Turkish Competition Authority – Guidelines On Competition Law Violations In Labor Markets Published

Turkish Competition Authority published the "Guidelines on Competition Violations in Labor Markets" ("the Guidelines") adopted by its decision dated 21.11.2024 and numbered 24-49/1087- RM (4). In the Guidelines, the types of competition infringements in labor markets are firstly addressed within the scope of Article 4 of Act No. 4054 on the Protection of Competition under the headings of (i) employee non-solicitation agreements, (ii) wage-fixing agreements and (iii) information exchange, and then evaluations are presented in terms of ancillary restraints and other articles of the Act. The Guidelines outline the following principles:

• Non-poaching agreements are evaluated within the same framework as provider/customer sharing agreements. Non-poaching agreements that constitute an infringement in terms of purpose are considered cartels.
• Wage-fixing agreements are evaluated within the same framework as price-fixing agreements that occur on the output side of the market. In this context, wage-fixing agreements that constitute a violation in terms of purpose are considered cartels.
• Competitively sensitive information generally includes information on wages (employee salaries) or other working conditions (e.g., fringe benefits and working hours) that can have a significant impact on employees' job choices or overall labor mobility.
• It is stated that information exchange may occur directly between undertakings or through intermediaries and third-party channels such as platforms and market research companies. In this context, it is also stated that the sharing between undertakings of information that is not aggregated, current and/or forward-looking, that makes it possible to understand the data source or the content of the data individually and that is not publicly available may restrict competition.
• For the exchange of information not to have anti-competitive effects, it should meet the following conditions:
  1. The exchange of information should be conducted by an independent third party,
  2. It should not be possible to understand the data source or individual data content,
  3. The information subject to the exchange of information must be at least three months outdated,
  4. The information must include data from at least ten participants,
  5. No participant's data should weigh more than 25% of the total data.

• It is stated that wage-fixing and non-poaching agreements, as well as information exchanges aimed at restricting competition, cannot benefit from exemption as a general rule.
• Restrictions that are found to be ancillary restrictions will not be evaluated within the scope of Article 4 of the Act; on the other hand, restrictions regarding non-poaching and wage fixing, which are not found to be ancillary restrictions, will be considered as a violation based on their purpose.
• In the assessments regarding abuse of dominant position, it is assessed whether the undertaking subject to review has a dominant position in both the relevant product or service market and the relevant labor market.
• Finally, it is stated that whether merger and acquisition transactions reduce competition in the labor market will be evaluated based on various criteria, including whether the relevant transaction involves the possibility of a killer acquisition.

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