South Korea

The financial regulators recently provided a preliminary consultation on the responsibilities map to 53 large financial investment companies and insurers (each with at least KRW 5 trillion in total assets or at least KRW 20 trillion in assets under management), following earlier consultations with 18 financial holding companies and banks, and announced the major deficiencies and recommendations identified during the consultation process. In addition, the regulators announced their commitment to facilitating the new responsibilities map regime through a series of initiatives, including holding briefing sessions and conducting further status reviews. Pursuant to the amended Act on Corporate Governance of Financial Companies (the “Corporate Governance Act”), which became effective as of July 3, 2024, large financial investment companies and insurers were required to prepare and submit a responsibilities map to the financial authorities by July 2, 2025. In an effort to facilitate the smooth operation of the responsibilities map regime, the Financial Supervisory Service (the “FSS”) announced a plan to conduct a responsibilities map pilot program intended for large financial investment companies and insurers. The FSS accepted applications to participate in this pilot program until April 11, 2025 and conducted a preliminary consultation for the participating companies, by reviewing their responsibilities maps and providing guidance and advice. On May 26, 2025, the FSS announced the key findings from the preliminary consultation through a press release titled “Status and Future Plans for the Responsibilities Map Pilot Program.” The key deficiencies and recommendations identified by the FSS from the pilot program are as follows: Different Standards for Allocating Responsibilities Under the System of Independent Representative Directors In the case of financial companies that have adopted a multiple independent representative director system (which typically operates as a two-person system consisting of a management representative director and a sales representative director), the financial regulators indicated that it would be advisable to allocate responsibilities among the representative directors based on their jobs’ nature and subject matters, by comprehensively taking into account the duties and authorities of each representative director, the purpose of the responsibilities map system and other relevant factors. For instance, the responsibilities requiring company-wide review, management and operation (such as the preparation of a responsibilities map and the execution and operation of policies, including those pertaining to internal control) should be allocated solely to the management representative director considering their nature, while any responsibilities falling directly within each representative director’s scope of duties should be allocated to such representative director. Potential Conflicts of Interest Arising From Holding Concurrent Offices of Representative Director and Chairperson of Board of Directors The financial regulators’ position is that while the Corporate Governance Act does not prohibit a representative director from concurrently serving as a chairperson of the board of directors, the principle of checks and balances following the introduction of the responsibilities map may not be efficiently implemented under such dual hatting arrangement. Under the Corporate Governance Act, (i) the board of directors is required to supervise the representative director’s performance of his or her overall management obligations, including internal control, and (ii) the internal control committee, which is a committee within the board of directors, is required to review and assess whether the representative director and the officers have appropriately taken overall management and reporting measures, including internal control measures, and request improvements if necessary. In light of concerns that concurrently holding the positions of representative director and chairperson of the board of directors may create a conflict of interest, the financial regulators recommended that financial companies establish effective internal control mechanisms (e.g., having all of the internal control committee members consist of outside directors) to ensure that the principle of checks and balances under the responsibilities map regime can be effectively implemented. Overlapping Responsibilities Due to Multi-Layered Allocation of Responsibilities The financial regulators pointed out that in cases where a higher-ranking officer and a subordinate officer both perform identical duties but substantive internal control responsibilities for the relevant duties are allocated to a subordinate officer instead of a higher-ranking officer who receives reports and exercises the decision-making authority, the internal control system may not function effectively as intended. Accordingly, where a higher-ranking officer and a subordinate officer perform the same duties, it is considered more appropriate to assign internal control responsibilities to the higher-ranking officer. This approach aligns with the principle of the responsibilities map system, which states that the management’s responsibilities for internal control should not be delegated to subordinate officers. Failure to Allocate Responsibilities to Key Officers The financial regulators’ position is that it is necessary to allocate responsibilities to the officers who perform and supervise duties related to such responsibilities, in order to ensure the effective operation of internal control in financial companies, regardless of whether or not they are standing officers and have the authority to approve internal control-related matters. Accordingly, financial companies should ensure that they do not, among others, (i) readily exclude non-standing directors from those to whom responsibilities are allocated, (ii) refrain from allocating responsibilities to certain officers based solely on the reason that they do not have the approval authority over internal control matters, and (iii) allocate less responsibilities to certain officers compared to the scope of responsibilities allocated to such officers described in the business report. The following cases were presented by the regulators as the cases involving inadequate allocation of responsibilities: (i) the responsibilities were not allocated to the CEO (executive director) who is in a position to exercise substantive influence over material decisions, such as the establishment of management strategies and business plans, on the ground that he or she “only has the duty to monitor as a director under the Korean Commercial Code and does not have the internal control-related approval authority,” and (ii) the chairperson of the board of directors (executive director) was assigned only the responsibilities related to the chairperson role, although his or her duties were described as “overall management” in the 2024 business report. While large financial investment companies and insurers were required to submit their responsibilities map to the FSS by July 2, 2025, the responsibilities map submission deadline for small and medium-sized financial investment companies is July 2, 2026. Upon submission of the responsibilities map, the representative director and officers of relevant companies will assume overall management obligations, including those related to internal control. In particular, starting from July 3, 2025, after the conclusion of the pilot program period, large financial investment companies and insurers are subject to sanctions (i) if they fail to meet requirements under the responsibilities map regime (such as avoiding overlap, omission or concentration of responsibilities), or (ii) if there is a breach of overall management obligations, including internal control, by the representative director and officers. Therefore, subject companies should ensure the effective operation of internal control systems based on their responsibilities maps, taking into account the financial regulators’ views on the necessary improvements to the mechanisms for reviewing the adequacy of the responsibilities map and internal control systems and compliance with applicable legal requirements. https://www.kimchang.com/en/insights/detail.kc?sch_section=4&idx=32306

On February 14, 2025, an amendment to the Act on the Consumer Protection in Electronic Commerce (the “E-Commerce Act”), which strengthens regulations on dark patterns, went into effect, along with related amendments to the Enforcement Decree and Enforcement Rules of the E-Commerce Act (the “Enforcement Regulations”). In particular, the amended Enforcement Regulations (i) specify obligations and prohibitions regarding dark patterns as stipulated under the E-Commerce Act, and (ii) include specified criteria for imposing business suspensions and administrative fines for non-compliance with these obligations. The amendments to the Enforcement Regulations aim to reinforce consumer protection in the online platform and e-commerce sectors by clarifying the regulations on dark patterns. The key details of the amended Enforcement Regulations are as follows: Specification of Obligations Regarding Dark Patterns Under E-Commerce Act The amended E-Commerce Act sets forth obligations and prohibitions concerning six types of dark patterns: (i) hidden renewals, (ii) gradual disclosure of costs, (iii) pre-selection of purchase options, (iv) false hierarchies, (v) obstruction of cancellation or withdrawal, and (vi) repeated interference. The amended Enforcement Regulations specify the consent period for consumers related to hidden renewals and provide exceptions for gradual disclosure of costs and repeated interference. Hidden Renewals: Obligations/Prohibitions Under Amended E-Commerce Act: E-commerce providers are required to obtain prior consent from consumers when increasing a subscription fee or converting a free service to a paid service (Article 13 (6) of the amended E-Commerce Act). Relevant Details in Amended Enforcement Regulations: Specification of consent period: Consumer consent must be obtained at least 30 days prior to any increase in a subscription fee or conversion of a free service to a paid service (Article 20-2 of the amended Enforcement Decree). Gradual Disclosure of Costs: Obligations/Prohibitions Under Amended E-Commerce Act: E-commerce providers are prohibited from displaying or advertising only a portion of the total price of goods without justifiable grounds (Article 21-2 (1) 1 of the amended E-Commerce Act). Relevant Details in Amended Enforcement Regulations: Exception: In cases where the total amount to be paid is difficult to list/advertise, the reasons must be disclosed on the first screen that displays the price information. The disclosure should specify the fees and items excluded from the initially advertised price, along with the reasons for their exclusion (i.e., why it is difficult to list the total amount at the outset). However, on pages with limited space, providing the justifiable grounds via a direct link to a pop-up page is allowed (Article 11-4 of the amended Enforcement Rules). Repeated Interference: Obligations/Prohibitions Under Amended E-Commerce Act: E-commerce providers are prohibited from repeatedly requesting that consumers change their choices (e.g., through pop-up windows) (Article 21-2 (1) 5 of the amended E-Commerce Act). Relevant Details in Amended Enforcement Regulations: Exception: If consumers are given the option to opt out of receiving requests to change decisions that they have already made for at least seven days, these requests will be excluded from the scope of repeated interference (Article 27-2 of the amended Enforcement Decree). Criteria for Imposing Business Suspension and Administrative Fines The amended Enforcement Decree provides for the imposition of business suspensions and administrative fines for violations related to the aforementioned six types of dark patterns. It also specifies the base duration of business suspensions and the base amounts of administrative fines imposed based on the number of violations, as outlined below. First Violation: Business Suspension: 3 months Administrative Fine: KRW 1 million Second Violation: Business Suspension: 6 months Administrative Fine: KRW 2 million Third Violation: Business Suspension: 12 months Administrative Fine: KRW 5 million Implications Hidden Renewals: To ensure that consumer consent is obtained at least 30 days before a scheduled increase in subscription fees or the conversion of a free service to a paid service, e-commerce providers must allocate sufficient time to complete the process. Gradual Disclosure of Costs: Regarding the wording and method of disclosing justifiable grounds for the gradual disclosure of costs, e-commerce providers may refer to the samples in the Korea Fair Trade Commission’s (the “KFTC”) press release dated February 10, 2025, which are related to the costs for installing air conditioners (Link). Repeated Interference: Cases where consumers have opted to not receive any requests to change their decisions for at least seven days will be excluded from repeated interference. Therefore, e-commerce providers should consider establishing a process that offers consumers options through a pop-up window, including a message such as “do not show again for [seven] days,” ensuring that the period lasts at least seven days. The KFTC has already imposed sanctions for violating the E-Commerce Act on the following entities: (i) five over-the-top (“OTT”) service providers for requiring consumers to go through cumbersome procedures to cancel contracts, (ii) an online retailer for labeling and advertising products at a discounted price even though it was unable to supply them, and (iii) an accommodation booking platform operator for failing to disclose that it displayed certain accommodations at the top of its search results page in return for advertising fees. The KFTC included its commitment to monitor and prevent dark patterns in its Annual Enforcement Plan for 2025. In addition, on February 13, 2025, it published a Q&A document regarding regulations on dark patterns to provide guidance to market participants on the enforcement of the amended Enforcement Regulations. Such proactive efforts to regulate dark patterns as a means of protecting consumers will likely continue under the new administration. Accordingly, companies should carefully follow regulatory developments regarding dark patterns and take adequate precautionary measures. https://www.kimchang.com/en/insights/detail.kc?sch_section=4&idx=32297

On June 4, 2025, Lee Jae-myung was inaugurated as the 21st President of the Republic of Korea. The new administration announced several pledges and policy statements during its presidential campaign, and on July 3, 2025, the National Assembly passed the proposed amendments to the Korean Commercial Code (the “KCC”), which provide for (i) a broadened scope of directors’ duty of loyalty, (ii) a strengthened 3% voting cap for the largest shareholders when appointing outside directors to the audit committee, (iii) the introduction of a mandatory independent director system for listed companies, and (iv) the codification of electronic general meetings of shareholders. As a result, significant changes to corporate governance regulations are anticipated. Companies are advised to proactively prepare strategic responses to the upcoming regulatory shifts. In the following paragraphs, we will analyze the expected direction of corporate governance regulations and discuss a proposed action plan for listed companies, based on our review of the proposed amendments to the KCC (the “Proposed Amendments”), as well as key pledges and proposed policies regarding corporate governance and the capital market. Amendments to KCC to Codify Directors’ Duty of Loyalty to Shareholders The Proposed Amendments address directors’ duty of loyalty to shareholders, the protection of the interests of all shareholders and the obligation to treat all shareholders equitably. The amended provision concerning directors’ duty of loyalty to shareholders will take effect immediately upon the promulgation of the Proposed Amendments. Even if the Proposed Amendments expanding directors’ duty of loyalty are enacted, there will be no material changes in situations where the interests of the company align with those of its shareholders. However, when a potential conflict arises between the interests of the company (or its controlling shareholders) and those of minority shareholders, breach of duty allegations involving directors are expected to become more prevalent. Under the current KCC, directors owe their duty of loyalty to the company. As long as directors can demonstrate that their actions served the best interests of the company, their business decisions, which may have not benefited certain shareholders, are likely to be protected. In contrast, the Proposed Amendments would expose directors to potential liability for breaching their duty of loyalty in transactions that, while beneficial to the company, could disadvantage certain shareholders (e.g., a third-party allotment of new shares). Furthermore, in transactions where potential conflicts of interest may arise between controlling and minority shareholders – such as mergers and comprehensive stock exchanges – directors could be at risk of breaching their duty to protect the interests of minority shareholders. In light of these proposed changes, directors will need to thoroughly review not only whether their decisions – including those involving corporate restructuring or mergers and acquisitions – are in the best interests of the company, but also how these decisions may affect different groups of shareholders. Strengthened 3% Voting Cap for Appointment/Dismissal of Audit Committee Members, Expansion of Mandatory Cumulative Voting and Separate Election of Audit Committee Members Under the current KCC, when appointing or dismissing an audit committee member who is not an outside director in a large listed company, the 3% voting cap for the largest shareholder is calculated by aggregating the shares held by the largest shareholder and its related parties. In contrast, under the Proposed Amendments, the aforementioned 3% voting cap will also apply to the largest shareholder when appointing or dismissing an audit committee member who is an outside director as well, starting one year after the promulgation of the Proposed Amendments. Currently, large listed companies must have at least two-thirds of their audit committee members appointed among their outside directors and, in practice, audit committees are often composed entirely of outside directors. With the Proposed Amendments expanding the 3% voting cap to be applicable to the appointment of audit committee members who are outside directors as well, companies will need to verify the scope and ratio of the voting cap before the Proposed Amendments take effect. Furthermore, the new administration is expected to support amendments to the KCC that would require large listed companies with total assets of KRW 2 trillion or more to: (i) adopt mandatory cumulative voting when appointing two or more directors, and (ii) gradually expand the number of directors who would be part of the audit committee, who therefore would have to be elected separately from other directors. If the aforementioned proposed amendments to (i) adopt mandatory cumulative voting when appointing two or more directors are enacted, large listed companies will no longer be able to opt out of the cumulative voting system through their articles of incorporation. Even if a large listed company already has provisions in its articles of incorporation opting out of cumulative voting, depending on the specific wording and the scope of the amendments to the KCC, such provisions may be rendered invalid in the event of legal disputes. As this may allow minority shareholders to immediately request the election of directors through cumulative voting, it would be essential for companies to proactively prepare for the possible change. Furthermore, the combination of the Proposed Amendments with the strengthened 3% voting cap and the subsequent amendments to the KCC described in points (i) and (ii) mentioned above may require the adoption of a cumulative voting system for separate election of directors who will become audit committee members, further increasing the likelihood of minority shareholder nominees being appointed as audit committee members. Introduction of Independent Director System and Codification of Electronic General Meetings of Shareholders for Listed Companies The Proposed Amendments change the title of outside directors to “independent directors” and increase the mandatory appointment ratio of “independent directors” for companies with total assets under KRW 2 trillion from one-fourth to one-third. According to the addenda to the Proposed Amendments, listed companies must comply with the mandatory appointment ratio within one year after the Proposed Amendments take effect. The term “Independent director” is defined as a “director who performs functions independently from inside directors, executive officers, and those with executive authority.” Notably, the term “independent director” places increased emphasis on directors’ independence from controlling shareholders. That said, there do not seem to be any significant differences in the duties and eligibility of “independent directors” in the Proposed Amendments and “outside directors” in the current KCC. Furthermore, the Proposed Amendments set forth legal grounds for electronic general meetings of shareholders and mandate the holding of such electronic shareholder meetings for listed companies designated by presidential decree, taking into account factors such as asset size (effective from January 1, 2027). Systematization of Mandatory Allocation of New Shares to Existing Ordinary Shareholders of Parent Companies Upon Subsidiary Listings After Spin-Offs There has been criticism in the market that when a listed company spins off a core business unit to establish a wholly owned subsidiary and subsequently lists that subsidiary, the share price of the parent company often declines, adversely affecting its minority shareholders. In response, regulators have pursued various reforms, including amendments to the Enforcement Decree of the Financial Investment Services and Capital Markets Act (the “FSCMA”), to grant appraisal rights to shareholders who oppose such spin-offs. Building on these developments, the new administration has announced plans for an additional regulatory framework that would require listed companies, when listing a subsidiary established through a spin-off, to mandatorily allocate a portion of the subsidiary’s new shares to the parent company’s existing ordinary shareholders who are not the largest shareholders and their related parties. If the above mentioned framework is adopted, the mandatory allocation of new shares to parent company shareholders upon the listing of a spun-off subsidiary will become a legal requirement. This may affect the shareholder composition of the subsidiary and could have implications for the overall listing process. Accordingly, it would be advisable for companies considering a spin-off and subsequent listing transactions to carefully examine the potential impact of these regulatory changes in advance. Adoption of Fair Value Standards for Determining M&A Prices for Listed Companies and Strengthened Board Accountability in Corporate Restructuring Transactions The new administration is expected to introduce regulatory measures requiring listed companies to determine the price of mergers and acquisitions by applying fair value standards that take into account share prices, asset values and earnings values. Additionally, there will likely be enhanced board responsibility to ensure that the legitimate interests of minority shareholders are protected during mergers and other corporate restructuring transactions. In line with these anticipated regulatory developments, a bill to amend the FSCMA (proposed by National Assembly member Lee Jung-mun and 11 others on February 12, 2025) has been submitted to the 22nd National Assembly. The proposed amendment stipulates the following: (i) in restructuring transactions such as mergers, spin-offs or business transfers, listed companies must determine transaction prices based on a fair value that comprehensively considers share price, asset value and earnings value, to the extent that does not undermine investor interests, (ii) in the event of a dispute regarding the fairness of transaction prices, the burden of proof to demonstrate that the price was fair rests with the company, and (iii) if the transaction price is found to have been unfairly determined, the company and its directors will bear joint and several liability for any resulting damages. If the regulations described above are implemented through amendments to the FSCMA, it will become more crucial for listed companies to ensure fairness in determining the terms of restructuring transactions (e.g., mergers) by, for example, setting transaction prices based on assessments carried out by independent third-party advisors. Furthermore, as disputes regarding directors’ liability for damages are likely to increase, it will be essential for companies to pay heightened attention to maintaining both substantive and procedural fairness throughout the process of any restructuring transactions. Introduction of Mandatory Tender Offer Requirement in Corporate Acquisitions The mandatory tender offer regime aims to protect minority shareholders by ensuring that, when a major shareholder sells a significant stake, the accompanying control premium is not exclusively enjoyed by the majority shareholder to the detriment of minority shareholders. Under this system, when a shareholder acquires shares exceeding a certain threshold, he/she is required to make a public offer to purchase all remaining shares in the company. This grants minority shareholders the opportunity to exit their investments on equitable terms. The new administration is expected to once again pursue amendments to the FSCMA to introduce a mandatory tender offer system. Should such requirement take effect, the complexity of transferring management control is likely to increase for sellers. At the same time, buyers would face increased financial and procedural burdens, such as having to secure acquisition funds and engage in further transactions with minority shareholders. These factors are expected to have a profound impact on transactions involving the acquisition of corporate control. Review of Mandatory Cancellation of Treasury Shares by Listed Companies Many have frequently criticized listed companies that often retain treasury shares acquired through buybacks rather than promptly canceling them. Such shares may subsequently be resold on the market or be disposed of to specific third parties for business purposes, ultimately limiting the effectiveness of share buybacks as a means of returning value to shareholders. To address this issue, the new administration is actively reviewing the introduction of a regime that would generally mandate the cancellation of treasury shares held by listed companies. When these reforms are implemented, it is likely to become increasingly difficult for listed companies to dispose of treasury shares to business partners for alliances or to raise funds through the issuance of exchangeable bonds backed by treasury shares. Accordingly, it would be advisable for companies with significant treasury shareholdings to take into consideration relevant legislative developments, including whether the new cancellation obligations would apply retroactively to shares already held. In addition, based on relevant policy announcements and the campaign pledges of the new administration, the amendments to the KCC and/or the FSCMA are likely to be pursued to: (i) introduce a non-binding shareholder proposal system, and (ii) introduce a “merger examiner” system, permitting minority shareholders to petition the court to appoint an examiner for mergers between listed companies and their affiliates. In light of the promulgation and enforcement of the Proposed Amendments, the new administration’s policy direction and the anticipated amendments to relevant legislations, significant changes to corporate governance and capital market regulations are expected in the coming years. Accordingly, companies, including listed entities, are advised to closely examine developments in key applicable laws, such as the KCC and the FSCMA, and to keep abreast of the new administration’s regulatory direction. In addition, companies should proactively identify and assess potential issues that may arise in connection with future corporate governance restructuring or related transactions and prepare robust, systematic response strategies to ensure compliance. https://www.kimchang.com/en/insights/detail.kc?sch_section=4&idx=32299

Yoon & Yang LLC (Yoon & Yang) has further strengthened its M&A and corporate advisory capabilities with the recruitment of Partner Jin Kook Lee, a veteran dealmaker renowned for his exceptional track record in both domestic and cross-border M&A and capital markets, and rising next-generation star Partner So Yeon Yoon. These new hires build on the May joining of Managing Partner Hee Woong Yoon, one of Korea’s most prominent M&A practitioners, and Senior Foreign Attorney Myong-Hyon (Brandon) Ryu, a leading cross-border M&A specialist. Together, these high-profile additions substantially reinforce Yoon & Yang’s depth and breadth of expertise in advising clients on complex corporate transactions, positioning the firm as one of the most competitive and comprehensive in Korea with a top-tier lineup of distinguished and proven attorneys in M&A, capital markets and corporate advisory. Jin Kook Lee is a strategic dealmaker with over 20 years of experience leading a wide range of large-scale domestic and cross-border M&A and capital markets transactions. A graduate of Seoul National University School of Law (Class of 1997), he passed the Korean bar in 1998 and served as a military judge advocate. He joined Yulchon LLC in 2004 and played a pivotal role in Yulchon’s M&A practice as a core member of the Corporate & Finance Group for over two decades. Mr. Lee possesses a rare combination in corporate advisory expertise and experience for a Korean attorney, with capabilities to advise not only on both inbound and outbound M&A transactions but also on IPOs and other capital markets transactions. He has advised on a number of landmark M&A transactions, including Lotte Group’s sale of Lotte Rental, Hanwha Group’s acquisitions of Daewoo Shipbuilding & Marine Engineering (currently Hanwha Ocean) and HDS Engine (currently Hanwha Engine), Naver’s acquisition of U.S.-based Poshmark, various financial investors’ sale of Woowa Brothers (d.b.a. Baemin), and Lotte Group’s acquisition of Ministop, as well as many high-profile IPOs in Korea such as SK IE Technology, Lotte Shopping REITs, Hyundai Autoever, and Hanwha Systems. Notably, he advised MBK Partners on its KRW 7.2 trillion acquisition of Homeplus—the largest private equity M&A deal in Asia to date. His track record has earned him the nickname “big deal maker” among clients and peers alike. He has consistently been recognized by global legal directories, including Chambers Asia-Pacific, Legal 500, and IFLR1000, as a Leading Individual or Highly Regarded lawyer in M&A and capital markets. So Yeon Yoon is recognized for her ability to provide tailored advice on M&A and corporate governance matters through a unique blend of external counsel experience handling major deals at a law firm and in-house counsel experience at Korea’s largest platform company, coupled with her specialized expertise in commercial law.  Ms. Yoon graduated as the second-highest in her class from Seoul National University Law School in 2012 and was admitted to Korean bar the same year. Afterward, she has developed her expertise and built a solid track record in M&A and corporate governance practices over more than 10 years at Yulchon LLC. Notable deals include Hanwha Galleria and TimeWorld’s share exchange, KT Group’s media content holding company project, Hillhouse Capital’s investment in Market Kurly, Lotte Capital’s equity sale, MBK Partners’ Homeplus acquisition, and SK IE Technology’s IPO. In 2018, she earned an LL.M. from Harvard Law School and was subsequently admitted to the New York Bar. She then joined the New York office of Sullivan & Cromwell, gaining hands-on experience in global transactions. From 2022 to 2024, she served as Head of Legal at Naver, where she oversaw a wide range of platform-specific legal matters, including TMT, AI, ESG, and litigation, and spearheaded strategic investment initiatives such as Naver’s largest acquisition to date of U.S.-based Poshmark. In 2025, she completed her Doctor of Juridical Science (J.S.D.) at Seoul National University Law School, with a dissertation on equity compensation structures such as RSUs and PSUs, further strengthening her commercial law expertise. With these new additions, Yoon & Yang aims to further enhance its capabilities in response to Korea’s evolving corporate and M&A landscape. Mr. Lee’s seasoned leadership and expertise in M&A transactions and IPOs is expected to elevate the firm’s global competitiveness, while Ms. Yoon’s deep understanding and experience in the tech and platform industries will provide valuable insights into emerging business sectors and support global-facing mandates. Managing Partner Myung Soo Lee stated, “as client needs grow increasingly sophisticated and deal structures become more complex, it is essential to have experts with strategic insight and differentiated experience. At Yoon & Yang, we are committed to building a client-centric team capable of delivering exceptional legal solutions. We will continue to recruit top talents until Yoon & Yang’s M&A and corporate advisory practice is firmly established as a top-tier player in Korea.” For more information, please contact: Mr. Jae Hyuk Yang Senior Marketing/Communications Manager Yoon & Yang LLC Tel: (82-2) 6003-7229 Email: [email protected]