A company may, for a variety of reasons, choose to remove a
director from office. In this respect, due consideration should be
given to what statutory or constitutional devices are available for
the purposes of taking such a radical step, and what the resultant
implications might be for all those who are implicated or are key
players in this process.
Affording shareholders the power of removing directors is, in
effect, a means by which the former may exercise a degree of
influence over the latter, in terms of putting members of the board
"on notice", that their directorial positions are by no
means sacrosanct, and ought not be taken for granted. In a
nutshell, and as aptly pointed out by John E Moye in "The Law
of Business Organisations" (2004) 166, the fact remains that
"directors serve at the pleasure of the
shareholders". In essence, this serves to counter-balance
and compensate for the fact that those who have been designated as
directors of the company, cannot