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Global Magnitsky Act: domestic law, transnational effects, and what it reveals about law and power

Partner at Medina Osório Advogados. PhD in Administrative Law from the Complutense University of Madrid, Spain. Master’s in Public Law from the Federal University of Rio Grande do Sul (UFRGS). Former Attorney General of Brazil. Chair of the Special Commission on Administrative Sanctioning Law at the Brazilian Bar Association (OAB). President of the International Institute for Studies of State Law (IIEDE). When accountability fails where it should prevail, the system once again asks whose side the law is on. In 2009, the lawyer Sergei Magnitsky exposed a fraud scheme and died in state custody in Russia. No effective domestic response followed; nor did international mechanisms offer a real remedy. In 2012, the United States Congress enacted an initial act focused on the Russian case; in 2016, faced with the repetition of this pattern of impunity, it broadened the scope and established a general regime: the Global Magnitsky Human Rights Accountability Act. Within US jurisdiction, the Act authorises personal sanctions—asset freezes and visa restrictions—against foreign individuals and entities for significant corruption or serious human rights abuses. In practice, the machinery is administrative: the Department of State and the Department of the Treasury/OFAC conduct designations, and since 2017 Executive Order 13818 (issued under the IEEPA) has structured the regime’s day-to-day operation and listings on the Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons (SDN) List. This is not an international instrument; its effects cross borders by virtue of the dollar’s weight, correspondent-banking networks, and US-regulated technology infrastructure. One should not, however, attribute the Act’s transnational efficacy solely to the dollar’s gravitational pull. The role of the SWIFT system—the backbone of international financial messaging—must also be considered. Although headquartered in Belgium, SWIFT is, in practice, subject to regulatory and political pressures exerted by Washington and Brussels, effectively making it a technical arm of sanctions. The experience of sanctions on Iran showed that exclusion from this network amounts to a form of de facto economic interdiction, cutting off access to global trade flows. Thus, even though the Magnitsky text does not expressly mention it, the Act’s reach is projected over this ecosystem because financial institutions, wary of retaliation, adjust their conduct in advance so as not to jeopardise their continued presence in such a vital network. The legal design is straightforward—and therefore effective. Designation triggers the blocking of assets within US reach, a prohibition on transactions with “U.S. persons”, and restrictions on mobility. The typical targets are non-US nationals—public officials, corporate leaders, organisations. As a large share of global operations settle in USD or touch systems governed by US rules, banks and companies in other countries adapt their behaviour to preserve access to the dollar system and the US market; wherever there is a US nexus (USD settlement, the involvement of a “U.S. person”, or the facilitation of a breach), non-compliance exposes actors to significant fines and, in commercial-regulatory terms, to the risk that dollar correspondents will be lost at counterparties’ discretion (de-risking). On the immigration front, visa restrictions may also be imposed under a parallel statutory basis (§ 7031(c) of the Department of State appropriations acts). Another salient point lies in the limits of judicial control over such designations. Although there is a formal possibility of recourse to US courts, experience shows that the D.C. Circuit adopts a posture of marked deference to the Executive, especially when national security and foreign policy are invoked. The result is a narrow scope for judicial review, in which substantive challenges to sanctions rarely succeed. In this setting, the administrative route of delisting before OFAC becomes, in practice, the only realistic hope of reversal—underscoring the asymmetry between the magnitude of the effects and the scarcity of effective procedural safeguards. It should be emphasised that breaches of Global Magnitsky designations are not confined to commercial repercussions. Under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA), US law provides for administrative and criminal penalties against financial institutions that, even through negligence, facilitate prohibited transactions. Multibillion-dollar fines have been imposed in analogous cases, hitting global banks that violated embargoes on sanctioned countries. Beyond monetary penalties, the greater risk is exclusion from the US market—the core of the international financial system. That scenario turns legal risk into existential risk: a bank unable to access the dollar system will struggle to survive. Liability is not limited to deliberate conduct. The sanctions regime admits attribution for “facilitation”, an open-textured concept encompassing any act that makes it possible, even indirectly, to carry out transactions with designated parties. Thus, the simple settlement of an operation that passes through a US institution, or the use of technology hosted on servers in the United States, may suffice to trigger the law’s application. This interpretive elasticity greatly expands the exposure of foreign financial institutions, which often do not perceive the hidden links that render their transactions reachable by OFAC’s extraterritorial arm. We should be clear about what is at stake. Magnitsky does not export a universal concept of human rights; it enacts, in domestic law, the United States’ legal and political interpretation of “serious violations” and “significant corruption”, and projects that reading through its economic and technological power. The same instrument that protects rights also operates as a lever of foreign policy—indeed, of legal hegemony. Law and power march together; recognising this refines—rather than weakens—the debate. The model has not been confined to Washington. Other jurisdictions have adopted their own regimes—Canada (2017), with the Justice for Victims of Corrupt Foreign Officials Act, and the European Union (2020), with its global human rights sanctions regime (Council Decision (CFSP) 2020/1999 and Regulation (EU) 2020/1998). The common denominator is targeted, name-specific sanctions—focused on natural and legal persons, not countries—with asset and mobility consequences that become effective because the world largely operates on infrastructure connected to the US. Real risks exist: political selectivity in the choice of targets, opaque criteria, and the erosion of procedural safeguards. The regime’s legitimacy depends on public and verifiable criteria, due administrative process with effective avenues of challenge (including delisting petitions to OFAC and, where applicable, judicial review under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA)), and independent institutional oversight. Without that, sanctions become a shortcut to arbitrariness; with it, the message is unambiguous: serious violations carry concrete consequences, within the bounds of legality. The debate that matters in Brazil is not outsourcing parameters to foreign jurisdictions, but strengthening our own. The Constitution enshrines the primacy of human rights in international relations (Article 4(II) of the Brazilian Federal Constitution). To discuss an analogous regime—with objective criteria, publicity of decisions, and opportunities for defence and review—is to discuss coherence between what is written and what is delivered. In an environment where finance, technology and compliance produce de facto transnational reach, sovereignty is also exercised through clear, stable and predictable rules. Thus, legal risks for financial institutions are not confined to regulatory compliance; they extend to institutional viability itself. Magnitsky sanctions have become a driver for the reorganisation of global banking conduct, forcing foreign institutions to choose between fidelity to their domestic legal order and pragmatic adherence to US norms. The room for neutrality is ever narrower: when in doubt, banks opt for over-compliance, abandoning legitimate clients and operations to preserve access to the international financial system. Here, law blends with power—and legal risk takes on the features of systemic risk. The Magnitsky Act achieved global reach not because it is “the law of the world”, but because a significant part of the world operates on US-centred infrastructure. Acknowledging this dual nature—humanitarian and geopolitical—does not relieve us of the need to choose parameters; it compels us to demand criteria, safeguards and institutional responsibility in the application of any regime. Where there is a serious violation, there should be a sanction—with clear rules, oversight and a commitment to legality—so that justice and power are not conflated. More broadly, in the global arena, no nation is beyond accountability to others; international relations imply transparency, reciprocity and a ban on arbitrariness by public authorities. To some extent, although there is neither a truly universal conception of human rights nor even a universal concept of corruption—and while there is no doubt about US global hegemony and China’s rise—it is impossible to ignore the growing importance of international public opinion and of certain ethical standards of integrity demanded in the observance of human rights by contemporary civilised nations. In this context, given countries’ economic, technological and commercial interdependence, the concept of sovereignty has become ever more complex and exposed to international politics and diplomacy. It is precisely in this new environment that legislation with transnational effects, enacted by sovereign powers, emerges and strengthens. Finally, it should be noted that Brazilian financial institutions occupy a structurally vulnerable position amid the conflict between national jurisdiction and the extraterritorial authority of the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC). Domestically, the recognition (homologação) of foreign decisions by the Superior Court of Justice (STJ) is a constitutionally indispensable requirement for property sanctions to take effect against individuals and companies located in Brazil. In the US legal system, however, OFAC—an agency subordinate to the Department of the Treasury and, ultimately, to the President—is not legally obliged to recognise or await that recognition procedure. OFAC’s structure empowers it to administer, supervise and impose financial sanctions immediately under the Global Magnitsky Act, applying them to all institutions that maintain direct or indirect links with the dollar financial system. This means that, even if Brazilian banks invoke a pending analysis before the STJ, OFAC has full discretion to accept or reject that justification—either treating it as a sign of respect for domestic due process or, conversely, as an unacceptable obstacle to the extraterritorial effectiveness of US law. To this equation one must add the spectre of so-called secondary sanctions, through which the Treasury threatens or restricts foreign banks and companies that, directly or indirectly, facilitate transactions for the benefit of designated parties. This is not just a loss of correspondents; it is the concrete possibility of exclusion from dollar payment networks and isolation from the international financial system. The mechanism operates as an indirect instrument of foreign policy, projecting onto third countries the need to conform to US directives on pain of economic marginalisation. The impact, for jurisdictions such as Brazil, is compulsory insertion into a zone of permanent tension between fidelity to the internal constitutional order and practical submission to the functional extraterritoriality imposed by OFAC. The gravity of the situation is heightened by the possibility of class actions in US courts. There are precedents in which victims of human rights violations have sought to hold banks liable for alleged complicity in indirectly financing sanctioned regimes. Even if such claims face evidential hurdles, the mere reputational and financial cost of litigating in US federal courts is a powerful deterrent. The logic is clear: non-compliance—or even the appearance of complacency—with designated parties can open flanks for complex litigation, compounding already severe administrative sanctions. This is, therefore, a field of tension between Brazilian constitutional sovereignty and the United States’ economic-normative power, in which banks are exposed to severe risks of secondary sanctions should OFAC choose not to recognise the authority of the Brazilian judiciary. Fábio Medina Osório
28 August 2025
Press Releases

OABRJ to host landmark debate on the future of administrative misconduct law

Rio de Janeiro, 27 August 2025 – The Sylvio Capanema Chamber at the Escola Superior de Advocacia of the Brazilian Bar Association (OABRJ) will stage a high-level forum, “The Contemporary Landscape of Administrative Misconduct Law”, convening some of Brazil’s leading jurists and practitioners to discuss the evolving contours of one of the most pivotal areas of public law. Opening Keynote – Fábio Medina Osório The conference will open with a keynote address from Fábio Medina Osório, founding partner of Medina Osório Advogados, Doctor of Administrative Law (Complutense University of Madrid), former Attorney General of Brazil, and current Chair of the Special Commission on Administrative Sanctioning Law at the Federal Council of the Brazilian Bar Association. Dr Medina Osório will trace the dogmatic and institutional evolution of administrative misconduct law, focusing on the delicate balance between ensuring accountability for misconduct and safeguarding fundamental rights and constitutional guarantees. Special Lecture – Vanessa Cerqueira Reis The programme continues with a special lecture from Vanessa Cerqueira Reis, partner at Medina Osório Advogados, State Attorney of Rio de Janeiro, and Vice-Chair of the Administrative Sanctioning Law Commission of the OABRJ. Her talk, “Contemporary Debates on Administrative Misconduct”, will deliver a critical analysis of the legislative and jurisprudential shifts brought by Law No. 14,230/2021, which redefined liability regimes for both public officials and private entities, reshaping Brazil’s legal and institutional landscape. A forum for institutional dialogue and democratic values Far from being a purely academic exercise, the event is positioned as a strategic forum for reflection, dialogue, and institutional strengthening. It underscores the role of law in consolidating democratic principles, reinforcing the rule of law, and promoting legal certainty—elements essential to transparent governance. The organisers highlight: “Our aim is to cultivate a collective dialogue that aligns integrity in public administration with the protection of individual rights.” ⸻ Why this event matters Relevance to practitioners: Offers critical updates on the interpretation of Law No. 14,230/2021. Thought leadership: Showcases insights from two of Brazil’s foremost authorities in administrative sanctioning law. Institutional significance: Hosted by OABRJ, reinforcing the Bar’s role in shaping the future of public law. ⸻ Press & Media Enquiries: Communications Office, Medina Osório Advogados www.medinaosorio.com.br  
22 August 2025
Energy and Natural Resources (Including Mining)

Niobium as a Geostrategic Pillar of the 21st Century: Brazil’s Centrality in the New Global Technological and Mineral Order

This article undertakes a broad analysis of the Federative Republic of Brazil’s strategic role in the global scenario of niobium production and trade.  Using an interdisciplinary approach, it examines the geological, industrial, economic, legal, and geopolitical aspects that position the country as a virtually exclusive participant in the global supply chain for this critical metal. Brazil holds approximately 98 per cent of known niobium reserves and accounts for over 90 per cent of globally traded production, conferring a uniquely powerful position in the 21st century. This centrality is particularly evident in sensitive sectors such as defence, infrastructure, energy, semiconductors, emerging technologies, and the energy transition. It should be noted that this geological and commercial advantage has not yet translated into effective sovereign power. The absence of a structured, integrated, and strategic national policy for the sector reveals legal and institutional vulnerabilities, including the lack of a specific regulatory framework, selective fiscal incentives, and interministerial coordination. Present governance is marked by fragmentation and the predominance of private interests, lacking coordination between industrial policy, economic diplomacy, and technological value addition. Consequently, the article proposes the creation of a new legal and economic regime for niobium, encompassing a dedicated legislative framework, industrial and fiscal policy mechanisms aimed at vertical integration, proactive mineral diplomacy, and the establishment of a public authority endowed with the technical expertise and legitimacy to coordinate national governance of this resource. In light of this context, niobium is treated not only as a commodity, but as a strategic asset for sovereignty, innovation, and geopolitical integration, particularly in an international environment marked by industrial reconfigurations, trade tensions, and disputes over critical minerals. Brazil’s central role in this new global landscape requires institutional intelligence and long-term strategic planning. Introduction The geoeconomic landscape of the 21st century has been strongly shaped by the rise of so-called strategic or critical minerals—essential inputs for the functioning of high-technology production chains, national security, the energy transition, and scientific innovation. In this framework, niobium emerges as one of the most relevant, albeit underestimated, metals in the new global material order. It is a chemical element with atomic number 41, belonging to the group of transition metals, with distinctive physicochemical properties: corrosion resistance, lightness, high thermal conductivity, and superconductivity at cryogenic temperatures. Its applications are varied and structural: from the aerospace and nuclear industries to advanced civil construction; from the production of superalloys for turbines, rockets, and pipelines to cutting-edge defence systems; and from industrial infrastructure to diagnostic imaging, such as magnetic resonance devices. Niobium—often described as the “invisible element”—is an indispensable component for sustaining the complexity of the contemporary economy[1]. What makes the geopolitics of this metal unique is Brazil’s near-monopoly position. As evidenced by updated data from the United States Geological Survey (USGS, 2025[2]) and Brazil’s National Mining Agency (ANM[3]), the country holds a significant proportion of the world’s known reserves and the largest effective annual global production. No other country exercises a comparable degree of control over a mineral resource of similar strategic value. The principal production hubs are located in the States of Minas Gerais (Araxá), Goiás (Catalão and Ouvidor), and Amazonas (São Gabriel da Cachoeira), with most production carried out by two major companies: CBMM—Companhia Brasileira de Metalurgia e Mineração (Brazilian Metallurgy and Mining Company)—and CMOC Brasil, a subsidiary of China Molybdenum Co. Ltd.[4]. At the same time, the United States of America, the European Union, the People’s Republic of China, Japan, and the Republic of Korea are highly dependent on Brazilian exports, lacking significant domestic production and fully functional alternatives. The United States Department of Defense has classified niobium as a critical mineral for national security, and documents released by WikiLeaks in 2010 revealed the inclusion of Brazilian mines on United States lists of global strategic infrastructure[5]. In light of this context, a central question arises: how has Brazil leveraged—or neglected to leverage—this geological and strategic advantage? This article seeks to answer that question based on an interdisciplinary analysis combining geological, industrial, economic, and legal perspectives. The proposed hypothesis is that Brazil occupies a central and privileged position in the new geopolitics of critical minerals, yet still lacks a robust state policy capable of articulating mineral sovereignty, value addition, technological innovation, and global resource diplomacy. Technical Overview and Industrial Applications of Niobium Niobium is a transition metal belonging to Group VB of the Periodic Table, with the chemical symbol Nb, atomic number 41, atomic mass of 92.91 u, and a melting point of approximately 2,468 °C. Its physical and chemical behaviour is characterised by high thermal resistance, ductility, good electrical conductivity, and excellent corrosion resistance, making it suitable for a wide range of industrial applications. From its identification by Charles Hatchett in 1801 to its consolidation as a critical element in the 21st century, niobium has evolved from a rare metal to a vital component of contemporary technological advancement. The principal commercial forms of niobium are diverse and serve different industrial sectors. The predominant form is ferroniobium (FeNb), an alloy of iron and niobium, which accounts for over 90 per cent of global demand and is widely used in the steel industry for the production of high-strength steels. Another relevant form is niobium oxide (Nb₂O₅), which has significant applications in the manufacture of advanced ceramics and precision optical devices. In addition, there are special alloys — such as nickel–niobium, aluminium–niobium, and titanium–niobium — which are used directly in strategic sectors, particularly the aerospace and defence industries, owing to their mechanical strength and thermal stability[6]. Furthermore, niobium plays a strategic role in several industrial sectors, particularly in the steel, aerospace, defence, energy, electronics, medical, and green technology industries. In the steel industry, its most widespread application is in the manufacture of high-strength, low-alloy microalloyed steels, known as HSLA (High Strength Low Alloy). The addition of small amounts of niobium — a process known as microalloying — provides substantial improvements in steel performance: increased mechanical strength, improved weldability, reduced weight in metal structures, and savings in material and energy[7]. These steels are widely used in the automotive industry, particularly in the production of lightweight yet safe vehicle bodies; in civil construction and major infrastructure projects, such as bridges, pipelines, and offshore platforms; as well as in the naval and railway industries[8]. In the aerospace and defence sector, niobium is essential for the formulation of superalloys used in jet engine turbines, rocket thermal coatings, and structural components of satellites and spacecraft. Alloys such as niobium–titanium (Nb–Ti) and niobium–tin (Nb₃Sn) are employed in the manufacture of superconducting magnets for radar systems, medical equipment, and particle accelerators[9]. In the energy and electronics sectors, niobium’s physical and chemical properties make it valuable for a range of applications. It is used in components of nuclear reactors due to its low neutron absorption cross-section, and in superconducting cables for high-voltage transmission systems and nuclear fusion projects such as ITER[10]. In medicine, niobium has been widely used for manufacturing orthopaedic and dental implants, cardiovascular stents, and high-precision surgical instruments[11]. Finally, in the so-called green technologies sector, niobium has gained prominence alongside the advance of renewable energy and the electrification of mobility. It is incorporated into wind turbines through high-strength alloys, into solid-state batteries, and into conductors for electric motors requiring greater thermal efficiency and durability[12]. Although most of Brazil’s production is exported as ferroniobium, there is growing demand for higher-value products, including special alloys customised for particular sectors; niobium-doped ceramic compounds; and niobium components for chips and three-dimensional metallic microstructures. CBMM, a global leader in the niobium products market, invests heavily in applied research aimed at developing new industrial uses for the element, focusing particularly on emerging technologies such as lithium-ion batteries containing niobium oxides. These investments include strategic partnerships with automotive companies, universities, and internationally renowned research centres, notably in Japan, Germany, China, and the United States[13]. However, such initiatives do not yet amount to a national public policy for mineral innovation. The absence of tax incentives, dedicated federal technology centres, and strategic regulation limits Brazil’s progress in transforming niobium into an industrial asset. Global Production and Market Control Global niobium production is characterised by a geological and industrial concentration unparalleled among today’s strategic minerals. Unlike other critical commodities — such as lithium, rare earth elements, and cobalt — which have multiple extraction sites across the globe, niobium is, in essence, monopolised by the Federative Republic of Brazil. According to data from the Serviço Geológico do Brasil (SGB – Geological Service of Brazil) and the United States Geological Survey (USGS), the country holds over 90 per cent of known reserves and accounts for approximately 90 per cent of annual global production. This dominant position is underpinned by three principal mining hubs within Brazilian territory: Araxá, in the State of Minas Gerais, operated by the Companhia Brasileira de Metalurgia e Mineração (CBMM), which alone is responsible for more than 75 per cent of global production[14]; Catalão, in the State of Goiás, operated by CMOC International Brasil; and São Gabriel da Cachoeira, in the State of Amazonas, where significant geological potential remains either in the exploratory phase or under legal restriction due to its location within Indigenous lands. Among these, the Araxá industrial complex is regarded as the most advanced in the world in terms of niobium extraction, processing, and metallurgical transformation technology. Beyond Brazil, the only other relevant operations, albeit on a smaller scale, are in Canada — through the Niobec mine in the province of Quebec[15] — and in certain Central African countries such as Rwanda, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and Nigeria. In these African states, niobium extraction occurs marginally, with little industrialisation and, in many cases, links to informal practices or unstable political contexts. However, none of these territories possesses reserves comparable in volume or quality to those of Brazil, nor do they possess the technological capacity or logistical infrastructure to rival Brazil’s production centre. In the United States of America, the Elk Creek Project in Nebraska is considered the sole domestic initiative with significant supply potential[16]. Nevertheless, it remains in the pre-operational stage, facing considerable environmental obstacles — such as the high cost of treating brackish groundwater — and requiring substantial financing to achieve large-scale economic viability[17]. The global niobium market is therefore not only geologically centralised but also technologically oligopolistic. CBMM — controlled by private Brazilian capital, with minority stakes held by Japanese and Chinese companies — dominates the global supply chain, acting as the near-exclusive supplier of ferroniobium to steelworks in Europe, North America, and Asia. It operates under a private contractual regime, without public international quotations and outside the scope of commodity exchanges, meaning that niobium prices are established by long-term bilateral agreements, with limited transparency and no international regulatory oversight. This structure confers upon Brazil a rare power in the geopolitics of critical minerals. No other nation exerts such market control with so little international competition over a resource considered indispensable for high-technology, infrastructure, and defence sectors. Paradoxically, however, this privileged position coexists with the absence of a specific national regulatory framework, the domestic deindustrialisation of the value chain, and export patterns concentrated in low-processing products, such as ferroniobium metal. At the same time, this market structure generates latent international tensions. The United States, for instance, has no domestic niobium production and imports 100 per cent of its consumption — the vast majority sourced directly from Brazil. This absolute dependence has been formally acknowledged by agencies such as the Department of the Interior, which placed niobium on its official list of critical minerals owing to its economic and strategic importance. The Department of Defense, for its part, recognises the use of niobium across various applications in the military sector, although, as of the 2021 fiscal year, it had not included the mineral in active acquisition or stockpiling programmes via the Defense Logistics Agency. The absence of reliable and substantial alternative suppliers or buffer stocks in the Northern Hemisphere renders Brazil a pivotal actor in the stability of the production chains for metal alloys and superconductors[18]. From a geopolitical standpoint, Brazil has yet to fully internalise the strategic implications of this concentration. National production remains largely oriented towards the export of metallic raw material, without state control over international flows, minimum local content requirements for technological transformation, or structured public policies to promote value addition or the formation of strategic reserves for market stabilisation. The lack of an official international quotation even prevents niobium from being treated as a structured financial asset, limiting its circulation as a hedging or investment instrument. In short, global niobium production is a singular example of a natural monopoly converted into private commercial hegemony. Brazil is simultaneously the largest holder, producer, and exporter of a resource fundamental to the energy transition, the aerospace industry, electronic devices, and the strategic defence capabilities of major world powers. This position grants the country a natural comparative advantage, yet it requires an intelligent and sovereign national strategy to convert this advantage into negotiating leverage, domestic value addition, technological innovation, and autonomous geopolitical positioning. Without such measures, Brazil’s niobium monopoly will remain a dormant asset — an exporter of raw potential and an importer of industrialised solutions that could otherwise be developed domestically. Unlike other industrial metals (such as copper, aluminium, or nickel), niobium is not traded on commodity exchanges or futures markets like the London Metal Exchange (LME) or COMEX. Contracts are negotiated directly between producers and buyers, with prices determined by private arrangements based on quality, application, term, and volume. This model, known as an opaque market or performance contract, prevents financial speculation but simultaneously restricts market transparency and liquidity. As a result, there is no daily public price for niobium; strategic stocks are held privately; and hedging strategies (financial risk protection) are limited. This arrangement benefits major producers — especially CBMM — which imposes its technical and commercial standards as the global benchmark. At present, there are no direct substitutes equivalent to niobium in its most critical applications, particularly in the manufacture of microalloyed steels and high-performance superalloys. Materials examined as partial substitutes include vanadium — with inferior thermal resistance; titanium — which is more costly and less ductile in certain alloys; and rare earth elements — which have greater chemical instability and are largely dependent on China. From an industrial perspective, replacing niobium would entail increased structural weight, reduced material durability, higher costs, and the necessity of new certification tests — factors that make substitution economically unattractive in the short and medium term. Against this backdrop, the international dependence on Brazilian production constitutes not only a commercial reality but also a systemic vulnerability for several nations. In this context, it is pertinent to note that, when signing the Executive Order of 30 July 2025, then-President of the United States, Donald Trump, declared a national state of emergency under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA), holding the Government of the Federative Republic of Brazil responsible for practices deemed to undermine the national security, economy, and foreign policy of the United States. As a consequence, an additional 40 per cent tariff was imposed on Brazilian products, resulting in a total taxation level of 50 per cent[19]. At the same time, certain items were explicitly excluded from this surcharge, and niobium was among the goods exempted, thereby being removed from the additional tariff. This measure demonstrates that President Trump was fully cognisant of niobium’s strategic importance, particularly in the context of critical industrial supply chains and the national security of the United States. The Geopolitics of Niobium’s External Dependence The near-total concentration of niobium reserves and production in the Federative Republic of Brazil has transformed this resource into a highly sensitive geopolitical variable. While most strategic minerals have a relatively diverse geographic distribution — such as lithium, found in the so-called “Lithium Triangle” (Argentina, Bolivia, and Chile), or copper, mined in Chile, Peru, China, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo — niobium is an exception: over 90 per cent of its practical availability, in technical, legal, and logistical terms, is concentrated in Brazil. This natural monopoly confers upon Brazil a unique position in the critical industrial supply chains of the 21st century, especially within a context of energy transition, green re-industrialisation, and global shifts in power[20]. Niobium’s external dependence is not solely economic but also strategic. Several industrialised countries — including the United States of America, the Federal Republic of Germany, Japan, and the Republic of Korea — rely on Brazilian imports to sustain sensitive sectors of their technological, military, and energy infrastructure. The North American case is particularly illustrative. According to data from the United States Geological Survey (USGS), approximately 87 per cent of the niobium consumed by the United States originates from Brazil, with the remainder sourced, to a lesser extent, from Canada. Since 2018, the mineral has been included on the official list of critical minerals published by the United States Department of the Interior, pursuant to Executive Order 13817, in recognition of its essential role in strategic sectors and its high vulnerability in the event of a supply disruption. Technical reports prepared by the Pentagon and opinions from United States strategic intelligence agencies, combined with documents released through WikiLeaks, indicate that Brazilian reserves — in particular, the Araxá mine in the State of Minas Gerais — are regarded as assets of vital geostrategic interest to the national security of the United States[21]. This vulnerability has prompted industrial powers to pursue diversification strategies. Canada operates the Niobec mine in Quebec, which accounts for about 8 per cent of global ferroniobium supply, although its scale remains incomparable to that of Brazil[22]. The United States is assessing the Elk Creek Project in Nebraska, led by NioCorp Developments Ltd., but this venture has yet to enter commercial operation and faces significant challenges in financing, environmental regulation, and logistics[23]. The People’s Republic of China, by contrast, has pursued a different strategy, acquiring equity stakes in Brazilian niobium and phosphate assets through CMOC Brasil, and positioning itself today as the second-largest producer of niobium globally[24]. This approach has placed niobium squarely within the Sino-American contest over critical minerals and technological leadership in the 21st century. This scenario reveals a geopolitical paradox: Brazil holds an extraordinary potential position of power, yet has not consolidated this advantage as an instrument of diplomacy, economic leverage, or industrial policy. There is no structured national policy of mineral sovereignty for niobium. Governance of the sector is fragmented, characterised by the absence of robust state guidelines, the private concentration of technical expertise, and insufficient coordination between foreign policy, scientific research, and value-added industrial development. Finally, the stability of the global niobium market — based on private contracts and lacking both a stock exchange listing and futures trading — depends largely upon CBMM’s historic reliability as a supplier. However, this stability is fragile in the face of climate-related risks, trade disputes, diplomatic tensions, or domestic political shocks. What is presently perceived as a predictable supply chain could, in a time of crisis, become a global bottleneck. Niobium, therefore, is not merely a technical commodity but also a sovereign asset, a driver of international influence, and a potential pillar of 21st-century industrial policy. Understanding this geopolitical dependence is the first step towards Brazil’s strategic repositioning on the global stage. The following sections will examine Brazilian mineral governance and the opportunities to convert this comparative advantage into a driver of effective leadership. Why Brazil Still Does Not Have a National Niobium Policy? Legal, Institutional, and Strategic Diagnosis Brazil’s near-absolute control over global niobium reserves and production has yet to translate into a coordinated, systemic, and sovereign national policy. Although the country occupies a unique position on the international stage, equivalent to a global natural monopoly, the governance of this asset remains diffuse, captured by private interests, lacking a specialised legal framework, and disconnected from the diplomatic and industrial strategies of the Brazilian State. The Brazilian legal system does not have specific legislation regulating strategic minerals such as niobium — a serious regulatory gap when compared to other major geoeconomic powers. At present, niobium is regulated only in a generic manner by Decree-Law No. 227/1967 (Mining Code) and through the residual competences of the Agência Nacional de Mineração (ANM – National Mining Agency), whose remit is limited to the technical and fiscal oversight of mining activities. Although Brazil established, via Decree No. 10.657/2021, the Política de Apoio ao Licenciamento Ambiental de Projetos de Investimento em Minerais Estratégicos (Policy to Support Environmental Licensing of Investment Projects in Strategic Minerals), creating the Comitê Interministerial de Análise de Projetos de Minerais Estratégicos (Interministerial Committee for the Analysis of Strategic Mineral Projects – CTAPME) and including niobium in the official list of the Ministry of Mines and Energy, this initiative still lacks a robust and permanent regulatory framework addressing the matter from the standpoint of national security, industrial policy, and the country’s strategic geoeconomic positioning[25]. Unlike the United States (which regularly publishes lists of critical minerals under special protection regimes), the European Union (which maintains the European Observatory for Critical Raw Materials), and the People’s Republic of China (which sets quotas, builds strategic stockpiles, and provides incentives for technological transformation), Brazil does not legally recognise the exceptional status of niobium. Consequently, there is no strategic legal classification for substances of sovereign interest. This omission compromises the regulatory autonomy of the Brazilian State, prevents the strategic use of niobium in international agreements, and renders impossible the adoption of policies for vertical integration, inventory control, fiscal incentives, and local content clauses — all fundamental instruments of Economic Law and contemporary mineral policy. Brazil’s niobium production chain is highly concentrated in private hands, with absolute dominance by the Companhia Brasileira de Metalurgia e Mineração (CBMM) and, to a lesser extent, CMOC Brasil — a subsidiary of the Chinese multinational. The State has no mechanism for strategic control over trade flows, pricing, reserves, or the geopolitical allocation of the product. The absence of a state-owned or mixed-capital company dedicated to the sector — akin to Petrobras in oil or Indústrias Nucleares do Brasil (INB) in uranium — represents an institutional vacuum, denationalising mineral policy and subjecting a geopolitically significant input to purely corporate criteria. Furthermore, the private contractual framework between foreign producers and buyers, conducted without public auction, regulated market, or international quotation, undermines transparency, hampers tax collection, and deprives the State of influence over the value chain. This state of affairs implicitly contravenes the principle of the supremacy of the public interest over the private interest — fundamental to Brazilian Administrative Law — and compromises the foundations of Regulatory Law by limiting the State’s normative authority over sectors that are sensitive to national security and the collective economic interest. Public governance of niobium in Brazil is marked by chronic institutional fragmentation. Responsibilities relating to mining, science and technology, foreign trade, national defence, foreign affairs, regional development, and technical education are dispersed among various ministries and agencies, without functional integration or coordination by a higher-level body. For example, there is no Conselho Nacional de Minerais Estratégicos (National Council for Strategic Minerals) or an interministerial committee with decision-making powers on the matter. This absence prevents the formulation of integrated multi-year plans, local content targets, industrial financing policies, or mineral diplomacy strategies based on national interests. The result is the perpetuation of a reactive, unstructured public policy limited to the technical-operational scope of the ANM. From the perspective of Public Policy Law, this is a case of systemic governance failure, in which the absence of a coordinating authority prevents the transformation of mineral assets into levers for development. The lack of unified command undermines the possibility of long-term planning and denies the country full regulatory sovereignty. Brazil’s tax system makes no distinction between the fiscal burden on exports of raw ferroniobium and on exports of products with a higher degree of technological transformation, such as superalloys, specialised oxides, or composite materials. This fiscal neutrality discourages domestic industrialisation of the niobium production chain, reducing the country to the role of global supplier of basic inputs without retaining added value domestically. Furthermore, the Compensação Financeira pela Exploração de Recursos Minerais (CFEM – Financial Compensation for the Exploitation of Mineral Resources), provided for in Article 20, §1 of the Federal Constitution, is applied uniformly, without selective criteria to reward projects incorporating innovation, sustainability, or value addition. Fiscal policy, as an instrument of public policy, is in this respect underutilised. There is an urgent need for extra-fiscal tax mechanisms, such as regressive rates for more highly processed products, incentives for the export of finished goods, and tax credit lines linked to niobium-based research, technical training, and energy transition projects. The current fiscal omission reinforces Brazil’s entrapment in a logic of dependent extractivism, incompatible with its geoeconomic potential. Despite Brazil’s growing international relevance as a niobium supplier — particularly to the United States, Japan, Germany, and China — the subject remains absent from the country’s foreign policy agenda and geopolitical strategy. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs has yet to structure a specialised mineral diplomacy, as countries like Canada, Australia, and India have done, nor does it use niobium as a bargaining instrument for geoeconomic advantage, scientific cooperation, or the development of technological partnerships. The absence of a “soft mineral power” strategy constitutes a squandered opportunity, especially as niobium’s centrality is set to increase in the era of renewable energy, microelectronics, and the aerospace industry. By failing to employ niobium as a bridge to integrate universities, innovation centres, and strategic alliances, Brazil forgoes legitimate international influence based on its unique mineral endowment. From the standpoint of International Relations and International Economic Law, the country remains peripheral despite being central to the supply of a critical resource. Formal sovereignty over subsoil resources does not translate into active geopolitical sovereignty — a paradox of significant strategic weight. The lack of a national niobium policy is, above all, symptomatic of profound institutional disarticulation, regulatory inertia, and a limited vision of Brazil’s role in the 21st century. Overcoming these barriers requires mobilising the instruments of Administrative, Fiscal, International, and Regulatory Law, combined with a new model of public mineral policy. Transforming niobium into an asset of sovereignty, innovation, and international prominence depends on the simultaneous adoption of five fronts: the creation of a specific legal framework; permanent interministerial coordination; sectoral fiscal reform; expansion of mineral diplomacy; and an industrial and scientific policy focused on value-added development. Final Considerations The consolidation of a National Niobium Policy in Brazil presupposes, above all, the recognition of this resource as an asset of national sovereignty, of inestimable geopolitical and technological value. Such a policy must be supported by a new legal framework that formally recognises niobium as a strategic mineral, granting it special legal status in light of the principles of Brazilian Administrative Law and Economic Law. This legislation should enable the State to act not only as a regulator but also as the coordinator of a public agenda focused on value creation, industrial innovation, and international recognition. Furthermore, it is essential to establish a public authority with the technical and legal expertise, international legitimacy, and executive capacity necessary to coordinate interministerial policies and formulate national guidelines for the governance of critical minerals. The tax system must be repositioned to shift from being merely a revenue-generating instrument to becoming an incentive instrument: fostering the domestic industrialisation of the niobium supply chain, rewarding local content, research, and vertical integration initiatives, and discouraging the simple export of raw alloys. Simultaneously, Brazil must launch a proactive mineral diplomacy that employs niobium as a vector for strategic insertion into global value chains in clean energy, defence, aerospace, microelectronics, and emerging technologies. This diplomacy must be underpinned by bilateral scientific cooperation agreements, technology security protocols, and multilateral initiatives positioning Brazil as a reliable and innovative supplier of critical raw materials. In the current international scenario, niobium is gaining centrality as a geopolitical asset in strategic negotiations between Brazil and the United States, particularly in light of the potential reconfiguration of United States foreign policy with Donald Trump’s return to power. Trump’s global project is essentially based on three pillars: national reindustrialisation, combating strategic dependence on rival powers (especially China), and reviewing international agreements that do not directly favour United States economic interests. This constitutes a doctrine of aggressive commercial nationalism, with a pronounced protectionist bias and a technocratic view of critical resources and sensitive production chains. In this context, niobium — a key input for advanced metal alloys, superconductors, defence technologies, and aerospace infrastructure — assumes the status of a priority raw material in the national security strategy of the United States. The country’s greatest vulnerability lies in its near-total dependence on Brazil for this mineral, given that its own reserves are insignificant and its strategic stocks limited. Trump’s potential re-election to the White House would intensify the United States’ focus on securing a stable, predictable, and politically reliable supply of niobium, thereby increasing Brazil’s bargaining power to an unprecedented degree. It is therefore imperative that Brazilian diplomacy avoid reactive and emotional responses, and instead adopt a cool, strategic, and technically informed posture, operating from the Executive Branch with interministerial coordination, and avoiding isolated protagonism by the Judiciary. The recent crisis involving decisions of the Supreme Federal Court that directly affected large American technology corporations (such as Google and Meta) has raised alarms in Washington about the legal and reputational risks of operating in Brazil. Although legitimate from the standpoint of jurisdictional sovereignty, such decisions generated institutional discomfort within the United States Department of State and provoked behind-the-scenes pressure in the United States Congress. The centrality of niobium, however, must be understood as part of a broader spectrum of strategic assets under the stewardship of the Brazilian State, whose mobilisation can strengthen Brazil’s position in negotiations with the United States. In short, it is evident that the Federal Executive Branch is not limited to niobium as the sole mineral asset capable of strategic mobilisation in relations with the United States. Brazil possesses a wider range of geoeconomic assets that can be deployed in bilateral negotiations. The ongoing crisis demands a coordinated approach at the diplomatic, political, and commercial levels, guided by strategic rationality and institutional coordination. It is implausible to suppose that Donald Trump criticised the Supreme Federal Court merely out of deference to Eduardo Bolsonaro or emotional ties to Jair Bolsonaro. The hallmark of Trump’s political conduct is pragmatism, and his foreign strategy has consistently been guided by the defence of the objective interests of American corporations. In this context, Brazilian court decisions directly affecting such companies — often perceived in the United States as arbitrary or incompatible with fundamental guarantees and human rights — came to be regarded as institutional affronts, thereby legitimising, in Trump’s view, an assertive posture towards the Brazilian Judiciary. This was one of the political strands underpinning Trump’s actions in exercising his sovereignty, particularly through the extraterritorial application of United States law — a recurring instrument of American foreign policy in the defence of its strategic and commercial interests. What Trump may fail to appreciate is that, within the Brazilian institutional framework, the Judiciary enjoys even greater independence and autonomy than is provided for in the North American system. Furthermore, decisions issued by the Supreme Federal Court are jurisdictional in nature and are not, under any circumstances, subject to the authority or responsibility of the Executive Branch, owing to the strict separation of powers enshrined in the 1988 Constitution. Accordingly, a clear distinction must be maintained in trade negotiations between impasses arising from the actions of the Judiciary and matters strictly related to bilateral economic relations. The Brazilian Judiciary is responsible for its own actions, including at the international level, although it may be institutionally assisted by the Office of the Attorney General in the exercise of its defence before other jurisdictions. However, relations and commercial ties between the two countries must proceed autonomously and in parallel, preserving their own logic and institutional continuity, regardless of any internal jurisdictional disputes that may occur within the Brazilian State. Given this context, Brazil must formulate structured, state-to-state negotiations with the United States, conducted with clarity as to the competing strategic interests, in order to safeguard its internal regulatory autonomy, preserve its central role in the global supply of niobium, avoid potential economic retaliation, and ideally transform this resource into a vector for diplomatic détente and economic reconfiguration within the framework of the new United States industrial policy. This is not a matter of subservience, but of geostrategic intelligence: by accurately identifying the United States’ core objectives — such as secure access to critical raw materials, diversification of supply chains, and revitalisation of its industrial base — Brazil positions itself as an indispensable partner. In return, it can seek political space, technology transfer, co-production agreements, and reinforcement of its standing as a geoeconomic power in the Global South. The Brazilian Government cannot be held responsible for the acts of another sovereign state, much less for those of an entire population. The Office of the Attorney General defends this prerogative by representing the political agents of the Brazilian Judiciary against potential interference by a foreign court in their functional autonomy. However, this institutional defence — also exercised pursuant to Article 131 of the Federal Constitution and Article 22 of Law No. 9,028/95 — is not necessarily a political component of trade negotiations between the two countries, despite appearing to be so in Trump’s view[26]. If it is true that Brazil, through the Supreme Federal Court, has exercised its sovereign powers, it is equally true that the United States, through its Executive Branch, when applying the Executive Order Addressing Threats to the United States by the Government of Brazil, would also be exercising its sovereign powers, insofar as it applies a law approved by its National Congress and within its domestic jurisdiction, with transnational, economic, technological, and financial repercussions[27]. There can be little doubt that the underlying political motivation for Trump’s actions was not the result of manipulation by the Bolsonaro family — and even less by Eduardo Bolsonaro — but rather politically calculated decisions based on the transnational effects of Supreme Federal Court rulings on the economic interests of major United States companies of substantial social and political significance in that country. In my work Administrative Sanctioning Law[28], now in its 10th edition and present in the publishing market for 25 years, I had the opportunity to comment on certain decisions of the Supreme Federal Court of Brazil, under the rapporteurship of Justice Alexandre de Moraes, in cases involving the convictions of individuals who had been at the encampment in front of the Court on 8 January 2024. In the decisions I examined, I observed that there had been violations of human rights, as strict (objective) criminal liability was applied. A statistical study would be necessary on the number of decisions issued in the same vein and following the same pattern: absence of individualisation of conduct, imposition of objective liability for the mere fact of having camped in front of the Supreme Federal Court, and a presumption of responsibility for an anti-democratic act. There have also been statements and protests in Brazil from numerous institutions, including the Brazilian Bar Association itself, against the arbitrariness committed in the so-called “fake news inquiry” and against the violation of professional prerogatives and restrictions on rights of defence. However, there are no statistical studies demonstrating or proving a systemic erosion of human rights stemming from these decisions. The political rationale underpinning United States tension and interventionism must be correctly identified. To what extent has the Supreme Federal Court of Brazil become a global legal risk to the human rights protected by the United States? In this context, it is clear that this discussion takes on its own contours, and that the role of the Office of the Attorney General is to defend, in legal terms, the justices of the Supreme Federal Court and any other political agents affected by foreign jurisdiction as a result of official acts performed in office. Nevertheless, the allegation that such acts violated the human and fundamental rights of American companies — or even those of Brazilian citizens — must be debated in the appropriate forum, and cannot, and should not, be conflated with trade negotiations concerning relations between the two countries and the interests of their respective peoples. It is also pertinent to recall the recent decision of the Supreme Federal Court in Petição No. 14.129, in which Justice of the Supreme Federal Court, Alexandre de Moraes ordered the preventive detention of former President Jair Messias Bolsonaro for persistent non-compliance with court-imposed precautionary measures. The ruling established that Bolsonaro had repeatedly and wilfully circumvented restrictions — including the prohibition on using social media directly or through third parties — by orchestrating and participating in public communications designed to undermine the authority of the Court and to interfere unlawfully in ongoing judicial proceedings. The decision, grounded in the need to protect the integrity of criminal investigations and to safeguard national sovereignty from coordinated attempts to destabilise Brazilian institutions, underscores that judicial determinations of this nature are matters of domestic legal order, immune to external political bargaining. As such, they must be understood as the exercise of Brazil’s sovereign jurisdiction, entirely distinct from — and not to be conflated with — the negotiation of economic or diplomatic agreements. References NATIONAL MINING AGENCY (Brazil). Niobium: Brazilian mineral summary 2024: base year 2023. Brasília: ANM, 2024. 2 p. 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Available at: https://agenciagov.ebc.com.br/noticias/202311/brasil-eo-principal-agente-no-mercado-mundial-de-niobio. Accessed on: 31 July 2025. BRAZILIAN COMPANY FOR INDUSTRIAL RESEARCH AND INNOVATION (EMBRAPII); CENTRE FOR MANAGEMENT AND STRATEGIC STUDIES (CGEE). Technological radar: technologies with niobium. Brasília: DIESP/CGEE, Jan. 2023. 53 p. Revised edition with executive summary. UNITED STATES. Executive Order: Addressing Threats to the United States by the Government of Brazil. Washington, DC: The White House, 30 July 2025. Available at: https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/2025/07/addressing-threats-to-the-us/. Accessed on: 3 August 2025. ÍGNEA – GEOLOGY AND ENVIRONMENT. Strategic Minerals Policy: A Comprehensive and Detailed Guide. Brasília: Ígnea, 9 April 2025. Available at: https://www.igneabr.com.br/en/noticias/general-laws-and-rules/strategic-minerals-policy-a-comprehensive-and-detailed-guide/. Accessed on: 31 July 2025. BRAZILIAN MINING INSTITUTE (IBRAM). 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DOI:https://doi.org/10.1590/0104-9224/SI2202.06; MA, Xiaoping; ZHOU, Cheng; WANG, Lijun; LIU, Chunming; SUBRAMANIAN, Sundaresa; OLIVEIRA, Mariana Perez de. Role of Nb in 13Cr super-martensitic stainless steel. REM: Revista Escola de Minas, Ouro Preto, v. 66, n. 2, p. 179–185, Apr./Jun. 2013. Available at:https://www.scielo.br/j/rem/a/dcSNBbYRbBbp4gGbmCZcxDM/?lang=en. [8] BRAZILIAN COMPANY FOR INDUSTRIAL RESEARCH AND INNOVATION (EMBRAPII); CENTER FOR MANAGEMENT AND STRATEGIC STUDIES (CGEE). Technological radar: niobium-based technologies. Brasília: DIESP/CGEE, Jan. 2023. 53 p. Revised edition with executive summary. [9] BRAZILIAN COMPANY FOR INDUSTRIAL RESEARCH AND INNOVATION (EMBRAPII); CENTER FOR MANAGEMENT AND STRATEGIC STUDIES (CGEE). Technological radar: niobium-based technologies. Brasília: DIESP/CGEE, Jan. 2023. 53 p. Revised edition with executive summary. [10] BRAZILIAN MINING INSTITUTE (IBRAM). Brazil rejects nuclear fusion project offer due to niobium. Brasília: IBRAM, July 11, 2023. Available at:https://ibram.org.br/noticia/niobio-brasil-recusa-oferta-para-projeto-de-fusao-nuclear/. Accessed on: July 31, 2025. [11] BRAZILIAN COMPANY FOR INDUSTRIAL RESEARCH AND INNOVATION (EMBRAPII); CENTER FOR MANAGEMENT AND STRATEGIC STUDIES (CGEE). Technological radar: niobium-based technologies. Brasília: DIESP/CGEE, Jan. 2023. 53 p. Revised edition with executive summary. [12] SUSTAINABLE MINING. Critical and strategic minerals: the foundation of Brazil's sustainable future. Brasília: Mineração Sustentável, May 26, 2025. Available at:https://mineracaosustentavel.org.br/minerais-criticos-e-estrategicos-a-base-do-futuro-sustentavel-do-brasil/. Accessed on: July 31, 2025; BRAZILIAN COMMUNICATIONS COMPANY (EBC). Brazil is the main agent in the global niobium market. Brasília: EBC, 2023 (published in November 2023). Available at:https://agenciagov.ebc.com.br/noticias/202311/brasil-eo-principal-agente-no-mercado-mundial-de-niobio. Accessed on: July 31, 2025. [13] BRAZILIAN METALLURGY AND MINING COMPANY (CBMM). Niobium technology is highlighted in battery development. Araxá: CBMM, April 12, 2024. Available at:https://cbmm.com/pt/midias/noticias/niobio-baterias-tecnologia. Accessed on: July 31, 2025. [14] BRAZILIAN MINING INSTITUTE (IBRAM). CBMM postpones expansion project. Brasília: IBRAM, July 28, 2009. Available at:https://ibram.org.br/noticia/cbmm-adia-projeto-de-expansao/. Accessed on: July 31, 2025. [15] NIOBIUM CANADA. Who mines niobium? Canada: Niobium Canada, 2023. Available at: https://niobiumcanada.com/who-mines-niobium/. Accessed on: July 31, 2025. [16] NS ENERGY BUSINESS. Elk Creek Project. London: NS Energy, 2023. Available at:https://www.nsenergybusiness.com/projects/elk-creek-project/. Accessed on: July 31, 2025 [17] NIOCORP DEVELOPMENTS LTD. NioCorp releases 2019 update to Elk Creek feasibility study. Centennial, CO: NioCorp, May 28, 2019. Available at:https://www.niocorp.com/niocorp_releases_2019_update_to-elk_creek_feasibility_study/. Accessed on: July 31, 2025. [18] UNITED STATES. Department of the Interior. Niobium. In: US Geological Survey. 2020 Minerals Yearbook – Niobium [Advance Release]. Washington, DC: US Government Publishing Office, 2024. Available at:https://www.usgs.gov/centers/national-minerals-information-center/niobium-and-tantalum-statistics-and-information. Accessed on: July 31, 2025. [19] UNITED STATES. Executive Order: Addressing Threats to the United States by the Government of Brazil. Washington, DC: The White House, 30 July 2025. Available at: https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/2025/07/addressing-threats-to-the-us/. Accessed on: 3 August 2025. [20] GEOLOGICAL SERVICE OF BRAZIL (SGB). Brazilian niobium. Brasília: Ministry of Mines and Energy, October 19, 2016. Available at:https://www.sgb.gov.br/niobio-brasileiro. Accessed on: July 31, 2025. [21] UNITED STATES. Congressional Research Service. Critical minerals and US supply chain policy. Washington, DC: US Congress, 28 June. 2019. (R45810). Available at:https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R45810. Accessed on: July 31, 2025; GEOLOGICAL SERVICE OF BRAZIL (SGB). Brazilian niobium. Brasília: Ministry of Mines and Energy, October 19, 2016. Available at:https://www.sgb.gov.br/niobio-brasileiro. Accessed on: July 31, 2025; UNITED STATES. Department of the Interior. Final list of critical minerals 2018. Federal Register, v. 83, n. 97, May 18, 2018. Available at: https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2018/05/18/2018-10667/final-list-of-critical-minerals-2018. Accessed on: July 31, 2025; WIKILEAKS. Cable 09STATE15113_a. Washington, DC, February 18, 2009. Available at:https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/09STATE15113_a.html. Accessed on: July 31, 2025. [22] ARGUS MEDIA. Niobec's FeNb production continues despite strike. Argus Metals, May 14, 2025. Available at:https://www.argusmedia.com/metals-platform/newsandanalysis/article/2688344-Niobec-s-FeNb-production-continues-despite-strike. Accessed on: July 31, 2025. [23] NIOCORP DEVELOPMENTS LTD. Elk Creek Project. NioCorp, 2025. Available at:https://www.niocorp.com/elk-creek-project/. Accessed on: July 31, 2025 [24] CMOC BRAZIL. Business – Niobium. CMOC Brazil, 2024. Available at:https://cmocbrasil.com/en/negocios/niobio. Accessed on: July 31, 2025. [25] ÍGNEA – GEOLOGY AND ENVIRONMENT. Strategic Minerals Policy: A Comprehensive and Detailed Guide. Brasília: Ígnea, April 9, 2025. Available at:https://www.igneabr.com.br/en/noticias/general-laws-and-rules/strategic-minerals-policy-a-comprehensive-and-detailed-guide/. Accessed on: July 31, 2025. [26] BRAZIL. Constitution of the Federative Republic of Brazil of 1988. Brasília, October 5, 1988. Available at:https://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/constituicao/constituicao.htm. Accessed on: August 3, 2025; BRAZIL. Law No. 9,028, of April 12, 1995. Provides for the exercise of the institutional powers of the Attorney General's Office, on an emergency and provisional basis, and contains other measures. Compiled text. Presidency of the Republic, Civil House, Deputy Chief of Staff for Legal Affairs. Brasília, April 12, 1995. Available at:https://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/LEIS/L9028.htm. Accessed on: August 3, 2025. [27] UNITED STATES. Executive Order: Addressing Threats to the United States by the Government of Brazil. Washington, DC: The White House, July 30. 2025. Available at:https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/2025/07/addressing-threats-to-the-us/. Accessed on: August 3, 2025 [28] MEDINA OSÓRIO, Fábio. Administrative Sanctioning Law. 10th ed. São Paulo: Revista dos Tribunais, 2025.
14 August 2025

Release II Congresso Brasileiro de Direito Administrativo Sancionador

On twenty-second of August, I have the honour of marking a milestone beyond my professional career — the 25th anniversary of the book Sanctioning Administrative Law — with an unprecedented lecture at the II Congresso Brasileiro de Direito Administrativo Sancionador (Brazilian Congress on Sanctioning Administrative Law), organised by IDASAN, to be held at the AASP headquarters. Lecture theme: Objective and Subjective Responsibility in Sanctioning Administrative Law More than merely a technical-legal domain, Sanctioning Administrative Law also reflects the ethical-institutional nature of the state’s punitive power. In this lecture, I propose reflections that transcend the boundaries of legal dogmatics: What is the meaning of legal responsibility in the 21st century? Which values should guide the state’s sanctioning function? How should the state’s punitive claims be oriented within a Democratic Rule of Law? This is a journey to reclaim the ethical purpose behind the exercise of power. It is not merely about punishing, but understanding, guiding, restoring, and protecting the dignity of institutions and individuals. To register, simply visit the IDASAN website: https://idasan.com.br/ii-congresso-brasileiro-de-direito-administrativo-sancionador#ingresso #FábioMedinaOsório #IDASAN #SanctioningAdministrativeLaw #Lecture
22 July 2025

ADMINISTRATIVE INFRACTIONS AND SANCTIONS IN COMPLEMENTARY LAW Nº 213/2025. NEW PARADIGMS OF SANCTIONING ADMINISTRATIVE LAW IN THE INSURANCE MARKET

SUMMARY This article analyzes the legislative changes that were introduced by Complementary Law No. 213/2025 in the private insurance system in Brazil, especially in Decree-Law No. 73/1966 and related legislation. These changes modernized the regulatory framework, covering topics such as the regulation of insurance cooperatives, which beforewere restricted to the agricultural, health and work accident sectors,and the formalization of mutualist asset protection operations, in addition to expanding the powers of the Superintendence of Private Insurance (SUSEP). Insurance cooperatives began to be regulated with clear requirements for governance, oversight and asset independence. Mutualist asset protection emerged as an alternativeto the insurance, based on the sharing of costs among participants. The sanctioning regime was reinforced with strict penalties, greater accountability of managers and criminalization of illicit behavior, aiming to guarantee market stability and greater protection for consumers. The article concludes that these changes have the potential to transform the insurance and asset protection sector in Brazil, promoting inclusion, legal certainty and alignment with international standards, although they present operational and adaptation challenges for regulated entities and regulators. KEYWORDS Administrative sanctioning law; Insurance cooperatives; Mutual Asset Protection; Susep; Insurance companies. ABSTRACT The article analyzes the legislative changes introduced by Complementary Law No. 213/2025 to the private insurance system in Brazil, particularly to Decree-Law No. 73/1966 and related legislation. These changes modernized the regulatory framework, covering topics such as the regulation of insurance cooperatives and the formalization of mutual property protection operations, as well as expanding the powers of the Superintendence of Private Insurance (SUSEP). Insurance cooperatives are now regulated with clear requirements for governance, oversight, and asset independence. Mutual property protection has emerged as an innovative alternative to traditional insurance, based on cost-sharing among participants. The sanctioning regime has been strengthened with stricter penalties, increased accountability for managers, and the criminalization of irregular practices, aiming to ensure market stability and greater consumer protection. The article states that these changes have the potential to transform the insurance and property protection sector in Brazil, promoting inclusion, legal certainty, and alignment with international standards, although they pose operational and adaptation challenges for conclusive regulated entities and regulators. KEYWORDS Sanctioning Administrative Law; Insurance Cooperatives; Mutualist Asset Protection; Susep; Superintendence of Private Insurance; Insurers.   Introduction The insurance sector in Brazil plays an essential role in economic development and in protecting the assets of individuals and companies. The evolution of this market is directly associated with the creation of a robust regulatory framework capable of meeting the demands of a dynamic economic environment. This market has expanded, both in Brazil and worldwide, in the post-globalization and post-pandemic scenario, with technological advances and the perception of increased risks. In this scenario, it is important to reflect on the principle of legal certainty and the irradiation of its effects within the scope of the sanctioning administrative law that governs the state's actions in this area. In this sense, administrative infractions in the insurance market, when committed by managers of insurance companies, have common and universal characteristics, reflecting the need to regulate the conduct of managers in this sector, which is highly sensitive to the public interest. These infractions are often associated with the violation of corporate governance standards, such as the lack of effective internal controls, or admit negligence in supervising critical operations. In any scenario, subjective liability is required. Furthermore, regulatory systems seek to hold managers accountable for both direct acts and omissions that compromise the solvency of the insurer or harm consumers. It should be noted that violations are linked to the principles of administrative sanctioning law, requiring that prohibited conduct and sanctions be previously defined in regulations and, above all, be previously delimited by law in a predictable manner in their minimum cores. The applicable sanctions include fines, disqualification from management positions and, in serious cases, restrictions on the company's operations. Finally, the application of these rules is guided by the principles of proportionality and reasonableness, in addition to the individualization and personality of the penalty, ensuring that the penalties are appropriate to the seriousness of the violation. This uniformity reflects the global commitment to the protection of consumers, investors and the stability of the insurance market. As José Inácio Ribeiro Lima de Oliveira rightly points out, “such is the importance attributed to private insurance and pension activities of a complementary nature that the Federal Constitution of 1988 itself provides that it is the responsibility of the Union to supervise insurance and private pension operations (art. 21, VIII) and to privately legislate on civil law and insurance policy (art. 22, I and VII, respectively), as well as outline the main line of private pensions of a complementary nature (art. 202)”[1]. On January 15, 2025, Complementary Law number 213/2025 was approved, originating from Complementary Bill number 143/2024, which has on cooperative insurance companies and mutualist asset protection operations, as well as on the commitment term and the administrative sanctioning process within the scope of the Superintendence of Private Insurance. This new legislation must be interpreted from the perspective of constitutionalized administrative sanctioning law and, above all, by the jurisprudence of the Federal Supreme Court and the Superior Court of Justice, which has followed a path of respect for the constitutional guarantees of those administered and under its jurisdiction, as can be seen from the vast jurisprudence produced on this subject.[2]. Regarding the recent regulatory changes brought about by Complementary Law No. 213 of 2025, it is imperative to highlight the implications arising from the revisions promoted in Decree-Law No. 73/1966 and related legislation, which, in turn, introduced significant innovations in the scope of insurance cooperatives and mutualist asset protection. In fact, the new regulatory guidelines aim tor egularize a social phenomenon by bringing into legislation a market currently operating irregularly, providing greater robustness to legal security and optimizing regulatory efficiency. Delegalization, characterized by the transfer of legislative matters to sub-legal norms, is a practice that, although useful in some circumstances, can compromise legal certainty, especially in regulated sectors such as the insurance market. The legislation for the sector in Brazil, traditionally based on Decree-Law No. 73/1966, delegated broad regulatory powers to the Superintendence of Private Insurance (SUSEP) and the National Council of Private Insurance (CNSP).. Professor Eduardo García de Enterría defines delegalization as “the operation carried out by a law that, without entering into the material regulation of the subject, until then regulated by a previous law, opens such subject to the availability of the regulatory power of the Administration. Through the principle of contrarius actus, when a subject is regulated by a certain law, what we call a 'freezing of the hierarchical level' of the regulations that regulate the subject occurs, so that only by another contrary law can such regulation be innovated. A delegalization law operates as contrarius actus of the previous law of material regulation, however, not to directly innovate this regulation, but to formally degrade its hierarchical level so that, from then on, it can be regulated by simple regulations. In this way, simple regulations can innovate and, therefore, revoke previous formal laws, an operation that, obviously, would not be possible if the degrading law did not previously exist.”[3]. However, the Supreme Federal Court has consolidated its position that the constitutional legitimacy of delegalization is contrasted by the possibility of prohibiting or freezing the hierarchical level based on the reservation of treatment of certain matters by law of the same hierarchical level. This is what is seen in the precedent established by ARE No. 1401225 RJ[4], when Justice Rosa Weber highlighted that the STF “has already had the opportunity to affirm the constitutional legitimacy of delegalization in the judgment of RE No. 140.669-1 PE, in which the Rapporteur Justice Ilmar Galvão, adopting the lessons of JJ Canotilho, asserted that “the principles of legality, freezing of the hierarchical level and precedence of the law do not prevent, except in matters reserved to the law (taxes and crimes), the adoption of greater flexibility through the delegalization or degradation of the hierarchical level. In this case, a law, without entering into the regulation of the matter, formally lowers its normative level, allowing this matter to be modified by regulations.” Complementary Law No. 213/2025, in the universe of Brazilian sanctioning administrative law,update the administrative sanctioning process, prevented delegalization and transformed the national regulatory framework, acting as an inhibitor of the phenomenon of delegalization in matters related to administrative sanctioning law within the scope of SUSEP's activities[5]. In this sense, this legislation must be interpreted in light of the 1988 Constitution and in accordance with the case law of the higher courts, as well as from the perspective of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights. Art. 36, VII, of Decree-Law No. 73/1966, with the wording included by the aforementioned Complementary Law,deals with  oversightfor institutions operating markets supervised by SUSEP . Updating the administrative sanctioning processimplicitly requiresthe reviewcompliance programs to ensure strict compliance with the Decree-Law, other relevant laws, regulatory provisions in general related to supervised markets and CNSP resolutions, among others. It is important to emphasize the importance of obtaining international certifications, such as those referring to compliance with ISO - International Organization for Standardization standards, to validate the effectiveness of the corresponding compliance programs, in the context of the desirable convergence of national and international standards, to mitigate the risk of characterization of infractions by legal entities participating in supervised markets and their directors. Delegalization, therefore, as stated, constitutes a formula by which the legislator seeks to deteriorate the normative typicality, with a semantic opening so vague that it causes an intolerable erosion in the predictability of the prohibited conduct, to such an extent that it becomes unfeasible to contemplate the minimum core of the infraction that is intended to be attributed to the natural or legal persons covered by the legal norm. In this step, there is an undue granting of competence by the legislator to the sub-legal authority, a phenomenon that is designated as delegalization, in such a way that the authority inferior to the legislator receives a competence that does not belong to it, namely, that concerning the classification of the infraction in its entirety. In this aspect, the legislator exempted itself from the competence regarding the classification of the infraction and granted a competence that was exclusive to it to the administrative authority. Another type of delegalization is when the legislator is silent on the definition of the offense and the administrative authority creates, of its own volition, an offense through an autonomous normative process. This phenomenon also occurs when the offense is contemplated by law, but the sanction is created exclusively by the administrative authority, in which case the violation of the principle of legality results in the creation of the penalty without prior legal imposition. In this scenario, the principle of legality in administrative sanctioning law encompasses infractions and sanctions, as much as in the scope of criminal law, whose rules and principles extend to administrative sanctioning law by symmetry, as the case law of the higher courts has recognized in Brazil, for a long time, as can be seen in the following precedents: EREsp: 875163 (RS 2009/0242997-0)[6], EDcl no REsp: 722403 (RS 2005/0020077-2)[7], REsp: 2087667 (RJ 2023/0261697-5)[8]and ADI: 2893 PE[9]. In the doctrine, see OSÓRIO, Fábio Medina. Administrative Sanctioning Law. 1st ed. The intersection between national and international regulations thus proves to be a fertile field for contemporary legal debate, as it challenges legal practitioners to reflect on the compatibility of legislation and the effectiveness of sanctions imposed, always in light of the basic principles of legality and the protection of human rights. Therefore, the integration of these different sources of law is not only desirable, but necessary for the construction of a more robust and fair legal system that respects human dignity and promotes legal certainty in the exercise of administrative activity. Strengthening the principle of legality in Complementary Law No. 213/2025 and the Risks of Delegalization[10] Decree-Law No. 73/1966, still in force, was enacted under the aegis of the 1946 Constitution, so it was received by the 1988 Constitution, including on the rule of the principle of legality (this constitutional principle that governs the sanctioning administrative law and the democratic rule of law). Nevertheless, in view of the reform introduced byComplementary Law No. 213/2025, it is imperative to pay attention to the importance of strengthening the principles of legality and typicality within the scope of administrative sanctioning law, since Decree-Law No. 73/1966 alloweddelegalization of the sanctioning power of the state. The principle of legality, the basis of the Democratic State of Law, requires that fundamental issues be addressed by formal law, approved by the Legislature, ensuring transparency, predictability and democratic legitimacy. Delegalization, when excessive, violates the legal reserve by delegating to sub-legal norms the regulation of matters that directly impact rights and obligations, in addition to imposing limits on the State's punitive power itself.Delegalization may occur, but under the pillars of non-arbitrariness, good grounds, transparency, and punitive coherence of the State. By disregarding these limits, delegalization will imply the deterioration of typicality in the law, that is, it will result in an excessive delegation to the sub-legal authority to classify the infraction and the sanction. According to Fabio Medina Osorio[11], criminal law and administrative sanctioning law are complementary branches of law in the exercise of the State's punitive power. As a result of this complementarity, the principles and guarantees applicable to each branch cannot be ignored. The unity of the punitive power imposes respect for the principles of legality and typicality in both branches, requiring a rigorous and systematic interpretation to avoid arbitrariness and excessive delegalization of sanctioning norms. The delegalization provided for in Decree-Law No. 73/1966, which established the National Private Insurance System in Brazil, transferred a series of regulatory powers to SUSEP and CNSP, where matters that could be addressed by law began to be regulated by sub-legal rules. Some hypotheses contained in the Decree-Law refer to the CNSP's power to establish guidelines and standards for private insurance policy, which includes the regulation of technical and operational aspects of the sector. CNSP also has the power to regulate the constitution, organization, operation and supervision of entities operating in the insurance market. With regard to SUSEP's power, Decree-Law No. 73/1966 tasked it with implementing the policies outlined by CNSP, regulating and supervising insurance, co-insurance, reinsurance and retrocession operations. In addition, SUSEP is competent to issue standards on independent audit reports and opinions for reinsurers and insurers. At the same time, Decree-Law No. 73/1966 expanded the delegalization to include the regulation of operations, the regulation of entities participating in the insurance market and the implementation of adjustments to changes in the insurance market. The Decree-Law allowed the CNSP and SUSEP to establish technical and operational standards for the conduct of insurance activities, including the definition of rates, policy conditions and operational limits. The CNSP may also regulate the administration of self-regulatory entities in the brokerage market and set fees and commissions. In turn, SUSEP may organize and manage consortia, in addition to settling claims in accordance with established criteria. The relevant Decree-Law also allowed the CNSP and SUSEP to adjust the standards in response to changes in the market, in order to ensure that regulation remains relevant and effective. These delegations allow for more agile adaptation to market changes and regulatory needs, but they can also raise concerns about the transparency and predictability of the rules applied, impacting legal certainty in the insurance sector. To some extent, Decree-Law No. 73/1966was updated byComplementary Law No. 213/2025, which introduced changesin insurance legislation, as it established specific limits and guidelines on how delegalization should be conducted, restricting the scope of normative delegation previously permitted by Decree-Law No. 73/1966. In the insurance market, the risks of delegalization include legal uncertainty, since, as previously stated, sub-legal standardswithin the scope of the administrative sanctioning processare more susceptible to frequent changes, which generates instability for those regulated. In addition, there is a risk of concentration of power in regulatory bodies, as broad delegation can lead to arbitrary decisions, compromising regulatory balance. Regulatory fragility also stands out, resulting from the absence of a robust legal basis, which weakens the legitimacy of the standards applied. Changes in Brazilian Legislation Regarding Decree-Law No. 73/1966, which became the cornerstone of the National Private Insurance System, it is worth highlighting that its conception aimed to regulate the complex insurance and reinsurance operations in Brazil, assigning SUSEP an indisputably important role in the supervision of these activities. However, the evolution of the economic scenario and the growing clamor for social demands imposed the needof an update of this regulatory framework. In this context, Complementary Law No. 213/2025 emerged as a restructuring instrument, proposing incisive changes that reverberate not only in the Decree-Law, but also in a range of related regulatory diplomas. The changes implemented cover a number of aspects, including the inclusion of cooperative insurance companies, which until then lacked adequate regulation and oversight. Furthermore, the formalization of mutual asset protection operations, combined with the creation of new sanctioning rules, demonstrates the intention to modernize the system. The interaction of these changes with preexisting legislation, such as Complementary Law No. 109/2001, which regulates supplementary pension plans, and Complementary Law No. 126/2007, which deals with reinsurance, demonstrates a deliberate effort to integrate the rules into a more cohesive regulatory landscape that is adaptable to contemporary demands. The Complementary Law, by making significant changes to several laws relevant to the sector, directly impacted Decree-Law No. 73/1966, expanding its regulatory scope to include mutualist asset protection operations, in addition to strengthening state control through the robust action of SUSEP (Superintendence of Private Insurance). These changes aim not only to modernize, but also to strengthen the regulatory framework of the insurance market. Furthermore, Complementary Law No. 109/2001 was also amended to eliminate the requirement for prior authorization for the election and appointment of administrators in certain circumstances. This measure promotes the reduction of bureaucracy and proposes to facilitate administrative procedures, thus ensuring greater efficiency in the management of regulated entities. Regarding Complementary Law No. 126/2007, the incorporation of new specific rules for the contracting of reinsurance by insurance cooperatives is a crucial step towards improving the regulation and legal security of the operations of these entities, strengthening their presence in the market. Law No. 12,249/2010 was also adjusted to adapt the inspection fee to the new reality of the insurance, reinsurance and capitalization markets. The adaptation of these fees, in turn, seeks contemplate new entrants, ensuring balance and efficiency in the sector's operations. Therefore, the changes covered by the Complementary Law represent a significant advance in the modernization of the legal framework of the insurance market, aligning it with current needs and thus promoting greater security, competitiveness and efficiency. Complementary Law No. 213/2025 and the Implicit Prohibition on Delegalization Although the Complementary Law does not explicitly mention the prohibition of delegalization, its provisions demonstrate a clear intention to reduce dependence on sub-legal norms, strengthening legal certainty in the sector. In this context, it is imperative to highlight the specific regulations that Insurance Cooperatives now adopt, with clear governance requirements and operational restrictions. Thus,the law provides that cooperatives must be established exclusively for this purpose and may, subject to prior authorization from Susep, operate in any branch of private insurance, except for those expressly prohibited in specific regulations issued by the CNSP and insurance structured in the financial regimes of capitalization and distribution of coverage capital. Insurance cooperatives are governed by the National Council of Private Insurance (CNSP) and supervised by the Superintendence of Private Insurance (Susep), being subject to strict criteria for their constitution and operation. Its governance structure is adapted according to the size and complexity of operations, ensuring legal and financial security. In addition, capital shares now enjoy protection against seizures, and the return of amounts is subject to compliance with prudential requirements. Cooperatives have the prerogative to act exclusively for the benefit of their members, except when there are regulatory provisions to the contrary, and are subject to limitations, such as the prohibition of carrying out insurance brokerage activities. The Complementary Law establishes three main categories of insurance cooperatives, each with specific functions and characteristics ,in the formto beregulated by CNSP,but interconnected by common objectives of protection and solidarity among their members. Central insurance cooperatives and confederations of insurance cooperatives shall be constituted, respectively, only by individual insurance cooperatives and by central insurance cooperatives. These entities can act in coinsurance of affiliated individual cooperatives and of the affiliates of their central cooperatives, respectively. The inclusion of a specific chapter on insurance cooperatives in the Complementary Law is a significant innovation, as it establishes clear rules for the creation, governance and operation of these cooperatives, providing for distinct structures, such as individual cooperatives, central cooperatives and confederations. This chapter introduces operational restrictions, such as the prohibition of brokerage for central cooperatives and confederations, in addition to the requirement of prior authorization for the appointment of administrators and fiscal councilors. Insurance cooperatives play an essential role in strengthening the Brazilian insurance market, promoting inclusion and democratizing access to protection products. The regulation introduced by the Complementary Law signals important advances, establishing a legal framework that guarantees safety, sustainability and efficiency in the operations of these entities. By consolidating these aspects in legislation, the rule limits the discretion of regulatory bodies and provides greater clarity on the obligations of cooperatives. The mutualist asset protection model, in turn, emerges as a proposal which provides for the sharing of costs among participants to cover adverse events. In order to implement this system, management by an authorized administrator is essential, ensuring the patrimonial independence and protection of the groups' resources against financial problems of their members or the administrator itself. Thus, the Complementary Law aims to create a regulated model of mutualist patrimonial protection, ensuring patrimonial interests through the sharing of expenses, with clear definitions on the functions of the administrators and associations, including the essential patrimonial independence of the groups. Furthermore, the Complementary Law establishes transparency and sustainability mechanisms to ensure the integrity of the model. Among the requirements for the effective functioning of this system, patrimonial independence stands out, which requires the protection of the resources of mutual groups against financial risks. In addition, the rule requires transparency in management, which must be conducted by authorized administrators and subject to due supervision. This approach prevents structural aspects of the model from being regulated exclusively by sub-legal norms, providing greater predictability for both associations and participants. Sanctioning Regime and Inspection by SUSEP Regarding the enactment of Complementary Law No. 213/2025, it is imperative to highlight the impactthat it exercises over the sanctioning regime to which entities regulated by the Superintendence of Private Insurance (SUSEP) are subject. The aforementioned legislation, when the updateto the sanctioning and punitive powerss, which now has expanded and better defined powers to exercise its market supervision and regulation function introducing, therefore, a list of penalties that are more severe, ranging from imposing fines to the extension of the period of disqualification of managers. The SUSEP competency system, already established in Decree-Law No. 73/1966, gives it powers to monitor the operating institutions of the supervised markets or by any other persons, natural or legal, upon the occurrence of any irregularity to be investigated under the terms of the relevant Decree-Law, for the purpose of verifying the occurrence of illicit acts. The broad spectrum of SUSEP's activities includes its regulatory powers as an executive body for the guidelines of insurance policies and mutualist asset protection established by the CNSP, acting as a supervisory body for the National Private Insurance System, in line with the registration, regulatory, supervisory and sanctioning responsibilities defined in the Decree-Law, which do not exclude the powers of the Central Bank of Brazil and the Securities and Exchange Commission to act in these areas, but in their respective segments of activity, in subordination to the National Monetary Council (CMN). It is important to emphasize the preference for electronic citation, which is consistent with the search for procedural efficiency, as well as the possibility of applying precautionary measures, such as the removal or replacement of service providers, in situations that give rise to serious suspicions. It is also imperative to recognize the provision for the application of warnings for minor infractions, the carrying out of administrative interventions and, ultimately, the revocation of licenses, practices that aim to maintain order and legality within the scope of regulated activities. The robustness of this legislation reflects the need for a balance between the protection of collective interests and the accountability of agents who perform administrative functions in entities under the aegis of the Complementary Law. Furthermore, the Complementary Law introduced mechanisms for adjusting conduct, with the use of terms of commitment to which those investigated may be subjected during sanctioning processes. Among the main changes in the scope of sanctions provided for in the Complementary Law in question, the creation of stricter penalties stands out, involving the application of administrative fines with high values, which can reach up to R$ 35 million, twice the value of the contract or irregular operation, twice the damage caused to consumers or three times the economic gain obtained illegally.[12]. In cases of recurrence of the aforementioned practices, fines of up to three times the established amounts may now be applied, in accordance with CNSP criteria. Additionally, penalties of suspension or disqualification of administrators, for periods of 2 to 20 years, may be applied depending on the severity of the violation, in cases of poor technical or financial management of business, or when there is damage to the liquidity, solvency or integrity of the supervised institutions. They are also applicable in situations of risk incompatible with the operations regulated by SUSEP, contribution to indiscipline in the markets or compromise of the stability of the National Private Insurance System, the National Capitalization System or the open supplementary pension market. SUSEP may also intervene when there are obstacles to the assessment of the real financial or equity situation of the operations or severe impact on the continuity of the activities of these systems and markets. The new regulations, which set forth the consequences of non-compliance with prohibitions, summons, orders and requests issued by the Superintendence of Private Insurance (SUSEP), establish that failure to comply with these orders will result in the imposition of a penalty, which will be calculated based on the daily frequency of the delay or non-compliance. The amount of this penalty will be determined by the greater of one thousandth of the total revenue, whether individual or consolidated, of the prudential group, as outlined by the National Council of Private Insurance (CNSP) and related to the fiscal year prior to the application of the sanction, or the fixed amount of R$100,000.00. It is important to emphasize that the fine must be duly paid to SUSEP within 10 days from the date of the summons for payment. It should also be noted that the application of this pecuniary penalty does not exempt the competent authority from initiating administrative proceedings, nor from imposing other sanctions provided for in the legal system embodied in the relevant Decree-Law. Thus, the robustness of the legal framework that aims to ensure the effectiveness of regulations, preserving order and discipline within the scope of regulatory activity, is evident. The Complementary Law, in accordance with the provisions of Decree-Law No. 73/66,It also explicitly establishes the joint liability of directors, administrators, managers and members of the fiscal councils of regulated entities, which include insurance companies, insurance cooperatives and mutual asset protection administrators, for any losses caused to third parties, notably due to non-compliance with legal regulations, such as the creation of mandatory reserves. In line with this guideline, among the measures implemented, we highlight the initiation of administrative sanctioning proceedings whenever there is evidence of the practice of infractions or irregularities, demonstrating a proactive and supervisory stance by the regulatory entity. It is important to note, even in the case of joint and several liability, the individualization of the conduct of each of the accused in the indictments when opening the sanctioning proceedings. This is a constitutional guarantee inherent to due process, as established in article 5, LIV, of the Constitution, and a logical consequence of the principles of full defense and adversarial proceedings (item LV). In other words, the description of the prohibited conduct in a concrete and individualized manner is a necessity inherent to the principle of subjective liability of the accused, and even joint and several liability is incompatible with an abstract and generic description of unlawful behavior. In this context, it would be wrong to imagine the prospect of attributing an accusation to any manager based on the presumption of joint and several liability for the unlawful act, without any correspondence with documentary evidence and subjective element of the conduct, much less adherence that allows inferring willful or negligent behavior, according to the terms of the sanctioning type applicable to the case and the circumstances of the offense. In fact, joint and several liability in the context of administrative sanctioning law should not be confused with joint and several liability in the sphere of civil law. For these reasons, it is not feasible to automatically include managers from the perspective of joint and several liability without prior investigation involving the subjective element of conduct. Regarding the determination of the subjective element to define joint and several liability, the precedent paradigm of Ruling No. 6228/2017 stands out.[13]within the scope of the Appeals Board of the National System of Private Insurance, Open Private Pensions and Capitalization (CRSNSP), in the context of an administrative appeal against a decision by SUSEP, in which the following understanding was established: “In fact, § 5 of art. 2 of CNSP Resolution No. 243/11 grants the option of punishing the director. This provision states that 'SUSEP may consider as the agent responsible for the alleged infraction, in the case of a natural person, to the extent of his/her culpability, the holder of an office' of administrator who, 'provenly, contributes to the commission of the infraction, or fails to prevent its commission, when he/she could have acted to avoid it'. In art. 10 of the same Resolution, proportionality is recommended between the type and extent of the penalty and the severity of the infraction and its effects. And, in § 1, it is determined that, when the sanction was applied to a natural person, 'the judging authority will consider his/her culpability'. These rules must be interpreted strictly. In these proceedings, at no time was it demonstrated or proven that the appellant acted to commit the irregularity that gave rise to the present proceedings.” Continuing with the analysis of the culpability of an insurance company director, the aforementioned precedent states, in the Rapporteur’s vote, that the mere fact of holding the position of director does not make the director responsible for everything that may happen in the company’s day-to-day activities, transforming him into a kind of “insurance scapegoat”. In fact, the aforementioned vote emphasizes that: “The exercise of the position makes the director responsible for the acts of his employees, but only within the scope of civil liability. If an employee commits an irregular act or an act that harms someone, the director may even be held liable; but only civilly. Any penalty resulting from the practice of an unlawful act can only affect the person who actually committed it, and the director cannot be punished due to the act of another person, due to the constitutional principle that the penalty should not go beyond the person of the offender.” Still regarding the analysis of the subjective element in joint and several liability, the leading vote of the CRSNSP Ruling 6228/2017, citing the work of Fábio Medina Osório[14], emphasizes that the consequence of applying the principles of culpability and personal nature of the sanction “is the fact that there is no solidarity in the field of illicit acts. In Criminal Law, as in Administrative Sanctioning Law, the punishment applied to a co-author offender does not benefit the other co-authors. Each one is responsible for his/her own act and receives an individualized penalty according to his/her degree of participation.” Regarding the characterization of the circumstances of the infraction, the National Financial System Appeals Council (CRSFN), in a judgment that established a relevant precedent on the subject (Judgment No. 150/2023)[15], dealing with the specific analysis of the sanctioning process originating from the CVM, established the understanding that, as such, they should be understood, “in analogy to the judicial circumstances adopted in criminal law, those factors that do not constitute the offense, but that influence its severity. Examples of such circumstances would be the state of the agent, the conditions and manner of acting, the means used, time and space factors, among others. Such elements, as contingent, are not of the essence of the offense type. Consequently, their presence is not capable of invalidating the materiality of the criminal conduct or even the guilt of the agent. More than that, such circumstances do not affect the set of evidence and proof collected in the records. They only serve to examine the degree of guilt of the agent and the reprehensibility of the conduct for the purposes of sentencing.” Notably, it is a question of evaluating, in the sentencing examination, the application of aggravating and mitigating factors based on the determination of the base sentence. In light of the context of insurance sector regulation and the actions of the Superintendence of Private Insurance (SUSEP), it is imperative to highlight the innovations introduced by the Complementary Law in force, which establishes the application of daily fines that can reach the amount of up to R$100,000.00 or one thousandth of the total revenue, in case of non-compliance with the determinations or summons issued by that agency. These changes aim, above all, to strengthen the supervision exercised by SUSEP, increasing the accountability of the parties involved and, consequently, ensuring greater protection for consumers, all while preserving the stability of the insurance market and mutual asset protection in Brazil. In addition, the aim is to foster a business environment that is safer and more reliable. It is important to emphasize that SUSEP, from now on, has expanded oversight powers, with mutual asset protection operations being included in its scope of action. In this context, the superintendence is authorized to call extraordinary meetings and to apply preventive measures aimed at ensuring the stability of operations under its supervision. The new legislation, as already stated in a similar way in the Decree-Law73/66,establishes free access by duly accredited auditors and employees of the supervisory body to insurance companies, insurance cooperatives, mutual asset protection operations administrators and reinsurers. Such professionals have the prerogative to request and seize books, technical notes, information and documents relevant to the exercise of their functions. Furthermore, any obstacle that prevents compliance with the established objectives will be considered as an impediment to supervision, giving rise to the application of the penalties provided for in the relevant Decree-Law. Considering that the Complementary Law grants a significant increase to the sanctioning power attributed to SUSEP, the expectation is that supervision will be more efficient, with a concomitant reduction in cases of fraud and harmful practices that may tarnish the sector. Furthermore, an increase in regulatory predictability is foreseen, which undoubtedly contributes to ensuring greater security and stability in the insurance market. Impacts of Implicit Prohibition The analysis of the evolution of the regulatory framework in the insurance sector, in light of Complementary Law No. 213/2025, reveals a deliberate movement towards the consolidation of standards that ensure legality and predictability in the regulatory environment. In a context in which legal certainty is fundamental, the aforementioned Law stands as a comprehensive response to the need for clarity and regulatory rigor, establishing guidelines that limit the discretion of regulatory authorities and promote transparency. In this sense, the Complementary Law not only reiterates the importance of legality, but also introduces mechanisms that aim to prevent delegalization, a practice that, over time, has generated uncertainty and insecurity in the market. It is important to note that Article 11 of the original bill, which provided for the creation of 26 new positions in the structure of Susep, was vetoed due to constitutional issues related to the creation of public positions. Complementary Law No. 213/2025, in turn, directly incorporates into its text provisions that were previously subject to sub-legal regulation, which, in turn, strengthens predictability for market operators. As a result, the State's punitive power is exercised in a more cohesive manner and linked to constitutional principles, preventing sanctions from being imposed based on lower-ranking rules that do not meet the requirements of the Constitution. In this context, the clear classification of administrative infractions and the definition of proportional sanctions are innovations that ensure greater legal certainty and confidence in the system. Furthermore, the regulation of insurance operations and the accountability of directors and fiscal advisors, as set out in the Complementary Law, illustrate a commitment to governance and ethics in the sector. These guidelines not only promote more transparent management, but also establish standards that make it difficult for regulators to engage in abusive or arbitrary practices. The Complementary Law thus presents itself as a bulwark of legality, in line with the contemporary demands of a market that demands predictability and stability. Furthermore, the emphasis on the governance of regulated entities By directly addressing fundamental issues in legislation, the Complementary Law neutralizes the possibility that sub-legal practices are used to circumvent the principles of legality and legal reserve, ensuring that regulation remains within constitutional limits. On the other hand, the transition to a more formalized model raises challenges that must be carefully managed by regulators and regulated parties. Adapting to the new requirements requires a coordinated effort to ensure that the innovations introduced by the Complementary Law effectively translate into concrete benefits for the market and consumers. The success of this transition will depend, to a large extent, on the ability of the agents involved to adapt to a stricter regulatory scenario, without compromising market dynamics. In conclusion, Complementary Law No. 213/2025 not only advances in the consolidation of a clearer and more predictable regulatory framework, but also represents a decisive step in the protection of consumer rights and the promotion of a more stable business environment. The advances provided by this legislation are fundamental for the construction of a regulatory system that meets the demands of the contemporary insurance sector, reflecting the commitment to legality and transparency as essential pillars for strengthening the market. Conclusion Regarding the principle of administrative legality, in the field of administrative sanctioning law, it is worth recalling the paradigmatic judgment of the Superior Court of Justice, when the following guideline was established:[16]: “The institution of an infraction and imposition of a penalty based on an infra-legal act - Ordinance - violates the principle of legality, since “only the law, in its formal and material sense, can describe an infraction and impose sanctions”. In fact, the principle of legality, with its unfolding in the typicality, finds resonance in the democratic rule of law, and in due process of law, all enshrined in articles art. 179, I and 5º, LIV, respectively, of the Constitution of the Federative Republic of Brazil. In this context, it is not surprising that Complementary Law No. 213/2025 must necessarily conform to the dictates of the Constitution of 88, as well as decrees Decree-Law No. 73/1966 and Decree-Law No. 261/1967, as well as laws Complementary Law No. 109/2001 and Complementary Law No. 126/2007[17]. In fact, the Superior Court of Justice's understanding is unanimous that[18]: “ordinances are not suitable instruments for imposing fines, since they violate the constitutional principle of the reserve of law by contemplating penalties. The definition of infractions and the imposition of administrative sanctions, after the validity of the 1988 Constitution, can only arise from law in the formal sense. Furthermore, as a hierarchically inferior normative act, the purpose of ordinances is to clarify legal norms to be observed by the Administration, without the need to restrict or expand legal provisions. Therefore, ordinances are not intended to fill gaps and omissions in the law and, thus, cannot add material content to the regulated norm, and must be limited to the purpose of facilitating the application and execution of the law that governs the matter. (...)”.[19] The recent changes covered by the Complementary Law represent a significant effort to modernize the National Private Insurance System, introducing greater flexibility and legal certainty to the sector. The regulation of insurance cooperatives and mutualist asset protection are examples of how legislation can be expanded with the approval of the Complementary Law, in order to cover issues and institutes that actually exist, but were previously omitted from the legislation. The sub-legal regulation of fundamental issues, without support from formal law, compromises the legitimacy of the State's punitive power by violating the principles of legality, typicality and legal reserve. In the context of the insurance market, this can generate legal uncertainty, inequality in the application of rules and fragility of administrative infractions. Complementary Law No. 213/2025 represents a significant advance by consolidating in the legal text provisions that reduce dependence on sub-legal norms, reinforcing alignment with the Democratic Rule of Law and promoting greater balance between the power of the State and the rights of those regulated. The changes positively affect the national insurance system by guaranteeing consumer security, through the attribution of sanctioning and inspection powers to SUSEP, as well as by defining the types of cooperatives that can operate in the market and how they should operate, in addition to filling other legal gaps regarding insurance cooperatives and mutualist asset protection. Despite the progress, implementing the changes presents challenges for operators and regulators, requiring investments in training and operational adjustments. As the rules are implemented and evaluated, these changes are expected to strengthen the insurance sector in Brazil, promoting its expansion and alignment with international regulatory standards. Author: Fabio Medina Osorio References CENTRAL BANK OF BRAZIL. Credit Cooperatives. Available at: https://www.bcb.gov.br/estabilidadefinanceira/cooperativacredito. Accessed on: December 24, 2024; CÔRTE REAL, Maria Manuela; CRUZ ALVES, Francisco José; FARINHA PEREIRA, Eduardo. The Insurance Sector: Evolution and Perspectives. [sl]: [sn], [sd]. Available at: https://purl.sgmf.pt/COL-MF-0064/1/COL-MF-0064_master/COL-MF-0064_pdf/capitulo%20VII.pdf. Accessed on: January 21, 2025; DOBBYN, John F.; FRENCH, Christopher C. Insurance Law in a Nutshell. 5. ed. St. Paul: West Academic Publishing, 2016; ENTERRIA, Eduardo Garcia. Delegated legislation, regulatory power and judicial control, Madrid: Civitas, 3. ed., 1998. p. 220/225; FISCHER, James M.; KEETON, Robert E.; WIDISS, Alan I. Insurance Law: A Guide to Fundamental Principles, Legal Doctrines, and Commercial Practices. 2nd ed. West Academic, 2017; MACHADO, Hendel Sobrosa. Controversial aspects of the credit insurance contract in comparative law. Available at: https://www.academia.edu/6556530/Aspectos_polemicos_do_seguro_de_credito_no_direito_comparado. Accessed on: January 17, 2025; MIRAGEM, Bruno. The essential contribution of comparative law to the formation and development of Brazilian private law. Revista dos Tribunais, São Paulo, v. 1000, p. 157-190, Feb. 2019; OLIVEIRA, José Inácio Ribeiro Lima de. The legality of the role of the Superintendence of Private Insurance in the inspection of marginal insurance and open supplementary pension entities. Brazilian Journal of Risk and Insurance, Rio de Janeiro, v. 11, n. 20, p. 225-276, Oct. 2015/Mar. 2016. OSÓRIO, Fabio Medina. Administrative Sanctioning Law. 9th ed. New York: Courts Review Publishing House, 2023; OSÓRIO, Fábio Medina. Typicality and Legality of Infractions and Sanctions in Administrative Sanctioning Law. Available at: https://www.medinaosorio.com.br/artigos/medina-osorio-exclusivo-tipicidade-e-legalidade-das-infracoes-e-sancoes-no-direito-administrativo-sancionador. Accessed on: January 26, 2025; RUSSO, Claudio. The sanctioning system in the health department: principle and guardianship. Dialoghi di Diritto dell'Economia, September 2023. Available at: https://www.dirittobancario.it/wp-content/uploads/2023/09/2023-Russo-Il-sistema-sanzionatorio-nel-settore-assicurativo.pdf. Accessed on: 21 Jan. 2025. SCHMITT, Daniel. On the punishability of the responsible agent in the private insurance market. Insurance Notebooks, v. 33, p. 34-46, 2013; STIGLITZ, Rubén S. Derecho de Seguros I. 3rd ed. Buenos Aires: Abeledo-Perrot, 2001. STIGLITZ, Rubén S. Derecho de Seguros II. 3rd ed. Buenos Aires: Abeledo-Perrot, 2001. PEREIRA, Alexandre Libório Dias. The Legal Construction of the Single Insurance Market. In: Studies dedicated to Professor Doctor Mário Júlio de Almeida Costa. Catholic University Press, 2002, p. 75-109; Footnotes [1]OLIVEIRA, José Inácio Ribeiro Lima de. The legality of the role of the Superintendence of Private Insurance in the inspection of marginal insurance and open supplementary pension entities. Brazilian Journal of Risk and Insurance, Rio de Janeiro, v. 11, n. 20, p. 225-276, Oct. 2015/Mar. 2016. [2]As a paradigmatic judgment, one can recall the recent judgment of the Federal Supreme Court involving administrative misconduct within the scope of general repercussion 1199, when that court established the applicability of the constitutional principles of sanctioning administrative law to that field and, even, relevant constitutional guarantees to those administered and under its jurisdiction. In addition to this, it should be noted that the jurisprudence of administrative courts such as the Securities and Exchange Commission itself establishes the incidence of the constitutional principles of sanctioned administrative law, as can be seen in its jurisprudence: CVM SANCTIONING ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS No. 12/03; CVM SANCTIONING ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS No. 19957.002528/2020-02. In this same context, the Superior Court of Justice, likewise, applies constitutional rules and guarantees of administrative sanctioning law within the scope of the financial market and the capital market, as can be seen from its case law: STJ. ARESP No. 602,480 - DF (2014/0273383-4), Rapporteur: Minister Napoleão Nunes Maia Filho, Judgment Date: November 17, 2020. Unanimous decision; STJ. AgInt in AgInt in RESP No. 1945137 - DF (2021/0191481-3), Rapporteur: Minister Herman Benjamin, Judgment Date: April 26, 2022; STJ. RESP No. 1,255,987 - PR (2011/0061307-1), Rapporteur: Minister Herman Benjamin, Judgment Date: 03/01/2012; STJ. ARESP No. 133,424 - SC (2012/0037539-2), Rapporteur: Minister Maria Isabel Gallotti, Judgment Date: 02/18/2014. In the same direction, the National Financial System Appeals Council also upholds the principle of legality of infractions and sanctions within the scope of administrative sanctioning law, as can be seen from the following precedent: JUDGMENT CRSFN 174/2024 (Process 18600.053500/2024-26 - BCB 271051), Rapporteur: Ilene Patrícia de Noronha Najjarian, 489th Session, Judgment Date: 12/3/2024, Electronic Service Bulletin: 12/19/2024. [3]ENTERRIA, Eduardo Garcia. Delegated legislation, regulatory power and judicial control, Madrid: Civitas, 3. ed., 1998. p. 220/225. [4]ARE: 1401225 RJ, Rapporteur: PRESIDENT, Judgment Date: 10/05/2022, Publication Date: ELECTRONIC PROCESS DJe-s/n DISCLOSED 10/06/2022 PUBLISHED 10/07/2022. [5]The prohibition of delegalization, as a result of the advent of Complementary Law No. 213/2025, must be understood, essentially, in accordance with the interpretation in light of the jurisprudence of the higher courts, in line with the 1988 Constitution. In this sense, the aforementioned Complementary Law merely reflects an advance in the normative system after the judgment of Theme 1,199 of general repercussion in the scope of administrative improbity, a judgment that meant new paradigms for Brazilian administrative sanctioning law. [6]EREsp: 875163 RS 2009/0242997-0, Rapporteur: Minister MAURO CAMPBELL MARQUES, Judgment Date: 06/23/2010, S1 - FIRST SECTION, Publication Date: DJe 06/30/2010. [7]EDcl in REsp: 722403 RS 2005/0020077-2, Rapporteur: Minister MAURO CAMPBELL MARQUES, Judgment Date: 11/17/2009, T2 - SECOND PANEL, Publication Date: --> DJe 11/27/2009. [8]REsp: 2087667 RJ 2023/0261697-5, Rapporteur: Minister SÉRGIO KUKINA, Judgment Date: 08/20/2024, T1 - FIRST PANEL, Publication Date: DJe 08/26/2024. [9]ADI: 2893 PE, Rapporteur: Min. NUNES MARQUES, Judgment Date: 06/17/2024, Full Court, Publication Date: ELECTRONIC PROCESS DJe-s/n DISCLOSED 07/02/2024 PUBLISHED 07/03/2024. [10]As recorded in the CVM precedent. PAS: 19957.008816/2018-48, Rapporteur: João Pedro Barroso Do Nascimento, Judgment Date: 07/10/2018. Unanimous decision., the sanctioning administrative law of the capital market allows the technique of general clauses, but requires respect for and obedience to the principle of legality. [11]OSÓRIO, Fábio Medina. Typicality and Legality of Infractions and Sanctions in Administrative Sanctioning Law. Available at: https://www.medinaosorio.com.br/artigos/medina-osorio-exclusivo-tipicidade-e-legalidade-das-infracoes-e-sancoes-no-direito-administrativo-sancionador. Accessed on: January 26, 2025. [12]Regarding the prohibition of objective liability in the insurance market, see the article by SCHMITT, Daniel. On the punishability of the responsible agent in the private insurance market. Cadernos de Seguro, v. 33, p. 34-46, 2013. The author addresses the legality of infractions and sanctions within the scope of SUSEP, highlighting the transfer of responsibility for fines to individual agents, introduced by LC 126/2007. He criticizes the lack of clear criteria for accountability, the absence of adequate motivation in administrative acts and the application of penalties based on hierarchical position, without proof of causal link or intent. He defends respect for the principle of personal liability and the need for detailed investigation to avoid excessive punishment. He concludes that unfounded punishments violate rights and may be illegal and arbitrary. In this sense, they may violate principles of legality and personal liability of infractions and sanctions. In fact, as stated in the workOSÓRIO, Fábio Medina. Administrative Sanctioning Law. 9th ed. São Paulo: Editora Revista dos Tribunais, 2023, the principle of personal sanction matters in subjective liability. This type of liability is incompatible with the presumption of liability. See the following bibliography: DOBBYN, John F.; FRENCH, Christopher C. Insurance Law in a Nutshell. 5th ed. St. Paul: West Academic Publishing, 2016; MACHADO, Hendel Sobrosa. Controversial aspects of the credit insurance contract in comparative law. Available at: https://www.academia.edu/6556530/Aspectos_polemicos_do_seguro_de_credito_no_direito_comparado. Accessed on: Jan. 17, 2025; FISCHER, James M.; KEETON, Robert E.; WIDISS, Alan I. Insurance Law: A Guide to Fundamental Principles, Legal Doctrines, and Commercial Practices. 2nd ed. West Academic, 2017; STIGLITZ, Rubén S. Insurance Law. 3rd ed. Buenos Aires: Abeledo-Perrot, 2001; STIGLITZ, Rubén S. Insurance Law II. 3rd ed. Buenos Aires: Abeledo-Perrot, 2001; PEREIRA, Alexandre Libório Dias. The Legal Construction of the Single Insurance Market. In: Studies dedicated to Professor Doctor Mário Júlio de Almeida Costa. Catholic University Press, 2002, p. 75-109; MIRAGEM, Bruno. The essential contribution of comparative law to the formation and development of Brazilian private law. 1000, p. 157-190, Feb. 2019; CÔRTE REAL, Maria Manuela; CRUZ ALVES, Francisco José; FARINHA PEREIRA, Eduardo. The Insurance Sector: Evolution and Perspectives. [sl]: [sn], [sd]. Available at: https://purl.sgmf.pt/COL-MF-0064/1/COL-MF-0064_master/COL-MF-0064_pdf/capitulo%20VII.pdf. Accessed on: Jan. 18, 2025; RUSSO, Claudio. The sanctions system in the insurance sector: principles and protection. Dialogues of Economic Law, September 2023. Available at: https://www.dirittobancario.it/wp-content/uploads/2023/09/2023-Russo-Il-sistema-sanzionatorio-nel-settore-assicurativo.pdf. Accessed on: January 19, 2025. [13]JUDGMENT CRSNSP 6228/2017 (Case 15414.100639/2012-41- CRSNSP Appeal No. 7191), Rapporteur: André Leal Faoro, 245th Session, Judgment Date: 09/11/2017, Electronic Service Bulletin: 11/01/2017.   [14]OSÓRIO, Fábio Medina, “Sanctioning Administrative Law”, Ed. RT, 3rd ed. 2009, p. 343. [15]JUDGMENT CRSFN 150/2023, Process 10372.100090/2022-87 - CVM 19957.006509/2019-11 (RJ2019/04665), Rapporteur: Renato da Câmara Pinheiro, 476th Session, Judgment Date: 10/11/2023, Electronic Service Bulletin: 03/07/2024. [16]STJ. AG.REG. in RE with AG No. 1,046,163- DF, Rapporteur: Minister Napoleão Nunes Maia Filho, Judgment Date: 11/17/2020. Unanimous decision. [17]In the same sense, including in the environmental field, the Superior Court of Justice has understood that: “In compliance with the Principle of Legality, the application of an environmental fine is not admissible without express provision in law strictu sensu, so that motivation exclusively in Regulatory Decrees or Ordinances is not admissible.” (STJ - AgRg in REsp: 1290827 MG 2011/0264879-5, Rapporteur: Napoleão Nunes Maia Filho, Judgment Date: 10/27/2016. Unanimous decision.) [18]STJ. AgInt in AgInt in RESP No. 1945137 - DF (2021/0191481-3), Rapporteur: Minister Herman Benjamin, Judgment Date: 04/26/2022. Unanimous decision. [19]On the contrary, it can be seen that the Supreme Federal Court admits infra-legal regulation when it is in accordance with the legal norm, as can be seen from the following precedent: STF. AG.REG. in RE with AG 1.046.163 - DF, Rapporteur: Minister Dias Toffoli, Judgment Date: 08/08/2017. Unanimous decision. In this case, Decree-Law number 395/1938 was received by the Constitution of 1988, exactly like Decree-Law no. 73/1966.  
12 February 2025

The Normative Revolution of ADPF 854: Transparency and Budget Traceability in the Supreme Federal Court

Abstract The monocratic decision rendered by Minister Flávio Dino in ADPF 854 marks a significant legal milestone by establishing parameters for transparency and traceability in the handling of parliamentary amendments in Brazil. However, the decision also raises questions about its practical implementation, the limits of judicial intervention in budgeting, and the challenges of aligning normative requirements with political realities. This article explores the constitutional foundations, practical implications, and potential challenges of this historic decision. Introduction Budget management in Brazil has historically been plagued by opacity and inefficiency, particularly regarding the execution of parliamentary amendments. ADPF 854, culminating in an innovative decision by the Supreme Federal Court (STF), directly confronts these distortions by declaring the unconstitutionality of practices associated with the so-called "secret budget" and establishing rigorous parameters for executing parliamentary amendments. While the STF's solution is legally robust, it faces significant political and institutional challenges. Implementing new rules—such as the requirement for full traceability and the limitation of parliamentary amendment growth—necessitates structural changes in a political system historically resistant to reform. Foundations and Advancements of the Decision 2.1. Transparency and Traceability The decision reinforces the constitutional principles of transparency and traceability, ensuring that the use of public funds is thoroughly documented and accessible. These principles, enshrined in Articles 37 and 163-A of the Federal Constitution, are essential for: Preventing corruption and mismanagement. Facilitating public oversight of budget execution. Strengthening the legitimacy of public expenditures. The STF mandated that all parliamentary amendments be meticulously documented, identifying the requesting parliamentarian and the ultimate destination of funds. Requiring this information to be published on the Transparency Portal represents undeniable progress. 2.2. Limits on Legislative Power The decision also underscores the principle of separation of powers by imposing limits on the Legislature's influence over the public budget. The expansion of parliamentary amendments in recent years—particularly RP 8 (committee amendments) and RP 9 (rapporteur amendments)—has led to a legislative overreach, weakening the Executive's capacity to plan and execute public policies. By capping the growth of parliamentary amendments in line with the discretionary expenses of the Executive or the spending cap, the STF rebalances powers and reinforces fiscal responsibility. A Critical Perspective: Potential Challenges and Uncertainties Despite its merits, the ADPF 854 decision is not without criticism. Certain practical and theoretical issues remain unresolved, requiring critical reflection. 3.1. Feasibility of Implementation While the new rules set a high standard of control, their implementation will depend on collaboration among various institutional actors, such as the National Congress, the Federal Court of Accounts (TCU), and the Office of the Comptroller General (CGU). The historical political resistance to budgetary reform raises doubts about the feasibility of such profound change in the short term. Key questions include: How can it be ensured that all information is accurately entered into the Transparency Portal, particularly in a system with thousands of municipalities benefiting from amendments? Is there sufficient technical capacity in oversight bodies to monitor compliance with the new requirements? 3.2. Judicialization of the Budget The decision also expands the STF's role in overseeing the public budget. While necessary to address identified unconstitutional practices, this could be seen as excessive judicial intervention. Judicial involvement in budgetary matters, traditionally reserved for the Executive and Legislative branches, could lead to political tensions and impair governance. This raises questions about: The legitimate scope of STF involvement in budgetary matters. Risks of excessive centralization of decision-making power within the Judiciary. 3.3. Limits on Parliamentary Amendments While necessary, imposing limits on the growth of parliamentary amendments faces significant political resistance. Legislators are likely to oppose measures that constrain their autonomy in allocating resources, especially in Brazil's highly fragmented political system. Reflections and Recommendations The ADPF 854 decision is a necessary milestone, but its effectiveness will depend on complementary adjustments and a well-defined implementation strategy. Measures that could enhance the decision's impact include: Strengthening inter-institutional governance: Establishing a permanent mechanism for dialogue among the Executive, Legislative, Judiciary, and oversight bodies to monitor the implementation of new rules. Technological enhancement: Investing in modernizing the Transparency Portal and systems like Transferegov.br to ensure all information is easily accessible and verifiable. Capacity building for public agents: Offering training for managers and officials, particularly at the municipal level, to ensure compliance with new standards. Conclusion The decision issued by Minister Flávio Dino in ADPF 854 represents significant progress in promoting transparency, traceability, and efficiency in budget management. However, the practical implementation of these directives will face political and technical challenges that cannot be ignored. While the decision reaffirms the STF's role as the guardian of the Constitution and republican principles, it also highlights the inherent tensions of judicializing public budgeting in a fragmented political system like Brazil's. The success of this reform will depend on joint efforts among the branches of government, cultural shifts in public resource management, and robust public engagement. If properly implemented, ADPF 854 could herald a new era of fiscal responsibility and integrity in public administration. However, the path to this future demands constant vigilance, institutional commitment, and, above all, strong societal engagement. Author: Fábio Medina Osório References Federal Constitution of 1988 Complementary Law No. 101/2000 (Fiscal Responsibility Law) Complementary Law No. 210/2024 Monocratic decision by Minister Flávio Dino in ADPF 854, dated December 2, 2024
15 January 2025

The Constitutionalization of Administrative Law in Brazil: A Substantive and Material Perspective

Introduction The 1988 Brazilian Constitution represents a turning point in the history of administrative law, embedding it firmly within the constitutional framework and redefining its role in the governance of public administration and the protection of constitutional values. This transformation did not occur in isolation but was preceded by intense scholarly reflection and advocacy for a broader conceptualization of administrative law. Among the most significant voices in this dialogue was Miguel Seabra Fagundes, whose work underscored the urgency of integrating administrative law into the constitutional order as a substantive and material discipline. Seabra Fagundes’s reflections, published during the preparatory period leading up to the drafting of the Constitution, highlighted the interplay between constitutional law and administrative law. While constitutional law establishes the foundational principles and structure of the state, administrative law operationalizes these principles in the daily interactions between the state and its citizens. He argued that administrative law, when viewed solely as a procedural mechanism, failed to fulfill its potential as a tool for promoting accountability, safeguarding public assets, and protecting individual rights against the excesses of state power. This perspective aligned with the aspirations of the 1988 Constitution, which sought to dismantle the remnants of authoritarianism and establish a legal framework grounded in democratic principles, social justice, and the rule of law. By incorporating administrative law directly into the constitutional text, the framers of the Constitution elevated its status from a mere technical instrument to a central pillar of constitutional governance. The work of Seabra Fagundes served as a critical foundation for this paradigm shift. His emphasis on the importance of constitutionalizing administrative law resonates throughout the 1988 Constitution, which enshrined principles such as legality, impersonality, morality, publicity, and efficiency as binding norms for all public administration. These principles are more than formal requirements; they represent substantive commitments to transparency, fairness, and the effective use of public resources. In addition, Seabra Fagundes advocated for a broader understanding of administrative law as a mechanism for safeguarding public integrity. He emphasized the need for clear accountability mechanisms, including shared responsibility between public servants and the state in cases of misconduct. His proposals for the creation of deliberative bodies and his defense of meritocratic public service hiring processes were prescient contributions to the debates that shaped the constitutional framework. The constitutionalization of administrative law under the 1988 Constitution reflects both the theoretical insights of scholars like Seabra Fagundes and the practical need to reform Brazil’s public administration. The Constitution did not merely codify procedural rules; it also imbued administrative law with a material dimension, allowing it to serve as a vehicle for protecting constitutional values, promoting social justice, and ensuring the proper functioning of public administration. This article examines the constitutionalization of administrative law from a contemporary perspective, recognizing its formal and material dimensions and its evolution into a substantive branch of constitutional governance. The discussion begins by analyzing the foundations laid by thinkers like Seabra Fagundes, whose ideas helped shape the role of administrative law in the constitutional order. It then explores the dual dimensions of administrative law—formal and material—highlighting their significance in regulating public administration and protecting constitutional values. Finally, the article delves into the principles governing public administration, demonstrating how they contribute to a modern and effective legal framework that transcends traditional boundaries and responds to the challenges of contemporary governance. The Foundations of Administrative Law in the Constitutional Order Administrative law’s elevation in the 1988 Constitution is a testament to its critical role in modern governance. By embedding principles such as accountability, legality, and efficiency into the constitutional text, the framers ensured that administrative law would serve as both a framework for regulating public administration and a mechanism for safeguarding public interests. These principles, enshrined in Article 37 of the Constitution, serve as a foundation for a legal system that balances state authority with the protection of individual rights and the promotion of collective welfare. The Constitution also introduced innovative mechanisms for ensuring accountability in public administration, including provisions for addressing administrative improbity (Article 37, §4º). These mechanisms demonstrate the substantive dimension of administrative law, allowing it to function as a guardian of constitutional values and a deterrent against misconduct. Through this framework, administrative law has become an essential tool for achieving the Constitution’s broader goals of transparency, social justice, and the rule of law. It operates not only as a regulatory instrument but also as a protector of the public interest, ensuring that public administration aligns with the principles and values enshrined in the constitutional order. Author: Fábio Medina Osório
02 December 2024

Which Artificial Intelligence Regulation Best Promotes Technological Advancement and Economic Growth? An Analysis of Models from the United States, European Union, and Brazil

Abstract: This article provides a comparative analysis of artificial intelligence regulatory frameworks established by the United States, the European Union, and Brazil. It evaluates each jurisdiction’s approach from a practical standpoint, focusing on the economic impact and technological progression facilitated by their respective regulatory models. The aim is to determine which framework may best foster an environment conducive to both innovation and the protection of fundamental rights, specifically in the context of Brazil’s growing tech ecosystem. Introduction The proliferation of artificial intelligence (AI) has sparked widespread economic interest, prompting numerous nations to enact specific regulatory frameworks aimed at balancing safety and innovation. The United States, European Union, and Brazil offer divergent approaches that reflect their unique economic and social priorities. This paper examines these regulatory models with an emphasis on identifying which has the highest potential to drive technological advancement and economic development, with particular attention to Brazil’s innovation ecosystem. As global demand for AI-driven activities rises—accelerated by the adoption of generative AI platforms—businesses are increasingly integrating AI to enhance productivity across industries. In this context, it becomes imperative to understand the regulatory pathways that various nations are pursuing to simultaneously stimulate innovation and ensure responsible AI usage. The transformative potential of AI across fields necessitates a critical examination of the newly implemented regulatory frameworks in the U.S. and EU, which serve as potential models for Brazil. The “fourth industrial revolution” represents a strategic opportunity for Brazil to achieve significant economic and technological gains by tapping into these evolving AI markets. To cultivate a regulatory environment that promotes creativity among innovators while ensuring effective fundamental rights protections, Brazil stands to benefit from a measured approach that combines flexibility with legal certainty. Accordingly, this article intends to provide a practical assessment of the recently established regulatory frameworks in the U.S. and EU and to evaluate Brazil’s own legislative efforts, specifically the Draft Bill No. 2,338/2024 currently under consideration in Congress.   United States: A Model of Regulatory Flexibility and Innovation Incentives The 2023 U.S. Executive Order on Artificial Intelligence adopts a broad, flexible framework to encourage innovation and competitiveness, while promoting safety in critical sectors. This model creates a regulatory environment that directly supports economic growth and technological development by implementing policies that minimize regulatory burdens, particularly in emerging and highly competitive industries. The American regulatory model offers several practical benefits to economic growth and technological advancement: Regulatory Flexibility: The absence of rigid restrictions enables startups and innovative companies to experiment with new AI applications without excessive regulatory barriers. This flexibility promotes agility, attracting investment and facilitating the rapid development of technological solutions. For Brazil, adopting a similar approach could invigorate the tech sector by fostering an environment conducive to continuous testing and evolution. Incentives for Innovation and Competitiveness: The Executive Order promotes growth within the AI workforce and aims to attract foreign talent, ensuring that the U.S. retains its position of leadership in AI. These policies can serve as a blueprint for Brazil, where efforts to attract talent and foreign investment in AI remain limited. The American approach enhances economic growth by encouraging small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) to participate actively in the AI sector, fostering a diverse and innovative economy. Emphasis on Security for Critical Sectors: While the American model is flexible in low-risk sectors, it maintains rigorous standards in areas such as defense and critical infrastructure. Emulating this approach could enable Brazil to support AI development in less sensitive sectors with minimal regulation, without compromising security in high-risk areas. European Union: Strict Protection and Compliance The European Union's AI Act is the first attempt at risk-based AI regulation, offering a formal, comprehensive framework focused on fundamental rights protection. This model emphasizes security and transparency, but its rigid compliance structure may impact the pace of innovation and economic growth. Challenges of the EU model for technological progress and economic development: Innovation Bureaucracy Risks: The strict compliance approach and mandatory audits for high-risk systems require financial and time resources that may discourage small businesses. Startups and small companies face greater difficulties meeting compliance demands, which can slow innovation and reduce competitiveness in the AI sector. In Brazil, adopting a similar model could hinder the growth of startups, which already struggle with bureaucracy and compliance costs. High Penalties for Violations: The AI Act imposes strict fines for infractions, encouraging accountability but also raising the risks for companies developing AI in regulated sectors. These sanctions aim to protect users but may deter new entrants into the AI market, particularly smaller companies without the capital to face hefty fines. In Brazil, such a model could significantly impact the economy, especially in a scenario where startups need a more welcoming regulatory environment to thrive. Transparency and Ethics as Priorities: The AI Act's requirements for bias audits and continuous compliance are positive in terms of rights protection but increase development costs and reduce companies' agility. While transparency and ethics are crucial, a more practical approach, like the U.S. model, might be more viable for promoting AI growth in Brazil, where tech companies face cost and efficiency challenges. Bill 2338/2023 in Brazil: A Hybrid Approach with Growth Potential Brazil's Bill 2338/2023 proposes regulation inspired by European and U.S. models, establishing a National Artificial Intelligence Authority (ANIA) to oversee the sector. The Brazilian proposal aims to balance innovation stimulus with rights protection but requires adjustments to maximize economic development and technological progress. For technological progress, the Brazilian model has characteristics that, with adjustments, could foster economic growth: Adaptable Flexibility: The bill lacks specific guidelines for audits and risk classification, but this initial flexibility could be advantageous, allowing regulations to evolve as the sector matures. This approach would enable Brazil to learn from challenges observed in other jurisdictions and adapt rules to the local AI market dynamics, encouraging economic growth with fewer entry barriers. Ethical Compliance with a Civil Rights Focus: The bill incorporates LGPD data protection, ensuring basic rights protection without the EU model's bureaucracy. This benefits startups by maintaining ethical responsibility without overburdening companies with complex compliance audits. For Brazil, a simplified but ethically guided approach could balance rights protection with AI growth. Need for Innovation and Competitiveness Incentives: While innovation is mentioned as a principle, the bill lacks clear policies to foster AI development, particularly for small and medium enterprises. Brazil could benefit from including financial and fiscal incentives, as well as training programs and talent attraction policies, similar to the U.S. model. Robust incentive policies are crucial to strengthening Brazil's AI sector and ensuring its significant contribution to the economy. 5) Pragmatic Comparison: Which Model Most Promotes Economic Growth United States: Innovation and Flexibility: High. Enables experimentation and adaptation. Rights Protection: Moderate-High. Focus on bias mitigation and civil rights audits. Competitiveness: High. Incentives for startups and talent attraction. Bureaucracy Risk: Low. Flexible guidelines in non-critical sectors. European Union: Innovation and Flexibility: Moderate. Strict restrictions limit flexibility. Rights Protection: High. Focus on ethics and transparency, with audits and penalties. Competitiveness: Low-Moderate. Rigid regulatory structure impacts agility and new entrants. Bureaucracy Risk: High. Significant compliance costs and bureaucracy. Brazil: Innovation and Flexibility: Moderate-High. Flexible model but lacks clear incentives. Rights Protection: Moderate. Based on LGPD, with less burdensome ethical compliance. Competitiveness: Moderate. Needs incentives and talent attraction policies. Bureaucracy Risk: Moderate. Still lacks regulatory clarity. 6) Conclusion: Which Model Allows Greater Technological Progress and Economic Development? Assessing the regulatory models of the U.S., EU, and Brazil, the practical analysis suggests the U.S. model offers the most significant potential for technological progress and economic development. Its regulatory flexibility and clear incentives for business growth allow companies to innovate rapidly while maintaining global AI competitiveness. The EU provides a robust protection system, but its strict compliance may hinder economic progress, especially for smaller businesses. Meanwhile, Brazil, with Bill 2338/2023, presents an opportunity to create a hybrid model but needs specific policies to encourage innovation and competitiveness. Adding financial and educational incentives to the bill could make Brazil an attractive hub for AI development, balancing security with economic progress. Ultimately, for Brazil to strike a balance between protection and growth, a pragmatic approach inspired by the U.S. model, complemented by ethical standards and local development incentives, would be the most promising path to fostering a robust and economically viable AI sector. Author: Fábio Medina Osório
12 November 2024

Administrative Misconduct and Sanctioning Administrative Law: Reflections on ADI 4295 in Light of Constitutional Jurisprudence

Introduction Brazil’s Administrative Misconduct Law (Law 8.429/92), which was significantly reformed by Law 14.230/2021, remains one of the primary tools of the Brazilian State in the fight against corruption, public mismanagement, and violations of the principles governing public administration. However, the concept of administrative misconduct, as we have argued in our scholarly works and reflections, goes far beyond mere acts of corruption or illicit enrichment. It is a mechanism that encompasses severe dishonesty and gross inefficiency, analyzed from a constitutional perspective, within a broader framework of sanctioning administrative law. In this article, we propose an analysis of the decision by the Brazilian Supreme Court (STF) in ADI 4295, which reviewed the constitutionality of several provisions of Law 8.429/92, emphasizing the role of sanctioning administrative law in the misconduct regime. Based on our interpretation, we examine the decision in light of constitutional jurisprudence and its interaction with the principles of morality, legality, and efficiency, which are the central focuses of administrative misconduct in Brazil. The Constitutional Concept of Misconduct and the 2021 Reform Administrative misconduct, as set out in Article 37, §4º of the Brazilian Federal Constitution, requires public officials to conduct themselves with administrative probity and respect for the principles governing public administration, such as legality, impartiality, morality, publicity, and efficiency, with heightened standards. The concept of misconduct is not limited to corruption in its strict sense but also includes acts that, while not directly harming the public treasury, violate these principles and erode public trust in government institutions. The legislature has discretion to determine whether culpable acts should be penalized or not. The reform introduced by Law 14.230/2021 sparked controversy by eliminating the culpable forms of administrative misconduct, focusing instead on intentional conduct. In our view, this reform reflects a legitimate choice by the legislature within a democratic framework, prioritizing the punishment of more serious, intentional misconduct over negligent acts that, while harmful to the treasury, do not involve bad faith or direct intent on the part of the public official. The STF, when ruling on ADI 4295, upheld the constitutionality of this legislative choice, emphasizing that the Constitution allows the legislature the flexibility to define the scope of misconduct offenses. Therefore, by excluding culpable misconduct, the Brazilian legislature followed a trend of strengthening legal certainty and the strict principle of legality in sanctioning law. Sanctioning Administrative Law: Origin and Application in Administrative Misconduct Since the 1990s, we have advocated for the treatment of administrative misconduct as an offense within the scope of sanctioning administrative law. This branch of law, which has primarily developed in Europe and gained traction in Brazil through jurisprudential evolution, legislative reforms, and the strengthening of oversight mechanisms, seeks to punish administrative violations under a distinct legal regime, separate from criminal law, but governed by similar protective principles, such as proportionality, legality, and specificity. Sanctioning administrative law aims to protect values like morality, efficiency, and legality in public administration through the application of penalties that may be imposed directly by the judiciary or executive authorities, with strict adherence to principles that are symmetrical with criminal law. Administrative misconduct, although not necessarily a crime, falls within this framework, as it demands a strong state response to ensure the proper functioning of public administration and to maintain public trust in public officials. The 2021 reform reaffirms the administrative nature of misconduct offenses, consolidating the understanding that penalties for misconduct fall within the framework of sanctioning administrative law, even though procedurally they are handled in civil jurisdiction. The STF, in ADI 4295, reinforced this view by confirming the independence of administrative and criminal spheres, highlighting that misconduct penalties may be applied autonomously without the need for a criminal conviction. This further underscores the punitive-administrative nature of administrative misconduct. The Constitutionality of Penalties: Analysis of the ADI 4295 Ruling In ADI 4295, the STF examined the constitutionality of provisions in Law 8.429/92 that allow for the application of severe penalties, such as removal from office, suspension of political rights, and prohibition from contracting with the government, even without proof of financial damage to the public treasury. The STF was clear in affirming that the protection of administrative morality goes beyond safeguarding public finances; it also involves upholding the principles that govern public administration, particularly legality, impartiality, morality, and efficiency. In the opinion of Justice Marco Aurélio, the rapporteur, it was made explicit that penalties for administrative misconduct, contrary to the arguments made by the petitioner, do not necessarily depend on proof of harm to the public treasury. Misconduct, above all, is a violation of administrative principles, and its punishment serves to protect broader public interests, including public confidence in the State’s administrative apparatus. Additionally, the ruling reinforced the idea that the penalties provided for in Law 8.429/92 are independent of other legal domains, such as criminal and civil law. This means that even if the public official has not been convicted of a crime, they can still be sanctioned for administrative misconduct based on the criteria set forth in the law. The STF’s affirmation of this independence of spheres is one of the pillars of sanctioning administrative law, ensuring a swift and effective response to serious violations of official duties. Of course, this independence does not disregard the principle of non bis in idem. The Role of the Public Prosecutor and Judicial Oversight in Administrative Misconduct Another significant aspect of the ADI 4295 ruling was the discussion concerning the role of the Public Prosecutor’s Office in overseeing administrative misconduct cases. Law 8.429/92 provides that the Public Prosecutor’s Office, along with the Courts of Accounts, has the right and duty to oversee both administrative and judicial processes involving the investigation of misconduct, and may even initiate legal action and assist in investigating damages. The petitioner in this case argued that this provision violated the separation of powers by allowing the Public Prosecutor’s Office to intervene in administrative processes. However, the STF categorically affirmed that the involvement of the Public Prosecutor is a fundamental safeguard for ensuring impartiality and objectivity in fact-finding, even in administrative proceedings. According to the rapporteur, this oversight by the Public Prosecutor’s Office does not violate the separation of powers but rather strengthens control and transparency in the application of misconduct penalties. The involvement of the Public Prosecutor in misconduct cases is essential to ensure that investigations and sanctions are based on legal and technical criteria, thus mitigating the risk of political interference or arbitrary decisions. Judicial oversight was also reaffirmed as an important safeguard to ensure that sanctioning administrative law is applied fairly and proportionally, in accordance with constitutional principles. Extending Penalties to Legal Entities: Preventing Fraud and Protecting Public Assets ADI 4295 also raised an important issue regarding the application of misconduct penalties to legal entities controlled by public officials. Law 8.429/92 provides that companies in which a public official is a majority shareholder may be penalized with the prohibition of contracting with the government or receiving tax and credit benefits if the official has been convicted of misconduct. The constitutionality of this provision was challenged, but the STF upheld it as a legitimate and necessary measure to prevent fraud and ensure the effectiveness of misconduct penalties. The Court highlighted that applying penalties to companies controlled by public officials is essential to prevent these officials from using private companies as tools to circumvent the legal consequences imposed by law. The STF’s decision ensured that penalties are applied effectively and proportionally, protecting public assets against fraudulent schemes, without compromising the importance of the non bis in idem principle. One of the significant contributions of the reform brought by Law 14.230/2021 was the consolidation of the independence of administrative penalties from criminal law, while respecting the non bis in idem principle. By reaffirming the administrative nature of misconduct offenses and their autonomy from other legal spheres, the reform promoted by Law 14.230/2021 represented a major advancement, as it consolidated the independence of administrative and criminal spheres. The recognition that penalties for administrative misconduct are materially administrative and procedurally civil was reaffirmed by the Supreme Court in ADI 4295, strengthening the autonomy of sanctioning administrative law in relation to criminal law. This independence is essential to ensure that misconduct penalties are applied efficiently and swiftly, without depending on the outcome of criminal proceedings, which often take years to resolve. Sanctioning administrative law, as an autonomous branch of public law, aims to protect public administration from serious offenses that compromise the morality, legality, and efficiency of public services, without the need for criminal liability to be established. The STF’s ruling in ADI 4295 confirmed that administrative misconduct may be penalized autonomously, without the need for a prior criminal conviction. This is crucial for the effective functioning of control mechanisms in public administration, ensuring that public officials who violate the duties of probity are held accountable proportionately and promptly, regardless of the outcome of any related criminal proceedings. Furthermore, ADI 4295 reaffirmed that administrative penalties are not criminal in nature, even if they may have similar effects, such as removal from office and suspension of political rights. These penalties are intended to protect public interests and maintain the integrity of public administration, in accordance with the principles of sanctioning administrative law. The Elimination of Culpable Misconduct in the Administrative Misconduct Law and Its Implications One of the most significant changes introduced by Law 14.230/2021 was the exclusion of culpable forms of administrative misconduct. Prior to the reform, Law 8.429/92 allowed for the punishment of negligent acts, where public officials acted without intentor bad faith, but with negligence, imprudence, or incompetence. However, the new law limits administrative misconduct penalties to intentional (dolous) actions, excluding culpable (negligent) acts, which has sparked debate in both legal doctrine and jurisprudence. The justification for this change lies in the principle that administrative misconduct penalties should be reserved for the most serious offenses, those that involve a conscious violation of the duties of probity, morality, and efficiency. The legislature recognized that punishing public officials for mere negligence, without intent, could create legal uncertainty and potentially discourage public officials from making decisions in complex or high-risk public policy areas. While the exclusion of culpable misconduct has been criticized, particularly on the grounds that serious inefficiency should also be subject to penalties, the STF upheld this legislative choice as constitutional. The Court emphasized that the Brazilian Federal Constitution grants the legislature the discretion to define the scope of misconduct offenses, including the ability to limit penalties to intentional actions. In the STF’s view, the choice to punish only intentional misconduct does not violate the principle of administrative morality. Moreover, the legislature may, in the future, reintroduce penalties for culpable misconduct if deemed necessary, much like the continued existence of the crime of “culpable embezzlement” (peculato culposo) under the Penal Code. What is crucial, as we see it, is that the punishment of administrative misconduct aligns with the principles of proportionality and legal certainty, avoiding disproportionate or arbitrary types of penalties that could compromise the principles of legality, legal security, or the dignity of the individual. Proportionality of Penalties and Due Process of Law Another central point highlighted by the STF is the reaffirmation of the principle of proportionality as one of the cornerstones of sanctioning administrative law. The Court consistently emphasizes that penalties for misconduct must be applied in proportion to the severity of the offense, taking into account the specific circumstances of the case and the extent of the harm caused to public administration. In this regard, the Court noted that the penalties provided in Law 8.429/92, such as removal from office, suspension of political rights, and prohibition from contracting with the government, are severe and, therefore, should be applied with caution, always respecting due process of law. The STF reaffirmed that due process not only ensures the right to defense and an adversarial proceeding, but also guarantees that penalties are imposed fairly and in a balanced manner, without excesses or arbitrariness. The decision in ADI 4295 also reiterated the importance of the principle of strict legality in sanctioning law. The principle of legality requires that offenses be clearly defined by law, ensuring that public officials know precisely what conduct is considered misconduct and what penalties may be applied in case of violation. This principle is fundamental for legal certainty and for the predictability of state actions within the sanctioning framework. The Constitutionality of Penalties Without Proof of Damage Another relevant point addressed in the STF’s decision in ADI 4295 was the analysis of whether penalties for misconduct can be imposed without proof of financial damage to the treasury. The Court emphasized that the defense of administrative probity is not limited to protecting public finances in their financial dimension. Administrative misconduct is, first and foremost, aimed at safeguarding the fundamental principles governing public administration, such as legality, morality, and efficiency. In this sense, the STF reaffirmed that it is possible to impose penalties for misconduct even in cases where there is no evidence of material harm to the public treasury, as long as it is proven that the public official has gravely violated the principles of public administration. The Court ruled that the defense of administrative morality and the prevention of improper conduct are legitimate objectives of the State, justifying the imposition of penalties regardless of direct financial loss. This interpretation is consistent with the logic of sanctioning administrative law, which is not limited to punishing conduct that causes financial harm, but also seeks to sanction acts that compromise the ethical and functional integrity of public administration. The focus, therefore, is on ensuring compliance with the duties of probity, morality, and efficiency, which are essential pillars for the proper functioning of the State. Final Considerations: The Legacy of ADI 4295 for Brazilian Administrative Law The judgment of ADI 4295 by the STF represents a significant milestone in consolidating the legal framework for administrative misconduct in Brazil. The decision reaffirmed the constitutionality of key provisions of the Administrative Misconduct Law, validating the legislative choice to limit penalties to intentional misconduct and recognizing the autonomy of sanctioning administrative law in relation to criminal law. ADI 4295 also reinforced the importance of the Public Prosecutor’s Office and the Courts of Accounts in overseeing misconduct cases, ensuring that investigations are conducted impartially and based on legal and technical criteria. The participation of these oversight bodies is crucial to ensuring that penalties for misconduct are applied fairly and proportionally, always in defense of the public interest. Another important legacy of the decision was the recognition that misconduct penalties can be imposed independently, without the need for proof of financial harm to the public treasury, as long as the public official has gravely violated the principles of public administration. This understanding strengthens the preventive and ethical dimensions of the Administrative Misconduct Law, which aims to protect not only the financial assets of the State but also the moral and functional integrity of public administration. Finally, ADI 4295 consolidated the understanding that sanctioning administrative law is an effective and necessary instrument for preserving morality, legality, and efficiency in public administration. By reaffirming the independence of spheres and the proportionality of penalties, the STF contributed to the strengthening of mechanisms for controlling and combating corruption in Brazil, ensuring that public administration operates in accordance with the highest standards of ethics and responsibility. The decision also highlighted the importance of continually improving the legal framework surrounding administrative misconduct, respecting constitutional limits and fundamental guarantees, while maintaining an unwavering commitment to defending morality and efficiency in public administration. In this way, the judgment of ADI 4295 represents a significant advancement for Brazilian administrative law and a strengthening of the country’s democratic institutions. Author: Fábio Medina Osório
29 October 2024

The Due Process of Law and Its Influence on Brazilian Law: A Comparative Analysis Based on American Substantive Due Process

Introduction The principle of due process of law is at the core of constitutional rights both in the United States and Brazil. Although the expression was adopted in Brazil’s 1988 Federal Constitution, its origin dates back to the English Magna Carta of 1215, and its contemporary application in the United States has directly influenced the protection of fundamental rights in various Western democracies. This article aims to analyze the impact of the concept of substantive due process, developed by the U.S. Supreme Court, on Brazilian law, emphasizing its relevance for the protection of fundamental rights and the limitation of state arbitrariness. The analysis will be based on the concept of substantive due process as presented by Erwin Chemerinsky, one of the leading authorities in American constitutional law. Chemerinsky’s work is crucial for understanding the evolution of this principle in the United States and its potential impact on other jurisdictions, such as Brazil. Due Process of Law in the United States: Substantive Aspects In American law, the concept of due process of law is divided into two main aspects: procedural due process, which pertains to formal procedural guarantees, and substantive due process, which refers to material guarantees for the protection of fundamental rights. Both aspects are enshrined in the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution, which ensure that no one will be deprived of “life, liberty, or property without due process of law.” As Erwin Chemerinsky explains, substantive due process plays a crucial role in protecting against state arbitrariness. He argues that the government cannot irrationally interfere with rights deemed fundamental, even when formal legal procedures are followed. Throughout history, the U.S. Supreme Court has used substantive due process to protect rights that are not explicitly stated in the constitutional text but are considered essential to human dignity. Examples of these rights include the right to privacy, established in Roe v. Wade (1973), and the right to same-sex marriage, recognized in Obergefell v. Hodges (2015) (CHEMERINSKY, 2023). Substantive Due Process and Its Application by the U.S. Supreme Court The U.S. Supreme Court has historically played a central role in defining and expanding fundamental rights, particularly through substantive due process. This doctrine has been applied in cases involving individual and economic liberties, as well as in protection against laws that unduly restrict fundamental rights. Substantive due process thus emerges as a tool to ensure that the government does not use its authority in a manner that violates implicit but fundamental rights. Chemerinsky explains that, in applying substantive due process, the Supreme Court uses different levels of scrutiny depending on the importance of the right in question. In cases involving fundamental rights, such as freedom of speech and the right to privacy, the court applies what is known as “strict scrutiny,” requiring the government to demonstrate that its action serves a compelling public interest and that no less restrictive means are available to achieve it (CHEMERINSKY, 2023). This concept also allows the U.S. judiciary to assess the substance of certain laws, meaning that even if the government follows all the required formal procedures, a law may still be declared unconstitutional if it unjustifiably violates fundamental rights. This approach has significantly expanded the protection of rights in the United States, leading to the recognition of liberties that, while not explicitly stated in the constitutional text, are essential to democracy. The Influence of American Due Process on Brazilian Law Although the Brazilian legal system follows a civil law tradition, it has been heavily influenced by the American doctrine of due process of law, especially after the promulgation of the 1988 Federal Constitution. Article 5, section LIV, of the Brazilian Constitution provides that “no one shall be deprived of liberty or property without due process of law.” As in the American model, due process in Brazil has both formal and substantive dimensions. In the Brazilian context, substantive due process is related to judicial review of government acts that, while meeting formal legal requirements, may violate fundamental rights. The application of this principle in Brazil is mainly manifested through the concepts of reasonableness and proportionality, which are frequently used by the Brazilian Supreme Court (STF) to assess the constitutionality of laws and administrative acts. Examples of the application of substantive due process in Brazil can be seen in decisions involving the protection of social and economic rights. In various cases, the STF has declared laws unconstitutional that, while formally correct, disproportionately restricted access to fundamental rights, such as the rights to health and education. This approach is clearly influenced by American substantive due process, which allows the judiciary to go beyond a strictly procedural analysis and evaluate the substance of the laws in question. Final Considerations The doctrine of substantive due process, as developed by the U.S. Supreme Court and explained by Erwin Chemerinsky, has had a profound impact on the interpretation of fundamental rights in both the United States and Brazil. While in the U.S. this doctrine has evolved to protect implicit rights such as privacy and personal autonomy, in Brazil, substantive due process is used by the STF to ensure that laws and government acts respect fundamental rights in their essence. The influence of the American model in Brazil is evident, particularly regarding the scrutiny of the reasonableness and proportionality of state actions. However, it is important to note that due process in Brazil has its own specificity, derived from its constitutional context and legal tradition, while constantly engaging in dialogue with foreign doctrinal and jurisprudential developments. References CHEMERINSKY, Erwin. Substantive Due Process. [PDF]. 2023. Constituição da República Federativa do Brasil de 1988. Available at: https://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/constituicao/constituicao.htm. Author: Fábio Medina Osório
24 October 2024

Brazilian Law and the Impact of Globalization

As an attorney familiar with both common law and civil law systems, observing the evolution of Brazilian law through the lens of globalization provides unique insights into the dynamic interplay between domestic legal traditions and international influences. While Brazil’s legal framework remains firmly rooted in the civil law tradition, characterized by codified statutes and the primacy of legislative enactments, recent developments indicate a gradual convergence with global legal standards, especially those prominent in common law jurisdictions like the United States. The Civil Law Tradition in Brazil Brazil’s legal system is historically grounded in the civil law tradition, which originated from Roman law and was further developed through Napoleonic codifications. In this tradition, codified statutes and comprehensive legal codes serve as the principal sources of law, leaving the judiciary with a more constrained role in legal interpretation compared to their counterparts in common law systems. Judges are primarily tasked with applying the written law, and legal certainty is maintained through the strict adherence to legislative texts. The Brazilian Civil Code, Penal Code, and Code of Civil Procedure exemplify this legislative dominance, providing detailed frameworks that guide legal relations and the administration of justice. This model parallels many European civil law systems, particularly in France, Italy, and Germany, where judicial discretion is similarly limited, and legal interpretation tends to follow a literal or doctrinal approach. However, Brazil has progressively evolved its civil law system to address the complexities of modern legal challenges, particularly in the context of a globalized economy. The Emergence of Precedent in Brazil A significant shift in Brazilian law, brought about by the influence of global legal trends, particularly from common law jurisdictions, is the increasing reliance on judicial precedent. Traditionally, Brazilian courts did not place much weight on prior judicial decisions, adhering instead to the legislative text. However, with the enactment of the 2015 Civil Procedure Code reforms, a new emphasis was placed on the doctrine of stare decisis, or the binding effect of judicial precedents, particularly from higher courts. Under this framework, decisions from Brazil’s Supreme Federal Court (STF) and Superior Court of Justice (STJ) have acquired greater authority in shaping the interpretation and application of laws across the judiciary. The adoption of mechanisms like súmulas vinculantes (binding precedents) and the resolution of repetitive appeals (recurso repetitivo) underscores Brazil’s shift toward a more unified and predictable legal system, echoing the role of precedents in common law systems such as the United States. This development enhances legal certainty by ensuring that lower courts adhere to established interpretations from superior tribunals, reducing disparities in judicial decision-making. Comparison with the United States’ Common Law Despite this move towards the integration of precedents, Brazil’s legal system still diverges from the common law tradition as practiced in the United States. In American jurisprudence, the doctrine of stare decisis is foundational, with judicial decisions, particularly from appellate courts, shaping the trajectory of legal principles over time. U.S. courts, especially the Supreme Court, often engage in the development of legal norms, filling gaps in statutory law and adapting principles to novel circumstances through case law. In contrast, Brazilian courts are more restrained in their interpretative function, as statutes remain the primary source of law. While precedents are gaining significance, particularly through the binding authority of higher courts, judges in Brazil generally do not have the same latitude to create law as their American counterparts. The legislative branch remains the dominant force in shaping legal frameworks, and judicial activism is more constrained in comparison to the U.S. legal system. Globalization and Legal Harmonization The impact of globalization on Brazilian law is perhaps most evident in the increasing harmonization of legal standards across borders. Brazil’s integration into international trade agreements, participation in global regulatory bodies, and adherence to international treaties have compelled the country to adapt its legal system to meet global standards. This is particularly evident in areas such as corporate governance, financial regulation, and human rights, where international norms play an influential role in shaping domestic legislation. For instance, in corporate and commercial law, Brazil has embraced international arbitration and adopted standards consistent with global business practices, allowing for greater cross-border legal certainty. Additionally, Brazil’s courts have increasingly recognized and enforced foreign judgments and arbitral awards, further integrating the country into the global legal framework. The convergence of legal systems is also seen in the influence of international human rights law on Brazilian jurisprudence. Brazilian courts, especially the STF, have cited international human rights conventions and decisions from supranational bodies in their rulings, reflecting a willingness to engage with international norms to protect fundamental rights. This mirrors a broader trend in civil law countries toward incorporating international legal principles into domestic legal reasoning. Challenges of Legal Pluralism Despite the advances brought about by globalization, Brazil faces challenges in reconciling its traditional legal system with emerging global trends. Legal pluralism—where multiple sources of law, including domestic codes, international treaties, and judicial precedents, coexist—can create tensions within the judiciary. While the move towards a greater reliance on precedents fosters predictability, it also requires Brazilian courts to balance these precedents with legislative statutes and international norms, all while preserving the civil law system’s core principles. Moreover, the global influence on Brazilian law has led to debates about the appropriate role of the judiciary. Critics argue that the increasing emphasis on precedents risks undermining the legislature’s authority, while proponents contend that judicial precedents provide necessary clarity in an evolving and complex legal landscape. Conclusion Brazil’s legal system is at a pivotal moment of transformation, driven by the forces of globalization and the cross-pollination of legal traditions. While rooted in the civil law tradition, Brazil’s courts are increasingly adopting elements of common law, particularly through the expanded use of precedents. This shift reflects a broader trend toward legal harmonization in a globalized world, where national legal systems must adapt to meet international standards and respond to global economic and social challenges. As Brazilian law continues to evolve, the country’s legal system will need to navigate the tensions between maintaining its civil law heritage and embracing the flexibility and adaptability that common law principles, such as stare decisis, offer. In this globalized legal landscape, Brazil stands as an example of how legal systems can adapt to new realities while preserving their foundational principles. Author: Fábio Medina Osório
01 October 2024

Spain's Expanding Role in Brazil: Trade and Investment Insights

Spanish trade and investments in Brazil have grown significantly, solidifying Spain's position as a major foreign investor in the country. In 2022, Spain ranked fourth among foreign direct investment (FDI) contributors to Brazil, with an FDI stock of approximately US$52.3 billion. Spanish investments in Brazil span multiple sectors, including infrastructure, energy, and financial services, with notable examples such as Banco Santander’s extensive branch network expansion and investments in renewable energy projects like the Marlim Azul gas power plant and the Ribeirão Gonçalves solar energy complex. The close economic ties between Spain and Brazil are also evident in trade relations. Spain has become one of Brazil's most important European trading partners. In 2023, bilateral trade reached US$11.8 billion, with Brazilian exports to Spain concentrated in commodities like crude petroleum, soy, and corn. Spanish imports from Brazil are highly reliant on oil, which accounted for 40.6% of the total imports in 2023, largely due to the increased demand caused by the disruption of Russian oil supplies following the conflict in Ukraine. Other products such as sugar and soy derivatives also saw significant growth during this period. Brazil’s export basket to Spain, while focused on commodities, has shown resilience and potential for diversification. The conclusion of the Mercosur-EU trade agreement could further enhance Brazil's access to the European market, particularly in agriculture, providing opportunities for growth in other sectors. However, challenges remain. Brazil must navigate evolving regulatory frameworks such as the European Union’s new deforestation law (EUDR), which will restrict imports from deforested areas, potentially affecting Brazilian exports of soy, beef, and other agricultural products. In terms of investment projects, Spanish companies have played a pivotal role in Brazil’s energy and infrastructure development. Repsol, a key player in the energy sector, has engaged in multi-billion-dollar investments in Brazil's offshore gas fields, while Neoenergia, another Spanish company, has established itself as a leader in renewable energy. These projects are crucial for Brazil's energy transition and infrastructure expansion, further reinforcing Spain’s role as a strategic investor in Brazil. Beyond traditional industries, the Brazilian government has emphasized its commitment to innovation and regulatory modernization, launching initiatives to foster a more favorable environment for foreign investors. Recent discussions between Brazilian and Spanish officials have highlighted the potential for increased collaboration, particularly in areas like renewable energy, digital transformation, and infrastructure development . As both countries explore these synergies, the framework for Spanish investments in Brazil is set to strengthen further, benefiting from shared interests and strategic partnerships. Fábio Medina Osório, the founding partner of Medina Osório Advogados and former Attorney General of Brazil, is a specialist in regulatory law and corporate compliance. He holds a Ph.D. in administrative law from Complutense University of Madrid and has been actively involved in organizing events alongside key financial institutions and telecom giants to discuss regulatory trends, infrastructure, and risk management strategies for companies looking to execute large-scale infrastructure projects or investments in Brazil. His expertise and leadership are essential for navigating Brazil’s complex regulatory landscape.  
20 September 2024
Finance

Brazil’s Infrastructure Financing: The Role of BNDES and Bond Market Opportunities

The Brazilian infrastructure bond market has increasingly gained prominence as a critical source of financing for large-scale projects,particularly in the areas of urban mobility, sanitation, and sustainable energy. In 2023, the National Bank for Economic and Social Development (BNDES) emerged as one of the key players in this space, with a 44% increase in approved credit compared to the previous year, reaching R$ 218.5 billion. This growth is in line with the recent introduction of Law No. 14.801/24 and Decree No. 11.964, which regulate incentivized bonds and promise greater flexibility and liquidity in the market BNDES plays a pivotal role in structuring these projects, providing long-term credit tailored to the unique demands of infrastructure initiatives, which often involve protracted bidding and construction phases. The institution's capacity to inject capital during times of economic stress, without the pressure to quickly reallocate funds to more profitable ventures, underscores its position as a vital partner in fostering sustainable development. In 2023, 70% of the bonds structured by BNDES were certified as sustainable, earning the bank international accolades, including the "Bond Arranger of the Year" award for Latin America. One of the primary challenges identified in the Brazilian infrastructure sector is the significant investment gap. Brazil’s infrastructure stock accounts for only 34% of its GDP, compared to 76% in China and 58% in India. To bridge this gap, Brazil needs to invest approximately R$ 450 billion annually in infrastructure, yet actual investment in 2023 reached only R$ 213 billion. In this context, infrastructure bonds emerge as a key solution, channeling private capital to complement public financing and mitigate the infrastructure deficit. The structuring of these bonds involves ongoing dialogue between issuers and investors. During the pre-completion phase, construction risks dominate, requiring robust guarantees and a thorough analysis of project complexities. Post-completion, the risks shift to operational and political variables, making financial guarantees a vital condition for investors' decision-making. In this regard, BNDES plays a fundamental role by taking on completion risks, providing an additional layer of security for investors. From the issuer’s perspective, contractual flexibility is crucial for the success of infrastructure bonds. This flexibility allows for adjustments throughout the project cycle as risks are mitigated and market conditions evolve. Recent Brazilian legislation permitting the issuance of bonds abroad with tax benefits, such as "infrastructure bonds," creates new opportunities for issuers to access international markets and attract additional capital. Environmental, social, and governance (ESG) criteria have become an essential factor in investment decisions, particularly in infrastructure projects. Brazil, with its vast natural resources, renewable energy potential, and sophisticated financial market, is well-positioned to become a global hub for sustainable capital. The combination of renewable energy, agribusiness, and extensive waterway networks offers Brazil a competitive advantage, attracting investors seeking to align financial returns with sustainability goals. In conclusion, BNDES, with its extensive history of supporting Brazil’s economic development, remains a strategic partner for issuers and investors in the infrastructure bond market. The recent regulatory changes, coupled with the bank’s expertise in long-term projects, have the potential to transform the Brazilian market, expanding investment opportunities and promoting sustainable development across the country. Author: Fábio Medina Osório
11 September 2024

Conflict Resolution through the Public Prosecutor’s Office in Brazil: An In-Depth Overview

The 1988 Federal Constitution, often referred to as the “Citizen Constitution,” brought significant transformations to Brazil’s legal framework, establishing a robust structure for the defense of the democratic regime and fundamental rights. Among its most notable innovations was the strengthening of the Public Prosecutor’s Office (Ministério Público), which was endowed with broad and essential powers to protect diffuse, collective, and social interests. The Public Prosecutor’s Office was enshrined as a permanent institution, essential to the judicial function of the State, with the mission to defend the legal order, the democratic regime, and the indisputable social and individual rights. Since 1988, the Public Prosecutor’s Office has taken on the responsibility of acting as a guardian of collective and diffuse interests, covering crucial areas such as environmental protection, the defense of economic order, and the safeguarding of the rights of indigenous populations and minorities. This new configuration gave the Public Prosecutor’s Office a central role in promoting social justice, making it an active agent in defending citizenship and ensuring the enforcement of laws. Its judicial and extrajudicial actions aim to guarantee that fundamental rights are effectively protected, promoting social inclusion and equity, and strengthening democracy in Brazil. The Role of the Public Prosecutor’s Office in Conflict Resolution The Public Prosecutor’s Office in Brazil has developed a comprehensive and multifaceted approach to conflict resolution, utilizing various judicial and extrajudicial mechanisms that prioritize efficiency, restorative justice, and the protection of public interests. These mechanisms include leniency agreements, non-prosecution agreements, plea bargains, terms of adjustment of conduct, terms of commitment, and administrative settlements. Each of these tools plays a specific role in resolving disputes while upholding the principles of justice and democracy. Leniency Agreements (Acordos de Leniência) Leniency agreements are essential in the fight against corruption and anti-competitive practices. They allow companies involved in illegal activities, such as cartel formation or corruption, to cooperate with investigations in exchange for reduced penalties. These agreements are critical in revealing complex schemes that threaten economic order and public trust. Procedure: A company voluntarily discloses its involvement in illegal activities and collaborates with authorities, providing information that aids in broader investigations. In return, penalties are reduced, and the company may avoid sanctions such as debarment from public contracts. Impact: Leniency agreements have been pivotal in major investigations like Operation Car Wash, enabling the dismantling of extensive corruption networks and reinforcing the rule of law. Non-Prosecution Civil Agreements (Acordos de Não Persecução Civil) Non-prosecution civil agreements serve as a means to resolve civil disputes without the need for litigation, particularly in cases involving public administration and collective rights. These agreements are instrumental in swiftly addressing harm caused to public assets or interests. Procedure: The Public Prosecutor’s Office negotiates with the involved party to agree on compensatory measures or corrective actions. The agreement precludes the need for a civil lawsuit, provided that the agreed terms are fulfilled. Impact: Such agreements reduce the judiciary’s caseload, facilitate the restitution of public interests, and ensure that justice is delivered efficiently. Non-Prosecution Penal Agreements (Acordos de Não Persecução Penal) Non-prosecution penal agreements are alternatives to traditional criminal prosecution, particularly in cases involving minor offenses. These agreements emphasize restorative justice, focusing on reparation and community service rather than incarceration. Procedure: The accused agrees to fulfill certain conditions, such as compensating the victim or performing community service, in exchange for the Public Prosecutor’s Office refraining from pursuing criminal charges. Impact: These agreements help reduce prison overcrowding, promote rehabilitation, and focus on restoring harm done to victims and communities. Plea Bargains (Colaborações Premiadas) Plea bargains, or “colaborações premiadas,” are agreements where defendants provide substantial information about criminal activities in return for reduced sentences. This mechanism is particularly effective in cases involving organized crime, corruption, and complex financial crimes. Procedure: The defendant cooperates with the investigation by providing crucial evidence or testimony, leading to the prosecution of other criminals or the dismantling of criminal organizations. In exchange, the defendant receives a reduced sentence or other legal benefits. Impact: Plea bargains have been crucial in uncovering large-scale corruption, especially within political and corporate sectors, significantly contributing to the enforcement of justice. Terms of Adjustment of Conduct (Termos de Ajustamento de Conduta - TAC) Terms of Adjustment of Conduct (TACs) are extrajudicial agreements designed to resolve disputes involving violations of public or social rights. TACs are widely used in environmental, consumer protection, labor law, and public health cases. Procedure: The Public Prosecutor’s Office negotiates with the violator to agree on actions necessary to remedy the situation. The TAC is legally binding, and non-compliance can lead to judicial enforcement. Impact: TACs offer a flexible and effective means to resolve disputes without resorting to litigation, ensuring that public interests are protected and compliance with the law is achieved. Terms of Commitment (Termos de Compromisso) Terms of Commitment are agreements similar to TACs, often used in regulatory compliance, particularly concerning public administration and environmental issues. These terms are negotiated between the Public Prosecutor’s Office and the party responsible for the potential harm. Procedure: The involved party agrees to take specific actions to prevent or correct harm, often within a set timeframe. Compliance with these terms can prevent further legal action. Impact: Terms of Commitment encourage proactive compliance with laws and regulations, helping to prevent damage before it occurs and promoting a culture of accountability. Administrative Settlements (Transações Administrativas) Administrative settlements resolve disputes or infractions at the administrative level without resorting to the judiciary. These settlements are often used in regulatory or economic matters where the Public Prosecutor’s Office and the involved party agree on terms to resolve the issue. Procedure: The Public Prosecutor’s Office and the infringing party reach an agreement, often involving the payment of fines, cessation of illegal activities, or implementation of corrective measures. The settlement is formalized through an administrative act. Impact: Administrative settlements provide a quicker resolution of disputes, reducing the need for prolonged legal or administrative procedures and ensuring that regulatory frameworks are respected. Conclusion The Public Prosecutor’s Office in Brazil has developed a comprehensive and multifaceted approach to conflict resolution, utilizing a variety of judicial and extrajudicial mechanisms that prioritize efficiency, restorative justice, and the protection of public interests. Through the use of leniency agreements, non-prosecution agreements, plea bargains, TACs, and other tools, the Public Prosecutor’s Office plays a vital role in upholding justice, promoting social inclusion, and strengthening democracy. These mechanisms not only alleviate the burden on the judiciary but also foster a culture of compliance and accountability across different sectors of society. As Brazil continues to navigate complex legal and social challenges, the role of the Public Prosecutor’s Office in conflict resolution remains crucial, adapting to meet the evolving demands of justice and public interest in a dynamic legal landscape.  
20 August 2024
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