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ARTICLE · 17 JULY 2013

Lessons From Recent MOFCOM Merger Decisions

De Brauw Blackstone Westbroek
De Brauw Blackstone Westbroek
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De Brauw Blackstone Westbroek

De Brauw Blackstone Westbroek

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The Ministry of Commerce has recently decided on two merger filings: Glencore/Xstrata and Marubeni/Gavilon.

NetherlandsCorporate/Commercial Law
Geert Potjewijd
Geert Potjewijd
Yi Duan
Yi Duan
Sjoerd Van Elferen
Sjoerd Van Elferen
Renee Xu
Renee Xu
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The Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM) recently decided on two merger filings: Glencore/Xstrata and Marubeni/Gavilon. These cases show that in global transactions involving commodities which are strategically important to China:

  • MOFCOM can take significantly more time to review the merger filing than regulators in other jurisdictions
  • MOFCOM is willing to find market power and to intervene at relatively low market share levels
  • MOFCOM seems confident in taking a different approach than regulators in other jurisdictions, including imposing behavioural remedies without a stipulated termination date.

Glencore/Xstrata and Marubeni/Gavilon recorded the first and third longest review timelines among MOFCOM's cases to date (13 and 10 months, respectively). Both involved the withdrawal and re-filing of the respective notifications. This emphasises the need for merger parties to plan and prepare the filing procedure with the utmost care.

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