Agrud Partners

INTRODUCTION The airline industry is unpredictable by nature, and financial instability often ends with declaration of insolvency. As airlines are handled with very thin margins of profit, even minor disturbances like a rise in fuel prices, changes in governing regulations or failures in supply changes can cause financial distress.[1] Go First Airlines has recently gone into insolvency, and this has again brought to light gaps in the Indian legal framework regarding airline bankruptcies, specifically regarding rights of lessors. A significant concern in airline insolvencies is the imposed moratorium under the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 (“IBC”).[2] This does not allow aircraft lessors to reclaim their assets, and leaves them helpless for months or even years. This has decreased the confidence of investors in the Indian aviation sector, and led to questions about compliance with various international treaties, like the Cape Town Convention.[3] Apart from financial concerns, a neglected angle of airline insolvency is data privacy concerns. A mammoth amount of passenger data is stored by airlines, and this data can be misappropriated, released or even sold without the customer’s knowledge or consent. A pertinent example in this regard would be the Jet Airways insolvency where the personal frequent flying data of the customer was treated as an asset. BACKGROUND AND CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK Airlines encounter high costs of operation, dependence on fluctuating fuel prices, hurdles due to regulators, and high competition, all of which make them susceptible to insolvency.[4] The Indian aviation sector has already seen multiple airlines fail, with some of the most notable instances being Kingfisher Airlines and Jet Airways, with the most recent being Go First Airlines. The IBC applies to corporate insolvency in India, including airlines. Section 14 of the Code, however, stipulates a moratorium period that does not allow lessors to repossess aircraft on commencement of insolvency proceedings. This has led to disharmony between Indian law and the Cape Town Convention (“CTC”). In the Go First case, lessors could not reclaim their aircraft during the moratorium and this led to major monetary losses and a regulatory predicament. Apart from financial concerns, airline insolvency can cause major data privacy concerns. Airlines have access to sensitive personal data of their passengers, including personal information, financial information and travel histories.[5] In cases like Air India’s data breach in 2021, data of millions of customers was endangered and was unprotected from potential misappropriation.[6] Indian legal frameworks fail to regulate how passenger data is handled after and during the insolvency process, and this leads to fears of unauthorised data transactions. CASE STUDIES Go First Airlines and the Lessors’ Dilemma The insolvency of Go First Airlines, filed before the National Company Law Tribunal (“NCLT”) on May 3, 2023, has underscored the conflict between the IBC, and international aircraft leasing protections. The airline owed more than ₹2,660 crore to lessors, as it operated on a lease-based model. The lessors thus were important stakeholders in the insolvency process.[7] However, Section 14 of the IBC imposed a moratorium, preventing lessors from reclaiming their leased aircraft, even though Go First had defaulted on its payments. This legal conflict created significant financial uncertainty for lessors. India has ratified the CTC, which grants lessors the right to repossess aircraft when airlines default.[8] However, due to the lack of full implementation of CTC through domestic law, the NCLT ruled in favour of IBC provisions, effectively barring lessors from reclaiming their assets. The Delhi High Court later allowed some relief, directing the Directorate General of Civil Aviation (“DGCA”) to deregister certain aircraft, but the damage to investor confidence had already been done.[9] In response, the Indian government issued a notification on October 3, 2023, exempting aircraft leases from the moratorium under IBC.[10] While this amendment aligns India with global standards, it raises new concerns about whether such exemptions should apply retrospectively and how they will affect future insolvency proceedings in the aviation sector.[11] Data Privacy in Airline Insolvency – The Jet Airways Case Beyond financial concerns, data privacy remains a critical gap in India’s airline insolvency framework. As already mentioned, airlines have access to gigantic amounts of passenger data. The Digital Personal Data Protection Act, 2023 (“DPDP”) still does not explicitly provide for how such data should be handled after insolvency. A concerning situation had arisen during the Jet Airways insolvency case in 2019. JetPrivilege, a program set up by the airline for frequent flyers, was weighed as one of its most valuable assets during the insolvency proceedings. It was deliberated whether passenger data from this program was to be treated as a saleable asset. Although the program was actually under the ownership of Etihad Airways and worked in isolation, its customer data was heavily discussed in negotiations. This case highlighted the pitfalls of not having clear restrictions on data monetization in similar cases. This is an alarming privacy risk, and could allow potential acquirers, creditors or lessors access to passenger information without their knowledge or consent. To protect its consumers, India must bring in provisions explicitly forbidding the use of passenger data as a sellable and monetizable asset during bankruptcy or insolvency proceedings. INTERNATIONAL FRAMEWORK There is conflict which exists between IBC and the CTC which has raised concerns about India’s credibility in the global aircraft leasing market.[12] However other international jurisdictions have implemented frameworks that protect lessors’ rights as well ensuring smooth insolvency resolution. United States Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code of the US provides for a balanced approach for IBC, unlike India’s IBC, as the repossession under S.1110 of the US Bankruptcy Code allows lessors to reclaim aircraft within 60 days unless the airlines continues payments.[13] In the American airlines restructuring case of 2011, the airline continued operation under the Bankruptcy protection while renegotiating lease agreements with lessors.[14] Now, moving onto the Data privacy aspect, the US airline passenger data is protected under the Federal Trade commission Act and the state level privacy laws. The sale of customer data is strictly regulated, requiring regular oversight. European Union EU also has a similar provision as that of the US Bankruptcy Code that ensures quick asset recovery for aircraft lessors. The EU regulations 2015/848 on Insolvency proceedings provides that there shall be not automatic suspension of the aircraft leasing contract  upon insolvency, ensuring lessors to recover assets efficiently. The case of Alitalia’s insolvency of 2020 where the lessors were able to successfully repossess the aircraft without prolonged legal dispute serves as a good example.[15] Under Art. 5 of the EU’s General Data Protection Regulation, personal data cannot be transferred or sold without user consent, even in insolvency proceedings. The mere failure of an airline does not give creditors the right to access passenger data, ensuring customer privacy. In the Thomas Cook’s insolvency (2019), data privacy authorities ensured that passenger information was not misused, blocking any unauthorized transfers.[16] The Cape Town Convention The CTC of 2001 is the global treaty safeguarding lessors’ rights in airline insolvency. Over 80 countries have adopted CTC. Under Art. XI (Alternative A), lessors have the option of repossessing an aircraft within a set timeframe is an airline defaults. The timeframe is typically 60 days. GAPS IN THE INDIAN LEGISLATIVE FRAMEWORK Aircraft Lessors’ Rights and the Conflict Between IBC and the Cape Town Convention A key issue in Indian airline insolvency law is the conflict between the IBC and the CTC. The IBC imposes a blanket moratorium under Section 14, preventing lessors from repossessing their aircraft once insolvency proceedings commence. This has led to prolonged legal battles, as seen in the Go First insolvency case, where lessors were unable to reclaim their assets for months. While India ratified CTC in 2008, it has not fully implemented its provisions, particularly Alternative A under Article XI, which allows lessors to repossess aircraft within a fixed timeframe of typically 60 days. Countries like Singapore, China, and the UAE have effectively incorporated CTC, ensuring swift aircraft recovery, whereas Indian courts have continued to prioritize IBC over CTC.[17] The October 3, 2023, notification issued by the Ministry of Corporate Affairs (MCA) exempting aircraft leases from the moratorium partially resolves the issue, but it lacks clarity on retrospective application and may not be sufficient to restore investor confidence.[18] Unless India fully incorporates CTC provisions into domestic law, global lessors may continue to see India as a risky jurisdiction for aircraft leasing. Data Protection Gaps in Airline Insolvency While financial concerns dominate airline insolvency discussions, data privacy is an equally pressing issue. Airlines store massive amounts of passenger data, including personal details, passport information, travel history, and payment data. However, DPDP Act, 2023, lacks specific provisions on how customer data should be handled when an airline goes bankrupt. The Jet Airways insolvency (2019) highlighted concerns about customer data being treated as a saleable asset, with discussions around the valuation of its frequent flyer program (“JetPrivilege”).[19] Without strict laws, there is a real risk that airline data could be misused, either by creditors, lessors, or acquiring entities. FILLING THE GAPS Strengthening India’s Airline Insolvency Framework for Lessors The Go First insolvency case has revealed significant weaknesses in India’s legal approach to airline bankruptcies, particularly regarding aircraft lessors’ rights. The IBC, 2016, imposes a moratorium under Section 14, preventing lessors from repossessing their aircraft, leading to prolonged legal battles and financial uncertainty.[20] Although India ratified this treaty in 2008, there has been no clear implementation of the same in domestic law. Indian Courts routinely prioritise IBC over this convention, and thus lessors could not access aircraft for two months in the Go First case. In regard to these concerns, the Ministry of Corporate Affairs did release a notification dated October 3, 2023 to exempt aircraft leases from the moratorium period.[21] However, the retrospective application and enforcement of this notification are still in question. India has currently lost a lot of investor confidence. Some steps that should be mandatorily considered are as follows: i. Incorporation of the provisions of the CTC into domestic law, and enforcing it such that aircraft lessors can reclaim their assets within two months, as per Alternative A under Article XI of the Convention. ii. Ensuring that Indian courts follow the international trend of upholding leasing protections by letting CTC provisions supersede local insolvency law, as done in China, Singapore and the UAE. iii. Creation of specialized aviation insolvency guidelines within IBC, similar to the Aviation Working Group protocols adopted by other jurisdictions. [22] 2.     Protecting Passenger Data in Airline Insolvency – The Jet Airways Case As previously mentioned, data privacy remains a critical gap in India’s airline insolvency framework. Airlines store large volumes of passenger data, including personal details, travel records, and financial information. However, there is no explicit provision under the DPDP Act, 2023, regulating how passenger data should be handled post-insolvency. With reference to the Jet Airways case, it is important that specific provisions are introduced in the DPDP Act, and it ensures that: Passenger data is not a monetizable or sellable asset during insolvency proceedings. Acquirers, lessors or creditors cannot freely access any databases containing customer information without their explicit and informed consent. CONCLUSION Airline insolvencies affect lessors, passengers, and the aviation sector. The Go First case exposed leasing loopholes, while Jet Airways highlighted risks of monetizing passenger data. India must fully implement the Cape Town Convention and strengthen the DPDP Act to protect lessors and ensure data security, boosting investor confidence [1] Business Today, Why Private Airlines Fail So Often in India, May 3, 2023. [2] The Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016, §14. [3] ICAO, Cape Town Convention and Its Implications for Aircraft Leasing, 2023. [4] The Economic Times, Why Airlines Keep Folding in India’s Booming Market, May 6, 2023. [5] Economic Times, How Airlines Collect and Use Passenger Data: Privacy Risks Explored, June 2021. [6] The Hindu, Air India Data Breach: 4.5 Million Passengers’ Information Compromised, May 2021. [7] Business Today, Go First Files for Bankruptcy, Owes ₹11,000 Crore: Check Debt Breakdown, May 3, 2023. [8] ICAO, Cape Town Convention and Aircraft Leasing Protections, 2023. [9] Delhi High Court, Accipiter Investments Aircraft 2 Ltd. v. Union of India, 2024 SCC OnLine Del 3125. [10] Ministry of Corporate Affairs, S.O. 4321(E): Exemption of Aircraft Leases from IBC Moratorium, October 3, 2023. [11] Economic Times, India’s Aircraft Leasing Market: Impact of the IBC Moratorium Exemption, October 2023. [12] Srinath Sridharan, Why India’s Aviation Sector has Aborted Take-offs for Decades Now, DECCAN HERALD, May 9, 2024, available at https://www.deccanherald.com/opinion/why-indias-aviation-sector-has-aborted-take offs-for-decades-now-3015079 [13] U.S. Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. §1110 – Rights of Aircraft Lessors in Bankruptcy. [14] American Airlines Bankruptcy Case, U.S. Bankruptcy Court, Southern District of New York, 2011. [15] Reuters, Alitalia’s Aircraft Lessors Win Repossession Rights in EU Court, 2021 [16]The Guardian, Thomas Cook Insolvency: Data Protection Authorities Intervene to Prevent Unauthorized Data Transfers, 2019. [17] UNIDROIT, CTC Implementation Status – UAE, China, and Singapore Case Studies, 2023. [18] Ministry of Corporate Affairs, S.O. 4321(E): Exemption of Aircraft Leases from IBC Moratorium, October 3, 2023. [19] Moneycontrol, Jet Airways’ Frequent Flyer Data Considered a Key Asset in Insolvency Proceedings, 2019. [20]  The Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016, §14(1); Go First Fallout: India Considers Passing Cape Town Convention Bill to Comfort Foreign Aircraft Lessors, The Times of India, May 14, 2023. [21] BUSINESS STANDARD, Delhi HC Tells DGCA to Clarify Stand on MCA Notification on Moratorium, October 19, 2023. [22] Aviation Working Group (AWG), Impact of India’s IBC on Aircraft Leasing Market, December 2023.

Introduction With the changing nature of the world, arbitration has emerged as a preferred mode of dispute resolution because it emphasises expediency, party autonomy, and finality. When facing disputes, many businesses choose arbitration instead of courts, because it's typically faster, this is an essential aspect when it comes to time-sensitive business matters. It also gives parties more control over the procedure, manner and flow of the proceedings. The Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 [hereinafter referred to as “A&C Act”] has set out to make this a smooth and workable process and thus sets timelines. S.23 (4),[1] an integral rule, mandates that “the submission of the statement of claim and defence be completed within six months from the date of notice of appointment of the arbitrator(s)”. However, whether the nature of this timeline is mandatory or merely regulatory has led to several discussions and developments in my Indian arbitration jurisprudence. This matters because while it does help in resolving disputes quickly when there are strict deadlines, being too rigid about the same may lead to parties being unable to fully present their case. The key is to find the right balance between speed and fairness. Legal Background The 2015 amendment to the A&C Act introduced S.23 (4) and aimed to streamline arbitral proceedings as part of broader reforms in India.[2] This provision provides for a six-month timeline for the submission of claims and defences, starting from the appointment of the arbitrator(s).  The Parliament’s legislative intent shows an attempt at a considered approach to procedural timelines, which can be inferred by the absence of specified penalties for non-compliance.[3] This lack of prescribed consequences has significant implications for the interpretation of this provision. The framework suggests a nature which is of regulatory rather than mandatory nature. Thus, it positions the timeline as a procedural guideline which promotes speedy resolution while still preserving arbitral discretion. This interpretation is in line with the A&C Act's basic principles of party autonomy and procedural flexibility, which are also important tenets of the field of alternative dispute resolution as a whole. The provision must be analysed within India's broader arbitration policy objectives. The legislative history and intent, particularly the Statement of Objects for the 2015 Amendment, demonstrates a commitment to making India a preferred arbitration jurisdiction through enhanced procedural efficiency. It also showcases a procedural safeguard which exists and attempts to promote effective case management while also preserving the authority of the tribunal to adapt timelines based on the specific needs of the dispute at hand.[4] Judicial Interpretation of Section 23(4) Courts have played a very important role in interpreting S.23(4) of the A&C Act, consistently placing emphasis through their rulings on the idea that timelines must serve arbitration's core tenets of efficiency, party autonomy, and justice. The lack of penalties for missing deadlines, as aforementioned, has also led courts to treat Section 23(4) as a regulatory rather than mandatory provision.[5] In the case of ONGC Petro Additions ltd. v. Ferns Construction Co. Inc,[6] it was established that while timelines promote efficiency, they should in no way compromise justice. Arbitrator’s discretion to adjust deadlines was emphasized, when needed to ensure fairness, and to prevent harm coming to either party. Further, the judgement of the State of Bihar v. Bihar Rajya Bhumi Vikas Bank,[7] solidified this principle, when circumstances warrant, tribunals can excuse delays. This approach of Courts reflects a careful balance between efficiency and fairness. Courts have time and again warned against strict timeline enforcement that might lead to dismissals on mere technical grounds, undermining arbitration’s effectiveness.[8] This interpretation also aligns with the broader principle of limited court intervention in alternative dispute resolution mechanisms, particularly arbitration.[9] This non-mandatory nature of timelines is however, not absolute as the parties must demonstrate good faith and not misuse it to create unnecessary delays. Accordingly, the arbitrators should also exercise their discretion carefully, considering the facts and circumstances specific to each case. Comparative Analysis with International Standards The procedural timelines given under S.23 (4) of the A&C Act can be better understood in lines of standards set in international arbitration. Jurisdictions with well- established and well- developed frameworks, such as the United Kingdom, Singapore, and the United States. The tribunals have great jurisdiction over the setting of timelines and there are no strict guidelines for the same The law which serves as the foundation for India’s arbitration law, the UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration, does not stipulate fixed procedural timelines at all. Instead, everything is left to the discretion of the Tribunal.[10] This is a very flexible approach and is firmly based on the principle of party autonomy, which allows the parties to tailor rules of procedure to the specific needs of their disputes. The Arbitration Act, 1996 of England also lays importance on party autonomy and tribunal discretion, and does not mandate any mandatory timelines like in India.[11] However, the courts in England have held that delays should not affect the efficiency of arbitration negatively. In Soh Beng Tee v. Fairmount Development, the Court stated that procedural rules should ensure fairness without permitting unreasonable delays.[12] Singapore, which is renowned for advanced arbitration practice, has adopted UNICITRAL framework under its International Arbitration Act.[13] The Singapore International Arbitration Centre (SIAC) Rules give tribunals the right to change and alter timelines. This also allows these tribunals to account for facts, circumstances and complexity of case.[14] The Federal Arbitration Act of the United States jurisdiction does not address procedural timelines, and Courts do not usually interfere in the Tribunal’s discretion of power. Arbitrators are bound to make sure of efficient procedure being followed and respecting the party agreements.[15] Mandatory or Directory: The Interpretation of Section 23(4) of the Arbitration & Conciliation Act, 1996 The legislative intent behind the A&C Act is to ensure efficient and expeditious arbitration proceedings. The introduction of statutory timelines under Sections 23(4) and 29A reflects the legislature's intent to curtail delays and promote timely resolution of disputes. Despite this, the interpretation of Section 23(4)—whether it is mandatory or directory—remains a subject of debate Legislative Intent: S. 23(4) of the A&C Act, introduced by the Amendment act of 2019, states that “The statement of claim and defence shall be completed within six months from the date the arbitrator or all arbitrators, as the case may be, received notice, in writing, of their appointment.” Furthermore, this is very much linked S.29 A of the A&C Act, which mandates that the arbitral award in domestic arbitrations must be rendered within 12 months from the completion of pleadings under Section 23(4). The Statement of Objects and Reasons of the 2019 Amendment throws light upon the need for this linkage to ensure expeditious disposal of arbitration cases. Moreover, the High-Level Committee to Review the Institutionalisation of Arbitration Mechanism in India noted that the timelines imposed under Section 29A are uncommon in global arbitration practices, highlighting India’s unique approach for enforcing procedural discipline. Judicial Interpretation: When we look at the court’s interpretation of S.29A, its mandatory nature has been constantly held up. In State of Bihar v. Bihar Rajya Bhumi Vikas Samiti, the SC held that non-compliance with Section 29A extinguishes the arbitrator’s mandate, rendering the proceedings invalid.[16] Furthermore, Telangana HC in Roop Singh Bhatty v. Shriram City Union Finance also concluded that awards issued beyond statutory timelines are null and void.[17] However, the interpretation of Section 23(4) remains less definitive. The Delhi HC in Raj Chawla and Co. Stock and Share Brokers v. Nine Media Information Services Ltd stated that timelines under Section 23(4) are intertwined with the consequences prescribed under Section 29A.[18] The Debate: The language used while framing S.23 (4), reflects prima facie for it to be mandatory, as the term used is “shall”. Furthermore, its connection with S.29A lends more weight to this interpretation, suggesting that the timeline for filing pleadings is crucial for achieving the overall objective of the A&C Act. As observed by the SC in Kailash v. Nankhu, procedural law must be interpreted as a tool to facilitate justice, not as a means to stymie proceedings.[19] The timelines in Order VIII Rule 1 of the CPC were deemed directory, despite their obvious mandatory language, as they did not carry penal consequences. Similarly, if we apply the same reasoning for S.23 (4), it could be construed as directory, allowing procedural flexibility when justice demands. Harmonisation with Section 25: The only potential consequence of non - compliance with S.23(4) can be inferred from S.25 of the A&C Act, which give the Tribunal the authority to terminate proceedings if pleadings are not submitted within prescribed timelines. However, S.25 specifically references Section 23(1), not Section 23(4), suggesting a deliberate legislative distinction. Therefore, this omission raises a solid doubt as to whether S.23 (4) carries the same mandatory character as S.29A. Criticisms and Challenges of Section 23(4) Despite the legislative intent to expedite arbitration proceedings through S.23 (4) of the A&C Act, it has faced criticism and encountered several challenges in its enforcement. Resolving the disputes quickly and expediently and ensuring a fair process, so that no injustice is done are at the two ends of the rope. Firstly, S.23 (4) has a very rigid approach to procedural timelines. This provision mandates the completion of pleadings within six months but it does not explicitly account for the complexities in certain cases, particularly in international or highly technical disputes. Critics argue that the six-month timeline is too short more often, especially when dealing with complex factual matters or when parties are located in different jurisdictions, making the exchange of documents bit tedious. This has led to concerns that the strict enforcement of timelines may result in the denial of justice, as parties may not have sufficient time to fully present their case. Secondly, parties have started to do strategic delays due to the lack of penalties for non-compliance with Section 23(4). The provision’s regulatory nature offers some leeway for extending timelines but there is concern that parties may exploit this flexibility to delay proceedings, especially when there is no clear sanction for failing to meet the deadline. This undermines the objective of expeditious resolution and also to the costs of arbitration, as tribunals are forced to spend additional time managing extensions and delays. Thirdly, the discretion vested in arbitral tribunals under Section 23(4). Even though this discretion is necessary to account for case-specific factors, its broad scope may lead to inconsistent practices across different tribunals. The lack of clear guidelines on when and how delays should be condoned leaves room for subjective decision-making, potentially resulting in unfair outcomes or delays in proceedings.[20] Reform Proposals for Section 23(4) The dynamics of arbitration are evolving, and reforms are needed. The key objective is to uphold the legislative intent of expediting arbitration proceedings while making sure the procedural fairness remains in complex cases. Firstly, the timelines should be extended as it is not pragmatic. The six-month deadline under Section 23(4) for the submission of pleadings may be good for less complex cases. However, it does not allow sufficient time for the submission of claims and defences in intricate matters, especially those with multiple parties or cross-border disputes. Inculcating the power of discretion by the tribunal would allow for a more tailored approach that takes into account the limitations and difficulties of each case.[21] Secondly, to introduce clearer guidelines regarding the discretion of arbitral tribunals. Presently, tribunals have discretion and authority in managing timelines, but this has led to inconsistent practices across different tribunals. A clear and cogent set of criteria for granting extensions, based on factors like the complexity of the case, the parties’ conduct, and external factors like unavoidable circumstances, time zone differences or logistical challenges, should provide less randomization and ensure fairness for all of the parties involved.[22] Thirdly, in some cases, parties delay proceedings on purpose. This could be somewhat solved by imposing penalties upon them, or by restricting them from seeking deadline extensions. Such mandatory guidelines would lead to more strict enforcement, and fewer parties would try to exploit procedural loopholes.[23] Fourthly, including provisions where the tribunal reviews the arbitration process from time to time could be helpful. By mandating that they assess whether the proceedings are moving within the timelines expected, tribunals would be empowered to identify any delays early in the process and could rectify them. This would also lead to speedier disposal of cases.[24] Lastly, submissions could be submitted in phases for particularly difficult and complex cases. The initial pleadings could be submitted within a strict deadline of six months, and detailed submissions could be provided later. This would allow parties to submit all their basic claims and defences to the tribunal and have them placed on record, and would still provide sufficient time for providing more detailed information as evidence.[25] Conclusion Section 23(4) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, has streamlined arbitration timelines but struggles with rigidity, fairness, and case-specific flexibility. Reforms such as extended timelines, clearer tribunal discretion, and strategic delay sanctions are vital to align India’s arbitration framework with global standards, ensuring efficiency, fairness, and adaptability in dispute resolution. [1] Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, § 23(4) (India). [2] Arbitration and Conciliation (Amendment) Act, No. 3 of 2016, Statement of Objects and Reasons, ¶ 1 [3] Justice R.V. Raveendran, Law of Arbitration: Understanding the New Changes, 1(2) IND. J. ARB. L. 45, 49 (2016). [4] Report of the High-Level Committee to Review the Institutionalisation of Arbitration Mechanism in India (2017), ¶ 3. [5] Bharat Aluminium Co. v. Kaiser Aluminium Technical Services Inc., (2012) 9 SCC 552 (India). [6] ONGC Petro Additions Ltd. v. Ferns Construction Co. Inc., 2022 SCC OnLine SC 19 (India) [7] State of Bihar v. Bihar Rajya Bhumi Vikas Bank, 2022 SCC OnLine SC 31 (India). [8] Union of India v. Singh Builders Syndicate, (2009) 4 SCC 523 (India). [10] UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration, art. 19, U.N. Doc. A/40/17, Annex I (1985). [11] Arbitration Act 1996, c. 23, § 34 (Eng.) [12] Soh Beng Tee v. Fairmount Dev., [2007] SGCA 28. [13] International Arbitration Act, Cap. 143A (1994) (Sing.). [14] Singapore Int’l Arbitration Ctr. Rules, Rule 19.9 (2021). [15] Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. §§ 1–16 (1925) (U.S.). [16] State of Bihar v. Bihar Rajya Bhumi Vikas Bank Samiti, (2018) 9 SCC 472. [17] Roop Singh Bhatty v. Shriram City Union Finance, CRP No. 1354 of 2021 (Telangana High Court, Apr. 8, 2022). [18] Raj Chawla and Co. Stock and Share Brokers v. Nine Media Information Services Ltd., 2023/DHC/000580 (Delhi High Court, 2023). [19] Kailash v. Nankhu, (2005) 4 SCC 480. [20] Report of the High-Level Committee to Review the Institutionalisation of Arbitration Mechanism in India (2017), ¶ 4. [21] P.C. Markanda et al., Law Relating to Arbitration and Conciliation in India 148 (10th ed. 2022). [22] Report of the High-Level Committee to Review the Institutionalisation of Arbitration Mechanism in India (2017), ¶ 5. [23] Justice R.V. Raveendran, Law of Arbitration: Understanding the New Changes, 1(2) IND. J. ARB. L. 45, 58 (2016). [24] K.K. Venugopal, Arbitration in India: A Long Road Ahead, 17(1) ASIAN DISP. REV. 16, 20 (2015). [25] Justice Indu Malhotra, The Law and Practice of Arbitration and Conciliation 117 (4th ed. 2021).