STLAF - Sadsad Tamesis Legal and Accountancy Firm

Atty. Gabriel D. Adora In any legal battle, time is always of the essence. Thus, it is a lawyer’s duty to diligently and seasonably act on any legal matter entrusted by his clients, and he shall not cause or occasion delay in any legal matter before any court, tribunal, or other agency. These duties are codified not only because of the client’s right and desire to obtain speedy justice, but also due to the lapse of a certain period provided by the law, which results in a loss or waiver of the right to prosecute cases. The latter instance is called prescription. Even the most meritorious claims have an expiration date, save for some exceptions. Why is this so? The Supreme Court, in the case of Pablo R. Antonio, Jr. v. Engr. Emilio M. Morales citing U.S. v. Serapio ruled that prescriptive statutes intend to prevent a situation where claims spring up at great distances of time, thereby surprising the parties against whom the claims are filed, at a time when the facts have already become obscure due to defective memories or deaths of witnesses. Thus, the consequence of filing a case beyond the prescriptive period is a dismissal. Applying this to criminal cases, one may imagine a comical situation where a person, in his extreme hunger and desperation as a struggling young man, steals a loaf of bread, then worth Thirty Pesos (P30.00), to prevent his own death due to starvation. Peculiarly, the store owner took this personally and vowed to eventually file a criminal case against the young man at a crucial point in his life. By the grace of the universe, thirty years later, the young man is at the zenith of his career and is now being interviewed by the Judicial and Bar Council in hopes of becoming a judge. Without prescriptive statutes, the store owner may stir controversy by finally filing a criminal case against the judge-to-be. One may argue that no one would mind that case due to the value of the thing stolen. Yet, should the store owner be able to prove it, a crime was indeed committed. Common sense would dictate, however, that the act of the young man thirty (30) years ago should have been cast into oblivion due to the passage of time. Thus, in criminal cases, prescriptive statutes are “not a statute of process, to be scantily and grudgingly applied, but an amnesty, declaring that after a certain time oblivion shall be cast over the offense; that the offender shall be at liberty to return to his country, and resume his immunities as a citizen; and that from henceforth he may cease to preserve the proofs of his innocence, for the proofs of his guilt are blotted out.” Under the law, theft of such value is only considered as a light felony, which are infractions of law, for the commission of which, a penalty of arresto menor (imprisonment of 1 to 30 days) or a fine not exceeding 200 pesos or both is imposed by the Revised Penal Code. For crimes punishable by arresto menor, the prescriptive period is two (2) months from the discovery of the crime. The store owner’s grudge that gave birth to his grand plan is not incentivized by the law. He sorely missed his chance at vindication. Comically as they may have been put, these disquisitions tell us one thing clearly: lawyers should always be aware of and be guided by the prescriptive periods set forth by the law. Otherwise, they run the risk of dealing injustice as the clients who trusted their expertise are sure to be confronted with a dismissal of their cases for being filed beyond the prescriptive period. Looking out for these situations and ensuring compliance with such periods for various kinds of cases are usually within the control of the lawyer—until Corpuz, Jr. v. People (hereinafter referred to as “Corpuz”) came along. The Corpuz case involves the crime of causing slight physical injuries. To cut a long story short, this case involves an altercation in Parañaque between Roberto and a group of three (3) men, namely Pastor, Zamora, and Corpuz, whereby the latter men allegedly inflicted physical injuries upon Roberto on November 25, 2017. On January 08, 2018, Roberto executed his Complaint-Affidavit before the prosecutor’s office. Then, on April 30, 2018, an Information charging the three men with serious physical injuries was filed before the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC). After trial on the merits, the MeTC convicted Corpuz of slight physical injuries and acquitted Pastor and Zamora for failure of the evidence to show their participation. Corpuz elevated this case up to the Supreme Court on the issue of prescription, stating that he should be acquitted since the prescriptive period for the subject offense had already lapsed. The Supreme Court ruled in favor of Corpuz and acquitted him, stating that indeed, the crime had already prescribed. Generally, in criminal cases, the prescriptive period stops running when proceedings are instituted against the person being accused of the commission of a crime. Bearing that in mind, the crime committed by Corpuz is slight physical injuries. Under the Revised Penal Code, it is a light offense; thus, similar to the example given above, the crime is punishable for two (2) months. In the Corpuz case, the material dates are as follows: (1) the altercation in Parañaque happened on November 25, 2017, (2) Roberto filed his Complaint-Affidavit before the prosecutor’s office on January 08, 2018, thus officially instituting proceedings against Corpuz and his cohorts. From this, it is easily surmisable that Roberto filed the case within the prescriptive period of two (2) months, if the general rule is taken into consideration. So why did the Supreme Court say that the crime had already been prescribed? The Supreme Court said that the crime of slight physical injuries is clearly governed by the Rules on Summary Procedure being punishable by arresto menor, and such Rules provide that criminal cases falling within its scope can only be commenced by the filing of an Information in court and not by the filing of a Complaint-Affidavit to institute proceedings against the person accused of the commission of a crime. Section 11 of the Revised Rules on Summary Procedure states that: SECTION 11. How Commenced. — The filing of criminal cases falling within the scope of this Rule shall be either by complaint or by information: Provided, however, that in Metropolitan Manila and in Chartered Cities, such cases shall be commenced only by information, except when the offense cannot be prosecuted de oficio. (emphasis supplied). The Supreme Court succinctly explained, in relation to such section, that “in Metropolitan Manila and in Chartered Cities, prescriptive period is tolled only by the filing of an Information in court and not by the commencement of a preliminary investigation by the investigating body nor the institution of the complaint with the investigating body.” It is important to note at this juncture that while Roberto filed his Complaint-Affidavit before the prosecutor’s office in Parañaque City within the prescriptive period, the investigating prosecutor was only able to file the Information in court on April 30, 2018. A plain reading of the Rules would indeed clearly dictate that if the reckoning period were the date of the filing of Information in court, the crime would indeed be prescribed. To the author, this creates a new hurdle for lawyers who put their best foot forward in the service of their clients. Corpus and its cited case Republic v. Desierto placed a new variable to consider (and deeply contemplate) in determining the outcome and progress of their cases covered by the Revised Rules of Summary Procedure: when will the Information be filed in court? This is a variable that is beyond the control of the lawyer and his client. The Supreme Court even addresses this in Corpus in this wise: “To be clear, we are fully aware of the unfortunate outcome of this ruling to the private complainant who rightfully seeks legal redress. Indeed, it is not the failure of the complainant, but that of the prosecutor’s office to timely file the Information before the court, which necessarily results in the dismissal of the case against Pastor.” Be that as it may, the Supreme Court had addressed the matter before in the case of Zaldivia v. Judge Reyes, Jr.: “The Court realizes that under the above interpretation, a crime may prescribe even if the complaint is filed seasonably with the prosecutor’s office if, intentionally or not, he delays the institution of the necessary judicial proceedings until it is too late. However, that possibility should not justify a misreading of the applicable rules beyond their obvious intent as reasonably deduced from their plain language. The remedy is not a distortion of the meaning of the rules but a rewording thereof to prevent the problem here sought to be corrected.” (emphasis supplied) In his practice, the author had personally witnessed the dismissal of criminal cases in court due to prescription, with the honorable judges applying the doctrines in Corpus and Desierto. One may therefore ask: what happens to those cases that are still pending before the Office of the City/Provincial Prosecutor even before these cases were published? How about cases pending before the Department of Justice which have been elevated via a Petition for Review—since the Information for cases covered by the Revised Rules on Summary Procedure (like Violations of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22) have not yet been filed by the investigating prosecutor? It must also be noted that procedural laws such as the Rules on Summary Procedure may apply retroactively as long as the effects thereof are favorable to the accused and that the said accused is not a habitual delinquent. Bearing this principle in mind, the answer to those questions, for now, is simply that all such cases will befall the same fate of dismissal due to prescription. To the mind of the author, it is quite difficult to accept, much less to confront the client with, the reality that this is the law, that is how it has been interpreted, and that there is nothing that can be done. The author looks back at Zaldivia, and while he agrees that a rewording of the Rules is proper, he is likewise at a crossroads in determining whether it would indeed be a distortion of the meaning of the Rules to provide a different interpretation. The author trusted that in due time, he, along with many others who may have been thinking about the same matters, would find satisfaction in how the law and these Rules had been dispensed with justice. However, it did not take too long before the Supreme Court abandoned its rulings on prescription in Corpuz, Jr. and Desierto. In the recent case of People v. Consebido, the Supreme Court, sitting en banc, recognized the reality that the prompt resolution of cases, though ideal, may not always be the reality: “With this dilemma, the Court takes this opportunity to pronounce that the filing of the complaint before the prosecution office and the conduct of the summary investigation should toll the running of the prescriptive period. While it is ideal that all cases are resolved promptly, the reality is that this is not done at all times, whether for valid reasons or not. The offended party, which is primarily the State, should not be prejudiced by any delay in the conduct of the preliminary investigation even for cases covered by summary procedure. The Court reiterates its reasoning in People v. Olarte that “it is unjust to deprive the injured party of the right to obtain vindication on account of delays that are not under his control. All that the victim of the offense may do on his part to initiate the prosecution is to file the requisite complaint.” Recognizing possible delays during preliminary investigation, the Supreme Court laid down the proper recourse for the respondent: “As explained in Panaguiton, Jr. and reiterated in Desierto, the injured party, i.e., the government, should not be penalized for the delays in the investigation even if the complaint is timely filed. If there is undue delay in the preliminary investigation, what should be invoked by the accused is the violation of their right to speedy disposition of cases under Article III, Section 16 of the Constitution and not the prescription of the offense.” The Supreme Court likewise held that the most favorable interpretation to the accused should be adopted with respect to laws on the prescription of crimes. Hence, the ruling in Consebido applies prospectively: “As pointed out by Chief Justice Gesmundo during the deliberation, the prescriptive period of a penal provision is an amnesty granted by the State in favor of the defendant. It is a surrender by the State of its right to prosecute and, as such, a liberal construction in favor of the defendant is proper. xxx xxx But in line with the time-honored principle that the interpretation that is most favorable to the accused should be adopted with respect to laws on prescription of crimes, this new rule shall apply prospectively.” To the author, this ruling corrected what may have been perceived as an inequitable rule. It realigns jurisprudence with the principles of fairness and access to justice, while still considering the favorable interpretation of the law that must be afforded to the accused. Likewise, the current rule on the issue is once more aligned with previously decided cases by the Supreme Court such as People v. Olarte, Francisco v. People, Reodica v. Court of Appeals and People, Cabelic v. Judge Geronimo, People v. Bautista. For reference, in Bautista, citing Olarte, the Supreme Court held: “The Office of the Prosecutor miserably incurred some delay in filing the information but such mistake or negligence should not unduly prejudice the interests of the State and the offended party. As held in People v. Olarte, it is unjust to deprive the injured party of the right to obtain vindication on account of delays that are not under his control. All that the victim of the offense may do on his part to initiate the prosecution is to file the requisite complaint.” Be that as it may, the author cannot help but think that the shift from Corpuz, Jr. and Desierto to Consebido shows the fragility of precedent in our jurisdiction, which affects real life. In the years when Corpuz, Jr. and Desierto governed, cases were in fact dismissed on the ground that prescription was not tolled by the filing of a complaint before the prosecutor, as mentioned earlier. For the complainants in those cases, the Supreme Court’s reversal in Consebido comes too late. What relief can these complainants take from the assurance that the doctrine has now been changed, when their own pursuit of justice has already been cut short? What also crosses the mind of the author is possibly a broader concern in the Philippine legal landscape: the predictability of the law. Lawyers advise clients, chart litigation strategies, and even discuss settlements based on the stability of jurisprudence. If rulings can change from one interpretation to another within a few years, then there is a tendency for the law to become less a rule to be relied upon and more a moving target. The more difficult question, then, is whether justice is being fairly administered when outcomes turn not on the merits of a case but on the timing of its resolution. A complainant whose case was dismissed under Corpuz, Jr. finds himself without recourse, while a similarly situated complainant today benefits from Consebido. Can it truly be said that justice has been equally dispensed when the rights of parties depend on which version of the doctrine happens to prevail at the time of filing? The stability of judicial precedents is a condition that gives legitimacy to certain conduct and decisions. While abandoning previously erroneous rulings is part of the Court’s role, the perceived cost of repeated doctrinal shifts is heavily borne by the very people the justice system is meant to protect. These are important considerations that lawyers must keep in mind, as they continue to advocate for their clients’ causes, in the quest of justice. In all of these musings, the author remembers passages of one notable case that, for him, explains justice in a beautiful manner. The author most respectfully quotes the Supreme Court, speaking through the brilliant Justice Isagani A. Cruz, in Alonzo v. IAC: “The question is sometimes asked, in serious inquiry or in curious conjecture, whether we are a court of law or a court of justice. Do we apply the law even if it is unjust or do we administer justice even against the law? Thus queried, we do not equivocate. The answer is that we do neither because we are a court both of law and of justice. We apply the law with justice for that is our mission and purpose in the scheme of our Republic.” xxx xxx “…we test a law by its results; and likewise, we may add, by its purposes. It is a cardinal rule that, in seeking the meaning of the law, the first concern of the judge should be to discover in its provisions the intent of the lawmaker. Unquestionably, the law should never be interpreted in such a way as to cause injustice as this is never within the legislative intent. An indispensable part of that intent, in fact, for we presume the good motives of the legislature, is to render justice.Thus, we interpret and apply the law not independently of but in consonance with justice. Law and justice are inseparable, and we must keep them so. To be sure, there are some laws that, while generally valid, may seem arbitrary when applied in a particular case because of its peculiar circumstances. In such a situation, we are not bound, because only of our nature and functions, to apply them just the same, in slavish obedience to their language. What we do instead is find a balance between the word and the will, that justice may be done even as the law is obeyed.” xxx xxx “More than twenty centuries ago, Justinian defined justice “as the constant and perpetual wish to render every one his due.” That wish continues to motivate this Court when it assesses the facts and the law in every case brought to it for decision. Justice is always an essential ingredient of its decisions. Thus when the facts warrants, we interpret the law in a way that will render justice, presuming that it was the intention of the lawmaker, to begin with, that the law be dispensed with justice. So we have done in this case.” It is hoped and prayed by the author that through zealous and enthusiastic legal representation, lawyers can aid in the administration of justice and in rendering everyone his/her due.

Atty. Carlo Artemus V. Diaz Code and Creation: The Rise of Machine-Made Art In 2023, an AI-generated image won a prestigious art competition, igniting a controversy that is now burning through the foundations of copyright law.1 This development has raised profound questions about creativity, intellectual property, and the role of technology in the arts. For context, artworks generated or “imagined” using artificial intelligence, commonly known as “AI Art”, are those usually created through automated learning models similar to the neural networks of humans. These AI systems analyze and pour through vast datasets of images, learn artistic styles, and generate arguably original compositions based on whatever prompts a user desires. An example is DALL-E 2, a neural network that generates images from phrases. Today, the rapid evolution of AI art has been driven by advancements in deep learning, such as GANs (Generative Adversarial Networks) and diffusion models, which have significantly improved AI’s ability to replicate human creativity. Initially, AI-generated art merely involved basic alterations and edits, but today, AI can produce hyper-realistic images, unique digital paintings, and even interactive or animated artworks. Take for example, ChatGPT and MetaAI’s image generator models, where all you have to do is ask the AI model to imagine a scene and even offer alterations post generation. Mobile phone applications such as PhotolabAI, Photo Room, and Face App even allows you to seamlessly swap a subject’s face with that of a prominent individual or character, creating an uncanny realism. Recently, with Adobe Photoshop’s AI integration, graphic artists can effortlessly add elements like smoke, sunlight, and other elemental effects, including adding a background to an otherwise plain photograph as if the subject was really taken in such an environment. Needless to say, while this transformation and technological advancements have revolutionized digital creativity, these however raised questions about authorship, copyright, and the role of human artists in an AI-assisted world. The Problem With the foregoing, we are now led to the core issue, which is the glaring inadequacy of existing copyright law, originally designed for human-created works, to fully address the complexities of AI-generated content. This policy gap inevitably leads us to a legal and ethical crisis regarding authorship, ownership, and the very definition of creativity. Thus, this requires urgent reforms to copyright law and the development of a new legal framework that can properly account for the unique challenges of AI-generated content. Authorship, Ownership, and Creation of Art in the Status Quo Before we dive into the complexities or lack thereof with respect to AI Art vis-à-vis copyright laws, let us re-establish our rudimentary knowledge in basic intellectual property rights principles. Here in the Philippines, for us to begin understanding copyright law, more specifically in the aspects of authorship, originality, and creation of art or artworks, we should set our sights towards the Intellectual Property Code of the Philippines (IPC). Talking about ownership of artistic works, Section 178.1 of the IPC states that “subject to the provisions of this Code, the author of a literary or artistic work is the owner of the copyright therein.” This is further classified into (a) works created during employment; (b) commissioned works; and (c) those under joint authorship. For those works created in the course of employment, Section 178.3 of the IPC provides that states that works created by an author for an employer in the course of employment are presumed to be owned by the employer, unless there is an agreement stating otherwise. However, as a form of protection, the creator’s moral rights as provided for under Article 193 of the IPC remain with them, meaning they still have the right to claim authorship and object to any modifications that could harm their reputation. As to commissioned works, Section 178.4 simply provides that if a work is commissioned by a person or entity, the copyright belongs to the creator, unless there is a written agreement transferring ownership to the commissioner. This means that if an artist is hired to produce content, they retain copyright ownership and enjoy all the protection thereon as provided for under Sections 177, which provides for the rights to reproduce, distribute, publicly display, and create derivative works, and Section 193 of the IPC, as earlier discussed. The only exception here is when the artist explicitly signs over their rights. Stated otherwise, Section 178.4 protects artists, ensuring they have control over their work unless otherwise agreed upon in writing. For those artistic works created by joint authorship or that which was created by two or more artists, in this context, while the IPC did not explicitly detail the sharing of ownership per se, the IPC recognizes joint authorship. In this regard, the basic principles of co-ownership under the New Civil Code would apply, meaning to say that co-authors share rights in the work. With respect to ownership, and apart from those provided for by Articles 177 and 193 of the IPC, so long as you qualify for a copyright under the law, it further provides protection in providing that the duration of the copyright shall be during the lifetime of the creator plus fifty (50) years thereafter.5 Having known the genesis of copyrights, which is generally upon the creation of the copyrightable work, we are faced with another important concept. The concept of originality. Originality is indispensable in order to fall within the protection of copyright laws. In fact, the IPC tacitly tells us that a work must be independently created. While the terms “originality” or “original” are not explicitly and fully defined, the law makes it clear that copies of existing works are not protected. Section 172.1 of the IPC lists the works that are copyrightable, and the implication of that list, is that the works must be original. In fact, Section 175 enumerates those which are not protected by copyright, such as any idea, procedure, system, method or operation, concept, principle, discovery or mere data as such, even if they are expressed, explained, illustrated or embodied in a work. This clearly delineates the difference between uncopyrightable ideas and copyrightable expressions. To be sure, the IPC follows the universal copyright doctrine that ideas are free for all, but their specific expression is protected. This safeguards creators’ rights while promoting innovation and knowledge-sharing. A Constant Catch-Up: Copyright Law and Technological Advancements Copyright law has perpetually found itself in a reactive dance with technological innovation. From the advent of digital music to the complexities of artificial intelligence, the law strives to maintain relevance, often finding itself trailing behind the rapid pace of progress. The digital revolution, for instance, dramatically altered the landscape of music consumption. The emergence of MP3s and streaming services necessitated legal adaptations like the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA), attempting to curb online piracy and establish licensing frameworks. However, the sheer scale of digital distribution and the inherent ease of replication through file-sharing applications and websites such as BitTorrent, MuTorrent, and others of the like it posed unprecedented enforcement challenges, revealing the limitations of traditional copyright paradigms. Similarly, the practice of sampling in music, where existing recordings are incorporated into new works like Kygo’s remix of Whitney Houston’s “Higher Love” or David Guetta’s “Blue” featuring Sia, which was an iteration of Eiffel 65’s “Blue (Da Ba Dee)”, has all tested the boundaries of copyright. While legal precedents and licensing agreements have emerged, the determination of “fair use” remains a contentious issue, particularly in an era where vast libraries of music are readily accessible. Thus, measures like the DMCA transformed from preventing piracy into curbing the rights of users to fair use, which creates a chilling effect against freedom of expression. The internet itself has fundamentally reshaped the dissemination of copyrighted material. Copyright law has extended its reach to encompass online content, but the global and decentralized nature of the web presents formidable enforcement hurdles. User-generated content and social media platforms further blur the lines of copyright ownership, demanding a nuanced approach that balances protection with freedom of expression. As these complex issues continue to evolve, policy-makers must strive to uphold the core principles of copyright law while adapting to the realities of the digital age. More recently, the rise of artificial intelligence has introduced a new frontier of legal uncertainty. The creation of AI-generated works and the use of copyrighted material for AI training raise fundamental questions about authorship and ownership. While legal systems are beginning to grapple with these issues, the rapid evolution of AI technology continues to outpace regulatory frameworks. Ultimately, copyright law’s ability to effectively adapt to technological advancements hinges on its capacity to strike a delicate balance between protecting the rights of creators and fostering innovation in an ever-evolving digital world. The rise of artificial intelligence has introduced a new frontier of legal uncertainty that poses significant challenges for copyright law. As AI systems become increasingly sophisticated in generating original content, the question of authorship and ownership has become increasingly complex. On one hand, AI-generated works may not be considered the product of human creativity, potentially undermining the traditional notion of authorship. On the other hand, the training of AI models often relies on the use of copyrighted material, raising concerns about the unauthorized exploitation of protected works. Legal systems around the world are grappling with these issues, but the rapid pace of technological advancements continues to outpace regulatory frameworks. In some cases, courts have struggled to determine whether AI-generated works are eligible for copyright protection, or whether the use of copyrighted data for AI training constitutes fair use or infringement. Ultimately, the ability of copyright law to effectively adapt to these technological changes will depend on its capacity to strike a delicate balance. Policymakers and legal experts must carefully consider the rights of creators, the need to foster innovation, and the public interest in accessing and utilizing AI-powered technologies. This will require a nuanced approach that takes into account the unique challenges posed by AI, while ensuring that the fundamental principles of copyright law remain relevant and effective in the digital age. AI-Generated Creations and Copyright: Navigating Legal Gray Areas The rise of artificial intelligence (AI) in creative fields has raised complex legal questions regarding authorship, originality, and ownership. While it may be conceded that copyright laws worldwide generally require human authorship, AI-generated works pose a great challenge against traditional legal frameworks. This has been manifested in different jurisdictions have taken varying approaches, leading to legal uncertainty. In answering the question of who the author of an AI-generated art is, whether it is the AI developer, the user, or the AI itself, copyright law traditionally grants rights to human creators. However, with the addition of AI-generated content comes into play, the principle is much more complicated than we would like it to be, and different jurisdictions adopt varying positions. Insofar as the Philippines is concerned, and under the IPC, copyright protection is granted to original intellectual creations in the literary and artistic domain. This, therefore, implies that only natural persons can be authors, as it refers to the rights of “the author” and does not mention non-human creators and AI-generated works, created without human intervention, are not eligible for copyright protection. As of now, the Supreme Court has not ruled on cases specifically addressing the ownership of AI-generated works. However, the Intellectual Property Office of the Philippines (IPOPHL) has acknowledged the challenges posed by AI in the realm of intellectual property. IPOPHL emphasizes the need for ongoing evaluation of legal frameworks to address the complexities arising from AI-generated content. Juxtaposed with other jurisdictions, in the United States, for example, the U.S. Copyright Office (USCO) maintains that AI-generated works are not copyrightable unless they involve significant human input. This has been enunciated in the case of Thaler v. Perlmutter (2023)7, the court ruled that AI-generated art without human intervention cannot receive copyright protection. In China, fully autonomous AI works are not copyrightable. The National Copyright Administration of China (NCAC) ruled in 2023 that AI-generated content may be protected if it involves original human creativity. Having a grasp of the concept of “originality”, the conundrum arises when it comes to AI-generated works. We know, and basic copyright law requires originality. However, we know that AI operates by analyzing and replicating existing datasets. So where do we draw the line? In Pacita Habana, et al. v. Felicidad C. Robles, et al.8 the Philippine Supreme Court discussed copyright infringement concerning educational books. Although it delves deeply into “substantial reproduction,” it inherently addresses the necessity of an “original work” for copyright protection to exist.  In this case, the court’s examination of whether portions of a book were “lifted, copied, plagiarized” directly involves the concept of whether the material was genuinely the author’s original creation. While the case also discusses whether or not the copied portions were from common sources, and therefore not subject to copyright, this discussion also touches on the concept of what makes something original. If the work is simply a copy of a common source, then it lacks originality. In the U.S., its Supreme Court, in Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Co. (1991)9, ruled that originality requires minimal creativity and independent human authorship. Since AI lacks human intent, fully AI-generated works may not qualify. Needless to state, without clear copyright protection, AI-generated works face ownership and licensing challenges. The Legal and Ethical Crossroads of AI-Generated Art All told, there is no doubt that the rapid rise of artificial intelligence in the creative sphere has put us into an inevitable legal and ethical crossroads that copyright law is ill-equipped to navigate. As AI-generated art becomes more sophisticated, more advanced, more “human-like”, it raises profound questions about authorship, ownership, and the definition of creativity itself. Copyright laws, designed to protect human intellectual labor, currently struggle to accommodate AI-assisted works. In jurisdictions like the Philippines, the Intellectual Property Code (IPC) grants copyright protection exclusively to natural persons, leaving fully autonomous AI creations in legal limbo. This legal uncertainty presents pressing challenges that demand immediate attention. Without clear regulations, AI-generated content may be freely exploited, potentially undermining human artists and content creators. Moreover, the ease with which AI replicates artistic styles raises ethical concerns about plagiarism and the unauthorized use of existing copyrighted works in AI training datasets. As AI continues to push the boundaries of creative expression, the future of art and copyright depends on proactive legal adaptation. To navigate this uncharted territory, legislative reforms must be taken. Copyright laws must be amended to define AI-assisted authorship and establish clear protections. So also, Ethical AI use Regulations incorporating safeguards against deepfakes, plagiarism, and unauthorized AI reproductions must be immediately formulated and adopted. In the same vein, Fair Ownership Standards ensuring that human artists are credited and compensated when their works are used in AI training datasets must be given attention. Public Awareness and Advocacy must also be given premium, and that legal professionals, artists, and policymakers should mandatorily be educated about AI’s impact on intellectual property rights. Lastly, but most importantly, in view of the varying principles regarding the treatment of AI art, there must be a strong international cooperation in order to develop harmonized global standards for AI-generated works to prevent jurisdictional inconsistencies. The future of creativity will not be defined by AI alone, but by how societies choose to regulate, protect, and adapt to its influence. Will copyright law evolve to accommodate machine-generated content, or will human creativity remain the sole pillar of artistic authorship? Will the concept of “originality” and the concomitant ownership of original works be forever altered to address the fast-rising trend of utilizing AI tools. The answer lies in the urgent need to rethink the intersection of technology, law, and artistic integrity in the digital age.