to administrative sanctioning law within the scope of SUSEP's activities[5]. In this sense, this legislation must be interpreted in light of the 1988 Constitution and in accordance with the case law of the higher courts, as well as from the perspective of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights. Art. 36, VII, of Decree-Law No. 73/1966, with the wording included by the aforementioned Complementary Law,deals with  oversightfor institutions operating markets supervised by SUSEP . Updating the administrative sanctioning processimplicitly requiresthe reviewcompliance programs to ensure strict compliance with the Decree-Law, other relevant laws, regulatory provisions in general related to supervised markets and CNSP resolutions, among others. It is important to emphasize the importance of obtaining international certifications, such as those referring to compliance with ISO - International Organization for Standardization standards, to validate the effectiveness of the corresponding compliance programs, in the context of the desirable convergence of national and international standards, to mitigate the risk of characterization of infractions by legal entities participating in supervised markets and their directors. Delegalization, therefore, as stated, constitutes a formula by which the legislator seeks to deteriorate the normative typicality, with a semantic opening so vague that it causes an intolerable erosion in the predictability of the prohibited conduct, to such an extent that it becomes unfeasible to contemplate the minimum core of the infraction that is intended to be attributed to the natural or legal persons covered by the legal norm. In this step, there is an undue granting of competence by the legislator to the sub-legal authority, a phenomenon that is designated as delegalization, in such a way that the authority inferior to the legislator receives a competence that does not belong to it, namely, that concerning the classification of the infraction in its entirety. In this aspect, the legislator exempted itself from the competence regarding the classification of the infraction and granted a competence that was exclusive to it to the administrative authority. Another type of delegalization is when the legislator is silent on the definition of the offense and the administrative authority creates, of its own volition, an offense through an autonomous normative process. This phenomenon also occurs when the offense is contemplated by law, but the sanction is created exclusively by the administrative authority, in which case the violation of the principle of legality results in the creation of the penalty without prior legal imposition. In this scenario, the principle of legality in administrative sanctioning law encompasses infractions and sanctions, as much as in the scope of criminal law, whose rules and principles extend to administrative sanctioning law by symmetry, as the case law of the higher courts has recognized in Brazil, for a long time, as can be seen in the following precedents: EREsp: 875163 (RS 2009/0242997-0)[6], EDcl no REsp: 722403 (RS 2005/0020077-2)[7], REsp: 2087667 (RJ 2023/0261697-5)[8]and ADI: 2893 PE[9]. In the doctrine, see OSÓRIO, Fábio Medina. Administrative Sanctioning Law. 1st ed. The intersection between national and international regulations thus proves to be a fertile field for contemporary legal debate, as it challenges legal practitioners to reflect on the compatibility of legislation and the effectiveness of sanctions imposed, always in light of the basic principles of legality and the protection of human rights. Therefore, the integration of these different sources of law is not only desirable, but necessary for the construction of a more robust and fair legal system that respects human dignity and promotes legal certainty in the exercise of administrative activity. Strengthening the principle of legality in Complementary Law No. 213/2025 and the Risks of Delegalization[10] Decree-Law No. 73/1966, still in force, was enacted under the aegis of the 1946 Constitution, so it was received by the 1988 Constitution, including on the rule of the principle of legality (this constitutional principle that governs the sanctioning administrative law and the democratic rule of law). Nevertheless, in view of the reform introduced byComplementary Law No. 213/2025, it is imperative to pay attention to the importance of strengthening the principles of legality and typicality within the scope of administrative sanctioning law, since Decree-Law No. 73/1966 alloweddelegalization of the sanctioning power of the state. The principle of legality, the basis of the Democratic State of Law, requires that fundamental issues be addressed by formal law, approved by the Legislature, ensuring transparency, predictability and democratic legitimacy. Delegalization, when excessive, violates the legal reserve by delegating to sub-legal norms the regulation of matters that directly impact rights and obligations, in addition to imposing limits on the State's punitive power itself.Delegalization may occur, but under the pillars of non-arbitrariness, good grounds, transparency, and punitive coherence of the State. By disregarding these limits, delegalization will imply the deterioration of typicality in the law, that is, it will result in an excessive delegation to the sub-legal authority to classify the infraction and the sanction. According to Fabio Medina Osorio[11], criminal law and administrative sanctioning law are complementary branches of law in the exercise of the State's punitive power. As a result of this complementarity, the principles and guarantees applicable to each branch cannot be ignored. The unity of the punitive power imposes respect for the principles of legality and typicality in both branches, requiring a rigorous and systematic interpretation to avoid arbitrariness and excessive delegalization of sanctioning norms. The delegalization provided for in Decree-Law No. 73/1966, which established the National Private Insurance System in Brazil, transferred a series of regulatory powers to SUSEP and CNSP, where matters that could be addressed by law began to be regulated by sub-legal rules. Some hypotheses contained in the Decree-Law refer to the CNSP's power to establish guidelines and standards for private insurance policy, which includes the regulation of technical and operational aspects of the sector. CNSP also has the power to regulate the constitution, organization, operation and supervision of entities operating in the insurance market. With regard to SUSEP's power, Decree-Law No. 73/1966 tasked it with implementing the policies outlined by CNSP, regulating and supervising insurance, co-insurance, reinsurance and retrocession operations. In addition, SUSEP is competent to issue standards on independent audit reports and opinions for reinsurers and insurers. At the same time, Decree-Law No. 73/1966 expanded the delegalization to include the regulation of operations, the regulation of entities participating in the insurance market and the implementation of adjustments to changes in the insurance market. The Decree-Law allowed the CNSP and SUSEP to establish technical and operational standards for the conduct of insurance activities, including the definition of rates, policy conditions and operational limits. The CNSP may also regulate the administration of self-regulatory entities in the brokerage market and set fees and commissions. In turn, SUSEP may organize and manage consortia, in addition to settling claims in accordance with established criteria. The relevant Decree-Law also allowed the CNSP and SUSEP to adjust the standards in response to changes in the market, in order to ensure that regulation remains relevant and effective. These delegations allow for more agile adaptation to market changes and regulatory needs, but they can also raise concerns about the transparency and predictability of the rules applied, impacting legal certainty in the insurance sector. To some extent, Decree-Law No. 73/1966was updated byComplementary Law No. 213/2025, which introduced changesin insurance legislation, as it established specific limits and guidelines on how delegalization should be conducted, restricting the scope of normative delegation previously permitted by Decree-Law No. 73/1966. In the insurance market, the risks of delegalization include legal uncertainty, since, as previously stated, sub-legal standardswithin the scope of the administrative sanctioning processare more susceptible to frequent changes, which generates instability for those regulated. In addition, there is a risk of concentration of power in regulatory bodies, as broad delegation can lead to arbitrary decisions, compromising regulatory balance. Regulatory fragility also stands out, resulting from the absence of a robust legal basis, which weakens the legitimacy of the standards applied. Changes in Brazilian Legislation Regarding Decree-Law No. 73/1966, which became the cornerstone of the National Private Insurance System, it is worth highlighting that its conception aimed to regulate the complex insurance and reinsurance operations in Brazil, assigning SUSEP an indisputably important role in the supervision of these activities. However, the evolution of the economic scenario and the growing clamor for social demands imposed the needof an update of this regulatory framework. In this context, Complementary Law No. 213/2025 emerged as a restructuring instrument, proposing incisive changes that reverberate not only in the Decree-Law, but also in a range of related regulatory diplomas. The changes implemented cover a number of aspects, including the inclusion of cooperative insurance companies, which until then lacked adequate regulation and oversight. Furthermore, the formalization of mutual asset protection operations, combined with the creation of new sanctioning rules, demonstrates the intention to modernize the system. The interaction of these changes with preexisting legislation, such as Complementary Law No. 109/2001, which regulates supplementary pension plans, and Complementary Law No. 126/2007, which deals with reinsurance, demonstrates a deliberate effort to integrate the rules into a more cohesive regulatory landscape that is adaptable to contemporary demands. The Complementary Law, by making significant changes to several laws relevant to the sector, directly impacted Decree-Law No. 73/1966, expanding its regulatory scope to include mutualist asset protection operations, in addition to strengthening state control through the robust action of SUSEP (Superintendence of Private Insurance). These changes aim not only to modernize, but also to strengthen the regulatory framework of the insurance market. Furthermore, Complementary Law No. 109/2001 was also amended to eliminate the requirement for prior authorization for the election and appointment of administrators in certain circumstances. This measure promotes the reduction of bureaucracy and proposes to facilitate administrative procedures, thus ensuring greater efficiency in the management of regulated entities. Regarding Complementary Law No. 126/2007, the incorporation of new specific rules for the contracting of reinsurance by insurance cooperatives is a crucial step towards improving the regulation and legal security of the operations of these entities, strengthening their presence in the market. Law No. 12,249/2010 was also adjusted to adapt the inspection fee to the new reality of the insurance, reinsurance and capitalization markets. The adaptation of these fees, in turn, seeks contemplate new entrants, ensuring balance and efficiency in the sector's operations. Therefore, the changes covered by the Complementary Law represent a significant advance in the modernization of the legal framework of the insurance market, aligning it with current needs and thus promoting greater security, competitiveness and efficiency. Complementary Law No. 213/2025 and the Implicit Prohibition on Delegalization Although the Complementary Law does not explicitly mention the prohibition of delegalization, its provisions demonstrate a clear intention to reduce dependence on sub-legal norms, strengthening legal certainty in the sector. In this context, it is imperative to highlight the specific regulations that Insurance Cooperatives now adopt, with clear governance requirements and operational restrictions. Thus,the law provides that cooperatives must be established exclusively for this purpose and may, subject to prior authorization from Susep, operate in any branch of private insurance, except for those expressly prohibited in specific regulations issued by the CNSP and insurance structured in the financial regimes of capitalization and distribution of coverage capital. Insurance cooperatives are governed by the National Council of Private Insurance (CNSP) and supervised by the Superintendence of Private Insurance (Susep), being subject to strict criteria for their constitution and operation. Its governance structure is adapted according to the size and complexity of operations, ensuring legal and financial security. In addition, capital shares now enjoy protection against seizures, and the return of amounts is subject to compliance with prudential requirements. Cooperatives have the prerogative to act exclusively for the benefit of their members, except when there are regulatory provisions to the contrary, and are subject to limitations, such as the prohibition of carrying out insurance brokerage activities. The Complementary Law establishes three main categories of insurance cooperatives, each with specific functions and characteristics ,in the formto beregulated by CNSP,but interconnected by common objectives of protection and solidarity among their members. Central insurance cooperatives and confederations of insurance cooperatives shall be constituted, respectively, only by individual insurance cooperatives and by central insurance cooperatives. These entities can act in coinsurance of affiliated individual cooperatives and of the affiliates of their central cooperatives, respectively. The inclusion of a specific chapter on insurance cooperatives in the Complementary Law is a significant innovation, as it establishes clear rules for the creation, governance and operation of these cooperatives, providing for distinct structures, such as individual cooperatives, central cooperatives and confederations. This chapter introduces operational restrictions, such as the prohibition of brokerage for central cooperatives and confederations, in addition to the requirement of prior authorization for the appointment of administrators and fiscal councilors. Insurance cooperatives play an essential role in strengthening the Brazilian insurance market, promoting inclusion and democratizing access to protection products. The regulation introduced by the Complementary Law signals important advances, establishing a legal framework that guarantees safety, sustainability and efficiency in the operations of these entities. By consolidating these aspects in legislation, the rule limits the discretion of regulatory bodies and provides greater clarity on the obligations of cooperatives. The mutualist asset protection model, in turn, emerges as a proposal which provides for the sharing of costs among participants to cover adverse events. In order to implement this system, management by an authorized administrator is essential, ensuring the patrimonial independence and protection of the groups' resources against financial problems of their members or the administrator itself. Thus, the Complementary Law aims to create a regulated model of mutualist patrimonial protection, ensuring patrimonial interests through the sharing of expenses, with clear definitions on the functions of the administrators and associations, including the essential patrimonial independence of the groups. Furthermore, the Complementary Law establishes transparency and sustainability mechanisms to ensure the integrity of the model. Among the requirements for the effective functioning of this system, patrimonial independence stands out, which requires the protection of the resources of mutual groups against financial risks. In addition, the rule requires transparency in management, which must be conducted by authorized administrators and subject to due supervision. This approach prevents structural aspects of the model from being regulated exclusively by sub-legal norms, providing greater predictability for both associations and participants. Sanctioning Regime and Inspection by SUSEP Regarding the enactment of Complementary Law No. 213/2025, it is imperative to highlight the impactthat it exercises over the sanctioning regime to which entities regulated by the Superintendence of Private Insurance (SUSEP) are subject. The aforementioned legislation, when the updateto the sanctioning and punitive powerss, which now has expanded and better defined powers to exercise its market supervision and regulation function introducing, therefore, a list of penalties that are more severe, ranging from imposing fines to the extension of the period of disqualification of managers. The SUSEP competency system, already established in Decree-Law No. 73/1966, gives it powers to monitor the operating institutions of the supervised markets or by any other persons, natural or legal, upon the occurrence of any irregularity to be investigated under the terms of the relevant Decree-Law, for the purpose of verifying the occurrence of illicit acts. The broad spectrum of SUSEP's activities includes its regulatory powers as an executive body for the guidelines of insurance policies and mutualist asset protection established by the CNSP, acting as a supervisory body for the National Private Insurance System, in line with the registration, regulatory, supervisory and sanctioning responsibilities defined in the Decree-Law, which do not exclude the powers of the Central Bank of Brazil and the Securities and Exchange Commission to act in these areas, but in their respective segments of activity, in subordination to the National Monetary Council (CMN). It is important to emphasize the preference for electronic citation, which is consistent with the search for procedural efficiency, as well as the possibility of applying precautionary measures, such as the removal or replacement of service providers, in situations that give rise to serious suspicions. It is also imperative to recognize the provision for the application of warnings for minor infractions, the carrying out of administrative interventions and, ultimately, the revocation of licenses, practices that aim to maintain order and legality within the scope of regulated activities. The robustness of this legislation reflects the need for a balance between the protection of collective interests and the accountability of agents who perform administrative functions in entities under the aegis of the Complementary Law. Furthermore, the Complementary Law introduced mechanisms for adjusting conduct, with the use of terms of commitment to which those investigated may be subjected during sanctioning processes. Among the main changes in the scope of sanctions provided for in the Complementary Law in question, the creation of stricter penalties stands out, involving the application of administrative fines with high values, which can reach up to R$ 35 million, twice the value of the contract or irregular operation, twice the damage caused to consumers or three times the economic gain obtained illegally.[12]. In cases of recurrence of the aforementioned practices, fines of up to three times the established amounts may now be applied, in accordance with CNSP criteria. Additionally, penalties of suspension or disqualification of administrators, for periods of 2 to 20 years, may be applied depending on the severity of the violation, in cases of poor technical or financial management of business, or when there is damage to the liquidity, solvency or integrity of the supervised institutions. They are also applicable in situations of risk incompatible with the operations regulated by SUSEP, contribution to indiscipline in the markets or compromise of the stability of the National Private Insurance System, the National Capitalization System or the open supplementary pension market. SUSEP may also intervene when there are obstacles to the assessment of the real financial or equity situation of the operations or severe impact on the continuity of the activities of these systems and markets. The new regulations, which set forth the consequences of non-compliance with prohibitions, summons, orders and requests issued by the Superintendence of Private Insurance (SUSEP), establish that failure to comply with these orders will result in the imposition of a penalty, which will be calculated based on the daily frequency of the delay or non-compliance. The amount of this penalty will be determined by the greater of one thousandth of the total revenue, whether individual or consolidated, of the prudential group, as outlined by the National Council of Private Insurance (CNSP) and related to the fiscal year prior to the application of the sanction, or the fixed amount of R$100,000.00. It is important to emphasize that the fine must be duly paid to SUSEP within 10 days from the date of the summons for payment. It should also be noted that the application of this pecuniary penalty does not exempt the competent authority from initiating administrative proceedings, nor from imposing other sanctions provided for in the legal system embodied in the relevant Decree-Law. Thus, the robustness of the legal framework that aims to ensure the effectiveness of regulations, preserving order and discipline within the scope of regulatory activity, is evident. The Complementary Law, in accordance with the provisions of Decree-Law No. 73/66,It also explicitly establishes the joint liability of directors, administrators, managers and members of the fiscal councils of regulated entities, which include insurance companies, insurance cooperatives and mutual asset protection administrators, for any losses caused to third parties, notably due to non-compliance with legal regulations, such as the creation of mandatory reserves. In line with this guideline, among the measures implemented, we highlight the initiation of administrative sanctioning proceedings whenever there is evidence of the practice of infractions or irregularities, demonstrating a proactive and supervisory stance by the regulatory entity. It is important to note, even in the case of joint and several liability, the individualization of the conduct of each of the accused in the indictments when opening the sanctioning proceedings. This is a constitutional guarantee inherent to due process, as established in article 5, LIV, of the Constitution, and a logical consequence of the principles of full defense and adversarial proceedings (item LV). In other words, the description of the prohibited conduct in a concrete and individualized manner is a necessity inherent to the principle of subjective liability of the accused, and even joint and several liability is incompatible with an abstract and generic description of unlawful behavior. In this context, it would be wrong to imagine the prospect of attributing an accusation to any manager based on the presumption of joint and several liability for the unlawful act, without any correspondence with documentary evidence and subjective element of the conduct, much less adherence that allows inferring willful or negligent behavior, according to the terms of the sanctioning type applicable to the case and the circumstances of the offense. In fact, joint and several liability in the context of administrative sanctioning law should not be confused with joint and several liability in the sphere of civil law. For these reasons, it is not feasible to automatically include managers from the perspective of joint and several liability without prior investigation involving the subjective element of conduct. Regarding the determination of the subjective element to define joint and several liability, the precedent paradigm of Ruling No. 6228/2017 stands out.[13]within the scope of the Appeals Board of the National System of Private Insurance, Open Private Pensions and Capitalization (CRSNSP), in the context of an administrative appeal against a decision by SUSEP, in which the following understanding was established: “In fact, § 5 of art. 2 of CNSP Resolution No. 243/11 grants the option of punishing the director. This provision states that 'SUSEP may consider as the agent responsible for the alleged infraction, in the case of a natural person, to the extent of his/her culpability, the holder of an office' of administrator who, 'provenly, contributes to the commission of the infraction, or fails to prevent its commission, when he/she could have acted to avoid it'. In art. 10 of the same Resolution, proportionality is recommended between the type and extent of the penalty and the severity of the infraction and its effects. And, in § 1, it is determined that, when the sanction was applied to a natural person, 'the judging authority will consider his/her culpability'. These rules must be interpreted strictly. In these proceedings, at no time was it demonstrated or proven that the appellant acted to commit the irregularity that gave rise to the present proceedings.” Continuing with the analysis of the culpability of an insurance company director, the aforementioned precedent states, in the Rapporteur’s vote, that the mere fact of holding the position of director does not make the director responsible for everything that may happen in the company’s day-to-day activities, transforming him into a kind of “insurance scapegoat”. In fact, the aforementioned vote emphasizes that: “The exercise of the position makes the director responsible for the acts of his employees, but only within the scope of civil liability. If an employee commits an irregular act or an act that harms someone, the director may even be held liable; but only civilly. Any penalty resulting from the practice of an unlawful act can only affect the person who actually committed it, and the director cannot be punished due to the act of another person, due to the constitutional principle that the penalty should not go beyond the person of the offender.” Still regarding the analysis of the subjective element in joint and several liability, the leading vote of the CRSNSP Ruling 6228/2017, citing the work of Fábio Medina Osório[14], emphasizes that the consequence of applying the principles of culpability and personal nature of the sanction “is the fact that there is no solidarity in the field of illicit acts. In Criminal Law, as in Administrative Sanctioning Law, the punishment applied to a co-author offender does not benefit the other co-authors. Each one is responsible for his/her own act and receives an individualized penalty according to his/her degree of participation.” Regarding the characterization of the circumstances of the infraction, the National Financial System Appeals Council (CRSFN), in a judgment that established a relevant precedent on the subject (Judgment No. 150/2023)[15], dealing with the specific analysis of the sanctioning process originating from the CVM, established the understanding that, as such, they should be understood, “in analogy to the judicial circumstances adopted in criminal law, those factors that do not constitute the offense, but that influence its severity. Examples of such circumstances would be the state of the agent, the conditions and manner of acting, the means used, time and space factors, among others. Such elements, as contingent, are not of the essence of the offense type. Consequently, their presence is not capable of invalidating the materiality of the criminal conduct or even the guilt of the agent. More than that, such circumstances do not affect the set of evidence and proof collected in the records. They only serve to examine the degree of guilt of the agent and the reprehensibility of the conduct for the purposes of sentencing.” Notably, it is a question of evaluating, in the sentencing examination, the application of aggravating and mitigating factors based on the determination of the base sentence. In light of the context of insurance sector regulation and the actions of the Superintendence of Private Insurance (SUSEP), it is imperative to highlight the innovations introduced by the Complementary Law in force, which establishes the application of daily fines that can reach the amount of up to R$100,000.00 or one thousandth of the total revenue, in case of non-compliance with the determinations or summons issued by that agency. These changes aim, above all, to strengthen the supervision exercised by SUSEP, increasing the accountability of the parties involved and, consequently, ensuring greater protection for consumers, all while preserving the stability of the insurance market and mutual asset protection in Brazil. In addition, the aim is to foster a business environment that is safer and more reliable. It is important to emphasize that SUSEP, from now on, has expanded oversight powers, with mutual asset protection operations being included in its scope of action. In this context, the superintendence is authorized to call extraordinary meetings and to apply preventive measures aimed at ensuring the stability of operations under its supervision. The new legislation, as already stated in a similar way in the Decree-Law73/66,establishes free access by duly accredited auditors and employees of the supervisory body to insurance companies, insurance cooperatives, mutual asset protection operations administrators and reinsurers. Such professionals have the prerogative to request and seize books, technical notes, information and documents relevant to the exercise of their functions. Furthermore, any obstacle that prevents compliance with the established objectives will be considered as an impediment to supervision, giving rise to the application of the penalties provided for in the relevant Decree-Law. Considering that the Complementary Law grants a significant increase to the sanctioning power attributed to SUSEP, the expectation is that supervision will be more efficient, with a concomitant reduction in cases of fraud and harmful practices that may tarnish the sector. Furthermore, an increase in regulatory predictability is foreseen, which undoubtedly contributes to ensuring greater security and stability in the insurance market. Impacts of Implicit Prohibition The analysis of the evolution of the regulatory framework in the insurance sector, in light of Complementary Law No. 213/2025, reveals a deliberate movement towards the consolidation of standards that ensure legality and predictability in the regulatory environment. In a context in which legal certainty is fundamental, the aforementioned Law stands as a comprehensive response to the need for clarity and regulatory rigor, establishing guidelines that limit the discretion of regulatory authorities and promote transparency. In this sense, the Complementary Law not only reiterates the importance of legality, but also introduces mechanisms that aim to prevent delegalization, a practice that, over time, has generated uncertainty and insecurity in the market. It is important to note that Article 11 of the original bill, which provided for the creation of 26 new positions in the structure of Susep, was vetoed due to constitutional issues related to the creation of public positions. Complementary Law No. 213/2025, in turn, directly incorporates into its text provisions that were previously subject to sub-legal regulation, which, in turn, strengthens predictability for market operators. As a result, the State's punitive power is exercised in a more cohesive manner and linked to constitutional principles, preventing sanctions from being imposed based on lower-ranking rules that do not meet the requirements of the Constitution. In this context, the clear classification of administrative infractions and the definition of proportional sanctions are innovations that ensure greater legal certainty and confidence in the system. Furthermore, the regulation of insurance operations and the accountability of directors and fiscal advisors, as set out in the Complementary Law, illustrate a commitment to governance and ethics in the sector. These guidelines not only promote more transparent management, but also establish standards that make it difficult for regulators to engage in abusive or arbitrary practices. The Complementary Law thus presents itself as a bulwark of legality, in line with the contemporary demands of a market that demands predictability and stability. Furthermore, the emphasis on the governance of regulated entities By directly addressing fundamental issues in legislation, the Complementary Law neutralizes the possibility that sub-legal practices are used to circumvent the principles of legality and legal reserve, ensuring that regulation remains within constitutional limits. On the other hand, the transition to a more formalized model raises challenges that must be carefully managed by regulators and regulated parties. Adapting to the new requirements requires a coordinated effort to ensure that the innovations introduced by the Complementary Law effectively translate into concrete benefits for the market and consumers. The success of this transition will depend, to a large extent, on the ability of the agents involved to adapt to a stricter regulatory scenario, without compromising market dynamics. In conclusion, Complementary Law No. 213/2025 not only advances in the consolidation of a clearer and more predictable regulatory framework, but also represents a decisive step in the protection of consumer rights and the promotion of a more stable business environment. The advances provided by this legislation are fundamental for the construction of a regulatory system that meets the demands of the contemporary insurance sector, reflecting the commitment to legality and transparency as essential pillars for strengthening the market. Conclusion Regarding the principle of administrative legality, in the field of administrative sanctioning law, it is worth recalling the paradigmatic judgment of the Superior Court of Justice, when the following guideline was established:[16]: “The institution of an infraction and imposition of a penalty based on an infra-legal act - Ordinance - violates the principle of legality, since “only the law, in its formal and material sense, can describe an infraction and impose sanctions”. In fact, the principle of legality, with its unfolding in the typicality, finds resonance in the democratic rule of law, and in due process of law, all enshrined in articles art. 179, I and 5º, LIV, respectively, of the Constitution of the Federative Republic of Brazil. In this context, it is not surprising that Complementary Law No. 213/2025 must necessarily conform to the dictates of the Constitution of 88, as well as decrees Decree-Law No. 73/1966 and Decree-Law No. 261/1967, as well as laws Complementary Law No. 109/2001 and Complementary Law No. 126/2007[17]. In fact, the Superior Court of Justice's understanding is unanimous that[18]: “ordinances are not suitable instruments for imposing fines, since they violate the constitutional principle of the reserve of law by contemplating penalties. The definition of infractions and the imposition of administrative sanctions, after the validity of the 1988 Constitution, can only arise from law in the formal sense. Furthermore, as a hierarchically inferior normative act, the purpose of ordinances is to clarify legal norms to be observed by the Administration, without the need to restrict or expand legal provisions. Therefore, ordinances are not intended to fill gaps and omissions in the law and, thus, cannot add material content to the regulated norm, and must be limited to the purpose of facilitating the application and execution of the law that governs the matter. (...)”.[19] The recent changes covered by the Complementary Law represent a significant effort to modernize the National Private Insurance System, introducing greater flexibility and legal certainty to the sector. The regulation of insurance cooperatives and mutualist asset protection are examples of how legislation can be expanded with the approval of the Complementary Law, in order to cover issues and institutes that actually exist, but were previously omitted from the legislation. The sub-legal regulation of fundamental issues, without support from formal law, compromises the legitimacy of the State's punitive power by violating the principles of legality, typicality and legal reserve. In the context of the insurance market, this can generate legal uncertainty, inequality in the application of rules and fragility of administrative infractions. Complementary Law No. 213/2025 represents a significant advance by consolidating in the legal text provisions that reduce dependence on sub-legal norms, reinforcing alignment with the Democratic Rule of Law and promoting greater balance between the power of the State and the rights of those regulated. The changes positively affect the national insurance system by guaranteeing consumer security, through the attribution of sanctioning and inspection powers to SUSEP, as well as by defining the types of cooperatives that can operate in the market and how they should operate, in addition to filling other legal gaps regarding insurance cooperatives and mutualist asset protection. Despite the progress, implementing the changes presents challenges for operators and regulators, requiring investments in training and operational adjustments. As the rules are implemented and evaluated, these changes are expected to strengthen the insurance sector in Brazil, promoting its expansion and alignment with international regulatory standards. Author: Fabio Medina Osorio References CENTRAL BANK OF BRAZIL. Credit Cooperatives. Available at: https://www.bcb.gov.br/estabilidadefinanceira/cooperativacredito. Accessed on: December 24, 2024; CÔRTE REAL, Maria Manuela; CRUZ ALVES, Francisco José; FARINHA PEREIRA, Eduardo. The Insurance Sector: Evolution and Perspectives. [sl]: [sn], [sd]. Available at: https://purl.sgmf.pt/COL-MF-0064/1/COL-MF-0064_master/COL-MF-0064_pdf/capitulo%20VII.pdf. Accessed on: January 21, 2025; DOBBYN, John F.; FRENCH, Christopher C. Insurance Law in a Nutshell. 5. ed. St. Paul: West Academic Publishing, 2016; ENTERRIA, Eduardo Garcia. Delegated legislation, regulatory power and judicial control, Madrid: Civitas, 3. ed., 1998. p. 220/225; FISCHER, James M.; KEETON, Robert E.; WIDISS, Alan I. Insurance Law: A Guide to Fundamental Principles, Legal Doctrines, and Commercial Practices. 2nd ed. West Academic, 2017;

Release II Congresso Brasileiro de Direito Administrativo Sancionador

On twenty-second of August, I have the honour of marking a milestone beyond my professional career — the 25th anniversary of the book Sanctioning Administrative Law — with an unprecedented lecture at the II Congresso Brasileiro de Direito Administrativo Sancionador (Brazilian Congress on Sanctioning Administrative Law), organised by IDASAN, to be held at the AASP headquarters. Lecture theme: Objective and Subjective Responsibility in Sanctioning Administrative Law More than merely a technical-legal domain, Sanctioning Administrative Law also reflects the ethical-institutional nature of the state’s punitive power. In this lecture, I propose reflections that transcend the boundaries of legal dogmatics: What is the meaning of legal responsibility in the 21st century? Which values should guide the state’s sanctioning function? How should the state’s punitive claims be oriented within a Democratic Rule of Law? This is a journey to reclaim the ethical purpose behind the exercise of power. It is not merely about punishing, but understanding, guiding, restoring, and protecting the dignity of institutions and individuals. To register, simply visit the IDASAN website: https://idasan.com.br/ii-congresso-brasileiro-de-direito-administrativo-sancionador#ingresso #FábioMedinaOsório #IDASAN #SanctioningAdministrativeLaw #Lecture

Fundamental Right to Understanding Public Decisions

Consolidating the pact between technology, education, and transparency is urgent; the State cannot hide within its own data. An analysis of the consolidation of precedent theory in Brazil, considering the innovations introduced by the 2015 Code of Civil Procedure (CPC), reveals a significant moment in the quest for predictability and rationality within the judicial system. Since this milestone, judicial decisions have gained binding force, becoming fundamental references for both administrative bodies and the courts. This not only implies institutional deference but also demands a robust organisational structure, firmly anchored in memory and transparency. The challenge ahead extends beyond the legal field, encompassing structural aspects. The effectiveness of the precedent system requires the State, across its various spheres and bodies, to establish legal databases capable of storing, classifying, interpreting, and interconnecting a broad array of decisions, agreements, and normative expressions. This necessity is not confined to the Judiciary alone; it equally involves regulatory agencies, audit courts, the Public Prosecutor’s Office, and administrative bodies responsible for decisions of legal significance. However, it is crucial to recognise that the administrative sphere represents the weakest link in Brazil’s institutional chain. Despite significant initiatives within the Brazilian Judiciary, the reality demonstrates that the vast majority of public institutions still lack databases that are structured, auditable, and semantically organised. Consequently, administrative decisions, disciplinary proceedings, judicial and extrajudicial agreements, as well as contracts and the entire universe of disciplinary and sanctioning jurisprudence, remain scattered and fragmented, hindering access to institutional memory, which should guide the State’s actions. In this context, the role of algorithms is fundamental. Currently, organising precedents depends on systems using legal, semantic, and statistical parameters. Implementing algorithms to categorise them requires a solid normative basis, technical curation, and a data structure that can be audited. Without these prerequisites, there is a risk that repetition will prevail over coherence, making automation a threat to the very essence of judicial reasoning. The scope of statistics must be understood in the context of AI’s impact. Statistics can be classified by different parameters. For reference, one may speak of inferential, predictive, diagnostic, multivariate, frequentist, Bayesian, non-parametric, jurimetrics, forensic, social, political, educational, descriptive, explanatory, high-dimensional statistics, and multiple variations, according to the discipline applied—such as biostatistics, psychometrics, computational statistics, and so forth. In other words, legal databases also serve statistical research, integrated with AI, to derive developments in various other areas and public policies. It is known that normative decisions impact the economy and public policies across numerous other spheres of society as a whole. In this regard, the interpretation of law is necessarily transdisciplinary and is not limited merely to the economic analysis of law. Organising precedents, therefore, ensures the right to understanding (the right to understand public decisions arises from fundamental rights enshrined in Articles 37 (head), 51 (item 14), 5 (item 60), and 1 (item 3) of the Constitution). Each individual, whether a natural or legal person, has the right to understand the criteria underpinning the public decisions affecting them. This fundamental right to comprehension is intrinsically linked to transparency, traceability, and institutional legitimacy and is realised only when decisions are intelligible, auditable, and consistent with consolidated jurisprudence. Without well-structured legal databases, there are no real precedents—only a disordered accumulation of decisions. And where accumulation exists, noise, inequalities, and arbitrariness arise, compromising justice and the system’s effectiveness. A structured legal database functions as a digital platform capable of storing, classifying, and correlating administrative and judicial decisions, norms, agreements, and regulatory documents. This organisation must follow clearly defined legal criteria, with rigorous classifications ensuring traceability and version control. Beyond mere preservation, the database must guarantee institutional coherence, facilitate intelligent searches, consistent interpretations, and decisions aligned with the historical jurisprudence of institutions and precedent systems. In this context, legal databases constitute genuine living ecosystems, continually fed by normative and decisional indexing based on algorithmic logics, metadata, discursive hierarchies, and pre-established patterns. Contemporary statistics, in its multiple facets, performs critical roles, offering causal and algorithmic effectiveness with profound impacts on the institutional interpretation of mapped and indexed norms and decisions. One cannot overlook that statistical functions, integrated within databases, facilitate numerous functionalities in comprehending how certain decisions consolidate into normative standards and their subsequent societal consequences and impacts, including deviations, dysfunctions, underlying hermeneutic currents, and numerous subjective or objective pathologies inherent to decision-making or algorithmic phenomena. AI, in turn, operates in conjunction with contemporary statistics to facilitate advanced, rapid analyses derived from massive datasets. AI also plays varied roles based fundamentally on statistics, though its functions are distinct and integrated within this domain, provided they maintain auditable and rationally traceable premises. Technology, at this juncture, will deeply impact classification models based on the language of precedents, argumentative similarities, prevailing legal grounds, recognition of argumentative and normative patterns within decisions, detection of frequent contradictions, inconsistencies, essential coherences, predictive models, and a vast series of patterns aimed at ensuring predictability, legal certainty, and efficiency within the normative system. In an era of transparency and complexity, the right to understand public decisions emerges as a fundamental right derived from the principle prohibiting arbitrariness by public powers, inherent in the substantial due legal process (Article 5, item 54, of the Brazilian Constitution). Publishing decisions in official gazettes is insufficient, as these instruments do not allow substantial access to transparency regarding the full set of decisions that constitute the norms embodied in precedents. On the other hand, judicial databases are also inadequate, as they do not ensure interconnection with other branches of government nor the effective efficacy of precedents throughout the Brazilian State. Furthermore, the formation of precedents itself demands cultural strengthening among public and private actors in decision-making processes, involving deeper transformations in Brazilian education and research on jurisprudential production as a whole. Thus, it is urgent for legal education institutions, judicial academies, Public Prosecutor’s Office training programmes, Public Defenders’ offices, law firms, and education overall, as well as the Ministry of Education itself, to integrate precedent theory as a central curricular vector—indeed as a standalone discipline rather than an appendix to Civil Procedure Law. Brazil must abandon fragmentary interpretation and cultivate a legal culture rooted in institutional memory, argumentative coherence, and collective responsibility. To achieve this, AI must be incorporated into legal curricula, not merely as a technological novelty but as a tool promoting the rational organisation of law, grounded in ethical, epistemological, and normative principles, acting as an aid to human intelligence and ensuring auditability. Precedent theory must not only be applied but taught, debated, and systematised. To consolidate it, material improvements alone are insufficient: a cultural transformation is required. Structured legal databases must move beyond governmental tools to become platforms for teaching, research, and critical reconstruction of decision-making practices. Recognising the right to comprehensible information allows the country to develop a robust, ethical, and inclusive public transparency policy. This construction demands more than adopting new technologies; it requires curation, training, and a genuine willingness to listen and reflect. Without this awareness, precedents become empty, decisions become isolated, and access to justice becomes an opaque normative labyrinth. Consolidating the pact between technology, education, and transparency is urgent. The State cannot hide within its own data; it must organise, explain, and share them—that is the essence of institutional legitimacy in the 21st century. In this sense, it is crucial to acknowledge that access to justice begins with access to the logic of decisions—comprehensible only when organised in public, coherent, and accessible databases, and taught from the outset. Promoting a culture of precedents thus becomes a public policy aimed at institutional integrity. Without this foundation, rights remain unattainable and justice incomprehensible.

THE RIGHT TO UNDERSTANDING IN THE AGE OF TECHNOLOGICAL COMPLEXITY: CONSTITUTIONAL, STATISTICAL AND ALGORITHMIC FOUNDATIONS OF DECISION-MAKING TRANSPARENCY

SUMMARY This essay addresses the strategic and essential relevance of the constitutional right to understanding the decisions of public authorities, resulting from the consolidation and maturation of the constitutional principles of publicity, transparency, justification for administrative and jurisdictional acts, substantial due process, equality, adversarial proceedings, full defense, human dignity, proportionality, reasonableness, and other fundamental rights enshrined in the 1988 Constitution. The application of these rights depends vitally, in the digital age of complexity, on systemic traceability structured in intelligent, digital, auditable legal databases based on statistics and statistical models. In this sense, this work addresses the concept of the right to understanding as a systemic and deeper evolution, derived from the set of fundamental rights, which modifies the traditional paradigm of publicity and transparency in public sector decision-making bodies—especially in light of the mandatory observance of judicial precedents by judges, courts, and administrative authorities. In this regard, the aim is to contextualize the right to understanding within the normative universe that enables people's access to structured legal databases, artificial intelligence, statistics, and the auditability of algorithms and databases. At the same time, this essay seeks to demonstrate the relevance of these contemporary tools for understanding the decision-making acts of public authorities. Finally, it aims to emphasize the importance of strengthening the culture, coherence, traceability, predictability, and self-criticism of authorities regarding the content and identification of decision-making patterns, as well as strengthening the culture of teaching, the culture of precedents, artificial intelligence, and access to databases in institutions as a whole — including education institutions and access to justice. KEYWORDS Right to Understanding; Precedents; Transparency; Publicity; Artificial Intelligence; Legal Databases; Statistics; Auditability; Public Decisions and Due Process of Law.   ABSTRACT This essay addresses the strategic and essential relevance of the constitutional right to understand public authorities' decisions, as a result of the consolidation and maturation of constitutional principles such as publicity, transparency, reasoning of administrative and judicial acts, substantive due process of law, equality, adversarial proceedings, broad defense, human dignity, proportionality, reasonableness, and other fundamental rights enshrined in the 1988 Brazilian Constitution. In the digital era of complexity, the effective application of these rights depends fundamentally on systemic traceability, structured through intelligent, digital, auditable legal databases supported by statistics and statistical models. In this sense, the work discusses the concept of the right to understanding as a systemic and more profound evolution derived from the set of fundamental rights, modifying the traditional paradigm of publicity and transparency in public decision-making bodies—especially in light of the mandatory observance of judicial precedents by judges, courts, and administrative authorities. Accordingly, this essay aims to contextualize the right to understanding within the normative framework that enables public access to structured legal databases, artificial intelligence, statistics, and the auditability of algorithms and databases. Simultaneously, it seeks to demonstrate the importance of these contemporary tools in understanding public decision making acts. Finally, this essay also emphasizes the importance of strengthening a culture of coherence, traceability, predictability, and institutional self-criticism regarding the content and identification of decision-making patterns, as well as reinforcing a culture of education, precedents, artificial intelligence, and data access across institutions—from educational frameworks to mechanisms of access to justice. KEYWORDS Right to Understand; Precedents; Transparency; Advertising; Artificial Intelligence; Legal Databases; Statistics; auditability; Public Decisions; Due Process of Law.   1. Introduction The classic right to publicity and transparency of judicial and administrative acts, provided for in Articles 5, items LX and XXXIII, 93, IX, and 37, caput, all of the 1988 Constitution, derives from the framework of contemporary liberal democracies. These same requirements of transparency and publicity coexist with the possibility of protecting intimacy, privacy, and confidentiality, whether in the cases provided for in the Constitution or in cases provided for by law 2. However, the digital age, intertwined with the concepts inherent to the era of complexity, in which transformations and the speed of events and plural thoughts interconnect, demands a rethinking of the hermeneutics regarding the scope of transparency and publicity surrounding decisions restricting fundamental rights. In the Brazilian Constitution of 1988, there is no doubt that it is necessary to interpret in a coherent and harmonious manner the requirements of transparency (art. 5, LX and XXXIII; art. 37, caput), publicity (art. 93, IX) and justification for judicial and administrative decisions (art. 93, IX; art. 37, caput), together with the mandatory observance of the prohibition of arbitrariness of public powers, resulting from substantive due process of law (art. 5, LIV), obedience to substantive and formal due process of law (art. 5, LIV and LV), compliance with legal certainty (art. 5, caput and XXXVI), equality (art. 5, caput and I), adversarial proceedings (art. 5, LV), full defense (art. 5, LV) and respect for human dignity (art. 1, III). As if this indispensable integration of this set of constitutional requirements connected to the transparency and publicity of state decisions were not enough, the duty of coherence, objective good faith and institutional loyalty was also embraced by the legislator, under the aegis of the democratic principle, when providing for the mandatory observance of precedents by the Judiciary and administrative authorities, when issuing their decisions and formatting jurisprudence in the application of laws (articles 926, 927, 928, 489, § 1, items V and VI, and 1,036 to 1,041 of the 2015 Code of Civil Procedure). In this context, the problem of judicial congestion, slowness, and overload affecting the judiciary is nothing new in Brazil. Furthermore, there is another serious structural problem: the unpredictability that plagues the system, given the lack of a culture of judicial precedent formation. The system adopted by articles 926, 927, 928, 489, §1, items V and VI, and 1036 to 1041 of the 2015 Code of Civil Procedure was not accompanied by a corresponding cultural implementation effort in the areas of education, training of judges, lawyers, and members of institutions essential to justice, much less by a national mobilization to foster this new culture. There is no doubt that there is high-quality national literature on the theory of precedents, originating in English law and embodied, with adaptations, in North American law, from where it emerged into Brazilian law 3. Nevertheless, the Romano-Germanic culture of which Brazil is heir does not automatically adapt to a distinct and secular culture, which presupposes an entire tradition in the construction of precedents, and obstacles persist. In this essay, our purpose is not to address the theoretical obstacles, typical of the field of the great scholars of civil procedural law, related to the dogmatics of precedent theory. As we warned initially, one of the first obstacles we will address in this work is related to the culture of teaching. However, there are essential pragmatic difficulties connected to the implementation of structured databases, artificial intelligence tools, statistics, transparency, and integration with the accessibility of administrative jurisprudence of institutions essential to justice, in addition to institutions that provide public services and enforce administrative norms. In short, the delivery of justice is not an exclusive prerogative of the Judiciary, and the constitutional principles that govern public administration, enshrined in Article 37, caput, of The 1988 Constitution must gain substantial depth to allow access to justice as a genuine fundamental right of the people, a circumstance that presupposes access to structured databases, closely interconnected with advanced artificial intelligence and statistical technologies, so that an authentic theory of judicial precedents can be constructed and administrative jurisprudence linked to these precedents, in a manner that is accessible and transparent to the public. Furthermore, this essay also proposes to demonstrate that this new culture will strengthen institutions and the market with new paradigms of institutional integrity, quality, and protection of fundamental rights, as well as efficiency and competitiveness. In this scenario, our conclusion is that this new framework will be made possible through new transformative compliance models, both in the public and private sectors. Regarding technological innovation in the legal field, it is important to reflect on three priority areas of action: (a) the careful implementation of artificial intelligence in the organization and analysis of documentary and case law collections; (b) systematic education on precedents in higher education institutions and government entities; and (c) expanding the application of the logic of precedents beyond the Judiciary, also encompassing the administrative sphere, such as audit courts, public defenders' offices, and regulatory agencies. One of the hallmarks of the contemporary world, especially in Brazil, is the normative tangle and the constant profusion of laws, constitutional amendments, sub-legal normative acts, regulations, and rules of all kinds—a phenomenon that constitutes a permanently complex and continually changing normative network. As if this sophisticated machinery were not enough, this entire abstract normative apparatus undergoes a surprising metamorphosis when applied to concrete cases submitted for judgment in judicial and administrative instances, where the most diverse authorities boast decision-making autonomy. In practice, we are talking about thousands of judges, appellate judges, and many other ministers of higher courts, as well as members of public prosecutors, public attorneys' offices, regulatory agencies, audit courts, autonomous agencies, decentralized administrations, and multiple state agencies, or even institutions overseeing activities essential to justice. The abstract normative tangle transforms into an even more complex and unpredictable jurisprudential multiplicity, aggravated by the difficulty of access for those administered and under their jurisdiction. This scenario greatly accentuates the compromise of expectations related to legal certainty, equality, transparency, impartiality, substantial publicity and prohibition of arbitrariness by public authorities.   2. Decisional transparency and databases as a constitutional imperative inherent to the right to understand decisions restricting fundamental rights 2.1. Legal Database: Architecture of Transparency and State Accountability The State's actions, in their contemporary form, transcend the limits of formal legislation and judicial decisions. The legal binding of a person—whether human or legal—does not derive solely from rules developed by the Legislative Branch or decisions handed down by courts. They unfold through a multitude of legally binding State actions: administrative decisions, judicial and administrative jurisprudence, agreements concluded with public authorities, administrative contracts, sub-legal normative acts, and other administrative acts that, directly or indirectly, restrict, modulate, or recognize fundamental rights. This plurality of decision-making, dispersed across different spheres and instances of public power, demands an institutional response commensurate with its complexity and impact. It is not enough for such manifestations to be formally accessible; it is essential that they be organized in a systematic, intelligible, and technically structured manner. Thus, the need for a legal database arises, not as a merely archival instrument, but as a material foundation for institutional transparency and state accountability. This database should gather and make accessible the State's decision-making acts that, even if they do not have a typical normative form, produce relevant legal effects on the sphere of human rights. It is an infrastructure focused on qualified publicity, structured research, institutional auditing, and democratic governance. In this scenario, it is imperative that we conceptually address the legal database and its impact on redefining the understanding of public authorities' decisions. A legal database is, initially, a digital structure, whether public or private, but necessarily organized, intelligent and auditable, whose purpose is to capture, gather, receive, classify, order, explain, enable third-party interaction and make data and information intelligible, in order to optimize the institutional performance of the respective holder of this data. bank and its users, respecting the fundamental and individual rights involved, preserving, when necessary, the limits inherent to the duties of confidentiality, in addition to the institutional memory of the decisions and patterns detected. This definition of a database, which always involves legal aspects, recognizes the database as a necessarily intelligent entity. In this context, the legal database must perform at least some essential, fully auditable functions: ordering and classification; intelligence and statistical functions; interactive and organizational functions; and institutional and protective security functions 4. This scope includes judicial decisions, administrative decisions, judicial and administrative jurisprudence, judicial and extrajudicial agreements signed before or with public authorities, administrative contracts, normative acts and any administrative acts that produce legal effects on the sphere of freedom, property, self- determination or legal prerogatives of the person. The legal database, in this sense, is not just an informational repository, but a technical-normative instrument aimed at consolidating public integrity, institutional predictability and social control over state acts. We will examine the legal, constitutional, and technical foundations of the proposed concept, as well as the operational challenges and potential of its application in the context of the digital transformation of the State and the consolidation of data-driven governance models. The function of a database in the legal field transcends the instrumental concept of a mere document repository. It is an institutional infrastructure oriented toward the systematization, rationalization, and transparency of legal knowledge, which carefully gathers and organizes judicial decisions, administrative decisions, case law, formal agreements, and administrative acts with significant legal impact. By adopting logical, chronological, thematic, and functional criteria, this type of database provides strategic support to interpretation and application of the law, allowing qualified access to precedents, normative foundations and coherent lines of argument. When well-structured, a legal database directly contributes to promoting legal certainty, institutional predictability, and the effectiveness of justice. Its function is not limited to consultation: it acts as a tool for consolidating understandings, supporting legal research, and reinforcing the integrity of state decisions. Thus, it ceases to be a secondary technical instrument and establishes itself as a fundamental pillar in the architecture of institutional trust, especially in a context of increasing regulatory complexity and the need for public oversight of state actions. 2.2. Artificial Intelligence and Statistics as Infrastructure for Institutional Inference and Public Motivation Statistics, in the era of mass, standardized decisions and institutional and technological complexity 5, should be understood as the scientific form of rational listening. It is a structured system of inference about regularities and exceptions, capable of identifying patterns, indicating risks of arbitrariness, and offering epistemic support for the legitimacy of public decisions. By transforming data into judgments, statistics allows the State to understand itself, revise its language, and act with predictability, responsibility, and prudence. It is not merely a technical tool for quantification, but a formal language of reasonableness. It organizes the relationship between variability and coherence, offering objective criteria for distinguishing acceptable fluctuations from unjustified deviations. In a scenario where public decisions produce massive, immediate, and cross-cutting effects, statistics become a basis for structural accountability: it provides judges, managers, and regulators with a methodical mirror of the institution itself. It is in this same context that artificial intelligence should be understood, especially in its predictive and explainable aspects. Artificial intelligence is not a substitute for public reason, but a technical extension of its analytical capacity. When guided by structured legal data and combined with statistical inference, AI can detect patterns of institutional behavior, recognize decisions outside expected parameters, suggest relevant precedents, and reinforce argumentative consistency 6. Artificial intelligence acts as an instrument of interpretative traceability, allowing public motivation to be transformed from a formal or rhetorical gesture into a reconstructible, auditable, and comparable process. Its function is to broaden the scope of institutional attention, detect inconsistencies before they consolidate as structural ambiguity, and provide technical support for normative coherence. Like statistics, artificial intelligence doesn't decide: it illuminates, signals, and suggests—so that human judgment can act with greater depth, context, and prudence. Integrated, statistics and artificial intelligence become the infrastructure for public motivation, institutional traceability, and the prohibition of arbitrary action. They operate as invisible pillars of a new form of decision-making accountability, which is no longer supported solely by the authority of the function, but by the verifiable coherence of its foundations. Ultimately, it is about equipping public discourse with technical tools that reinforce its commitment to legality, predictability, and integrity in the 21st century. Statistics and artificial intelligence in the context of public institutions in the 21st century XXI, must be understood as convergent expressions of the same applied rationality: institutional inference under uncertainty. Both operate not only on data; they operate on doubts, asymmetries, variations, and repetitions—those things that, in the daily grind of public decision-making, require prudence, comparison, and motivation. Statistics provides the method of listening. Rational; artificial intelligence expands the scale, speed, and capacity of pattern recognition. Together, they structure a silent verification architecture. Statistics is not just a measurement technique. It is a scientific way of interpreting regularities, recognizing exceptions, and estimating risks based on evidence. It transforms dispersion into structure, variation into signal, and noise into diagnosis. In a complex institutional environment, marked by repeated decisions and conflicting interpretations, statistics act as a filter for reasonableness: it allows us to distinguish between legitimate variations and unjustified deviations. Its function is to anchor public discourse in criteria that can be audited, compared, and eventually revised. Artificial intelligence, in its predictive and explainable aspects, should be understood as a computational continuation of statistical inference. Every model that suggests, classifies, or anticipates the outcome of an institutional decision does so based on probabilistic structures. —sometimes hidden, but always inferential. When combined with structured legal databases and guided by traceability principles, AI becomes an interpretative extension of institutional memory: it allows us to identify relevant precedents, suggest argumentative convergences, and flag decisions that deviate from recognizable norms. Public motivation — which, at the legal level, requires clear and verifiable grounds—finds legitimate technical support in statistics and artificial intelligence. It's not about replacing judgment, but about qualifying it. Decisions that incorporate statistical inference and computational intelligence are no less human; they are more nuanced, more contextualized, and more open to public criticism. Motivation ceases to be a ritual of language and becomes a manifestation of institutional coherence fueled by standards, references, and accountability. By integrating statistics and artificial intelligence, the State reinforces its commitment to the traceability of decision-making and the prohibition of arbitrariness. Where there are identifiable patterns, there must be criteria to justify ruptures. Where there is normative regularity, there must be control over exceptions. The role of these technologies is not to decide—it is to illuminate. They are tools for institutional listening: they allow the State to listen to itself, compare itself, explain itself, and, when necessary, correct itself. This understanding — that statistics and artificial intelligence, integrated and based on structured legal databases, should act as the technical infrastructure for public motivation and as guarantees of traceability, coherence and the prohibition of arbitrariness — was recently corroborated, on an international scale, by the study of Chutisant Kerdvibulvech (Big Data and AI-driven evidence analysis: a global perspective on citation trends, accessibility, and future research in legal applications, 2024) 7. Kerdvibulvech demonstrates, through empirical analysis and a global literature review, that artificial intelligence systems applied to legal analysis — especially in document review, litigation prediction, forensic image analysis, and contract evaluation — only produce legitimate and admissible effects when accompanied by rigorous statistical validation, methodological traceability, and transparent ethical parameters. Statistics, in this context, do not appear as an accessory technique, but as an epistemic guarantee of institutional rationality. Kerdvibulvech argues that statistical inference is essential for controlling biases, measuring uncertainty, and identifying patterns and exceptions. At the same time, artificial intelligence must be applied under interpretable and auditable guidelines, so that institutional decisions—administrative, judicial, or investigative—do not become automatic gestures, but rather motivated acts with depth, prudence, and inferential responsibility. This finding confirms the central thesis of this topic: contemporary public decision- making requires, in addition to legal grounds, a technical basis for inference, verification, and explanation to enable the right to understanding. Furthermore, decisions need to be interpreted within a systemic context to enable societal understanding. By integrating statistics and AI, the public institution commits to a systemic and complex decision-making language model, authentically integrated, capable of resisting structural ambiguity, preventing normative inconsistencies, and ensuring predictability without rigidity. Motivation ceases to be a formal requirement and becomes a continuous exercise of institutional listening: listening to data, patterns, ruptures, and the limits of one's own decision-making power. The structuring of case law, administrative, and business databases should not only serve retrospective statistics or predictive artificial intelligence. Their deeper role is to provide a stable, auditable, and technically grounded language for the conclusion of out-of- court settlements and to guide public authorities in their decisions, whose legitimacy depends on consistency with past decisions—whether judicial, administrative, or business. The lack of this anchoring in precedents and prior agreements compromises not only fairness between parties in similar situations, but also the but also the logical integrity of the normative function exercised by institutions. As Chutisant Kerdvibulvech (2024) demonstrates, disorganized or disjointed data weaken artificial intelligence systems, impede pattern detection, and obscure systemic deviations. Therefore, to be legitimate, effective, and transparent, judicial or extrajudicial agreements must be integrated into the institutional memory formalized within contemporary technological standards rather than 20th-century methodology, reflecting already recognized standards and allowing public control over their consistency with the historical language of decisions. In this context, the coordinated application of statistics and artificial intelligence offers public and private institutions the possibility of developing a cognitive infrastructure focused on analyzing, cross-referencing, and validating these databases. Statistics allow for mapping decision-making frequencies, identifying recurring argumentative patterns, and recognizing hermeneutical inflection points—including in historical series of out-of-court settlements and administrative decisions. Artificial intelligence, fueled by this structured universe, becomes capable of performing more sophisticated tasks: detecting internal inconsistencies, pointing out unjustified divergences between similar cases, assessing adherence to precedents, and predictively flagging risks arising from solutions outside the institutional framework. This combined functionality acts as a silent engine of coherence. Systems trained with properly classified, versioned, and traceable data can offer, for example, suggestions for clauses aligned with the terms of previous similar agreements, alert to the risks of contradictory decisions, or project regulatory impacts not yet perceived by traditional legal rationality. The potential of this analytical architecture is not limited to efficiency, but reaches a deeper level: institutional self-awareness. It allows organizations to observe themselves, review themselves, learn from their own records, and, above all, establish a language that can be recognized and replicated responsibly. The constitutional right to understanding inaugurates a new interpretative paradigm and breaks the limits of administrative and jurisdictional transparency and publicity. Decision-making acts must be understandable; it is not enough to be public and transparent. They must be well- founded, rational, and coherent. No one understands an arbitrary act. Coherence ceases to be merely a rhetorical aspiration and becomes monitorable, auditable, and measurable by metrics informed by empirical standards. Even an out-of-court or judicial settlement ceases to be an isolated gesture of convenience and becomes part of an ecosystem of decisions. Interdependent, subject to technical scrutiny and comparative review. This expands the capacity of the State and corporations to engage with their own precedents—judicial, administrative, and business—without losing sight of the uniqueness of each case. Artificial intelligence and statistics, together, do not replace institutional deliberation, but rather accompany it with an ethical horizon: avoiding distortions, preserving memory, and preventing arbitrariness from masquerading as discretion. For the theory of precedents to operate as the rational core of the legal system—as required by stare decisis—it is essential that case law be analyzed not only hermeneutically but also through statistical and computational resources capable of diagnosing its internal fractures. Statistics, in this field, allows us to identify divergent patterns between decisions on analogous cases, map the dispersion of reasoning across different chambers and courts, and quantify the degree to which decisions adhere to or deviate from qualified precedents, signaling which areas offer legitimate controversy or hermeneutical discretion and which areas are pure anomalies and arbitrariness. This is a diagnostic and predictive function: it highlights where the system behaves coherently and where, due to interpretative or contextual flaws, it begins to lose its consistency and even enter suspect zones. Artificial intelligence, powered by structured databases with robust metadata (topic, thesis, adjudicating body, rapporteur, outcome, main grounds, legal provisions invoked), can go further: it can not only identify these inconsistencies but also project future deviations based on emerging decision-making trends. Through supervised algorithms, it is possible to train models that indicate, for example, the likelihood of a given thesis being revised, challenged, or ignored by certain instances or regions. This monitoring is vital for preserving the integrity of the precedent system, as it allows not only early warning of the erosion of consolidated understandings but also the continuous calibration of judicial language based on its own decisional memory. For this process to be reliable, however, the databases' feed is crucial. Without adequate technical curation, artificial intelligence becomes blind and statistics become illusory. It is essential that decisions are correctly classified, that qualified precedents are clearly marked, and that there is an institutional protocol for recording relevant grounds. The data needs to be cleaned, updated, standardized, and enriched with context. It's not just about digitizing judgments: it's about necessary to transform decisions into structured language, with specific fields that allow their algorithmic interpretation without loss of legal density. This structure will allow us to filter relevant cases, distinguishratio decidendiofobiter dicta, and accurately map the cores of normative meaning that radiate from the precedents. Thus, the preservation of stare decisis in the age of complexity will not be guaranteed solely by formal declarations of binding force, but by the institutional capacity to systematically monitor, audit, and project legal coherence. Statistics and AI, in this sense, operate as instruments of lucidity: they reveal the structure behind discourse, the regularity behind exceptions, and the instability behind the appearance of uniformity. Law ceases to be a self-centered narrative and becomes a field of empirical observation and interpretative responsibility. The logic of structuring, statistical analysis, and predictive interpretation applied to case law and out-of-court settlements should be extended to public contracts and regulatory acts, whose regulatory effects are often broader and more lasting than specific court decisions. The creation of structured databases containing contractual clauses, performance conditions, addenda, legal opinions, and practical results allows artificial intelligence to detect abusive recurrences, strategic omissions, inconsistencies in interpretation, and asymmetries in treatment between different contracting parties in similar situations. In the regulatory field, the systematic organization of resolutions, instructions, ordinances, and decrees, with metadata on legal basis, issuing agencies, express motivation, and validity, enables analyses that reveal the degree of interpretative uniformity between federative entities and regulatory agencies. The statistics applied to this set become a tool for continuous constitutional auditing, capable of verifying whether normative acts comply with legal frameworks and align with the system of precedents, avoiding contradictions, normative redundancies, or regulatory gaps. When fed with technical rigor and processed by explainable AI, these collections become part of an integrated institutional intelligence, in which contracts and norms not only produce legal effects but also feed back into the state's normative memory, allowing public governance to learn from its own actions and anticipate recurring deviations 2.3. Artificial intelligence, traceability and prohibition of arbitrariness The application of artificial intelligence in public administration is a topic of growing importance. In this context, the relevance of this technology in systematizing and categorizing the reasons underlying the decisions of different agencies in similar situations stands out. This organizational capacity not only allows for the identification of inconsistencies but also helps clarify interpretative inconsistencies. Furthermore, systematization favors the promotion of institutional consistency, which is highly desirable. However, it is essential that the implementation of artificial intelligence in this area is guided by public and auditable criteria 8, respecting the constitutional principles in force. This guidance is especially important regarding the principles that guarantee legal certainty and adequate justification for administrative acts. Motivation, understood as the requirement of a rational basis, is closely related to the concept of traceability. An administrative act that presents adequate motivation is one whose reasons can be easily reconstructed, verified, and challenged. It is worth noting that this requirement of motivation is not limited to judicial decisions. It also extends to administrative sanctioning acts, binding opinions, regulatory resolutions, and agreements signed between public entities. In this sense, the organization of administrative jurisprudence in structured, improved databases. Powered by artificial intelligence and made publicly available, this represents an effective strategy. This approach not only ensures transparency but also establishes a model of administrative justice based on the coherence, rationality, and integrity of legal language. Finally, it is imperative that technological advances in the public sector be accompanied by a firm commitment to the values that underpin the democratic rule of law. The responsible integration of artificial intelligence can thus significantly contribute to a more efficient, fair, and transparent public administration. 2.4. Integrative hermeneutics of constitutional law to understanding: convergence between administrative and judicial jurisprudence through databases The constitutional right to understand the content of public decisions restricting fundamental rights requires a hermeneutics that views the set of decisions as a whole—that is, a normative system properly structured, organized, classified, and capable of in-depth research in the technological age. In this sense, this hermeneutics, regardless of the current it purports to designate, is based on an unavoidable contemporary assumption: viewing the decision in its comprehensive and organized normative context. It is impossible to ignore that this context is part of the age of complexity, as has been stated from the outset 9. Statistics, in its contemporary approach, transcends the mere measurement of quantitative phenomena. It establishes itself as a science that encompasses structure, inference, and decision-making, focusing on organizing information, identifying patterns, anticipating risks, and providing a rational basis for institutional choices. legal context, this function acquires crucial importance, proving to be a vital element for public rationality, consistency in decisions and the integrity of governance. Legal statistics are based on three fundamental pillars: first, the systematic and structured collection of relevant public data; second, the mathematical modeling of identifiable patterns in different contexts, ranging from regulatory to judicial; and finally, responsible inference, which must be auditable and publicly justifiable, regarding risks, trends, repetitions, and deviations. Thus, its object of study goes beyond numbers, encompassing institutional behavior, the language of decision-making, and the logic of institutions in uncertain situations. In this sense, statistics transform the legal database into a space for systemic observation, enabling the identification of asymmetries, the prediction of conflicts, and the rationalization of state action. The relationship between statistics, databases, and legal language is, therefore, structural in nature. Without reliable, organized, and auditable data, legitimate inferences cannot be made; similarly, without institutionalized statistics, databases become mere technical repositories, devoid of analytical value. Furthermore, without a standardized legal language, classifying, cross-referencing, and interpreting decisions becomes a challenge. Within the justice system, statistics perform four central functions. First, a diagnostic function, which seeks to identify interpretative patterns, areas of instability, inconsistencies in decisions, and unequal treatment in similar cases. The preventive function, in turn, anticipates the emergence of conflicts, legal risks, or argumentative distortions, based on historical data and institutional patterns. Next, the strategic function underpins the management of case provisioning, the prioritization of agendas, and the structuring of coherent public responses. Finally, the restorative function provides objective support for reviewing dysfunctional practices and correcting institutional biases, also encompassing the perspective of external oversight. For these reasons, it is essential that statistics be understood as a principle of democratic governance, especially in complex and sensitive legal environments. It strengthens the state's capacity for introspection, allowing it to review its structures and promote actions based on standards of coherence, efficiency, and equity. The application of this rationality in the justice system is imperative in times of complexity. To this end, courts, regulatory agencies, public prosecutors, audit courts, and internal control bodies must incorporate statistical tools guided by clear public purposes and ethical, auditable routines that are permanently aligned with the constitutional language. Thus, legal statistics should not be seen merely as an auxiliary technique, but as an epistemological foundation that sustains institutional integrity. It does not replace argumentation, but enhances it; it does not supplant the norm, but rather the structure; and it does not automate justice, but rather anchors it in evidence, memory, and public accountability. By translating legal data into analytical language, statistics ground justice as an expression of collective intelligence. 3. Metric Transparency in the Age of Algorithms 3.1. The role of statistics in the legal world and in improving the justice system It is important to note, from the outset, the conceptual difference between data and algorithms, although it is assumed that these concepts underlie the logic of this essay. The concepts taken fromArtificial Intelligence Risk Management Framework (AI RMF 1.0), prepared by the National Institute of Standards and Technology – NIST (2023), as well as the Regulation (EU) 2024/1689 of the European Parliament and of the Council, which deals with artificial intelligence within the European Union (EUROPEAN UNION, 2024). Both are based on essential premises inherent to digital governance 10. The conceptual distinction between data, metadata, and algorithms constitutes a structuring element in contemporary debates on artificial intelligence, automated governance, and digital regulation. This distinction is essential for the proper interpretation of the obligations imposed on institutions seeking to ensure fair and equal access, comprehensible reading, and informational protection in the ethical use of data within the Brazilian legal, economic, and communication space—especially in digital environments such as social media, where data processing reaches massive proportions and amplified effects. Data are digital records or representations—structured or unstructured—of any fact, act, occurrence, state, process, or event that can be captured and has relevance. Metadata, in turn, is data about the data, according to the context of its collection. In the European legal and technical context, it encompasses both raw data (such as the date and time of a purchase) and processed data (such as a user's consumption history). In the RFM model, data corresponds to the observable elements that feed the metrics: number of purchases made, date of the last transaction, and total amount spent. Algorithms, on the other hand, are finite sets of logical or mathematical rules and instructions used to process data, extract patterns, categorize subjects, or make automated decisions. An algorithm based on the RFM model must be explainable through predefined formulas, based on risk models contextualized by segment. From a regulatory perspective, European Regulation (EU) 2023/2854 classifies algorithms as operations on data that must comply with fundamental principles such as proportionality, non-discrimination, necessity, and transparency. This classification implies recognizing that algorithms are not immune to oversight, especially in contexts where they impact fundamental rights, access to essential services, or the classification of standards, agreements, and decisions that directly affect these rights. In the Brazilian context, the General Data Protection Law (LGPD – Law No. 13,709/2018) establishes fundamental guidelines for the processing of personal data, highlighting the principles of purpose, adequacy, necessity, free access, data quality, transparency, security, prevention, and non-discrimination. The LGPD also imposes obligations regarding the protection of confidentiality and information security, requiring both the controller and the processor to adopt effective technical and administrative measures to safeguard personal data against unauthorized access or incidents—whether accidental or unlawful—that may result in the destruction, loss, modification, improper communication, or dissemination of such information. The distinction between data, metadata, and algorithms, therefore, is not merely bureaucratic: it is a structural element for the ethical and normative governance of digital systems. Data constitutes the raw material; algorithms, the instruments of transformation. Protecting the integrity of the process requires oversight of both: the origin, classification, and use of data, as well as the criteria and impacts associated with algorithms. The structuring of documentation, rigorous data processing, and the auditability of digital systems, including algorithms, provide new paradigms for the legitimacy of public decisions. The consolidation and strengthening of precedents are connected to the right to understanding, which derives from a constitutional system integrated into a dynamic, self- critical, and regenerative institutional culture. This culture must not only defend itself but also constantly renew itself and engage in dialogue with the State. In this context, transformative compliance in companies also emerges, emerging as the link between the technical structure and the institutional essence, representing the ethical intelligence that guides artificial intelligence, the integrity that organizes data, and the trust that underpins predictability, with regulatory autonomy and a new perspective on the organization's identity. As I mentioned, the complexity of decision-making, the lack of transparency, and the difficulty in accessing state decisions and acts stem from multiple factors. The legal database lacks integration with statistics, as it is an intelligent tool that enables a sophisticated reading of institutional memory. It has become clear that statistics reveal patterns and deviations, allow for the critical interpretation of trends, hidden flaws, fissures, inequalities, asymmetries, and diagnoses regarding normative and decision-making implications. In the current context, the improvement of statistical tools shows trends toward integration with artificial intelligence, thus fulfilling extremely important functions in the analysis, diagnosis, and anticipation of scenarios and risks in the institutional decision- making architecture. In these new scenarios, AI considerably expands the scale and scope of statistical impact, and technological advances increasingly enable the identification of invisible and sophisticated patterns. Methodologies exist that allow for continuous revisions as evidence emerges or undergoes transformation. In any case, it should be noted that statistics and artificial intelligence do not replace human judgment, but constitute auxiliary instruments and have auditable and variable methodologies 11. 3.2. How algorithms impact and structure legal databases Regarding the concept of an algorithm in information technology, it's crucial to remember that it's a structured set of instructions designed to solve problems or perform tasks automatically. In the digital world, an algorithm operates like a recipe that guides computers in their decisions, based on data. Rather than adopting a random approach, the algorithm follows meticulously designed steps aimed at classifying, ordering, correlating, or predicting information. This dynamic proves crucial, for example, when an electronic legal system is able to identify analogous decisions, when a platform detects contractual risks, or even when a compliance program identifies inconsistencies in business operations. Although developed by technology experts, algorithms are not neutral; on the contrary, they reflect human choices about what should be valued, what can be disregarded, and which paths deserve to be prioritized. Therefore, their application in legal spheres requires a commitment to accountability, transparency, and oversight. When properly designed and audited, algorithms have the ability to organize vast volumes of data, reduce the incidence of errors, and increase the consistency of decisions. However, when they operate without proper oversight or with biased data, they risk perpetuating inequalities, creating legal vulnerabilities, and compromising institutional integrity. Algorithms currently constitute the dynamic axis that transforms legal databases into functional systems of institutional rationality. If the database is responsible for storing and organizing decisions, normative acts, contracts, and opinions, they are the algorithms that give form, intelligibility, and operability to this collection 12. Through them, it becomes possible to classify documents, extract linguistic and normative patterns, identify recurrences, assess argumentative coherence, and build inferences applicable to new cases or regulatory scenarios. In contemporary legal databases, algorithms perform a variety of structural functions, such as semantic indexing and hierarchical organization of content, where classification algorithms categorically organize decisions according to subject matter, legal basis, adjudicating body, cited case law, type of request or legal thesis, ensuring accurate information retrieval, even in massive and heterogeneous collections. Furthermore, detecting patterns and inconsistencies becomes a vital function, with clustering and anomaly detection algorithms facilitating the identification of inconsistencies between similar decisions, revealing areas of jurisprudential instability and locating interpretations outside the historical norm. Temporal traceability and predictive inference are also crucial, with time-series algorithms enabling the detection of decision-making seasonality, interpretative ruptures, and normative effects over time, which is essential for statistical inferences, resource allocation, and institutional impact simulations. Explainability and legal inference in artificial intelligence are equally relevant; in more advanced systems, algorithms become logical inference mechanisms, used to suggest arguments, reconstruct legal grounds, predict procedural outcomes, or recommend contractual clauses, with all of this functionality dependent on the integrity of the database and the ethical governance of the applied algorithm. Finally, filtering, cleaning, and anonymizing sensitive data through pre- processing algorithms is essential to eliminate duplication, correct inconsistencies, and ensure the anonymization of personal data before it is used for AI training or public analysis. As a result, legal databases are transformed into algorithmic environments, ceasing to be mere passive repositories and becoming dynamic infrastructures for inference, institutional memory, and public or corporate intelligence. Without algorithms, there is only a mass of documents; with their application, there is structure, meaning, criticality, and decision-making potential. However, this transformation is only legitimate if the algorithms are: explainable, so that one can understand how they perform classifications, recommendations, or exclusions; auditable, so that

Niobium as a Geostrategic Pillar of the 21st Century: Brazil’s Centrality in the New Global Technological and Mineral Order

This article undertakes a broad analysis of the Federative Republic of Brazil’s strategic role in the global scenario of niobium production and trade.  Using an interdisciplinary approach, it examines the geological, industrial, economic, legal, and geopolitical aspects that position the country as a virtually exclusive participant in the global supply chain for this critical metal. Brazil holds approximately 98 per cent of known niobium reserves and accounts for over 90 per cent of globally traded production, conferring a uniquely powerful position in the 21st century. This centrality is particularly evident in sensitive sectors such as defence, infrastructure, energy, semiconductors, emerging technologies, and the energy transition. It should be noted that this geological and commercial advantage has not yet translated into effective sovereign power. The absence of a structured, integrated, and strategic national policy for the sector reveals legal and institutional vulnerabilities, including the lack of a specific regulatory framework, selective fiscal incentives, and interministerial coordination. Present governance is marked by fragmentation and the predominance of private interests, lacking coordination between industrial policy, economic diplomacy, and technological value addition. Consequently, the article proposes the creation of a new legal and economic regime for niobium, encompassing a dedicated legislative framework, industrial and fiscal policy mechanisms aimed at vertical integration, proactive mineral diplomacy, and the establishment of a public authority endowed with the technical expertise and legitimacy to coordinate national governance of this resource. In light of this context, niobium is treated not only as a commodity, but as a strategic asset for sovereignty, innovation, and geopolitical integration, particularly in an international environment marked by industrial reconfigurations, trade tensions, and disputes over critical minerals. Brazil’s central role in this new global landscape requires institutional intelligence and long-term strategic planning. Introduction The geoeconomic landscape of the 21st century has been strongly shaped by the rise of so-called strategic or critical minerals—essential inputs for the functioning of high-technology production chains, national security, the energy transition, and scientific innovation. In this framework, niobium emerges as one of the most relevant, albeit underestimated, metals in the new global material order. It is a chemical element with atomic number 41, belonging to the group of transition metals, with distinctive physicochemical properties: corrosion resistance, lightness, high thermal conductivity, and superconductivity at cryogenic temperatures. Its applications are varied and structural: from the aerospace and nuclear industries to advanced civil construction; from the production of superalloys for turbines, rockets, and pipelines to cutting-edge defence systems; and from industrial infrastructure to diagnostic imaging, such as magnetic resonance devices. Niobium—often described as the “invisible element”—is an indispensable component for sustaining the complexity of the contemporary economy[1]. What makes the geopolitics of this metal unique is Brazil’s near-monopoly position. As evidenced by updated data from the United States Geological Survey (USGS, 2025[2]) and Brazil’s National Mining Agency (ANM[3]), the country holds a significant proportion of the world’s known reserves and the largest effective annual global production. No other country exercises a comparable degree of control over a mineral resource of similar strategic value. The principal production hubs are located in the States of Minas Gerais (Araxá), Goiás (Catalão and Ouvidor), and Amazonas (São Gabriel da Cachoeira), with most production carried out by two major companies: CBMM—Companhia Brasileira de Metalurgia e Mineração (Brazilian Metallurgy and Mining Company)—and CMOC Brasil, a subsidiary of China Molybdenum Co. Ltd.[4]. At the same time, the United States of America, the European Union, the People’s Republic of China, Japan, and the Republic of Korea are highly dependent on Brazilian exports, lacking significant domestic production and fully functional alternatives. The United States Department of Defense has classified niobium as a critical mineral for national security, and documents released by WikiLeaks in 2010 revealed the inclusion of Brazilian mines on United States lists of global strategic infrastructure[5]. In light of this context, a central question arises: how has Brazil leveraged—or neglected to leverage—this geological and strategic advantage? This article seeks to answer that question based on an interdisciplinary analysis combining geological, industrial, economic, and legal perspectives. The proposed hypothesis is that Brazil occupies a central and privileged position in the new geopolitics of critical minerals, yet still lacks a robust state policy capable of articulating mineral sovereignty, value addition, technological innovation, and global resource diplomacy. Technical Overview and Industrial Applications of Niobium Niobium is a transition metal belonging to Group VB of the Periodic Table, with the chemical symbol Nb, atomic number 41, atomic mass of 92.91 u, and a melting point of approximately 2,468 °C. Its physical and chemical behaviour is characterised by high thermal resistance, ductility, good electrical conductivity, and excellent corrosion resistance, making it suitable for a wide range of industrial applications. From its identification by Charles Hatchett in 1801 to its consolidation as a critical element in the 21st century, niobium has evolved from a rare metal to a vital component of contemporary technological advancement. The principal commercial forms of niobium are diverse and serve different industrial sectors. The predominant form is ferroniobium (FeNb), an alloy of iron and niobium, which accounts for over 90 per cent of global demand and is widely used in the steel industry for the production of high-strength steels. Another relevant form is niobium oxide (Nb₂O₅), which has significant applications in the manufacture of advanced ceramics and precision optical devices. In addition, there are special alloys — such as nickel–niobium, aluminium–niobium, and titanium–niobium — which are used directly in strategic sectors, particularly the aerospace and defence industries, owing to their mechanical strength and thermal stability[6]. Furthermore, niobium plays a strategic role in several industrial sectors, particularly in the steel, aerospace, defence, energy, electronics, medical, and green technology industries. In the steel industry, its most widespread application is in the manufacture of high-strength, low-alloy microalloyed steels, known as HSLA (High Strength Low Alloy). The addition of small amounts of niobium — a process known as microalloying — provides substantial improvements in steel performance: increased mechanical strength, improved weldability, reduced weight in metal structures, and savings in material and energy[7]. These steels are widely used in the automotive industry, particularly in the production of lightweight yet safe vehicle bodies; in civil construction and major infrastructure projects, such as bridges, pipelines, and offshore platforms; as well as in the naval and railway industries[8]. In the aerospace and defence sector, niobium is essential for the formulation of superalloys used in jet engine turbines, rocket thermal coatings, and structural components of satellites and spacecraft. Alloys such as niobium–titanium (Nb–Ti) and niobium–tin (Nb₃Sn) are employed in the manufacture of superconducting magnets for radar systems, medical equipment, and particle accelerators[9]. In the energy and electronics sectors, niobium’s physical and chemical properties make it valuable for a range of applications. It is used in components of nuclear reactors due to its low neutron absorption cross-section, and in superconducting cables for high-voltage transmission systems and nuclear fusion projects such as ITER[10]. In medicine, niobium has been widely used for manufacturing orthopaedic and dental implants, cardiovascular stents, and high-precision surgical instruments[11]. Finally, in the so-called green technologies sector, niobium has gained prominence alongside the advance of renewable energy and the electrification of mobility. It is incorporated into wind turbines through high-strength alloys, into solid-state batteries, and into conductors for electric motors requiring greater thermal efficiency and durability[12]. Although most of Brazil’s production is exported as ferroniobium, there is growing demand for higher-value products, including special alloys customised for particular sectors; niobium-doped ceramic compounds; and niobium components for chips and three-dimensional metallic microstructures. CBMM, a global leader in the niobium products market, invests heavily in applied research aimed at developing new industrial uses for the element, focusing particularly on emerging technologies such as lithium-ion batteries containing niobium oxides. These investments include strategic partnerships with automotive companies, universities, and internationally renowned research centres, notably in Japan, Germany, China, and the United States[13]. However, such initiatives do not yet amount to a national public policy for mineral innovation. The absence of tax incentives, dedicated federal technology centres, and strategic regulation limits Brazil’s progress in transforming niobium into an industrial asset. Global Production and Market Control Global niobium production is characterised by a geological and industrial concentration unparalleled among today’s strategic minerals. Unlike other critical commodities — such as lithium, rare earth elements, and cobalt — which have multiple extraction sites across the globe, niobium is, in essence, monopolised by the Federative Republic of Brazil. According to data from the Serviço Geológico do Brasil (SGB – Geological Service of Brazil) and the United States Geological Survey (USGS), the country holds over 90 per cent of known reserves and accounts for approximately 90 per cent of annual global production. This dominant position is underpinned by three principal mining hubs within Brazilian territory: Araxá, in the State of Minas Gerais, operated by the Companhia Brasileira de Metalurgia e Mineração (CBMM), which alone is responsible for more than 75 per cent of global production[14]; Catalão, in the State of Goiás, operated by CMOC International Brasil; and São Gabriel da Cachoeira, in the State of Amazonas, where significant geological potential remains either in the exploratory phase or under legal restriction due to its location within Indigenous lands. Among these, the Araxá industrial complex is regarded as the most advanced in the world in terms of niobium extraction, processing, and metallurgical transformation technology. Beyond Brazil, the only other relevant operations, albeit on a smaller scale, are in Canada — through the Niobec mine in the province of Quebec[15] — and in certain Central African countries such as Rwanda, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and Nigeria. In these African states, niobium extraction occurs marginally, with little industrialisation and, in many cases, links to informal practices or unstable political contexts. However, none of these territories possesses reserves comparable in volume or quality to those of Brazil, nor do they possess the technological capacity or logistical infrastructure to rival Brazil’s production centre. In the United States of America, the Elk Creek Project in Nebraska is considered the sole domestic initiative with significant supply potential[16]. Nevertheless, it remains in the pre-operational stage, facing considerable environmental obstacles — such as the high cost of treating brackish groundwater — and requiring substantial financing to achieve large-scale economic viability[17]. The global niobium market is therefore not only geologically centralised but also technologically oligopolistic. CBMM — controlled by private Brazilian capital, with minority stakes held by Japanese and Chinese companies — dominates the global supply chain, acting as the near-exclusive supplier of ferroniobium to steelworks in Europe, North America, and Asia. It operates under a private contractual regime, without public international quotations and outside the scope of commodity exchanges, meaning that niobium prices are established by long-term bilateral agreements, with limited transparency and no international regulatory oversight. This structure confers upon Brazil a rare power in the geopolitics of critical minerals. No other nation exerts such market control with so little international competition over a resource considered indispensable for high-technology, infrastructure, and defence sectors. Paradoxically, however, this privileged position coexists with the absence of a specific national regulatory framework, the domestic deindustrialisation of the value chain, and export patterns concentrated in low-processing products, such as ferroniobium metal. At the same time, this market structure generates latent international tensions. The United States, for instance, has no domestic niobium production and imports 100 per cent of its consumption — the vast majority sourced directly from Brazil. This absolute dependence has been formally acknowledged by agencies such as the Department of the Interior, which placed niobium on its official list of critical minerals owing to its economic and strategic importance. The Department of Defense, for its part, recognises the use of niobium across various applications in the military sector, although, as of the 2021 fiscal year, it had not included the mineral in active acquisition or stockpiling programmes via the Defense Logistics Agency. The absence of reliable and substantial alternative suppliers or buffer stocks in the Northern Hemisphere renders Brazil a pivotal actor in the stability of the production chains for metal alloys and superconductors[18]. From a geopolitical standpoint, Brazil has yet to fully internalise the strategic implications of this concentration. National production remains largely oriented towards the export of metallic raw material, without state control over international flows, minimum local content requirements for technological transformation, or structured public policies to promote value addition or the formation of strategic reserves for market stabilisation. The lack of an official international quotation even prevents niobium from being treated as a structured financial asset, limiting its circulation as a hedging or investment instrument. In short, global niobium production is a singular example of a natural monopoly converted into private commercial hegemony. Brazil is simultaneously the largest holder, producer, and exporter of a resource fundamental to the energy transition, the aerospace industry, electronic devices, and the strategic defence capabilities of major world powers. This position grants the country a natural comparative advantage, yet it requires an intelligent and sovereign national strategy to convert this advantage into negotiating leverage, domestic value addition, technological innovation, and autonomous geopolitical positioning. Without such measures, Brazil’s niobium monopoly will remain a dormant asset — an exporter of raw potential and an importer of industrialised solutions that could otherwise be developed domestically. Unlike other industrial metals (such as copper, aluminium, or nickel), niobium is not traded on commodity exchanges or futures markets like the London Metal Exchange (LME) or COMEX. Contracts are negotiated directly between producers and buyers, with prices determined by private arrangements based on quality, application, term, and volume. This model, known as an opaque market or performance contract, prevents financial speculation but simultaneously restricts market transparency and liquidity. As a result, there is no daily public price for niobium; strategic stocks are held privately; and hedging strategies (financial risk protection) are limited. This arrangement benefits major producers — especially CBMM — which imposes its technical and commercial standards as the global benchmark. At present, there are no direct substitutes equivalent to niobium in its most critical applications, particularly in the manufacture of microalloyed steels and high-performance superalloys. Materials examined as partial substitutes include vanadium — with inferior thermal resistance; titanium — which is more costly and less ductile in certain alloys; and rare earth elements — which have greater chemical instability and are largely dependent on China. From an industrial perspective, replacing niobium would entail increased structural weight, reduced material durability, higher costs, and the necessity of new certification tests — factors that make substitution economically unattractive in the short and medium term. Against this backdrop, the international dependence on Brazilian production constitutes not only a commercial reality but also a systemic vulnerability for several nations. In this context, it is pertinent to note that, when signing the Executive Order of 30 July 2025, then-President of the United States, Donald Trump, declared a national state of emergency under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA), holding the Government of the Federative Republic of Brazil responsible for practices deemed to undermine the national security, economy, and foreign policy of the United States. As a consequence, an additional 40 per cent tariff was imposed on Brazilian products, resulting in a total taxation level of 50 per cent[19]. At the same time, certain items were explicitly excluded from this surcharge, and niobium was among the goods exempted, thereby being removed from the additional tariff. This measure demonstrates that President Trump was fully cognisant of niobium’s strategic importance, particularly in the context of critical industrial supply chains and the national security of the United States. The Geopolitics of Niobium’s External Dependence The near-total concentration of niobium reserves and production in the Federative Republic of Brazil has transformed this resource into a highly sensitive geopolitical variable. While most strategic minerals have a relatively diverse geographic distribution — such as lithium, found in the so-called “Lithium Triangle” (Argentina, Bolivia, and Chile), or copper, mined in Chile, Peru, China, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo — niobium is an exception: over 90 per cent of its practical availability, in technical, legal, and logistical terms, is concentrated in Brazil. This natural monopoly confers upon Brazil a unique position in the critical industrial supply chains of the 21st century, especially within a context of energy transition, green re-industrialisation, and global shifts in power[20]. Niobium’s external dependence is not solely economic but also strategic. Several industrialised countries — including the United States of America, the Federal Republic of Germany, Japan, and the Republic of Korea — rely on Brazilian imports to sustain sensitive sectors of their technological, military, and energy infrastructure. The North American case is particularly illustrative. According to data from the United States Geological Survey (USGS), approximately 87 per cent of the niobium consumed by the United States originates from Brazil, with the remainder sourced, to a lesser extent, from Canada. Since 2018, the mineral has been included on the official list of critical minerals published by the United States Department of the Interior, pursuant to Executive Order 13817, in recognition of its essential role in strategic sectors and its high vulnerability in the event of a supply disruption. Technical reports prepared by the Pentagon and opinions from United States strategic intelligence agencies, combined with documents released through WikiLeaks, indicate that Brazilian reserves — in particular, the Araxá mine in the State of Minas Gerais — are regarded as assets of vital geostrategic interest to the national security of the United States[21]. This vulnerability has prompted industrial powers to pursue diversification strategies. Canada operates the Niobec mine in Quebec, which accounts for about 8 per cent of global ferroniobium supply, although its scale remains incomparable to that of Brazil[22]. The United States is assessing the Elk Creek Project in Nebraska, led by NioCorp Developments Ltd., but this venture has yet to enter commercial operation and faces significant challenges in financing, environmental regulation, and logistics[23]. The People’s Republic of China, by contrast, has pursued a different strategy, acquiring equity stakes in Brazilian niobium and phosphate assets through CMOC Brasil, and positioning itself today as the second-largest producer of niobium globally[24]. This approach has placed niobium squarely within the Sino-American contest over critical minerals and technological leadership in the 21st century. This scenario reveals a geopolitical paradox: Brazil holds an extraordinary potential position of power, yet has not consolidated this advantage as an instrument of diplomacy, economic leverage, or industrial policy. There is no structured national policy of mineral sovereignty for niobium. Governance of the sector is fragmented, characterised by the absence of robust state guidelines, the private concentration of technical expertise, and insufficient coordination between foreign policy, scientific research, and value-added industrial development. Finally, the stability of the global niobium market — based on private contracts and lacking both a stock exchange listing and futures trading — depends largely upon CBMM’s historic reliability as a supplier. However, this stability is fragile in the face of climate-related risks, trade disputes, diplomatic tensions, or domestic political shocks. What is presently perceived as a predictable supply chain could, in a time of crisis, become a global bottleneck. Niobium, therefore, is not merely a technical commodity but also a sovereign asset, a driver of international influence, and a potential pillar of 21st-century industrial policy. Understanding this geopolitical dependence is the first step towards Brazil’s strategic repositioning on the global stage. The following sections will examine Brazilian mineral governance and the opportunities to convert this comparative advantage into a driver of effective leadership. Why Brazil Still Does Not Have a National Niobium Policy? Legal, Institutional, and Strategic Diagnosis Brazil’s near-absolute control over global niobium reserves and production has yet to translate into a coordinated, systemic, and sovereign national policy. Although the country occupies a unique position on the international stage, equivalent to a global natural monopoly, the governance of this asset remains diffuse, captured by private interests, lacking a specialised legal framework, and disconnected from the diplomatic and industrial strategies of the Brazilian State. The Brazilian legal system does not have specific legislation regulating strategic minerals such as niobium — a serious regulatory gap when compared to other major geoeconomic powers. At present, niobium is regulated only in a generic manner by Decree-Law No. 227/1967 (Mining Code) and through the residual competences of the Agência Nacional de Mineração (ANM – National Mining Agency), whose remit is limited to the technical and fiscal oversight of mining activities. Although Brazil established, via Decree No. 10.657/2021, the Política de Apoio ao Licenciamento Ambiental de Projetos de Investimento em Minerais Estratégicos (Policy to Support Environmental Licensing of Investment Projects in Strategic Minerals), creating the Comitê Interministerial de Análise de Projetos de Minerais Estratégicos (Interministerial Committee for the Analysis of Strategic Mineral Projects – CTAPME) and including niobium in the official list of the Ministry of Mines and Energy, this initiative still lacks a robust and permanent regulatory framework addressing the matter from the standpoint of national security, industrial policy, and the country’s strategic geoeconomic positioning[25]. Unlike the United States (which regularly publishes lists of critical minerals under special protection regimes), the European Union (which maintains the European Observatory for Critical Raw Materials), and the People’s Republic of China (which sets quotas, builds strategic stockpiles, and provides incentives for technological transformation), Brazil does not legally recognise the exceptional status of niobium. Consequently, there is no strategic legal classification for substances of sovereign interest. This omission compromises the regulatory autonomy of the Brazilian State, prevents the strategic use of niobium in international agreements, and renders impossible the adoption of policies for vertical integration, inventory control, fiscal incentives, and local content clauses — all fundamental instruments of Economic Law and contemporary mineral policy. Brazil’s niobium production chain is highly concentrated in private hands, with absolute dominance by the Companhia Brasileira de Metalurgia e Mineração (CBMM) and, to a lesser extent, CMOC Brasil — a subsidiary of the Chinese multinational. The State has no mechanism for strategic control over trade flows, pricing, reserves, or the geopolitical allocation of the product. The absence of a state-owned or mixed-capital company dedicated to the sector — akin to Petrobras in oil or Indústrias Nucleares do Brasil (INB) in uranium — represents an institutional vacuum, denationalising mineral policy and subjecting a geopolitically significant input to purely corporate criteria. Furthermore, the private contractual framework between foreign producers and buyers, conducted without public auction, regulated market, or international quotation, undermines transparency, hampers tax collection, and deprives the State of influence over the value chain. This state of affairs implicitly contravenes the principle of the supremacy of the public interest over the private interest — fundamental to Brazilian Administrative Law — and compromises the foundations of Regulatory Law by limiting the State’s normative authority over sectors that are sensitive to national security and the collective economic interest. Public governance of niobium in Brazil is marked by chronic institutional fragmentation. Responsibilities relating to mining, science and technology, foreign trade, national defence, foreign affairs, regional development, and technical education are dispersed among various ministries and agencies, without functional integration or coordination by a higher-level body. For example, there is no Conselho Nacional de Minerais Estratégicos (National Council for Strategic Minerals) or an interministerial committee with decision-making powers on the matter. This absence prevents the formulation of integrated multi-year plans, local content targets, industrial financing policies, or mineral diplomacy strategies based on national interests. The result is the perpetuation of a reactive, unstructured public policy limited to the technical-operational scope of the ANM. From the perspective of Public Policy Law, this is a case of systemic governance failure, in which the absence of a coordinating authority prevents the transformation of mineral assets into levers for development. The lack of unified command undermines the possibility of long-term planning and denies the country full regulatory sovereignty. Brazil’s tax system makes no distinction between the fiscal burden on exports of raw ferroniobium and on exports of products with a higher degree of technological transformation, such as superalloys, specialised oxides, or composite materials. This fiscal neutrality discourages domestic industrialisation of the niobium production chain, reducing the country to the role of global supplier of basic inputs without retaining added value domestically. Furthermore, the Compensação Financeira pela Exploração de Recursos Minerais (CFEM – Financial Compensation for the Exploitation of Mineral Resources), provided for in Article 20, §1 of the Federal Constitution, is applied uniformly, without selective criteria to reward projects incorporating innovation, sustainability, or value addition. Fiscal policy, as an instrument of public policy, is in this respect underutilised. There is an urgent need for extra-fiscal tax mechanisms, such as regressive rates for more highly processed products, incentives for the export of finished goods, and tax credit lines linked to niobium-based research, technical training, and energy transition projects. The current fiscal omission reinforces Brazil’s entrapment in a logic of dependent extractivism, incompatible with its geoeconomic potential. Despite Brazil’s growing international relevance as a niobium supplier — particularly to the United States, Japan, Germany, and China — the subject remains absent from the country’s foreign policy agenda and geopolitical strategy. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs has yet to structure a specialised mineral diplomacy, as countries like Canada, Australia, and India have done, nor does it use niobium as a bargaining instrument for geoeconomic advantage, scientific cooperation, or the development of technological partnerships. The absence of a “soft mineral power” strategy constitutes a squandered opportunity, especially as niobium’s centrality is set to increase in the era of renewable energy, microelectronics, and the aerospace industry. By failing to employ niobium as a bridge to integrate universities, innovation centres, and strategic alliances, Brazil forgoes legitimate international influence based on its unique mineral endowment. From the standpoint of International Relations and International Economic Law, the country remains peripheral despite being central to the supply of a critical resource. Formal sovereignty over subsoil resources does not translate into active geopolitical sovereignty — a paradox of significant strategic weight. The lack of a national niobium policy is, above all, symptomatic of profound institutional disarticulation, regulatory inertia, and a limited vision of Brazil’s role in the 21st century. Overcoming these barriers requires mobilising the instruments of Administrative, Fiscal, International, and Regulatory Law, combined with a new model of public mineral policy. Transforming niobium into an asset of sovereignty, innovation, and international prominence depends on the simultaneous adoption of five fronts: the creation of a specific legal framework; permanent interministerial coordination; sectoral fiscal reform; expansion of mineral diplomacy; and an industrial and scientific policy focused on value-added development. Final Considerations The consolidation of a National Niobium Policy in Brazil presupposes, above all, the recognition of this resource as an asset of national sovereignty, of inestimable geopolitical and technological value. Such a policy must be supported by a new legal framework that formally recognises niobium as a strategic mineral, granting it special legal status in light of the principles of Brazilian Administrative Law and Economic Law. This legislation should enable the State to act not only as a regulator but also as the coordinator of a public agenda focused on value creation, industrial innovation, and international recognition. Furthermore, it is essential to establish a public authority with the technical and legal expertise, international legitimacy, and executive capacity necessary to coordinate interministerial policies and formulate national guidelines for the governance of critical minerals. The tax system must be repositioned to shift from being merely a revenue-generating instrument to becoming an incentive instrument: fostering the domestic industrialisation of the niobium supply chain, rewarding local content, research, and vertical integration initiatives, and discouraging the simple export of raw alloys. Simultaneously, Brazil must launch a proactive mineral diplomacy that employs niobium as a vector for strategic insertion into global value chains in clean energy, defence, aerospace, microelectronics, and emerging technologies. This diplomacy must be underpinned by bilateral scientific cooperation agreements, technology security protocols, and multilateral initiatives positioning Brazil as a reliable and innovative supplier of critical raw materials. In the current international scenario, niobium is gaining centrality as a geopolitical asset in strategic negotiations between Brazil and the United States, particularly in light of the potential reconfiguration of United States foreign policy with Donald Trump’s return to power. Trump’s global project is essentially based on three pillars: national reindustrialisation, combating strategic dependence on rival powers (especially China), and reviewing international agreements that do not directly favour United States economic interests. This constitutes a doctrine of aggressive commercial nationalism, with a pronounced protectionist bias and a technocratic view of critical resources and sensitive production chains. In this context, niobium — a key input for advanced metal alloys, superconductors, defence technologies, and aerospace infrastructure — assumes the status of a priority raw material in the national security strategy of the United States. The country’s greatest vulnerability lies in its near-total dependence on Brazil for this mineral, given that its own reserves are insignificant and its strategic stocks limited. Trump’s potential re-election to the White House would intensify the United States’ focus on securing a stable, predictable, and politically reliable supply of niobium, thereby increasing Brazil’s bargaining power to an unprecedented degree. It is therefore imperative that Brazilian diplomacy avoid reactive and emotional responses, and instead adopt a cool, strategic, and technically informed posture, operating from the Executive Branch with interministerial coordination, and avoiding isolated protagonism by the Judiciary. The recent crisis involving decisions of the Supreme Federal Court that directly affected large American technology corporations (such as Google and Meta) has raised alarms in Washington about the legal and reputational risks of operating in Brazil. Although legitimate from the standpoint of jurisdictional sovereignty, such decisions generated institutional discomfort within the United States Department of State and provoked behind-the-scenes pressure in the United States Congress. The centrality of niobium, however, must be understood as part of a broader spectrum of strategic assets under the stewardship of the Brazilian State, whose mobilisation can strengthen Brazil’s position in negotiations with the United States. In short, it is evident that the Federal Executive Branch is not limited to niobium as the sole mineral asset capable of strategic mobilisation in relations with the United States. Brazil possesses a wider range of geoeconomic assets that can be deployed in bilateral negotiations. The ongoing crisis demands a coordinated approach at the diplomatic, political, and commercial levels, guided by strategic rationality and institutional coordination. It is implausible to suppose that Donald Trump criticised the Supreme Federal Court merely out of deference to Eduardo Bolsonaro or emotional ties to Jair Bolsonaro. The hallmark of Trump’s political conduct is pragmatism, and his foreign strategy has consistently been guided by the defence of the objective interests of American corporations. In this context, Brazilian court decisions directly affecting such companies — often perceived in the United States as arbitrary or incompatible with fundamental guarantees and human rights — came to be regarded as institutional affronts, thereby legitimising, in Trump’s view, an assertive posture towards the Brazilian Judiciary. This was one of the political strands underpinning Trump’s actions in exercising his sovereignty, particularly through the extraterritorial application of United States law — a recurring instrument of American foreign policy in the defence of its strategic and commercial interests. What Trump may fail to appreciate is that, within the Brazilian institutional framework, the Judiciary enjoys even greater independence and autonomy than is provided for in the North American system. Furthermore, decisions issued by the Supreme Federal Court are jurisdictional in nature and are not, under any circumstances, subject to the authority or responsibility of the Executive Branch, owing to the strict separation of powers enshrined in the 1988 Constitution. Accordingly, a clear distinction must be maintained in trade negotiations between impasses arising from the actions of the Judiciary and matters strictly related to bilateral economic relations. The Brazilian Judiciary is responsible for its own actions, including at the international level, although it may be institutionally assisted by the Office of the Attorney General in the exercise of its defence before other jurisdictions. However, relations and commercial ties between the two countries must proceed autonomously and in parallel, preserving their own logic and institutional continuity, regardless of any internal jurisdictional disputes that may occur within the Brazilian State. Given this context, Brazil must formulate structured, state-to-state negotiations with the United States, conducted with clarity as to the competing strategic interests, in order to safeguard its internal regulatory autonomy, preserve its central role in the global supply of niobium, avoid potential economic retaliation, and ideally transform this resource into a vector for diplomatic détente and economic reconfiguration within the framework of the new United States industrial policy. This is not a matter of subservience, but of geostrategic intelligence: by accurately identifying the United States’ core objectives — such as secure access to critical raw materials, diversification of supply chains, and revitalisation of its industrial base — Brazil positions itself as an indispensable partner. In return, it can seek political space, technology transfer, co-production agreements, and reinforcement of its standing as a geoeconomic power in the Global South. The Brazilian Government cannot be held responsible for the acts of another sovereign state, much less for those of an entire population. The Office of the Attorney General defends this prerogative by representing the political agents of the Brazilian Judiciary against potential interference by a foreign court in their functional autonomy. However, this institutional defence — also exercised pursuant to Article 131 of the Federal Constitution and Article 22 of Law No. 9,028/95 — is not necessarily a political component of trade negotiations between the two countries, despite appearing to be so in Trump’s view[26]. If it is true that Brazil, through the Supreme Federal Court, has exercised its sovereign powers, it is equally true that the United States, through its Executive Branch, when applying the Executive Order Addressing Threats to the United States by the Government of Brazil, would also be exercising its sovereign powers, insofar as it applies a law approved by its National Congress and within its domestic jurisdiction, with transnational, economic, technological, and financial repercussions[27]. There can be little doubt that the underlying political motivation for Trump’s actions was not the result of manipulation by the Bolsonaro family — and even less by Eduardo Bolsonaro — but rather politically calculated decisions based on the transnational effects of Supreme Federal Court rulings on the economic interests of major United States companies of substantial social and political significance in that country. In my work Administrative Sanctioning Law[28], now in its 10th edition and present in the publishing market for 25 years, I had the opportunity to comment on certain decisions of the Supreme Federal Court of Brazil, under the rapporteurship of Justice Alexandre de Moraes, in cases involving the convictions of individuals who had been at the encampment in front of the Court on 8 January 2024. In the decisions I examined, I observed that there had been violations of human rights, as strict (objective) criminal liability was applied. A statistical study would be necessary on the number of decisions issued in the same vein and following the same pattern: absence of individualisation of conduct, imposition of objective liability for the mere fact of having camped in front of the Supreme Federal Court, and a presumption of responsibility for an anti-democratic act. There have also been statements and protests in Brazil from numerous institutions, including the Brazilian Bar Association itself, against the arbitrariness committed in the so-called “fake news inquiry” and against the violation of professional prerogatives and restrictions on rights of defence. However, there are no statistical studies demonstrating or proving a systemic erosion of human rights stemming from these decisions. The political rationale underpinning United States tension and interventionism must be correctly identified. To what extent has the Supreme Federal Court of Brazil become a global legal risk to the human rights protected by the United States? In this context, it is clear that this discussion takes on its own contours, and that the role of the Office of the Attorney General is to defend, in legal terms, the justices of the Supreme Federal Court and any other political agents affected by foreign jurisdiction as a result of official acts performed in office. Nevertheless, the allegation that such acts violated the human and fundamental rights of American companies — or even those of Brazilian citizens — must be debated in the appropriate forum, and cannot, and should not, be conflated with trade negotiations concerning relations between the two countries and the interests of their respective peoples. It is also pertinent to recall the recent decision of the Supreme Federal Court in Petição No. 14.129, in which Justice of the Supreme Federal Court, Alexandre de Moraes ordered the preventive detention of former President Jair Messias Bolsonaro for persistent non-compliance with court-imposed precautionary measures. The ruling established that Bolsonaro had repeatedly and wilfully circumvented restrictions — including the prohibition on using social media directly or through third parties — by orchestrating and participating in public communications designed to undermine the authority of the Court and to interfere unlawfully in ongoing judicial proceedings. The decision, grounded in the need to protect the integrity of criminal investigations and to safeguard national sovereignty from coordinated attempts to destabilise Brazilian institutions, underscores that judicial determinations of this nature are matters of domestic legal order, immune to external political bargaining. As such, they must be understood as the exercise of Brazil’s sovereign jurisdiction, entirely distinct from — and not to be conflated with — the negotiation of economic or diplomatic agreements. References NATIONAL MINING AGENCY (Brazil). Niobium: Brazilian mineral summary 2024: base year 2023. Brasília: ANM, 2024. 2 p. Available at: https://www.gov.br/anm/pt-br/assuntos/economia-mineral/publicacoes/sumario-mineral/sumario-mineral-brasileiro-2024/niobio-2024-ano-base-2023.pdf. Accessed on: 31 July 2025. AMARAL, Thiago de Souza; CARBONI, Marcelo Carboneri; SCOTTI, Américo. Evaluation of the application of a welding atlas for a niobium microalloyed bainitic steel. Welding & Inspection, São Paulo, v. 22, n. 2, p. 163–173, 2017. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1590/0104-9224/SI2202.06. ARGUS MEDIA. Niobec’s FeNb production continues despite strike. Argus Metals, 14 May 2025. Available at: https://www.argusmedia.com/metals-platform/newsandanalysis/article/2688344-Niobec-s-FeNb-production-continues-despite-strike. Accessed on: 31 July 2025. BRAZIL. Constitution of the Federative Republic of Brazil of 1988. Brasília, 5 October 1988. Available at: https://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/constituicao/constituicao.htm. Accessed on: 3 August 2025. BRAZIL. Law No. 9,028 of 12 April 1995. Establishes the exercise of the institutional powers of the Attorney General’s Office, on an emergency and provisional basis, and contains other measures. Compiled text. Presidency of the Republic, Civil House, Deputy Chief of Staff for Legal Affairs. Brasília, 12 April 1995. Available at: https://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/LEIS/L9028.htm. Accessed on: 3 August 2025. CMOC BRAZIL. Business – Niobium. CMOC Brazil, 2024. Available at: https://cmocbrasil.com/en/negocios/niobio. Accessed on: 31 July 2025. BRAZILIAN COMPANY OF METALLURGY AND MINING (CBMM). Niobium technology is highlighted in battery development. Araxá: CBMM, 12 April 2024. Available at: https://cbmm.com/pt/midias/noticias/niobio-baterias-tecnologia. Accessed on: 31 July 2025. BRAZILIAN COMMUNICATIONS COMPANY (EBC). Brazil is the main player in the global niobium market. Brasília: EBC, 2023 (published in November 2023). Available at: https://agenciagov.ebc.com.br/noticias/202311/brasil-eo-principal-agente-no-mercado-mundial-de-niobio. Accessed on: 31 July 2025. BRAZILIAN COMPANY FOR INDUSTRIAL RESEARCH AND INNOVATION (EMBRAPII); CENTRE FOR MANAGEMENT AND STRATEGIC STUDIES (CGEE). Technological radar: technologies with niobium. Brasília: DIESP/CGEE, Jan. 2023. 53 p. Revised edition with executive summary. UNITED STATES. Executive Order: Addressing Threats to the United States by the Government of Brazil. Washington, DC: The White House, 30 July 2025. Available at: https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/2025/07/addressing-threats-to-the-us/. Accessed on: 3 August 2025. ÍGNEA – GEOLOGY AND ENVIRONMENT. Strategic Minerals Policy: A Comprehensive and Detailed Guide. Brasília: Ígnea, 9 April 2025. Available at: https://www.igneabr.com.br/en/noticias/general-laws-and-rules/strategic-minerals-policy-a-comprehensive-and-detailed-guide/. Accessed on: 31 July 2025. BRAZILIAN MINING INSTITUTE (IBRAM). Brazil rejects nuclear fusion project offer due to niobium. Brasília: IBRAM, 11 July 2023. Available at: https://ibram.org.br/noticia/niobio-brasil-recusa-oferta-para-projeto-de-fusao-nuclear/. Accessed on: 31 July 2025. BRAZILIAN MINING INSTITUTE (IBRAM). CBMM postpones expansion project. Brasília: IBRAM, 28 July 2009. Available at: https://ibram.org.br/noticia/cbmm-adia-projeto-de-expansao/. Accessed on: 31 July 2025. BRAZILIAN MINING INSTITUTE (IBRAM). Niobium dependence is a cause for concern in Washington. Brasília: IBRAM, 11 March 2011. Available at: https://ibram.org.br/noticia/dependencia-de-niobio-e-causa-de-preocupacao-de-washington/. Accessed on: 31 July 2025. BRAZILIAN MINING INSTITUTE (IBRAM). IBRAM and the U.S. Embassy discuss cooperation in the area of critical and strategic minerals. Brasília: IBRAM, 17 July 2025. Available at: https://www.ibram.org.br/noticia/ibram-e-embaixada-dos-eua-discutem-cooperacao-na-area-de-minerais-criticos-e-estrategicos/. Accessed on: 31 July 2025. MA, Xiaoping; ZHOU, Cheng; WANG, Lijun; LIU, Chunming; SUBRAMANIAN, Sundaresa; OLIVEIRA, Mariana Perez de. Role of Nb in 13Cr super-martensitic stainless steel. REM: Revista Escola de Minas, Ouro Preto, v. 66, n. 2, p. 179–185, Apr./Jun. 2013. Available at: https://www.scielo.br/j/rem/a/dcSNBbYRbBbp4gGbmCZcxDM/?lang=en. Accessed on: 31 July 2025. SUSTAINABLE MINING. Critical and strategic minerals: the foundation of Brazil’s sustainable future. Brasília: Mineração Sustentável, 26 May 2025. Available at: https://mineracaosustentavel.org.br/minerais-criticos-e-estrategicos-a-base-do-futuro-sustentavel-do-brasil/. Accessed on: 31 July 2025. NIOBIUM CANADA. Who mines niobium? Canada: Niobium Canada, 2023. Available at: https://niobiumcanada.com/who-mines-niobium/. Accessed on: 31 July 2025. NIOCORP DEVELOPMENTS LTD. Elk Creek Project. NioCorp, 2025. Available at: https://

Fundamental Right to Understanding Public Decisions

 Consolidating the pact between technology, education, and transparency is urgent; the State cannot hide within its own data. An analysis of the consolidation of precedent theory in Brazil, considering the innovations introduced by the 2015 Code of Civil Procedure (CPC), reveals a significant moment in the quest for predictability and rationality within the judicial system. Since this milestone, judicial decisions have gained binding force, becoming fundamental references for both administrative bodies and the courts. This not only implies institutional deference but also demands a robust organisational structure, firmly anchored in memory and transparency. The challenge ahead extends beyond the legal field, encompassing structural aspects. The effectiveness of the precedent system requires the State, across its various spheres and bodies, to establish legal databases capable of storing, classifying, interpreting, and interconnecting a broad array of decisions, agreements, and normative expressions. This necessity is not confined to the Judiciary alone; it equally involves regulatory agencies, audit courts, the Public Prosecutor’s Office, and administrative bodies responsible for decisions of legal significance. However, it is crucial to recognise that the administrative sphere represents the weakest link in Brazil’s institutional chain. Despite significant initiatives within the Brazilian Judiciary, the reality demonstrates that the vast majority of public institutions still lack databases that are structured, auditable, and semantically organised. Consequently, administrative decisions, disciplinary proceedings, judicial and extrajudicial agreements, as well as contracts and the entire universe of disciplinary and sanctioning jurisprudence, remain scattered and fragmented, hindering access to institutional memory, which should guide the State’s actions. In this context, the role of algorithms is fundamental. Currently, organising precedents depends on systems using legal, semantic, and statistical parameters. Implementing algorithms to categorise them requires a solid normative basis, technical curation, and a data structure that can be audited. Without these prerequisites, there is a risk that repetition will prevail over coherence, making automation a threat to the very essence of judicial reasoning. The scope of statistics must be understood in the context of AI’s impact. Statistics can be classified by different parameters. For reference, one may speak of inferential, predictive, diagnostic, multivariate, frequentist, Bayesian, non-parametric, jurimetrics, forensic, social, political, educational, descriptive, explanatory, high-dimensional statistics, and multiple variations, according to the discipline applied—such as biostatistics, psychometrics, computational statistics, and so forth. In other words, legal databases also serve statistical research, integrated with AI, to derive developments in various other areas and public policies. It is known that normative decisions impact the economy and public policies across numerous other spheres of society as a whole. In this regard, the interpretation of law is necessarily transdisciplinary and is not limited merely to the economic analysis of law. Organising precedents, therefore, ensures the right to understanding (the right to understand public decisions arises from fundamental rights enshrined in Articles 37 (head), 51 (item 14), 5 (item 60), and 1 (item 3) of the Constitution). Each individual, whether a natural or legal person, has the right to understand the criteria underpinning the public decisions affecting them. This fundamental right to comprehension is intrinsically linked to transparency, traceability, and institutional legitimacy and is realised only when decisions are intelligible, auditable, and consistent with consolidated jurisprudence. Without well-structured legal databases, there are no real precedents—only a disordered accumulation of decisions. And where accumulation exists, noise, inequalities, and arbitrariness arise, compromising justice and the system’s effectiveness. A structured legal database functions as a digital platform capable of storing, classifying, and correlating administrative and judicial decisions, norms, agreements, and regulatory documents. This organisation must follow clearly defined legal criteria, with rigorous classifications ensuring traceability and version control. Beyond mere preservation, the database must guarantee institutional coherence, facilitate intelligent searches, consistent interpretations, and decisions aligned with the historical jurisprudence of institutions and precedent systems. In this context, legal databases constitute genuine living ecosystems, continually fed by normative and decisional indexing based on algorithmic logics, metadata, discursive hierarchies, and pre-established patterns. Contemporary statistics, in its multiple facets, performs critical roles, offering causal and algorithmic effectiveness with profound impacts on the institutional interpretation of mapped and indexed norms and decisions. One cannot overlook that statistical functions, integrated within databases, facilitate numerous functionalities in comprehending how certain decisions consolidate into normative standards and their subsequent societal consequences and impacts, including deviations, dysfunctions, underlying hermeneutic currents, and numerous subjective or objective pathologies inherent to decision-making or algorithmic phenomena. AI, in turn, operates in conjunction with contemporary statistics to facilitate advanced, rapid analyses derived from massive datasets. AI also plays varied roles based fundamentally on statistics, though its functions are distinct and integrated within this domain, provided they maintain auditable and rationally traceable premises. Technology, at this juncture, will deeply impact classification models based on the language of precedents, argumentative similarities, prevailing legal grounds, recognition of argumentative and normative patterns within decisions, detection of frequent contradictions, inconsistencies, essential coherences, predictive models, and a vast series of patterns aimed at ensuring predictability, legal certainty, and efficiency within the normative system. In an era of transparency and complexity, the right to understand public decisions emerges as a fundamental right derived from the principle prohibiting arbitrariness by public powers, inherent in the substantial due legal process (Article 5, item 54, of the Brazilian Constitution). Publishing decisions in official gazettes is insufficient, as these instruments do not allow substantial access to transparency regarding the full set of decisions that constitute the norms embodied in precedents. On the other hand, judicial databases are also inadequate, as they do not ensure interconnection with other branches of government nor the effective efficacy of precedents throughout the Brazilian State. Furthermore, the formation of precedents itself demands cultural strengthening among public and private actors in decision-making processes, involving deeper transformations in Brazilian education and research on jurisprudential production as a whole. Thus, it is urgent for legal education institutions, judicial academies, Public Prosecutor’s Office training programmes, Public Defenders’ offices, law firms, and education overall, as well as the Ministry of Education itself, to integrate precedent theory as a central curricular vector—indeed as a standalone discipline rather than an appendix to Civil Procedure Law. Brazil must abandon fragmentary interpretation and cultivate a legal culture rooted in institutional memory, argumentative coherence, and collective responsibility. To achieve this, AI must be incorporated into legal curricula, not merely as a technological novelty but as a tool promoting the rational organisation of law, grounded in ethical, epistemological, and normative principles, acting as an aid to human intelligence and ensuring auditability. Precedent theory must not only be applied but taught, debated, and systematised. To consolidate it, material improvements alone are insufficient: a cultural transformation is required. Structured legal databases must move beyond governmental tools to become platforms for teaching, research, and critical reconstruction of decision-making practices. Recognising the right to comprehensible information allows the country to develop a robust, ethical, and inclusive public transparency policy. This construction demands more than adopting new technologies; it requires curation, training, and a genuine willingness to listen and reflect. Without this awareness, precedents become empty, decisions become isolated, and access to justice becomes an opaque normative labyrinth. Consolidating the pact between technology, education, and transparency is urgent. The State cannot hide within its own data; it must organise, explain, and share them—that is the essence of institutional legitimacy in the 21st century. In this sense, it is crucial to acknowledge that access to justice begins with access to the logic of decisions—comprehensible only when organised in public, coherent, and accessible databases, and taught from the outset. Promoting a culture of precedents thus becomes a public policy aimed at institutional integrity. Without this foundation, rights remain unattainable and justice incomprehensible.

Global Magnitsky Act: domestic law, transnational effects, and what it reveals about law and power

Partner at Medina Osório Advogados. PhD in Administrative Law from the Complutense University of Madrid, Spain. Master’s in Public Law from the Federal University of Rio Grande do Sul (UFRGS). Former Attorney General of Brazil. Chair of the Special Commission on Administrative Sanctioning Law at the Brazilian Bar Association (OAB). President of the International Institute for Studies of State Law (IIEDE). When accountability fails where it should prevail, the system once again asks whose side the law is on. In 2009, the lawyer Sergei Magnitsky exposed a fraud scheme and died in state custody in Russia. No effective domestic response followed; nor did international mechanisms offer a real remedy. In 2012, the United States Congress enacted an initial act focused on the Russian case; in 2016, faced with the repetition of this pattern of impunity, it broadened the scope and established a general regime: the Global Magnitsky Human Rights Accountability Act. Within US jurisdiction, the Act authorises personal sanctions—asset freezes and visa restrictions—against foreign individuals and entities for significant corruption or serious human rights abuses. In practice, the machinery is administrative: the Department of State and the Department of the Treasury/OFAC conduct designations, and since 2017 Executive Order 13818 (issued under the IEEPA) has structured the regime’s day-to-day operation and listings on the Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons (SDN) List. This is not an international instrument; its effects cross borders by virtue of the dollar’s weight, correspondent-banking networks, and US-regulated technology infrastructure. One should not, however, attribute the Act’s transnational efficacy solely to the dollar’s gravitational pull. The role of the SWIFT system—the backbone of international financial messaging—must also be considered. Although headquartered in Belgium, SWIFT is, in practice, subject to regulatory and political pressures exerted by Washington and Brussels, effectively making it a technical arm of sanctions. The experience of sanctions on Iran showed that exclusion from this network amounts to a form of de facto economic interdiction, cutting off access to global trade flows. Thus, even though the Magnitsky text does not expressly mention it, the Act’s reach is projected over this ecosystem because financial institutions, wary of retaliation, adjust their conduct in advance so as not to jeopardise their continued presence in such a vital network. The legal design is straightforward—and therefore effective. Designation triggers the blocking of assets within US reach, a prohibition on transactions with “U.S. persons”, and restrictions on mobility. The typical targets are non-US nationals—public officials, corporate leaders, organisations. As a large share of global operations settle in USD or touch systems governed by US rules, banks and companies in other countries adapt their behaviour to preserve access to the dollar system and the US market; wherever there is a US nexus (USD settlement, the involvement of a “U.S. person”, or the facilitation of a breach), non-compliance exposes actors to significant fines and, in commercial-regulatory terms, to the risk that dollar correspondents will be lost at counterparties’ discretion (de-risking). On the immigration front, visa restrictions may also be imposed under a parallel statutory basis (§ 7031(c) of the Department of State appropriations acts). Another salient point lies in the limits of judicial control over such designations. Although there is a formal possibility of recourse to US courts, experience shows that the D.C. Circuit adopts a posture of marked deference to the Executive, especially when national security and foreign policy are invoked. The result is a narrow scope for judicial review, in which substantive challenges to sanctions rarely succeed. In this setting, the administrative route of delisting before OFAC becomes, in practice, the only realistic hope of reversal—underscoring the asymmetry between the magnitude of the effects and the scarcity of effective procedural safeguards. It should be emphasised that breaches of Global Magnitsky designations are not confined to commercial repercussions. Under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA), US law provides for administrative and criminal penalties against financial institutions that, even through negligence, facilitate prohibited transactions. Multibillion-dollar fines have been imposed in analogous cases, hitting global banks that violated embargoes on sanctioned countries. Beyond monetary penalties, the greater risk is exclusion from the US market—the core of the international financial system. That scenario turns legal risk into existential risk: a bank unable to access the dollar system will struggle to survive. Liability is not limited to deliberate conduct. The sanctions regime admits attribution for “facilitation”, an open-textured concept encompassing any act that makes it possible, even indirectly, to carry out transactions with designated parties. Thus, the simple settlement of an operation that passes through a US institution, or the use of technology hosted on servers in the United States, may suffice to trigger the law’s application. This interpretive elasticity greatly expands the exposure of foreign financial institutions, which often do not perceive the hidden links that render their transactions reachable by OFAC’s extraterritorial arm. We should be clear about what is at stake. Magnitsky does not export a universal concept of human rights; it enacts, in domestic law, the United States’ legal and political interpretation of “serious violations” and “significant corruption”, and projects that reading through its economic and technological power. The same instrument that protects rights also operates as a lever of foreign policy—indeed, of legal hegemony. Law and power march together; recognising this refines—rather than weakens—the debate. The model has not been confined to Washington. Other jurisdictions have adopted their own regimes—Canada (2017), with the Justice for Victims of Corrupt Foreign Officials Act, and the European Union (2020), with its global human rights sanctions regime (Council Decision (CFSP) 2020/1999 and Regulation (EU) 2020/1998). The common denominator is targeted, name-specific sanctions—focused on natural and legal persons, not countries—with asset and mobility consequences that become effective because the world largely operates on infrastructure connected to the US. Real risks exist: political selectivity in the choice of targets, opaque criteria, and the erosion of procedural safeguards. The regime’s legitimacy depends on public and verifiable criteria, due administrative process with effective avenues of challenge (including delisting petitions to OFAC and, where applicable, judicial review under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA)), and independent institutional oversight. Without that, sanctions become a shortcut to arbitrariness; with it, the message is unambiguous: serious violations carry concrete consequences, within the bounds of legality. The debate that matters in Brazil is not outsourcing parameters to foreign jurisdictions, but strengthening our own. The Constitution enshrines the primacy of human rights in international relations (Article 4(II) of the Brazilian Federal Constitution). To discuss an analogous regime—with objective criteria, publicity of decisions, and opportunities for defence and review—is to discuss coherence between what is written and what is delivered. In an environment where finance, technology and compliance produce de facto transnational reach, sovereignty is also exercised through clear, stable and predictable rules. Thus, legal risks for financial institutions are not confined to regulatory compliance; they extend to institutional viability itself. Magnitsky sanctions have become a driver for the reorganisation of global banking conduct, forcing foreign institutions to choose between fidelity to their domestic legal order and pragmatic adherence to US norms. The room for neutrality is ever narrower: when in doubt, banks opt for over-compliance, abandoning legitimate clients and operations to preserve access to the international financial system. Here, law blends with power—and legal risk takes on the features of systemic risk. The Magnitsky Act achieved global reach not because it is “the law of the world”, but because a significant part of the world operates on US-centred infrastructure. Acknowledging this dual nature—humanitarian and geopolitical—does not relieve us of the need to choose parameters; it compels us to demand criteria, safeguards and institutional responsibility in the application of any regime. Where there is a serious violation, there should be a sanction—with clear rules, oversight and a commitment to legality—so that justice and power are not conflated. More broadly, in the global arena, no nation is beyond accountability to others; international relations imply transparency, reciprocity and a ban on arbitrariness by public authorities. To some extent, although there is neither a truly universal conception of human rights nor even a universal concept of corruption—and while there is no doubt about US global hegemony and China’s rise—it is impossible to ignore the growing importance of international public opinion and of certain ethical standards of integrity demanded in the observance of human rights by contemporary civilised nations. In this context, given countries’ economic, technological and commercial interdependence, the concept of sovereignty has become ever more complex and exposed to international politics and diplomacy. It is precisely in this new environment that legislation with transnational effects, enacted by sovereign powers, emerges and strengthens. Finally, it should be noted that Brazilian financial institutions occupy a structurally vulnerable position amid the conflict between national jurisdiction and the extraterritorial authority of the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC). Domestically, the recognition (homologação) of foreign decisions by the Superior Court of Justice (STJ) is a constitutionally indispensable requirement for property sanctions to take effect against individuals and companies located in Brazil. In the US legal system, however, OFAC—an agency subordinate to the Department of the Treasury and, ultimately, to the President—is not legally obliged to recognise or await that recognition procedure. OFAC’s structure empowers it to administer, supervise and impose financial sanctions immediately under the Global Magnitsky Act, applying them to all institutions that maintain direct or indirect links with the dollar financial system. This means that, even if Brazilian banks invoke a pending analysis before the STJ, OFAC has full discretion to accept or reject that justification—either treating it as a sign of respect for domestic due process or, conversely, as an unacceptable obstacle to the extraterritorial effectiveness of US law. To this equation one must add the spectre of so-called secondary sanctions, through which the Treasury threatens or restricts foreign banks and companies that, directly or indirectly, facilitate transactions for the benefit of designated parties. This is not just a loss of correspondents; it is the concrete possibility of exclusion from dollar payment networks and isolation from the international financial system. The mechanism operates as an indirect instrument of foreign policy, projecting onto third countries the need to conform to US directives on pain of economic marginalisation. The impact, for jurisdictions such as Brazil, is compulsory insertion into a zone of permanent tension between fidelity to the internal constitutional order and practical submission to the functional extraterritoriality imposed by OFAC. The gravity of the situation is heightened by the possibility of class actions in US courts. There are precedents in which victims of human rights violations have sought to hold banks liable for alleged complicity in indirectly financing sanctioned regimes. Even if such claims face evidential hurdles, the mere reputational and financial cost of litigating in US federal courts is a powerful deterrent. The logic is clear: non-compliance—or even the appearance of complacency—with designated parties can open flanks for complex litigation, compounding already severe administrative sanctions. This is, therefore, a field of tension between Brazilian constitutional sovereignty and the United States’ economic-normative power, in which banks are exposed to severe risks of secondary sanctions should OFAC choose not to recognise the authority of the Brazilian judiciary. Fábio Medina Osório

STF and Statute of Limitations in Administrative Improbity: what are the limits of interim relief?

Fábio Medina Osório Partner at Medina Osório Advogados. PhD in Administrative Law from the Complutense University of Madrid, Spain. Master’s in Public Law from the Federal University of Rio Grande do Sul (UFRGS). Former Attorney General of Brazil. President of the International Institute for Studies of State Law (IIEDE). Law No. 14,230 of 25 October 2021 introduced a wide-ranging reform of Law No. 8,429/1992, known as the Administrative Improbity Law. Among the most significant changes are the requirement of specific intent (dolo específico) for the configuration of acts of improbity, the possibility of civil non-prosecution agreements, the redefinition of sanctioning hypotheses and, above all, changes to the regime of limitation periods and statutes of limitations during proceedings (prescrição intercorrente). In response to these changes, the National Association of Members of the Public Prosecutor’s Office (CONAMP) filed Direct Action of Unconstitutionality (ADI) No. 7,236, accompanied by a request for interim relief, alleging that various provisions of the reform violated constitutional principles such as administrative morality, proportionality, legal certainty and the very institutional mission of the Public Prosecutor’s Office. The issue quickly gained prominence before the Federal Supreme Court (STF). On 27 December 2022, Justice Alexandre de Moraes, the rapporteur, partially granted the injunction, ad referendum of the Plenary, suspending provisions of the law relating to prescription. This was followed, on 16 May 2024, by a complementary vote in plenary and, on 23 September 2025, by a new ex officio interim decision, motivated by the alleged imminent risk of mass expiry of actions for improbity. The object of ADI 7,236 fell upon Article 2 of Law No. 14,230/2021, insofar as it amended several provisions of the Administrative Improbity Law. Of these, Article 23, § 5 drew particular attention: it provided that, once the limitation period was interrupted, the deadline would resume at half the original time, that is, only four years. CONAMP argued that this rule was incompatible with the reality of Brazilian civil procedure, in which complex actions take, on average, almost five years to be processed in each instance, which would render accountability for acts of improbity impracticable. The analysis of interim relief in ADI 7,236 reveals three successive moments in which the Supreme Court sought to balance the risks posed by the immediate application of the reform. In the first decision, on 27 December 2022, the rapporteur partially granted the injunction, recognising fumus boni iuris and periculum in mora only in relation to prescription. The provisions dealing with limitation periods and statutes of limitations during proceedings were therefore suspended, while the other requests were denied. On 16 May 2024, Moraes delivered a vote in Plenary declaring the partial nullity, with reduction of text, of Article 23, § 5, in order to exclude the expression that halved the limitation period. The aim was to prevent the eight-year period, after interruption, from being reduced to four. The judgment, however, was suspended by requests for review from Justices Gilmar Mendes and Edson Fachin. Finally, on 23 September 2025, in view of reports that more than eight thousand improbity actions could become time-barred within weeks, the rapporteur ex officio supplemented the interim relief. He reiterated that the regime of prescription during proceedings undermined the effectiveness of the law and once again suspended the validity of the expression that reduced the period. The rapporteur’s decisions were based on some central grounds. The plausibility of the argument that the reduction of the deadline weakened the constitutional protection of probity (Article 37, caput and § 4 of the Constitution) was emphasised. Also highlighted were the concrete risk of the mass extinction of ongoing proceedings, the incompatibility of the reduced period with the complexity of improbity actions — which require extensive evidentiary proceedings and adversarial debate — and the consistency of the measure with STF precedents, such as ARE 843.989-RG, which recognised the imprescriptibility of claims for damages to the Treasury caused by intentional acts. Although correct in identifying the danger of generalised prescription, the interim relief may be criticised for its premature character. The immediate suspension of § 5, since 2022, eliminated the effectiveness of the provision at once, without considering alternatives such as modulating effects on the basis of concrete cases of prescription. An intermediate solution would have allowed at least partial preservation of the legislative intent to expedite proceedings. On the other hand, the complementary measures of 2024 and 2025 show the STF’s attention to the practical realities of the judiciary. Data presented by state Public Prosecutors’ Offices indicated that application of the rule would result in the limitation of thousands of actions. The Court’s action, in this context, illustrates its role as guardian of constitutional effectiveness, adjusting the legal text to bring it into line with the republican principle and administrative morality. Nevertheless, within the scope of interim relief, the injunction granted presents a serious problem, namely that it empties the Plenary of its jurisdictional competence. By granting relief before the lapse of the time required for a possible prescription, the rapporteur in fact prevented the impugned provision from taking effect and emptied the substance of the main action. In this sense, it would have sufficed to grant the injunction one day after the lapse of the statutory deadline and thereafter submit the matter to the scrutiny of the Plenary. The trajectory of ADI 7,236/DF reveals how the Supreme Court progressively intervened, between 2022 and 2025, to set aside the effects of the rules on prescription introduced by Law No. 14,230/2021. The focus was on Article 23, § 5, whose provision for reducing the period, after interruption, could prematurely extinguish thousands of actions for improbity. The strongest argument for intervention lies in the risk of prescription without inertia on the part of the claimant. In lengthy and complex proceedings, the punitive claim could be extinguished even where the Public Prosecutor’s Office or the legitimate public entity had acted diligently, contrary to the very logic of prescription in Brazilian law, which has always been linked to procedural inactivity. Even so, less drastic solutions could have been envisaged, such as making the reduction of the deadline conditional upon proof of the claimant’s inertia, thereby preserving the legislative intent of conferring greater speed on proceedings. The Supreme Court’s monocratic decision, in suspending a legal provision dependent upon the passage of a specific period of time, opens the door to criticism of possible premature interference in the normative framework, since the effectiveness of this provision would still depend upon the occurrence of a factual condition. Ultimately, the interim relief in ADI 7,236 highlights the classic dilemma of constitutional review: protecting administrative probity and ensuring the effectiveness of the accountability system, but at the cost of straining legislative autonomy and the separation of powers. In this context, an injunction cannot be granted in such a way that it empties the very content of the direct action of unconstitutionality, depriving the Plenary of its decision-making competence.

NO FACTS, NO FORUM: CONVICTED SOLELY FOR BEING AT THE 8 JANUARY ENCAMPMENT

    I.        INTRODUCTION In this essay, I propose to develop critical reflections on Criminal Case No. 1,666/DF, adjudicated by the Supreme Federal Court, with Justice Alexandre de Moraes acting as the reporting Justice, in a judgment delivered by that Court’s Full Bench. This is a paradigmatic case in which not only the conduct imputed to the accused is at issue, but also the limits of the exercise of the State’s punitive power in a democratic regime. The subject is all the more sensitive as it lies within the broader context of criminal proceedings linked to the so-called Inquiry No. 4,781, the “Fake News” inquiry, and Inquiry No. 4,874, on “digital militias”, both established as derivative inquiries of an investigative line aimed at confronting attacks against institutions. It is also connected to the specific inquiries into the anti-democratic acts of 8 January 2023, notably Nos. 4,917, 4,918, 4,919, 4,920, 4,921, 4,922 and 4,923/DF, instituted to investigate crimes such as criminal association, incitement to crime, the violent abolition of the Democratic Rule of Law and coup d’état. Not by chance, many of the individuals involved — often conflated with one another — ended up being labelled “coup-plotters”, although countless among them were convicted of different offences. It should be recorded at the outset that, on an academic plane, a critical view of the jurisprudence adopted by the Supreme Federal Court in no way signifies ignoring that institution’s relevance and dignity for Brazilian democracy, nor does it entail disregarding its essential role in preserving the Rule of Law. Quite the contrary: it falls to that very Supreme Federal Court to ensure and guarantee, in Brazil, the freedom to criticise judicial decisions as a legitimate expression of democratic pluralism[1]. The defendant, Joel Muru Chagas Machado, a self-employed professional, was convicted, in a 2024 sitting, in a real concurrence of crimes, of criminal association (Article 288, caput, of the Penal Code) and of inciting animosity between the Armed Forces and the Branches of the Republic (Article 286, sole paragraph, of the Penal Code). The sentence imposed consisted of one (1) year’s imprisonment, substituted by community-based penalties, together with twenty (20) day-fines, each unit being fixed at half the minimum wage in force at the time of the facts. In addition, payment of R$ 5,000,000.00 (five million reais) was set as compensation for collective moral damages, to be fulfilled jointly and severally with the other defendants convicted in criminal cases related to the events of 8 January 2023[2]. The scope of this article is strictly limited to the leading opinion of Justice Alexandre de Moraes, which prevailed as the ground of the conviction before the Full Bench. Thus, it is not my intention to revisit the entire case file or the dissenting opinions, but rather to examine critically the arguments set out in the majority opinion. The analysis seeks to verify whether the conviction of Joel Muru Chagas Machado, as grounded in the reasoning set forth in the judgment assessed herein, is compatible with the constitutional principles of legality, typicity, culpability, subjective criminal liability, and the individualisation of criminal conduct — all enshrined in the 1988 Constitution and consolidated in the Supreme Federal Court’s traditional jurisprudence and in the case law of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, as will be observed in the course of this work. Moreover, these constitutional principles are intrinsically connected to fundamental rights — human dignity, due process of law (in both its procedural and substantive dimensions), and the offence-based criminal law model — civilisational achievements inherent to the Democratic Rule of Law.   II.        JURISDICTION OF THE SUPREME FEDERAL COURT AND THE FORUM PRIVILEGE Article 102, item I, subparagraph (b), of the 1988 Federal Constitution provides that it falls within the original jurisdiction of the Supreme Federal Court to hear and judge, in common criminal offences, the President of the Republic, the Vice-President, members of the National Congress and other authorities therein listed. This is the so-called forum privilege, an institution which, far from constituting a personal prerogative, serves to protect the office institutionally, ensuring that certain functions of high national relevance are adjudicated by the country’s highest court. It should be noted, however, that although the constitutional text does not restrict the privilege to crimes committed in the exercise of, or in relation to, the office, the Supreme Federal Court, in Criminal Case (Ação Penal) 937 – Question of Order (2018), settled the understanding that forum privilege is limited to offences perpetrated during the tenure of office and related to the office-holder’s official duties. It should further be clarified that individuals without forum privilege may be tried jointly with those who enjoy it, provided that the indictment and, above all, the conviction judgment demonstrate the connection between the crimes imputed to the privileged agent and to the co-defendant who lacks such privilege, pursuant to Supreme Federal Court Súmula (Precedent) 704. In that sense, the institutes of joinder by continence (Article 77 of the Code of Criminal Procedure) and by connection (Article 76 of the Code of Criminal Procedure) must be duly evidenced in the accusatory pleading and in the judicial decision, so as to legitimise the attraction of jurisdiction to the Supreme Federal Court. The Supreme Federal Court itself has already established that the consolidation of proceedings by connection or continence cannot be presumed; concrete evidential grounds are required to demonstrate the nexus between the conducts. Such was the holding, for example, of Justice Joaquim Barbosa in Criminal Case 470, in which 38 defendants were prosecuted for active corruption, passive corruption, embezzlement, money laundering, conspiracy, unlawful remittance of funds abroad and fraudulent management of a financial institution. On that occasion, the Court underscored the understanding crystallised in Súmula 704 of the Supreme Federal Court to the effect that “the attraction, on account of continence or connection, of a co-defendant’s case to the forum privilege of one of the accused does not violate the guarantees of the natural judge, of full defence, or of due process of law.” Likewise, in AP 937 – Question of Order (2018), reported by Justice Luís Roberto Barroso, in which an indictment for passive corruption against a federal parliamentarian was under scrutiny, the Court fixed the following theses: “(i) Forum privilege applies only to crimes committed during the exercise of the office and related to the functions performed; and (ii) after the close of evidential proceedings, with publication of the order summoning the parties to file closing submissions, jurisdiction to hear and judge criminal actions shall no longer be affected by the office-holder coming to assume or to leave office, for whatever reason.” In Criminal Case No. 1,666/DF, Justice Alexandre de Moraes grounded the Supreme Federal Court’s jurisdiction not only on the gravity of the facts associated with the events of 8 January 2023, but also on the evidential connection with investigations already pending before the Court involving authorities possessing forum privilege. In his opinion, the Reporting Justice made express reference, inter alia, to Inquiry No. 4,781/DF (known as the “Fake News Inquiry”), in which federal parliamentarians are investigated for conduct related to the dissemination of hate speech, attacks on institutions and encouragement of anti-democratic acts. In this context, he named authorities with forum privilege, such as: Senator Flávio Bolsonaro; Federal Deputies Otoni de Paula, Cabo Júnior do Amaral, Carla Zambelli, Bia Kicis, Eduardo Bolsonaro, Filipe Barros, Luiz Phillipe de Orleans e Bragança, Guiga Peixoto and Eliéser Girão; as well as other parliamentarians mentioned in related inquiries, such as Carlos Jordy, Cabo Gilberto Silva and Gustavo Gayer. Thus, the Supreme Federal Court deemed that the actions of Joel Muru Chagas Machado, although not himself a holder of forum privilege, were intrinsically connected to the same factual and evidential context of those inquiries. For that reason, the attraction of the Supreme Federal Court’s jurisdiction was justified on the basis of Article 76, items II and III, of the Code of Criminal Procedure, thereby avoiding procedural fragmentation and the possibility of contradictory decisions. Notwithstanding, within the reasoning of the conviction judgment, there is no reference to any co-perpetration between the convicted defendant and parliamentarians or authorities possessing forum privilege, whether as regards the crime of criminal association (Article 288 of the Penal Code) or the crime of inciting animosity between the Armed Forces and the Branches of the Republic (Article 286, sole paragraph, of the Penal Code). Indeed, there is a descriptive lacuna that disconnects the defendant from any link with a privileged authority within the criminal sphere, such that, at the level of the accusatory and condemnatory narratives themselves, the Supreme Federal Court’s jurisdiction is emptied. As regards typicity, the crime of criminal association requires the description of a bond between the defendant and other determined persons, in a specific and concrete manner. Such an association cannot be conceived as an abstract, invisible entity devoid of any identification. To justify the Supreme Federal Court’s jurisdiction, the reasoning of the judgment should have pointed out, expressly, at least one authority with forum privilege as an integral member of the criminal association of which the defendant Joel Muru Chagas Machado was said to be part, as well as demonstrated how the bond between them, and with the other supposed associates, was formed. With respect to the crime of inciting animosity between the Armed Forces and the Branches of the Republic (Article 286, sole paragraph, of the Penal Code), the conviction likewise failed to describe the role of any authority holding forum privilege or that authority’s alleged protagonism as a co-perpetrator with the defendant. Consequently, it is not known whether Joel Muru Chagas Machado was incited by some authority to join the encampment, whether he himself incited the privileged authority to any criminal practice, or whether both acted jointly to incite the Armed Forces to hostility against the constituted Powers. This deficit becomes even more evident when the Supreme Federal Court’s jurisdiction is examined in the light of the institutes of connection and continence. Both are provided for in the Code of Criminal Procedure as hypotheses for consolidating proceedings, but they have distinct grounds: connection (Article 76 of the Code of Criminal Procedure) occurs when two or more offences bear between them an evidential, objective or subjective nexus such that the investigation of one influences that of the other; continence (Article 77 of the Code of Criminal Procedure) is verified when there is a concurrence of persons in the same offence or when several offences result from a single act, requiring joint judgment. The Supreme Federal Court’s case law establishes that consolidation by connection or continence is neither automatic nor presumed. Concrete demonstration in the indictment and in the conviction judgment is required, evidencing a factual or evidential bond that justifies the Court’s jurisdiction, as settled in Súmula 704. In AP 470, Justice Joaquim Barbosa emphasised that attraction of jurisdiction by connection presupposes clear reasoning as to the nexus between the co-defendants’ conduct. Likewise, in AP 937 – Question of Order (2018), reported by Justice Luís Roberto Barroso, the Court delimited that forum privilege is only maintained where there is a direct functional link between the crime and the privileged authority. In this context, it was incumbent upon the conviction judgment in AP No. 1,666/DF to make explicit what evidential connection or continence link would attract the Supreme Federal Court’s jurisdiction. The absence of a clear description on this point undermines the legitimacy of the jurisdiction invoked, for the generic gravity of the facts is insufficient: it is indispensable to demonstrate whether there was a concurrence of agents or evidential interdependence between the defendant and authorities with forum privilege. Furthermore, when one observes the reasoning contained in the opinion of the eminent Reporting Justice, Alexandre de Moraes, no concrete connection is apparent between acts allegedly committed by the defendant and any specific act attributed to the deputies named by the Reporting Justice when justifying the evidential connection — an aspect that is striking. Indeed, in the present case, there is not even an evidential or factual connection between the acts attributed to the convicted defendant and any acts committed by former President of the Republic Jair Bolsonaro — whose forum privilege was likewise recognised by the Supreme Federal Court, as is a matter of public knowledge — or by any other office-holder vested with forum privilege. In this regard, the forum privilege applicable to the accused in Criminal Case No. 1,666 remains without a logical explanation or evidential basis, inasmuch as no link was demonstrated between his conduct and any chain of command involving a figure clothed with forum privilege. It suffices to note that, in the structure of the alleged criminal association that the defendant supposedly joined, no ostensible participation by any person with forum privilege was described; that is, no connection between the defendant and a privileged figure was indicated. Accordingly, at least for the purpose of justifying the Supreme Federal Court’s jurisdiction in the specific hypothesis, the individualisation of conduct in co-perpetration between the defendant and a holder of forum privilege was emptied, such that the principle of the natural judge was impaired, in breach of Article 5, items XXXVII and LIII, of the Federal Constitution, which guarantee that there shall be no exceptional court or judge and that no one shall be prosecuted or sentenced save by the competent authority. III.        THE ASSIGNMENT OF THE “FAKE NEWS” INQUIRY TO JUSTICE ALEXANDRE DE MORAES The reasoning of Justice Alexandre de Moraes in Criminal Case No. 1,666/DF makes express reference to Inquiry No. 4,781/DF, known as the “Fake News Inquiry”, as one of the connecting bases that justify the Supreme Federal Court’s jurisdiction. The Reporting Justice recalls that this inquiry was not allocated by electronic random distribution, as ordinarily occurs in cases within the Court’s original jurisdiction. Its origin stems from a decision by the Presidency of the Supreme Federal Court, then held by Justice Dias Toffoli, who instituted the inquiry ex officio and assigned it to Justice Alexandre de Moraes for rapporteurship. That direct assignment, carried out in 2019, sought to provide a swift response to a set of attacks and false news that, in the Full Bench’s understanding, affected the honour of the Justices and the institution itself. Since then, Inquiry 4,781 has become a hub for investigations into attacks on democratic institutions, serving as the basis for the establishment of other related proceedings, such as Inquiry 4,874/DF (digital militias) and, subsequently, for the connection with the facts of 8 January 2023. By invoking this line of continuity, the Reporting Justice underscored that the Supreme Federal Court’s jurisdiction was already consolidated by the presence of authorities with forum privilege in Inquiry 4,781 and in inquiries connected to it. Thus, the criminal prosecution of individuals without such privilege — like Joel Muru Chagas Machado — would be justified by the attraction of jurisdiction provided for in Article 76, items II and III, of the Code of Criminal Procedure. This point, however, raises significant constitutional and conventional discussions. The absence of random distribution and the direction of the inquiry by the Presidency — albeit subsequently endorsed by a majority of the Full Bench — have been questioned from the standpoint of the principle of the natural judge (Article 5, item LIII, of the 1988 Federal Constitution) and of the case law of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights. IV.        THE INDIVIDUALISATION OF THE DEFENDANT’S CONDUCT In the opinion delivered, Justice Alexandre de Moraes set out the elements which, in his view, demonstrated Joel Muru Chagas Machado’s adherence to the criminal association and to the offence of incitement. The individualisation of the conduct was described along three axes: (i) the confession given in the police sphere, in which the defendant admits having travelled from Santa Maria/RS to Brasília on 8 January 2023, remaining at the encampment until being arrested on 9 January; (ii) the indirect corroboration of that confession by the behaviour of another 529 accused persons, who acknowledged the same conduct and entered into Non-Prosecution Agreements (ANPPs) with the Office of the Prosecutor General; (iii) the use of photographs to demonstrate the organised structure of the encampment in front of the Army Headquarters. It is noteworthy that the judgment does not record any seizure of weapons or illicit objects, the identification of a vehicle used by the defendant, or any signs of recruitment or leadership. The individual proof is restricted to the extra-judicial confession, corroborated by an inference of collective adherence drawn from the context. Such a mode of individualisation opens the way to critical analysis: the Constitution requires individualised criminal imputation (Article 5, items XLV and XLVI), whilst the Inter-American Court of Human Rights reiterates that criminal responsibility must be anchored in concrete acts attributable to the person, and not in collective presumptions. It becomes evident that the judgment was not unanimous. Justice Nunes Marques, in a dissenting opinion, rejected any perspective of strict liability in criminal law and found not only the Supreme Federal Court’s absolute lack of jurisdiction, but also the absence of conduct individualisation capable of supporting any conviction decree against the defendant, summarising his position in the following terms: “It should be noted that the demonstrations carried out by those encamped were quite diverse and heterogeneous, ranging from agendas linked to customs to varied political demands. It cannot be asserted — indeed there is no evidence to that effect — that all members of the encampment, indiscriminately, shared the common purpose of inciting the Armed Forces to depose the constituted government or to bring about the violent abolition of the democratic rule of law. Nor are there material elements of proof pointing to the defendant’s concrete conduct in instigating or encouraging the commission of any crimes.” Further regarding the lack of individualisation of the convicted defendant’s conduct, attention is drawn to the ground employed in the judgment concerning the use of supposed confessions by other members of the same alleged criminal association, such confessions having occurred within Non-Prosecution Agreements. In his opinion, the eminent Justice Alexandre de Moraes stated that at least 529 defendants, in circumstances identical to those of Joel Muru Chagas Machado, admitted co-perpetration and entered into ANPPs with the Prosecutor General’s Office, assuming obligations such as community service, participation in a course on democracy, restrictions on the use of social media, and payment of pecuniary contributions. In other words, the reasoning of the judgment, by alluding to confessions obtained in the context of Non-Prosecution Agreements, proved entirely empty of any individualisation of the conduct imputed to the convicted defendant in Criminal Case No. 1,666. Should such statements have been limited to confirming the defendant’s mere presence at the encampment, without any other element of authorship or participation, they are inoperative for purposes of conviction. Indeed, the defendant denied any criminal practice, admitting only that he had been present at the site. In fact, the Reporting Justice’s opinion did not name the co-defendants who are said to have confessed to unlawful acts in ANPPs, nor did it detail the content of those supposed confessions, rendering it impossible to use such elements to underpin a conviction decree against the accused Joel Muru Chagas Machado. It should further be recorded that it would be inadmissible for the Supreme Federal Court to use confessions taken within a Non-Prosecution Agreement as borrowed evidence to support the conviction of Joel Muru Chagas Machado, inasmuch as confessions obtained for the purpose of an ANPP are not intended for that end. Quite apart from the fact that those co-defendants were not named and that the respective contents of their confessions were not detailed in the conviction decree, such confessions serve solely the limited purpose of the agreement entered into, and not the conviction of third parties, for they do not entail any judicial finding of guilt as to the facts narrated[3]. A question imposes itself: if the mere presence at the encampment were sufficient to characterise a crime, why did the authorities not dissolve it at an earlier stage? And further, why were Federal Police agents not previously embedded within the encampment? If, in truth, the facts were connected with an attempted coup d’état, with the commission of anti-democratic acts, or with the operation of a criminal organisation and digital militias, Law No. 12,850/2013 would have applied, and the criminal investigation could have permitted — long before 8 January 2023 — by court order, the use of undercover agents, interception of communications (wiretapping), and monitoring within the encampment by the Federal Police, with potentially high effectiveness. However, none of this is substantiated in the individualisation of the accused’s conduct and, by all indications, is not even present in the indictments filed against other accused persons in analogous conditions, likewise arrested solely for being encamped in the vicinity of the Supreme Federal Court. Another decontextualised foundation of the judgment under examination refers to an excerpt taken from a different case, namely Criminal Case No. 1,060/DF, adjudicated on 10 May 2023, under the rapporteurship of the eminent Justice Rosa Weber, which the Reporting Justice, Alexandre de Moraes, reproduced to support the conviction of Joel Muru Chagas Machado, whose conduct consisted simply of being present at the encampment on 8 and 9 January 2023. In grounding the conviction, Justice Alexandre de Moraes referred to Justice Rosa Weber’s judgment, in which a conviction was entered against another accused, mentioning the existence of an armed, stable and permanent human grouping, previously coordinated over social networks to commit indeterminate offences, manifested in attacks on Union property, on listed heritage assets, and in an attempt to abolish the Democratic Rule of Law, restricting the operation of the constitutional branches and seeking to depose the lawfully established government. In fact, the reference made in the reasoning to the judgment handed down in Criminal Case No. 1,060/DF, reported by Justice Rosa Weber, proved decontextualised and disconnected from the situation of the accused Joel Muru Chagas Machado, because the individualisation of his conduct reveals no premeditation to attack the institutions of the Democratic Rule of Law, much less indicates coordination over social networks to that end, nor any behaviour aimed at restricting the operation of the constitutional branches or at deposing the lawfully established government. On the contrary, the only conduct attributed to the defendant by the conviction judgment was that of being present at the encampment; from that mere circumstance, his participation in a multitudinous crime was presumed, based on judicial precedents that would never authorise such a presumption for conviction purposes. It cannot be denied that we are facing an absolutely innovative precedent in criminal matters within the Brazilian legal system. There was no investigation, it bears repeating, into any possible modus operandi for recruiting the defendant, his speeches at the encampment, or his subjective interaction with third parties. No weapons were seized from him; nor were his social networks even investigated. If this was the standard model used to underpin convictions — and if such mass convictions replicated this pattern — a serious investigative deficit on the part of the State is established. Nevertheless, it is neither possible nor legally permissible for the Judiciary to remedy such lacunae by abolishing the accused persons’ fundamental rights. Furthermore, Justice Nunes Marques, in his dissent, rightly highlighted the heterogeneity of the encampment, a circumstance recorded, indeed, in indictments brought by the Federal Prosecution Service itself. Note that those indictments narrated that the encampment “already operated like a sort of village, with a place for meals, a market, transport, medical care, [and] a room for puppet theatre.” The manner in which arrests at the encampment were carried out is also worthy of record and was noted by Justice Nunes Marques in his vote, stressing that, on the morning of 9 January 2023, the Military Police merely requested that the encamped gather their belongings and board a bus, without prior notice that they would be arrested, a situation in which all complied with the police authority’s instructions. It is not known, in truth, whether the arrests of those encamped — similarly situated to Joel Muru Chagas — were ordered by a court, supposedly on grounds of in flagrante delicto, and, if so, for which offence. In this perspective, it is worth recalling that both the Supreme Federal Court and the Superior Court of Justice have repeatedly held that the individualisation of conduct is an indispensable requirement for the validity of an accusation and of a conviction in criminal matters. Criminal responsibility, in a Democratic Rule of Law, must always be subjective — never objective — especially in serious offences such as corruption or money laundering. In that sense, the Supreme Federal Court has already acknowledged the ineptitude of generic indictments for lack of concrete description of the conduct attributed to the accused, affirming that mere collective imputation violates the adversarial principle and the right of defence. Along the same lines, the Superior Court of Justice has held that accusatory pleadings that fail to individualise conduct — generically imputing crimes such as corruption or laundering to several defendants — must be quashed for ineptitude. These precedents confirm that it is impermissible to legitimise convictions grounded solely on the accused’s physical presence within a given collective context, absent a minimal factual description of their concrete acts. On the contrary, Brazilian constitutional and infra-constitutional jurisprudence reinforces the requirement of a subjective nexus clearly and individually demonstrated, so as to avoid the application of strict liability in criminal law, expressly repudiated by the Constitution and by the inter-American human rights system. In this vein, the mere generic imputation of crimes, unaccompanied by a minimal description of concrete acts attributable to the accused, does not meet the constitutional and conventional requirements of due process of law. The individualisation of conduct is an indispensable requirement for the validity of criminal prosecution; its absence is cause for ineptitude of the indictment and for nullity of any conviction. The Supreme Federal Court and the Superior Court of Justice have repeatedly affirmed that generic imputations do not allow the full exercise of the right of defence and must therefore be quashed in habeas corpus or related appeals[4]. By admitting convictions based solely on presumptions derived from an accused’s physical presence within a certain collective context, the judgment in Criminal Case No. 1,666/DF adopts a form of strict criminal liability, in blatant violation of the principle of culpability and of the postulate of subjective responsibility — structuring pillars of democratic criminal law.  V.        THE IMPOSSIBILITY OF USING ANPP CONFESSIONS AS EVIDENCE FOR CONVICTION In the conviction entered in AP No. 1,666/DF, Justice Alexandre de Moraes employed, as a reinforcing element, confessions given by co-defendants within Non-Prosecution Agreements (ANPP), to conclude that Joel Muru Chagas Machado was in an analogous situation. Such reasoning, however, finds no support in the jurisprudence of the Supreme Federal Court and of the Superior Court of Justice. The Supreme Federal Court has already established that “the ANPP is exhausted at the pre-procedural stage, especially because the consequence of its refusal, non-approval or breach is the initiation of the phase of offering and receiving the indictment.”[5] In other words, the confession given in that context is not intended to form guilt, but merely to fulfil a formal requirement that enables the agreement’s execution. In the same sense, the Superior Court of Justice has consolidated the understanding that “the extra-judicial assumption of guilt within an ANPP is akin to the content of a confession of the criminal offence before the police or prosecutorial authority, having probative value solely as extra-judicial data, and only being usable to support an indictment in the event of breach of the agreement, leading the Prosecution Service to file charges.”[6] More recently still, the Supreme Federal Court has recognised that “in the ANPP, the confession is not intended for the formation of guilt”[7], reinforcing that its use as evidence for conviction violates due process of law. It appears, therefore, that the function of the confession in an ANPP is not to serve as an evidential element in court, but solely as an extra-judicial, formal requirement for the agreement’s celebration. The case law of the Supreme Federal Court and of the Superior Court of Justice is firm in recognising that this confession is exhausted at the pre-procedural stage, and is not even admissible within the same proceedings as evidence of criminal responsibility. Accordingly, by relying on confessions by co-defendants taken within ANPPs, without concrete individualisation of the conduct of the defendant Joel Muru Chagas Machado, the majority opinion fell into a flagrant contradiction with the consolidated jurisprudence of the Higher Courts, treating a pre-procedural datum as suitable judicial proof. Such a practice results in a distortion of the agreement’s purpose and in a violation of the principle of subjective criminal responsibility[8]. VI.        THE DISTORTION OF THE CONCEPT OF “MULTITUDINOUS CRIME” AND THE MISAPPLICATION OF SUPREME FEDERAL COURT PRECEDENTS In the opinion delivered, Justice Alexandre de Moraes invoked the notion of a multitudinous crime to uphold the conviction, citing precedents from the 1990s (HC 71,899/RJ, HC 73,638/GO and HC 75,868/DF, reported by Justice Maurício Corrêa). Those precedents, however, were limited to admitting a generic indictment in situations involving multitudinous crimes, always conditioning any conviction on an individualised imputation and on the demonstration of concrete proof of the accused’s participation. In Criminal Case No. 1,666/DF, by contrast, that criterion — originally restricted to the admissibility stage — was transposed to the judgment on the merits, such that mere presence at the encampment came to be deemed sufficient to support a conviction. Accordingly, the majority opinion fell into a manifest distortion of the precedents cited, unduly expanding their ratio decidendi and weakening Brazilian criminal dogmatics by admitting criminal liability without individualisation of conduct. VII.        THE DEFICIENCY OF THE INVESTIGATION AND OF THE EVIDENTIAL PHASE The conviction of Joel Muru Chagas Machado resulted from an evident deficit both in the investigation and in the evidential phase. No concrete acts were identified that could be attributed to him as incitement or criminal association. Nor was it ascertained how he entered the encampment, whether there had been any recruitment, associative links, or specific logistics related to his presence at the location. The criminal proceedings did not produce testimony or records capable of proving the defendant’s active participation in the facts narrated. Moreover, the exercise of the right to silence was interpreted in a biased manner, to the defendant’s manifest detriment. Thus, the conviction rested on generic presumptions, in direct affront to the principle of culpability and to the fundamental guarantees of due process of law. VIII.        THE INVESTIGATIVE DEFICIT, THE RISK OF STRICT CRIMINAL LIABILITY, AND THE CORROSIVE EFFECTS OF A PRECEDENT ON DEMOCRACY The absence of consistent investigation into financing, logistics or associative links transformed mere presence at the encampment into sufficient indicia of guilt. This investigative deficit resulted, in practice, in the adoption of a form of strict criminal liability, in direct breach of Article 5, items XLV and XLVI, of the 1988 Federal Constitution, as well as of the consolidated case law in Baena Ricardo et al. v. Panama of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, which established the need for subjective responsibility and individualisation of conduct as indispensable conditions for the validity of criminal or administrative sanctions[9]. More serious still, this deficient pattern of imputation, according to the Reporting Justice himself, was replicated in 1,557 serial decisions, consolidating a corrosive precedent for democracy by normalising convictions without individualisation of conduct. By legitimising violations of constitutional and conventional guarantees, the precedent compromises the integrity of the justice system, since, in the Reporting Justice’s words, “the SUPREME FEDERAL COURT’s jurisdiction over the criminal actions concerning the extremely serious crimes committed on 8 January was examined and recognised by the Court’s FULL BENCH in 1,557 (one thousand, five hundred and fifty-seven) decisions.” This automatic alignment undermines the coherence of the constitutional process and affects, at the very least, all individuals who were encamped near the Supreme Federal Court — whose number was not even duly ascertained. Note, moreover, that if the encampment were indeed a coup-oriented structure and if those present there were all organised in an associative manner for a premeditated coup d’état, it would be expected that they would already have been on the investigative radar of the Federal Police and of the Federal Prosecution Service, given that the criminal investigation into anti-democratic acts and into the attempted coup d’état was already under way. In that context, it is unclear why, at least at the investigative stage, that group was not brought under Law No. 12,850/2013, which defines criminal organisation and provides for criminal investigation. In such a scenario, the Federal Police and the Federal Prosecution Service could, by court order, have used undercover agents in the encampment, ambient listening devices, interception of communications and other investigative tools apt to individualise each participant’s conduct. In truth, even if a generic indictment without proper individualisation of conduct were admitted on the basis of precedents HC 71,899/RJ, HC 73,638/GO and HC 75,868/DF (reported by Justice Maurício Corrêa), those decisions could never have been used to authorise the conviction of the defendant Joel Muru Chagas Machado. If the same decision-making pattern is being replicated in analogous cases, its urgent review is required—whether by the Supreme Federal Court, by the National Congress, or by the President of the Republic — each within their respective competences, so as to delimit with precision the scope of such cases. IX.        CONCLUSION The analysis of AP 1,666/DF reveals investigative deficits, the adoption of strict criminal liability, and a serious irregularity in the allocation of the case. The assignment of Inquiry 4,781 to Justice Alexandre de Moraes without random distribution violates the principle of the natural judge (Article 5, items XXXVII and LIII, of the 1988 Federal Constitution) and Article 8(1) of the American Convention on Human Rights. This flaw, combined with fragile evidence and the distorted application of the concept of a multitudinous crime, compromised fundamental rights and produced corrosive effects on Brazilian democracy. In view of the serious violations of constitutional and conventional guarantees identified, correction of this state of affairs may proceed along three legitimate institutional avenues. It falls to the Supreme Federal Court, in criminal review proceedings, to examine the validity of convictions rendered in disregard of the requirements of due process of law and of the individualisation of conduct. The National Congress, in turn, holds the political prerogative to deliberate on the granting of amnesty, an institute expressly provided for in Article 48, item VIII, of the Federal Constitution. There is no constitutional prohibition on amnesty for the crimes of criminal association (Article 288 of the Penal Code) and of inciting animosity between the Armed Forces and the Branches of the Republic (Article 286, sole paragraph, of the Penal Code). The Constitution, in Article 5, item XLIII, limits amnesty solely in relation to heinous crimes, torture, illicit drug trafficking and terrorism, which do not apply to the offences at issue. Therefore, convictions that have already become final, as well as Non-Prosecution Agreements entered into by hundreds of persons as a result of the events of 8 January 2023, may be encompassed by a legislative amnesty, extinguishing their penal effects and restoring coherence to the constitutional system. For his part, the President of the Republic is constitutionally empowered to grant pardons and commutation of sentences (Article 84, item XII, of the Federal Constitution). Among the possible modalities, humanitarian pardon stands out, aimed at safeguarding human dignity in the face of disproportionate convictions or in situations of manifest social, personal or procedural fragility. The Supreme Federal Court has already recognised, in precedents such as Direct Action of Unconstitutionality (ADI) No. 5,874/DF (Reporting Justice Alexandre de Moraes), the constitutionality of that measure, affirming the Executive’s broad margin of political discretion. In this context, humanitarian pardon emerges as a legitimate instrument of sovereign clemency, capable of correcting punitive distortions and ensuring that criminal law is not converted into an instrument of oppression. Fábio Medina Osório PhD in Administrative Law from the Complutense University of Madrid. Master’s in Public Law from the Federal University of Rio Grande do Sul. Former Minister-Head of the Office of the Attorney General of the Union (Government of Michel Temer). President of the International Institute for Studies of State Law. Email: [email protected] *published in portal JOTA (9 October 2025)   [1] In the sense of the exercise of academic freedom and of the freedom to criticise judicial decisions, see the following precedents: ADPF 548, Reporting Justice: Cármen Lúcia, Full Bench, judgment on 15-05-2020, ELECTRONIC CASE FILE DJe-142 RELEASED 08-06-2020 PUBLISHED 09-06-2020; ADPF 187, Reporting Justice: Celso de Mello, Full Bench, judgment on 15-06-2011, ELECTRONIC JUDGMENT DJe-102 RELEASED 28-05-2014 PUBLISHED 29-05-2014 RTJ VOL-00228-01 PP-00041; and RE 631053 RG, Reporting Justice: Ricardo Lewandowski, Justice writing for the judgment: Celso de Mello, Full Bench, judgment on 15-06-2012, ELECTRONIC CASE FILE DJe-213 RELEASED 29-10-2014 PUBLISHED 30-10-2014. As to freedom of expression and criticism as upheld by the Supreme Federal Court, see the following precedents: STF – ADPF 130/DF, Reporting Justice: Carlos Britto, Date of Judgment: 30/04/2009, Full Bench, Date of Publication: DJe-208 RELEASED 05-11-2009 PUBLISHED 06-11-2009 EMENT VOL-02381-01 PP-00001; STF – Rcl 65017/AM, Reporting Justice: Dias Toffoli, Date of Judgment: 12/08/2024, Second Panel, Date of Publication: ELECTRONIC CASE FILE DJe-n/a RELEASED 27-08-2024 PUBLISHED 28-08-2024; STF – Rcl 62174/MG, Reporting Justice: Flávio Dino, Date of Judgment: 09/04/2024, First Panel, Date of Publication: ELECTRONIC CASE FILE DJe-n/a RELEASED 22-04-2024 PUBLISHED 23-04-2024; and STF – Rcl 23899/PR, Reporting Justice: Rosa Weber, Date of Judgment: 02/10/2023, Full Bench, Date of Publication: ELECTRONIC CASE FILE DJe-n/a RELEASED 27-10-2023 PUBLISHED 30-10-2023. [2] Note, moreover, that in Criminal Case No. 1,670/DF, in which the defendant Ademir Domingos Pinto da Silva was sentenced to one (1) year’s imprisonment, substituted by community-based penalties, in addition to twenty (20) day-fines and the joint and several fixing of R$ 5,000,000.00 (five million reais) by way of compensation for collective moral damages, for the offences of criminal association (Article 288, caput, of the Penal Code) and inciting animosity of the Armed Forces against the Branches of the Republic (Article 286, sole paragraph, of the Penal Code), there is an analogous description of conduct and of a model of criminal responsibility based on the defendant’s mere presence at the encampment, as detailed in this essay. [3] In this regard, there are relevant precedents of the Supreme Federal Court showing that the Court has reaffirmed that the confession given within the scope of a Non-Prosecution Agreement (ANPP) has a merely formal nature and cannot be used as evidence for conviction, under penalty of violating due process of law and the principle of culpability. See, to that effect, the precedents: STF, HC 218.798/SP, Reporting Justice: Cármen Lúcia, j. 15.8.2022, Single-Justice Decision, DJe 17.8.2022; and STF, RHC 214.146/SP, Reporting Justice: André Mendonça, j. 4.3.2024, Second Panel, DJe 23.4.2024. [4] In that sense, a paradigmatic precedent of the Supreme Federal Court addressed the ineptitude of the indictment and the prohibition of strict criminal liability due to the lack of individualisation of conduct, where the Court, under the rapporteurship of Justice Edson Fachin, examined a case in which the petitioner, a former public servant, was charged with alleged participation in a scheme of corruption and money laundering linked to the so-called Operation Zelotes, without the indictment describing any concrete act of requesting, receiving or concealing an undue advantage. The accusation limited itself to narrating, in generic terms, the existence of a group devoted to committing crimes against the public administration, without pointing to the accused’s individual conduct or subjective elements of authorship and intent. The Supreme Federal Court recognised that such a generic imputation contravenes Article 41 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, due process of law and Article 8(2)(b) of the American Convention on Human Rights, as it does not allow the exercise of the right of defence nor the subsumption of the conduct to the criminal provision. The Court therefore granted the writ to quash the criminal action, reaffirming that criminal liability must be subjective and individualised, never presumed from collective contexts or abstract associations. See the relevant precedent: STF, HC 182.458/DF, Reporting Justice: Edson Fachin, Second Panel, judgment on 27/09/2021, DJe 08/11/2021. [5] STF, HC 218.798/SP, Reporting Justice: Cármen Lúcia, judgment on 15.8.2022, Single-Justice Decision, DJe 17.8.2022. [6] STF, HC 756.907/SP, Reporting Justice: Jorge Mussi, Single-Justice Decision, DJe 19.7.2022. [7] STF, RHC 214.146/SP, Reporting Justice: André Mendonça, judgment on 4.3.2024, Second Panel, DJe 23.4.2024. [8] The Inter-American Court of Human Rights, as is known, prohibits the application of strict liability, not only in the criminal sphere but also within Administrative Sanctioning Law, including in cases involving multitudinous unlawful acts. In the case Baena Ricardo et al. v. Panama (2001), the President of that country ordered the dismissal of several civil servants on the allegation that there was a link between the stoppage of their activities and the movement led by Colonel Eduardo Herrera-Hassan, thereby presuming the workers’ guilt. The Inter-American Court held that such State action, by presuming culpability without formal proceedings and without adequate proof, constituted a form of strict liability in sanctioning matters. It decided, therefore, that the principles of culpability and of due process of law must be observed in all punitive action by the State, even administrative, prohibiting the imputation of liability without demonstration of individual intent or fault. See the case: INTER-AMERICAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS. Baena Ricardo et al. v. Panama. Judgment of 2 February 2001. Series C, No. 72. Available at: https://www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/casos/articulos/Seriec_72_ing.pdf   [9] INTER-AMERICAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS. Baena Ricardo et al. v. Panama. Judgment of 2 February 2001. Series C, No. 72. Available at: https://www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/casos/articulos/Seriec_72_ing.pdf  

TAXATION OF PROFITS AND DIVIDENDS AND THE SPECIAL LEGAL REGIME OF LAW FIRMS: CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION OF LAW NO. 15.270/2025

This article analyzes the applicability of Law No. 15.270/2025 — which introduced a new taxation system on profits and dividends distributed to individuals — to law firms established under the Brazilian Bar Association Statute (Law No. 8.906/94). Based on a systematic and teleological hermeneutics, the article argues that the new tax discipline cannot be automatically and unreservedly applied to law firms, given their special legal nature, the constitutional framework of legal practice as an essential function of Justice (art. 133 of the Brazilian Constitution), and the implicit functional institutional immunity derived therefrom. The conclusion advocates for a constitutional interpretation that excludes such entities from the subjective scope of the contested provision. Keywords: Dividend taxation. Law No. 15.270/2025. Law firms. Essential function of Justice. Constitutional interpretation. Implicit institutional immunity. Tax typicality. TABLE OF CONTENTS 1 Introduction. 2 Legal practice as an essential function of Justice (art. 133 of the Federal Constitution). 3 The legal nature of law firms. 4 Systematic and teleological interpretation of Law No. 15.270/2025. 5 Constitutional interpretation. 6 Prohibition against expansive interpretation in tax and sanctioning matters. 7 The organizational autonomy of the legal profession. 8 The implicit functional institutional immunity derived from art. 133 of the Federal Constitution. 9 The materially sanctioning legal nature of the mandatory withholding. 10 Potential violation of the ability-to-pay principle and competitive neutrality. 11 Favorable treatment for micro and small enterprises — autonomous subsidiary argument. 12 The ruling in ADI 7.917 (preliminary injunction) and its implications for the constitutional interpretation of Law No. 15.270/2025. 13 Strategies for constitutional review. 14 Conclusion. References.   1 INTRODUCTION The enactment of Law No. 15.270/2025 introduces a new taxation regime on profits and dividends distributed to individuals, establishing a mandatory 10% (ten percent) withholding tax at source on amounts exceeding BRL 50,000.00 (fifty thousand Brazilian reais) per month per beneficiary, in addition to a minimum annual income tax mechanism applicable to high-income earners. This article examines, objectively, whether such regulatory framework may be automatically and unreservedly applied to law firms duly organized under arts. 15 et seq. of Law No. 8.906/94 (the Brazilian Lawyers' Statute and the Brazilian Bar Association Act), or whether it must be subject to constitutional interpretation so as to exclude such entities from its subjective scope of application. The matter is far from trivial. It stands at the intersection of tax law, constitutional law, and the theory of institutional guarantees, calling upon the interpreter to engage in systematic and teleological hermeneutics fully committed to the maximum effectiveness of constitutional values. 2 LEGAL PRACTICE AS AN ESSENTIAL FUNCTION OF JUSTICE (ART. 133 OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION) Art. 133 of the Federal Constitution provides that the attorney is indispensable to the administration of justice and is inviolable for his acts and statements in the exercise of the profession, within the limits of the law. The Brazilian Constitution does not treat legal practice as an ordinary economic activity. Rather, it qualifies it as an essential function of Justice, an integral part of the constitutional system of guarantees inherent to the Democratic Rule of Law. Legal practice does not constitute a mere regulated profession. It is embedded in the system of checks and balances of the Democratic Rule of Law, serving as the structural prerequisite for effective adversarial proceedings, equality of arms, and jurisdictional effectiveness. It represents, in sum, a structural institutional guarantee — and not a mere corporate prerogative —, which elevates the debate from the realm of ordinary tax law to the domain of structural constitutional law. 2.1 ADI 1.127/DF In the judgment of ADI 1.127/DF, the Brazilian Supreme Court (Supremo Tribunal Federal — STF) upheld the constitutionality of attorneys' prerogatives, affirming the institutional centrality of the legal profession to the effectiveness of judicial proceedings. The ruling, authored by Justice Marco Aurélio, expressly states: "The attorney is indispensable to the administration of Justice. [...] Professional immunity is indispensable so that the attorney may properly and fully exercise his public function. [...] The constitutional function exercised by the attorney justifies the guarantee of arrest only in flagrante delicto and in the case of non-bailable offenses." (STF — ADI 1.127/DF, Reporting Justice Marco Aurélio, Full Court, decided 17.05.2006) The ruling established, with unequivocal clarity, that professional immunity constitutes an inalienable prerequisite for the proper and full exercise of the public function that the constitutional order assigns to the attorney. The Court further recognized that this constitutional function justifies the extension of differentiated guarantees that are ontologically incompatible with the legal treatment afforded to the exercise of ordinary economic activities. These foundations apply directly to law firms — organizational instruments of that same constitutional function — which cannot be subjected, through expansive interpretation, to the same tax regime applicable to ordinary business structures. 2.2 ADI 3.026/DF In the judgment of ADI 3.026/DF, authored by Justice Eros Grau, the Supreme Court reaffirmed the institutional singularity of the Brazilian Bar Association (Ordem dos Advogados do Brasil — OAB). The ruling's headnote is categorical: "The OAB is not an entity of the Indirect Public Administration of the Union. The Bar is an independent public service, a unique category among the legal persons existing in Brazilian law. [...] Since it does not constitute an entity of the Indirect Public Administration, the OAB is not subject to the Administration's control, nor is it tied to any of its branches. This non-affiliation is formally and materially necessary." (STF — ADI 3.026/DF, Reporting Justice Eros Grau, Full Court, decided 08.06.2006) Justice Cezar Peluso, in his concurring opinion, added that the public character attributed to the Bar's service has an eminently protective purpose aimed at securing its institutional independence: "The public character of the service is recognized [...] less as a need to subject it to rules specific to the Public Administration [...] than as the fact that it cannot be subject to any interference in the performance of its functions, which bear the hallmark of independence." (Concurring Opinion of Justice Cezar Peluso — ADI 3.026/DF) This understanding prevents, as a matter of logical and legal consequence, the extension of prerogatives or regulatory impositions to law firms by mere analogy or expansive interpretation. If the OAB — and, by extension, the law firms that depend on it to exist and operate — cannot be equated with ordinary public administration entities for organizational regulation purposes, it equally cannot be so equated for tax purposes without an express and unequivocal statutory provision to that effect. The consolidated jurisprudence of the Supreme Court demonstrates, in sum, that legal practice occupies a differentiated normative position within the Brazilian legal order, a position that is binding upon both the interpreter and the enforcer of the law.   3 THE LEGAL NATURE OF LAW FIRMS Law firms are not ordinary business corporations. They are governed by special legislation — Law No. 8.906/94 — which restricts their scope exclusively to the provision of legal services, prohibits the commercialization of legal activity, establishes a specific liability regime, requires exclusive registration with the Brazilian Bar Association, and prohibits the adoption of typical corporate forms. A law firm constitutes an organizational instrument of the essential function of Justice. It is not a business structure oriented toward profit in the commercial sense, but a professional organization aimed at providing a constitutionally qualified activity. This distinction is legally essential and cannot be disregarded by the interpreter, on pain of subverting the constitutional model of legal practice and hollowing out the guarantees inherent to it.   4 SYSTEMATIC AND TELEOLOGICAL INTERPRETATION OF LAW NO. 15.270/2025 Law No. 15.270/2025 is part of a tax reform aimed at taxing dividends in business structures, combating abusive tax planning, and aligning the domestic legal order with international standards for income taxation. The teleological purpose of the statute is to reach business structures that have historically distributed profits under the tax exemption regime in effect since 1996 — and not to cover professional entities organized under a special legal regime whose nature is radically different from what motivated the reform. Not a single provision of Law No. 15.270/2025 makes express reference to law firms. In tax matters, the principle of strict legality applies, as set forth in art. 150, I, of the Federal Constitution. Normative interpretation cannot, therefore, expand the subjective scope of the statute to encompass entities not explicitly included by the legislature, on pain of direct violation of the constitutional text and the very foundations of the Rule of Law in fiscal matters.   5 CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION The technique of constitutional interpretation, enshrined in the Supreme Court's jurisprudence, requires that, when faced with multiple possible interpretations of an infra-constitutional provision, the one that renders it compatible with the constitutional text be adopted, preserving the norm within the legal order without violating the values and principles enshrined in the Constitution. Applying this technique to the present case, it becomes clear that Law No. 15.270/2025 admits two possible readings: one of a restrictive nature, according to which the statute is directed exclusively at ordinary business corporations; and another of an expansive nature, which would reach professional organizations endowed with a special legal regime, such as law firms. The expansive interpretation, however, generates a direct collision with art. 133 of the Federal Constitution, with the special legal regime governing legal practice, and with the institutional autonomy that characterizes the profession. In the face of this normative conflict, the restrictive interpretation is inexorably required — one that preserves the integrity of the constitutional model of legal practice and rules out the application of the new discipline to law firms.   6 PROHIBITION AGAINST EXPANSIVE INTERPRETATION IN TAX AND SANCTIONING MATTERS The Supreme Court has consolidated jurisprudence to the effect that tax rules do not admit extensive interpretation to expand taxable events not provided for by statute, and that, in sanctioning matters, the principle of strict typicality demands interpretation rigorously confined to the normative text. The mandatory withholding established by Law No. 15.270/2025 has a hybrid nature, being simultaneously a tax measure and potentially a sanctioning one, given the serious administrative consequences arising from its non-compliance. This prohibition has express statutory support in arts. 108, §1°, and 111 of the Brazilian Tax Code (Código Tributário Nacional — CTN), which prohibit the use of analogy to impose taxes not provided for by statute and require the literal interpretation of rules governing taxpayer liability. The classical doctrine of Brazilian tax law is consistent on this point. Paulo de Barros Carvalho[1], when addressing closed typicality, notes that the tax incidence hypothesis does not admit subjective expansion through hermeneutics; Geraldo Ataliba[2], in developing the theory of the tax incidence hypothesis, reinforces that the legislature exhaustively defines the criteria for identifying the taxpayer; and Roque Carrazza[3] argues that the principle of legality, in its tax dimension, requires specificity and completeness of the incidence rule, prohibiting extensive integration. Extensive or analogical interpretation to reach entities not expressly provided for in the statute is therefore inadmissible. The Brazilian Federal Revenue Service (Receita Federal do Brasil) cannot, through infra-statutory normative guidance or administrative interpretation, equate law firms with ordinary business corporations, on pain of violating tax legality, legal certainty, and the institutional autonomy of the legal profession — all values of constitutional standing.   7 THE ORGANIZATIONAL AUTONOMY OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION The compensation structure of law firms is an integral part of the organizational core of the profession, the constitutionally guaranteed professional freedom, and the institutional model of legal practice as outlined by the Federal Constitution of 1988. The automatic and unrestricted application of the new tax discipline may interfere with the internal organization of law firms, undermine the formation of technical reserves indispensable to the continuity of legal services, and affect the institutional sustainability of the legal profession as a whole. The Constitution does not authorize an interpretation that indirectly weakens a function that it itself has qualified as essential to Justice, even when the invoked normative instrument is of a tax nature. Constitutional teleology demands that the interpreter exercise maximum caution in the face of rules that may, directly or indirectly, compromise the full exercise of legal practice.   8 THE IMPLICIT FUNCTIONAL INSTITUTIONAL IMMUNITY DERIVED FROM ART. 133 OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION Art. 133 of the Federal Constitution, by qualifying legal practice as an essential function of Justice, establishes not merely a corporate prerogative but a genuine institutional statute guaranteeing judicial proceedings. From this constitutional framework, it is necessary to recognize the existence of an implicit functional institutional immunity, which prevents the State from, through indirect taxation, structurally weakening legal activity as a pillar of the justice system. The recognition of implied immunities is not novel in the Supreme Court's jurisprudence. In the judgment of RE 601.720, the Court recognized that reciprocal immunity, although not exhaustively provided for all its incidence hypotheses, derives structurally from the federative principle — demonstrating that the Constitution can generate implicit protections from its structural values. The same reasoning applies, with even greater normative force, to legal practice: if art. 133 erects the advocacy function as an indissociable prerequisite of jurisdictional effectiveness, it would be logically contradictory to admit that the State could, through taxation, disorganize the structures through which that function is exercised. This thesis finds support in the constitutional doctrine of Konrad Hesse[4], for whom the principle of maximum effectiveness requires that constitutional norms be given the greatest possible normative force, and in the theory of institutional guarantees, according to which the legislature cannot, under the pretext of ordinary regulation, hollow out the essential core of constitutionally qualified institutions. In the elaboration of J.J. Gomes Canotilho[5], the institutional guarantee operates as a negative limit on the legislature, preventing infra-constitutional discipline from dissolving the substance of the institution protected by the Constitution. Legal practice, under art. 133, is one of these institutions — and its organizational substance must be preserved against any normative framework that, directly or indirectly, threatens it.   9 THE MATERIALLY SANCTIONING LEGAL NATURE OF THE MANDATORY WITHHOLDING The mandatory withholding obligation at source established by Law No. 15.270/2025 does not have an exclusively tax nature. From a material and functional perspective, it bears an autonomous sanctioning dimension, insofar as its non-compliance triggers automatic penalties of considerable severity, imposes onerous procedural obligations on law firms, and directly interferes with internal governance structures — such as the preparation of interim balance sheets, partners' meetings, and legally mandated profit allocation procedures within excessively tight deadlines. Given this hybrid nature, the following constitutional guarantees apply cumulatively to the normative provision: substantive due process of law (art. 5°, LIV, of the Federal Constitution), the principle of proportionality, strict legality in sanctioning matters, and the prohibition of analogy in malam partem, the latter recognized by the Supreme Court in HC 97.256. The Superior Court of Justice's jurisprudence is firm in holding that tax sanctions cannot assume a confiscatory character (REsp 1.325.709), and the Supreme Court, in RE 833.106, reaffirmed the requirements of due process of law in the domain of administrative sanctions. These premises reinforce, in the domain of sanctioning legal theory, the prohibition against expansive interpretation reaching law firms, since expanding the passive pole of the withholding obligation without express statutory provision constitutes a direct violation of the principle of strict typicality and the constitutional regime of due process of law.   10 POTENTIAL VIOLATION OF THE ABILITY-TO-PAY PRINCIPLE AND COMPETITIVE NEUTRALITY The indiscriminate application of the new tax discipline to law firms also raises a fundamental issue tied to the ability-to-pay principle (art. 145, §1°, of the Federal Constitution). The distribution of results in law firms is not structurally identical to the distribution of dividends in business corporations. Law firms do not operate under a purely commercial logic: the amounts distributed to partners correspond, to a large extent, to remuneration for the personal and non-transferable exercise of legal activity — activity that, by express statutory prohibition, cannot be organized in a corporate manner or transferred to third parties. Equating such distributions with corporate dividends for purposes of withholding at source implies disregarding the underlying economic reality of the professional organization of legal practice, in violation of the ability-to-pay principle in its material dimension. There is, moreover, a concrete risk of a breach of competitive neutrality. The application of the new discipline to law firms — but not necessarily to other forms of organization for the provision of legal services or to hybrid business structures — may generate an unjustifiable systemic asymmetry, placing law firms at a structural disadvantage relative to other forms of organization of legal activity. Such a distortion, in addition to being economically irrational, is constitutionally censurable from the perspective of tax equality (art. 150, II, of the Federal Constitution).   11 FAVORABLE TREATMENT FOR MICRO AND SMALL ENTERPRISES — AUTONOMOUS SUBSIDIARY ARGUMENT The Supreme Court recognizes that the favorable treatment for micro and small enterprises, established in arts. 170, IX, and 179 of the Federal Constitution and specified in Complementary Law No. 123/2006, carries binding normative density. It does not constitute a mere option granted to the ordinary legislature but a true constitutional mandate of mandatory compliance (ADI 4.033). This understanding was reiterated in ADI 1.643 and speaks directly to the situation of law firms enrolled in the Simples Nacional simplified tax regime. Even if one were to argue — which is entirely rejected here — the general validity of applying Law No. 15.270/2025 to law firms, it would be necessary to recognize, as an autonomous subsidiary argument, the impossibility of its application to those enrolled in the Simples Nacional regime. This differentiated tax regime constitutes public policy of constitutional standing, the circumvention of which by ordinary legislation entails direct violation of art. 179 of the Federal Constitution. The application of the new discipline to such firms, without any transitional rules or adjustments to the simplified regime, imposes a disproportionate procedural burden on recognized simplified organizational structures, in manifest violation of the principle of reasonableness and the constitutionally mandated differential treatment they are owed.   12 THE RULING IN ADI 7.917 (PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION) AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR THE CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION OF LAW NO. 15.270/2025 The recent ruling issued by Justice Nunes Marques in the preliminary injunction proceedings of ADI 7.917, filed by the Federal Council of the Brazilian Bar Association, carries central hermeneutic relevance for the proper interpretation of Law No. 15.270/2025. Although the specific preliminary relief requested by the CFOAB was denied at that procedural stage, the ruling contains reasoning that significantly reinforces the need for a systematic and constitutionally oriented interpretation of the contested statute — particularly with respect to micro and small enterprises and, most notably, law firms enrolled in the Simples Nacional regime. 12.1 The express recognition of constitutional limits on the power to tax The Reporting Justice begins his reasoning by reaffirming that the principles of legal certainty, legitimate expectations, non-surprise, legality, and reasonableness constitute genuine postulates limiting the State's power to tax and, consequently, protecting taxpayers. This recognition reiterates the Supreme Court's consolidated jurisprudence, according to which the taxing power is not absolute and must be exercised in strict accordance with legal certainty (art. 1° of the Federal Constitution), substantive due process (art. 5°, LIV), ability to pay (art. 145, §1°), and favorable treatment for micro and small enterprises (arts. 170, IX, and 179 of the Federal Constitution). These constitutional vectors are fully applicable to the analysis of the new discipline's incidence on law firms, whose special legal regime must be preserved against any attempt at equating them with ordinary business corporations. 12.2 The recognition of the special vulnerability of small structures The ruling is particularly incisive in examining the impact of the new system on micro and small enterprises. The Reporting Justice expressly notes: "The imposition of such a tight deadline may affect small enterprises and those enrolled in the SIMPLES Nacional regime in an even more onerous manner. Such taxpayers, who are so important from a social and economic standpoint for the country, are characterized by simplified business structures, rarely possessing teams dedicated exclusively to legal and accounting matters. Thus, the requirement to comply with various internal measures, interim and final balance sheets, partners' meetings, and legally mandated deliberative procedures within such a short timeframe proves incompatible with the operational reality of such taxpayers, imposing a disproportionate procedural burden." (ADI 7.917 MC/DF, Justice Nunes Marques, decided 26.12.2025) The Supreme Court authoritatively reaffirms that favorable treatment for small enterprises does not constitute a mere option granted to the ordinary legislature but a genuine constitutional mandate of mandatory compliance, expressly invoking the precedents established in ADIs 4.033 and 1.643. This understanding speaks directly to the situation of law firms enrolled in the Simples Nacional regime, which have simplified organizational structures and perform, above all, a constitutionally qualified function under art. 133 of the Federal Constitution. 12.3 The hermeneutic opening left by the denial of preliminary relief The denial of the preliminary injunction in ADI 7.917 does not represent a final ruling on the constitutionality of Law No. 15.270/2025. The Reporting Justice himself notes that "the remaining merits issues raised in the direct actions, particularly regarding the legitimacy of the taxation inserted into the legal order by arts. 2° and 3° of Law No. 15.270/2025, prove to be controversial." He further records: "A potential ruling on the unconstitutionality of the new profit and dividend distribution taxation model will, as a rule, entail the removal of the provision from the legal order with retroactive effect to the date of its publication. As a result, the tax assessments made under Law No. 15.270/2025 would be annulled, allowing for the restitution of any amounts already paid by taxpayers." (ADI 7.917 MC/DF, Justice Nunes Marques, decided 26.12.2025) There was, therefore, no definitive validation of the tax model established by the new statute, nor any dismissal of the constitutional arguments put forward by the Brazilian Bar Association. The merits remain entirely open, which preserves, in full, the possibility of constitutional interpretation in the final judgment. 12.4 The ruling as reinforcement of the prohibition against expansive interpretation The ruling demonstrates concrete legal concern with the legal uncertainty generated by the new legislation. The Reporting Justice points out that the brevity of the statutory deadline "evidences the lack of reasonableness and proportionality of the norm, in its sense of substantive due process (Federal Constitution, art. 5°, LIV), as well as the violation of legal certainty, a postulate of the Rule of Law (Federal Constitution, art. 1°), more specifically in its dimension of predictability and legitimate expectations." He invokes, to this end, the jurisprudence established in ARE 713.196 AgR, according to which the Supreme Court requires the provision of a reasonable period for taxpayers to adapt to regulatory changes in tax matters, and RE 566.621, in which the Full Court held that the retroactive or immediate application of new tax discipline, without transitional safeguards, violates the principle of legal certainty in its dimensions of protection of legitimate expectations and guarantee of access to Justice. In tax and sanctioning matters, expansive interpretation unfavorable to the taxpayer is prohibited, strict legality is inviolably applicable, and the principle of closed typicality is mandatory. The Revenue Service cannot, through infra-statutory acts or administrative guidance, automatically equate law firms with ordinary business corporations when such equivalence implies disregarding the special legal regime established by the Federal Constitution and Law No. 8.906/94. 12.5 Reconciling the ruling with art. 133 of the Federal Constitution The ruling in ADI 7.917 examined the contested statute from the perspective of micro and small enterprises in general, without yet addressing in depth the institutional dimension of legal practice as an essential function of Justice under art. 133 of the Federal Constitution. This point remains open for definitive examination in the merits judgment. Legal practice, as outlined by the current constitutional order, is not an ordinary economic activity, does not constitute a mere business organization, and forms part of the constitutional justice system as an indissociable prerequisite of jurisdictional effectiveness. The automatic and indiscriminate application of the new discipline to law firms disregards their institutional nature, improperly places them on the same footing as ordinary business corporations, and undermines the constitutional model of legal practice in its entirety. The preliminary ruling does not obstruct this reading; on the contrary, by vigorously reaffirming the constitutional limits on the power to tax, it provides a solid principiological basis for the restrictive interpretation advanced in this article. 12.6 Hermeneutic synthesis The ruling in ADI 7.917 reveals three fundamental elements that converge, consistently, with the thesis advanced herein: the express recognition of the constitutional limits on the State's power to tax; the emphasis on differentiated treatment for small structures as a constitutional mandate rather than a mere legislative option; and the absence of a definitive ruling on the constitutionality of the new taxation introduced by Law No. 15.270/2025. In light of this normative and jurisprudential framework, a systematic and constitutionally oriented reading is required, according to which the said statute cannot be interpreted expansively to reach law firms, on pain of violating art. 133 of the Federal Constitution, the special legal regime of the legal profession, the constitutional protection afforded to small enterprises, and the principles of legal certainty and legitimate expectations.   13 STRATEGIES FOR CONSTITUTIONAL REVIEW The institutional thesis developed herein is susceptible to multiple avenues of constitutional review, which may be pursued by the Federal Council of the Brazilian Bar Association in a coordinated and strategically graduated manner. In the domain of concentrated judicial review, the primary avenue is the direct action of unconstitutionality (ação direta de inconstitucionalidade) with a request for constitutional interpretation, pursuant to art. 28, sole paragraph, of Law No. 9.868/99, by which the Supreme Court would be requested to declare, without textual reduction, the unconstitutionality of any interpretation that subjects law firms to the mandatory withholding regime established by Law No. 15.270/2025. Alternatively, a declaration of partial unconstitutionality with textual reduction may be sought, or a request for temporal modulation of the decision's effects may be filed pursuant to art. 27 of the same statute, in order to preserve consolidated legal situations based on the legitimate expectation of exemption. In the domain of diffuse constitutional review, the strategic filing of collective writs of mandamus on behalf of Bar-affiliated law firms before the federal regional courts is recommended, with the aim of suspending the enforceability of the withholding requirement pending the Supreme Court's final ruling. In any tax enforcement proceedings that may be initiated by the Revenue Service based on the new discipline, the constitutional question may be raised incidentally, enabling the formation of precedents in the domain of diffuse review and the subsequent assignment of the matter to the repetitive appeals track before the Superior Court of Justice or to the general repercussion regime before the Supreme Court. Finally, in the domain of preventive administrative action, the Federal Council of the Brazilian Bar Association may issue binding interpretive guidance within its institutional competence, instructing law firms on the legal impossibility of automatic compliance with the new discipline and documenting, from the outset, the institutional resistance that will underpin any future request for preliminary relief based on the risk of irreversible institutional harm to the justice system.   14 CONCLUSION In light of art. 133 of the Federal Constitution, the Brazilian Lawyers' Statute and the Brazilian Bar Association Act (Law No. 8.906/94), the consolidated jurisprudence of the Supreme Court in the judgments of ADIs 1.127, 3.026, and 7.917 and related precedents, the constitutional prohibition against expansive interpretation in tax and sanctioning matters, the principle of closed tax typicality enshrined in arts. 108, §1°, and 111 of the Brazilian Tax Code, and the technique of constitutional interpretation, the following conclusions are warranted. Law No. 15.270/2025 cannot be automatically applied to law firms; a systematic and teleological interpretation is required that excludes such entities from the scope of the profit and dividend taxation established therein. The Brazilian Federal Revenue Service cannot promote an expansive interpretation aimed at equating law firms with ordinary business corporations, particularly those enrolled in the Simples Nacional regime, whose differentiated legal regime derives directly from the essential character of legal practice to Justice and the Democratic Rule of Law. The distribution of results in law firms is not structurally equivalent to the distribution of corporate dividends, which is why the application of the new discipline, without express statutory provision, violates the ability-to-pay principle and breaks the constitutionally required competitive neutrality. The implicit functional institutional immunity derived from art. 133 of the Federal Constitution additionally prevents the State from, through indirect taxation, undermining the organizational structures through which legal practice discharges its constitutional function as a guarantee of judicial proceedings. The ruling in ADI 7.917, far from weakening the institutional position of the Brazilian Bar Association, reinforces the need for constitutional interpretation, particularly with respect to the prohibition against disproportionate treatment of small structures, the protection of taxpayers' legitimate expectations, and the material limits on the State's taxing power. In this context, the Federal Council of the Brazilian Bar Association holds full institutional standing to issue binding interpretive guidance, to file a direct action of unconstitutionality with a request for constitutional interpretation, to bring collective writs of mandamus, and to pursue the other constitutional review strategies discussed in this article, thereby preserving the special legal regime of the legal profession as an inalienable prerequisite of the Democratic Rule of Law.   Brasília, Federal District, February 21, 2026.   REFERENCES ATALIBA, Geraldo. Hipótese de Incidência Tributária [Tax Incidence Hypothesis]. 6th ed. São Paulo: Malheiros, 2002. BARROSO, Luís Roberto. Interpretação e Aplicação da Constituição [Interpretation and Application of the Constitution]. 7th ed. São Paulo: Saraiva, 2009. CANOTILHO, J.J. Gomes. Direito Constitucional e Teoria da Constituição [Constitutional Law and Theory of the Constitution]. 7th ed. Coimbra: Almedina, 2003. CARRAZZA, Roque Antonio. Curso de Direito Constitucional Tributário [Course on Constitutional Tax Law]. 31st ed. São Paulo: Malheiros, 2017. CARVALHO, Paulo de Barros. Curso de Direito Tributário [Course on Tax Law]. 30th ed. São Paulo: Saraiva, 2019. DI PIETRO, Maria Sylvia Zanella. Direito Administrativo [Administrative Law]. 35th ed. Rio de Janeiro: Forense, 2022. FERREIRA, Daniel. Teoria Geral da Infração Administrativa [General Theory of Administrative Offenses]. Belo Horizonte: Fórum, 2009. HESSE, Konrad. A Força Normativa da Constituição [The Normative Force of the Constitution]. Translated by Gilmar Ferreira Mendes. Porto Alegre: Sergio Antonio Fabris, 1991. MOREIRA, Egon Bockmann. Processo Administrativo [Administrative Procedure]. 5th ed. São Paulo: Malheiros, 2017. OLIVEIRA, Rafael Carvalho Rezende. Curso de Direito Administrativo [Course on Administrative Law]. 9th ed. Rio de Janeiro: Método, 2021. OSÓRIO, Fábio Medina. Direito Administrativo Sancionador [Administrative Sanctioning Law]. 6th ed. São Paulo: Thomson Reuters Brasil, 2019. [1]CARVALHO, Paulo de Barros. Curso de Direito Tributário [Course on Tax Law]. 30th ed. São Paulo: Saraiva, 2019. [2]ATALIBA, Geraldo. Hipótese de Incidência Tributária [Tax Incidence Hypothesis]. 6th ed. São Paulo: Malheiros, 2002. [3]CARRAZZA, Roque Antonio. Curso de Direito Constitucional Tributário [Course on Constitutional Tax Law]. 31st ed. São Paulo: Malheiros, 2017. [4]HESSE, Konrad. A Força Normativa da Constituição [The Normative Force of the Constitution]. Translated by Gilmar Ferreira Mendes. Porto Alegre: Sergio Antonio Fabris, 1991. [5]CANOTILHO, J.J. Gomes. Direito Constitucional e Teoria da Constituição [Constitutional Law and Theory of the Constitution]. 7th ed. Coimbra: Almedina, 2003.

Defense Independence and Narrative Non-Communication in Plea Bargaining Agreements

Fábio Medina Osório The autonomy of counsel is essential to truthfulness, with a proposal to prevent cross-influence between the accounts of investigated parties. Monday, March 30, 2026 Introduction Plea bargaining agreements, as set forth in Law 12.850/13, have become one of the primary instruments for combating organized crime in Brazil. This is a means of obtaining evidence grounded in the utility, effectiveness, and truthfulness of the information provided by the cooperating witness. Within this framework, the role of technical legal counsel assumes a central position — not merely as a safeguard of fundamental rights, but as a structural element of the very reliability of the institution. This article proposes a reinterpretation of plea bargaining agreements in light of the principle of defense independence, arguing that such independence constitutes a precondition for the duty of truthfulness. To that end, a parallel is drawn with the precautionary logic of criminal procedure, particularly with the precedents of the Brazilian Supreme Court (STF) that prohibit communication between investigated parties, and an implicit principle of narrative non-communication among cooperating witnesses with conflicting interests is proposed. Development Law 12.850/13 establishes, in its Article 3-C, the mandatory presence of an attorney in all plea bargaining negotiations, and, in Article 4, conditions the granting of benefits upon the effectiveness of the cooperation. It further provides for the replacement of defense counsel in cases of conflict of interest. A systematic reading of these provisions reveals that the legislature assigned to technical legal counsel a functional role in shaping the evidence — and not merely a formal assistance function. A plea bargaining agreement is not a mere spontaneous account. It is a legally oriented narrative, constructed through strategic decisions, selection of facts, chronological reconstruction, and evidentiary contextualization. In this environment, the narrative autonomy of the cooperating witness is a precondition for the validity of the evidence produced. The duty of truthfulness, although legally imposed upon the cooperating witness, depends on an institutional context that allows for its full realization. It is at this point that the conflict of interest assumes structural significance. The simultaneous representation by a single attorney of cooperating witnesses whose positions intersect — particularly in cases of reciprocal denunciations — introduces an objective limitation upon the independence of the defense. The attorney comes to hold confidential information belonging to multiple clients and to operate under cross-cutting duties of loyalty and confidentiality, which compromises their capacity for free counsel. The direct consequence is the potential contamination of the cooperative narrative. Accounts may be filtered, adjusted, or calibrated in accordance with parallel interests, even if not deliberately so. In such a scenario, the cooperation ceases to be an autonomous expression of truth and begins to take on the contours of a shared strategic construction. The parallel with the precautionary logic of criminal procedure reinforces this interpretation. The Code of Criminal Procedure (CPP) permits the imposition of measures prohibiting communication between investigated parties, with the objective of preventing the coordination of accounts and preserving the integrity of the evidence. The STF, in numerous precedents, has upheld such restrictions as legitimate instruments for the protection of investigations. If the legal system acknowledges that direct communication between investigated parties can compromise the production of evidence, then it must be recognized, with even greater reason, that indirect communication mediated by shared defense counsel produces an equivalent effect. What the precautionary measure prevents at the external level — the coordination of accounts — cannot be tolerated at the internal level of the formation of the cooperative narrative. From this observation emerges an interpretive proposal: Law 12.850/13 contains, implicitly, a principle of narrative non-communication among cooperating witnesses with mutually affected interests. This principle derives from the combination of the evidentiary nature of cooperation, the duty of truthfulness, the requirement of technical legal counsel, and the prohibition of conflicts of interest. Conclusion Plea bargaining agreements, as a means of obtaining evidence, require an institutional environment that guarantees the narrative autonomy of the cooperating witness. The independence of the defense, in this context, does not constitute a mere ethical requirement, but rather a structural condition for the realization of the duty of truthfulness and for the reliability of the evidence produced. The parallel with the precautionary measures that prohibit communication between investigated parties deepens this understanding, demonstrating that the legal system already recognizes the need to prevent the contamination of evidence through the alignment of accounts. The extension of this logic to the field of plea bargaining agreements leads to the recognition of an implicit principle of narrative non-communication. The prohibition of conflicts of interest in legal practice, within plea bargaining environments, must be understood as a foundational element of the validity of the institution. The concern is not merely to protect individual rights, but to preserve the integrity of the evidence, the quality of the investigation, and the legitimacy of criminal prosecution within the Rule of Law.

THE CNMP NATIONAL DATABASE IN THE AGE OF INVESTIGATIVE COMPLEXITY: CONSTITUTIONAL, STATISTICAL AND ALGORITHMIC FOUNDATIONS OF CRIMINAL TRACEABILITY

The CNMP National Data Repository in the Age of Investigative Complexity: Constitutional, Statistical, and Algorithmic Foundations of Penal Traceability Fábio Medina Osório Managing partner of Medina Osório Advogados. PhD in Administrative Law from the Complutense University of Madrid (Spain). Master's degree in Public Law from the Faculty of Law of the Federal University of Rio Grande do Sul (UFRGS). Former Prosecutor in Rio Grande do Sul. Former Assistant Secretary of Justice and Public Security of the State of Rio Grande do Sul. Former Chief Minister of the Attorney General's Office. President of the Special Commission on Administrative Sanctioning Law of the Federal Council of the OAB. Advisor to the MDA – Advocacy Defense Movement. President of the International Institute of State Law Studies (IIEDE). This article expresses the academic opinion of the author and not of any institution of which he is part or has been a member. Summary This essay examines the institutional need for a National Database under the governance of the National Council of the Public Prosecutor's Office (CNMP), conceived as an infrastructure for traceability, coherence and self-criticism in criminal prosecution. It is argued that the private ownership of public criminal action, the external control of police activity and the investigative power of the Public Prosecutor's Office, when interpreted in the context of the Digital Age, presuppose material conditions of intelligibility that cannot be achieved without structured bases, semantic standardization and systemic auditability. In data-driven investigation, the efficiency and integrity of the criminal justice system depend on uniform methodology for collecting, normalizing, resolving identity, and recording decisional and access trails. The article demonstrates — based on comparative evidence extracted from the national and international specialized literature — that the current Brazilian scenario is marked by severe fragmentation: twenty-seven distinct criminal statistical systems, absence of a national semantic standard, refusal of states to share microdata, and documented episodes of vulnerability of databases to criminal actors. Thus, a model of "informational unit" of the Public Prosecutor's Office is proposed, which does not replace national banks of the Executive (nor does it intend to absorb state banks), but organizes the data core of the Public Prosecutor's Office and establishes governed interoperability with external systems, according to standards of quality, security and algorithmic governance. The proposal is contextualized in the light of the General Data Protection Law (LGPD – Law 13,709/2018), CNMP Resolution 318/2025 (BDP/MP), MJSP Ordinance 1,123/2026 (Sinic) and relevant international regulatory frameworks. Keywords: National database — CNMP — Public Prosecutor's Office — External control — Statistics — Artificial intelligence — Auditability — Traceability — LGPD — Data protection. Abstract This essay discusses the institutional need for a National Data Repository governed by Brazil's National Council of the Public Prosecutor's Office (CNMP), conceived as infrastructure for traceability, coherence, and institutional self-critique in criminal prosecution. It argues that the Prosecutor's exclusive authority to bring public criminal actions, its external oversight of police activity, and its investigative powers, when interpreted in the Digital Age, require material conditions of intelligibility that cannot be achieved without structured databases, semantic standardization, and systemic auditability. In data-driven investigations, efficiency and integrity depend on uniform methodologies of collection, normalization, entity resolution, and robust trails for access and decision-making. Drawing on comparative evidence from national and international specialized literature, the paper demonstrates that the current Brazilian landscape is characterized by severe fragmentation — twenty-seven distinct criminal statistics systems, absence of national semantic standards, states refusing to share microdata, and documented episodes of database vulnerability to criminal actors. The paper proposes an informational unity model for the Public Prosecutor's Office, which does not replace Executive-branch national databases nor absorb state police databases, but organizes the Prosecutor's own core data and enables governed interoperability with external systems under quality, security, and AI governance standards. The proposal is contextualized in light of Brazil's General Data Protection Law (LGPD — Law 13,709/2018), CNMP Resolution 318/2025 (BDP/MP), Ministry of Justice Ordinance 1,123/2026 (Sinic), and relevant international normative frameworks. Keywords: National data repository — CNMP — Public Prosecutor — External oversight — Statistics — Artificial intelligence — Auditability — Traceability — Data protection — LGPD. Summary 1 Introduction — 2 External control, criminal prosecution and investigative power: the constitutional tripod of traceability — 3 Investigation as an informational phenomenon: when efficiency depends on language and method — 4 National database of the CNMP and national banks of the Executive: necessary distinctions — 5 Metric transparency in criminal prosecution: statistics as institutional listening — 6 Algorithmic standardization and auditability: from search to graph — 7 Public data infrastructure,  Interinstitutional Agreements and Informational Sovereignty — 8 Protection of Personal Data and Safeguards in Criminal Prosecution — 9 Conclusion: A New Architecture of External Control — 10 Bibliographic References — 11 Legislative References 1. Introduction The 1988 Constitution enshrined a set of classic guarantees — publicity, transparency, reasoning, due process, adversarial proceedings, ample defense — which, historically, were read as requirements oriented to the final decision-making act: the sentence, the judgment, the sanctioning administrative act. The Digital Age has shifted the center of gravity of this debate. Today, the concrete restriction of rights, in the criminal sphere, often materializes before the trial: in the investigative choices, in the criteria for prioritizing targets, in the construction of evidentiary narratives, in intelligence records, in the selection of what is sought and what is ignored. In other words: the decision, in the contemporary world, is composed of a chain of micro-decisions, often invisible, whose legitimacy depends on traceability. This scenario requires recognizing a methodological premise: one does not understand what cannot be reconstructed. Formal publicity of acts and classic transparency are no longer enough when criminal prosecution becomes dependent on massive databases, structured searches, and algorithmic correlations. If information is fragmented, if records are semantically incompatible between states, if there are no audit trails, the very rationality of the system loses density: the investigation may produce results, but it does not produce intelligibility; it can generate criminal action, but weakens the capacity for critical review; it can condemn, but it dissolves the legitimacy of the course.[1] The empirical diagnosis confirms this premise with force. A comprehensive survey on the situation of public security technologies in the Brazilian Federation Units revealed that twelve states do not even use disruptive technologies and another nine did not respond to requests for information during the survey.[2] The 2023-2024 Public Security Statistical Yearbook, prepared jointly by Ipea and the National Public Security Secretariat (Senasp/MJSP), is even more accurate: Brazil has twenty-seven different criminal statistics systems among civil police forces alone, and the country "still does not have a structured public security information system, with reliable data."[3] The regulatory vacuum is also documented: the General Data Protection Law (LGPD – Law No. 13,709/2018) provides, in its article 4, an exception for public security and criminal prosecution activities, but this exception, in the absence of a specific law that disciplines it, becomes a zone of opacity, making it difficult to control and be transparent about how data is treated by state agencies.[4] In this context, it is important to observe the role of the National Council of the Public Prosecutor's Office (CNMP) which, according to its own official definition, carries out the administrative, financial and disciplinary oversight of the Public Prosecutor's Office in Brazil and its members, respecting the autonomy of the institution. The body, created on December 30, 2004 by Constitutional Amendment No. 45, had its installation completed on June 21, 2005, with headquarters in Brasília-DF. Formed by 14 members representing different sectors of society, the CNMP aims to imprint a national vision to the MP, which is a result of the constitutional principle of institutional unity. The Council is responsible for guiding and supervising all branches of the Brazilian Public Prosecutor's Office: the Federal Public Prosecutor's Office (MPU), composed of the Federal Public Prosecutor's Office (MPF), the Military Public Prosecutor's Office (MPM), the Labor Public Prosecutor's Office (MPT) and the Federal District and Territories (MPDFT); and the Public Prosecutor's Office of the States (MPE). Chaired by the Attorney General of the Republic, the Council is composed of four members of the MPU, three members of the MPE, two judges appointed one by the Federal Supreme Court and the other by the Superior Court of Justice, two lawyers appointed by the Federal Council of the Brazilian Bar Association, and two citizens of notable legal knowledge and unblemished reputation, one appointed by the Chamber of Deputies and the other by the Federal Senate. Before taking office at the CNMP, the names presented are considered by the Commission on Constitution and Justice and Citizenship (CCJ) of the Federal Senate, then go to the Senate Plenary and go to the sanction of the President of the Republic. Guided by the control and administrative transparency of the Public Prosecutor's Office and its members, the CNMP is an entity open to social control and to Brazilian entities, which can forward complaints against members or bodies of the Public Prosecutor's Office, including against its auxiliary services. Such principles must be interpreted in harmony with the principles of efficiency, impersonality, legality, due process, economy, administrative morality, prohibition of arbitrariness by public authorities and the right to understand the content of decisions taken by public authorities.[5] The implementation of the institutional unity of the Public Prosecutor's Office, in the criminal sphere and in the fight against violent and organized crime, involves national control of the exercise of the institution's investigative power and external control of the police in an integrated and harmonious manner, through strategic and nationally articulated planning. It is at this point that the constitutional architecture of the Public Prosecutor's Office gains centrality. The CNMP must ensure institutional unity in the management of intelligence of the Brazilian Public Prosecutor's Office and, above all, this management should have a first major impact on public security and criminal investigations throughout the national territory. The Public Prosecutor's Office is not only the private holder of public criminal action (article 129, I, of the Federal Constitution), but also exercises external control of police activity (article 129, VII), in addition to holding requisition powers and, in the jurisprudential horizon consolidated by the Federal Supreme Court (RE 593.727, Topic 184), investigative powers compatible with the Constitution,  as long as it is under guarantees. The tripod accusation-control-investigation puts the Public Prosecutor's Office in an inevitable position: it is the recipient and inspector of the investigative product. However, recipient and controller can only operate in a data environment if they have adequate infrastructure. The absence of this infrastructure produces an essential contradiction: the Public Prosecutor's Office carries increasing constitutional responsibilities, but inherits a dispersed, heterogeneous and often opaque informational universe. Hence the hypothesis of this essay: external control, although not hierarchical, has a conformative nature in the digital world. It conforms to the minimum of registerability, auditability and semantic standardization required for police activity to be controllable, comparable and correctable, and for the ownership of the criminal action to be exercised with national coherence. From this perspective, the CNMP's National Database emerges as an infrastructure of the Public Prosecutor's Office itself: an institutional memory center, a standardization base, and a bridge of governed interoperability with external systems. It is essential, however, to delimit the object to avoid misunderstandings. The National Bank of the CNMP does not intend to replace national banks of the Executive Branch. The Ministry of Justice and Public Security (MJSP) established the National Criminal Information System (Sinic), by Ordinance No. 1,123/2026, as the official basis for consolidating and making criminal information available. The recent legislative environment — based on the SUSP Law (Law No. 13,675/2018) — also designs thematic national databases in the fight against organized crime, with a federative logic of interoperability. The CNMP Bank has its own vocation: to organize the data center of the Public Prosecutor's Office and allow controlled, auditable and finalistic interoperability — without indiscriminate absorption of state police databases. 2. External control, criminal action and investigative power: the constitutional tripod of traceability External control is not an administrative command. This statement, although correct, is often misused: as if the absence of hierarchy implies the absence of institutional power. In the Digital Age, precisely the opposite occurs. When police activity materializes in systems, records, and information chains, external control needs to focus on what makes the activity verifiable: minimal records, metadata integrity, traceability of changes, preservation of versions, minimum standardization of remittance, and the ability to reconstruct investigative decisions. The private ownership of the public criminal action imposes on the Public Prosecutor's Office the responsibility for organizing the accusation based on comprehensible and criticizable evidence. This increasingly requires that investigative acts reach the Public Prosecutor's Office accompanied by essential metadata and trails that allow subsequent measurement. Each piece of a police investigation sent to the Public Prosecutor's Office carries, in the digital age, implicit metadata — timestamps, terminal identifiers, access logs, history of changes — which, when preserved, allow the evidential integrity to be assessed, and, when suppressed or corrupted, make control unfeasible. Investigation, in turn, cannot be conceived as an administrative "black box": it is the field where fundamental rights are under tension on a daily basis. External control gains density when it becomes a requirement for auditability, and this auditability, in an informational environment, is always a standard phenomenon. Forensic analysis systems that apply large-scale language models (LLMs) to evidence extracted from mobile devices—such as the framework developed by the South Korean National Police Agency—demonstrate that minimal metadata structuring is a condition of epistemic validity: without precise identification of sender, recipient, timestamp, and conversational context,  Digital evidence loses the chain of custody that makes it usable in prosecution.[6] The inter-organizational dimension of this challenge is equally relevant. In Brazil, investigative powers are distributed among the civil police, the federal police, the military police (in some states), and the Public Prosecutor's Office itself — with shared attributions that historically generate distortions in the production and sharing of intelligence.[7] The absence of a structured data-driven intelligence model — such as the Intelligence-Led Policing (ILP) practiced in the United Kingdom (National Intelligence Model) and adopted as a guideline by the Public Security Intelligence Subsystem (SISP) in Brazil — results in intuition-based patrolling, historically low case resolution rates, and inability to detect criminal networks with interstate operations.[8] 3. Investigation as an informational phenomenon: when efficiency depends on language and method The investigative inefficiency in Brazil is not explained only by the scarcity of human or technological resources. It is explained, in a significant part, by the absence of a common language between databases. Data-driven investigation relies on finding relationships between scattered records—people, addresses, vehicles, weapons, corporate ties, communications, georeferences. When each state registers in its own language, the national system does not see networks — it sees fragments. This phenomenon produces a paradox: the investigation is digitized, but the analog logic of the record is preserved. The consequences are predictable: the search does not work, the correlation is precarious, homonyms proliferate, duplicity sets in, and statistical analysis loses validity. The quality of the data is no longer a technical detail and becomes a requirement of efficiency and legitimacy. The 2023-2024 Public Security Statistical Yearbook documents this paradox accurately: most states use their own collection systems (such as RAI in Goiás, SROP in Mato Grosso, and Millenium in the Federal District) and then export spreadsheets or employ Business Intelligence tools to pass on statistical data to the federal government via Sinesp VDE. Some states refuse to send microdata alleging barriers linked to the LGPD "inadequately", compromising the statistical validity and, by extension, the rationality of public policies based on this data. International research on disruptive technologies in public security provides instructive contrast. The SafetySmart platform, operated by SoundThinking, Inc. in the United States, processes more than 1.3 billion structured and unstructured records from multiple jurisdictions through a federated search engine, CrimeTracer, which allows it to "access and cross-reference crucial information from multiple IT agencies across cities, counties, states and across the country." The CaseBuilder module digitally structures all case information in a unified format, eliminating manual processes and siloed systems. The comparison is not a recommendation for the privatization of criminal intelligence – a model that raises serious objections of informational sovereignty and democratic control, as discussed later – but a demonstration that semantic standardization and federated search are technically feasible and operationally transformative. At the level of evidentiary microanalysis, recent research demonstrates that structuring the metadata of messages extracted from smartphones—with standardized fields of sender, recipient, timestamp, chat room identifier, and message type—allows language models (such as GPT, in its more advanced versions, and Claude, in its more advanced versions) to automate reading,  understanding context and extracting hidden criminal evidence, dramatically reducing the time required to analyze massive volumes of data in strict procedural timelines. The Italian study on Knowledge Graphs and NLP applied to the analysis of messages from real fraud and corruption investigations points in the same direction: the structuring of metadata (list of participants, times, senders, attachments, entities identified by NER – Recognition of Named Entities) is a precondition for investigators to extract insights without manually reading all the seized material. "Contestable AI" — a concept proposed by German researchers at the Federal University of the Bundeswehr in Munich — goes further: it proposes that criminal intelligence analysis systems are not only explainable, but contestable, allowing the human investigator to question, correct, and refine algorithmic outputs through semantic modeling and structured human supervision.[9] These developments converge on the same conclusion: the quality of the input data—its completeness, semantic standardization, traceability, and completeness—determines the quality ceiling of the output analysis, whether done by humans or algorithms. 4. National bank of the CNMP and national banks of the Executive: necessary distinctions CNMP Resolution No. 318/2025 establishes the Procedural Database of the Public Prosecutor's Office (BDP/MP) and establishes rules for treatment, governance, and use. It is the institutional core of the CNMP's National Bank: procedural and extrajudicial data of the MP, organized under national standards and its own governance. The basis is justified by the constitutional nature of the Public Prosecutor's Office as the holder of criminal and fiscal action in the legal system: without a structured institutional memory, the exercise of these functions is systematically dependent on information produced by third parties — which compromises both functional independence and the quality of prosecution. Sinic, in turn, was established by the MJSP, by Ordinance No. 1,123/2026, as the official basis for consolidating and making available criminal information — indictments, complaints, and convictions — with the vocation of becoming the "single source" for issuing the National Criminal Certificate and the Criminal Records Sheet, progressively replacing the fragmented systems of courts, civil police, and identification institutes of the Federation Units.[10] The SUSP ecosystem (Law No. 13,675/2018) provides the legal framework for national integration of public security data, with Sinesp as the reference system for police statistics.[11] Thus, the CNMP Bank should be designed as: (i) the national base of the Public Prosecutor's Office (nucleus), comprising the procedural and extrajudicial data produced by the Public Prosecutor's Office in all spheres; (ii) governed interoperability with federal and state bases (bridge), through technical protocols, sharing agreements and audit trails; and (iii) analytical and statistical layer (institutional intelligence), which allows the CNMP to exercise its function of planning, evaluating, and controlling criminal prosecution. The legitimacy of the project depends precisely on this distinction: not to duplicate, not to absorb indiscriminately, but to integrate with governance. The distinction between controller and operator, under the terms of the LGPD (Law No. 13,709/2018), is essential here. The CNMP, as the public controller of BDP/MP's data, defines the purposes and means of processing; the police and other agencies that feed the system operate as sources; and any technology companies hired to develop state connectors and normalize data act as technical operators, subject to the controller's instructions and subject to periodic audits. This responsibility architecture is a condition of compliance with article 23 of the LGPD, which imposes on the Government the duty to publish its processing rules and to appoint the Data Protection Officer (DPO). Sinic incorporates, as an express normative guideline, records of people convicted of being part of criminal organizations or factions — which densifies criminal intelligence against organized crime at the national level. The experience of the Integrated Network of Genetic Profile Banks (RIBPG), which already accumulates more than 254 thousand genetic profiles in federated architecture (23 state banks connected to the National Bank of Genetic Profiles – BNPG), demonstrates that this interoperability is technically feasible and institutionally sustainable.[12] The RIBPG model — with a technical standard defined in the Manual of Operational Procedures, standardized software (CODIS) and connectivity to the INTERPOL base — offers a template for the CNMP Bank: federated architecture, centralized technical standard, public governance and external auditability. 5. Metric transparency in criminal prosecution: statistics as institutional listening In criminal prosecution, statistics should not be reduced to annual reports or occurrence counts. In the Age of Complexity, statistics is the scientific form of institutional listening: it identifies patterns, reveals anomalies, detects inequalities, and allows for self-criticism. This function is only possible with comparable data and with measurable quality. The 2023-2024 Statistical Yearbook of Public Security documents that organized crime (such as PCC and CV) operates strongly in border regions (North and Midwest), using transnational routes for the flow of drugs and weapons, but "there is currently no federal initiative or single and consolidated database that integrates the various institutions (Senappen, CNJ, Federal Police,  Coaf, Abin) for a comprehensive diagnosis of organized crime". The absence of an integrated database forces researchers to construct proxies — indirect markers — using existing databases (Sinesp), such as the ratio between completed and attempted homicides, seizures of large-caliber weapons, and rates of intentional deaths within the prison system. International frameworks of statistical quality gain relevance here. The IMF's Data Quality Assessment Framework (DQAF) and the United Nations Fundamental Principles of Official Statistics (UN Resolution 68/261) enshrine integrity, reliability, confidentiality, and responsible use as conditions of public trust.[13] These principles have direct implications for the CNMP Bank: (i) UN Principle 6 determines that individual data collected by statistical agencies must be "strictly confidential and used exclusively for statistical purposes", which imposes a structural separation between the aggregated analytical layer of the database and the individual procedural data, with differentiated access controls; (ii) Principle 8 prescribes that "coordination between statistical agencies within countries is essential to achieve consistency and efficiency in the statistical system", justifying the role of the CNMP as national coordinator of statistics of the Public Prosecutor's Office; and (iii) Principle 9 defends the international standardization of concepts and classifications, guiding the choices of schema and legal ontology for the system. Research on predictive policing in Brazil reveals that states and municipalities have adopted "self-regulation" in the application of algorithms, "subjecting public security to methodological flaws, government discretion, data leakage, and discriminatory bias."[14] This fragmentary self-regulation compromises not only investigative efficiency, but the legitimacy of the statistics produced: when a state's algorithm is fed with data that "portrays the selectivity of the public security and criminal justice system," statistical inferences amplify bias rather than correct it. The Court of Auditors of the State of São Paulo, when auditing the Detecta system, found "conflicts between operational systems, lack of infrastructure and training", which illustrates that the absence of structured governance affects both the operational validity and the statistical reliability of the data. A documented episode dramatically illustrates the risk of the absence of governance: in 2023, an investigation by the Federal Police revealed that the PCC (First Command of the Capital) was able to access the Detecta camera system, using the state database to monitor an unmarked Civil Police vehicle in the midst of an assassination plot.[15] The episode demonstrates that public security databases without adequate access controls, authentication, anomaly monitoring, and vulnerability management can be instrumentalized by organized crime itself — converting it from a protection tool into a threat vector. 6. Algorithmic standardization and auditability: from search to graph Algorithmic standardization does not mean imposing a single software on states. It means enforcing minimal properties: (i) versioned canonical schema — data structure with defined fields and types, version-controlled to ensure backward compatibility; (ii) semantic dictionary — controlled vocabulary of legal and criminological terms that ensures that the same phenomenon is described in the same way in all systems; (iii) identity resolution rules — algorithms that identify whether two records refer to the same individual, entity, or event, eliminating duplicates and homonyms; (iv) immutable logs — access and operation records that cannot be changed retroactively, essential to the digital chain of custody; (v) transformation trails (data lineage) — tracking of all transformations undergone by the data from collection to analytical use; and (vi) quality metrics by source and by state — measurable indicators of completeness, consistency, accuracy, and timeliness. AI risk governance, as emphasized by the NIST AI RMF 1.0 (Artificial Intelligence Risk Management Framework), is based on the premise that risks emerge from the interaction between technical components and social and institutional factors, requiring documentation, control, and continuous management.[16] The framework organizes the governance of AI systems into four functions — Govern, Map, Measure, and Manage — directly applicable to the life cycle of the algorithms used in the search, correlation, and analysis of criminal data. The European AI Act (Regulation (EU) 2024/1689) enshrines risk management, transparency and governance obligations that are especially relevant when systems impact fundamental rights and enforcement activities.[17] The regulation classifies AI systems aimed at law enforcement as high-risk, requiring impact assessment on fundamental rights before deployment, structured human oversight, accuracy testing, and assessment of demographic disparities. Although it is a rule of European law, the AI Act works as a reference parameter for the governance of similar systems in Brazil, especially in the absence of specific legislation for AI applied to public security. The U.S. Department of Justice's Final Report on AI and Criminal Justice (2024) — prepared in compliance with Section 7.1(b) of Executive Order 14.110 (repealed on January 20, 2025 by President Trump, without prejudice to the documents produced during its validity) — points out that AI tools used to "identify criminal suspects, predict crimes,  apply digital forensics techniques, monitor social networks, or track the physical location of individuals" must be subject to AI Impact Assessments and structured risk management practices, with procedures to audit input data and avoid discriminatory feedback loops.[18] White House Memorandum M-25-21 (OMB, 2025) reinforces this guidance, mandating that Chief AI Officers and Chief Data Officers coordinate cross-agency interoperability criteria and invest in "quality data assets, technology infrastructure, and governance in the collection, curation, and preparation of information."[19] These milestones help give contemporary density to the central argument: databases and algorithms are not just tools; they are infrastructures of power that require auditability. UNESCO's Recommendation on the Ethics of Artificial Intelligence (2021) is explicit in prohibiting the use of AI for "social scoring or mass surveillance" and in requiring systems deployed by States for law enforcement to submit to independent oversight mechanisms, ensuring that training data "does not reinforce bias, inequalities or discrimination".[20] On the technical level, the Knowledge Graph architecture — as proposed in the Neo4j-based system for analyzing messages from criminal investigations — offers an alternative to the classical relational model to represent the complexity of the investigated networks: instead of tables, the graph represents entities (people, organizations, places) and their relationships (communicated with, transferred money to,  appeared in the same place as) with semantic enrichment by NER (Named Entity Recognition) and automatic transcription of audios. The FEDLEGAL benchmark, discussed in the Computational Law literature, proposes Federated Learning as an alternative architecture to train AI models on sensitive legal data without physically centralizing the data — preserving the privacy of distributed databases and, at the same time, allowing collective learning.[21] 7. Public data infrastructure, interinstitutional agreements and informational sovereignty The viability of the CNMP Bank, on a federative scale, presupposes interoperability agreements and protocols with state systems, with the MJSP SINIC, with Sinesp and with thematic bases such as the RIBPG. These instruments must define: (a) the types of data being shared (category, purpose and sensitivity); (b) the legal bases applicable in each case (article 7, III or VI; article 11, II, f; and article 23 of the LGPD, depending on whether or not the data is of a sensitive nature); (c) the technical safeguards required (encryption at rest and in transit, role-based access control, multi-factor authentication, immutable access logs); (d) the responsibilities of each party (controller, co-controller or processor); and (e) the audit and accountability mechanisms. The company eventually hired by the CNMP must act as a technical operator, implementing state connectors and normalizing data to the national standard, under the governance of the public controller. This relationship must be governed by a data processing agreement (article 39 of the LGPD), with periodic audit clauses, prohibition of the use of data for purposes other than the contract, mandatory notification in the event of a security incident (article 48 of the LGPD) and secure termination of the processing at the end of the contract. The model is not one of privatization of criminal intelligence — which raises serious objections of informational sovereignty and democratic accountability — but of technical outsourcing with public responsibility preserved. International experience provides relevant parameters. The US Tribal Law and Order Act of 2010 demonstrates that the integration of databases between entities from different spheres can be made possible by "gradual access" mechanisms, conditioned to the fulfillment of technical and legal requirements.[22] The model of American fusion centers — centers where criminal agencies at the local, state, and federal levels integrate and share intelligence — offers a reference for the articulation between the CNMP Bank and the intelligence centers of the state and federal police. At the global level, INTERPOL's architecture demonstrates that criminal intelligence databases with transnational reach are viable under strict governance: all data shared by member countries "comply with strict international standards, with a legal basis and built-in security features", with structured access through the secure I-24/7 system and the ability to simultaneously consult the national databases and the central database,  in real time.[23] This reinforces that informational sovereignty is not incompatible with interoperability — as long as access is controlled, the purpose is defined, and the data remains under the governance of public authority. The objective of the CNMP Bank is not to "copy everything", but to create an auditable bridge that allows search and correlation on a national scale, with preservation of functional confidentiality and compliance with the LGPD. Criminal intelligence data, communications protected by professional secrecy, defendants' mental health data, information on victims of sexual crimes, and protected witness data require differentiated treatment, with more restrictive access controls and more narrowly defined purposes. 8. Protection of personal data and safeguards in criminal prosecution The articulation between public security and personal data protection is one of the most complex knots in the contemporary Brazilian legal system. The LGPD (Law No. 13,709/2018), in its article 4, III, excludes from its scope of application the processing of data for the exclusive purposes of public security, national defense, State security, and activities of investigation and prosecution of criminal offenses — excluding such processing operations from the general incidence of the law and referring them to the specific law to be enacted. This exception, however, does not equate to the absence of protection. Two converging arguments support this assertion. First, the constitutional argument: the fundamental rights to privacy (article 5, X), data protection (article 5, LXXIX, with EC No. 115/2022) and due process of law (article 5, LIV) constitute insurmountable limits even for criminal prosecution, regardless of ordinary law. Second, the systemic argument: the absence of a specific law does not create an absolute normative vacuum, since the following affect the matter: (i) the Code of Criminal Procedure (CPP), which regulates the production of evidence and the integrity of chains of custody; (ii) the CNMP resolutions on data handling and functional secrecy; (iii) Convention 108+ of the Council of Europe, to which Brazil is not a party, but which functions as an interpretative parameter for data protection in law enforcement contexts; and (iv) UNESCO's guidelines on ethics in AI, which impose specific safeguards for data relating to offences, criminal prosecutions and convictions. For the purposes of application to the CNMP Bank, the principles of data protection operate as follows. The principle of purpose determines that each type of data can only be processed for the purpose that justified its collection — data collected for criminal identification purposes cannot be reused for the purposes of behavioral profiling or continuous surveillance. The principle of necessity imposes that the bank collects only the minimum amount of data indispensable for the defined purposes, prohibiting the speculative collection or storage of unnecessary data. The principle of adequacy requires that the means of processing be proportionate to the purpose pursued. The principle of transparency requires the publication of processing rules and the designation of a data officer (DPO). The principle of security requires the adoption of technical and administrative measures to protect data against unauthorized access, destruction, loss and alteration. The principle of accountability imposes on the controller the obligation to demonstrate compliance and to respond for damages caused as a result of the processing. These principles impose, in practice, a set of operational safeguards for the CNMP Bank: (a) mapping of data categories and sensitivity assessment (data related to infractions, racial origin, health, sexual orientation and private life receive reinforced protection); (b) role-based access control (RBAC), with differentiated profiles for intelligence consultants, prosecutors, system administrators, and auditors; (c) immutable access logs, periodically audited by an external body; (d) anonymization or pseudonymization of data for statistical and analytical purposes, preserving the identified data only for specific procedural purposes; (e) Data Protection Impact Assessment (DPIA) prior to the deployment of new analytics modules, especially those using AI; and (f) incident response plan, with notification to the CNMP, the National Data Protection Authority (ANPD) and, when applicable, to the subject of the affected data. One specific risk deserves attention: algorithmic bias. When the data that feeds a criminal AI system were collected in the context of selective policing — with overrepresentation of certain population groups in the records of suspects, infractions, and convictions — the algorithms trained on this basis reproduce and amplify structural discrimination, violating the principles of equality (article 5, I, of the FC) and non-discrimination. Mitigation requires: (i) bias audit on the input data and on the outputs of the system; (ii) demographic disparity tests in analytical results; (iii) documentation of the model's design choices and limitations; and (iv) mandatory human oversight over decisions that impact individual rights. 9. Conclusion: A New External Control Architecture External control, in the digital world, is not limited to inspections and recommendations. It is realized as a requirement for traceability. Traceability, in turn, depends on common language, collection methodology, data quality, and auditability of accesses and transformations. Without these conditions, external control remains rhetorical — a formal guarantee that does not reach the field where decisions are actually made: in the chain of investigative micro-decisions that precede the accusatory act. The construction of the CNMP's National Database, based on the BDP/MP and articulated with the national databases of the Executive — especially Sinic — through governed interoperability, represents an institutional architecture capable of increasing investigative efficiency, strengthening fundamental rights, and allowing self-criticism of the criminal justice system. This architecture is necessary, but not sufficient: it needs to be accompanied by a specific law for the processing of data in criminal prosecution (to be approved in the manner required by article 4, paragraph 1, of the LGPD), a National Data Protection Authority (ANPD) strengthened in its capacity to oversee the Public Power, and an institutional culture of data governance that still needs to be built in Brazilian public security organizations. The international literature converges, with variations of emphasis, around five fundamental lessons for the construction of this type of infrastructure: (i) data fragmentation is the main obstacle to effective criminal intelligence, and semantic standardization is a precondition for integration; (ii) the centralization of data without adequate governance creates risks of abuse, discrimination, and instrumentalization by criminal actors; (iii) human oversight is irreplaceable — algorithms identify patterns, but do not exercise judgment; (iv) external accountability (auditing, parliamentary oversight, judicial control) is a condition for legitimacy; and (v) federated interoperability — an architecture in which data resides in the agencies of origin and is accessed by controlled consultation, as in the RIBPG and INTERPOL model — is more compatible with Brazilian federalism and data protection principles than unrestricted physical centralization. The Public Prosecutor's Office, as the holder of the criminal action and guardian of the Democratic Rule of Law (article 127, caput, of the Federal Constitution), is responsible for leading this process – not because the National Bank is its exclusive property, but because no other institutional actor has the same constitutional scope as the mandate to accuse, control and investigate. The informational unity of the Public Prosecutor's Office is not centralism; It is the epistemic presupposition of a criminal prosecution that aspires to coherence, equity and the possibility of being corrected. 10. Bibliographic references AMBROSIO, Gleiner Pedroso Ferreira; BARBOSA, André Luis Jardini. The paradigm of the implementation of artificial intelligence in Brazilian public security: regulation versus efficiency. Journal of Legal Studies of UNESP, v. 28, n. 48, 2024. ARRIETA, Alejandro Barredo et al. Explainable Artificial Intelligence (XAI): concepts, taxonomies, opportunities and challenges toward responsible AI. Information Fusion, v. 58, p. 82-115, 2020. CHMIELINSKI, Kasia et al. The CLeAR Documentation Framework for AI Transparency: recommendations for practitioners and context for policymakers. Cambridge, MA: Shorenstein Center/HKS, 2024. GROSSI, Alexandre Viezzer. The application of Artificial Intelligence in Brazilian public security: the case of São Paulo and the analysis of PL No. 2338/2023. Journal of Public Policies & Cities, v. 14, n. 4, 2025. ISSN: 2359-1552. DOI: https://doi.org/10.23900/2359-1552v14n4-72-2025. INTERPOL. Rules on the Processing of Data (RPD). Lyon: INTERPOL, 2019. INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND (IMF). Data Quality Assessment Framework (DQAF). Washington, D.C.: IMF, 2012. IPEA; SENASP/MJSP. Statistical Yearbook of Public Security 2023-2024. Brasília: Ipea, 2025. DOI: https://dx.doi.org/10.38116/ri-anuario-estatistico-2023-2024. KERDVIBULVECH, Chutisant. Big Data and AI-driven evidence analysis: a global perspective on citation trends, accessibility, and future research in legal applications. Journal of Big Data, v. 11, n. 180, 2024. KIM, Kyung-Jong; LEE, Chan-Hwi; BAE, So-Eun; CHOI, Ju-Hyun; KANG, Wook. Digital forensics in law enforcement: A case study of LLM-driven evidence analysis. Forensic Science International: Digital Investigation, v. 54, art. 301939, 2025. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.fsidi.2025.301939. KÜÇÜK, Dilek; CAN, Fazli. Computational law: datasets, benchmarks, and ontologies. arXiv, 2025. Preprint 2503.04305v2. MAORO, Falk; GEIERHOS, Michaela. Contestable AI for criminal intelligence analysis: improving decision-making through semantic modeling and human oversight. Frontiers in Artificial Intelligence, v. 8, art. 1602998, 2025. DOI: 10.3389/frai.2025.1602998. MJSP/CG-RIBPG. XXII Report of the Integrated Network of Genetic Profile Banks (RIBPG): Statistical data and results — Nov/2024 to May/2025. Brasília: MJSP, May 2025. NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF STANDARDS AND TECHNOLOGY (NIST). Artificial Intelligence Risk Management Framework (AI RMF 1.0). Gaithersburg, MD: NIST, 2023. (NIST. AI.100-1). DOI: https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.AI.100-1. ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT (OECD). Recommendation of the Council on Artificial Intelligence. Paris: OECD, 2019 (revisada em 2024). OSÓRIO, Fábio Medina. The right to understanding in the era of technological complexity: constitutional, statistical and algorithmic foundations of decision-making transparency. Revista dos Tribunais, v. 1077/2025, jul. 2025. DTR\2025\7689. PADIU, Bogdan; IACOB, Radu; REBEDEA, Traian; DASCALU, Mihai. To what extent have LLMs reshaped the legal domain so far? A scoping literature review. Information, v. 15, n. 11, 2024. POZZI, Riccardo; BARBERA, Valentina; PRINCIPE, Renzo Alva; GIARDINI, Davide; PALMONARI, Matteo. Combining Knowledge Graphs and NLP to Analyze Instant Messaging Data in Criminal Investigations. In: Proceedings of WISE 2024. Springer, 2024. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-96-0567-5_30. PYTLOWANCIV, Diogo Fernando Sampaio. Intelligence-Led Policing and its Possibility of Implementation in Brazil. Brazilian Journal of Police Sciences, v. 15, n. 1, p. 103-123, Jan./Apr. 2024. ISSN: 2318-6917. RIGANO, Christopher. Using Artificial Intelligence to Address Criminal Justice Needs. NIJ Journal, n. 280. Washington, D.C.: National Institute of Justice, jan. 2019. NCJ 252038. SOUNDTHINKING, INC. Form 10-K: Annual Report Pursuant to Section 13 or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (Fiscal Year Ended December 31, 2024). U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, 2025. Commission File Number 001-38107; Nasdaq: SSTI. TSUNODA, Denise Fukumi; CÂNDIDO, Ana Clara; GUIMARÃES, André José Ribeiro. Disruptive technologies in public security: a Brazilian situational analysis. Revista Tecnologia e Sociedade, v. 20, n. 61, p. 317-333, jul./set. 2024. DOI: 10.3895/rts.v20n61.18408. UNESCO. Recommendation on the Ethics of Artificial Intelligence. Paris: UNESCO, 2021. Código SHS/BIO/REC-AIETHICS/2021. UNITED NATIONS. Fundamental Principles of Official Statistics. Resolution 68/261. New York: United Nations Statistics Division, 2014. A/RES/68/261. UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE. Artificial Intelligence and Criminal Justice: Final Report. Washington, D.C.: U.S. DOJ, 3 dez. 2024. VOUGHT, Russell T. M-25-21: Accelerating Federal Use of AI through Innovation, Governance, and Public Trust. Washington, D.C.: Executive Office of the President, Office of Management and Budget, 3 abr. 2025. 11. Legislative references BRAZIL. Constitution of the Federative Republic of Brazil of 1988. BRAZIL. Constitutional Amendment No. 115, of February 10, 2022. It includes the protection of personal data among the fundamental rights and guarantees (art. 5, LXXIX, FC). BRAZIL. Law No. 13,675, of June 11, 2018. Establishes the Unified Public Security System (SUSP). BRAZIL. Law No. 13,709, of August 14, 2018. General Law for the P

INTEGRITY IN THE PUBLIC SECTOR, LEGAL DATABASES AND ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE

The fundamental right to comprehension and the digital revolution as an agenda for the Brazilian Public Prosecution Service Fábio Medina Osório Lawyer · Former Minister of the Attorney General’s Office · Former Public Prosecutor in Rio Grande do Sul · Doctor of Administrative Law from the Complutense University of Madrid Abstract This article examines the fundamental right to comprehension of the decisions of public authorities as a constitutional requirement derived from the principles of publicity, the duty to give reasons for decisional acts, due process of law and the prohibition of arbitrariness by public powers. It is argued that the digital revolution and the advancement of artificial intelligence render imperative the structuring of integrated legal databases, with national algorithmic standardisation, as a condition of institutional integrity in the public sector. The article also examines the pioneering role of the Brazilian Public Prosecution Service in this process, the critique of bureaucratic façade compliance and the need for a culture of statistics and continuity in State policies as prerequisites for national development. Keywords: Right to comprehension; institutional integrity; legal databases; artificial intelligence; Public Prosecution Service; compliance; State policies; statistics. 1. Introduction The digital revolution is not an external phenomenon to Law — it reconfigures it from within. The advancement of artificial intelligence and the proliferation of large-scale databases impose on legal institutions a choice: to adapt with scientific rigour or to maintain opaque, incoherent and uncontrollable decision-making structures. This article proposes that such adaptation is not merely a technical convenience, but a constitutional requirement. The central axis of the argument is the fundamental right to comprehension of the decisions of public authorities — a right not expressly stated in the text of the Federal Constitution of 1988, but which emerges from the systematic conjunction of the principles of publicity, duty to give reasons, due process of law and prohibition of arbitrariness by public powers. In the age of artificial intelligence, this right assumes precise institutional contours: it demands the structuring of integrated, auditable and statistically controlled legal databases. 2. The Fundamental Right to Comprehension of Public Decisions 2.1 Constitutional Foundations The right to comprehension does not appear expressly in the catalogue of fundamental rights in the Constitution of 1988. Its construction is necessarily systematic: it results from the interconnection between the right to publicity of judicial and administrative acts, the right to reasons for decisions, substantive due process of law and, especially, what Professor Eduardo García de Enterría — Professor of the Universidad Complutense de Madrid and one of the greatest administrative law scholars of the twentieth century — termed the principle of the prohibition of arbitrariness by public powers. This principle, extracted since the nineteenth century from the jurisprudence of the United States Supreme Court, translates the requirement that the exercise of public power be rational, coherent and traceable. In the digital age, this requirement materialises in a concrete manner: without structured databases and qualified statistics, it is not possible to verify whether similar decisions receive equal treatment, whether there are systematic biases in decision-making patterns, or whether precedents are respected consistently. 2.2 Institutional Radiations of the Right to Comprehension The right to comprehension radiates consequences beyond the Judiciary. It reaches the Public Prosecution Service — whose leniency agreements, civil non-prosecution agreements, conduct adjustment terms and disciplinary jurisprudence need to be organised in databases that allow self-referencing, verification of coherence and effective implementation of the principle of institutional unity. It equally reaches the administrative decisions of municipalities, states and the Federal Union, public contracts, privatisations and the provisioning of liabilities. The Judiciary is the institution that has advanced most in this area, but even there significant gaps persist for research and statistical control purposes. In the other branches and institutions, the void is even more pronounced: administrative decisions that affect and restrict fundamental rights continue, to a large extent, without algorithmic parameterisation, without a structured database and without national auditability. 3. Legal Databases and National Algorithmic Standardisation 3.1 The National Dimension as a Structural Requirement One of the recurring errors in the debate on public security and institutional integrity is the assumption that criminal and decisional phenomena are essentially local. The reality is otherwise: criminal organisations such as the Comando Vermelho and the PCC operate with transnational logic, recruiting human resources throughout the Brazilian territory and beyond its borders. Similarly, patterns of corruption, decisional distortions and administrative irregularities follow systemic dynamics that only become visible when data is analysed at a national scale. The draft law on the National Database, drawn up within the Ministry of Justice, points in this direction by conceiving a data interconnection with a unitary national vision, in which the Union collects, with algorithmic standardisation, data from all state territories. This standardisation is not a technical detail: it is the condition of possibility for any reliable statistical analysis. Fragmented data, with heterogeneous classification criteria and irregular temporalities, does not produce knowledge — it produces the illusion of knowledge. 3.2 Public Liabilities, Risk Management and Integrity in Agreements One aspect frequently neglected in discussions of institutional integrity concerns the management of public sector legal liabilities. In the private sector, mergers and acquisitions require rigorous legal due diligence to identify and price the liabilities that will be absorbed. The public sector, however, frequently operates without structured legal risk analysis — which results in multi-billion losses in state-owned enterprises, unjustified refusal of advantageous agreements and the artificial generation of court-ordered debts. The refusal of agreements by the public manager — when the latter prefers to pass to his successor the burden of a definitive defeat, rather than accepting a discount that would be economically rational for the public purse — is, in many cases, an act of administrative misconduct that penalises the taxpayer. Without databases that parameterise the jurisprudence and allow the real risk of each dispute to be assessed, this arbitrariness remains invisible and uncontrollable. The jurisprudence that denies the administered party the subjective right to an agreement must be revisited: what is at stake is not merely the convenience of the manager, but the prohibition of arbitrariness that the constitutional principle demands. 4. Beyond Bureaucratic Compliance: A Transformative Integrity Compliance, both in the private and public sector, has degenerated in many contexts into a façade industry: formal procedures that generate cost and the appearance of conformity without producing real institutional transformation. This bureaucratic compliance — merely formal and without real effectiveness — is not only ineffective: it is counterproductive, as it demoralises the culture of integrity it purports to promote. The integrity proposed here is of a different nature: pragmatic, measurable and consequential. It manifests itself in statistical control over decision-making patterns, in the identification of discriminatory biases or ideological subjectivisms in decisions, in the effective compliance with precedents and in the traceability of institutional choices. A decision-making pattern that only favours a particular law firm, that reveals systematic ideological distortion or that ignores binding precedents is not merely technically incorrect — it is a violation of the fundamental right to comprehension and of the guarantee of equality. In this sense, the digital revolution is not an instrument of external control over institutions: it is, rather, an opportunity for institutional self-reflection and self-referencing. Artificial intelligence tools, when correctly integrated with structured databases and a culture of qualified statistics, allow institutions themselves to identify and correct their internal distortions — before those distortions become scandals. 5. The Public Prosecution Service as the Vanguard of the Institutional Digital Revolution 5.1 The Resolutive Model and the Overcoming of Institutional Fragmentation The Brazilian Public Prosecution Service has occupied, in recent years, a vanguard position in incorporating the digital revolution into the exercise of its institutional functions. This leadership is not accidental: it stems from the very nature of the institution, which holds criminal investigatory power, the standing to bring criminal action and an extrajudicial conflict resolution function that positions it as the principal instrument for relieving the burden on the Judiciary. The metaphor of the Public Prosecution Service as a judge at the doors of the courts — coined by the late prosecutor from Rio Grande do Sul, Paulo Pinto de Carvalho, back in the 1990s — remains relevant and must be deepened: the modern Public Prosecution Service needs to operate as a great law firm of Brazilian society, with institutional unity, human supervision over artificial intelligence tools and national statistics that allow teams to be structured with an integrated strategic vision. 5.2 The Judiciary as a Victim of Predatory Actors The Brazilian Judiciary suffers from a tarnished image that, in significant part, is not the result of its own failings, but of the spurious instrumentalisation by actors — public and private — who use litigation as a mechanism for postponing the fulfilment of legitimate obligations. Predatory claims, repeated dilatory manoeuvres and the systematic refusal of agreements by public managers to pass to their successor the burden of inevitable defeats constitute forms of abuse of process that violate the fundamental rights of elderly persons, legitimate creditors and citizens who depend on the system for the realisation of their rights. These actors need to be identified, mapped and held accountable. Artificial intelligence tools and integrated databases are instruments precisely for that purpose: to make visible patterns of abusive litigious behaviour that, in the current fragmentation of data, remain hidden. 6. A Culture of Statistics, Administrative Continuity and State Policies A country without a culture of statistics will not become a developed country. This statement, apparently simple, contains a structural critique of the Brazilian public management model: without national mapping of crime, without a scientific investigatory standard, without strategic planning based on data, each change of government may completely redirect policies that require decades to produce results. The report of the Federal Court of Audit on the suspension of public works is revealing in this regard: the principal cause of the stoppages was not the fight against corruption — it was the patrimonialist culture that prevents the political successor from continuing the work of his predecessor, because it does not carry his name or his brand. This patrimonialism is not merely a moral defect: it is a systemic failure that can only be corrected by State institutions with the capacity for continuous monitoring and structured institutional memory. In this context, institutions such as the Public Prosecution Service, the Attorney General’s Office, the Comptroller General of the Union, the Central Bank and CADE represent precisely the model of State policy that Brazil needs to consolidate: supra-partisan institutions, with administrative continuity, accumulated technical capacity and independence from electoral-political cycles. The digital revolution, when incorporated by these institutions with rigour and integrity, has the potential to transform this model from exception to rule. 7. A Note on Administrative Misconduct and the Subjective Element The thesis established by the Supreme Federal Tribunal that culpable administrative misconduct would be unconstitutional merits criticism. If accepted in its broadest terms, the logic of this position would lead to unsustainable results: culpable misappropriation of public funds would equally be unconstitutional, culpable environmental offences would lose their improper character, and any culpable form of violation of public patrimony would be immune to the sanctioning regime of the Administrative Misconduct Law. The constitutional root of the concept of misconduct — gross error — does not require specific intent as a universal prerequisite. Serious culpable misconduct, particularly where it results from systematic negligence or a refusal to incorporate available control instruments, is compatible with the constitutional sanctioning regime and necessary for the effective accountability of managers who, by omission, cause multi-billion losses to the public purse. 8. Conclusion Integrity in the public sector is not an abstract value: it is an operational requirement that, in the age of artificial intelligence, translates into concrete structures of data, statistics and algorithmic auditability. The fundamental right to comprehension of the decisions of public authorities — derived from the systematic conjunction of the constitutional principles of publicity, duty to give reasons, due process of law and prohibition of arbitrariness — is the legal foundation of this requirement. The Brazilian Public Prosecution Service occupies a singular position in this process: it is the institution with the greatest investigatory power, the holder of the standing to bring criminal action and the actor with the greatest potential to relieve the burden on the Judiciary through extrajudicial solutions. To realise this potential, it must build a national data infrastructure, overcome institutional fragmentation and embrace a culture of statistics that transforms the exercise of its functions from intuitive to scientific. The digital revolution is not a threat to legal institutions — it is the greatest opportunity that Brazilian Law has had in recent decades to rebuild itself on solid, transparent and equal foundations. Taking advantage of it requires institutional courage, investment in technology and, above all, the willingness to submit one’s own decisions to the scrutiny one demands of others. References BRAZIL. Constitution of the Federative Republic of Brazil of 1988. Brasília: Federal Senate. BRAZIL. Law No. 8,429, of 2nd June 1992. Provides for sanctions applicable to public agents in cases of illicit enrichment (Administrative Misconduct Law). Official Gazette. BRAZIL. Law No. 14,230, of 25th October 2021. Amends the Administrative Misconduct Law. Official Gazette. BRAZIL. Supreme Federal Tribunal. ADI 7236. Reporter: Justice Alexandre de Moraes. STF, 2023. BRAZIL. Federal Court of Audit. Report on the suspension of public works. Brasília: TCU, 2022. ENTERRÍA, Eduardo García de. La lucha contra las inmunidades del poder en el derecho administrativo. 3rd ed. Madrid: Civitas, 1983. GARCIA, Emerson. Ministério Público: organização, atribuições e regime jurídico. 7th ed. São Paulo: Saraiva, 2020. MELLO, Celso Antônio Bandeira de. Curso de Direito Administrativo. 35th ed. São Paulo: Malheiros, 2021. OSÓRIO, Fábio Medina. Legal databases, artificial intelligence and the fundamental right to comprehension. Revista dos Tribunais, v. 1070, 2025. OSÓRIO, Fábio Medina. Direito Administrativo Sancionador. 7th ed. São Paulo: Thomson Reuters Brasil, 2022. Fábio Medina Osório · International Institute for the Study of State Law.

LIABILITY OF PUBLIC AND PRIVATE AGENTS AND THE IMPACT OF ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE

Legal databases, investigative tools and the role of the Public Prosecution Service in the digital age Fábio Medina Osório Lawyer · Former Minister of the Attorney General’s Office · Former Public Prosecutor in Rio Grande do Sul · Doctor of Administrative Law from the Complutense University of Madrid Abstract This article examines the liability of public and private agents in the face of the advancement of artificial intelligence, focusing on three central axes: (i) the fundamental right to comprehension as a constitutional requirement of algorithmic auditability and integration of legal databases; (ii) the technological tools of criminal investigation available in the Brazilian legal order and their underutilisation; and (iii) the strategic role of the Public Prosecution Service in the construction of a public security policy based on data, qualified statistics and artificial intelligence. It is argued that the digital age imposes a profound institutional reconfiguration, particularly upon the Public Prosecution Service, which holds investigatory powers and must assume leadership in the parameterisation of national public security. Keywords: Artificial intelligence; liability of public agents; legal databases; Public Prosecution Service; criminal investigation; public security; algorithmic auditability. 1. Introduction We are living through a historic moment of inflection. Artificial intelligence is no longer an emerging or peripheral phenomenon to Law: it already forms part of judicial decisions, criminal investigations, administrative contracts and public policies. This article systematises reflections on the responsibilities that arise from this new paradigm, with the aim of contributing to the legal debate surrounding artificial intelligence, databases and the institutional reform required of the Public Prosecution Service. The central proposition is that the integration of legal databases, statistics and artificial intelligence is not merely a technological convenience, but a constitutional requirement derived from the principles of transparency, publicity, due process of law and the controllability of public acts. Without such integration, any theory — be it neo-constitutionalism, new originalism or post-structuralism — remains an inert abstraction in the face of the decisional opacity that plagues Brazilian institutions. 2. The Fundamental Right to Comprehension and Algorithmic Auditability The Federal Constitution of 1988 enshrines, in systematic conjunction, the rights to transparency, publicity and due process of law. From an integrated reading of these fundamental rights it is possible to derive a right to comprehension of the decisions of public authorities — a right that, in the age of artificial intelligence, assumes even more essential contours. This fundamental right to comprehension requires that all decisions of public authorities — not only judicial ones, but also administrative acts, public contracts, administrative jurisprudence and disciplinary proceedings — be supported by legal databases integrated with statistics and auditable artificial intelligence. Auditability is not an adjective; it is a condition of validity. Without such statistical traceability, no decision-making system — regardless of the legal theory informing it — is able to detect biases, anti-isonomy distortions or structural prejudices. Decisional coherence is not a matter of theoretical purity: it is a matter of verifiable equality. An identical case, decided with distinct parameters and without traceable justification, violates the principle of equality in a way that no dogmatics can repair without data. It is further submitted that this right to comprehension has a universal vocation, being applicable not only to judicial decisions, but also to universities, legal education, the private sector with a public function and to the totality of acts of federal entities. The integration of statistics, databases and artificial intelligence is, equally, the adequate mechanism for regulating privacy rights and giving normative density to the General Data Protection Law in the public sphere. 3. Technological Tools of Criminal Investigation: State of the Art and Prospects for Use in Brazil 3.1 The Legal Framework: ADPF 1143 and the Absence of a Judicial Prohibition ADPF 1143, reported by Justice Alexandre de Moraes, was brought by the Attorney General’s Office challenging artificial intelligence tools acquired by the Brazilian State for use in criminal investigations. The action alleged the absence of specific regulation for such instruments. However, the Supreme Federal Tribunal did not grant an injunction suspending their use, which means that, in the light of the principle of legality and the principle of juridicity, these tools remain available for use subject to duly reasoned judicial authorisation. This observation is relevant because it reveals a paradox: the Brazilian State acquired investigative instruments of high technological sophistication which, due to institutional underutilisation or insufficient capacity-building, remain largely idle whilst violent organised crime flourishes. 3.2 Remote Access Tools: Capabilities and Constitutional Limits Amongst the tools with the greatest investigative potential, remote access software stands out — of which Pegasus, developed by the NSO Group (Israel), is the best-known example. This is a system that allows the silent and complete invasion of smartphones, with access to messages, e-mails, call history, encrypted files and the covert activation of microphone and camera, transforming the target device into an instrument of environmental surveillance. The use of this type of tool evidently requires robustly reasoned judicial authorisation — mere slight indications are insufficient, nor is the notorious in dubio pro societate, which the jurisprudence of the Supreme Federal Tribunal, in an orientation yet to be superseded, still admits as a parameter for the receipt of charges. The high degree of invasiveness of these tools demands strict proportionality, selectivity in data capture and absolute adherence to the subject matter of the offence under investigation. 3.3 Signal Interception Systems: IMSI Catchers and Mobile Tracking So-called IMSI catchers — devices that simulate legitimate base stations to capture data from mobile devices — represent another category of tool available in the Brazilian investigative arsenal. The PIC-6, for example, is capable of emulating 2G, 3G and 4G telephony stations, capturing the IMSI number of each device (a unique 15-digit identifier), intercepting voice calls and SMS messages and passively tracking users in public or private areas without the need for installed spyware. Complementarily, systems such as the Landmark platform allow continuous location tracking by multiple antennae, with the capacity to monitor up to ten thousand devices per month. Such tools are particularly relevant in operations demanding constant surveillance of targets without direct physical contact — such as investigations into violent criminal organisations, drug trafficking and factions that dominate entire urban territories. 3.4 Undercover Agents and Statistical Tools for Criminal Prediction The Organised Crime Act (Law 12,850/2013) expressly provides for the institution of the undercover agent — a tool enshrined in the most advanced legislation in the world, which allows, under rigorous judicial oversight, the immunity of the agent for the commission of offences in co-authorship with the targets of the investigation. This is a mechanism of high efficacy for penetrating criminal organisations, including their family networks and parallel structures. In the field of statistical and predictive tools, particular mention should be made of Criminalizer (USP), PredPol and the Palantir Gotham platform. These solutions are capable of identifying behavioural patterns, mapping criminal networks and subsidising investigative decisions based on large-scale data analysis. Their efficacy, however, fundamentally depends on the quality and uniformity of the databases that feed them — a central issue examined in the next section. 4. Brazil’s Statistical Deficit and the Reform of Public Security Databases One of the principal structural weaknesses of the Brazilian public security system is the absence of uniformity in criminal databases. Data is fed by the states in a fragmentary manner, with heterogeneous criteria and irregular temporality, making any reliable statistical analysis at the national level impossible. The thesis advanced here is that the National Council of the Public Prosecution Service (CNMP) and the National College of Attorneys General (CNPG) have the competence and legitimacy to regulate public security databases throughout the national territory. The rationale is straightforward: it is the Public Prosecution Service — and not the Federal Executive Power, nor the police authority — that is the holder of the criminal action and the investigatory power. Those who hold the power to investigate equally hold the institutional interest in the quality of the data that feeds such investigation. Regulation by the CNMP and the CNPG should establish, at a minimum: (i) uniform national criteria for the classification and feeding of criminal data; (ii) mandatory frequency of real-time online updates; (iii) integration with the artificial intelligence systems already available; and (iv) mechanisms of external audit and bias control. Without qualified and uniform statistics, the use of artificial intelligence in public security is unviable — the most sophisticated technology cannot correct dirty data. 5. The Public Prosecution Service as a Strategic Actor in the Age of Artificial Intelligence 5.1 The Problem of Deficient Investigations and Premature Charges The recent experience of the Brazilian Public Prosecution Service — particularly in Operation Car Wash and in the investigations into the anti-democratic acts of 8th January 2023 — revealed structural failures that undermine institutional credibility: charges with precarious individualisation of conduct, plea bargains without robust corroborating elements, premature search and seizure warrants and telephone intercepts authorised without the necessary evidentiary support. The jurisprudence of the Supreme Federal Tribunal that admits criminal charges based on in dubio pro societate and mere slight indications is, at one and the same time, constitutionally questionable and institutionally damaging. A premature charge destroys reputations, violates the dignity of the investigated and frequently results in annulled criminal actions — the worst of all worlds for the credibility of the Public Prosecution Service. 5.2 The Model of Exhaustive Investigation The alternative is exhaustive investigation: the Public Prosecution Service must fully utilise the investigatory power at its disposal — including the technological tools described in this article — before bringing any charges. The filing of criminal actions must be guided by a serious prognosis of success and by a robust individualisation of conduct. Success, from this perspective, may take multiple forms: conviction, agreement, archiving or even the decision not to investigate. What is not permissible is the charge as a wager. In this context, the rate of agreements — a modality that in the United States accounts for the overwhelming majority of criminal case closures — must be valued as a measure of efficacy, not as a sign of institutional weakness. Resolutiveness is the true distinguishing mark of the modern Public Prosecution Service. 5.3 The Public Prosecution Service as the Great Law Firm of Brazilian Society There is an illuminating metaphor in the history of the Public Prosecution Service of Rio Grande do Sul: that the Public Prosecution Service is a judge at the doors of the courts. In the age of artificial intelligence, this image must be updated: the Public Prosecution Service must reinvent itself as the great law firm of Brazilian society — with institutional unity, technical capacity, technological instruments and clear leadership over public security data. This also implies rethinking the role of senior prosecutors: not as opinion-writers advising courts, but as protagonists on the front line of the fight against organised crime, in the defence of public assets and in the guarantee of fundamental rights. Institutional fragmentation is the greatest enemy of efficacy. 6. The International Regulation of Artificial Intelligence and the Formation of a New Legal Branch The regulatory landscape of artificial intelligence has been expanding rapidly at the international level. The European Union approved the AI Act; the United States advanced through executive orders on the subject; China and Japan have their own regulatory frameworks. This regulatory volume already permits one to affirm, with reasonable certainty, that Artificial Intelligence Law constitutes an autonomous legal branch in formation — just as judicial precedents, formerly treated as a mere procedural appendix, have already consolidated their dogmatic independence. In Brazil, the regulation of this new branch — which encompasses not only civil procedure, but criminal procedure, administrative sanctioning law and public security — should be incorporated into curricula by the Ministry of Education, being recognised as a mandatory legal discipline in law schools. The formation of a new generation of jurists capable of operating with data, statistics and algorithms is a necessary condition for Law not to be overtaken by technology. 7. Conclusion Artificial intelligence is not a problem for Law: it is a historic opportunity to overcome its deepest dysfunctions — decisional opacity, normative fragmentation, investigative selectivity and structural sluggishness. But this opportunity is only realised if legal institutions have the courage to rebuild themselves. The Brazilian Public Prosecution Service has, in this context, a singular position: it is the holder of the investigatory power, the guardian of fundamental rights and the institution with the greatest capacity to assume leadership in the reorganisation of national public security on technological foundations. To do so, it will need to abandon the logic of speculative charges and embrace the culture of exhaustive investigation, qualified statistics and auditable artificial intelligence. The path is long, but the trail already exists. Brazil can follow it — provided its institutions have the willingness to begin. References BRAZIL. Constitution of the Federative Republic of Brazil of 1988. Brasília: Federal Senate. BRAZIL. Law No. 12,850, of 2nd August 2013. Provides for criminal organisations. Official Gazette. BRAZIL. Law No. 13,709, of 14th August 2018. General Data Protection Law (LGPD). Official Gazette. BRAZIL. Supreme Federal Tribunal. ADPF 1143. Reporter: Justice Alexandre de Moraes. STF, 2024. EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT. Regulation (EU) 2024/1689 — Artificial Intelligence Act. Official Journal of the European Union, 2024. GARCIA, Emerson. Ministério Público: organização, atribuições e regime jurídico. 7th ed. São Paulo: Saraiva, 2020. NOVOA MONREAL, Eduardo. El derecho como obstáculo al cambio social. 15th ed. México: Siglo XXI, 2010. OSÓRIO, Fábio Medina. Legal databases, artificial intelligence and the fundamental right to comprehension. Revista dos Tribunais, v. 1070, 2025. PALANTIR TECHNOLOGIES. Palantir Gotham: Platform Overview. New York: Palantir, 2023. PREDPOL. Crime Prediction Software — Technical White Paper. Santa Cruz: PredPol Inc., 2022. Fábio Medina Osório · International Institute for the Study of State Law.

COGNITIVE SOVEREIGNTY IN THE AGE OF ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE: CONTROL OVER THE INFRASTRUCTURES OF KNOWLEDGE AS A NEW FACTOR OF POWER

ABSTRACT: This article proposes cognitive sovereignty as a legal, economic and geopolitical category indispensable to understanding the Age of Artificial Intelligence. Its central thesis is that artificial intelligence shifts digital sovereignty toward a cognitive sovereignty, because power no longer resides in the command of data, in physical infrastructure or in computing capacity alone, but in control over the infrastructures that produce intelligence. Starting from the transition from a data economy to an intelligence economy — anticipated by the notion of surveillance capitalism — the article examines the concentration of cognitive infrastructures (compute, semiconductors, cloud and foundation models), the regulatory paradox whereby legitimate governance rules may entrench incumbents, and the problem of auditability, transparency and what is here termed the right to comprehension. It then discusses the effects on democracy, markets and the State, proposing a normative agenda capable of reconciling innovation, competition and institutional autonomy. The text engages with the literature on the digital economy, regulation and theory of the State and is grounded in recent data on investment, market concentration and public trust in artificial intelligence. Keywords: Cognitive sovereignty. Artificial intelligence. Cognitive infrastructure. Surveillance capitalism. Concentration of power. Algorithmic governance. Auditability. Regulation. Competition. Right to comprehension. Contents: Introduction - 1 The Birth of the Digital Age and the Transformation of the Nature of Power - 2 From the Data Economy to the Intelligence Economy - 3 Surveillance Capitalism and the Cognitive Turn - 4 The Concentration of Cognitive Infrastructures - 5 Cognitive Sovereignty as a Legal Category - 6 The Regulatory Paradox - 7 Auditability, Transparency and the Right to Comprehension - 8 Democracy, Markets and the State - 9 Conclusion: Toward a Normative Agenda for Cognitive Sovereignty - References Introduction Every historical order has organized itself around a dominant factor of power. Land structured agrarian societies; machines and coal, the industrial economy; energy, finance and information, the geopolitics of the twentieth century. The twenty-first century introduces a rupture of a different nature: the decisive strategic asset is no longer information, but intelligence — understood as the capacity to produce inferences, syntheses and decisions at scale. Whoever commands the means of producing intelligence occupies today the position once held by those who controlled land, industry or financial capital. The thesis of this article can be stated in a single sentence: artificial intelligence shifts digital sovereignty toward a cognitive sovereignty, because real power comes to reside in control over the infrastructures that produce intelligence. This is not a metaphor, but a verifiable change in the material structure of the economy and, consequently, in the distribution of authority among States, corporations and institutions. The prevailing legal debate still revolves around data protection, privacy and the control of algorithms. These are legitimate and necessary agendas, yet insufficient, for they assume that the essential problem is the collection of information, when the decisive problem is already a different one: who holds the capacity to transform information into intelligence, according to which criteria and for whose benefit. Shifting the focus from collection to production is the first step toward understanding the economy now taking shape. To sustain this argument, the text proceeds through nine movements: the birth of the Digital Age and the mutation of power; the transition from the data economy to the intelligence economy; surveillance capitalism as the antechamber of that turn; the concentration of cognitive infrastructures; cognitive sovereignty as a legal category; the regulatory paradox; auditability and the right to comprehension; the effects on democracy, markets and the State; and, finally, a normative agenda. The guiding thread is the conviction that new legal categories become necessary when the old ones cease to describe the reality they purport to govern. 1 The Birth of the Digital Age and the Transformation of the Nature of Power Digitalization is usually narrated as a mere succession of technical innovations. That description is impoverished. What electricity did for industry and the railways did for the circulation of goods, digital infrastructure did for information: it turned information into a universal input and, in doing so, reorganized the architecture of power. Manuel Castells had already shown that the network society does not merely accelerate exchange but redefines where authority is located — in the nodes that concentrate connectivity and processing capacity. Conceived as a calculating machine, the computer became, with the internet, cloud computing and mobility, the substrate of nearly all economic activity. The philosophy of technology offers a deeper key to interpretation. For Heidegger, modern technology is not a set of tools but a mode of revealing the world that reduces everything to a standing reserve available for use — what he called Gestell, enframing. Jacques Ellul and Lewis Mumford warned, by different routes, that technical systems tend to impose their own logic upon the institutions meant to govern them, and Gilbert Simondon insisted that to understand technology is the condition for not being subjected to it. Digitalization is the contemporary form of this process: it organizes experience according to patterns that largely escape the control of those who live it. In the first decades of the digital economy, the center of gravity was data. Firms competed for the capacity to collect, store and correlate records of behavior; the user, in browsing, paid with his own conduct. It was this dynamic that Shoshana Zuboff described as surveillance capitalism and that Nick Srnicek analyzed under the heading of platform capitalism — business models whose raw material is human experience converted into data, and data converted into prediction. The singularity of the present moment lies in the fact that this raw material has at last found an industry capable of refining it into something of higher value: intelligence. 2 From the Data Economy to the Intelligence Economy For years it was repeated that data would be the new oil. The image had didactic merit and an analytical limit. Oil is a raw material and is worth something only once refined; data occupy an identical position, for in isolation they mean little and become decisive only when organized, interpreted and converted into actionable knowledge. The stage that performs this conversion — and that captures most of the value — is intelligence. The data economy thus gives way to an intelligence economy. The great foundation models are the infrastructure of this stage. They do not merely store: they relate knowledge dispersed across millions of documents, synthesize arguments, recognize patterns imperceptible to the human eye, formulate hypotheses and assist decisions. Daron Acemoglu and Simon Johnson recall, in the register of political economy, that the direction of technical progress is not neutral and depends on institutional choices about who appropriates the gains in productivity. Kai-Fu Lee, observing the Sino-American race, shows that competitive advantage has migrated from access to data toward the quality of the model and the scale of computation. The figures give the measure of the shift. According to the 2026 Stanford AI Index, private investment in artificial intelligence reached roughly US$ 285.9 billion in the United States in 2025, approximately twenty-three times China's US$ 12.4 billion, with California alone accounting for more than three quarters of the U.S. total — although private data understate the Chinese effort, channeled through state guidance funds. Diffusion was the fastest ever recorded: generative artificial intelligence reached more than half of the world's population within three years, a pace exceeding that of the personal computer and of the internet. Productivity no longer grows merely through the automation of physical tasks but through the expansion of the cognitive capacity of organizations, which confers upon intelligence the status of a factor of production of a new kind. 3 Surveillance Capitalism and the Cognitive Turn Understanding the intelligence economy requires revisiting its antechamber. Surveillance capitalism, in Zuboff's formulation, is not content to know preferences: it aspires to predict and, ultimately, to modulate conduct, extracting from human experience a surplus that feeds prediction markets. Julie Cohen showed how law itself was reshaped to accommodate this informational logic, and Frank Pasquale, in his analysis of the black-box society, denounced the opacity of systems that decide on credit, reputation and opportunity without accountability. The cognitive turn radicalizes the picture. Whereas the surveillance economy captured data in order to sell predictions, the intelligence economy internalizes the very act of producing knowledge. Yochai Benkler had celebrated the promise of a social production of knowledge, distributed and collaborative; Lawrence Lessig had warned that code is law — that is, that technical architecture regulates conduct with force comparable to that of legal norms. The synthesis of these diagnoses is uncomfortable: knowledge continues to be produced socially — through billions of texts, images, decisions and inquiries — but the intelligence built upon that common patrimony becomes private infrastructure. Luciano Floridi describes the infosphere as the environment we have come to inhabit; it remains to be seen who designs it and who administers it. 4 The Concentration of Cognitive Infrastructures Intelligence, as a factor of production, rests upon an extraordinarily concentrated material base. This base — which may be termed cognitive infrastructure — brings together computing capacity, advanced semiconductors, energy, cloud, training datasets and foundation models. In each of these layers, concentration is the rule, not the exception. At the level of semiconductors, Taiwan accounts for roughly 92% of the world's leading-edge logic capacity, and TSMC alone for approximately 70% of global foundry revenue and for nearly all of the chips that train and operate the large models. In computing, Nvidia's graphics processing units hold more than 60% of the market, and the United States is estimated to concentrate about three quarters of global GPU capacity. In the cloud, three providers — Amazon, Microsoft and Google — control approximately two thirds of the world market, with switching costs that lock in most corporate workloads. At the model layer, the United States produced fifty of the notable systems of 2025, and China thirty; more than ninety percent of those models came from private companies. The concentration is not accidental. It results from network effects and increasing returns to scale long studied by the economics of competition. Jean Tirole demonstrated how platform markets tend toward the dominance of a few; Lina Khan and Tim Wu argued that the classical antitrust categories, centered on consumer price, capture poorly the power of the digital giants; Luigi Zingales warned of the capture of the political process itself by incumbents. The cycle is cumulative: more users generate more data and more revenue; more revenue finances more computation and better models; better models attract more users. Schumpeter saw in creative destruction the engine of capitalist renewal; the intelligence economy risks producing its opposite — a destruction that, instead of opening space for new entrants, seals acquired positions. Hence the leap from economic concentration to cognitive concentration, and from the latter to geopolitics. Joseph Nye taught that power is also exercised through attraction and through control of infrastructures; Henry Kissinger and Graham Allison foresaw artificial intelligence as an axis of competition among great powers; Ian Bremmer described the rise of technology companies to the condition of actors of quasi-sovereign stature. International rivalry ceases to turn solely on territory, energy and industry and comes to encompass research centers, supercomputers, semiconductors and the talent capable of designing them — talent whose mobility, the same Stanford AI Index records, has itself become a strategic variable, with a sharp decline in the pull of any single pole for researchers. 5 Cognitive Sovereignty as a Legal Category Sovereignty has always been redefined in step with the material transformations of power. In Bodin, it was supreme power over a territory; in Carl Schmitt, the competence to decide on the exception. Globalization added adjectives to it — economic, monetary, energy, food sovereignty — and the digital economy, more recently, spoke of digital sovereignty and data sovereignty. Artificial intelligence imposes a further shift: the object of sovereignty ceases to be technological infrastructure in general and becomes, specifically, the infrastructure that produces intelligence. By cognitive sovereignty is meant the capacity of individuals, organizations and States to preserve autonomy over the mechanisms of production, use, auditing and evolution of artificial intelligence. The definition is deliberately institutional, not autarkic. It does not postulate self-sufficiency — no State produces on its own all the technology it needs — nor does it reject international cooperation, on which innovation itself has always depended. What it asserts is the need to retain autonomy sufficient to prevent a permanent structural dependence. The distinction is legal before it is technical. A society may use foreign technology and still remain sovereign, provided it retains the capacity to understand, audit, adapt and, if necessary, replace the systems on which it depends. It loses cognitive sovereignty when that capacity is extinguished and decision-making — in health, justice, defense, finance or public administration — comes to rest upon infrastructures whose governance is inaccessible to it. Technological dependence then becomes decisional dependence, and the question migrates from the field of industrial policy to that of public law. Artificial intelligence is today a transversal infrastructure, for it cuts across education, industry, finance, defense, justice and science at once. Hannah Arendt defined power as the human faculty to act in concert, and its corruption as the substitution of plural action by imposition. When the capacity to decide is concentrated in a few centers that design the intelligence of all, the risk is not only economic: it is the erosion of the plurality that sustains public life. From this angle, cognitive sovereignty is a condition of institutional freedom, not a banner of closure. 6 The Regulatory Paradox No technology of comparable impact dispenses with regulation. The risks of artificial intelligence — algorithmic discrimination, disinformation, manipulation, bias, surveillance — justify robust legal frameworks. Yet a paradox persists, one well known to economic theory and confirmed by the history of regulation: rules conceived to protect society may, without that being the intention, entrench the very actors they purport to discipline. The mechanism is the economics of compliance. The more sophisticated the requirements of auditing, certification, documentation, compliance and cybersecurity, the higher the fixed costs of entry. Established firms absorb them; startups, universities and independent laboratories do not. George Stigler described, more than fifty years ago, the capture of the regulator by the regulated; artificial intelligence offers a contemporary illustration of it. The effect tends to be the raising of entry barriers and the reinforcement of incumbents — a concentration that, bearing on the production of intelligence, is also cognitive concentration. The normative landscape aggravates the problem through fragmentation. The European Union adopted, in the AI Act — in force since August 2024 and applied progressively in the following years — a risk-based approach; the Council of Europe opened for signature, in September 2024, the Framework Convention on Artificial Intelligence, the first legally binding international treaty on the matter, whose first anniversary was marked at a conference hosted by the Complutense University of Madrid. In the opposite direction, the United States revoked, in January 2025, the executive order that structured the federal governance of AI, replacing it with deregulatory guidelines oriented toward technological leadership. The Stanford AI Index records that, among the forty-seven countries with AI legislation in force, only twelve possess effective enforcement mechanisms, and that compliance costs vary by as much as eightfold across jurisdictions. The picture is one of discoordination, not convergence. To this is added public distrust. Still according to the same survey, only 31% of U.S. citizens trust their own government to regulate artificial intelligence, against a global average of 54%, and the gulf between experts and the public regarding the effects on employment is abyssal. Regulation without legitimacy and without enforcement capacity does not reduce risk: it merely redistributes advantage. The challenge lies not in choosing between regulating and innovating, but in designing a proportionate regulation that contains harm without turning compliance into a competitive moat. 7 Auditability, Transparency and the Right to Comprehension If concentration is the structural problem, opacity is its aggravating factor. Foundation models operate as architectures of extreme complexity, and the recent tendency is toward less, not greater, transparency: of the ninety-five significant models released in 2025, eighty were made available without their training code. Cathy O'Neil showed how opaque models can institutionalize discrimination under the appearance of objectivity; Frank Pasquale insisted that the black box is incompatible with the accountability required of those who exercise power. From this emerges what may be called the right to comprehension — a category that I had the opportunity to introduce and systematize in Brazilian legal scholarship in a study devoted specifically to the subject, published in the Revista dos Tribunais (vol. 1077, 2025). I argued, in that work, that the right to comprehension constitutes an evolution of the constitutional principles of publicity, transparency and the duty to give reasons: the decisions of public authorities must not only be public and transparent, for they must be comprehensible, rational and coherent — no one comprehends an arbitrary act. More than that, the right to comprehension is there built upon an infrastructure of structured legal databases, statistics and auditable artificial intelligence, capable of rendering public justification traceable, comparable and verifiable. In comparative terms, Sandra Wachter and Brent Mittelstadt discussed the scope and limits of a right to explanation in the face of automated decisions; Daniel Solove reconstructed privacy as a question of informational power, and not of mere secrecy; Cass Sunstein examined how choice architectures shape conduct without the subject perceiving it. The right to comprehension does not require that every citizen master the mathematics of the models; it requires that there be institutions — public and independent — capable of auditing them on behalf of all. The technical-normative framework for this is already beginning to take shape. The NIST AI Risk Management Framework of 2023 offers a grammar of risk management; the ISO/IEC 42001 and 23894 standards govern AI management and risk-treatment systems, alongside the information-security tradition of ISO/IEC 27001 and 27701; the UNESCO Recommendation on the Ethics of Artificial Intelligence of 2021 and the OECD Principles consolidate global parameters of trustworthy AI. What is lacking is not vocabulary, but the institutionalization of auditability as a condition of validity, rather than a mere recommendation. 8 Democracy, Markets and the State The consequences of cognitive concentration extend beyond the economy. For centuries, knowledge was produced in a relatively distributed manner: universities published, books circulated, patents expired, discoveries entered the common patrimony. Artificial intelligence keeps the production of knowledge collective but privatizes the intelligence extracted from it. Bernard Stiegler and Byung-Chul Han, in distinct keys, warned of the risk of a proletarianization of the mind — the loss, by the individual, of his very capacity to know and to decide — when cognition is delegated to systems he does not control. Constitutional democracy learned to distrust concentrations of power. It limited political power through the separation of functions and disciplined economic power through competition law. Artificial intelligence introduces a third dimension — cognitive power — which does not replace the former two but amplifies them. Whoever controls intelligence enlarges economic influence; economic influence converts into political capacity; political capacity favors technological expansion. The circle, if not institutionally interrupted, tends to close. The State, too, is transformed. Historically, it fell to the State to produce the norm; to the market, wealth; to the university, knowledge. These frontiers blur when private firms develop scientific capacities comparable to those of the foremost academic centers, supply models to governments and take part in defining the very standards meant to discipline them. Anne-Marie Slaughter described a world of networks that cut across the divide between public and private; the challenge is to ensure that such networks remain subject to democratic scrutiny. None of this warrants pessimism. Artificial intelligence is, in all likelihood, the greatest lever of productivity and of scientific progress of our era: it accelerates discovery, broadens access to knowledge, refines diagnoses and improves public administration. History shows that transformative technologies generate more consistent development when accompanied by institutions equal to them. The problem is not the technology, but the absence of institutions capable of distributing its benefits. 9 Conclusion: Toward a Normative Agenda for Cognitive Sovereignty Cognitive sovereignty is neither nationalist nostalgia nor a rejection of international cooperation. It is the recognition that, when intelligence becomes essential infrastructure, preserving autonomy over the mechanisms that produce it ceases to be a technological strategy and becomes a condition of the very autonomy of democracies, of markets and of the rule of law. A normative agenda equal to the problem may be organized around a few axes, without any claim to exhaust them. The first is a proportionate regulation that modulates requirements according to risk and materiality, containing harm without erecting barriers that only incumbents can surmount. The second is the institutionalization of auditability, with public and independent bodies endowed with the technical competence to inspect high-impact models, after the manner in which the law has already done with financial auditing and supervision. The third is the guarantee of interoperability and technological pluralism, as competition law did, in other eras, with telecommunications networks. The fourth is sustained public investment in computing capacity, the training of researchers and open research, without which autonomy is no more than rhetoric. The fifth is international cooperation grounded in rights — of which the Council of Europe's Framework Convention is the first binding example — capable of averting both the regulatory vacuum and the race to the bottom. The thread that unites these axes is the refusal of a false alternative. It is not a matter of choosing between innovation and control, between market and State, between openness and sovereignty, but of building the institutions that render these values compatible. Artificial intelligence has shifted the center of power toward control over the infrastructures that produce intelligence; it falls to the law to ensure that this power remains distributed, auditable and accountable. Cognitive sovereignty is the name of that task — and, perhaps, one of the categories indispensable if the Age of Artificial Intelligence is to remain compatible with democratic constitutionalism, the market economy and human freedom. References Scholarship ACEMOGLU, Daron; JOHNSON, Simon. Power and Progress: Our Thousand-Year Struggle over Technology and Prosperity. New York: PublicAffairs, 2023. ALLISON, Graham. Destined for War: Can America and China Escape Thucydides's Trap? Boston: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 2017. ARENDT, Hannah. The Human Condition. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1958. BENKLER, Yochai. The Wealth of Networks: How Social Production Transforms Markets and Freedom. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2006. BODIN, Jean. The Six Books of the Commonwealth [Les Six Livres de la République, 1576]. BREMMER, Ian. The Technopolar Moment. Foreign Affairs, vol. 100, no. 6, 2021. CASTELLS, Manuel. The Rise of the Network Society (The Information Age, vol. I). Oxford: Blackwell, 1996. COHEN, Julie E. Between Truth and Power: The Legal Constructions of Informational Capitalism. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2019. ELLUL, Jacques. The Technological Society. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1964. FLORIDI, Luciano. The Fourth Revolution: How the Infosphere is Reshaping Human Reality. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014. HAN, Byung-Chul. Psychopolitics: Neoliberalism and New Technologies of Power. London: Verso, 2017. HEIDEGGER, Martin. The Question Concerning Technology. In: The Question Concerning Technology and Other Essays. New York: Harper & Row, 1977. KHAN, Lina M. Amazon's Antitrust Paradox. The Yale Law Journal, vol. 126, no. 3, 2017. KISSINGER, Henry; SCHMIDT, Eric; HUTTENLOCHER, Daniel. The Age of AI: And Our Human Future. New York: Little, Brown, 2021. LEE, Kai-Fu. AI Superpowers: China, Silicon Valley, and the New World Order. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 2018. LESSIG, Lawrence. Code: Version 2.0. New York: Basic Books, 2006. MUMFORD, Lewis. Technics and Civilization. New York: Harcourt, Brace & Co., 1934. NYE, Joseph S. The Future of Power. New York: PublicAffairs, 2011. O'NEIL, Cathy. Weapons of Math Destruction: How Big Data Increases Inequality and Threatens Democracy. New York: Crown, 2016. OSÓRIO, Fábio Medina. The Right to Comprehension in the Age of Technological Complexity: Constitutional, Statistical, and Algorithmic Foundations of Decision-Making Transparency. Revista dos Tribunais, São Paulo, vol. 1077, 2025. PASQUALE, Frank. The Black Box Society: The Secret Algorithms That Control Money and Information. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2015. SCHMITT, Carl. Political Theology: Four Chapters on the Concept of Sovereignty [1922]. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005. SCHUMPETER, Joseph A. Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1942. SIMONDON, Gilbert. On the Mode of Existence of Technical Objects [1958]. Minneapolis: Univocal Publishing, 2017. SLAUGHTER, Anne-Marie. A New World Order. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004. SOLOVE, Daniel J. Understanding Privacy. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2008. SRNICEK, Nick. Platform Capitalism. Cambridge: Polity Press, 2017. STIEGLER, Bernard. Technics and Time, 1: The Fault of Epimetheus [1994]. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1998. STIGLER, George J. The Theory of Economic Regulation. The Bell Journal of Economics and Management Science, vol. 2, no. 1, 1971. SUNSTEIN, Cass R.; THALER, Richard H. Nudge: Improving Decisions about Health, Wealth, and Happiness. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2008. TIROLE, Jean. Economics for the Common Good. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2017. WACHTER, Sandra; MITTELSTADT, Brent; FLORIDI, Luciano. Why a Right to Explanation of Automated Decision-Making Does Not Exist in the GDPR. International Data Privacy Law, vol. 7, no. 2, 2017. WU, Tim. The Curse of Bigness: Antitrust in the New Gilded Age. New York: Columbia Global Reports, 2018. ZINGALES, Luigi. A Capitalism for the People: Recapturing the Lost Genius of American Prosperity. New York: Basic Books, 2012. ZUBOFF, Shoshana. The Age of Surveillance Capitalism: The Fight for a Human Future at the New Frontier of Power. New York: PublicAffairs, 2019. Legal instruments and international documents BRAZIL. Law No. 13,709 of 14 August 2018 (General Personal Data Protection Law — LGPD). COUNCIL OF EUROPE. Framework Convention on Artificial Intelligence and Human Rights, Democracy and the Rule of Law (CETS No. 225). Vilnius, 2024. ISO/IEC 42001:2023 — Artificial Intelligence Management System; ISO/IEC 23894:2023 — AI Risk Management; ISO/IEC 27001 and 27701 — Information security and privacy. NIST. Artificial Intelligence Risk Management Framework (AI RMF 1.0). U.S. Department of Commerce, 2023. OECD. Recommendation of the Council on Artificial Intelligence (OECD AI Principles). Paris, 2019 (updated 2024). UNESCO. Recommendation on the Ethics of Artificial Intelligence. Paris, 2021. EUROPEAN UNION. Regulation (EU) 2024/1689 (Artificial Intelligence Act); Regulation (EU) 2016/679 (GDPR). UNITED STATES. Executive Order 14110 (2023, revoked in 2025); Executive Order 14179 — Removing Barriers to American Leadership in Artificial Intelligence (2025). Reports and empirical sources STANFORD HAI. Artificial Intelligence Index Report 2025 and 2026. Stanford Institute for Human-Centered Artificial Intelligence. OECD.AI Policy Observatory — indicators of AI policy and investment. SYNERGY RESEARCH GROUP; CANALYS. Cloud infrastructure market data, 2025–2026. TRENDFORCE; TSMC. Market-share reports and foundry results, 2025. PEW RESEARCH CENTER; EDELMAN TRUST BAROMETER. Surveys on public trust in and perception of artificial intelligence.

PLEA BARGAINING AGREEMENTS IN THE BRAZILIAN LEGAL SYSTEM AND THE IMPACT OF NEW TECHNOLOGICAL TOOLS: AN ANALYSIS IN LIGHT OF THE CASE LAW OF THE STF AND ADPF 919

Fábio Medina Osório Lawyer · Former Minister of the Advocacia-Geral da União · Former Public Prosecutor in Rio Grande do Sul · Doctor in Administrative Law from the Universidad Complutense de Madrid Subject Area: Criminal Procedural Law – Administrative Sanctions Law – Constitutional Law CNPq Classification: 6.01.02.00-4 (Public Law) – 6.01.01.00-8 (Legal Theory) CAPES Classification: Major Area: Applied Social Sciences – Assessment Area: Law (60100001) ABSTRACT (PORTUGUESE) This article examines the institute of the plea bargaining agreement (colaboração premiada) from the perspective of Law No. 12,850/2013 and the case law of the Supremo Tribunal Federal (STF), integrating this analysis with the context of modern technological tools for criminal investigation. Through the scrutiny of the claims raised in ADPF 919 (filed by the Partido dos Trabalhadores) and ADI 5508, as well as the submissions of the Advocacia-Geral da União (AGU) and the Procuradoria-Geral da República (PGR), the inadequacy of abstract judicial review as a means to reshape boundaries already established by the Supreme Court is demonstrated. The legal nature of the plea bargaining agreement, the limits of corroborative evidence, and the complementarity of cooperation with cyber intelligence solutions such as Maltego and Social Links are discussed. Keywords (Portuguese): Colaboração premiada; Supremo Tribunal Federal; ADPF 919; Criminal investigation; OSINT. ABSTRACT This article examines the institute of plea bargaining (colaboração premiada) under the framework of Law No. 12,850/2013 and the case law of the Brazilian Supreme Court (STF), integrating this analysis with the context of modern technological tools for criminal investigation. Through the scrutiny of the claims raised in ADPF 919 (filed by the Workers’ Party) and ADI 5508, as well as the positions of the Attorney General’s Office (AGU) and the Prosecutor General’s Office (PGR), the article demonstrates the inadequacy of abstract judicial review to reshape boundaries already established by the Supreme Court. The study discusses the legal nature of plea bargaining agreements, the limits of corroborative evidence, and the complementarity of cooperation with cyber intelligence solutions such as Maltego and Social Links. Keywords: Plea bargaining; Brazilian Supreme Court; ADPF 919; Criminal investigation; OSINT; Corroborative evidence; Organized crime; Administrative sanctions law. INTRODUCTION The complexity of contemporary organised crime has imposed upon the Brazilian State the need to modernise its prosecutorial arsenal. In this context, the institute of the plea bargaining agreement (colaboração premiada), consolidated in the Brazilian legal system with the enactment of the Organised Crime Act (Lei nº 12.850/2013), has established itself as an important and strategic tool for the dismantling of structured criminal networks. Far from operating in isolation, the plea bargaining agreement forms part of an ecosystem of extraordinary means of obtaining evidence, aligning itself with instruments such as the infiltration of agents and the use of Open Source Intelligence (OSINT) cyber tools, such as the Maltego platform[1] and Social Links[2]. Maltego, with its advanced capacity for link analysis, enables the massive cross-referencing of data for asset tracking and identification of front persons within a matter of hours[3], whilst Social Links enables the in-depth mapping of digital identities, activity on the dark web and cross-referencing of metadata from messaging applications such as WhatsApp and Telegram[4]. These mechanisms are further complemented by sophisticated remote access and signal interception tools (such as the Pegasus system and IMSI catchers), whose use by state agencies, although challenging from the standpoint of constitutional limits, was validated by the absence of an injunctive prohibition within the scope of ADPF 114, under the rapporteurship of Justice Alexandre de Moraes, at the STF[5]. In light of the imminent judgement of the Arguição de Descumprimento de Preceito Fundamental (ADPF) No. 919, filed by the Partido dos Trabalhadores (PT)[6], it becomes essential to detail the legal and operational contours of the plea bargaining agreement. The said action challenges the interpretive limits of the institute, which demands caution, given that the hermeneutic consolidation of Lei nº 12.850/2013 has already been the subject of extensive prior deliberations by the Supremo Tribunal Federal, notably in the judgement of ADI 5508[7], which endorsed the capacity of the Judicial Police to negotiate the agreement, in addition to a vast body of case law focused on the preservation of legal certainty. LEGAL NATURE OF THE PLEA BARGAINING AGREEMENT In Brazilian law, the plea bargaining agreement possesses a dual legal nature, expressly recognised by the STF: it constitutes, simultaneously, a procedural legal transaction and a means of obtaining evidence[8]. In this context, the case law of the Supremo Tribunal Federal has been consolidated in the sense of settling the understanding as to the impossibility of using plea bargaining agreements to support convictions without external corroborative elements, whether in criminal law or in administrative sanctions law.[9] Within this contractual context, the case law of the STF has also consolidated the attributions of state agencies. In the landmark judgement of ADI 5508[10], with the masterful vote of Justice Celso de Mello[11], the Supreme Court declared the constitutionality of §§ 2 and 6 of art. 4 of Lei nº 12.850/2013, ensuring that the Federal Police and the Civil Police forces, presiding over police inquiries, possess full legitimacy to negotiate and conclude plea bargaining agreements, the Public Prosecution Service not holding a monopoly over this instrument. The participation of the Public Prosecution Service (MP), in this scenario, occurs through the issuance of a prior opinion (albeit non-binding upon the judge) during the course of the police inquiry, preserving the investigative balance. When analysing the institute as a means of obtaining evidence (mezzi di ricerca della prova), it is distinguished from evidence itself (mezzi di prova). The Supremo Tribunal Federal established the premise that the statements of the cooperating witness ontologically possess a reduced evidentiary value (quid minus) arising from their impure source[12]. Therefore, the word of the informant, in order to be vested with evidentiary aptitude and reliability, incontestably requires the duty of truthfulness of the cooperating witness coupled with the existence of external corroborative elements[13]. Sob a perspectiva da jurisprudência do STF, os external corroborative elements devem emanar de fontes autônomas e diversas da própria delação (documentos, laudos periciais, escutas telefônicas)[14]. In this regard, the rejection of the so-called exclusive “cross-informing” (delação cruzada) (mutual corroboration), a situation in which the sole element corroborating one plea bargaining agreement is another plea bargaining agreement[15]. In this same context, the elements brought by the cooperating witness, such as recordings, e-mails, copies of documents, and even bank statements, are considered internal elements of the cooperation, such that they must equally be corroborated by external elements. Indeed, one of the greatest errors in major recent operations was to confuse such documents brought by the cooperating witness with supposed external evidence, a circumstance that led to the annulment of many plea bargaining agreements. Proceeding further, it is worth recalling that the current system, including as supported by the case law of the STF, safeguards the duty of truthfulness of the informant and the guarantee of voluntariness, which must be preserved in combating the industry of plea bargaining agreements that arose due to the absence of control over conflicts of interest of lawyers who act simultaneously for informants and those informed upon, or of individuals who inform upon one another. Notwithstanding, there is no legal lacuna to be filled by a new ADPF, there being merely the need for greater rigour on the part of the authorities in complying with the existing law. Similarly, ADPF 919 is well-intentioned in seeking to prohibit the remuneration of informants by another informant, as was recently witnessed in Brazil: informants of a company, at a lower echelon than the owner — who was also an informant —, all represented by the same legal structure, received bonuses for informing. It is not necessary to adjudicate this ADPF to curb this practice. It is plainly evident that Lei nº 12.850/2013 prohibits coordinated and pre-arranged plea bargaining agreements. This collective architecture of informing, a veritable collusion amongst informants, is a reprehensible practice and antithetical to the essence of the said legislation. Nevertheless, this may well have been one of the grounds for the explosion of so many distorted plea bargaining agreements in the recent Brazilian context. It is by no means a matter of suggesting the absence of the need for the Supremo Tribunal Federal itself to refine its case law in due course, but merely of demanding greater rigour from the constituted authorities regarding compliance with the current provisions of Lei nº 12.850/2013. This is a requirement that imposes respect for the duty of truthfulness of the cooperating witness and the prevention of conflicts of interest amongst lawyers. ANALYSIS OF ADPF 919 FILED BY THE PT ADPF 919, brought by the PT, seeks to establish "constitutional parameters for the interpretation and application" of the plea bargaining agreement, by means of the technique of interpretation in conformity with the Constitution[16]. The initial petition raises seven hypotheses of unconstitutionality based on alleged abusive practices: Cross-informing (Delação cruzada): Impossibility of grounding precautionary measures or sentences solely on the basis of reciprocal cooperation agreements. Order of submissions: Requirement, under penalty of absolute nullity, that the accused who has been informed upon always speaks after the informant. Limitation of clauses: Allegation that the advantages offered to the cooperating witness are restricted to an exhaustive statutory list, it not being within the competence of the MP to establish atypical benefits. Venal informing (Delação venal): Illegality in the conclusion of plea bargaining agreements mediated by payment from third parties. Challenge by third parties: Argument that would extend to the accused who has been informed upon (third party) the right to challenge the ratified agreement. Unlawful pre-trial detention: Presumption of lack of voluntariness when the cooperation is carried out by a defendant unlawfully detained. Belated cooperating witness: Violation of the principle of equal treatment by conferring greater benefits upon those who cooperate after sentencing. Arguments of the Advocacia-Geral da União (AGU): The AGU argued for the non-cognisance of the action on the basis of non-compliance with the principle of subsidiarity (art. 4, § 1, of Lei 9.882/99), noting that the ADPF purports to act as a veritable "appellate surrogate"[17]. On the merits, the AGU refutes the arguments by demonstrating that the Anti-Crime Act (Lei nº 13.964/2019) itself already enshrined that no measure shall be decreed on the basis "solely" of the statements of the cooperating witness (art. 4, §16), thereby emptying the cross-informing argument[18]. As to the nullity arising from non-compliance with the order of hearings, the criminal procedural principle of pas de nullité sans grief (art. 563, CPP)[19]. Furthermore, the AGU defended the contractual flexibility of the clauses subject to judicial ratification and rejected the intervention of third parties[20]. Arguments of the Procuradoria-Geral da República (PGR): The submission of the PGR fully corroborated the applicability of the lack of subsidiarity, asserting that there are suitable procedural means to remedy any individual grievances[21]. The PGR argued that the conforming interpretation cannot serve to create "new norms" (the STF acting as a positive legislator)[22]. It refuted the restrictions on the validity of the agreement, underlining that abuses or defects of consent inevitably depend on the subjective and factual analysis inherent to each case. Additionally, the PGR highlighted the efficient internal system of checks and balances, whereby the agreements are submitted for review by the Câmaras de Coordenação e Revisão of the MPF[23]. CONCLUSION The thorough dogmatic analysis of the case law of the Supremo Tribunal Federal amply demonstrates the inefficacy and futility of the claim raised in ADPF 919. The author of the said action seeks to establish interpretive rules regarding guarantees that are already exhausted and supported by the current statutory text and the overwhelming hermeneutics of the Supreme Court. As aptly noted by Judge Rodrigo Capez, when analysing the case law of the STF in the context of the Colaboração Premiada[24], a rejeição à famigerada delação cruzada exclusiva já constitui axioma lógico do sistema probatório: “O § 16 do art. 4º da Lei 12.850/13, ao não admitir a condenação baseada exclusivamente nas declarações do delator, implica uma limitação ao livre convencimento. É insuficiente para o fim de corroboração exigido pelo § 16, que o elemento de confirmação de uma delação premiada seja outra delação premiada”. With regard to the claim to allow third parties who have been informed upon to challenge the judicial decision ratifying the agreement, this contention comes up against the categorical determination that the agreement does not directly affect the legal sphere of the third party. As established by the Plenary of the STF in the aforementioned HC 127.483/PR[25]: "Por se tratar de um procedural legal transaction personalíssimo, o acordo de colaboração premiada não pode ser impugnado por coautores ou partícipes do colaborador na organização criminosa e nas infrações penais por ela praticadas"[26]. And this understanding remains settled in the Court, having been replicated in judgements such as HC 142.205/PR[27]. Finally, the intended standardisation of automatic invalidities by ADPF 919 disregards the complex evidentiary mechanism and the utility of phenomena such as the fortuitous discovery of evidence (serendipity validated in Inq. 4.130-QO and in Pet 7.074-QO/DF)[28]. The advancement in the elucidation of criminal networks demands the rational and strategic use of predictive and cyber technologies articulated with police and prosecutorial investigations, without the exceptional procedural architecture delineated by the plea bargaining agreement suffering setbacks disguised as abstract guaranteeism. The national legal system, refined by the collegiate decisions of the STF, possesses concrete ratification filters capable of remedying any defects (in concreto), which entirely empties the diffuse and generalist object claimed in ADPF 919. BIBLIOGRAPHIC REFERENCES BRASIL. Advocacia-Geral da União (AGU). Manifestação na Arguição de Descumprimento de Preceito Fundamental nº 919/DF. Brasília: Supremo Tribunal Federal, fev. 2022. BRASIL. Procuradoria-Geral da República (PGR). Parecer AJCONST/PGR Nº 256707/2022 na Arguição de Descumprimento de Preceito Fundamental nº 919/DF. Brasília: Supremo Tribunal Federal, jun. 2022. BRASIL. Supremo Tribunal Federal. Ação Direta de Inconstitucionalidade nº 5.508/DF. Relator: Ministro Marco Aurélio. Órgão Julgador: Tribunal Pleno. Julgado em 20/06/2018. BRASIL. Supremo Tribunal Federal. Arguição de Descumprimento de Preceito Fundamental nº 919/DF. Petição Inicial — técnica da interpretation in conformity with the Constitution. Brasília: STF, 2021. BRASIL. Supremo Tribunal Federal. Habeas Corpus nº 127.483/PR. Relator: Ministro Dias Toffoli. Órgão Julgador: Tribunal Pleno. Julgado em 27/08/2015. BRASIL. Supremo Tribunal Federal. Habeas Corpus nº 142.205/PR. Relator: Ministro Gilmar Mendes. Órgão Julgador: Segunda Turma. Julgado em 25/08/2020. BRASIL. Supremo Tribunal Federal. Inquérito n. 3.998/DF. Relator: Min. Edson Fachin. Redator do acórdão: Min. Dias Toffoli. Segunda Turma. Julgado em 18/12/2017. BRASIL. Supremo Tribunal Federal. Mandado de Segurança n. 37.810/DF. Relator: Min. Nunes Marques. Decisão monocrática, 28 jun. 2021. BRASIL. Supremo Tribunal Federal. Petição nº 7.074 QO/DF. Relator: Ministro Edson Fachin. Órgão Julgador: Tribunal Pleno. Julgado em 29/06/2017. BRASIL. Supremo Tribunal Federal. Reclamação n. 59.231/PB. Relator: Min. Gilmar Mendes. Decisão monocrática, 20 dez. 2023. CAPEZ, Rodrigo. O acordo de colaboração premiada na visão do Supremo Tribunal Federal. Cadernos Jurídicos da Escola Paulista da Magistratura, São Paulo. MALTEGO. Ferramenta Maltego: OSINT & Investigação Jurídica. Documento Técnico-Jurídico. Versão Janeiro 2026. OSÓRIO, Fábio Medina. Responsabilidade dos agentes públicos e privados e o impacto da inteligência artificial: Bancos de dados jurídicos, ferramentas investigativas e o papel do Ministério Público na era digital. Manuscrito inédito, 2026. PARTIDO DOS TRABALHADORES (PT). Petição Inicial da Arguição de Descumprimento de Preceito Fundamental nº 919/DF. Brasília: Supremo Tribunal Federal, 2021. SOCIAL LINKS. Ferramenta Social Links: OSINT & Investigação Jurídica. Documento Técnico-Jurídico. Versão Janeiro 2026. [1]MALTEGO. Maltego Tool: OSINT & Legal Investigation. Technical-Legal Document. Version January 2026. [2]SOCIAL LINKS. Social Links Tool: OSINT & Legal Investigation. Technical-Legal Document. Version January 2026. [3]Idem. [4]Idem. [5]OSÓRIO, Fábio Medina. Liability of public and private agents and the impact of artificial intelligence: Legal databases, investigative tools, and the role of the Public Prosecution Service in the digital era. Unpublished manuscript, 2026. [6]PARTIDO DOS TRABALHADORES (PT). Initial Petition of the Arguição de Descumprimento de Preceito Fundamental No. 919/DF. Brasília: Supremo Tribunal Federal, 2021. [7]BRAZIL. Supremo Tribunal Federal. Ação Direta de Inconstitucionalidade No. 5.508/DF. Rapporteur: Justice Marco Aurélio. Adjudicating Body: Tribunal Pleno. Decided on 20/06/2018. [8]CAPEZ, Rodrigo. The plea bargaining agreement in the view of the Supremo Tribunal Federal. Cadernos Jurídicos da Escola Paulista da Magistratura, São Paulo. [9]Vale lembrar, a esse respeito, o precedente estampado no Inquérito n. 3.998/DF (Rel. Min. Edson Fachin, Red. do acórdão Min. Dias Toffoli, Segunda Turma, j. 18 dez. 2017), no qual se firmou o entendimento de que a colaboração premiada, como meio de obtenção de prova, pode deflagrar a investigação criminal, mas não fundamenta, isoladamente, o oferecimento da denúncia ou eventual condenação, quando ausentes elementos externos de corroboração. Consta do julgado que “os depoimentos do colaborador premiado, desacompanhados de outras provas idôneas de corroboração, não possuem densidade suficiente para lastrear um juízo positivo de admissibilidade da acusação, o qual exige a presença do fumus commissi delicti”. Confira-se, a propósito, o Mandado de Segurança n. 37.810/DF (Rel. Min. Nunes Marques, decisão monocrática de 28 jun. 2021), no qual se assentou a necessidade de elementos externos de corroboração para a validade de colaborações premiadas, inclusive no âmbito do Direito Administrativo Sancionador. Vale lembrar, ainda, do precedente estampado na Reclamação n. 59.231/PB (Rel. Min. Gilmar Mendes, decisão monocrática de 20 dez. 2023), na qual se concedeu habeas corpus de ofício para trancar a ação penal, em razão da inadmissibilidade da denominada “delação cruzada”. Em matéria de Direito Administrativo Sancionador, especificamente na área da improbidade administrativa, o Supremo Tribunal Federal editou o Tema 1043, com repercussão geral, para proibir o uso de colaborações premiadas sem elementos de corroboração. [10]BRAZIL. Supremo Tribunal Federal. Ação Direta de Inconstitucionalidade No. 5.508/DF. Rapporteur: Justice Marco Aurélio. Adjudicating Body: Tribunal Pleno. Decided on 20/06/2018. [11]BRAZIL. Supremo Tribunal Federal. Ação Direta de Inconstitucionalidade No. 5.508/DF. Vote of Justice Celso de Mello. Decided on 20/06/2018. [12]BRAZIL. Supremo Tribunal Federal. Habeas Corpus No. 127.483/PR. Rapporteur: Justice Dias Toffoli. Adjudicating Body: Tribunal Pleno. Decided on 27/08/2015. [13]It must not be forgotten that the Supremo Tribunal Federal itself has already consolidated the understanding that plea bargaining agreements apply to the field of Administrative Sanctions Law, which governs Lei nº 8.429/92 and Lei nº 12.846/2013. In this regard, it is worth noting the precedent set in Mandado de Segurança No. 37.810/DF (Rapporteur: Justice Nunes Marques, monocratic decision of 28 June 2021), in which the need for external corroborative elements for the validity of plea bargaining agreements was established, including within the sphere of Administrative Sanctions Law. [14]BRAZIL. Supremo Tribunal Federal. Habeas Corpus No. 127.483/PR. Rapporteur: Justice Dias Toffoli. Adjudicating Body: Tribunal Pleno. Decided on 27/08/2015. [15]BADARÓ, Gustavo. The evidentiary value of the plea bargaining agreement: on § 16 of art. 4 of Lei nº 12.850/13. Revista Jurídica Consulex, Brasília, No. 443, pp. 26-29, Feb. 2015. [16]BRAZIL. Supremo Tribunal Federal. Arguição de Descumprimento de Preceito Fundamental No. 919/DF. Initial Petition — technique of interpretation in conformity with the Constitution. Brasília: STF, 2021. [17]BRAZIL. Advocacia-Geral da União (AGU). Submission in the Arguição de Descumprimento de Preceito Fundamental No. 919/DF. Brasília: Supremo Tribunal Federal, Feb. 2022. [18]Idem. [19]Idem. [20]Idem. [21]BRAZIL. Procuradoria-Geral da República (PGR). Opinion AJCONST/PGR No. 256707/2022 in the Arguição de Descumprimento de Preceito Fundamental No. 919/DF. Brasília: Supremo Tribunal Federal, June 2022. [22]Idem. [23]Idem. [24]CAPEZ, Rodrigo. The plea bargaining agreement in the view of the Supremo Tribunal Federal. Cadernos Jurídicos da Escola Paulista da Magistratura, São Paulo. [25]BRAZIL. Supremo Tribunal Federal. Habeas Corpus No. 127.483/PR. Rapporteur: Justice Dias Toffoli. Adjudicating Body: Tribunal Pleno. Decided on 27/08/2015. [26]Idem. [27]BRAZIL. Supremo Tribunal Federal. Habeas Corpus No. 142.205/PR. Rapporteur: Justice Gilmar Mendes. Adjudicating Body: Segunda Turma. Decided on 25/08/2020. [28]BRAZIL. Supremo Tribunal Federal. Petição No. 7.074 QO/DF. Rapporteur: Justice Edson Fachin. Adjudicating Body: Tribunal Pleno. Decided on 29/06/2017.
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