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ARTICLE · 04 MARCH 2008

To Cooperate Or Not: The Corporate Leniency Program After “Stolt-Nielsen”

Since 1993, the U.S. Department of Justice Antitrust Division’s Corporate Leniency Program has been instrumental in the Antitrust Division’s crusade against antitrust violators.

United StatesAntitrust/Competition Law
Edward Magarina
Edward Magarina
William Michael, Jr.
William Michael, Jr.
Michael Lindsay
Michael Lindsay
James Nichols
James Nichols

Excerpt of article which first appeared in The Antitrust Source, February, 2008. (www.abanet.org/antitrust/at-source/at-source.html)

Since 1993, the U.S. Department of Justice Antitrust Division's Corporate Leniency Program has been instrumental in the Antitrust Division's crusade against antitrust violators. In fact, antitrust violators have entered the Leniency Program at rates as high as two per month, resulting in the prosecution of some of the Antitrust Division's biggest cases.

The Leniency Program's success is due largely to its ability to offer an incentive that is simply too good to pass up. If accepted into the Leniency Program, a company can avoid all criminal penalties (both for itself and its officers and employees) for its antitrust violations, as long as the company complies with its obligations under its agreement with the Antitrust Division. This is a tremendous inducement for

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