Seddons GSC LLP

Jenny Ha, a Senior Associate on the Personal Injury and Clinical Negligence Team, discusses lens replacement surgery and the regulatory and legal challenges surrounding informed consent in the medical sector. Lens replacement surgery, also known as refractive lens exchange (RLE), is the now commonplace medical procedure for replacing the natural eye lens with a prosthetic alternate, or intraocular lens (IOL), in circumstances where the natural lens loses opacity and normal vision is impaired to an extent that a patient no longer considers to be tolerable. Initially developed as a treatment for cataracts, the procedure is now increasingly offered to individuals without cataracts but as a vision correction procedure – it is widely marketed as being a safe and effective solution for people seeking to be free from glasses and contact lenses and is frequently sold on the promise that the outcome can restore almost 20/20 vision. Specifically, it is appealing to those over 40 where age-related wear has caused a diminution in the eyes’ ability to focus on objects close-up. The surgery has grown in popularity, but costs approximately £3,000 to £4,000 per eye. There are also increasing concerns about the potential risks of the surgery and more significantly, the adequacy of the information given out by providers about possibly adverse consequences, and the shortcomings in the process of obtaining properly informed consent from the patient to the procedure. Many patients report they were not made adequately aware of the various possible complications, some of which are permanent and irreversible. Given the complexity of the process and its inherent potential dangers, is it fair or reasonable to expect untrained individuals to be conducting their own due diligence before asking themselves ‘is it worth it?’ Understanding the Risks of Lens Replacement Surgery As with any surgical procedure, lens replacement surgery is not risk free and that is not restricted to the danger of a post-procedure infection. There are other possible complications, which can include the following: Retinal Detachment: A serious complication, which can lead to permanent blindness if the detachment is not tackled by corrective surgical intervention fast enough. Some patients may present with an enhanced risk of Retinal Detachment even before the surgery. Glare and Visual Disturbances: Halo effects, and increased sensitivity to glare around lights, particularly at night, can create real difficulties with night driving. These are common side effects of lens replacement surgery and often dismissed by practitioners as ‘temporary” with eventual resolution over several months, but that is not always the case. If these disturbances do not resolve, they cannot be corrected by further surgery. For some, these effects lead to serious and permanent impairment to the patient’s quality of life. Posterior Capsule Opacification (PCO): This occurs if the membrane behind the artificial lens becomes cloudy. Practitioners generally suggest that the effect can be fixed quickly by a laser procedure known as YAG capsulotomy, but that secondary process cannot resolve other complications. Loss of Focus, Depth Perception, and Contrast Sensitivity: Many individuals go for this type of surgery in the mistaken belief that it can potentially restore the full functionality of a young natural lens, but that is not so. An artificial fixed focus lens may restore clearer vision and brighter colours, but it will not replicate original functionality in terms of the ability to adjust focus, manage depth or contrast. Many patients who go into this surgery without that full appreciation of what it can and cannot do are then disappointed to find out only after the procedure, that they still require glasses, and do not have the youthful vision they had planned for. Many say that had they known that they would not be glasses free after all, they would never have put themselves thought it or wasted their money. Informed Consent The patients we meet repeatedly report that the marketing of the procedure sells the notion of a permanent fix and a freedom from glasses. They complain that they were not fully informed about the process of lens replacement surgery, its limits, and that they had little or no discussion of the downside. We are often told that the risks and possible complications were downplayed by those selling or promoting the product, and those assisting in the procedure. Another main complaint is that any discussion happens on the day and having already turned up for the procedure, little or no time is given for questions or reflection on what can be a large amount of information or booklets handed to them by the clinics on the day. Patients have a clear right to understand not just the benefits of a procedure, but also its potential drawbacks. Given that this surgery is mainly an ‘elective’ surgery, and for many a purely voluntary choice, there should an enhanced level of transparency around risks and complications, expected recovery times, the future use of glasses, and what the patient might experience. Informed consent should be more than a generic brochure and a signature on a tick box questionnaire and consent form. If the medical practitioner has not created the environment for true understanding, has failed to take the time to understand the specific needs and hopes of the patient and address them, the signature on the form will not protect him or his clinic from a potential suit – particularly so where private practitioners derive a direct financial incentive to perform each elective surgery for personal gain. The priority of looking to the Patients’ personal best interest remains the foremost consideration for any procedure. Regulatory and Legal Implications Regulation of the sector is governed by the Care Quality Commission who have responsibility for clinics meeting basic standards of practice, and the General Medical Counsel which monitors and oversees medical and ethical practice. However, those regulators do not control or restrict the general marketing activities of private clinics and content, nor do they issue general information to the public on complications of individual processes and procedures or warnings they may have issued to surgeries, clinics, or practitioners. The public is still largely expected to look to their own personal protection, conduct their own research, and rely upon their own due diligence before committing. While lens replacement surgery has benefits and has helped many people achieve better vision and freedom from glasses, it is not a magic solution and does not necessarily result in a glasses-free future, free from issue. No procedure is risk-free, and the consent process does not often give all of the information patients would want. Patients have taken to various platforms highlighting their experiences and outcomes following surgery and prospective patients should review commentary and if in doubt, seek more than one opinion and more than one consult, beyond those simply marketing their wares.

6th April 2026 is a significant date in the world of inheritance tax (“IHT”) and business property relief (“BRP”). It has been widely documented since the 2024 Autumn Budget that major reforms were proposed to BPR legislation, which has now been formalised after the UK government released the draft Finance Bill 2025/26 legislation delivering new tax proposals. What is BPR? Where an individual owns a business or a share of a business, it is included in their estate for IHT purposes. For years, BPR has been a useful tool in reducing the IHT liability on an individual’s estate. At present, BPR is available at the rate of 100% on: A business or interest in a business including sole traders, interest in partnerships or LLPs; and Shares in an unlisted company or shares listed on an alternative stock exchange. This generous relief has been welcome by business owners. If an individual owns a business valued at £5 million and other personal assets (properties, investments and cash) worth £3 million, then on their death they could leave their business to their children with no liability to IHT with only assets outside of the business being subject to IHT. This IHT liability would be approximately £1,070,000 (after deducting the IHT nil-rate band of £325,000). In addition to this, a 50% relief applies to: Shares or securities giving control of quoted companies; and Land, buildings or machinery individually owned but used by a company or partnership in service of the business. To be eligible for BPR, the individual must have owned the business or asset used for a qualifying period of two years prior to death. The business must also be wholly or mainly trading, so no involvement in investment activities. What is changing from 6th April 2026? The key change sees the introduction of a cap on the 100% relief of £1 million. Any assets exceeding the £1 million threshold will be subject to IHT at a rate of 50%. Considering the above scenario, this means the first £1 million of the individuals’ business can be left free of IHT. The remaining £4 million would receive the reduced 50% relief (resulting in an effective 20% IHT charge on the remaining value) potentially meaning an additional IHT liability of £800,000 in addition to the £1,070,000. Until now, businesses have been able to continue trading on the death of the owner without the worry of exposure to IHT. From 6th April 2026 this will be a concern for business owners who may have to look at selling their business, or parts of it in order to fund the IHT liability despite there being an option to pay this over a 10-year period with added interest. Other key changes include: A reduction of BPR for unlisted shares from 100% to 50% – essentially this includes shares not listed on recognised stock exchanges, such as the Alternative Investment Market or Enterprise Investment Scheme and other similar markets in all cases irrespective of the total value invested. Existing trusts with a value of more than £1 million of business property created before 30th October 2024 will also be subject to the new BPR legislation. Ultimately, the proposed changes will completely change the scope of how business owners can pass on their business assets to the next generation which up until now, have been free of IHT. Whilst the long-lasting effects and public reaction are uncertain, in the coming years, it is expected to see an increase of the number of larger estates which may now be exposed to IHT. How can I prepare? The draft legislation is currently going through the technical consultation phase ending on 15th September 2025, but it seems likely the fundamental changes that have been proposed will be implemented in less than a years’ time. HMRC have said ‘the purpose of the reforms is to raise revenue to ensure the sustainability of the public finances and to fund public services, whilst continuing to support businesses by targeting the reliefs to make them fairer’. Despite this rationale, the proposed reforms are still an unwelcome development for business owners. By taking a proactive approach and reviewing their current circumstances now, business owners can look to implement measures to mitigate their exposure to IHT moving forward and planning for the future as follows: Seek legal and tax advice Most business owners already consult a solicitor, accountant and financial advisor. At the earliest opportunity, discussions should be had with them to determine how the changes will affect the business owner and if any action could be taken to minimise the IHT implications. Lifetime Gifting There are no proposed changes to the IHT legislation on making lifetime gifts, the key principle being that surviving seven years from the date of any gift means that asset falls outside of an individual’s estate for IHT purpose. Therefore, business owners can look to gift part/s of the business during their lifetime to limit the IHT exposure of the business. However, this does raise further issues such as capital gains tax which is a lifetime tax that could be applicable on a gift of a business. Additionally, some business owners may not be comfortable dividing up ownership whilst they are alive and having other family members involved in the day to day running of the business and assuming an element of control over this. Review of Wills and succession planning The £1 million cap is not planned to be transferable between spouses as is the position with the IHT nil-rate band of £325,000 which can be transferred to the estate of the second spouse to die. Therefore, business owners should look to use the £1 million cap effectively and consider the involvement of their spouse to effectively double up on the new BRP allowance. For example, civil partners can each pass on £1 million on their respective deaths to the next generation free of IHT. Business owners should consider reviewing their current Wills to ensure their estate is distributed in an IHT efficient manner. Different approaches can be implemented such as the use of trusts or family investment companies. These can help the business owner retain control of the business but have the advantage of being outside of their estate for IHT purposes. Different IHT charges would be applicable to such structures but overall, this could still achieve a more IHT efficient result. Life Insurance It may be an option to take out life insurance to cover the IHT liability, or to extend the current level of cover to consider the additional IHT payable on the business assets. Typically, the insurance proceeds would be held on trust for the benefit of nominated beneficiaries (e.g. spouse and children) and would be paid to them outside of the individual’s estate for IHT purposes. This would provide the business owner’s family with an additional cash fund that could be used towards the IHT liability. It would be preferable to obtain such a policy (or policies) as young as possible and provided the business owner is in good health, this can result in more beneficial premium rates. By Zoe Pearse If you have any concerns regarding the succession of your estate or would like further information regarding the implications of the proposed changes to BPR legislation, please contact our Private Client team at Seddons GSC on [email protected]

The Supreme Court has unanimously dismissed a wife’s appeal, in financial remedy proceedings, where she sought to argue that the sharing principle applied to assets worth £80 million, which the husband transferred to her to avoid inheritance tax. The Judgment handed down by the Supreme Court in the case of Standish is now a defining concept in the ever-evolving landscape of family law. The husband entered the marriage with substantial wealth. In 2017, following tax advice, he transferred a substantial part of this to the wife on the assumption that she would be transferring the assets into a trust for the benefit of their children. The wife did not do so and instead commenced divorce proceedings in 2020. The wife originally disputed that the husband’s sole aim was to gain tax relief benefits and claimed that the husband’s separate property, that had been transferred to her, then became her separate property. In the Supreme Court, the wife’s case was that the 2017 transfer matrimonialised assets and therefore made them subject to the sharing principle. The Supreme Court ruled in favour of the husband and held that the source of the funds were pre-marital and the transfer did not change this status. It was therefore decided that the assets were not subject to the sharing principle. On marriage, there is often a process called ‘’matrimonilisation’’ which means assets acquired before or outside of the marriage become assets that can be considered on divorce if treated as shared during the marriage.  Typically, the Court considers that legal title confirming legal ownership a determining factor in ownership. The Standish ruling now determines that courts should now also consider the original source and underlying intent of the parties at the time of transfer. This confirms that there is no legal right to share property that is found to be non-matrimonial. The new test for matrimonialisation is therefore as follows: The matrimonialisation of property will occur where there is intention by the transferor to share the non-marital property, coupled with treatment by the parties of this property as shared over time. Interestingly the ruling also differentiates between passive and active contributions. If there is market-driven growth on premarital investments, the growth will remain separate property unless the couple have agreed to pool the gains. On the other hand, profits derived from a business run by one spouse, for example, will be treated as shared equity. What does this mean for divorcing parties? The Court’s finding in this case that sharing does not now apply to non-matrimonial property will mean there will need to be consideration given to ensuring that there is clear documentation recording an asset’s origin and reasons for any transfer. Clear advice will need to be sought, not only from a financial advisor, but from a family lawyer as well prior to the transfer. A family lawyer can assist with cohabitation agreements for example, which assist in a scenario where one party owns the property but the couple will be living in the property together. This can assist in divorce proceedings as it shows clear intentions that the asset was to be separate property. A pre-nuptial agreement can also assist parties and should be entered into prior to the marriage. This agreement can set out the couple’s intentions as to the assets that each or one of them is bringing into the marriage. It is important to note, that even though the Court may rule that assets are non-matrimonial, a spouse  can be expected to draw upon such assets to meet the needs of the other spouse, if such needs cannot be met from the joint pot, to ensure fairness. Fairness is a familiar concept to family law practitioners following the presumption that a 50/50 split of the assets is the starting point. This is not, however, always the outcome as the court will need to consider the needs of both parties, dependant children, contributions made, and the other factors set out in section 25 of the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973. If a spouse is seeking to share in non-marital assets following divorce, they will need to demonstrate that their spouse had an intention to share the assets with them despite them being non-marital in nature. The passage of time is also a relevant indicator of intention to share in this context as the longer the asset is treated in such a way, the stronger the evidence is of a settled intention. This will impact the advice we now give to clients when advising them prior to marriage. Family lawyers will need to consider the outcome of Standish when advising clients in relation to cohabitation and nuptial agreements. Parties will need to think about how they are documenting and communicating the treatment of assets before and during the marriage, as it is likely that any evidence around the origin of assets and how the couple have treated the same will be important on divorce.

An increasing number of Americans are choosing to build a life in the UK. According to the UK Home Office, applications for British citizenship from US nationals rose by 26 percent in 2024, marking the highest level recorded in over two decades. The motivations vary, but many are driven by a desire for greater political stability, access to public healthcare, and a new lifestyle with international perspective. For those contemplating such a move, the UK offers many appealing qualities. A shared language, a familiar legal system, renowned educational and cultural institutions, and a strong real estate market all contribute to the appeal. However, relocating internationally involves important legal, financial, and personal considerations that are worth understanding early. Immigration and Visa Pathways The UK’s visa system includes a variety of routes depending on your reason for moving. Whether you are relocating for employment, to join family, or planning a long-term stay, it is important to identify the correct visa and understand the requirements. Planning ahead helps ensure a smoother process and provides clarity on what your future path to residency or citizenship could look like. Buying or Renting Property Navigating the UK property market can be quite different from buying in the US. Key concepts such as freehold and leasehold ownership, stamp duty, and differing legal procedures can feel unfamiliar. Many newcomers choose to rent initially to better understand the market before making a long-term investment. Wealth and Estate Planning Managing your financial affairs across two countries often requires expert advice. Inheritance tax, wills, trusts, and reporting obligations can vary significantly between UK and US jurisdictions. Taking time to plan appropriately can help preserve wealth and avoid unnecessary complications, especially for those relocating with substantial assets. Family Considerations Relocating can raise important questions for families, particularly where existing custody arrangements or international considerations are involved. Some individuals also use the opportunity to put pre- or post-nuptial agreements in place to provide clarity and reassurance in a new legal setting. It is worth thinking through these personal factors as part of the broader move. Business and Corporate Law Some Americans moving to the UK may be launching a new venture or expanding an existing business. This transition brings with it practical and regulatory considerations, including company formation, governance, and local compliance. The UK offers a stable and well-regulated environment for entrepreneurs, but early legal guidance can help avoid missteps. Finding the Right Support An international move involves more than packing up and booking flights. It is a complex process with many moving parts, from immigration to property, family matters to finances. At Seddons GSC, we regularly advise American clients at all stages of their move and settlement. Our goal is to help you make informed decisions with confidence. If you are considering a move to the UK and want to understand what support might be helpful, we welcome the opportunity to speak with you. Need help navigating these changes? If you, your clients or employees are affected by these changes please contact Soma Barzinji ([email protected]) in our immigration team for further advice.

A Will is one of the most important documents that a person might prepare in their lifetime. The law on making a Will in England and Wales is based on statute and case law, with the Wills Act 1837 (“Act”) governing the key formalities. The Act has not been updated since its introduction and it has long been debated that the legislation should be modernised. The Law Commission’s Wills Project on the proposal for reform commenced in 2016, and the Commission released its final, two volume report on 16 May 2025 (the “Report”). The Report includes the Commission’s recommendations for reform and a draft Bill for a new Wills Act. It is suggested by the Commission that the new Bill should introduce a more streamlined, comprehensive and modern legal framework for making Wills in England and Wales. A link to the Report and related documents is here Wills – Law Commission The key recommendations that the Commission has made in the Report are: That the legal age to make a Will be reduced to 16 years and for the Court to have the power to authorise the making of a Will by younger testators in specific circumstances. That a gift in a Will should be invalidated not only if it is made to the witness of a Will or their spouse/civil partner but also if the gift is made to: The witness’s cohabitant; or a person who signed the Will on behalf and at the direction of, the testator; or the spouse/civil partner or cohabitant of the person that signed the Will on behalf and at the direction of the testator. That marriage should no longer revoke a Will. That the test for testamentary capacity should be the test set out in the Mental Capacity Act 2005 (“MCA”), with reference to the elements set out in the Banks v Goodfellow test to support guiding principles and the operation of the MCA test in practice. That a statutory presumption of capacity should apply to making a Will. That a Code of Practice should be established on assessing capacity under the MCA. That provision be made for electronic Wills, using a ‘reliable system’ to ensure the security of the Will and that virtual witnessing be permissible. A ‘reliable system’[1]  is recommended to be one that: – links any signature with the person, at the time of signing – identifies the Will so that it can be distinguished from copies; and – protects the Will against any alterations other than by the testator or person authorised by them. And that the Court be provided with: An overriding dispensing power to validate a Will that does not comply with all the formality requirements, if the testamentary intentions are clear despite this. The power to rectify a Will that does not give effect to the testator’s Will due to a drafting error (as well as a clerical error). The power to infer that a Will was brought about by undue influence where there are reasonable grounds to suspect so. The power to save a gift to a witness or person that signs on a person’s behalf if it considers it just and reasonable to do so. As the Commission cites in the Report, it appears that the proposed reforms, and specially the draft new Bill should not only offer modernisation but also clarify certain legal points, bolster guiding principles and increase protections for vulnerable testators. The key theme of the report is supporting testamentary freedom, the key principle of Wills law in England and Wales. The Government will review and consider the recommendations and provide their response as to whether the proposals for reform are accepted. We shall await further updates. Any reform to the Act will provide an opportunity for clients to review their Will, to ensure that it accords with their wishes and offers the preferred estate planning solution considering current circumstances and current law. It will be crucial for advisors to keep abreast of the developments and to proactively engage with clients to facilitate the Will review process. If you have any questions on these proposals, please contact Natasha Southam ([email protected]) in our private client team for further advice. The information contained in this article is provided for informational purposes only and should not be construed as legal advice on any subject matter. No recipients of content from this article, clients or otherwise, should act or refrain from acting on the basis of any content included in the article without seeking the appropriate legal or other professional advice. The content of this article contains general information and may not reflect current legal developments, verdicts or settlements.

From 1988 - 2019, Ms Norton and Rex Gardner were in an on-off relationship and had two children together. In 1998, they bought a property – ‘Blindman’s Lane’ – in joint names, the purchase price being funded principally by a joint mortgage. The deposit was a joint gift from Mr Gardner’s father and the final completion monies were paid from the joint account to which they had both contributed. In 2001, Blindman’s Lane was sold and ‘Bay Tree Cottage’ was purchased, this time in Rex Gardner’s sole name, because – Ms Norton then understood - her poor credit rating meant that she could not be on the mortgage or, it followed, the legal title. The balance of the purchase monies derived from the sale proceeds of Blindman’s Lane. Both properties were bought and occupied as family homes. The judgment, which rewards reading, can be found  here. The legal principles The law in this area is to be found in the House of Lords (now Supreme Court) decisions in Stack v Dowden (2007) and Jones v Kernott (2011) and the relevant principles deduced from them are as follows: 1. ‘Just as the starting point where there is sole legal ownership is sole beneficial ownership, the starting point where there is joint legal ownership is joint beneficial ownership. The onus is upon the person seeking to show that the beneficial ownership is different from the legal ownership. So in sole ownership cases it is upon the non-owner to show that he has any interest at all. In joint ownership cases, it is upon the joint owner who claims to have other than a joint beneficial interest.’ 2. The court will determine this by ascertaining ‘the parties' shared intentions, actual, inferred or imputed, with respect to the property in the light of their whole course of conduct in relation to it.’ Pausing there, Mr Gardner had the burden of proving that Blindman’s Lane was beneficially his alone and Ms Norton of proving that she had a share (and, if so, its extent) in Bay Tree Cottage. 3. Where there is an express agreement as to the beneficial ownership – ‘however imperfectly remembered and however imprecise their terms may have been’ - the court will give effect to it. 4. ‘Each case will turn on its own facts. Many more factors than financial contributions may be relevant to divining the parties' true intentions. These include: any advice or discussions at the time of the transfer which cast light upon their intentions then; the reasons why the home was acquired in their joint names; the reasons why (if it be the case) the survivor was authorised to give a receipt for the capital moneys; the purpose for which the home was acquired; the nature of the parties' relationship; whether they had children for whom they both had responsibility to provide a home; how the purchase was financed, both initially and subsequently; how the parties arranged their finances, whether separately or together or a bit of both; how they discharged the outgoings on the property and their other household expenses. When a couple are joint owners of the home and jointly liable for the mortgage, the inferences to be drawn from who pays for what may be very different from the inferences to be drawn when only one is owner of the home. The arithmetical calculation of how much was paid by each is also likely to be less important. It will be easier to draw the inference that they intended that each should contribute as much to the household as they reasonably could and that they would share the eventual benefit or burden equally. The parties' individual characters and personalities may also be a factor in deciding where their true intentions lay. In the cohabitation context, mercenary considerations may be more to the fore than they would be in marriage, but it should not be assumed that they always take pride of place over natural love and affection. At the end of the day, having taken all this into account, cases in which the joint legal owners are to be taken to have intended that their beneficial interests should be different from their legal interests will be very unusual.’ 5. The claimant must have acted to their detriment in reliance upon the common intention, to justify the intervention of the court. The judgment In his judgment, HHJ Monty KC confirmed his broad acceptance of Ms Norton’s evidence: ‘In general, Ms Norton struck me as doing her best to recall events which mainly took place a long time ago.’ In contrast, ‘I found Mr Gardner to be much less satisfactory as a witness’, describing his evidence on various aspects of his defence as ‘wholly incredible’, ‘clearly untrue and embarrassing’, before concluding: ‘Overall, I found Mr Gardner to be an untruthful witness. I do not accept his evidence, where it differs from that of Ms Norton, unless it is corroborated by a contemporaneous document or is plainly on balance likely to be correct – and those instances were few and far between. In particular, in relation to the crucial questions of ownership, I prefer Ms Norton’s version of events.’ The Judge found that Mr Gardner had failed to discharge the burden of proving that Blindman’s Lane was owned other than jointly and equally, meaning that money of which Ms Norton was the joint owner had been rolled over into the purchase of Bay Tree Cottage. Establishing detriment was straightforward: her half share of Blindman’s Lane alone was sufficient. As to why Bay Tree Cottage was purchased in Mr Gardner’s name: ‘I am satisfied that Ms Norton was not told the truth – indeed, she was lied to – by Mr Gardner over whether she could be an owner…. I am also entirely satisfied that there was an express discussion between Mr Gardner and Ms Norton to the effect that she was not going to be a mortgagor or on the title because of the supposed (in fact, non-existent) problems with her credit rating but that did not affect the understanding and agreement between them that the property was in fact owned by them both, just as Blindman’s Lane had been.’ Conclusion Given the facts and the law, why did Mr Gardner defend all the way to trial a claim he was very likely to lose, with the result that his own share of Bay Tree Cottage will now be largely consumed in legal costs, his own and Ms Norton’s? Only he can answer that question, but the truth may be found in comments made by Baroness Hale in Stack v Dowden, salutary advice applicable to all litigants in highly charged disputes, particularly those arising from relationship breakdowns: ‘In family disputes, strong feelings are aroused when couples split up. These often lead the parties, honestly but mistakenly, to reinterpret the past in self-exculpatory or vengeful terms. They also lead people to spend far more on the legal battle than is warranted by the sums actually at stake. A full examination of the facts is likely to involve disproportionate costs. In joint names cases it is also unlikely to lead to a different result unless the facts are very unusual.’ Author: John Melville-Smith

UK media has recently covered the news that Diane Culligan, the founder of the UK women’s national football team, the Lionesses, “has triumphed in a divorce row involving a £7 million home in north London.” (The Times). Mr Justice MacDonald ordered that Mr and Ms Culligan should be awarded about £13.7 million each in assets, allowing for an equal division of the matrimonial assets. Ms Culligan would receive the family home, and her former husband would get the other properties and the bulk of his business interests. The couple married in 1992 and have three children. The judge acknowledged that “on the face of it, it is difficult to see how the wife’s current needs as a single person extend to a nine-bedroom, seven-bathroom property”. However, he recognised her emotional connection to the family home, adding that “a fair distribution of the assets can be achieved without the need to sell” the property. Usually, the former matrimonial or family home (“FMH”) is the most valuable matrimonial asset that couples have, both financially and emotionally. Deciding what will happen to the FMH is one of the more sensitive and contentious issues divorcing couples face. Ms Culligan was fortunate in that there were surplus matrimonial assets to allow her to retain the FMH, whilst still leaving enough for her spouse to retain an appropriate share of the family assets overall. In other cases, however, deciding what happens to the FMH in a divorce can be more complex. The Law The FMH is considered a matrimonial asset and therefore forms part of the matrimonial pot that is up for division on a divorce. It is important to understand that both parties have a financial interest in the FMH. This is regardless of circumstances where for example, one spouse purchased the FMH prior to marriage, one spouse contributed more to its purchase, or if it is only in one spouse’s sole legal name. The case of RM v WP [2024] EWFC 191 (B) highlights that a property owned prior to marriage can become a matrimonial asset if it is used as a family home. However, it makes clear that the FMH is not always shared equally. On divorce, the starting point is equality unless there are good reasons to depart from equality, as set out in Section 25(2) of the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973. Therefore, the court can depart from an equal division of matrimonial property, even the FMH, where fairness requires it. Examples Of How The FMH Could Be Dealt With On Divorce The FMH may be sold and the net proceeds divided between the spouses. This is appropriate if: The sale proceeds (along with their mortgage raising capacities) will be sufficient to enable both spouses to purchase a new home. Neither spouse will be able to keep up with the mortgage payments on the FMH. The FMH is the only/largest capital asset of value meaning if one spouse remains in the FMH, the other will not be able to afford to rehouse. The FMH may be transferred to one spouse (one spouse buys out the other’s share). This is appropriate if: The sale proceeds would not be sufficient to enable both spouses to rehouse. The FMH meets the needs of one spouse, usually the primary carer of the children. There are sufficient other assets in the matrimonial pot to compensate the other spouse for the loss of their interest in the FMH. The other spouse has a good income and mortgage raising capacity and so will be able to afford to purchase a new home. A Mesher Order could be ordered, which would postpone the sale of the FMH, allowing the occupying spouse, usually the primary carer, to remain there. The other spouse would then have to wait to realise their interest in the property. The sale of the FMH is postponed until a specified trigger event, such as the youngest child turning 18, after which the house is sold, and the proceeds are divided. This is appropriate if: The spouses agree/the court determines that it would be best for the primary carer to remain in the FMH with the children. There are sufficient other assets in the matrimonial pot to compensate the other spouse and to enable them to rehouse now. The primary carer and children would need a home of a similar size/value if the FMH is sold, but it would be inequitable to order an outright transfer to the primary carer because the FMH is the only major asset of the marriage. Need Advice Deciding What Happens To Your FMH During A Divorce? At Seddons, we have a dedicated team of family law experts who will be able to assist you. Please get in touch. How the Family Home is Treated in a Divorce | Seddons Solicitors

The Rentersʼ Rights Bill has been described by Deputy Prime Minister Angela Raynor as “a wave of bold action” to ensure that all homes are “decent, safe and warm”.  The legislation promises to reform the private rental sector PRS) and will introduce the Decent Homes Standard DHS, long applied in the social housing sector. The government has pledged to reduce nondecent housing by 2030. According to the English Housing Survey 2022 to 2023 published in July 2024, some 3.5million households in England failed to meet the DHS, with some 2.1million homes living with at least one Category 1 hazard and about 1million households living with damp. Private renters are said to be the highest percentage within each category. The DHS is designed to ensure that properties meet minimum standards of health, safety and decency. It will also give local authorities new enforcement powers to require landlords to bring properties up to standard, with fines of up to £30,000, banning orders and tenants will be able to claim up to 24 months back rent as opposed to the 12 months that can currently be claimed. The definition of ‘decent homeʼ is reflected in the Housing Health and Safety Rating System HHSRS) which is a risk-based assessment tool designed to assist local authorities in determining potential risk. There are some 29 Category 1 hazards set out in Schedule 1 of the Housing Health and Safety Rating System England) Regulations 2005 and include mould, damp, asbestos, certain chemicals treatments, carbon monoxide, lead, lack of security, overcrowding, inadequate lighting and heat, noise, lack of personal hygiene, sanitation and drainage, fall hazards (i.e. stairs must be safe, secure, in sound condition, free of defects and projections, well maintained), water supply, fire, electrical hazards and structural issues. The obligation on landlords to meet certain standards and to comply with statutory duties is not new. Since March 2019 landlords were required to comply with the Homes Fitness for Human Habitation) Act 2018. This itself is derived from section 9A of the Landlord and Tenant Act 1985 which imposes a statutory duty on landlords to ensure that the property is free from disrepair, damp and mould, water or sanitation problems and health and safety hazards. Further the HMO licensing regulations require compliance with statutory standards (determined in accordance with the HHSRS) in relation to mandatory HMO licensing as well as additional and selective licencing schemes. The question remains that of compliance and enforcement against defaulting landlords, which is what the Rentersʼ Rights Bill seeks to address, although many remain sceptical as to how this is to be achieved in an already overburdened legal system and the absence of guidance as to how the government proposes to fund this. Awaabʼs Law, which came about following the tragic death of a toddler from excessive mould in his social housing property, imposes a strict timeframe for dealing with damp and mould once reported, but this is not the only category 1 hazard that many are asking the government to address. Richard Blakeway, the Housing Ombudsman, advocates awareness of other ‘toxicʼ materials, crucially lead, which is currently going undetected in the housing market. He argues that lead should be treated as seriously as other hazards such as asbestos, mould and damp. Lead is classed as a pollutant along with asbestos and radon gas. Whilst lead paint and pipes were banned completely in 1978, given the age of UK properties, it is thought that millions of houses in the UK still have antiquated lead pipes systems, lead paint and lead flashing which poses a serious health risk. Richard Blakely and others like him are advocating that the government should look at other hazards whilst the Rentersʼ Rights Bill is still being debated in Parliament. He would like to see a survey of properties to determine the presence of lead in the same way as say the asbestos regulations 2012 imposed obligations on landlords in respect of common parts and public areas. Lead pipes are being replaced both by the water authority and by landlords. Lead paintwork usually only becomes an issue if interfered with. It can be managed but this requires regular inspections, and the risk is where the paintwork is in a poor condition, or it becomes damaged. In those circumstances, it is best removed, and landlords need to take proper care in doing so and comply with current legislation. A prudent landlord, as part of any maintenance scheme, will take steps to investigate the existence of hazards and will act accordingly and promptly to avoid enforcement action by the local authority or more crucially a claim by a tenant for breach of contract, nuisance and negligence. None of this is new but the Renters Rights Bill has highlighted the measures being imposed and the risks to landlords who ignore complaints. Author: Lara Nyman, partner at Seddons

I read with interest an article published in The Times recently which was in relation to the debate over a bid to use police body-worn video camera evidence in domestic violence cases,even when witnesses have withdrawn their allegations. Including such evidence is a significant step in this area and a huge step for victims in terms of how domestic violence cases are dealt with by the police and the justice system. It will hopefully also result in more convictions for perpetrators of domestic violence.  The basis for the police body-worn cameras is that where witnesses (or a victim) withdraw allegations, which is often done out of fear for their own safety, concern over how this will be dealt with or pressure from family or friends, any evidence captured on the camera can be used to support a prosecution. This announcement comes alongside a further change to how initially police calls are handled.  There are now to be specialist advisers dealing specifically with domestic violence situations included within the teams at police 999 control rooms. Again, this shines the spotlight on how domestic violence cases need specialist support from the moment the victim or witness telephones the police to the gathering of evidence, the supporting and questioning of victims and how they are dealt with in the justice system and ultimately how perpetrators are convicted. It is hugely important that along with the practical implementation of specialist measures such as the above along with the Domestic Abuse Act and the foundations that his Act sets out for support at ground and Government level continue to be supported and implemented. Some clients can be trapped within violent relationships and are vulnerable even within their own home. It is crucial for both their safety and the safety of their families that the above measures are taken. This will hopefully allow victims to feel more confident about reporting acts of abuse to the police, they will be dealt with in the right way by a trained specialist which can reduce their own trauma and aid their recovery. The use of police body-worn cameras can provide clearer and more detailed evidence of events, which will result in more convictions, and therefore a future deterrent for perpetrators and a clear message that acts of domestic violence will not be tolerated.  

Winston Churchill wasn’t known for his pacifist tendencies. Neither was he referring to civil litigation when he uttered the above words. However, since the case of Halsey v Milton Keynes General NHS Trust in 2004 - which decided that “to oblige truly unwilling parties to refer their disputes to mediation would be to impose an unacceptable obstruction on their right of access to the court” - pressure on litigating parties to resolve their disputes informally has been steadily growing, underpinned by the increasing willingness of judges to impose costs sanctions, even on parties who are ultimately wholly successful, for failing to attempt settlement without the need for a costly trial. The Halsey decision noted the basic principle that the loser pays the winner’s costs of the litigation. It asserted that a departure from that, on the grounds of a refusal to mediate, could only be justified if the winner acted unreasonably in refusing to agree to it. There was no presumption in favour of mediation, and refusing parties were simply advised to explain their reasoning by reference to certain criteria. The position is now fundamentally different. In 2023, the Court of Appeal handed down its judgment in Churchill v Merthyr Tydfil County Borough Council. The issues revolved around Mr Churchill’s failure to engage in the council’s non-contractual complaints procedure concerning his complaint that Japanese knotweed had encroached from the council’s land onto his own. Instead, he issued proceedings seeking damages for nuisance and the council duly sought a stay, as it had warned him it would do prior to the issue of his claim. The Court of Appeal found against Mr Churchill regarding his failure to utilise the complaints procedure (which it deemed to be a form of alternative dispute resolution (ADR)) and, crucially, held that the court can compel a party to engage in ADR, provided it does not prevent the claimant’s right to proceed to trial (impliedly if the ADR is unsuccessful) and if it is proportionate to achieving the legitimate aim of settling the dispute quickly, fairly and at a reasonable cost. It did not set out fixed principles governing whether a stay should be ordered in future cases. The case has informed a series of important changes in the Civil Procedure Rules, which govern civil claims in the courts of England and Wales. These came into effect on 1 October 2024. Part 1 – ‘the overriding objective’ - now includes the aim of "promoting or using alternative dispute resolution" and it gives the court the powers of "ordering or encouraging the parties to use, and facilitating the use of, alternative dispute resolution”. More importantly still, the court’s case management powers now contain a specific provision permitting the court to “order the parties to engage in alternative dispute resolution.” In addition to the usual directions concerning the exchange of documentary evidence and witness statements, the court will now consider “whether to order or encourage the parties to engage in alternative dispute resolution”. Finally, following judgment, when costs come to be dealt with and the parties’ conduct must be considered in determining what costs order to make, the court will have regard, among other things, to “whether a party failed to comply with an order for alternative dispute resolution, or unreasonably failed to engage in alternative dispute resolution.” A refusal to mediate, or a failure to respond to a proposal to mediate, will almost invariably be seen by the court as unreasonable. It remains to be seen exactly how the courts will use their new powers but probable that guidance indicated in Churchill v Merthyr Tydfil will be the starting point. Will courts simply punish offending parties in costs after the event (as they do now)? Or might cases be stayed indefinitely until a mediation has taken place, perhaps against the will of one of the parties? The bottom line Courts like mediation and, except in a very few cases where it may be impractical, they expect parties to suggest it, agree to it, and pursue it with, so far as possible, an open mind. Seddons has a policy of raising it with clients at the outset of a matter, indeed in the retainer letter, and thereafter at appropriate intervals. By and large, clients agree to try. There are good reasons for this. A case settled by way of mediation, especially earlier rather than later in the litigation timetable, can save a fortune in legal costs, particularly for whoever turns out to be the ultimate loser at trial. Uncertainty as to who that will be often impels parties, who may agree on nothing else, to try to mediate the dispute to avoid the risks of trial. The overall success rate of mediation is high, well over 75%. The vast majority settle on the day or shortly thereafter, often contrary to the expectations of a client predicting in advance: “He’ll never settle; he’d rather go down fighting” or similar. Finally, mediation allows the parties to achieve settlement on almost any terms, including ones the court itself could not impose. I am reminded of a case I heard about years ago. It involved a claim, decades before, by the mother of a young man against the local bus company, seeking damages arising out of his death in an accident. The case was not settling. At a meeting arranged to establish why – it wasn’t called mediation in those days - it emerged that all the mother wanted was not to have to see the very same bus that had killed her son passing her house several times each day. The bus company immediately offered to remove it from the route and replace it with a new bus. The case was settled immediately. The court could not have ordered that.