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WRC Considers Employer Obligations Following Request For Remote Working

In a recent decision of the Workplace Relations Commission (“WRC”) in Alina Karabko v Tiktok Technology... In a recent decision of the Workplace Relations Commission (“WRC”) in Alina Karabko v Tiktok Technology Ltd ADJ-00051600, the Complainant alleged the Respondent did not fully consider her application for fully remote working arrangements in accordance with the Work Life Balance and Miscellaneous Provisions Act 2023 (the “Act”) and the Code of Practice for Employers and Employees Right to Request Flexible Working and Right to Request Remote Working (the “Code”). The Complainant alleged that the Respondent disregarded her needs in their decision to refuse her request for remote working and did not consider the request in an objective, fair and reasonable manner. The Respondent rejected the claim in its entirety. Facts: According to the case put forward by the Respondent, the Complainant was employed as a Core Operations Specialist within the Respondent’s Core Operations Team, commencing on 24 January 2022. The Respondent submitted that the Complainants contract, signed in January 2022, provided that her normal place of work would be the Dublin office. However, her contract further stated that due to the covid-19 pandemic the Respondent may require her to work remotely from time to time, which the Complainant did on a full-time basis. The Respondent’s submitted that in July 2022, a non-mandatory Return to Office (RTO) policy was issued, providing for employees to work 2 days from the office, whilst encouraging 3 days on site. However, the Complainant was permitted to work full time from home during 2022 on a discretionary individual basis. The Respondent indicated there was a further review of the RTO policy in January 2023 and due to the Complainant’s previous exception she was not required to attend the office at that time. However, in July 2023 a planned return to the office for all employees was announced effective from October 2023. According to the Respondent, the announcement stated “The Company believes that in person collaboration inspired creativity and creates irreplaceable value”. The Respondent indicated that the Complainant’s exception request was refused in August 2023 as exceptions were only being considered on the basis of providing reasonable accommodation in respect of a disability and were no longer being granted on the basis of individual exception requests. The Respondent told the WRC that on 11 March 2024, the Complainant had submitted a request for fully remote work, setting out in her request that it would reduce her daily commute (which the Complainant previously stated would take 2.5 hours each way) and carbon footprint, it would improve her quality of life and also that there was a lack of suitable accommodation in Dublin for herself and her pet. The Respondent told the WRC that on the 5 April 2024, the Respondent’s HR Business Partners (HRBP) acknowledged the application and advised the Complainant that they required an extension to consider her application fully. The Respondent confirmed to the WRC that on 12 April 2024, it issued a decision setting out that the Complainant’s request had been refused and the grounds for the refusal as follows: “Our Core Operations department, with 123 Core Ops specialists in Dublin, operates on a hybrid work model. This model promotes 3 days of in-person collaboration in the office and 2 days of remote work. Whilst some duties of this role can be performed from home, there are other essential parts of the job that must be performed from the office, such as team collaboration and knowledge sharing for continuous upskill and performance. The company believes that in-person presence is crucial for team engagement and effective training. Exclusively working remotely would have a substantial adverse effect on these benefits”.  According to the Respondent the Complainant had responded alleging that the Respondent had not fully considered her request in line with the Act and the Code of practice. The Respondent told the WRC she had also raised queries in relation to the decision itself and the process. The Respondent submitted that the Complainant had been invited to a meeting on 2 May 2024 and that at that meeting it was discussed in detail the reasons for the refusing of the request and the other queries raised by the Complainant. The Respondent indicated that the Complainant was informed of her right to pursue the matter under the grievance procedure, however she confirmed she would not be considering that route. It seems the Complainant subsequently lodged her complaint with the WRC on 6 May 2024, claiming the Respondent had failed to consider her needs when processing her request and alleging a failure to comply with the Act and Code when considering her application. Decision: The Adjudicator, Marie Flynn, stated the relevant provisions for the purpose of the matter to be considered under the Act was Section 20 which provides for the entitlement of employees to request remote working arrangements.  Section 20 provides that: (1) An employee may, request approval from his or her employer for a remote working arrangement. (2) An employee must have completed 6 months continuous employment before a remote working arrangement can commence; (3) A request for a remote working arrangement shall— (a) be in writing and signed by the employee, (b) specify the details of the remote working arrangement requested and the proposed date of commencement and expiration if applicable; (c) specify, having regard to the code of practice— (i) the reasons why he or she is requesting approval of the remote working arrangement; (ii) details of the proposed remote working location, and (iii) information as may be specified in the code of practice on the suitability of the proposed remote working location, and (d) the request must be submitted as soon as reasonably practicable but not later than 8 weeks before the proposed commencement of the remote working arrangement.  Section 21 of the Act obliges an employer who receives a remote working request to consider the request having regard to a number of criteria and to respond not later than four weeks after receipt of the request: (1) An employer who receives a request for a remote working arrangement submitted in accordance with section 20 (3) shall— (a) consider that request, having regard to— (i) his or her needs, (ii) the employee’s needs, and (iii) the requirements of the code of practice, and (b) as soon as reasonably practicable but, subject to subsection (2), not later than 4 weeks after receipt of the request— (i) approve the request, which approval shall include an agreement prepared and signed by the employer and employee setting out— (I) the details of the remote working arrangement, and (II) the date of the commencement and the expiration, if any, of the remote working arrangement, (ii) provide a notice in writing informing the employee that the request has been refused and of the reasons for the refusal, or (iii) where subsection (2) applies, provide a notice in writing to the employee that the employer has extended the 4 week period under this subsection for a further period specified in the notice. (2) Where an employer is having difficulty assessing the viability of the request for a remote working arrangement, the employer may extend the 4 week period referred to in subsection (1) by a further period not exceeding 8 weeks. (3) When the agreement referred to in subsection (1)(b)(i) is signed by the employer and the employee, the employer shall retain the agreement and provide a copy of the agreement to the employee who shall retain it. “ The AO outlined that their remit under Section 27(6) of the Act was limited to assessing whether an employer considered a request for remote working in accordance with Section 21 of the Act and the Code. Specifically, that they were precluded from investigating the merits of a decision to grant or refuse a request. The AO referred to three distinct duties on an employer who receives a remote working request, as follows; First Duty The employer must have regard to its needs, the needs of the employee and the requirements of the Code of Practice. In respect of this duty the AO pointed out that on submission of the Complainant’s request, a manager and member of HR of the Respondent’s staff met to consider the application in line with the Act and the Code and the Respondents business plans. The AO referred to the Respondent’s evidence that taking all of the relevant factors into account, the decision was made to refuse the Complainant’s request to work remotely on a full-time basis.  The Adjudicator found that the Respondent had complied with their obligations under Section 21(1)(a) of the Act in this regard. Second and Third Duties Under Section 21 (1)(b) of the Act an employer is obliged to either approve a request for remote working or notify in writing its refusal of a request within 4 weeks of receipt. An employer can also avail of an extension of up to eight weeks, which the Respondent in this instance had sought. The Respondent had acknowledged receipt of the Complainant’s request on the 5 April, notified the Complainant that they required an extension and duly issued a decision to the request on 12 April 2024. The Adjudicator found that the Respondent had fully complied with their obligations under Section 21(1)(b) and Section 21 (2) of the Act and the claim was not well founded. Takeaway for Employers: It is important to reiterate that the rights under the Act and the Code provide a right of any employee to request remote working, they do not have a right to remote work. An employer is obliged to consider the request having regard to the employer’s needs, the employee’s needs and the requirements under the Code but the employee will not have a legal claim against the employer purely because they are unhappy with the decision taken by the employer in respect of their request for remote working. The remit of the WRC or Labour Court is not to decide on the merits of a decision made by an employer to decline a request for remote work. The WRC and Labour Court are limited to an assessment of whether an employer has complied with their obligations under the Act, more specifically section 21 and in accordance with the Code. Employers should ensure that they have an up-to-date Remote Working Policy, outlining their obligations but also the obligations of any employee in making a request for remote working. Links ADJ-00051600 - Workplace Relations Commission Code of Practice Authors – Ethna Dillon and Laura Killelea

WRC Orders Re-engagement of Employee Dismissed Due to Discriminatory Workplace Policy on Absence

In Courtney Carter v Tesco Ireland Limited (ADJ-00049889), the Complainant brought a complaint to the Workplace... In Courtney Carter v Tesco Ireland Limited (ADJ-00049889), the Complainant brought a complaint to the Workplace Relations Commission (“WRC”) under the Employment Equality Acts 1998 – 2015 claiming that she was discriminated against on the ground of family status. Facts: The Complainant began working for the Respondent on 23rd October 2023 and was dismissed on 17th December 2023, after just 13 weeks of employment. This was during her probationary period. The Complainant was absent a number of times during her short employment due to her chronically ill child needing care and attendance at hospital visits and, on one occasion, hospitalisation. Despite producing medical certificates corroborating this, the Respondent dismissed her due to her inability to adhere to a strict attendance policy which it applied to all employees. There were no performance issues, and her dismissal was directly related to her absences to care for her child. The Respondent was able to show that it applied the relevant policy equally to all of its employees and that it was consistent in its approach. Decision: The Adjudicator, Brian Dalton, considered firstly whether or not there was direct discrimination in this case. Given the consistent application of the policy to all employees who failed the absenteeism requirement, and the absence of a comparator, it was clear that there was no direct discrimination. He turned his consideration to whether or not the Respondent’s practice and application of the policy  indirectly discriminated against the Complainant, i.e, if it “weighed more heavily” on the Complainant because of her family status when compared to an employee with no family status. The Adjudicator noted that the Respondent had classified the Complainant’s absences as illness when they were in fact absences due to caring responsibilities. The Adjudicator referred to the decision in NBK Designs and Inoue cited by Purdy, Equality Law in the Workplace (1st edition, Bloomsbury 2015) in which the Labour Court determined that an employee who was dismissed because she could not change her working arrangements from job-sharing to a full-time role due to her family commitments was indirectly discriminated against. The Labour Court in that case upheld the complainant’s argument that the requirement to work full-time was a condition of employment that disadvantaged significantly more women than men, and significantly more people who came within the grounds of marital status and family status than people of a different marital and family status and therefore amounted to discrimination on the grounds of gender, family status and marital status. Turning to the instant case, the Adjudicator found that the practice of applying an “inflexible policy” indirectly discriminated against the Complainant because of her family status and he found that no objective reasons had been provided by the Respondent for the practice. In finding for the Complainant, the Adjudicator ordered the Respondent to re-engage the Complainant within four weeks of the date of the decision and extend her probationary period for a further 13-week period. He also made an order for compensation of €2,500 in line with section 82(1)(f) of the Act for the effects of the discrimination. Takeaway for Employers: It is not enough for a policy not to directly discriminate against an employee(s), employers must also exercise caution in terms of the application of its policies. This decision shows the importance of applying workplace policies consistently yet flexibly when circumstances require it. The rigid application of a policy will not be appropriate where there are extenuating circumstances and employers must be particularly careful to ensure that they apply their policies in a way that does not indirectly discriminate against a particular employee(s). There are a number of different redress options open to an adjudicator, including re-instatement, re-engagement and/or compensation and the effects of a successful complaint can be costly for employers. Link:  https://workplacerelations.ie/en/cases/2024/july/adj-00049889.html Authors- Nicola MacCarthy and Jenny Wakely

Supreme Court Rules High Court Erred in Re-engaging School Principal in a Manner that Meant He was Effectively Reinstated

Supreme Court Rules High Court Erred in Re-engaging School Principal in a Manner that Meant He was Effectively Reinstated... The Supreme Court has recently found that the High Court, Labour Court and the Workplace Relations Commission (“WRC”) erred in law in ordering the re-engagement of a principal of a primary school. In An Bord Banistíochta, Gaelscoil Moshíológ v The Labour Court and Aodhagán Ó Súird and the Department of Education [2024] IESC 38, the Supreme Court (judgment delivered by O’Donnell C.J.) emphasised the exceptional nature of the remedies of reinstatement and re-engagement and the need to ensure that they are appropriate in the particular circumstances of a case. Facts: This is a long-running dispute which has lasted over 13 years. In January 2012, the Principal of Gaelscoil Moshíológ (the “School”)was placed on administrative leave following an incident in a classroom. He was subsequently suspended on full pay in May 2013 following the discovery of issues relating to enrolment figures and pending the outcome of a disciplinary process. After a protracted disciplinary process, the Principal was dismissed from his role with effect from 30th November 2015. He appealed his dismissal, but his appeal was unsuccessful. The Principal brought a claim to the WRC which found that he had been unfairly dismissed and ordered his re-engagement with effect from 1st January 2018. The Board of Management of the School (the “Board”) appealed this decision to the Labour Court which found that the Principal had been unfairly dismissed and ordered his re-engagement with effect from 1st September 2017, four months earlier than the date stipulated by the WRC. The Board subsequently appealed to the High Court on a point of law.The High Court dismissed the appeal, but found that the Labour Court erred in directing re-engagement from September 2017. The High Court initially ordered reinstatement with effect from 30th January 2013, which was the date on which it considered that the period of administrative leave should have ended. However, in a subsequent judgment re-engagement was ordered with effect from 30th November 2015, restored to payroll with effect from 1st August 2023, and restored to his duties with effect from 4th August 2023, and paid arrears of salary with effect from 30th November 2015. The High Court also ordered the Board of Management to pay the Principal’s legal costs on a legal practitioner and client basis, a higher legal costs liability than usual.The Board appealed again to the Supreme Court. Decision: The Supreme Court examined the scope of an appeal on a point of law, which, it is well established, does not involve a re-hearing of the case. The Supreme Court held that the High Court went much further than holding that the Labour Court did not err in law, but exceeded its scope of appeal by considering the merits of the case. O’Donnell C.J. went on to say that the decision-making bodies were incorrect in law in ordering the remedy of re-engagement, emphasising that reinstatement and re-engagement are remedies that are “exceptional in nature”. That was not given due consideration by the WRC, Labour Court, or the High Court. The Court stated that the decisions to re-engage the Principal “focussed solely on the interests of the Principal” and failed to consider other factors that the Supreme Court deemed ought to have been considered, including: the fraught relations between the parties the long period of time that had elapsed any changes to the curriculum or responsibilities of a school principal, or the capacity of the Principal to resume his duties following the length of time he had been out for. O’Donnell C.J. also placed emphasis on the fact that a new principal had been appointed to the school for some time: “It is necessary to consider whether any order of reinstatement or reengagement is practicable in the circumstances. If it is not practicable it should not be ordered. This assessment may include a consideration of whether that reengagement will displace an innocent person who has been engaged to fulfil that role.” He went on to say that: “Indeed, neither body made any finding about the validity of the appointment of the principal. (It is indeed a valid criticism of both decisions that they did not consider the impact of their decision on the position of the new principal at all).” In considering the circumstance as a whole, O’Donnell C.J. stated that ordering re-engagement in this case “does not reflect the exceptional nature of the remedy.” He differentiated between the Board of Management of a school, and the management of a commercial enterprise, as a school Board of Management is run by volunteers, has less flexibility, and cannot negotiate settlements in a manner open to commercial bodies. It would not be reasonable to expect the school to remain without a principal during lengthy litigation proceedings. In light of this, the Court went on to say: “Life must go on. In this case this was a working school, and the pupils, parents and teachers could all reasonably expect to have a principal in place. As set out in the extract from Redmond on Dismissal Law (op. cit.) at paragraph 103 above, it is extremely rare, even in those cases in which a claim for unfair dismissal succeeds, for an order for reinstatement to be made. It is not reasonable to expect that businesses would remain in limbo pending the outcome of protracted legal proceedings. That is so in general, but must apply with particular force in a case such as this, in which there has been such a lapse of time between dismissal and adjudication, and in the context of a small national school.” The Chief Justice noted that the appropriate order to make would usually be to set aside the Labour Court’s decision which was upheld by the High Court and remit it back to be reconsidered. However, in light of the "inordinate amount of time that has already elapsed", the Supreme Court found that it would not be appropriate to do so, particularly in circumstances where the Principal had been back in his position for close to a year. The Supreme Court ordered that the portion of the decision of the High Court varying the order of the Labour Court (by providing for re-engagement to date from the date of effective dismissal of 30th November 2015) should be set aside and the order of the Labour Court deeming re-engagement to have taken effect from September 2017 should be restored. Finally, the Supreme Court varied the order of the High Court Order in relation to costs. The High Court had ordered that the Board of Management should pay the Principal’s legal costs on a legal practitioner and client basis. The Supreme Court disagreed with this order. O’Donnell C.J. found that costs ought to have been awarded on a party and party basis. The Court also ordered the Principal to pay back the Board of Management the arrears of almost two years of salary that was awarded to him by the High Court. Takeaway for Employers: This case is an important authority from the Supreme Court addressing the remedies of reinstatement and re-engagement under the Unfair Dismissals Acts. The Supreme Court has made it abundantly clear to lower decision-making bodies that those remedies are only to be ordered in exceptional cases. Factors to be considered in cases seeking these remedies include the passage of time, the state of relations between the parties, changes in the workplace, and the implications on innocent third parties. Links https://www.courts.ie/acc/alfresco/c93705b1-781d-4c38-b4e7-522f05f93f3c/2024_IESC_38_.pdf/pdf#view=fitH Our article on the decision of the High Court can be found here. Authors - Jane Holian, Jenny Wakely

WRC Holds Fiddler To Be An Employee

In Matthew McGranaghan v. MEPC Music Ltd (ADJ-00037668), the Complainant brought a number of complaints... In Matthew McGranaghan v. MEPC Music Ltd (ADJ-00037668), the Complainant brought a number of complaints to the Workplace Relations Commission (“the WRC”) alleging that he was an employee and not self-employed and on that basis, he claimed that he was unfairly dismissed; not paid his notice entitlement; not paid his annual leave or public holiday entitlement. He also claimed compensation for the Respondent’s failure to comply with the minimum notice requirement. The Adjudicator, Caroline Reidy, found in his favour and awarded him a total amount of €43,840 Facts: The Complainant is a musician (fiddler) who started providing his services to the Respondent band in January 2014. In May 2020 the Complainant contacted the Scope Section of the Department of Social Protection alleging that he believed he fitted the criteria for being an employee and was therefore eligible for the Pandemic Unemployment Payments. Scope determined that the Complainant was an employee for the purposes of social insurance. However, the Respondent successfully appealed this decision to the Appeals Officer. The Complainant worked on average 4 days per week for the Respondent between rehearsals and gigs. He would send an invoice at the end of every week indicating the number of gigs he played. Apparently, the Complainant had negotiated his rate of pay with the Respondent. He was also free to play with other bands, which he did. He was also able to determine when he was or wasn’t available but he was only not available on 2 occasions. When the Complainant was not available the Respondent would get someone else and pay that person directly. When the Complainant played with the Respondent he had to wear the uniform of the band and he had to learn the music in advance. Due to Covid-19 shut down, the Complainant had not played for the Respondent since March 2020 and he lodged his complainant form with the WRC on 4 March 2022. The Respondent alleged that all the claims were out of time. Decision: Time Limit – The Adjudicator acknowledged that the reason why the Complainant had not worked since March 2020 was mainly due to Covid-19. Although the Respondent wrote to the Complainant offering him a gig in August 2021, which the Complainant was not available for. The Adjudicator held that the email of 22 September 2021 which the Respondent wrote to the Complainant confirming that they would no longer require his services was the last date of contravention and therefore the claims were lodged within 6 months from that date. This would result in the claims for unfair dismissal, notice payment, compensation for failure to pay notice and Terms of Employment (Information) Act claim all being within time. However, the Adjudicator did not explain in her decision how she awarded the Complainant annual leave and public holiday when he had not worked within the statutory annual leave year to which the claim related and nor had he worked 5 weeks before the public holiday that was within the relevant period. This may have been explained through oral submissions at the hearing. Employment Status - The Adjudicator applied the 5-step test set out by the Supreme Court in the decision of Karshan (Midlands) Ltd t/a Domino’s Pizza v. Revenue Commissioners (the “Karshan Case”) and found as follows – The Complainant did provide personal service of being the fiddle player for the bank in exchange for payment. He provided personal service and the use of a substitute was very exceptional and when a substitute was used, the substitute was paid directly. It was determined that the Respondent had sufficient control over the Complainant as the Complainant had no flexibility as to when the gigs were scheduled, he was told what music to play, wears the band uniform and was instructed by the Respondent for all work-related matters. The Adjudicator held that when considering the evidence and the circumstances of the case in practice, she held that the Complainant was an employee based on the arrangements in place and he was not self-employed. There was no legislation that required any adjustment to the above answers. Unfortunately, the Adjudicator did not get into the issue of continuity of service and/or reckonable service in this decision, which the Supreme Court did not address either. It appears that the Covid-19 shut down made such an exercise very difficult in this case. The Complainant was awarded 6 months salary for the unfair dismissal claim which amounted to €26,880. He was awarded 4 weeks pay in respect of his notice and a further 4 weeks compensation for the Respondent’s failure to pay his notice entitlement. However, he was only awarded €500 in respect of not having received a contract of employment. He was awarded €5,000 in respect of not being paid annual leave and €1,500 in respect of not receiving his public holiday entitlement. This totalled €43,840 gross. Takeaway for employers: This decision illustrates how easy it is now going to be for workers to  be able to prove that in reality they are employees. It is vital that all businesses that engage with contractors who provide personal service review their arrangements and either permit substitution by which the contractor engages and pays the substitute or insist that the contractor operates through a limited company going forward or change the arrangement to that of an employment relationship. There are careful steps that need to be considered in respect of each of these options. However, doing nothing is no longer a viable option. Link: https://workplacerelations.ie/en/cases/2024/august/adj-00037668.html Author- Anne O’Connell

Wrc Finds Complainant Never Was An Employee Regardless Of Having Paid Employee Taxes For 11 Years

In A Solicitor v A Construction Consultancy Business (ADJ-00046911), the Complainant brought a complaint to the... In A Solicitor v A Construction Consultancy Business (ADJ-00046911), the Complainant brought a complaint to the Workplace Relations Commission (“the WRC”) under Section 8 of the Unfair Dismissals Act, 1977, alleging that she was an employee of the Respondent company and was unfairly dismissed. The Adjudicator, Catherine Byrne, found that the Complaint was never an  employee of the Respondent company, regardless of having been treated as an employee by the Revenue and paying taxes for 11 years. Facts: The Complainant is a solicitor who was married to AB, a manager in the Respondent company. AB’s son, MD, is the managing director of the Respondent company. A company that was established by AB went into liquidation following the 2008 financial crash. A new business was established in 2011 which carried out similar work to the previous company, i.e. construction consultancy. The Complainant’s marriage to AB ended in 2020. The Complainant submitted to the WRC that she was an employee of the Respondent company. She provided legal advice and supported her husband in his role as a manager. The Complainant told the WRC that she did a “huge amount” of work for the Respondent at times, dealing with legacy issues from the previous company. She said that she was engaged with the liquidators and debtors and sourcing seed capital for the new business.  She said that she was involved in “everything to do with the office.”  The Complainant described her work as “assisting my husband.”  She said that he did the pricing for contracts, and she helped him to compose emails.  When her marriage ended in March 2020, the complainant said that she asked to be paid her full salary, to which her husband replied, “we’re not together anymore.”  She said that she offered to continue to work, but her husband left their home, and she wasn’t given any work. The Complainant cited her annual salary to be €52,000.  On the documents she submitted from Revenue for 2021 and 2022, her salary was stated to be €42,000.  When she was asked at the hearing about this discrepancy, the Complainant said that she spoke to her accountant about this and she was advised that the difference didn’t matter and that her husband “has the funds.”  She said that she was not concerned about the discrepancy because she was happily married at the time. The Respondent put it to the Complainant that she never worked in the company’s office in Dublin. The Respondent submitted that there was no evidence that the Complainant was in an employment relationship with the Respondent.  The Respondent argued that the Complainant did no work for the Respondent since March 2020, and argued that she did no work for many years. MD gave evidence that when the new company was set up in 2011, the Complainant gave them advice in her capacity as a solicitor.  She sourced a handbook and employee contracts.  She dealt with the office manager and gave her the contracts to issue to employees. MD said that he had no dealings with the Complainant directly or indirectly for 10 years. He said that there is no file in the office in relation to the Complainant. AB, the Complainant’s ex-husband, gave evidence to the WRC. He said that his job is to price work all over the country.  He said that, in 2011, the Complainant sourced the contracts for the employees at the time and gave them to the office manager.  When the first company went into liquidation, AB said that the Complainant “helped me a lot”. He said she helped him because she was his wife and she gave him advice.  In relation to the Complainant’s wages, AB said that he and the complainant came up with the arrangement, as by splitting his wages into his and the complainant’s, his tax burden was reduced. Decision: The Adjudicator referred to the definition of an “employee” as stated at s.1 of the Unfair Dismissals Act, 1977: “…an individual who has entered into or works under (or, where the employment has ceased, worked under) a contract of employment…” At the hearing, the Complainant provided a document which she claimed to be a copy of her contract of employment dated May 1st 2011.  She said that this contract was issued to her when she sourced contracts for employees at the time the business was set up in 2011. The Adjudicator expressed concerns over this document, as it was not signed by the managing director of the company, and there was no clear start date of employment provided. The document stated that the Complainant’s place of work is “various construction sites within the Republic of Ireland… or Europe.”  The Adjudicator stated that this was not consistent with the role that the Complainant claimed that she held of office manager / legal advisor, and the Complainant ought to have ensured that the contact stated that her place of work is her home. Further, the contract stated that the Complainant’s annual salary was €52,000.  The documents that she provided from the Revenue Commissioners show that, in 2021 and 2022, she is recorded as having earned €42,000. The Adjudicator said that if the complainant earned €42,000 in 2021 and 2022, it is unlikely that she earned €52,000 in 2011.  He said that it seems that the Complainant was uncertain of the amount in wages that the Respondent put through the payroll in her name, something that is not consistent with being an employee. For the reasons set out, the Adjudicator was satisfied that the document submitted by the Complainant was not a contract of employment and was satisfied that she was not issued with a contract by the Respondent. The Adjudicator was not satisfied that the Complainant demonstrated that she was an employee of the Respondent company.  The Adjudicator referred to the fact that in her written submissions to the WRC, the Complainant presented information which was incorrect, as she was mistaken with regard to the ownership of the company, She incorrectly said that her former husband was a director, and incorrectly named two people who she said were employees. The Adjudicator concluded that apart from her marriage to AB, the Complainant was detached from the Respondent’s business. The Complainant referred to work she did to support the previous business when it went into liquidation and the work she did to help to set up the new business in 2011.  In his evidence, AB stated that the complainant was of great assistance to him at this time, as his wife and not as an employee. The Adjudicator held that this collaboration between the Complainant and her husband was entirely normal in the context of a supportive marriage and is disingenuous to seek to re-frame this support as a contractual employment relationship.  The Adjudicator also noted that while remote working is now a common working arrangement, it would have been very unusual between 2012 to 2020, and did not accept that the Complainant worked for the Respondent from home for all this time. Employment Status: The Adjudicator stated that where there is a question about whether an individual is an employee, most precedents, including Karshan, concern the difference between a contract of service and a contract for service; that is, the difference between an employee and a self-employed contractor.  However, this was not the issue in question in this case. In this way she distinguished this case from the five tests set out by the Supreme Court in Karshan. The Adjudicator said that here, the Respondent did not provide work to the Complainant and she did not seek out work.  She was not involved in the business on a day-to-day basis.  She never went to the office, she did not know the names of any of the employees and, on the date of this hearing, she had not spoken to the managing director of the Company in more than ten years.  The Complainant’s evidence showed that her involvement in the business was confined to the advice she gave at the beginning, her effort to have a debt repaid on an unknown date, and her assistance to her husband with drafting emails over a period of eleven years. The Adjudicator held that this was an insufficient contribution to establish a relationship of employment or to show that the Respondent was obliged to provide her with work. In considering the fact that the Complainant received a salary into her bank account from the Respondent payroll, the Adjudicator held that it was irrelevant which bank account the Complainant’s wages were paid into, as the reality was the she was not required to do any work in return for her wages, and that she colluded with the Respondent to create a false impression with the Revenue Commissioners that she was an employee of the company. Although the Supreme Court in Karshan had held that the mutuality of obligation test should no longer be considered when determining whether or not someone is an employee, the Adjudicator based her decision on the lack of mutuality of obligation. The Adjudicator referred to the mutuality of obligation test and referred to the fact that there was no obligation on the Complainant to carry out work for the Respondent, and no obligation on the Respondent to provide the Complainant with work. The Adjudicator held that the Complainant was not an employee of the company and therefore did not have the standing to make a claim under the Unfair Dismissal Act. Takeaway for Employers: It must be noted that we were not at the WRC hearing of this case. However, it appears from the decision that the Adjudicator was not convinced that the Complainant was an employee of the Respondent. However, it is strange that rather than applying the five step test set down in the Supreme Court decision of Karshan (Midlands) Ltd t/a Dominos Pizza v Revenue Commissioners [2023] IESC 24, the Adjudicator distinguished this case from Karshan decision and relied on the test of mutuality of obligation. It appears from the published decision that the Complainant may not have satisfied the Karshan test to be determined to be an employee. It will be interesting to see whether or not this decision is followed or whether the Karshan tests will be relied upon when this arises again. We have seen in recent decisions that post Karshan, it is now far easier for workers to establish a relationship of employment. The decision herein appears out of step with the current position on employee status, and it may be that the Labour Court will provide further clarification on this topical issue. However, it remains the case that employers should be proactive in engaging with contractors and any workers who provide personal services. Link - https://www.workplacerelations.ie/en/cases/2024/august/adj-00046911.html Author- Jane Holian, Anne O’Connell

WRC Finds Dismissal Unfair as Re-Deployment Request Not Properly Considered, even for Trial Period

In a recent decision of the Workplace Relations Commission (“WRC”) in Gareth Elliot v Legs Eleven Limited... In a recent decision of the Workplace Relations Commission (“WRC”) in Gareth Elliot v Legs Eleven Limited (ADJ-00050223), the Complainant claimed that his dismissal for reason of redundancy was unfair. The Complainant argued that the Respondent had not taken into consideration other roles which he could have done. The Respondent rejected the claim. Facts: The Complainant was employed as a digital marketing executive in September 2021 and was promoted to the role of content marketing manager 6 months later. His role was to manage communications with prospective clients, search engine optimisation (SEO) and managing the social media content. He worked from his home in Amsterdam. On 9th November 2023, the Respondent’s General Manager, Mr Stephen Kelly, met with the Complainant and informed him that his position was at risk of redundancy due to commercial struggles, as there had been consecutive losses between August and October 2023. Evidence given by Mr Kelly was that the Complainant’s role was selected due to the leadership opinion that it was not generating revenue and that paid social media was a better option compared to content management. Following the meeting on 9th November, the Complainant emailed Mr Kelly and asked him to consider an alternative to redundancy, knowing that a social media marketing manager had recently been hired in September 2023. In his evidence, Mr Kelly stated that the Complainant did not have the requisite experience in paid social media and had never shown skills in targeted advertising or advertising campaigns. Mr Kelly further stated that after consideration of the Complainant’s CV, he did not envisage the Complainant taking on a social media marketing manager role as it was more than just marketing. He also stated that the company did not have the time to provide training for the Complainant in the new social media role. On 16th November, the Complainant was notified on a video call that his role was being made redundant and his employment would terminate on 30th November. This was confirmed in writing. Under cross examination, Mr Kelly confirmed that a further social media manager was hired subsequent to the Complainant being made redundant. Mr Kelly told the WRC that the vacancy had arisen after an internal move – the social media roles are based on “regions” and one of the social media managers moved to an international position. He also confirmed that a freelance videographer was hired in October 2023, to do on-street videos and comic pieces which were uploaded to social media sites by the manager. Mr Kelly confirmed that there were no performance issues with the Complainant, who had met his targets but stated that the company focus had shifted to social media rather than Google analytics or email marketing. The Complainant gave evidence that he had worked in paid advertising in the first six months of his employment with the Respondent and outlined that he was one of the longest-serving employees with transferable skills. The Complainant stated that he believed that he was unfairly selected for redundancy, with others like his manager now doing parts of his role. He believed that he was more skilled than others hired after him and no effort was made to slot him into a different role. Decision: The Adjudicator, Catherine Byrne, considered the Complainant’s complaint under the Redundancy Payments Acts 1967-2014 (the “RP Act”) and the Unfair Dismissals Act 1977-2015 (the “UD Act”). Under section 7(2)(c) of the RP Act, “…an employee who is dismissed shall be taken to be dismissed by reason of redundancy if, for one or more reasons not related to the employee concerned, the dismissal is attributable wholly or mainly to – (c) the fact that his employer has decided to carry on the business with fewer or no employees, whether by requiring the work for which the employee had been employed (or had been doing before his dismissal) to be done by other employees or otherwise[.]” The Adjudicator stated that from Mr Kelly’s evidence, the number of employees working for the Respondent had decreased from 15 to 8 during the period between November 2023 and the date of the hearing in May 2024. Furthermore, certain parts of the Complainant’s role were no longer carried out, with other parts being carried out by a freelance videographer and the Complainant’s former manager. On that basis, the Adjudicator was satisfied that a genuine redundancy situation existed. The Adjudicator then considered whether the process that resulted in the Complainant’s redundancy was unfair and whether it was unreasonable for the Respondent to select the Complainant for redundancy and not for the role of social media marketing manager. The Adjudicator referred to section 6(7) of the UD Act and stated that an adjudicator must have regard to; “(a) to the reasonableness or otherwise of the conduct (whether by act or omission) of the employer in relation to the dismissal, and  (b) to the extent (if any) of the compliance or failure to comply by the employer, in relation to the employee, with the procedure referred to in section 14(1) of this Act or with the provisions of any code of practice referred to in paragraph (d) (inserted by the Unfair Dismissals (Amendment) Act, 1993) of section 7(2) of this Act.” The Adjudicator stated that no evidence was submitted regarding the existence of any company procedure for implementing redundancies. In the absence of same, fair procedures must be applied, to include the right to notice, the right to be represented at meetings, the right of response to a decision to make an employee redundancy, and the right of appeal. The Adjudicator found that with some training and support, an employee whose job is redundant may be suitable for a different job: “A job may be eliminated, but the employee may be capable of doing a different job or, they may be capable of doing the same job in another part of the organisation.” Referring to subsections (2A) and (2B) of section 15 of the RP Act, the Adjudicator noted the provision for a trial period for an employee to consider if an alternative job is suitable. The Adjudicator stated that in her view the objective of the subsections is to avoid the dismissal of an employee by permitting him/her to try out another role even if it  is not a “direct match” .The Adjudicator noted that if an employee whose job is at risk of redundancy requests to take on another role, “it is incumbent on an employer to consider that request.” Section 15 (2A) and (2B) set out the following: “(2A) Where an employee who has been offered suitable employment and has carried out, for a period of not more than four weeks, the duties of that employment, refuses the offer, the temporary acceptance of that employment shall not solely constitute an unreasonable refusal for the purposes of this section. (2B) Where - (a) an employee's remuneration is reduced substantially but not to less than one-half of his normal weekly remuneration, or his hours of work are reduced substantially but not to less than one-half of his normal weekly hours, and (b) the employee temporarily accepts the reduction in remuneration or hours of work and indicates his acceptance to his employer, such a temporary acceptance for a period not exceeding 52 weeks shall not be taken to be an acceptance by the employee of an offer of suitable employment in relation to him.” The Adjudicator concluded that while the Complainant’s role was redundant, his dismissal was unfair for two reasons. Firstly, the Respondent made “no effort” to avoid the Complainant’s dismissal. The Complainant should have been re-deployed and permitted to try out the role as social media marketing manager (which he had requested) for a trial period. In so finding, the Adjudicator was cognisant of the fact that the Complainant was an experienced marketing executive, and that the alternative role was also related to marketing, albeit a different aspect. His performance would then have been subject to review to consider whether he was suitable in the long-term or following an unsatisfactory review, whether he should be made redundant at that point. Secondly, the Adjudicator found that the process leading to the Complainant’s dismissal was not consistent with a “standard” redundancy procedure. She noted the very short period between the Complainant being put at risk of redundancy, and his redundancy being confirmed a week later. She also noted that the Complainant was not informed of his right to be accompanied or represented at the meetings and he was never advised of any appeal process. The Adjudicator commented that the process may have been slowed down if the Complainant had been in receipt of support, the effect of which may have been that a different decision could have been reached. The Complainant started in a new role on 24th January 2024. On that basis, the Adjudicator deemed compensation to be the most appropriate redress, and she awarded €5,400 to the Complainant, equivalent to eight weeks’ gross pay (his loss of earnings for the period he was out of work). Takeaway for Employers: This decision emphasises the importance of adhering to fair procedures in the context of a redundancy process. It is in keeping with the trend in other recent decisions which place significant focus on the obligation on employers to consider alternatives to avoiding redundancies. The Adjudicator appears to go a step further in this case by referring to section 15 (2A) and (2B) of the Redundancy Payments Acts. Section 15 relates to circumstances in which an employee may be disentitled to a statutory redundancy payment for refusing to accept alternative employment. Subsections 15(2A) and (2B) enable employees to try out an alternative role without losing the entitlement to a redundancy payment purely for having tried out the alternative role. It remains to be seen whether the Adjudicator’s line of reasoning in this regard will be followed in subsequent decisions. However, either way it is imperative that employers ensure that proper and adequate consideration is given to all alternatives to redundancy, particularly in circumstances where there is a similar role available which an employee regards as a suitable alternative and which is not significantly different from the role that he/she has been carrying out or has previously carried out. Links ADJ-00050223 - Workplace Relations Commission Authors – Ethna Dillon and Jenny Wakely

The recent determinations of the Labour Court in Parnells GAA Club, Parnells GAA Club LTd v Leigh Fogarty

The recent determinations of the Labour Court in Parnells GAA Club, Parnells GAA Club LTd v Leigh Fogarty (Decision No’s RPD2420 & RPD2419) are noteworthy for any employer faced with a possible layoff situation. However, it should be noted that the employer chose not to attend the hearing of the Labour Court and so the Labour Court’s determination discussed below would have been on the basis of the evidence of the employee only. Facts: The determination sets out the background of this case as follows. The employer’s premises closed on 12th March 2020 due to the Covid-19 Pandemic. In terms of communications around the closure the employee confirmed to the Labour Court that he was never at any time given any notice of temporary lay-off in accordance with Section 11 of the Redundancy Payments Acts 1967-2014 (the “Acts”). However, neither was he ever at any time given any notice of dismissal. Nonetheless, his employer ceased to pay him or offer him work.. An employee who is on temporary lay-off can usually (after a specified period of time) serve a notice on their employer of their intention to claim a redundancy payment. The employer can avoid having to make a redundancy payment in such a situation if they serve a counter notice within a certain time frame confirming there will be work available to the employee within a specified time period. The time periods in each case are set out in the legislation. It is not necessary to go into them for the purpose of this article. Suffice to note the employee here confirmed to the Labour Court that he eventually served a notice of an intention to claim a redundancy payment (in the form of an RP9 form) on the employer. The employee contended that the employer did not responded to the RP9 form in any substantive manner. The employee subsequently brought a claim to the WRC and on appeal to the Labour Court seeking a redundancy payment. Decision: The Labour Court determined that in order for the employee to be regarded as laid off within the meaning of the Acts, it is a condition precedent  that he be given notice to that effect by the Respondent (in accordance with Section 11(b) of the Acts) prior to the cessation of his employment for that reason. In the absence of such notice, the Labour Court concluded that the employee’s employment had never ceased by reason of lay-off within the meaning of the Acts on 12th March, 2020 or at any other time and that it therefore followed the serving by the employee of notice to claim a redundancy payment by reason of lay-off upon the employer can have no meaning. Consequently, it was determined that the employee has neither been dismissed from his employment nor acquired a right to redundancy payment arising out of a layoff. Instead and very significantly, the Labour Court determined that the employee remains employed by the employer albeit that he has not been paid or provided with work in over four years. Such a decision gives rise to complex employment law considerations from the perspective of an employer. Takeaway for Employers: Where an employer finds themselves in a sutation of needing to temporarily lay off a member of staff, it is important to ensure that all necessary paperwork is put in place around this including issuing the appropriate official written notice of layoff to the employee in accordance with the requirements of the Acts. Separately, while it was not something that arose for discussion in this decision, employers should also be careful to ensure they include clauses on layoff/short time in their employees’ contracts of employment as the absence of such contractual clauses can prove problematic later if a lay off/short time situation arises. Links  - https://www.workplacerelations.ie/en/cases/2024/august/rpd2419.html and https://www.workplacerelations.ie/en/cases/2024/august/rpd2420.html Authors –Hannah Smullen and Laura Killelea

Twitter ordered to pay €550,000 to Former Employee

In the recent high-profile case of Gary Rooney v Twitter International Unlimited Company (ADJ – 00044246)... In the recent high-profile case of Gary Rooney v Twitter International Unlimited Company (ADJ – 00044246), the Workplace Relations Commission (“WRC”) upheld the Complainant’s claim for unfair dismissal and awarded him a record €550,131. The decision is under appeal to the Labour Court. Facts: The Complainant began employment with the Respondent in 2013. At the time his employment ended in December 2022 he held the position of “Director of Source to Pay”. On 16th November 2022, the Respondent’s then entire workforce received an email from the Respondent’s new owner (Elon Musk). The email was entitled “A Fork in the Road”. The content of the email (as outlined to the WRC by the Complainant and accepted by the Respondent) was as follows: “Going forward, to build a breakthrough Twitter 2.0 and succeed in an increasingly competitive world, we will need to be extremely hardcore. This will mean working long hours at high intensity. Only exceptional performance will constitute a passing a grade. [….] If you are sure that you want to be part of the new Twitter, please click yes on the link below. Anyone has not done so by 5pm ET tomorrow (Thursday) will receive three months of severance. Whatever decision you make, thank you for your efforts to make twitter successful. Elon.” Following the Fork in the Road email, the Respondent sent employees an accompanying FAQ document which according to the Complainant stated that “If you do not confirm that you wish to stay at Twitter, you are resigning. You will not be entitled to statutory redundancy or other termination payments, unless otherwise required by law.” According to the Complainant the FAQ document contained a reference to a “separation offer” but the Complainant argued it was not possible to know from the information given what was being offered. The Complainant argued that confusingly the FAQ document also seemed to suggest that if a person did not click the box and did not agree the severance offer the Company would take some other unknown approach. Specifically, the Complainant referred to the following alleged statement in the FAQ document “If you don’t click “yes” we will liaise with you in relation to next steps in accordance with our legal obligations.” On 17th November 2022 at 6pm Irish Time (which the Complaint said was just four hours before the deadline outlined in Mr. Musk’s email) the Complainant virtually attended a large meeting involving a number of staff in the company. The Complainant contended that he did not glean any useful information from this meeting. It was common case that the Complainant did not click “yes” by the time the deadline passed. It was also common case that the following day,18th November, the Complainant’s access to the company’s internal systems and network was cut off without any form of communication. On 19th November, the Complainant received an email from the Respondent acknowledging his “decision to resign and accept the voluntary separation outlined to you”. The Complainant responded to this email stating that he had not indicated that he was resigning. He received an automated response to this email indicating he would receive a response within three business days. The Complainant sent a follow-up email on 5th December 2022 noting his disappointment that his email was not responded to within three business days. The Respondent’s HR Department responded, noting that the failure to respond to the Fork in the Road email had been treated as the Complainant having served notice of resignation. Decision: There were extensive legal submissions from both sides on the question of whether the fact that the Complainant did not respond to Mr. Musk’s Fork in the Road email could amount to a resignation. The Respondent argued that it did. The Complainant strongly contested this and argued that the termination of the Complainant’s employment was an unfair dismissal. Among other things, the Respondent raised that there had been various communications from the Complainant on the Respondent’s internal communication platforms following the Fork in the Road email and that those communications demonstrated the Complainant had made a conscious decision that he was not going to click “yes”. The Respondent argued that these communications taken together constituted a communication to the Respondent of his intention to resign. There was detailed consideration of previous case law in respect of resignations and dismissals including the UK case of Sothern v Franks Charlesly & Co [1981] IR 278 as cited in subsequent decisions in this jurisdiction. The Sothern case determined that: “in the normal case if unequivocal words of resignation are used the employer is entitled to immediately accept the resignation and act accordingly”. The Adjudicator rejected the arguments put forward by the Respondent and determined that the Complainant’s failure to click “yes” to Mr. Musk’s email of 16th November email “cannot by any reasonable standards be deemed to equate with the use of unequivocal or unambiguous words of resignation.” The Adjudicator held that the Respondent had dismissed the Complainant, and the dismissal was unfair. The Adjudicator then turned to consideration of the appropriate level of compensation. The Adjudicator’s decision on this point is hugely significant for the following reasons: The Adjudicator took into account Equity Grants/ Deferred Cash Consideration benefits enjoyed by the Complainant arising from his employment with the Respondent and factored them into his calculation of the award to the Complainant for losses arising from the dismissal. This decision is also significant because in addition to making an award to the Complainant in respect of losses already incurred as a result of the dismissal, the Adjudicator made a substantial award for future losses (not yet incurred). Of the €550,131 awarded, a substantial €200,000 represented an award for future losses. The Adjudicator’s approach to the question of mitigation of loss is also noteworthy. Employees in unfair dismissal claims must be in a position to demonstrate they have made adequate efforts to mitigate their financial loss arising from the dismissal (usually by seeking alternative paid employment). On this point, the Complainant’s lawyers had submitted that for nine months the Complainant had attempted to find a job with an equally high level of remuneration but had been unable to do so and was then forced to accept a position at a considerably lower salary. The Respondent argued the Complainant had not made sufficient efforts to mitigate his loss. However, the Adjudicator found that the Complainant made appropriate efforts to mitigate and remarked as follows: “He was not obliged to take any job at any salary but rather to seek suitable alternative employment attracting an income as close as he could get to the overall compensation package he had enjoyed prior to the dismissal. From the point of view of assessing mitigation I find that. in all of the circumstances, it would be unfair to criticise the Complainant for failure adequately to mitigate by not achieving a base salary together with benefits as generous as those he enjoyed with the Respondent, and I do not make such a finding.” Takeaway for Employers: This case is hugely significant for employers who operate employee incentive/equity schemes as it paves the way for employees to claim for loss of benefits under those schemes as part of an unfair dismissal claim. This case also reinforces the principle that resignations need to be unequivocal and unambiguous and that if an employer wrongly treats a termination of employment as a resignation, there will likely be a legal exposure under Unfair Dismissals Acts. This point was covered in another of our articles last month in the context of “heat of the moment” resignations where similar principles apply (see that previous article here https://aocsolicitors.ie/employers-should-be-cautious-of-heat-of-the-moment-resignations/). Link -  https://www.workplacerelations.ie/en/cases/2024/august/adj-00044246.html   Authors – Lia Berkery & Laura Killelea

New Mother Discriminated Against By Employer Awarded €50,000

In Lisa McGrath v Net Smart Security Limited (ADJ-00056559) the Workplace Relations Commission (“the WRC”) found that the Complainant was discriminated against by her employer on the grounds of gender and family status. The Adjudicator, Particia Owens, awarded the Complainant €50,000 (almost two years pay) for the Respondent’s breach of section 77 of the Employment Equality Act, 1998. Facts: The Complainant commenced employment with the Respondent company in August 2022 as an Accounts Administrator. The Complainant commenced a period of maternity leave in January 2024, followed by a period of parental leave up to the 15th of September 2024.  When planning her return to work, the Complainant requested to work part time due to difficulties during her pregnancy and childcare obligations. The Respondent refused this request. The Complainant resigned and submitted complaints of constructive discriminatory dismissal. The Respondent submitted the WRC complaint was out of time and that they acted in good faith at all times and denied the Complainant was discriminated against. The Complainant does not appear to have raised any formal grievance prior to resigning. Decision: Having engaged with the Respondent’s arguments that the Complainant’s claims were out of time, the Adjudicator ultimately determined that the Complainant’s case under the  Employment Equality Acts could be heard. Having considered the evidence offered by both sides, the Adjudicator set out a list of what she determined to be the primary facts in the case including the following: The Complainant was not paid for attending ante natal appointments and her bonus was affected by virtue of her attending these appointments. The Complainant experienced difficulties with her manager after informing her that she was pregnant. No risk assessment was carried out in relation to what, if any, accommodations might be required for the Complainant. The Complainant was refused part time working hours on the basis that it did not take place in the company. However, part time work was allowed for family members of the CEO of the Respondent. There was no meaningful engagement from the Respondent with the Complainant in relation to return to work options and a potential timescale. Despite acknowledging that payments to the Complainant “may have been overlooked” there was no offer by the Respondent to rectify this. In light of the foregoing, the Adjudicator was satisfied that the Complainant had presented facts from which it may be presumed that the principle of equal treatment was not applied to the Complainant. The Adjudicator found that it was clear from the evidence of the Respondent’s witnesses that there was a lack of knowledge in relation to the protection afforded to pregnant employees.  There was no credible explanation to explain why a risk assessment, paid time off for maternity related appointments and meaningful and tangible efforts to reasonably accommodate the Complainant were not undertaken. The Adjudicator found that the Complainant was discriminated against on the grounds of gender and family status and that she was entitled to redress that is “effective; that has a genuine dissuasive effect with regard to the employer and that is commensurate with the injury suffered by her”. The Adjudicator did not consider that reinstatement or reengagement were appropriate in this case. After considering the Complainant’s salary (including bonus) of €26,000, the Complainant’s present loss, future loss and her loss of statutory protection, and the “effects “of the dismissal on the Complainant and to ensure that there is a dissuasive effect with regard to the employer, the Adjudicator awarded her the sum of €50,000. Takeaway for employers: This decision is a strong reminder to employers that they should be aware of their obligations to pregnant employees and employees returning to work post maternity leave. Failures in this regard and any acts of discrimination can prove very costly for the employer. Employers should be cognisant that in employment equality cases, awards of compensation are frequently made for the “effects” of the discrimination, increasing the potential exposure. The award of €50,000.00 in this case was almost two years pay.  See another of our recent Articles here (https://aocsolicitors.ie/pregnant-employee-who-was-dismissed-awarded-e136200-in-wrc/) where the employee was awarded €136,200.00. Employers should also note that the €50,000.00 award in this case was made not withstanding that the employee does not appear to have lodged any formal grievance prior to her resignation. Link - https://workplacerelations.ie/en/cases/2025/july/adj-00056559.html Authors – Jane Holian and Laura Killelea 31st July 2025 AOC Solicitors 19-22 Baggot Street Lower Dublin 2 www.aocsolicitors.ie

Government Publish Updated Code of Practice on Determining Employment Status

Following the 2023 judgement of the Supreme Court in The Revenue Commissioners v Karshan (midlands) Ltd/ T/A Donimo’s Pizza [2023] IESC 24 the Government’s “Code of Practice on Determining Employment Status”(hereafter “the Code”) has been reviewed and updated by an interdepartmental group comprising of the Department of Social Protection (hereafter the “Department”), the Office of the Revenue Commissioners (hereafter the “Revenue”) and the Workplace Relations Commission (hereafter the “WRC”). The Code is intended to provide a clear understanding of the employment status of individuals, taking into account current labour market practices and developments in legislation and case law. Included below is a high level summary of the Code. A full copy of the Code can be accessed here: https://www.gov.ie/en/publication/23e13-code-of-practice-on-determining-employment-status/ General Summary of the Code: The Code confirms that the Department, Revenue and the WRC each have a remit in determining the employment status of a person and that decisions of these bodies are not binding on each other. The Code confirms the five-step framework for determining employment status as set out by the Supreme Court in Karshan and includes specific guidance on each question some of which is briefly summarised below. Question 1: Does the contract involve the exchange of wage or other remuneration for work? Summary Guidance on Question 1: The Code indicates that provided there is payment by a business to a worker for a service “directly or indirectly” for the provision of the worker’s labour, whether agreed in writing or not, and whether the work is carried out on a once off basis or on a continuous basis or anything in between, there is a contract which is capable of being an employment contract. Question 2: If so, is the agreement one where the worker is agreeing to provide their own services, and not those of a third party, to the business? Summary Guidance on Question 2: The Code confirms that the more restrictions imposed on the freedom for a worker to appoint a substitute, the more indicative the arrangement is that of a contract of employment. Question 3: If so, does the business exercise sufficient control over the worker to render the agreement one that is capable of being an employment agreement? Summary Guidance on Question 3: The Code confirms that the right of the business to exercise control is more relevant than whether they actually exercise this right. The Code also confirms that when considering the issue of “control”, a decision maker may have regard to the issues of “enterprise” and “integration”. “Enterprise” being the extent to which the worker carries risk and their ability to make financial gain through their own ingenuity/efficiency. “Integration” being the extent to which a worker is an integral part of the operations of the business/person engaging their services, as opposed to carrying out work that, although done for the business, is peripheral or accessory to it. If question 1,2 or 3 above are answered negatively it means that there can be no contract of employment. Question 4: If the above three requirements are met, all of the circumstances of the arrangement/agreement/ contract must be considered. In other words, whether the terms of the arrangement/agreement/ contract between the business and the worker, interpreted in the light of the practical/real conditions of engagement (the “factual matrix”) are consistent with a contract of employment, or with some other form of contract having regard, in particular, to whether the arrangements point to the worker working for themselves or for the business/employer. Summary Guidance on Question 4: The Code confirms that while a detailed written agreement may carry significant weight, efforts to describe a relationship in a particular way which differs from the day-to-day reality, in order to circumvent or frustrate the operation of statutory provisions, will be challenged. On this point the Code concludes that the question to be considered is whether the facts indicate that the worker is providing services on his or her own account, or whether the facts indicate that the worker is providing the services on behalf of the business. Question 5: Finally, it should be determined whether there is anything in the particular legislative regime under consideration that requires a particular approach to be taken, e.g., a person might be an employee for social insurance purposes but self-employed for employment law or tax purposes. Summary Guidance on Question 5: On this point the Code emphasises that in the context of the WRC determining employment status under the relevant employment legislation, the definitions of ‘contract of employment, ‘employee’ and ‘employer’ differ from one employment enactment to another. Therefore, each case lodged with the WRC for Adjudication is different and is decided on its own facts by an independent Adjudication Officer. Pages 13-14 of the Code set out some typical characteristics of an employee as well as important caveats to same. Pages 15-16 of the Code set out some typical characteristics of self-employment and again sets out important caveats to same. The Code references the term “False/ Bogus self-employment” and confirms it is a term used to describe when a worker, who is in fact engaged under an employee contract of service, is knowingly recorded and reported to Revenue and the Department as if they were operating under a self-employed contract for services. The Code confirms this is a criminal offence subject to significant sanctions under the Social Welfare Acts. The Code also goes into detail on employment status classifications in respect of people who own or control companies, agency workers, intermediary arrangements and workers in the digital/gig economy. Of particular note is the guidance contained at page 17-19 in respect of “intermediary arrangements”. Third Party Intermediary Companies: The Code reflects that there are two main forms of intermediary structures used in lieu of a direct engagement between a worker providing services and the end-user of those services namely “Personal Service Companies” (hereafter “PSC’s”) and “Managed Service Companies (hereafter “MSC’s”). The Code reflects that under a PSC arrangement a contract for services is agreed between the end-user and an intermediary company owned/directed by the worker. A PSC is generally a limited company that typically has a sole director who is the worker/contractor who owns most or all of the shares in the company. A variation of the PSC arrangement above involves the use of what have become known as MSC’s. In essence, this involves setting up a company, which is generally structured with a number of worker shareholders who may or may not be involved in delivering similar services to the same end-user. MSC’s are typically facilitated by a third-party agent who organises the legal and administrative affairs of the Company. Th Code confirms that notwithstanding the use of such intermediary structures, the employment relationship will still be subject to the same five questions provided for by the Karshan ruling (outlined above) when determining whether the worker is self-employed or an employee. The Code confirms that in looking at all the facts and circumstances of the case, it is possible that a decision-maker or Adjudicator may determine that the end-user, is the employer for PRSI purposes. Each case is determined on its own facts. Notwithstanding the above, the Code confirms that for taxation purposes, Revenue cannot, except for limited circumstances provided for in tax legislation, “look through” corporate structures. Interestingly, the Code’s commentary on intermediary structures coincides with a timely WRC decision in which an individual worker was deemed an employee despite being paid through a third party company of which she was the sole shareholder and director - PR Company v Hotel Resort (ADJ-00046181, ADJ-00047024, ADJ-00045524, ADJ-00047375). We have written a separate article on that case which is available at this link.  However, the facts of that case were very unusual, and it will remain to be seen if a similar determination would be made in a case involving different facts. Takeaway from Employers: Employers should familiarise themselves with the Code and ensure that adequate analysis is undertaken of engagements with contractors so as to reduce the chances of costly consequences arising later from a mis-categorisation of the relationship. Employers should also be mindful that contractor arrangements are something that should be kept under review as a relationship that starts out as a genuine contractor arrangement can be deemed to have become an employment relationship over time. In addition to familiarising themselves with this newly updated Code, it would be advisable for employers to familiarise themselves with the detailed guidelines that previously issued from Revenue on this subject. Those guidelines are discussed in our previous article from June of this year available here: https://aocsolicitors.ie/new-revenue-guidelines-for-determining-employment-status/ Link: https://www.gov.ie/en/publication/23e13-code-of-practice-on-determining-employment-status   Author – Laura Killelea 11th December 2024

High Court Clarifies the Scope of a De Novo Appeal to the Labour Court

The High Court judgement of Ms Justice Bolger in Padraic Hanley v. PBR Restaurants Ltd t/a Fish Shack Café [2024] IEHC 662 delivered on 19th November 2024 gives clarification to the scope of a de novo hearing before the Labour Court.It may also permit Complainants to change strategy between the WRC hearing and the Labour Court hearing. Facts: This case was an appeal of the Labour Court decision to the High Court on a point of law. The Appellant had lodged a number of claims including an unfair dismissal claim under section 8 of the Unfair Dismissals Act to the Workplace Relations Commission (“WRC”) on 21st October 2020. The narrative in the WRC Complaint Form stated that there was a breakdown in his relationship with management which he claimed led to a sham redundancy. The Adjudicator found that the Appellant was self-employed from August 2008 to December 2019 and therefore he did not have the one year’s requisite service to take a claim under the Unfair Dismissals Act. She relied mainly on the ‘mutuality of obligation’ test but did make reference to the enterprise test, contract, control, pay, tax and social insurance. The Appellant appealed to the Labour Court. He lodged written submissions in advance of the hearing, most of which focused on his employment status from 2008 to December 2019. On the first of three days of hearing before the Labour Court on 23rd June 2022, the Appellant’s representative claimed for the first time that the Appellant was dismissed wholly or partly for having made protected disclosures. This would obviate the need for the Appellant to have one year’s service to claim unfair dismissal. The Appellant’s representative contended that this was part of the factual submissions made in the WRC claim form in relation to the deterioration of the relationship with management leading to his purported redundancy. The Labour Court invited submissions on whether it had jurisdiction to consider the argument. The Appellant argued that the Labour Court should not deal with the matter as a preliminary point and should hear the evidence in respect of whether or not his dismissal was wholly or mainly on the making of a protected disclosure. The Respondent argued that this was a new head of claim and that the Labour Court did not have jurisdiction to hear it. The Labour Court deemed that it had two preliminary issues to determine, the first in respect of whether it has the jurisdiction to consider the arguments relating to a protected disclosure and, if not, whether the Appellant had the required one year’s service to claim under the Unfair Dismissals Act. The Labour Court referred to its own decision in Dawn Country Meats Ltd v. Hill which related to the Organisation of Working Time Act.  The Labour Court concluded that its jurisdiction under section 44 of the WRC Act is solely that of an appellate body from decisions of the WRC Adjudicators and it has no jurisdiction to act as a court of first instance. It held that it did not have jurisdiction to enlarge the scope of the appeal to allow arguments that were not made at first instance. The Labour Court then considered the employment status of the Appellant from 2008 to December 2019. It relied on the High Court decision in Minister for Agriculture and Food v. Barry and Others and in particular the mutuality of obligation test. It held that the Appellant was not an employee from 2008 to December 2019 and therefore did not have the one year’s service. The Labour Court’s decision issued on 23rd June 2023. The Appellant’s grounds of appeal to the High Court were: The Labour Court was required to hear the evidence on protected disclosures and not decide on the preliminary issue of his employment status alone. The Labour Court erred in law in determining the Appellant was not an employee before December 2019 and in applying a mutuality of obligation test to his situation. Decision: Ms Justice Bolger addressed both grounds of appeal in her judgement. In relation to the Labour Court’s jurisdiction to determine a preliminary issue, Ms Justice Bolger referred to the Supreme Court decision in Fitzgibbon v. The Law Society of Ireland and quotes parts of the judgement in which Clarke J. (as he was then) set out what was involved in a de novo hearing and goes on to state – “In summary, therefore, it seems to me that the use of the term ‘de novo appeal’ or similar terminology, carries with it a requirement that the  appellate  body  exercise  its  own  judgment  on  the  issues  before  it  without any regard to the decision made by the first instance body against whom the appeal lies.” The Supreme Court decision was after the Labour Court’s decision in Dawn Meats. Ms Justice Bolger referred to the statutory jurisdiction of the Labour Court in dealing with an appeal of an unfair dismissal decision in s.44(1)(a)(i) of the WRC Act which requires the Labour Court to “give the parties to an appeal an opportunity to be heard by it and to present to it any evidence relevant to the appeal”. Ms Justice Bolger held that the Labour Court erred in law by refusing to hear the Appellant’s evidence and arguments on what he said was his protected disclosure and the reason for his dismissal and such approach was inconsistent with s.44. Ms Justice Bolger addressed each of the elements referred to in the Labour Court decision and found them not to be in line with s.44 and the nature of a de novo appeal as per the Supreme Court decision in Fitzgibbon. She referred to s.47(1) of WRC Act where a party who did not participate in the WRC hearing could, after paying a fine, appeal the case to the Labour Court and have their case heard for the first time before the Labour Court, which is contrary to what the Labour Court decision referred to. In particular, Ms Justice Bolger pointed out that the claim that was raised by the Appellant in the Labour Court was not a new claim but was one of the 20 situations referred to under s.6(2) of the Unfair Dismissals Act and therefore still a claim under s.8 of the Unfair Dismissals Act as was heard in the WRC. The fact that it was a different argument under s.6 then that argued before the WRC Adjudicator does not make it anything other than an unfair dismissal claim and referred to the fact that all dismissals are deemed unfair unless proved otherwise by the employer. The Respondent argued that the potential higher award that may be granted in respect of a dismissal that is wholly or mainly due to a protected disclosure creates a “new jurisdiction” that was not available to the WRC Adjudicator and therefore the Labour Court should not be allowed to hear the protected disclosure argument. Ms Justice Bolger held that the Respondent confused the monetary jurisdiction of the Labour Court under s.7 with its jurisdiction to hear an appeal pursuant to s.44(1) of the WRC Act. She held that the availability of a higher award does not render the underlying claim anything other than a s.8 Unfair Dismissal Act claim. In relation to the employment status, Ms Justice Bolger applied the Supreme Court decision in The Revenue Commissioners v. Karshan (Midlands) Trading as Dominos Pizza, regardless of the decision having been made after the Labour Court decision that was subject to the appeal. She found that the Labour Court had erred in law by relying on the mutuality of obligation test. Ms Justice Bolger set aside the decision of the Labour Court and sent it back to the Labour Court for a rehearing of the appeal from the WRC. Takeaway for Employers: This High Court decision clarifies the scope of a de novo appeal to the Labour Court and how an employee may change the arguments that he/she wishes to rely upon. However, the claim itself must remain under the same section of the legislation as per the claim before the WRC. As a Respondent has the right to know the case that it has to meet, if such a change occurs in a Labour Court hearing without prior notice, then the Labour Court should give the Respondent time to consider this new argument and possibly put in further written submissions if it so wishes. It should also be noted that sworn evidence from the WRC may still be referred to in the Labour Court and a complete change in argument may result in difficulties for the Complainant in relation to the sworn evidence previously given by him/her. Link https://www.courts.ie/viewer/pdf/c19c0284-260c-41df-9d29-ffda80cac0b6/2024_IEHC_662.pdf/pdf#view=fitH Authors – Anne O’Connell

Pregnant Employee who was Dismissed Awarded €136,200 in WRC

Raquel Vieira Dos Santos Silva v Eteam Workforce Limited (ADJ-00051855) is a decision of the Workplace Relations Commission (“WRC”) in a case under the Employment Equality Acts 1998-2015 (the “Acts”). It concerned an employee who alleged she was dismissed from her employment because she was pregnant. Facts: The Complainant was employed by the Respondent as a Category Sourcing Consultant from 12th December 2022 until 29th February 2024. She was issued with a contract of employment in November 2022, which did not contain an end date. In July 2023 the Complainant informed the Respondent that she was pregnant, following which emails were exchanged regarding her due date and estimated start of her maternity leave. The Complainant was presented with a contract addendum ten days later, purporting to extend her contract from the end of December 2023 until the end of February 2024, the month she was due to commence maternity leave. The Complainant initially refused to sign this addendum as it was the Complainant’s position that she was employed on a full-time permanent basis since her start date, and she told the WRC that there was never any mention of her role being fixed-term in nature. The Complainant submitted to the WRC that she eventually signed this addendum under duress, as she was told that she would receive no income for January and February 2024 if she did not sign it. The Complainant’s employment was terminated on 29th February 2024 while she was on maternity leave. The Respondent’s position was that it was an error that the Complainant’s original contract had no end date. Their legal representative submitted that the Respondent’s contract with their client was being terminated at the same time as the Complainant being due to go on maternity leave, and that they had been actively trying to seek alternative roles for her. Decision: The Adjudicator, Gaye Cunningham, considered whether the Respondent discriminated against the Complainant on the grounds of her gender and whether she was discriminatorily dismissed because of her pregnancy. Under the Acts an employer shall not discriminate against an employee on any of the nine discriminatory grounds. Section 6 (2A) states that: “discrimination on the gender ground shall be taken to occur where, on a ground related to her pregnancy or maternity leave, a woman employee is treated, contrary to any statutory requirement, less favourably than another employee is, has been or would be treated.” In any employment equality case before the WRC, the initial burden of proof is on the Complainant to establish facts from which discrimination may be presumed, before the burden shifts to the Respondent to prove the contrary. The Adjudicator was satisfied that a prima facie case of discrimination had been made out by the Complainant where she had been presented with a contract addendum bringing her contract to an end merely ten days after informing the Respondent of her pregnancy. The Adjudicator seemed critical that no written submissions and, in particular, no documentary evidence, had been provided by the Respondent who relied only on oral evidence at the hearing. For example, no documents were provided showing that the Respondent’s contract with the client was being terminated at the same time that the Complainant was due to go on maternity leave, or showing that they were regularly seeking alternative roles for the Complainant. The Adjudicator accepted the Complainant’s evidence that she was put under pressure to sign the contract addendum and commented that to unilaterally change an employee’s terms and conditions of employment is a serious matter, which is “particularly egregious” where the Complainant had notified the Respondent of her pregnancy. The Adjudicator ultimately found that the Respondent discriminated against the Complainant on the ground of gender and that the Respondent discriminatorily dismissed her on the grounds of gender and related to her pregnancy. In deciding upon redress, the Adjudicator specifically referred to the European Court of Justice case Von Colson & Kamann v Land Nordrhein- Westfalen [1984] ECR 1891, which is authority for the well-established position that the sanction for discrimination should be “effective, dissuasive and proportionate”. It should be noted that this case was referred to by the Complainant in her submissions, along with the WRC case of Dr Jacqueline Elliott v Flexiteam Ltd (ADJ-00045346), where the Adjudicator stated that “the embarrassing and distressful situation the Complainant was put in” should be taken into account when deciding upon the quantum of award. The Respondent was ordered to pay €124,800 for the effects of the discrimination and the distress caused to the Complainant. The Respondent was also ordered to pay €11,400 in respect of her loss of earnings between July and September 2024. Takeaway for Employers: Employers should be aware that pregnant women have strong protection from discrimination in Ireland. This protection is rooted not only in the Acts, but also in the Maternity Protection Acts, EU law and the Irish Constitution. Employers should be wary of taking any steps to terminate a pregnant employee’s employment, or to terminate an employee’s employment while they are on maternity leave, as this is a form of protected leave. Employers should also take note of the high quantum of the award in this case. As noted by the Adjudicator when referring to EU law, awards for discrimination are meant to be dissuasive. In unfair dismissal cases, awards of compensation are based on a complainant’s loss of earnings and complainants are obliged to mitigate their loss and actively seek new employment. However, in employment equality cases, awards of compensation are frequently made for the effects of the discrimination, increasing the potential exposure. Link – https://www.workplacerelations.ie/en/cases/2024/adj-00051855.html Authors – Tara Kelly and Jenny Wakely

Reeling In The Year 2024

It is appropriate at this time of the year to look back at some of the interesting developments and the important cases that have shaped employment law in Ireland in 2024. Code of Practice on the Right to Request Flexible and Remote Working The Workplace Relations Commission (“WRC”) published its highly anticipated Code of Practice on the right to request flexible working for caring purposes for certain categories of workers and the right to request remote working (the “Code”). The Code sets out practical guidance on how to approach requests for flexible and remote working and provides a template Work Life Balance Policy and application form. Further details can be found in our article AOC Article. Parent’s Leave Update From 1st August 2024, parents are now entitled to nine weeks of Parent’s Leave in respect of children born or adopted on or after 1st August 2024, an increase from seven weeks. Parent’s Leave entitles “a relevant parent” to avail of time off work during the first two years of a child’s life, or in the case of adoption, within two years of the placement of the child with the family. During a period of Parent’s Leave, parents will be entitled to avail of Parent’s Benefit through the Department of Social Welfare if they have sufficient PRSI contributions and meet any relevant eligibility requirements. Further details can be found in our article AOC Article. Gender Pay Gap Reporting Update Under The Employment Equality Act 1998 (Section 20A) (Gender Pay Gap Information) (Amendment) Regulations 2024 ( “the 2024 Regulations), from 31st May 2024, reporting requirements have been extended to employers with at least 150 employees. All employers with at least 150 employees were required to choose a snapshot date in June 2024 and were required to report within six months of that date. The 2024 Regulations also introduced changes to how gender pay gap reporting is carried out and clarified that basic pay includes payments made to employees (by the State and/or by an employer) during adoptive, maternity, paternity and parent’s leave. Reporting requirements will be extended to employers with at least 50 employees in 2025. Further details can be found in our AOC Article. Sick Leave Act 2022 – Update On 1 January 2024, statutory sick leave was increased to 5 days’ sick pay a year, an increased from 3 days in 2023).  It is proposed that the entitlement will increase to 7 days in 2025 and 10 days in 2026. However, at the time of writing this has yet to be confirmed. The Sick Leave Act 2022 is linked here. New criteria for non-disclosure agreements regarding discrimination, harassment and/or victimisation. A new section was added into the Employment Equality Act which restricts employers entering into non-disclosure agreements with employees relating to any allegations of discrimination, harassment, sexual harassment and victimisation. However, the section goes on to provide that this does not apply to agreements reached through the WRC Mediation Services or where it complies with the requirements of an excepted non-disclosure agreement. Further details can be found in our article AOC Article. Government Publish’s Updated Code of Practice on Determining Employment Status. Following the 2023 judgement of the Supreme Court in The Revenue Commissioners v Karshan (midlands) Ltd/ T/A Donimo’s Pizza [2023] IESC 24 the Government’s “Code of Practice on Determining Employment Status” has been reviewed and updated. The Code is intended to provide a clear understanding of the employment status of individuals, taking into account current labour market practices and developments in legislation and case law. Further details can be found in our Article. Supreme Court Clarification on the law on Mandatory Retirement Age - Seamus Mallon v The Minister For Justice, Ireland, and The AG [2024] IESC 20  The Supreme Court issued an important judgement clarifying the law on mandatory retirement ages. It clarified that contrary to what had previously been understood, the law on mandatory retirement age setting, does not presumptively require case by case or role by role assessment or that such individual assessment must be shown to be impractical if a generally applicable retirement age is to be justified. Further details can be found in our article AOC Article. The principles in Mallon were subsequently followed in Holland v HSE and Ors [2024] IEHC 533 . Supreme Court Rules High Court Erred in Re-engaging School Principal in a Manner that Meant He was Effectively Reinstated - An Bord Banistíochta, Gaelscoil Moshíológ v The Labour Court and Aodhagán Ó Súird and the Department of Education [2024] IESC 38 The Supreme Court found that the High Court, Labour Court and the Workplace Relations Commission (“WRC”) had erred in law in ordering the re-engagement of a principal of a primary school, in a long-standing dispute. The Supreme Court addressing the remedies of reinstatement and re-engagement under the Unfair Dismissals Acts and made it abundantly clear to lower decision-making bodies that those remedies are only to be ordered in exceptional cases. Factors to be considered in cases seeking these remedies include the passage of time, the state of relations between the parties, changes in the workplace, and the implications on innocent third parties. Further details can be found in our article AOC Article. WRC Holds Fiddler To Be An Employee - Matthew McGranaghan v. MEPC Music Ltd (ADJ-00037668) The Complainant in this case had brought a number of complaints to the Workplace Relations Commission (“the WRC”) alleging that he was an employee and not self-employed and, on that basis, he successfully claimed that he was unfairly dismissed; not paid his notice entitlement; not paid his annual leave or public holiday entitlement. This decision illustrated how easy it is now going to be for workers to be able to prove that in reality they are employees. It is vital that all businesses that engage with contractors who provide personal service review their arrangements. There are careful steps that need to be considered in respect of each of these options. However, doing nothing is no longer a viable option. Further details can be found in our article  AOC Article. Twitter ordered to pay €550,000 to Former Employee - Gary Rooney v Twitter International Unlimited Company (ADJ – 00044246) This case is hugely significant for employers who operate employee incentive/equity schemes as it paves the way for employees to claim for loss of benefits under those schemes as part of an unfair dismissal claim. This case also reinforces the principle that resignations need to be unequivocal and unambiguous and that if an employer wrongly treats a termination of employment as a resignation, there will likely be a legal exposure under Unfair Dismissals Acts. The decision is under appeal to the Labour Court. Further details can be found in our article  AOC Article. Supreme Court Decision Makes It Very Difficult For Employers To Obtain an Injunction To Restrain Industrial Action in the Future - H.A. O’Neil Limited v. Unite the Union and Ors [2024] IESC 8 The Supreme Court judgements in this case make it extremely difficult for an employer to obtain an injunction restraining picketing and other industrial action in the future. It highlights that alternative reliefs and action may need to be explored by employers in such circumstances. Further details can be found in our article AOC Article. Employee Awarded Significant Compensation for Unfair Dismissal by WRC - Michael Kiely v Hyph Ireland Limited (ADJ-00037708) The Adjudicator found that the Complainant in this matter was unfairly dismissed and assessed his financial loss to be €460,000 over 17 months. He made an adjustment of €20,000 to account for a five-month period following expiration of the Complainant’s non-compete clause, reducing the financial loss figure to €440,000. This decision is interesting in terms of the comprehensive assessment of financial loss by the Adjudicator. Of particular note is the Adjudicator’s view that because the Complainant was a “successful entrepreneur” he had “every right to pursue that goal to re-establish himself in a similar role that he was dismissed from”, and that it was not reasonable for him to compromise that “legitimate goal” by accepting “any work that detracts from that objective.” Employers need to bear this in mind in terms of assessing the potential level of exposure in respect of a former employee who is or was a successful entrepreneur, and the efforts that he or she has made to mitigate his or her loss. Employers should also consider the potential impact of post termination restrictions on a former employee’s ability to mitigate his/her loss. Further details can be found in our article AOC Article.  

WRC Finds Employer’s Sick Pay Scheme More Favourable Overall Than Statutory Sick Pay Scheme

 In Alan Lehane v Sean Ahern Ltd ADJ-00051505, the Workplace Relations Commission (“WRC”) found that an employer’s sick pay scheme was more favourable overall than entitlements provided for under the Sick Leave Act 2022 (“the Act”),notwithstanding that the Complainant had been disadvantaged by a waiting period under the employer’s sick pay scheme. Facts: The Complainant’s case was that he was an employee of the Respondent from August 2021 to February 2024. He claimed that in January 2024, he was absent from work for three consecutive days. The Complainant submitted that he had noticed that his next payslip did not reflect payment for these absences, as he had anticipated given the Respondent participated in the Construction Worker’s Pension Scheme (“CWPS”) and followed the CWPS sick pay scheme (“CWPS scheme”). The Complainant claimed that he queried this with his employer, who informed him that the CWPS scheme did not provide sick pay until a fourth day of absence. The Complainant contended that he should have received pay for his absences through the statutory sick pay scheme (“SSP”) instead, as it would entitle him to be paid from the first day of absence. It was the Complainant’s submission that the SSP was the more favourable of the two schemes and highlighted that the CWPS scheme’s three-day waiting period meant that he may never claim the benefit of sick pay due to potentially only ever being absent for short periods of time. It was the Respondent’s submission that the Industrial Relations Sub Committee of the CWPS conducted a comparison exercise between the CWPS scheme and SSP. The Respondent contended that the result of that exercise was a recommendation that the CWPS scheme substitute the SSP, in accordance with section 9 of the Act as it is more favourable to employees. The Respondent further submitted that the WRC’s decision in Karolina Leszczynska v Musgrave Operating Partners Ireland (“the Musgrave case”) supported this substitution. Decision: The Adjudicating Officer stated that the Act is intended to confer a benefit on employees who have no contractual entitlement to paid sick leave. The SSP at that time provided five days sick pay over a twelve-month period, at a rate of 70% normal pay up to a maximum of €110, whichever the lesser. In line with section 8(1) of the Act, an employer may provide a sick pay scheme that is as favourable or more favourable to its employees than the SSP, and “…any such provision shall be in substitution for, and not in addition to that entitlement”. Section 9 of the Act states that an employer shall not be obliged to provide SSP “where the terms of the scheme confer, over the course of a reference period set out in the scheme, benefits that are, as a whole, more favourable to the employee than statutory sick leave.” Although the Adjudicating Officer recognised that the three-day wait period under the CWPS scheme put the Complainant at a disadvantage whereby he was not entitled to receive any sick pay until his fourth day of absence, the Adjudicating Officer was satisfied that the CWPS scheme was, on the whole, a more favourable scheme compared to that under the 2022 Act. The Respondent demonstrated that the CWPS scheme allowed for payment of 50 days sick pay per annum, which was accepted as being more favourable than the SSP allowance. The Adjudicating Officer noted that the benefits conferred by the CWPS scheme outweighed the disadvantage the Complainant faced. Takeaway for Employers: This decision is an interesting development on recent caselaw on the Sick Leave Act 2022. This decision appears to follow the rationale of the Musgrave case, which determined that the benefits of a company’s sick pay scheme will be considered as a whole and compared with the overall benefits of the SSP. Our readers will note the contrast between these decisions and Ann Britton v Amcor Flexibles Ltd, in which it was decided that a company sick pay scheme was, as a whole, less favourable than the SSP, having regard to the disadvantage faced by the Complainant as an employee with less than twelve months service (links to our previous articles on these case are below). These cases highlight the importance of evaluating company sick leave policies on a regular basis to ensure that they do not fall short of the SSP allowance. Link - Alan Lehane v Sean Ahern Ltd WRC Examines First Case Under Sick Leave Act 2022 WRC Finds that Company Sick Pay Scheme less favourable overall than the Statutory Sick Pay Scheme Authors – Lia Berkery & Laura Killelea

WRC Looks Behind Company and Deems an Individual an Employee

The WRC recently delivered decisions on a number of employment law claims brought by the Complainant in a case entitled PR Company v Hotel Resort (ADJ-00046181, ADJ-00047024, ADJ-00045524, ADJ-00047375). The decisions are noteworthy as the WRC found the individual to be an employee (and not an independent contractor) for the purpose of various employment law statutes notwithstanding that she was paid through a company. Facts: On various dates in 2023 the Complainant lodged claims against the Respondent under a number of different employment law statutes. The Complainant described herself as the PR and Digital Marketing Manager for the Respondent. She submitted that while she performed some duties as an independent contractor, following a successful application for a work permit, she became an employee of the Respondent. The Respondent submitted the Complainant was never their employee and that all work she completed on their behalf was as an independent contractor. The Respondent submitted that the duties she carried out were completed by a limited company of which the Complainant was the sole director. It was submitted the Complainant retained complete autonomy over the strategies and operations of her company. The Respondent submitted that they imposed no restrictions as to when or how the Complainant completed work assigned to her company nor was she assigned any company laptop, phone or other assets to complete her work. As part of their defence, the Respondent referred to documentation where the Complainant allegedly referred to herself as a “contractor”. They also argued she was in a position to substitute others to complete work for her so long as the work was completed by her limited company. The Respondent referenced an invoice that named a different individual within the Complainant’s company. There were some very unusual facts in this case, including the Complainant being under the investigation of the Gardai at the time of the WRC hearing and a significant dispute around the level of knowledge/involvement by the Respondent in respect of the Complainant’s application for the abovementioned employment permit. It was not in dispute that for a period of time from March 2023, the Complainant provided services to the Respondent as an independent contractor and that such services were provided by a third party company of which the Complainant was the sole shareholder and director. However, the position of the Complainant was that this arrangement was to come to an end with the commencement of her employment visa/permit in August 2022. The Respondent on the other hand argued that the Complainant remained an independent contractor at all times and, notwithstanding the terms of the Complainant’s visa/permit, she did not take up direct employment with them at any point during their engagement. Decision: In determining whether the Complainant was an employee or independent contractor, the Adjudicator applied the five question framework set out by the Supreme Court in the case of Revenue Commissioners v Karshan [2023] IESC 24.Those questions are as follows: Does the contract involve the exchange of wage or other remuneration for work? If so, is the agreement one pursuant to which the worker is agreeing to provide their own services, and not those of a third party, to the employer? If so, does the employer exercise sufficient control over the putative employee to render the agreement one that is capable of being an employment agreement? If these three requirements are met the decision maker must then determine whether the terms of the contract between employer and worker interpreted in the light of the admissible factual matrix and having regard to the working arrangements between the parties as disclosed by the evidence, are consistent with a contract of employment, or with some other form of contract having regard, in particular, to whether the arrangements point to the putative employee working for themselves or for the putative employer. Finally, it should be determined whether there is anything in the particular legislative regime under consideration that requires the court to adjust or supplement any of the foregoing. In analysing these questions, the Adjudicator considered the extent of the Respondent’s knowledge and involvement with the Complainant’s employment permit application process. While the board of the Respondent denied any knowledge of same, the Complainant opened various communications from the then General Manager advising her to make the permit application and acknowledging the application while it was in progress. There also appears to have been some level of acknowledgement on the part of the Respondent that the former General Manger did assist the Complainant with the permit application. The Adjudicator concluded that while the Respondent had noted that the Complainant signed the permit application on the part of the former general manager, and apparently drafted an accompanying contract of employment of her own volition, it was apparent that the senior management of the Respondent was aware, at all times, that the Complainant intended to make such an application in the anticipation of the commencement of direct employment with their organisation. The Adjudicator went on to comment that it is apparent it waas a condition precedent of the permit application that the applicant must have secured an offer of employment prior to the award of the permit and that while the Respondent had raised many deeply concerning points in respect to the manner by which the Complainant applied for the permit, the fact remained that the Respondent was aware she was making the application and should have been aware that such application would by operation of statute serve to create an employment relationship between the parties. The Adjudicator went on to state that if the Respondent intended for the Complainant to remain as an independent contractor, then they had a duty to make this extremely clear to her, particularly when her ongoing residence in the state was dependent on her ongoing employment with the Respondent. As mentioned above, there were a number of very unusual issues that arose in this case. Another such point was the fact that the Complainant opened correspondence from the Respondent in which the Respondent apparently sought to ostensibly terminate its agreement with the Complainant and then later stated that should the Complainant return various passwords and digital marketing assets, the Respondent would come to an arrangement regarding the Complainant’s ongoing visa and continued residence. On this point, the Adjudicator commented that it was “utterly inappropriate” for the Complainant’s visa status and ongoing residence to be used as a form of bargaining chip and that the foregoing further illustrates the Respondent were well aware of the Complainant’s status and were prepared to rely on same, and the consequent contract of employment implied by same, when the result was to their benefit. The Adjudicator commented that in considering the various points that arose in this case, it was apparent that the facts represented an extremely unusual set of circumstances and even having considered voluminous submissions from both parties etc. it remained difficult to classify the relationship between the parties with any degree of certainty. Nonetheless, the Adjudicator determined that applying the Karshan principles it could be seen that in respect of question 1, the contract between the Complainant, “or at least the corporate entity controlled by the Complainant”, and the Respondent involved the exchange of remuneration for work. Significantly, the Adjudicator determined that “While the Respondent placed a great deal of reliance on the fact that all payments were issued through a third-party company controlled by the Complainant, such a system is commonplace in complaints of incorrectly classed self-employment and cannot, of itself, disqualify the existence of a contract of employment”. In respect of question 2 of the Karshan framework the Adjudicator noted the Complainant’s evidence that she was under the direct control and supervision of the Respondent and that while the Respondent submitted a third party could have provided such services, there was no evidence of such services having been provided by a third party. On the question of control, the Respondent had argued that they exerted little to no control over the Complainant in the manner in which she performed her duties and noted that she performed most of her duties on a remote basis. On this point the Adjudicator commented that while the concept of control is a crucial criterion by which an engagement might be classified as a contract of employment, in recent times an increasing number of roles are performed either fully or partially remotely and that the nature of the Complainant’s role was that such duties could be performed remotely. The Adjudicator noted the Complainant’s evidence that she performed such duties under the direct control and supervision of the incoming general manager. In respect of questions 4 and 5 of the Karshan framework the Adjudicator noted the Respondent’s position was that the relationship was entirely inconsistent with a contract of employment and the arrangements did point to the Complainant working for herself. The Adjudicator commented that while this point was far from conclusive, the fifth question of the Karshan framework advises that any finding must be adjusted based on the existence of a particular legislative regime. The Adjudicator commented that in this regard, the relevant legislative regime provides that in sponsoring, or at least having constructive knowledge of the application for residence, the Respondent engaged in a process that would have the legal requirement of the criterion of a contract of employment and any finding in respect of question 4 of the Karshan framework must be viewed in this respect. The Adjudicator ultimately concluded that the Complainant was engaged under a contract of employment and moved on to consider her various employment law claims against the Respondent. Takeaway for Employers: This case shows that in contractor arrangements even where an individual is engaged through a company, the WRC may in theory be willing to look behind that company and deem the individual worker to be an employee. It will be interesting to see whether the case is appealed. It is important to point out that the facts of this case were very unusual, and it would remain to be seen whether the WRC would adopt a similar approach in another case. The case is timely in circumstances where the Government has recently published an updated Code of Practice on Determining Employment Status. It is noteworthy in the context of this case, that the code includes a whole section on the use of intermediary arrangements in lieu of a direct engagement between a worker and an end user and sets out how Revenue and the Department of Social Protection are likely to approach such arrangements. See our article summarising the provisions of the Code available at this link. Links: https://www.workplacerelations.ie/en/cases/2024/november/adj-00046181.html https://www.workplacerelations.ie/en/cases/2024/november/adj-00047024.html https://www.workplacerelations.ie/en/cases/2024/november/adj-00045524.html https://www.workplacerelations.ie/en/cases/2024/november/adj-00047375.html Author – Laura Killelea

Parent’s Leave Update August 2024

An increase in the amount of Parent’s Leave was expected this year following Budget 2024. As highlighted in our first newsletter of 2024, an increase in the amount of Parent’s Leave was expected this year following Budget 2024. From 1st August 2024, parents are now entitled to nine weeks of Parent’s Leave in respect of children born or adopted on or after 1st August 2024, an increase from seven weeks. Parent’s Leave entitles “a relevant parent” to avail of time off work during the first two years of a child’s life, or in the case of adoption, within two years of the placement of the child with the family. A relevant parent is the parent of the child, the spouse/civil partner/cohabitant of the parent of the child, the adopting parents or parent of the child or the spouse/civil partner/cohabitant of the adopting parent of the child (if they have not adopted the child together) or the parent of a donor-conceived child (as provided for under section 5 of the Children and Family Relationships Act 2015). During a period of Parent’s Leave, parents will be entitled to avail of Parent’s Benefit through the Department of Social Welfare if they have sufficient PRSI contributions and meet any relevant eligibility requirements. Parent’s Leave was initially introduced in Ireland by the Parent’s Leave and Benefit Act 2019. This legislation initially provided for only two weeks of Parent’s Leave, but this has been steadily increased over the past number of years. For further updates throughout the year, please keep an eye on our newsletter! Authors – Tara Kelly and Jenny Wakely

Employee Dismissed on Probation Awarded €15,000 for Discriminatory Dismissal and Failure to Provide Reasonable Accommodation

In the case of Abdulah Aljaber v Dawn Meats Group Unlimited Company (ADJ-00036503), the Complainant brought... In the case of Abdulah Aljaber v Dawn Meats Group Unlimited Company (ADJ-00036503), the Complainant brought a successful case under the Employment Equality Acts 1998-2015 (“the Acts”) on the basis that he was discriminatory dismissed on the ground of disability and the Respondent failed to fulfil its obligations in relation to providing reasonable accommodation for his disability. Facts: The Complainant began employment with the Respondent in October 2020. He received online training during the COVID-19 Pandemic which he considered to be inadequate. He submits that he often had to carry heavy trays of meat, sometimes over 25kgs, in sub zero temperatures. The Complainant sustained an injury to his back in January 2021. It is in dispute as to whether this injury was sustained at work or at home. On 5th January 2021, the Complainant’s GP sent a letter to the Respondent advising that the Complainant had ‘radicular lumbar back pain’ and requesting that the Complainant be tasked with light duties. The Respondent submits that due to the nature of the work, there were no light duties available. The Respondent submits that the Complainant received a probation review on 22nd December 2020 which outlined a number of instances of lateness and absence. The Respondent alleges that the Complainant met with the Safety Manager on 7th January 2021 without a medical fitness certificate to return to work after a period of sick leave. Following this, the Safety Manager issued an email to a number of colleagues outlining a number of concerns that he had in relation to the Complainant, including hygiene concerns such as the lack of a face mask when necessary. The Respondent further alleges that in July 2021 a number of meetings were arranged with the Complainant that he failed to attend due to illness.  On 12th July 2021 the Complainant was advised that due to his absence and lack of return to work date, that he had failed his probation and that his contract was being terminated.  The Respondent told the Complainant that if he were fit to work in the future that he should reapply for a job with them. Preliminary Issue: The Adjudicator, Gaye Cunningham, noted the difficulty in investigating this complaint due to numerous submissions, correspondence from the Complainant’s solicitor, threats of judicial review and interruptions during evidence in the three hearings. Allegations were made against the Respondent regarding hygiene and and falsification of records, all of which were refuted by the Respondent. The Adjudicator noted that the investigation of the complaint was under the Employment Equality Act 1998 on the ground of disability, discriminatory dismissal and failure to provide reasonable accommodation. There were no complaints under the Protected Disclosures Act 2014 or the Safety Health and Welfare at Work Act 2005. The Adjudicator reiterated that she had a duty to inquire and investigate and admit only relevant evidence, citing the Supreme Court decision in County Louth Vocational Education Committee v Equality Tribunal and Pearse Brannigan [2016] IESC 40 where it was stated that in relation to the Tribunal, it must be determined what has lawfully been referred to it with a view to providing redress – the Tribunal cannot freelance its inquiries. The Adjudicator thus clarified that the complaint at hand is that the Complainant suffers from a disability and was dismissed as a result of such, and that the Respondent made no effort to provide the Complainant with reasonable accommodation. Decision: The Adjudicator found that the Complainant’s back injury met the definition of disability under Section 2 of the Acts, citing the seven medical certificates submitted in relation to his absence from work which stated “lumbar spine disc prolapse” and “medical illness.” The Adjudicator noted that the Complainant was employed with the Respondent for less than three months when he went on long term sick leave. The Adjudicator held that no due process was followed when the Complainant was dismissed for having failed his probation, as per S.I. 146/2000 where the employee ought to be given the right to reply, right to representation and right to appeal the decision to dismiss. The Adjudicator stated that despite the short service, there was some onus on the Respondent to afford the Complainant due process. She noted that despite the seven medical certificates submitted to the Respondent, the Complainant had not been referred to Occupational Health. However, it was the fact that the Respondent had offered the Complainant the opportunity to apply again for a job with the Company if and when he was fit to do so that led the Adjudicator to conclude that the dismissal of the Complainant was linked to his disability. In relation to the latter element of the Complainant’s complaint, the Adjudicator noted Section 16(3) of the Acts in which the obligations and requirements on employers to take appropriate measures to enable a person with a disability to have access to employment. It was noted that for reasonable accommodation to arise, it is necessary for the employee in question not only to have a disability within the meaning of the Acts but also that appropriate measures must be necessary in order for the employee to undertake their duties. The Adjudicator cited the Supreme Court in Nano Nagle School v Daly in relation to this issue where it was stated that an enquiry into whether reasonable accommodations were necessary could only be held to be adequate if the employee concerned was “allowed a full opportunity to participate at each level, and, on the facts of that case, to present relevant medical evidence, and submissions.” The Adjudicator in the present case found that there was no such enquiry into whether the Complainant could be reasonably accommodated with the opportunity to carry on employment with the Respondent company, and that the evidence of the Respondent was simply to state that there were no light duties available without any examination of alternatives, no medical examination and no input from the Complainant. The Adjudicator therefore held that the Respondent discriminated against the Complainant on the grounds of disability and failed to fulfil the requirements in relation to the matter of reasonable accommodation. The Adjudicator held that the complaint was well founded and ordered the Respondent to pay the Complainant €15,000 compensation. Takeaway for Employers: Employers should note that, regardless of the length of service or availability of light duties, it cannot simply dismiss an employee due to a disability without following fair procedures which includes obtaining medical evidence and including input from the employee in question throughout the process. Furthermore, reasonable accommodation must also be properly examined again with the input of medical evidence and the employee’s input. Link  - https://www.workplacerelations.ie/en/cases/2024/july/adj-00036503.html Authors – Anne O’Connell and Hannah Smullen

Employers should be cautious of ‘Heat of the Moment’ Resignations

In a recent decision of the Workplace Relations Commission (“WRC”) in Darryl Scales v Ennistymon Parish... In a recent decision of the Workplace Relations Commission (“WRC”) in Darryl Scales v Ennistymon Parish & Community Group ADJ-00047886, the Complainant alleged he was unfairly dismissed under section 6 of the Unfair Dismissals Act 1977 (“the Act”) while the Respondent alleged the Complainant had resigned. Facts: The dispute regarding whether the Complainant was dismissed or resigned revolved around a meeting of 4th August 2023, between the Complainant and his supervisor. It appears there was no dispute that on Friday 4 August 2023, the Complainant turned up unannounced on his day off in the office of his supervisor. He appeared to be dissatisfied with the way an investigation into a particular workplace incident was being carried out. There was no dispute that at the said meeting the Complainant threw his key back to his supervisor. It appears that, when asked by his supervisor if he was coming back to work on the next morning, the Complainant’s reply was to the effect that he was not, why would he, and that he was leaving. It seems that the parties’ interpretation of the Complainant’s response was completely different. There was no dispute that the Complainant did not turn up for work on Saturday 5th August and Sunday 6th August 2023. The Complainant did not contact the Respondent at all to explain his non-attendance. The Complainant, at the adjudication hearing asserted that he declined to work but he did not resign. The Respondent, on the other hand, contended that the Complainant resigned his position. Decision: Adjudicator Ewa Sobanska held that the complaint of unfair dismissal was well-founded. She found that even if she were to accept the Respondent’s position that its understanding was that the Complainant resigned his position, legal precedent cautioned against ‘heat of the moment’ resignations. The Adjudicator stated that best practise provides an employee is allowed to come back to at least discuss the case when tempers are cooled. She referred to the Labour Court decision of Shinkwin v Donna Millett EED044 and various other authorities in support of this position. The award in this case was low at €990 but this was linked to the fact that the Complainant was deemed not to have met the required standard in terms of his efforts to mitigate his loss (i.e. find alternative employment). The Complainant had taken on a full-time course and so he was unavailable for work. If the Complainant had been deemed to have met the necessary standard in terms of efforts to mitigate his loss the award would likely have been higher. Takeaway for Employers: Employers are advised to be cautious of accepting ‘heat of the moment’ resignations at face value. Actions or words during a heated exchange should not generally be taken as final. Instead, discussions should continue when tensions have deescalated and the intent behind an employee’s actions or words can be determined, particularly to enquire whether resignation was really intended. Employers need to be aware that if they accept a heat of the moment resignation and treat the employment relationship as terminated, depending on the circumstances, this could result in a successful unfair dismissal claim by the employee. Link - https://www.workplacerelations.ie/en/cases/2024/july/adj-00047886.html Authors – Lia Berkery & Laura Killelea

Gender Pay Gap Reporting Update

As highlighted in our previous article in June 2022 entitled “Employers to Begin Mandatory Reporting of Gender Pay Gap... As highlighted in our previous article in June 2022 entitled “Employers to Begin Mandatory Reporting of Gender Pay Gap Information for the First Time” (link below), the Gender Pay Gap Information Act 2021 (“the Act”) came into force on 31st May 2022. The Act amends the Employment Equality Act 1998 and aims to ensure greater transparency regarding differences in the remuneration of employees by reference to gender. The Act requires relevant employers to do the following: Publish an annual report identifying any gender pay gaps within their organisation; and Publish a “relevant report” explaining the reasons for such a pay gap and identifying steps it can take to reduce or eliminate it. The reporting requirements are being rolled out incrementally based on the size of the employer. Employers with 250 or more employees have been required to report since December 2022. Those employers were required to select a date in June 2022, a so-called “snapshot” date, and report within six months. From 31st May 2024, reporting requirements have been extended to employers with at least 150 employees. The Employment Equality Act 1998 (Section 20A) (Gender Pay Gap Information) (Amendment) Regulations 2024 update the Employment Equality Act 1998 (Section 20A) (Gender Pay Gap Information) Regulations 2022 by amending the definition of “relevant employer” to an employer who employs not less than 150 employees on the relevant date. All employers with at least 150 employees were required to choose a snapshot date in June 2024 and they are required to report within six months of that date. The 2024 Regulations also introduce changes to how gender pay gap reporting is carried out. These changes include the following: An update to the formula used to calculate an employee’s working hours. A change to the treatment of share options and interests in shares which are now treated as benefits in kind as opposed to bonus remuneration. Clarification that basic pay includes payments made to employees (by the State and/or by an employer) during adoptive, maternity, paternity and parent’s leave. Reporting requirements will be extended to employers with at least 50 employees in 2025. Links – https://aocsolicitors.ie/employers-to-begin-mandatory-reporting-of-gender-pay-gap-information-for-the-first-time/ https://www.irishstatutebook.ie/eli/2021/act/20/enacted/en/print.html The Employment Equality Act 1998 (section 20A)(Gender Pay Gap Information) Regulations 2022 The Employment Equality Act 1998 (section 20A)(Gender Pay Gap Information)(Amendment) Regulations 2024 Author – Jenny Wakely

Leave to Appeal to Supreme Court Sought by Civilian Garda Driver who was Refused Interlocutory Injunction by High Court

A civilian garda driver, Mr Tom Ronan, is seeking leave to appeal to the Supreme Court after having been refused an interlocutory injunction by the High Court. Mr Ronan was recently successful in a complaint before the Workplace Relations Commission (“WRC”) in which he claimed that he was discriminated against on the ground of age when he was forced to retire at 70. That decision is under appeal to the Labour Court. Decision of the Workplace Relations Commission In our newsletter article “WRC Orders Re-Engagement of Driver Forced to Retire at 70 – Mandatory Retirement ‘Highly Likely’ to Cause Him Financial Hardship” here, we examined the WRC decision in Tom Ronan v An Garda Síochána (ADJ-00047174). In that decision the Adjudicator, Brian Dalton, found that the Complainant who was forced to retire at 70 was discriminated against on the ground of age. He ordered that the Complainant be re-engaged in his role as a driver with the Respondent organisation within a period of four weeks from the date of the decision, and that his employment be extended by a further three years from the date of re-engagement. What was particularly interesting in that decision, was the fact that the retirement age was objectively justified, but the Adjudicator nevertheless found that the mandatory retirement age was unreasonable for the Complainant due to the financial hardship that he would endure. The Respondent appealed the WRC decision to the Labour Court, which will involve a de novo hearing. Interim Injunction Mr Ronan was successful in his application to the High Court for an interim injunction requiring the Garda Commissioner to immediately re-engage him as a civilian driver with An Garda Síochána and he returned to work performing his duties on a “for time being” basis. Interlocutory Injunction However, Mr Ronan’s application for an interlocutory injunction was recently refused by the High Court. On 14th February 2025, Mr Justice Rory Mulcahy refused to continue the interim order. In Tom Ronan v. Commissioner for An Garda Siochana, Ireland and the Attorney General [2025] IEHC 79 Mr Justice Mulcahy found that: “there seems little doubt that the plaintiff cannot pursue a claim in this court that he has been discriminated against on the grounds of age, there being a statutory remedy available, a statutory remedy, moreover, which he has been pursuing since 2023.” He found that the appropriate manner to pursue the Plaintiff’s claim for discrimination on the grounds of age was through the statutory mechanism of the WRC and the Labour Court. He found that it would not be appropriate for him to “trespass” on the decision-making role of the Labour Court to which the WRC decision has been appealed. Mr Justice Mulcahy found that the Plaintiff appeared not to be entitled to a remedy for discrimination on the grounds of age from the High Court “at all”. Mr Justice Mulcahy further decided that the granting of an injunction in this case would, as in the case of Power v HSE [2019] IEHC 462, involve the court deciding matters on an interlocutory basis in circumstances where it “would not and could not decide the substance of the case.” He also found that the statutory scheme for dealing with age discrimination cases does not require WRC decisions to be implemented where they are appealed to the Labour Court and are awaiting a de novo hearing in the Labour Court. He referred to section 43(3) of the Workplace Relations Act 2015 which makes it clear that where a WRC decision is appealed to the Labour Court, the WRC order cannot be enforced by the District Court. “That being so, it is clearly not correct to suggest that an order from the WRC which is under appeal should be treated as being operative. To grant an injunction to give effect to the terms of the WRC order would, therefore, not supplement but subvert the statutory scheme.” He decided that even if there was an exceptional jurisdiction to grant relief where there is a statutory remedy, that jurisdiction would be limited to exceptional circumstances where the statutory remedy was “wholly undermined”.  In this case, he was satisfied that there were no such exceptional circumstances, and the statutory scheme had not been wholly undermined. Mr Ronan is now seeking leave to appeal the High Court refusal to the Supreme Court or in the alternative to the Court of Appeal. Takeaway for Employers: The area of mandatory retirement ages and age discrimination is a complex one. It will be very interesting to see what the Labour Court decides in respect of the appeal of the WRC decision in this case. It is advisable for employers to obtain legal advice before terminating an employee’s employment on the basis of a mandatory retirement age, and in considering a request(s) from an employee to work beyond the mandatory retirement age. Links: https://www.courts.ie/acc/alfresco/f6943dfd-a270-47bc-ad6a-cd4f8f0b2fc3/2025_IEHC_79.pdf/pdf#view=fitH (High Court decision) https://www.workplacerelations.ie/en/cases/2024/october/adj-00047174.html (WRC decision) https://aocsolicitors.ie/wrc-orders-re-engagement-of-driver-forced-to-retire-at-70-mandatory-retirement-highly-likely-to-cause-him-financial-hardship/ (Our previous article in respect of the WRC decision) Author – Jenny Wakely 3rd March 2025 Anne O’Connell Solicitors 19-22 Lower Baggot Street Dublin 2. www.aocsolicitors.ie

WRC Finds that Dismissal of Airport Senior Executive Arrested for Theft was Fair

In Gerard Carey v DAA plc Dublin Airport Authority (ADJ-00048839), the Workplace Relations Commission (the “WRC”) found that a senior executive at Dublin Airport Authority who was arrested for theft, was not unfairly dismissed by his employer. The Adjudicator, Michael McEntee, found that the Complainant’s claim under section 8 of the Unfair Dismissals Act, 1977 was not successfully made out as the relationship of trust and confidence had irreparably broken down and an extensive and fair process had taken place. Facts: The Complainant had a long history of employment with the Respondent, having begun employment in March 1998, and having been promoted to his final position in 2008. The Complainant admitted that he has been arrested by the Gardaí for alleged theft from an airport retailer on 29th June 2023. He claimed that he was then subjected to a lengthy and unfair, prejudicial investigation, disciplinary, and appeal hearings by the Respondent. He also claimed that insufficient regard was had for his mental health and personal circumstances by the Respondent and that the Respondent had ignored the medical evidence he provided. The Complainant referred to the decision of Frizelle v New Ross Credit Union Ltd [1997] IEHC 137 in which Flood J. held that dismissal must be proportionate to any wrongdoing. The Complainant claimed that the decision to dismiss him, given his lengthy service and previous unblemished record, was disproportionate. He claimed that the Respondent did not take into account the “overwhelming mitigating circumstances”. The Respondent’s position was that the breach of trust by the Complainant was a key issue in this case, in particular in an airport setting where security and trust in employees is paramount. Evidence was heard from the disciplinary manager, Mr D, who was of the view that the Respondent simply could no longer trust the Complainant in the Safety/Regulatory area of the organisation. When asked if any alternative, or less senior roles for the Complainant were considered, the witness answered that there were no suitable alternative roles available. One vacancy at the time was a role of Car Park Attendant, which would be wholly unsuitable for the Complainant given his senior executive role and tenure of employment with the Respondent. Mr D said that it was not an easy decision to dismiss a senior employee of long service, but that there were no realistic alternatives. The appeals manager, Ms M, also gave evidence in respect of the Complainant’s significant safety and regulatory role and the fundamental requirement for trust and confidence. She told the WRC that the relevant medical evidence had been carefully considered, but did not outweigh the decision to dismiss. Decision: The Adjudicator found that the decision to dismiss in this case was procedurally fair. A full and fair investigation and disciplinary process took place. An independent appeals process was also held and he was satisfied that the appeals manager was sufficiently independent. The Adjudicator noted that it is not the role of a court or tribunal to substitute itself for an employer. Although the Complainant was not criminally convicted of theft in this case, the Adjudicator accepted the Respondent’s position that the relationship of trust and confidence had broken down. The Adjudicator found that the decision to dismiss the Complainant was “well considered”, based on the Respondent’s particular experience and expertise regarding Aviation and Safety in an airport. Takeaway for Employers: This case is an example of an employer following what the Adjudicator regarded as a fair process in which the rules of natural justice were observed throughout. While dismissal for gross misconduct will often not be an appropriate or proportionate sanction, in this case the overwhelming factor was the Aviation Safety and Regulatory Environment in circumstances where the Complainant had a senior position with unimpeded access to aircraft.  In those circumstances, trust and confidence in the employer-employee relationship was absolutely crucial and the Adjudicator was satisfied that only the Respondent had the expertise and experience to evaluate the required trust and safety confidence requirements in that environment. He accepted that trust and confidence had broken down and that the decision to dismiss the Complainant for gross misconduct was in this case fair. Employers should ensure that they exercise caution before summarily dismissing an employee for gross misconduct. Not only must an employer be satisfied that the decision is substantively fair and proportionate, but they must also ensure that they adhere rigorously to fair procedures throughout the investigation, disciplinary and appeals process. Link - https://www.workplacerelations.ie/en/cases/2025/january/adj-00048839.html Authors - Jane Holian, Jenny Wakely 4th March 2025 Anne O’Connell Solicitors 19-22 Baggot Street Lower Dublin 2 www.aocsolicitors.ie

WRC Orders Reinstatement of Employee who was Unfairly Dismissed

In Nkemka Patrick Okachi v Sodexo Ireland Limited (ADJ-00045306), the Workplace Relations Commission (“WRC”) ordered reinstatement of the Complainant following a finding that he had been unfairly dismissed. This case is noteworthy in circumstances where the exceptional nature of the remedy of reinstatement was emphasised by the Supreme Court last year in the case of An Bord Banistíochta, Gaelscoil Moshíológ v The Labour Court and Aodhagán Ó Súird and the Department of Education [2024] IESC 38. See our previous article on that Supreme Court Judgement here. Facts: In the instant case, the Complainant’s evidence was that he commenced work with the Respondent on 5 May 2014 and was dismissed on 17 February 2023 from his position as a Cleaning Supervisor. The Complainant contended that he had been unfairly dismissed by the Respondent after being accused of sexual harassment by a female colleague. The female colleague was not an employee of the Respondent; she was an employee of Respondent’s client. The Complainant’s version of events was that he had an interaction with this female colleague in the gym where they were both working. The Complainant described the conversation as jovial and upbeat. He denied there was anything of a sexual nature. He said that he complimented her, and she gave him a hug at the end of the conversation. It was the Complainant’s evidence that when he next attended work his manager told him that there had been a complaint made against him. The Complainant submitted that he requested the CCTV footage of the interaction but was told the evidence was “not based on camera footage”. The Complainant was suspended from work and he was sent a disciplinary invite letter. The Respondent provided evidence of investigation, disciplinary and appeals processes it followed in respect of the allegation against the Complainant. Decision: The Adjudicating Officer, Úna Glazier-Farmer, found that the Respondent had not followed fair procedures or its own policies in handling the complaint of sexual harassment. For instance: The Adjudicator found that given the nature of the Respondent’s business, which involves access to other work locations, the suspension appeared to be a knee-jerk reaction and therefore unreasonable. Furthermore, there was no request by the female colleague not to work with the Complainant. There was also a timing issue around the decision to suspend as it appears to have been taken before the written details of the complaint were ever received by the Respondent from its client. The Adjudicator did not accept the Respondent’s submission that its Dignity at Work policy did not apply when the accusation originates from a client rather than an employee. The initial complaint came in the form of a list of points “HR agreed” with the female colleague. This email did not name the Complainant, nor did it make any complaint of physical contact. The Adjudicator remarked that it was “extraordinary” given how matters unfolded for the Complainant that the Respondent had been advised the female colleague “did not want to make a big deal” of the interaction. Despite the complaint email not mentioning physical contact, a statement from a manager who reviewed the CCTV footage noted the Complainant “put his arm around her”. The Complainant consistently denied this maintaining he placed a hand on her shoulder. Despite this, each stage of the disciplinary process relied on the inappropriateness of this conduct which ultimately led to the Complainant’s dismissal. The Adjudicator noted that an email from a receptionist also made no reference to physical contact between the parties and a personal trainer identified by the receptionist as having witnessed the incident was not interviewed. The Complainant consistently requested access to the CCTV footage, which was denied. While the Respondent claimed the footage was not relied upon, the evidence suggests otherwise. The Adjudicator questioned the objective fairness of the investigation and found the disciplinary process lacked objectivity and independence. The Adjudicator noted that no cross examination of witnesses was allowed despite the Respondent’s own Disciplinary Procedure providing “Employees may question witnesses (via the meeting/hearing manager where appropriate)”. The Adjudicator determined that the Respondent’s handling of the case fell significantly short of the principles of natural justice and commented that: "While the standard for workplace investigation is not perfection, it does go beyond merely populating template documents without any objective independent thought and consideration for the Complainant’s version of events. This is even more significant when it comes to complaints, if founded, can have a lasting impact on a party’s reputation both in the workplace and beyond." The Adjudicator commented that the investigation was neither fair nor independent, and the decision to dismiss the Complainant was based on flawed procedures and hearsay evidence. The Adjudicator found that this failure has not only resulted in the loss of the Complainant’s employment of 8 years but has also damaged his reputation. The Adjudicator found the sanction of dismissal was entirely disproportionate. Redress – The Adjudicator awarded reinstatement and set out the reasoning for doing so as follows: “Having carefully reviewed the specific circumstances of this complaint, in which the Complainant was unfairly dismissed, subsequently secured short-term work from June 2023 until January 2024, and now finds himself unemployed again, together with the nature of the Complainant’s business, where the complaint did not originate from a fellow employee of the Respondent or someone with whom he worked directly, and the potential for alternative work sites within his county, I conclude that the most appropriate redress is reinstatement by the Respondent on the same terms and conditions as those held prior to his unfair dismissal.” Takeaway for Employers: Employers should ensure that when they are notified of complaints, that they handle them according to their employment policies and in line with fair procedures. This should not be treated as a simple ‘box-ticking’ exercise. It should be noted that while reinstatement was deemed the most appropriate means of redress for the Complainant in this case, the Supreme Court has made it clear that the remedy of reinstatement should only be awarded in exceptional cases. Link - https://www.workplacerelations.ie/en/cases/2025/january/adj-00045306.html Authors – Laura Killelea & Lia Berkery 5th March 2025 Anne O’Connell Solicitors 19-22 Lower Baggot Street Dublin 2. www.aocsolicitors.ie

WRC Finds Employer Liable for Sexual Harassment of Employee on Staff Night Out

In An Employee v A Café (ADJ-00047296), the Workplace Relations Commission (“WRC”) made an award of €12,000 in compensation to the Complainant, a former café worker, following a complaint of sexual harassment arising from a work night out under the Employment Equality Acts 1998-2015 (the “Acts”). Facts: In 2023, the Complainant was an employee of the Respondent café for 12 weeks. Shortly after she started, she attended a night out with other staff, which included the café manager, Mr X. The Complainant and Mr X left at the same and Mr X walked her home. The Complainant alleged that Mr X pushed her up against a wall and kissed her and she pushed him away. The Complainant gave evidence that on her return to work after the incident, Mr X was hostile and critical of her work. She also gave evidence that she spoke about the incident with the Duty Manager, Ms A. The Complainant stated in her evidence that she also contacted the Area/Regional Manager, Ms B, a number of weeks later stating that there was an issue she wished to discuss. However, she was discouraged by another member of staff from meeting with Ms B. The Complainant stated that she suffered from stress due to the situation in work stating in her evidence that she felt Mr X was always criticising her and hovering over her following the incident. The Complainant subsequently resigned in June 2023. It was Mr X’s evidence that he had tried to kiss the Complainant on the cheek as was customary where he was from, but that he accidently kissed her and immediately apologised. Mr X also stated that he had apologised again when they returned to work after the weekend and the Complainant accepted his apology and wished to move on. Mr X gave evidence that as the Complainant progressed through the different stations in the café, it became apparent that her performance was not up to the Respondent’s standards. Mr X stated that this was addressed with the Complainant, and she was given a chance to improve while another new employee was let go due to their poor performance. During the hearing, Ms A, the Duty Manager, and Ms B, the Area/Regional Manager, and Mr D, the Assistant Manager, all gave evidence as to the performance issues with the Complainant. It was submitted on behalf of the Respondent that the night out was not a workplace function and the staff member who suggested the drinks also gave evidence that she did not consider it to be a workplace function. The Respondent also submitted that the Complainant’s performance was not sufficient, and it became apparent when her role was expanded. Decision: The Adjudicator, Mr David Murphy, determined that having heard all the evidence, on the balance of probabilities the incident had happened as alleged by the Complainant. The Adjudicator added that the fact the Complainant had discussed the incident with other colleagues and had contacted the Area/Regional Manager supported her version of events. The Adjudicator concluded that Mr X’s conduct fell within the definition of sexual harassment under Section 14A(7)(a)(ii) of the Acts which states that: “references to sexual harassment are to any form of unwanted verbal, non-verbal or physical conduct of a sexual nature, being conduct which in either case has the purpose or effect of violating a person’s dignity and creating an intimidating, hostile, degrading, humiliating or offensive environment for the person.” The Adjudicator then considered whether the events of the night fell within the scope of the Respondent’s liability, i.e. whether the incident that occurred on the night out could be considered to have occurred “otherwise in the course of his or her employment” as provided for in section 14A(1)(a) of the Acts. The Adjudicator was satisfied that that the night out fell within the scope of section 14A. This was on the basis that the night out was organised by an employee, attended exclusively by employees of the Respondent including the manager, and the Complainant would not have been in attendance had she not been an employee. The Adjudicator acknowledged the argument of the Respondent’s legal representative that employers should not be put in a position of having to ban or discourage staff from socialising for fear of liability arising. However, the Adjudicator was satisfied that the defence in section 14A(2) of the Acts provides a “sufficiently broad defence” for employers that take reasonably practicable steps to prevent workplace harassment. Section 14A(2) states that: “if harassment or sexual harassment of the victim by a person other than his or her employer would, but for this subsection, be regarded as discrimination by the employer under subsection (1), it is a defence for the employer to prove that the employer took such steps as are reasonably practicable—(a) in a case where subsection (1)(a) applies (whether or not subsection (1)(b) also applies), to prevent the person from harassing or sexually harassing the victim or any class of persons which includes the victim, and (b) in a case where subsection (1)(b) applies, to prevent the victim from being treated differently in the workplace or otherwise in the course of the victim’s employment and, if and so far as any such treatment has occurred to reverse its effects.” The Complainant gave evidence that she told Ms A, the Duty Manager, about the incident and while Ms A was supportive, she did not suggest that the Complainant escalate matters, and she did not refer the Complainant to any policy on harassment. The Complainant also gave evidence that she had received a soft copy of the handbook six weeks after she started, but that it was not practical to read it fully on her phone and it had only been provided to her in English, which was not her first language. The Complainant also gave evidence that she contacted the Area/Regional Manager, Ms B, as she felt that Mr X was penalising her in work following the incident. Ms B quickly responded to set up a call. However, on speaking with another member of staff about the incident the Complainant again contacted Ms B stating that everything was fine. The Adjudicator referred to the evidence given at the hearing and noted that neither Ms A, Duty Manager, or Mr D, Assistant Manager, were aware of the polices on sexual harassment. Furthermore, Ms B, the Area/Regional Manager and Mr X, while aware of the policies, had done nothing to promote its knowledge among junior members of staff, and neither had given any evidence that they had received training in respect of the policies. The Adjudicator found that in such circumstances, the defence was not available to the Respondent as the Respondent had not taken such steps as were reasonably practicable to prevent the sexual harassment from having taken place. Therefore, the Respondent was liable for the sexual harassment of the Complainant. The Complainant also submitted a complaint in relation to her treatment after the incident on the night out. The Adjudicator noted that section 14A(1)(b) provides for a separate basis by which an employer may be found liable for harassment, where an employee is treated differently due to rejecting the harassment. The Complainant alleged that Mr X was overly critical and hostile towards her after the incident. However, Mr X, Ms A, Ms B and Mr D all gave evidence that as her training progressed, it became apparent that the Complainant’s work was not up to the required standard. It was also noted that another member of staff was also treated in the same way and was dismissed for poor performance, whereas the Complainant was provided with an opportunity to improve. The Adjudicator was satisfied that there was no penalisation of the Complainant in respect of her rejecting the harassment and that her resignation was not forced by the actions of Mr X. In circumstances where the Complainant no longer worked for the Respondent and was not dismissed, the Adjudicator noted that the maximum amount that could be awarded to her on foot of her claim was €13,000. Having regard to all the circumstances, the Adjudicator awarded her €12,000. Takeaway for Employers: This decision is an interesting case dealing with an employer’s potential liability for sexual harassment occurring on work nights out. Employers should ensure that they have in place robust policies dealing with harassment and that these are clearly communicated to their employees. It is also important to ensure that managers are properly trained in how to deal with complaints regarding all forms of workplace harassment. Another interesting feature of this case was the Adjudicator’s decision to anonymise the decision. While there does not appear to have been any request for anonymisation and the Adjudicator notes that his decision to anonymise the decision “does not arise from a direct discussion on the issue of anonymisation”, the Adjudicator regarded anonymisation as appropriate following the Supreme Court judgment in An Bord Banistíochta, Gaelscoil Moshíológ and the Labour Court and Aoghahán Ó’Súird [2024] IESC 38. In concluding that anonymisation was appropriate, the Adjudicator referred to the position set out by the Chief Justice in that case at paragraph 75: “It is important for any person adjudicating and whose decisions are published, to recognise that without anonymisation of parties, findings made on the balance of probabilities, and sometimes limited evidence, may often be treated as definitive judgments on individuals and will have a considerable half-life and the damage done to reputations can be spread very far, and persist for some time.” It will be interesting to see if this approach is adopted in subsequent WRC decisions. Link - https://www.workplacerelations.ie/en/cases/2025/january/adj-00047296.html Authors – Ethna Dillon and Jenny Wakely 25th February 2025 Anne O’Connell Solicitors 19-22 Lower Baggot Street Dublin 2. www.aocsolicitors.ie

HSE found not to be Data Controller of Non- Work Related Personal Data of Employee

Background: In the recent case of Eamon McShane v Data Protection Commission [2015] IEHC 19, the High Court upheld a decision of the Data Protection Commissioner (“DPC”) which dismissed a complaint by Mr. McShane (the “Applicant”) on the basis of a finding that the HSE was not the “data controller” in respect of non-work related personal data stored by the Applicant on a work phone issued to him by the HSE. Facts: This case arose out of the well-publicised HSE hack in 2021. The Applicant’s case was that in June/July, 2021 he discovered that his personal email accounts had been hacked as well as his personal cryptocurrency account from which €1,400 of cryptocurrency had been stolen. The Applicant believed that his work mobile phone was the source or cause of the hack, and as such, believed his work mobile phone had been affected by the hack of May 2021. He made a complaint about the matter to the HSE in September 2021. The Complainant was not satisfied with the response he received and thereafter made a complaint to the DPC. The HSE’s position was that it had an Acceptable Use Policy in place which provided that, absent express agreement, non-work use of the work phone was not permitted. The Applicant accepted that the use of the work phone to conduct his personal business was not permitted. On the 23rd of May 2022, the DPC dismissed the Applicant’s complaint against the HSE. The DPC was of the view that the HSE was not a “data controller”, within the meaning of that term in article 4.7 of the General Data Protection Regulation (EU) 2016/679 (“GDPR”), as it did not authorise the use of the personal data on the phone. The Applicant attempted to appeal the DPC decision internally and thereafter brought judicial review proceedings to the High Court. The High Court determined that the DPC’s decision was lawful and refused Mr. McShane's application for judicial review.   Takeaway for employers: The decision in this case is helpful for employers as it decided the employer here could not be liable as a data controller in respect of the non-work related personal data stored by the employee on a work phone in breach of the employer’s Acceptable Use Policy. Employers may wish to give consideration to updating their Policies around company devices to ensure they specifically prohibit the use of those devices by employees to store non-work related personal data.   Authors - Jane Holian and Laura Killelea Link: https://www.courts.ie/acc/alfresco/e422caa7-645d-4f30-8630-dccd67ac1b9c/2025_IEHC_191.pdf/pdf#view=fitH   09 May 2025 Anne O’Connell Solicitors 19-22 Baggot Street Lower Dublin 2 www.aocsolicitors.ie

WRC Find it is Not Unlawful for Employer to Enforce Mandatory Retirement Age, Despite Shortcomings in Following Code of Practice

Eugene McEnery v Partners in Logistics Ltd (ADJ-00052442) concerned an employee who alleged he was subjected to discriminatory treatment by his employer on the grounds of his age, when he was forced to retire six months after reaching the age of 65. This case was brought before the Workplace Relations Commission (“WRC”) under the Employment Equality Acts 1998-2015 (the “Acts”). The Complainant also lodged a complaint of discrimination in relation to his salary on the grounds of age and gender. Facts: The Complainant was employed by the Respondent from 1st January 2003 to 14th June 2024 as a warehouse operator. As the Complainant approached the age of 65 in November 2023, he submitted a formal request to extend his employment beyond the age of 65. There was a dispute between the parties on the precise events following this request. The Respondent argued they agreed to a temporary extension on the explicit understanding that it was on an exceptional basis. They submitted to the WRC that they knew the Complainant had recently gotten married and therefore granted him some flexibility around his retirement date. The Complainant argued that by agreeing to his request to work beyond his 65th birthday the Respondent had effectively confirmed there was no mandatory retirement age in the organisation. In a meeting in April 2024 the option of the Complainant working a 3-day week until his 66th birthday was discussed. The Respondent told the WRC that they asked the Complainant what tasks he felt comfortable performing, in light of their recent move to a smaller warehouse. The Respondent had previously accommodated the Complainant’s medical condition by moving him indoors away from the cold environment of the warehouse, however this indoor role could no longer be facilitated in the new reduced space. The Complainant told the WRC that as he did not want to work a reduced working week of 3 days per week, he was later told his employment was being terminated with 8 weeks’ notice. The Respondent submitted to the WRC that their retirement age of 65 was objectively justified and described the role of warehouse operator as a physically demanding and sometimes dangerous role. They highlighted the following objective justifications: Allowing employment opportunities for younger workers Health and safety concerns Addressing age imbalances in the workforce Succession planning The Complainant stressed that there was no appeal process offered to him, as provided for in the Industrial Relations Act 1990 (Code of Practice on Longer Working) (Declaration) Order 2017 S.I. 600/2017 (the “Code of Practice”). The Respondent argued that it advised the Complainant that he could put reasons for an appeal to them and they would consider them. In relation to the Complainant’s claim regarding his pay, the Complainant highlighted that the national minimum wage was €12.70 per hour from 1st January 2024 and colleagues younger than himself with less service had received increases. In addition, he flagged that female colleagues received an increase in their hourly rate of pay in 2023/2024 while he did not receive any increase. The Respondent told the WRC they were satisfied the Complainant was paid at the appropriate rate in accordance with his role, and any increases in January 2024 were to bring others in line with national minimum wage requirements. The Respondent also flagged that the indoor job the Complainant was reassigned to attracted a lower rate of pay but the Complainant had retained his higher rate of pay. Decision: The Adjudicator, Orla Jones, held that the Complainant was not discriminated against on the grounds of age by the Respondent by their enforcement of a mandatory retirement age. The Adjudicator considered section 34(4) of the Acts which states it shall not constitute discrimination on the age ground to fix different ages for the retirement of employees if – (a) it is objectively and reasonably justified by a legitimate aim, and (b) the means of achieving that aim are appropriate and necessary. The Adjudicator noted that the Respondent’s evidence at the hearing came across as consistent and genuine. She commented that a key requirement for an employer to legitimately enforce a mandatory retirement age is to have a contractual retirement policy in place in the organisation.  The Complainant’s contract included reference to a mandatory retirement age of 65 and the Adjudicator observed that the Complainant “seemed to veer” from arguing there was no mandatory retirement age to acknowledging he knew he was expected to retire at 65 due to the mandatory retirement age. The Adjudicator acknowledged shortcomings in the Respondent not following the Code of Practice, in that the Complainant was not afforded access to a proper appeals process. However overall, she was satisfied in the context of all the evidence presented at the hearing that the retirement age in question was objectively and reasonably justified by legitimate aims and the means of achieving these aims were appropriate and necessary. In relation to the Complainant’s claim regarding his pay, the Adjudicator was satisfied that he was not discriminated against on the grounds of age or gender in respect of his pay. Takeaway for Employers: While this decision highlights that minor shortcomings in following the Code of Practice may be permissible, it is important to consider this finding may be confined to the facts and context of the decision itself. It is certainly advisable for all employers to familiarise themselves with the Code of Practice , which sets out best principles and practices to follow regarding requests to work beyond the normal retirement age. This is a complex area of law and employers should seek legal advice if seeking to enforce a mandatory retirement age. Link – https://www.workplacerelations.ie/en/cases/2025/february/adj-00052442.html   Authors – Tara Kelly, Anne O’Connell 25th April 2025 Anne O’Connell Solicitors 19-22 Lower Baggot Street Dublin 2. www.aocsolicitors.ie  

High Court overturns Labour Court Decision in High Profile Debenhams Case

Background: In Debenhams Retail Ireland Limited (In Liquidation) v Jane Crowe [2025] IEHC 141, Barr J. reversed a decision of the Labour Court which found that Debenhams Retail Ireland (“the Appellant”) owed their former employee, Jane Crowe, (“the Respondent”) €1,140 for a breach of its obligations under section 9 the Protection of Employment Act, 1977 (as amended) (the “Act”). Article 2.1 of the Council Directive 98/59/EC of 20 July 1998 on the approximation of the laws of the Member States relating to collective redundancies (“the Directive”) states: “Where an employer is contemplating collective redundancies, he shall begin consultations with the workers' representatives in good time with a view to reaching an agreement.” Section 9 and 10 of the Act implemented the provisions of the Directive into Irish law. The High Court decision in the Debenhams case centred around Section 9 of the Act which places consultation obligations on employers proposing to create collective redundancies i.e. that they shall, with a view to reaching an agreement, initiate consultation with employees’ representatives, and, that such consultations “shall be initiated at the earliest opportunity and in any event at least 30 days before the first dismissal takes effect”. Certain aspects of the Act were amended in 2024 (discussed below). The Debenhams case dealt with version of the Act in force as of April 2020. Nonetheless it examined important aspects of the Act which remain in force and the decision has provided welcome clarity on the question of what constitutes the commencement of consultations. Facts: On 8 April 2020, the Board of Directors of the Appellant company was informed by its UK parent company that it would receive no more funding and was therefore insolvent. Over the next few days arrangements were set in train to seek the appointment of provisional liquidators to the Appellant. On 14 April 2020, Ms O’Connor, a member of the Board of Directors, sent a letter via email to Mr Light, the Respondent’s Trade Union representative. The letter set out information in relation to proposed collective redundancies. Provisional liquidators were appointed by the High Court on 16 April 2020. On 17 April 2020, the first consultative meeting was held between the provisional liquidators, the Board of Directors of the Appellant, and the Respondent’s Trade Union representatives. Almost 800 employees lodged claims in the WRC under sections 9 and 10 of the Act (i.e. the sections of the Act that set out an employer’s obligation to inform and consult with employee representatives in respect of collective redundancies. The Respondent’s claim was a test case in the matter. WRC Decision: The WRC found that the Appellant was required to commence the consultation process under Section 9 of the Act earlier than it did and failed to provide the Respondent with all relevant information pursuant to section 10 of the Act. The WRC awarded the Respondent the maximum award of four weeks renumeration for each breach. Labour Court Decision: The Appellant appealed this decision to the Labour Court, which upheld the decision of the WRC. In its decision dated 10 April 2024, the Labour Court agreed that the Respondent failed to commence the consultation process “in good time” as is required by the Directive. The Labour Court held that the consultation process ought to have commended at the point in time where it became clear that collective redundancies were going to be a feature and “By delaying the consultation until after the liquidators had been appointed the respondent limited the options available in terms of coming to an agreement.” The Labour Court determined that the earliest opportunity to commence the consultations was on 9 April 2020, immediately after the Board of Directors became aware that the company was insolvent and passed a resolution that the company would cease trading. While the delay between 9 April 2020 and 17 April 2020 was only eight days, the Labour Court ruled it was still significant enough to narrow the available options and constituted a breach of section 9 of the Act. Debenhams appealed the Labour Court’s decision regarding section 9, on a point of law, to the High Court. High Court Decision: The High Court extensively examined relevant case law, including a number of decisions of the Court of Justice of the European Union (“the CJEU”). Barr J. noted that from the case law, there is a “difficult and nuanced question as to when exactly the obligation on an employer to engage in consultations is triggered.” The High Court declined to address this question in this particular decision. The High Court held that the Labour Court was entitled to find that as and from 9 April 2020, the Board of Directors were compelled to consider making collective redundancies. However, the High Court accepted submission made by the Appellant that the Labour Court erred in its interpretation of what is required by consultations under the Directive and the Act. Barr J. found that the letter sent from Ms O’Connor to Mr Light on 14 April 2020 in fact started the consultation process, as it was clearly stated in the letter that information was being supplied in accordance with the Act in relation to collective redundancies. Significantly, the Court held that a consultation process can start “in advance” of the first consultation meeting. Accordingly, the Court held that the Labour Court erred in law in finding that the consultation process commenced at the first meeting on 17 April 2020. The High Court also took into account the surrounding circumstances of the consultation process. The events took place at the beginning of unprecedented Covid 19 restrictions, and the Board of Director’s meeting took place before the Easter Bank Holiday weekend. The Court noted that the obligation to hold consultations “at the earliest opportunity” must be “considered within the practicalities of life on that ground at that time.” Regarding the delay of eight days, the High Court went on to find that there was no evidence put before the Labour Court of any options having been lost or unavailable as a result of that delay, and accordingly that finding of the Labour Court could not stand. Finally, the High Court addressed the compensation awarded to the Respondent by the Labour Court. Barr J. held that the Labour Court has no jurisdiction under the 1977 Act to award compensation as a penalty against an employer. The Court held that there was no evidence that the Respondent suffered any financial loss, or lost out on any benefit, due to the delay in commencing the consultation process. Barr J. held that while compensation is not limited to compensation for financial loss, it must be referrable to some form of loss or injury suffered by a person being compensated and there was no evidence before the Labour Court that the Respondent had suffered additional distress due to any perceived delay on the part of the Appellant in commencing consultations. The Court also looked to the commercial realities faced by the Appellant at the time: the Board of Directors were informed that the Appellant company was hopelessly insolvent. Had they allowed the company to continue trading, they would be guilty of trading recklessly or fraudulently. Further, had they had tried to make any payments or beneficial deals to the employees prior to the appointment of the provisional liquidators, these payments and deals would have been struck down by the High Court as unfair preferences pursuant to ss. 604 and 608 of the Companies Act 2014, as amended. Therefore, the Board of Directors were left in an impossible situation where there was nothing they could do for the Respondent and the other employees. Barr J. held that there was no loss suffered by the Respondent in the delay by the Appellant in commencing the consultation process between 9th April 2020 and 14th April 2020 and accordingly the Labour Court erred as a matter of law in awarding compensation to the Respondent. Recent Legislative Amendments It is important to be aware that amendments were made in July 2024 to the Act so that various other persons (other than employers) are now also responsible for complying with information and consultation obligations in collective redundancy situations. These persons are referred to in the amended legislation as “Responsible Persons” and include liquidators, provisional liquidators, receivers or any other person appointed by the Court where the person has assumed full responsibility for the management of the business. In addition to the employee claims which were under discussion in the Debenhams case (i.e. alleged breaches of the obligations to inform and consult in collective redundancy situations) the amended legislation now creates an additional claim for employees in collective redundancy situations where the employer or responsible person fails to notify the Minister for Trade and Employment of the proposed collective redundancies “at the earliest opportunity” and in any event at least 30 days prior to the first dismissal taking effect. Where this obligation is breached an employee can now be awarded up to four weeks pay in addition to any awards for failure to inform/consult. Furthermore, such a breach may constitute a criminal offence on the part of the employer/responsible person. Takeaway for employers: This Debenhams judgement provides helpful clarity on what amounts to consultation in a collective redundancy situation. It is also a helpful precedent for employers arguing against the imposition of an award for a short delay in commencing consultations where such delay did not result in any loss to the employees. Nonetheless, obligations on employers in collective redundancy situations remain onerous and extremely time sensitive and legal advice will need to be taken and actioned as a matter of the utmost urgency. Even a seemingly small delay in complying with the information and consultation obligations could prove very costly. Link - https://www.courts.ie/acc/alfresco/8b18da2d-ba02-419f-bade-2234bc8218a2/2025_IEHC_141.pdf/pdf#view=fitH Authors - Jane Holian and Laura Killelea 08 May 2025 Anne O’Connell Solicitors 19-22 Baggot Street Lower Dublin 2 www.aocsolicitors.ie

WRC Awards Two Years’ Compensation to Employee Who Was Dismissed Without Cause

In the recent decision of Maria Inmaculada De La Torre Ruiz v Hamilton UK Services Limited (ADJ-00049851), the Workplace Relations Commission (“WRC”) found that the dismissal of the Complainant without cause was unfair. She was awarded maximum compensation in the amount of €145,122, equivalent to two years’ remuneration. Facts: The Complainant was employed by the Respondent as a Financial Accountant from 6th July 2021 until the Respondent terminated her employment on 27th July 2023. The Complainant was paid three months in lieu of notice. She submitted that her dismissal was unfair. The Respondent accepted that the dismissal was effected without cause. Decision: In circumstances where the Respondent accepted that dismissal had been effected without cause, the Adjudicator, Breiffni O’Neill, found that the Complainant had been unfairly dismissed from her employment. Compensation was deemed to be the most appropriate redress for the Complainant. Calculation of Remuneration The Adjudicator first assessed the Complainant’s remuneration. At the time of her dismissal, the Complainant earned a base salary of €63,000 per year, she received an employer pension contribution of 12.5%, namely €7,875 per annum. The Complainant also submitted that the Respondent paid her membership fee of €636 to Chartered Accountants Ireland and also paid fees amounting to €1,050 for continuous professional development. All of these contributions were accepted as constituting remuneration for the purposes of the Unfair Dismissals Acts. However, the Complainant’s unvested VAP share awards and her discretionary annual bonus were found not to form part of her remuneration. The Adjudicator found that the Complainant’s total weekly remuneration for the purposes of the Unfair Dismissals Acts was €1,395.40. Her annual remuneration inclusive of her base salary, pension contribution and annual contributions to professional membership fees and to professional development therefore totalled €72,561. Accordingly, the Adjudicator found that the maximum compensation the WRC could award was €145,122. Calculation of Financial Loss Attributable to the Dismissal In assessing the Complainant’s total financial loss attributable to her dismissal, the Adjudicator first considered the period between the date of her dismissal (27th July 2023) and the date of the WRC hearing (7th January 2025). The Adjudicator calculated her loss during that period as follows: • 27th July 2023 to 15th January 2024: Following her dismissal on 27th July 2023, the Complainant was unemployed for 24 weeks until 15th January 2024. The Adjudicator calculated the total loss for this period to be €33,490. • 15th January 2024 to 11th October 2024: The Complainant secured employment on a 9-month fixed-term contract during which she earned €48,900. The Adjudicator calculated that her remuneration would have been €54,421 for this period if she had remained in the Respondent’s employment, thus the Complainant’s financial loss for this period amounted to €5,521. • 12th October 2024 to 7th January 2025: At the date of the hearing on 7th January 2025, the Complainant had not secured employment subsequent to the completion of her fixed-term contract in October. When deciding whether or not her financial loss continued after the completion of her fixed-term contract, the Adjudicator referred to Courtaulds Northern Spinning Ltd v Moosa [1984] IRLR 43 and noted that a complainant’s loss only stops when further permanent employment is secured. As the Complainant was still unemployed on the date of the hearing, the Adjudicator found that her losses were ongoing. Her loss for the thirteen-week period between the end of her fixed-term contract and the date of the hearing amounted to €18,140. The Adjudicator then proceeded to consider the Complainant’s estimated prospective financial loss following the date of the WRC hearing. The Adjudicator accepted the Complainant’s position that because she had been dismissed without cause, it had been difficult and would continue to be difficult for her to secure a new role as she was unable to justify or explain the reason(s) for the termination of her most recent employment, because the Respondent had not provided her with any reason. The Adjudicator was satisfied that the Complainant had made “extensive attempts” to secure alternative permanent employment in the almost 18-month period following her termination. He referred to London Underground v Edwards [1998] IRLR 364, a decision of the Court of Appeal in England (which was in turn applied in the decision of the Irish Supreme Court in Benedict McGowan and Ors v The Labour Court and Ors [2010] 21 ELR 277), in which it was stated that expert tribunals “do not sit in blinkers and are entitled to make use of their own knowledge and experience in the industrial field”. Drawing on his experience as a human resources professional, the Adjudicator, estimated that it would take her at least a further 18 months for the Complainant to secure a permanent role elsewhere. He therefore estimated her prospective loss from the hearing date to be €108,841. Therefore, the Adjudicator found that the total financial loss attributable to the Complainant’s dismissal was €165,992. Calculation of Award and Mitigation of Loss It was submitted on behalf of the Respondent that the Complainant had not sufficiently mitigated her loss, and that this should be considered in calculating any award. The Adjudicator stated that focusing solely on her inability to mitigate her loss would be “wholly inappropriate” given that the manner in which the Respondent had dismissed her had significantly impacted her job prospects. Noting that the Respondent accepted that there was not a “scintilla of procedural fairness” in dismissing the Complainant, he referred to the decision of the Adjudicator in ADJ-00032667 where, in calculating the award of compensation, she stated as follows: “in considering compensation, regard must be had to all of the subsection of Section 7-and the tests are not confined to the efforts of the former employee-or the Complainant in this case. In circumstances where the Respondent is found not to have met the tests set out in subsections (c) and (d) …. and the Complainant made no contribution to the decision to dismiss her under (a) (b) or (f) It would be wholly unjustified to penalise the Complainant solely for a conclusion that she did not make a sufficient effort of mitigate her losses where the balance of unfairness and failure to comply with the terms of Section 7 as a whole lie squarely with the Respondent.” The Adjudicator was also satisfied that the Complainant had made sufficient efforts to mitigate her loss and noted that she had submitted evidence of applying for “hundreds of new roles”. The Respondent further submitted that the Complainant had unreasonably refused a small number of these roles on the basis that they were too far from her home and that the travel would have been too significant. However, the Adjudicator was satisfied that it was reasonable for the Complainant to refuse these roles. The Adjudicator found that there was no basis for a reduction in compensation in the present case. However, he acknowledged that the maximum compensation the WRC could award under the Unfair Dismissals Acts was capped at 104 weeks’ remuneration. Therefore, the Complainant was awarded the maximum award €145,122. Takeaway for Employers: This decision is a reminder to employers considering terminating an employee’s employment on a “no fault” basis that there is significant risk in doing so, particularly where an employee has over a year’s service. So called “no fault” dismissals by their very nature contravene the provisions of the Unfair Dismissals legislation, and, while they may reduce the risk of High Court injunctive action, legal advice ought to be obtained to ensure that employers appreciate the risks. This decision highlights the level of awards that may be made and the WRC’s disdain for dismissals effected on this basis. The decision provides an interesting, detailed analysis of the calculation of financial loss, particularly in respect of estimating prospective future loss in circumstances where a complainant is unemployed at the date of hearing. Employers should note the importance attributed to the impact that the absence of a reason for dismissal can have on a complainant’s ability to secure new employment; in this case the Adjudicator found that it could reasonably take the Complainant a further 18 months to find new employment. Link - https://www.workplacerelations.ie/en/cases/2025/march/adj-00049851.html Authors – Lia Berkery & Jenny Wakely 29th April 2025 Anne O’Connell Solicitors 19-22 Lower Baggot Street Dublin 2. www.aocsolicitors.ie

Government Publishes New Bill on Contractual Retirement Ages

The Government has published the new Employment (Contractual Retirement Ages) Bill 2025 (hereinafter referred to as the “Bill”). This Bill is still making its way through Dail Eireann and is yet to be enacted, however it is prudent for employers to familiarise themselves with the proposed changes. The new Bill provides that employees whose contract of employment specifies a retirement age below the state pension age (currently age 66) may notify their employer that they do not consent to retire at that age. This notification must be provided not less than 3 months and not more than one year prior to the contractual retirement date. The new Bill does not apply to employees who have not completed their probation period. On receipt of this notification, the employer must not enforce the contractual retirement age before providing the employee with a “reasoned written reply” setting out their justification for enforcing the contractual retirement age. In line with existing law on mandatory retirement ages, the retirement of the employee at the contractual retirement age must be objectively and reasonably justified by a legitimate aim, and the means of achieving that aim must be appropriate and necessary. The Bill also provides protection for employees from penalisation for exercising their rights under this new Bill. Under the new Bill employees can refer complaints for non-compliance with the Bill to the Workplace Relations Commission. If the complaint is well founded the Workplace Relations Commission may require the employer to re-instate or re-engage the employee concerned, or award a maximum of the greater of €40,000 or 104 times the employee’s weekly salary as compensation, having regard to what it considers just and equitable in all the circumstances.  The new Bill also makes it a criminal offence for an employer to fail to provide an employee with a reasoned written reply, punishable by a fine or a maximum twelve-month prison term, or both. The key takeaway from this Bill is to respond in writing to the employee with reasons for enforcing the retirement age, if it is less than the state pension age but this is not required if the company retirement age is the same as the State pension age. Link: https://www.oireachtas.ie/en/bills/bill/2025/10/?tab=bill-text   Authors – Tara Kelly, Anne O’Connell   25th April 2025 Anne O’Connell Solicitors 19-22 Lower Baggot Street Dublin 2. www.aocsolicitors.ie

WRC Deems Contractor to be an Employee Despite A Contract Existing Between Two Limited Companies

In Paul Lingard v Randridge International Ltd (In Examinership) (ADJ-00053934), the Workplace Relations Commission (“WRC”) found that a contractor satisfied the test for an employee set out by the Supreme Court in Revenue Commissioners v Karshan Midlands (Ltd t/a Domino’s Pizza) [2023] IESC 24. Although the contractual relationship was between two limited companies, the WRC looked behind this arrangement and found that there was a “contract of services”, i.e. an employment relationship. Facts: The Complainant was engaged as a contractor with the Respondent, operating as a Construction/ Civil Works Manager for the Respondent between 14 July 2020 and 25 April 2024. It is common case that the working relationship had been uneventful for some time prior to the termination of the relationship between parties. The Complainant submitted a complaint to the WRC under the Payment of Wages Act 1991 due to the non-payment of monies owed to him by the Respondent. The Respondent argued that the Payment of Wages complaint was not justiciable. It was submitted that the Complainant was not an employee as defined by section 1 of the Payment of Wages Act 1991 and distinguished between a “contract of services” (employer-employee relationship) and a “contract for services” (self-employed contractor to main company). The Respondent highlighted clause 17 of the contract between the parties, which stated “The Sub-contractor as an independent limited sub-contractor is not entitled to rights under employment law”. The Respondent contended that this was not an employment contract but a commercial business contract between the Respondent and a limited company owed by a self-employed contractor, PSL (Aberdeen) Ltd (“PSL”) of which the Complainant was the sole director. The Complainant stated that he understood upon entering this contract, he was not an employee of the Respondent. He stated that he was familiar with a sub-contractor to main contractor business arrangement and worked using this business model for some time. However, as the relationship between the parties had been uneventful for a number of years and because of the outstanding payments owed to him, the Complainant had reconsidered the relationship with the Respondent and had submitted a Payment of Wages complaint to the WRC to seek clarification on the relationship between him and the Respondent. He further submitted that aside from his Personal Tax filings, his working relationship with the Respondent had been “effectively identical” to that of an employment relationship. Decision: The Adjudicator, Michael McEntee, considered the five-step test established by the Supreme Court in Karshan to assess whether a working relationship constitutes a contract of services or a contract for services. Overall, the Adjudicator considered the key point for consideration in Karshan that was applicable to the present facts was whether: “…the terms of the contract between the employer and worker interpreted in light of the admissible factual matrix and having regard to the working arrangements between the parties as disclosed by evidence, consistent with a contract of employment, or with some other form of contract having regard, in particular, to whether the arrangements point to the putative employee working for themselves or for the putative employer.” In assessing whether the day-to-day work arrangements were consistent with a contract of employment, the Adjudicator highlighted the following points: • Exchange of remuneration for work: payments were made by the Respondent to PSL based on submitted invoices. The Adjudicator noted that payment was issued to PSL and not the Complainant personally. • Right of Substitution: The Complainant had stated that there was a limited possibility for substitution in the contract, whereby it was possible for PSL to substitute another person for the Complainant, however this issue had never arisen. • Issue of Control: It was accepted that the Complainant was a Senior Professional and there was no day to day ‘micro control’ over his work for the Respondent. However, the Adjudicator referred to the contract between the parties and noted several sections which indicated a high degree of control over the Complainant. Examples of control included a requirement that the Complainant comply with Health and Safety Regulations and “all reasonable operational requirements relating to working hours and security”. The contract required the Complainant to use the daily clocking in/out system and required him to submit certificates of medical fitness upon request. The contract also provided a budget for a Travel/Food Allowance payable by the Respondent to the Complainant for travelling to and working on remote sites. Furthermore, the contract did not provide any holiday or public holiday pay for the Complainant but it referred to it being included in the rate of pay, which would be more akin to an employee than a contractor. • Freedom to Undertake Other Work/ “Being a Business As Of Their Own Right”: The Adjudicator noted that the Supreme Court noted that an individual’s freedom to undertake any other work should be considered. A clause of the contract restricted the “sub-contractor” from providing services to other parties and further restricted the sub-contractor from approaching customers or employees of the end-user from participating in projects or providing services outside the scope of the agreement. The Adjudicator noted that at first glance, it appeared that the contractual relationship was an uneventful contract for services between PSL and the Respondent. However considering the day-to-day relationship between the parties and the principles set out in Karshan, the Adjudicator was satisfied that the relationship was a contract of service. The complaint before the WRC was therefore justiciable and the Complainant was awarded €8,500 which was due in outstanding invoices but was now referred to as ‘salary’. Takeaway for Employers: This case demonstrates that an employment relationship may arise between a company and a contractor even where there is a contract between two limited companies. It is interesting to note post-Karshan that the WRC are increasingly looking behind the corporate veil of a company to examine the employment status of workers. This decision follows PR Company v Hotel Resort (ADJ-00046181, ADJ-00047024, ADJ-00045524, ADJ00047375) from late 2024, in which the WRC took a similar approach to determining an independent contractor’s employment status by looking behind a company and examining the relationship between parties. Although several unusual circumstances arose in that case, it is noteworthy that a similar approach was adopted by the WRC in the present case. A link to our article on that decision can be accessed here. It is also worth highlighting that this exercise was conducted in another decision by the WRC this month in A Worker v A Company (ADJ-00052528). Whilst the substantive complaint concerned an alleged discriminatory dismissal, a preliminary issue of the Complainant’s employment status was addressed by examining the day-to-day work arrangements between the parties with particular focus on remuneration, the right of substitution and the Respondent’s exercise of control. Despite the fact the Complainant operated his own business, and the Respondent submitted that the relationship had been a commercial/agency arrangement, the Complainant was found to be an employee in light of evidence of the working relationship and the substantive complaint proceeded for adjudication. This decision comes after recent publication of the Government’s Code of Practice on Determining Employment Status which provides a framework for establishing employment status to The Department of Social Protection, the Revenue Commissioners and the WRC. Of particular note in light of the present case, the Code provides guidance on determining employment status in circumstances where there are intermediary companies between the worker and the end-user of the worker’s services. The Code considers arrangements where there is intermediary “Personal Service Companies” which are limited companies of which the worker is typically the sole director, or “Managed Service Companies” which are companies that have a number of worker shareholders and are facilitated by a third-party who organises the legal and administrative affairs of that company. The Code establishes that notwithstanding the existence of these intermediary companies, the five-step framework derived from Karshan should be applied to determine a worker’s employment status. However, each case will be determined on its own unique circumstances. Our analysis of the Code of Practice can be accessed here. Employers should be mindful that contractor relationships are being closely examined by the WRC and while a relationship may appear on its face to be a commercial relationship between companies, the factual matrix could be such that an employment relationship exists. This is bolstered by the guidance in the new Code of Practice, which clarifies the approach(es) the WRC can adopt when establishing whether an individual is an employee. Employers should familiarise themselves with the Code and consider their engagement with contract workers carefully to ensure that they understand how that relationship may be categorised and understand the rights and obligations that could arise. Links - https://www.workplacerelations.ie/en/cases/2025/february/adj-00053934.html https://www.workplacerelations.ie/en/cases/2024/november/adj-00047375.html https://www.workplacerelations.ie/en/cases/2025/february/adj-00052528.html   Authors – Lia Berkery & Anne O’Connell 14th March 2025 Anne O’Connell Solicitors 19-22 Lower Baggot Street Dublin 2. www.aocsolicitors.ie

Proposed Changes under the General Scheme of the Equality (Miscellaneous Provisions) Bill 2024

In 2021, the Minister for Children, Equality, Disability, Integration and Youth announced a comprehensive review of the equality legislation with a view to the promotion of equality and the elimination of discrimination. Following from this review and the requirement to implement the EU Pay Transparency Directive, the Government recently published the General Scheme of the Equality (Miscellaneous Provisions) Bill 2004 (“the Bill”). The Bill proposes a number of significant amendments to the equality legislation, namely to the Equal Status Act 2000 (“the ES Act”), the Employment Equality Act 1998-2015 (“the EEA”), the Intoxicating Liquor Act 2003 and the Workplace Relations Act 2015. The key proposals in relation to the EEA and the ES Act are outlined below. Part II of the Bill proposes a number of amendments to the Employment Equality Acts 1998 -2015 Head 4 provides for pay transparency prior to employment. This proposed amendment transposes part of Article 5 of the EU Pay Transparency Directive requiring employers to provide information regarding pay levels or ranges either in a job advertisement or in advance of an interview. The proposed amendment however goes further than what the Directive provides for by requiring employers to provide it in the advertisement. Head 5 provides for a prohibition on employers asking job applicants about their pay history or their current rate of pay. Similar to the previous Head, the proposed amendment transposes the relevant section of Article 5 of the EU Pay Transparency Directive. Head 6 provides for an amendment to the definition of “vocational training”. The current definition narrows the scope of vocational training to apply to persons engaging in vocational training that is connected with an occupational activity. The proposed amendment will mean that more education providers will be brought into the definition. Head 7 provides for an extension to the possibility of taking positive action on grounds (other than gender) to include prospective employees (i.e. employees seeking to access employment in a specific organisation). Head 8 proposes the removal of the provision in the EEA that allows differential pay rates to be paid to disabled persons. Any justification that may have existed for differential pay rates has been superseded by the Department of Social Protection’s Wage Subsidy Scheme which makes up any shortfall in productivity directly to the employer. Head 9 would require employers to show that the specific criteria they seek of a job applicant is necessary and proportionate for a particular role. This will assist in preventing indirect discrimination on a number of grounds. Head 10 proposes an extension of the current six-month time limit to 12 months to bring a claim under the EEA, with a further extension of 6 months for reasonable cause. Head 11 provides for two proposed amendments. The purpose of the first is to ensure that the redress ordered under the EEAs satisfies the test set out in the Race Directive (2000/43/EC) that they must be “effective, proportionate and dissuasive”. Under Head 11, it is also proposed to extend the eligibility to the maximum compensation to someone who has left their employment prior to the referral of their complaint, without necessarily being dismissed. Currently, such persons cannot be awarded more than €13,000. The extension of eligibility would mean an entitlement to maximum compensation of two years’ remuneration or €40,000. Part III Amendment to the Equal Status Act 2000 (“the ES Act”) Head 12 amends several definitions of the Equal Status Act, with an amendment to the addition of “prohibited conduct” to include victimisation. This would mean that victimisation would be an offence under the Act and a person could seek redress if they were subjected to victimisation under Part III of the Act. Head 13 proposes to amend the ES Act with the insertion of a new paragraph to provide certainty that consideration can be given to discrimination cases that are taken under a number of protected grounds. The purpose of this provision is to strengthen the existing provisions on discrimination by allowing for complaints in which there may not be sufficient merit on an individual ground, but where combined grounds amount to poor treatment of a sufficiently serious nature to satisfy the test for discriminatory treatment. Head 14 proposes the insertion of a new section which provides that the “disproportionate burden” test for reasonable accommodation would now be imposed on public bodies, financial and insurance institutions, credit unions and public transport operators. Head 15 proposes the introduction of a new section under which “victimisation” would be treated as a tort. Head 16 provides for the extension of time limits that apply to redress under the ES Act. Currently, a person making a complaint of discrimination must notify a person or organisation alleged to have discriminated within two months of the alleged incident. If unsatisfied with the response, he or she then has six months from the date of the alleged incident to make a complaint to the Workplace Relations Commission (“WRC”). It is proposed that the notification period is extended to four months with a potential extension for reasonable cause of a further two months. The time period for making a claim to the WRC is also proposed to be extended to 12 months with a potential further extension of 6 month for reasonable cause. Head 17 proposes increasing the compensation limits from €15,000 (the maximum District Court award) to €75,000 (the maximum Circuit Court award). Considering the proposed significant increase, it is intended that adjudicators would be given guidance to determine the level of award within compensation bands. Takeaway from Employers: While the proposed amendments are still at the early stage of the legislative process, the General Scheme of the Bill suggests significant changes to equality legislation with serious implications for employers. Employers should familiarise themselves with the Bill and ensure that adequate analysis is undertaken of their recruitment practices to include salary ranges and job descriptions. Employers should also be mindful of the potential extension of time limits in relation to the submission of a complaint to the WRC under the relevant Acts and the potential for higher awards in certain instances. Link: General Scheme – Equality (Miscellaneous Provisions) Bill 2024 Author – Ethna Dillon and Jenny Wakely 24th April 2025

WRC Finds Employer Used Redundancy as “Cloak” to Exit Senior Employee in Ireland

 In Mark Langham v JMK Group (ADJ-00047192) the Workplace Relations Commission (“WRC”) awarded €125,000 in compensation under the Unfair Dismissals Acts 1977-2015 (the “Acts”) after finding that the Complainant was unfairly dismissed under the “cloak” of redundancy. Facts: The Complainant commenced employment with the Respondent on 16th May 2022 as Head of Operations Ireland. He was dismissed by reason of redundancy just over a year later on 16th June 2023. The Complainant was informed that “last in first out” (“LIFO”) was the reason for his role’s selection for redundancy (the sole proposed redundancy) and following a consultation period his role was made redundant. The Respondent is a family-owned group which operates hotels in the UK and Ireland. The Respondent submitted to the WRC that they reviewed senior management roles in the business in or around November 2022 and decided that the Head of Operations role in Ireland was surplus to requirements. This role was responsible for managing the operational department in Ireland and had a number of direct reports. Ms Kajani, Director, gave evidence to the WRC on the business rationale for cost saving measures in the Irish business which led to the Complainant’s redundancy. The Complainant’s salary of €160,000 was taken into consideration along with refinancing options and outsourcing of housekeeping. The Respondent submitted that the redundancy was genuine, and the role remains vacant. They also submitted that they engaged the services of an external HR consultancy firm to ensure impartiality in relation to the procedures they followed. The Complainant gave evidence that the business had a turnover of approximately €50.5 million and was doing very well. He submitted that a number of employees started after he did in the business including a Finance Director for UK and Ireland and a coffee shop manager. The Complainant highlighted that he challenged a number of points in the business rationale for redundancy during the consultation process and felt he was met with “weak responses”. The Complainantdescribed feeling sick with the outcome, especially as he had relocated to Ireland from London for the role. Decision: The Adjudicator, John Harraghy, determined that the Complainant was unfairly dismissed and awarded €125,000 as compensation considering the Complainant's loss of earnings and ongoing loss on a lower salary in his new role. The Adjudicator referred to the Unfair Dismissal Acts which provide that the burden of proof is on the employer to show that the dismissal resulted wholly or mainly from the redundancy of the employee. Under the Acts the WRC can also have regard to the reasonableness or otherwise of the conduct of the employer in relation to the dismissal. Even if there is a genuine redundancy situation, the Adjudicator noted there is on onus on the employer to show the selection of the individual was reasonable and that the selection process was fair and transparent. In particular, the Adjudicator noted that no evidence was adduced to substantiate the assertion that the financial position of the Respondent was such that it justified the redundancy of the Head of Operations Ireland role. He commented that it seemed implausible that the Respondent would decide the Complainant’s salary was a burden on the business given the Complainant’s recent role in the renewal of a significant contract and in light of expansion plans for the Irish part of the business. The timing of the redundancy was also questioned by the Adjudicator, as he found it difficult to reconcile how the role was specifically selected for review less than 6 months since the Complainant took up the role. The Adjudicator noted “contradictory evidence” from the Respondent regarding LIFO being the criteria used for selecting the Complainant’s role for redundancy and found there was a failure to fully consider the Complainant’s suggestions for possible alternatives to redundancy. The Adjudicator also highlighted the “marked absence” of the minutes of the senior management meeting where the decision to make the role redundant was made. In concluding remarks, the Adjudicator stated that he found the redundancy was used “as a cloak” to dismiss the Complainant. Takeaway for Employers: This decision highlights the evidential burden on employers in unfair dismissal cases, and in particular the requirement for written evidence in respect of the justification for a decision to dismiss an employee. If an employer is relying on one of the specified grounds for dismissal which are deemed not to be unfair under the Acts, for example redundancy, they must be able to demonstrate the dismissal resulted wholly or mainly from that matter. In redundancy cases, the WRC will peel back the layers to determine whether a genuine redundancy situation existed and whether fair procedures were followed. A standalone redundancy will always bear more scrutiny, as the WRC Adjudicator will need to be satisfied that the individual was not unfairly targeted for dismissal and the onus will be on the employer to produce contemporaneous documentary evidence to the WRC substantiating the reason for the redundancy. An interesting element of this case is that the Adjudicator specifically noted the absence of minutes from the senior management meeting where the decision was made to make the role redundant, which demonstrates the extent of documentary evidence the employer may be required to produce at a WRC hearing. Link - https://www.workplacerelations.ie/en/cases/2025/march/adj-00047192.html Authors – Tara Kelly and Anne O’Connell 29th April 2025 Anne O’Connell Solicitors 19-22 Lower Baggot Street Dublin 2. www.aocsolicitors.ie

WRC Finds Contract was Frustrated as Employee Could Not Find Accommodation in Dublin – No Unfair Dismissal

Francisco Martin Santano v Enable Ireland Sandymount School (ADJ-00050049) concerned a complaint under the Unfair Dismissals Acts 1977-2015. The Complainant claimed that he was unfairly dismissed when the Respondent refused his request to take a career break, needed due to loss of his accommodation in Dublin, and subsequently refused to allow him to return to his role when he finally secured accommodation months later. The Respondent claimed that his employment contract was frustrated when he left Dublin and he was not dismissed. Facts: The Complainant commenced employment with the Respondent on 1st September 2019 as a Special Needs Assistant. On 29th January 2023 the Complainant requested a one-year career break as he had to move out from his home by 22nd March 2023. His lease had been terminated by his landlord after 10 years. The Complainant described the effects of the cost of living and accommodation crisis in Dublin to the WRC; that he was unable to secure a property to rent in Dublin and was unable to purchase a property. He managed to agree an extension with his landlord to stay in his current home until the end of June 2023, meaning he could finish his work commitments for the current academic year. However, the Complainant submitted he was then left with no option but to relocate home to Spain ahead of the 2023/2024 academic year. His request for a career break was denied by the Board of Management of the School on grounds that only a certain number of teachers and special needs assistants were eligible for a career break at any one time, to ensure the school meets its obligations to its pupils, and the quota had been reached. The Complainant contacted the Department of Education who advised him that it was a matter for the Board of Management at the Respondent to resolve and that he could appeal the decision. The Complainant submitted his appeal, but it was unsuccessful. The Board of Management expressed to him that they recognised it was not the solution he was hoping for but that they were willing to engage with the Complainant if he was to apply for a role again in the future. The Complainant sent a letter to the Chairperson of the Board of Management in July 2023 outlining the exceptional circumstances that he faced, that he had to move home to Spain but would keep the school informed of any change if he secured accommodation. In December 2023 the Complainant informed the school that he would returning as he secured accommodation in Dublin as of 1st January 2024. The Respondent notified the Complainant that his contract of indefinite duration had been frustrated by his failure to return to work for the new academic year. The school had no choice but to recruit new applicants for his position as special needs assistants are critical to the support and education of the children in the school’s care. Separately the Complainant also described his frustrations with trying to access his personal data over a number of months after he submitted a data subject access request (“DSAR”) to the Respondent. In particular he requested minutes of meetings where his career break was discussed. The Complainant raised a complaint with the Data Protection Commission due to the Respondent’s failure to engage with his DSAR. Decision: The Adjudicator, Mr Jim Dolan, determined that he did not have jurisdiction to investigate the complaints concerning the Complainant’s personal data/potential breaches of the General Data Protection Regulation, as these should be referred to the Office of the Data Protection Commissioner. In relation to the complaint under the Unfair Dismissal Acts, the Adjudicator found no dismissal had taken place and therefore the complaint was not well-founded. In relation to the refusal to grant the Complainant a career break, the Adjudicator had regard to the Department of Education’s circular on the topic which states “in drawing up this policy, the welfare and educational needs of the pupils shall take precedence over all other considerations. The sole discretion as whether to grant an application for a career break rests with the employer”. The Adjudicator also considered the Respondent’s position that the contract had been frustrated. He referred to the following explanation of the doctrine of frustration in Redmond on Dismissal Law: “a contract of employment may end as a result of the legal doctrine of frustration, that is, where performance of the employee’s duties in the future would become radically different from that undertaken by him”. The Adjudicator found it impossible to disagree with the Respondent’s position, that the employee’s act of returning to Spain frustrated the employment contract. Takeaway for Employers: This is an interesting WRC decision as it is very rare that a contract of employment is held to be terminated by frustration. The decision quotes useful authorities on the doctrine of frustration. Separately, the decision also demonstrates the very real impact of the Irish housing crisis on industrial relations and employment law matters in Ireland. It is likely that similar cases will arise in the future, as employees may experience difficulty finding affordable accommodation in Dublin. Employers should be mindful of their policies and procedures in place concerning career breaks and/or requests for remote working or working from abroad. Any decisions made under these policies and the reasons for those decisions should be well documented. Indeed, if an employer can demonstrate they treated the employee experiencing this hardship with fairness and compassion and duly considered their request in line with established procedures (with the option to appeal), they will be better placed to defend potential claims. Link – https://www.workplacerelations.ie/en/cases/2025/april/adj-00050049.html Authors – Tara Kelly and Anne O’Connell 6th June 2025 Anne O’Connell Solicitors 19-22 Lower Baggot Street Dublin 2. www.aocsolicitors.ie

WRC Awards €1,000 for Two Day Delay by Respondent in Responding to Remote Working Request

In the recent decision of Thomas Farrell v Salesforce (ADJ-00052842), the Workplace Relations Commission (“WRC”) found that the Respondent’s failure to respond to a request for remote working within the four-week deadline breached the Work Life Balance and Miscellaneous Provisions Act 2023 (the “Act”). Our previous article on the Act can be found here. Facts: With the agreement of the Respondent, the Complainant had worked fully remotely since June 2023, only attending the office when needed. In May 2024, the Complainant’s line manager informed her team members that employees would be required to attend the office between three and four days per week. The Complainant submitted a formal request on 10th June 2024 to continue working fully remotely. On 11th July 2024, the Respondent responded to the request seeking more time to consider the matter. However, this was outside the four-week timeframe stipulated in the Act for an employer’s response to such a request. It was submitted by the Respondent that the delay was due to human error. Decision: The Adjudicator, Breiffni O’Neill, upheld the Complainant’s complaint. When considering the amount of compensation to award, he noted that the Respondent had not provided any compelling reasons for their failure to respond to the Complainant’s request within the time period which had expired on 9th July 2024. On the other hand, he noted that the delay was minor, being only two days outside the four-week period prescribed by the Act. He made an award of €1,000. Takeaway for Employers: This decision is a reminder to employers to pay careful attention to the strict time limits provided for under the Act when dealing with remote working requests. The award of €1,000 was not insignificant for such a minor delay of only two days. Employers should familiarise themselves with the relevant time periods and their obligations when presented with a formal request for remote working. Further details are provided below in the WRC Code of Practice for Employers and Employees on the Right to Request Flexible Working and Right to Request Remote Working. Links WRC Decision  AOC Solicitors – Work Life Balance and Miscellaneous Provisions Act 2023  Code of Practice for Employers and Employees Work Life Balance and Miscellaneous Provisions Act 2023 Authors – Ethna Dillon & Jenny Wakely 3 May 2025 Anne O’Connell Solicitors 19-22 Lower Baggot Street Dublin 2. www.aocsolicitors.ie

Recent Caselaw: Mandatory Retirement Ages and Post- Retirement Fixed Term Contracts

This article discusses a recent Workplace Relations Commission “WRC” decision and a recent Labour Court decision on the knotty subject of mandatory retirement ages. Case 1: Tom Kitterick v Mayo County Fire Service (ADJ-00050808) Facts: Mr. Kitterick (the “Complainant”) commenced working for the Respondent in 2008 as a fire fighter at the Westport Fire Service in County Mayo. In 2019 he was promoted to Station Officer. The Complainant had been granted two extensions of his employment, from age 55 to 58 and from 58 to 60. Both occurred after he completed a successful medical assessment. The Complainant then requested to be retained beyond his 60th birthday.  However, his employment terminated on the 18th December 2023, his 60th birthday. The Complainant sued under the Employment Equality Acts 1998-2015 as amended (hereinafter the “EEA”) on the basis of discrimination on the grounds of age. Of note is the fact that the refusal to extend the Complainant’s contract beyond retirement age came just three months prior to the introduction of a new circular which extended mandatory retirement age to 62. This proposed extension had been flagged in August 2023 and unions and management were supporting it, although the circular did not issue or take effect until May 2024. Decision: The WRC Adjudicator’s decision is interesting as it goes through and applies the principles laid down by the Supreme Court in last year’s landmark judgement on mandatory retirement ages in the case of Mallon v the Minister for Justice & Ors [2024] IESC 20. See our previous article on the Mallon decision here (https://aocsolicitors.ie/supreme-court-clarifies-law-on-mandatory-retirement-ages/ ). Having gone through the Mallon principles the Adjudicator determined that the Complainant had clearly established a prima facie case that an act of discrimination took place in relation to mandatory retirement on his 60th birthday. However, an employer can still successfully defend such act of discrimination if it can establish that the relevant mandatory retirement age was objectively and reasonably justified by a legitimate aim; and the means of achieving that aim were appropriate and necessary. The Adjudicator acknowledged the principle determined in Mallon that the relevant competent authority is better placed than the courts to assess what is necessary or appropriate for the effective operation of the role. The Adjudicator also accepted that the physical and mental abilities of retained firefighters are crucial for the role and the proper functioning of the fire service and that the Respondent acted in accordance with the ciruclar that was in place at the time. Therefore, the mandatory retirement age was objectively and reasonably justified by a “legitimate aim”. However, the Adjudicator then went on to examine whether the means of achieving that aim were appropriate and necessary.  The Adjudicator found there was no evidence of consideration of the means that were appropriate and necessary. The Adjudicator distinguished this case from Mallon on the basis that the legislation in Mallon was clear and in place from the outset on mandatory retirement at age 70 years. In Mr. Ketterick’s case, the age was moving incrementally and there was a custom of joint engagement on the means of implementation. The Adjudicator commented that it was regrettable no consideration had been given to using the normal medical assessment on an interim basis pending the “imminent” extension of the retirement age to 62. Th Adjudicator determined that while she remained conscious of Mallon and the margin of appreciation to be afforded to the appropriate authority, she nevertheless viewed the lack of consideration of any appropriate means as unreasonable. She determined that the Complainant was left in limbo with no consideration on his extension request, either nationally or locally. The Adjudicator was critical of the fact that unlike the previous occasions when the retirement age increased, there was no lead in period considered; there was no interim extension of his contract considered; and there was no consideration to facilitate his return or apply the circular retrospectively once the new circular extending the age to 62 issued. The Adudicator found the Complainant was discriminated against on the grounds of age. The Adjudicator made an award of €9,500 by way of compensation to the Complainant. The Adjudicator commented that she would have considered awarding re-instatement but the Complainant had sought compensation. This WRC decision is the latest in a string of WRC decisions on the issue of mandatory retirement ages for retained fire fighters. The WRC arrived at a similar decision to the decision issued in Ketterick in the previous cases of Jim Murphy v Carlow County Council ADJ- 00052056 available here (https://www.workplacerelations.ie/en/cases/2024/december/adj-00052056.html) and Paul Curran v Carlow County Council ADJ–00052052 (https://www.workplacerelations.ie/en/cases/2024/december/adj-00052052.html ). Case 2: John Murphy v Bausch Health Ireland Limited (EDA2534) The Complainant commenced employment with the Respondent on 9th April 2011 as a General Operative. The Respondent operates a normal retirement age of sixty-five. In May 2021, prior to reaching the Respondent’s retirement age, the Complainant had requested to work beyond the normal retirement age. This request was initially refused and the Complainant retired in October 2021 upon reaching the age of sixty-five. The Complainant and Respondent subsequently reached an agreement under which the Respondent offered the Complainant a one-year fixed term contract which commenced on 29 October 2022 and was due to expire on 29 October 2023. The Complainant made written requests on 19 July 2023 and 21 August 2023 for a further one-year post retirement fixed term contract which were refused by the Respondent. The Complainant then submitted a complaint to the WRC, alleging discrimination on the grounds of age. The Complainant was unsuccessful in his complaint of age discrimination to the WRC. The Adjudicating Officer held that the complaint was not well-founded and determined that “the Complainant’s employment ended because of the expiry of fixed term contract and for no other reason.” The Complainant appealed to the Labour Court. During the Labour Court hearing a member of the Respondent’s Human Resources team confirmed that the Respondent employs staff, including general operatives, on fixed term contracts from time-to-time. She also confirmed that on occasion these fixed-term contracts have been renewed. The Labour Court determined it was self-evident the employees so engaged on fixed term contracts – including those that were extended or renewed – were hired when of an age that is under the Respondent’s normal retirement age and were, at the material time, therefore, younger than the Complainant when he was offered and accepted a fixed-term contract which was not extended notwithstanding his request to do so. Decision: The Labour Court determined that the Complainant was prima facie treated less favourably than younger comparators on the age ground. The Court allowed the Complainant’s appeal and awarded €2,000 to the Complainant by way of compensation, equivalent to one month’s gross pay. Interestingly, this case seems to have turned on the availability of comparator employees who were younger than the Complainant and had been on fixed term contracts which had been renewed. It appears that had there been no such comparators, the employer may have been able to successfully defend the Complainant’s age discrimination claim on the basis that the Complainant’s employment expired by reason only of the expiry of his post-retirement fixed term contract. This defence has worked successfully for employers before the WRC in the past. By way of example, in the cases of Carl Davidson v Amari Ireland Limited – (ADJ00037279) and Peter O’Loughlin and the Health Service Executive (ADJ-00026333). See our previous article last year which reviewed the Davidson case (along with a number of other retirement age cases) – https://aocsolicitors.ie/recent-wrc-decisions-on-retirement-age/ Takeaway for Employers: The above mentioned cases add to evolving caselaw on mandatory retirement ages. The following are the key takeaways for employers: If you wish to enforce a mandatory retirement age, you need to be able to demonstrate it serves a legitimate aim and that the means of achieving that aim are appropriate and necessary. Where an employer gives an employee a post-retirement fixed term contract of one year, for example, this may be sufficient to provide the employer with a defence to any subsequent age discrimination claim on the part of the employee so long as the only reason for the subsequent termination of the employment is the expiry of the post termination fixed term contract. However, this defence may not work where there are other younger staff members in comparable roles who were on fixed term contracts and had them renewed. While the giving of a one year post-retirement age fixed term contract might assist the employer in defending an age discrimination claim from that particular employee, where employers routinely give post-retirement fixed term contracts this could risk undermining the general mandatory retirement age in the organisation. For example, in the WRC case of Doreen Nolan v Alsaa, ADJ-00029859, the Adjudicator determined that there appeared to be a ‘rule of thumb’ that staff would be allowed to work on for a further two years which in effect was ignoring the employer’s stated retirement age of 65 in that case and bringing in a retirement age of 67. Employers should note this is a complex area of law that can be challenging to navigate. It is advisable to seek legal advice around the question of enforcing mandatory retirement ages in order to mitigate (in so far as possible) exposure to claims of age discrimination under the Acts. One final point of interest is the fact the WRC Adjudicator in the Ketterick case (and indeed the Adjudicators in the Curran and Murphy cases) confirmed a willingness to consider ordering reinstatement had the employee sought it. This is noteworthy in light of last year’s Supreme Court Judgement in the An Bord Banistíochta, Gaelscoil Moshíológ v The Labour Court and Aodhagán Ó Súird and the Department of Education [2024] IESC 38 where the Supreme Court determined that reinstatement is only to be ordered in “exceptional” circumstances. See our previous article on that Supreme Court decision here (https://aocsolicitors.ie/supreme-court-rules-high-court-erred-in-re-engaging-school-principal-in-a-manner-that-meant-he-was-effectively-reinstated/ ). See also our previous article here (https://aocsolicitors.ie/wrc-orders-reinstatement-of-employee-who-was-unfairly-dismissed/ )  on a recent WRC award of reinstatement. Links – https://www.workplacerelations.ie/en/cases/2025/april/adj-00050808.html https://www.workplacerelations.ie/en/cases/2024/december/adj-00052056.html https://www.workplacerelations.ie/en/cases/2024/december/adj-00052052.html https://www.workplacerelations.ie/en/cases/2025/april/eda2534.html https://www.workplacerelations.ie/en/cases/2020/december/adj-00026333.html Authors – Lia Berkery & Laura Killelea 17th June 2024 Anne O’Connell Solicitors 19-22 Lower Baggot Street Dublin 2. www.aocsolicitors.ie

Significant Award for Breaches of Organisation of Working Time Act

In the recent decision of Mark Alcock v Knights Tower Trading (ADJ-00049112), the Workplace Relations Commission (“WRC”) made an award of €34,999.99 for multiple breaches of the Organisation of Working Time Act 1997 (the “Act”). Facts: In September 2019, the Complainant commenced work as a Sous Chef with the Respondent Hotel and was promoted to the role of Head Chef in June 2022. The Complainant subsequently resigned, and his employment ended on 12th November 2023. The Complainant referred three complaints to the WRC in December 2023 claiming that the Respondent had breached section 11 of the Act dealing with daily rest periods, section 13 dealing with weekly rest periods, and section 15 in respect of maximum weekly working hours. The Complainant’s position was that on a number of occasions he was not afforded his daily and/or weekly rest periods and that he worked far in excess of his contracted hours and in excess of the maximum weekly working hours provided for under the Act. The Respondent refuted the complaints and submitted as a preliminary point that Part II of the Act did not apply to the Complainant as he had complete control over his working hours and was in fact responsible for rostering his own hours and those of the other kitchen staff. The Respondent’s Managing Director gave evidence on behalf of the Respondent and stated that the General Manager’s role was to monitor the Complainant’s hours and that he would have seen what hours were and were not being worked. The Managing Director also stated that the Complainant would not have been approved for overtime. The Complainant gave evidence agreeing that it was his responsibility to roster all kitchen staff, including himself. The Complainant also accepted that his contract provided for a 39-hour working week, however he stated in his evidence that he could not simply leave after eight hours when there were a large number of guests in the hotel and a number of functions taking place. Decision: On the preliminary issue the Adjudicator, Ms Christina Ryan, considered section 3(2)(c) of the Act which provides as follows: Non-application of Act or provisions thereof (2) Subject to subsection (4), Part II shall not apply to— (c) a person the duration of whose working time (saving any minimum period of such time that is stipulated by the employer) is determined by himself or herself, whether or not provision for the making of such determination by that person is made by his or her contract of employment. The Adjudicator also considered the decisions of the Labour Court in M & J Gleeson & Company v. Robert Maloney DWT 1395. The Labour Court determined that: “[b]ased on the evidence provided the Court cannot accept that the Complainant was a person the duration of whose working time is determined by him. The times when he was required to perform his work were essentially dictated by fulfilling customer orders which was the main function of the business”. On that basis, the Labour Court found that the Complainant’s employment was not the type envisaged by section 3(2)(c) of the 1997 Act. Further, in Erac Ireland Limited v. Eddie Murphy DWT 1583 the Labour Court found that the Complainant was employed to work hours as determined by the business needs of the Respondent and consequently was not a person in control of his own working hours. Taking into consideration the provisions of section 3(2)(c), the case law from the Labour Court and the evidence of the parties, the Adjudicator concluded that the Complainant did not determine his working time and found that the business needs of the Respondent determined the hours worked by him. On that basis, the Adjudicator found that Part II of the 1997 Act applied to the Complainant’s employment with the Respondent. Therefore, the minimum daily rest periods, weekly rest periods and weekly working hours provided in the Act applied to his employment. In relation to the complaints in respect of breaches of the daily rest period and weekly rest period, the Adjudicator found that the Complainant gave credible evidence that he was not afforded his daily and/or weekly rest periods. The Adjudicator considered the case law and the EU Directive, Directive 93/104/EC (the “Working Time Directive”) from which the right to rest breaks is derived. The Adjudicator ordered the Respondent to pay the Complainant compensation in the amount of €5,833.33 being one month’s pay for the breach of section 11 of the Act and a further month’s pay of €5,833.33 for the breach of section 13 of the Act. In relation to the complaint in respect of a breach of section 15 of the Act, the Adjudicator found that the Complainant gave credible evidence that he not only worked in excess of his contracted working hours, but also in excess of the maximum weekly working hours set out under the Act. Under section 15, “An employer shall not permit an employee to work, in each period of 7 days, more than an average of 48 hours…” The Adjudicator ordered the Respondent to pay the Complainant compensation in the amount of €23,333.33 being four months’ pay for the breach of section 15 of the Act. Takeaway for Employers: In this case, the total award of compensation was €34,999.99 for breaches of the relevant sections of the Act. While the Complainant’s contract of employment provided that he had control over his own working hours, the Adjudicator was satisfied that it was in fact the business that determined his working time. It is incumbent on employers to ensure that their employees take their minimum rest periods and that they do not work in excess of the maximum weekly working hours. Employers intending to rely on an employee’s ability to control his or her own working hours need to ensure that the employee genuinely has such control. This decision is particularly noteworthy in circumstances where the Adjudicator found that the Complainant’s working hours were determined by the needs of the business notwithstanding that the Complainant was responsible for rostering his own hours. Link – WRC Decision  Authors – Ethna Dillon & Jenny Wakely 6 May 2025 Anne O’Connell Solicitors 19-22 Lower Baggot Street Dublin 2. www.aocsolicitors.ie

WRC Finds Employer Breached TUPE Regulations by Unilaterally Changing Employee’s Terms and Conditions of Employment

In Kathy Coleman v Cáirde Credit Union Ltd (ADJ-00054649), the Complainant brought a number of complaints  alleging  that the Respondent  breached the European Communities (Protection of Employees on Transfer of Undertakings) Regulations 2003 (“TUPE Regulations”). The Complainant alleged that the Respondent unilaterally changed the terms and conditions of her employment and had dismissed her through a sham redundancy process in breach of the TUPE Regulations. Facts: The Complainant was  employed by Lismore and Cappoquin Credit Union (“Lismore”) as an Office Assistant since 3rd December 1996 until a merger with Cáirde Credit Union in January 2023 when her employment was transferred to the Respondent (the Transferee) under TUPE regulations. Since commencing employment with Lismore, the Complainant held a number of contracts of employment. At the time of the transfer of her employment the Complainant worked three days per week which was set out her in contract of employment: “Your normal working week is 21 hours working Monday, Thursday and Friday but you may be required to work overtime from time to time to meet the needs of the position... The Credit Union reserves the right to alter the working hours, but any such change will be affected in consultation with you.” It was submitted that as part of the transfer, the Respondent agreed to issue new contracts of employment to transferring  employees which contained the same terms and conditions of employment. Several months after the transfer, the Respondent provided the Complainant with a new proposed contract of employment. The Complainant contended that this new contract attempted to unilaterally amend her terms and conditions of employment. Specifically, the Complainant contended that the proposed contract: Changed her job title to Teller/ Office Assistant and changed her line manager from Manager/Deputy Manager to “Team Lead”. Her new contract did not set out the days of work as agreed in her previous contract. The proposed new contract set out her days of work as Monday – Friday 9:15am – 5:15pm and Saturday 9:15am - 4:15pm Her contract did not clearly set out her place of work. The contract stated that her normal place of work would be Lismore, or any other offices owned and operated by the Respondent. The Complainant disputed these changes to her contract. In a subsequent consultation meeting between the Complainant and the CEO of the Respondent regarding the proposed changes, the Complainant submitted that she was informed that she may be required to work Saturdays in a different branch owned by the Respondent. She objected on the basis that she had not been required to work on Saturdays and had not been required to work in a different location prior to the transfer. The Complainant and Respondent could not reach agreement on the proposed changes. The Complainant was then informed that if she did not accept the changes that she would  be placed at risk of redundancy. There was correspondence between both parties disputing whether the Complainant would be made redundant due to her opposition to the changes. In a letter to the Complainant on 30th August 2024, the Respondent informed her, “Cáirde Credit Union has a requirement for you to work on a Monday to Saturday rota which will entail you being placed on a roster to work every third Saturday….in any of Cáirde Credit Union’s offices and for other ancillary amendments to your terms of employment”. The Complainant submitted that this letter also stated that if she did not accept this requirement, she would be placed at risk of redundancy. The Complainant did not accept the changes and was placed at risk of redundancy but was ultimately never made redundant. The Complainant submitted that the Respondent’s conduct breached its obligation under Regulation 4, which requires the Transferee to observe the same terms and conditions that had been in effect with the Transferor. The Complainant further submitted that the Respondent had breached Regulation 5 in its attempt to dismiss her through a sham redundancy process when she opposed the changes to her contract. The Respondent submitted that it had fully complied with its obligations under TUPE Regulations. The Respondent submitted that the Complainant’s contract contained two variation clauses, specifically: “Place of Work: You will normally be required to work at Main Street Lismore, but you may be required from time to time to work at other locations. You will be given as much notice of any change to place of work as is reasonably practicable” “Changes to Terms of Employment: The Board reserves the right to make reasonable changes to any of your terms and conditions of employment set out in this contract, the job description attached, and should this occur, you will be notified in advance in writing, of the nature and date of change” It contended that it did not unilaterally change the Complainant’s terms and conditions in breach of TUPE Regulations. Instead, it sought to change the Complainant’s terms and conditions in accordance with the variation clauses in her contract to assist it coping with an increase of business in another branch. The Respondent submitted that it had made efforts to make changes in consultation with the Complainant. The Respondent maintained that when the Complainant disputed the proposed changes, no changes were imposed on her and as such, no breach of TUPE Regulations occurred. Decision: The Adjudicating Officer, Gaye Cunnigham, found the Complainant’s claims that the Respondent had failed to observe the terms and conditions of employment transferred by her previous employer, and that the Respondent had unilaterally changed her terms and conditions of employment. The Adjudicator accepted the Respondent’s position that in line with the judgment in Foreningen af Arbeidsledere I Danmark v Daddy’s Dance Hall A/S, the Respondent as the Transferee inherited contractual rights from the Transferor and sought to “stand in the shoes of the Transferor” in its efforts to amend the terms and conditions of employment. It was noted that the Complainant’s existing contract provided some flexibility for certain alterations but only   in consultation with the employee. The Adjudicator noted the Respondent’s submission that it had not unilaterally changed her terms and conditions of employment and that it had engaged with the Complainant for the purposes of seeking her agreement but the Complainant had clearly objected to the change.  The Adjudicator was satisfied that the letter of 30th August 2024 outlining the “requirement” for the Complainant to work on Saturdays imposed a fundamental change to her terms and conditions of employment that had not existed pre-transfer. The Adjudicator found that this constituted a fundamental change to the terms and conditions of employment, which was in breach of Regulation 4(1). Regarding the Complainant’s claim that her employment had been terminated by reason of sham redundancy under TUPE Regulations, the Adjudicator did not find this claim to be well-founded. Although there was correspondence between the parties about making the Complainant’s role redundant, no dismissal had been  affected. Th Adjudicator directed the Respondent to pay €10,000 to the Complainant for compensation of its breach of TUPE Regulations and directed the Respondent to comply with its obligations under Regulation 4. Takeaway for Employers: TUPE is a complex area of employment law which can be difficult for employers to successfully navigate. This case demonstrates how challenging it can be for employers to satisfy its obligations under TUPE Regulations and the importance of ensuring that a Transferee observes the existing terms and conditions of employment at the point of transfer and ensure that this remains for a period post-transfer. Where there is a change of legal ownership of a business or a merger of business, employers should note that TUPE may arise. Where it arises, employers should ensure that they strike a balance between commercial and operational needs and be aware of their legal obligations to the impacted  employees. It is prudent for employers to seek legal advice in relation to same to ensure that they do not fall foul of the TUPE Regulations. Link - https://www.workplacerelations.ie/en/cases/2025/may/adj-00054649.html 30th June 2025 Anne O’Connell Solicitors 19-22 Lower Baggot Street Dublin 2. www.aocsolicitors.ie

Employer Successfully Defends Claim of Sexual Harassment Due to its Post-Incident Actions

This case Serhat Aksakal v. Kivaway2 Limited trading as the Odeon (ADJ-00053151) concerned a complaint under the Employment Equality Acts 1998-2015 (“the Acts”). The Complainant claimed the Respondent discriminated against him on the grounds of his gender, in circumstances where he was subjected to sexual harassment in the workplace. He also lodged a Payment of Wages claim for unpaid tips. Facts: The Complainant was employed by the Respondent since March 2022 and at the time of the claim he was  a Commis Chef at the Respondent’s busy restaurant. The Complainant alleged he was the target of a crude sexual joke from his co-worker, the Head Chef, Mr. M. He claimed that when he bent down to retrieve something from below the countertop, Mr. M came up behind the Complainant and made a thrusting gesture against him and shouted “yee-haw”. The Complainant told the Workplace Relations Commission (“WRC”) this incident violated his dignity at work and created a degrading, humiliating and offensive environment for him. Mr. M was the Head Chef and therefore above the Complainant in the workplace hierarchy. The Complainant immediately reported the incident to his line manager, “AM”. The Complainant submitted to the WRC that he was not sent home and instead was obliged to continue working even though Mr. M was in relatively close proximity. However, the Respondent produced a text message thread between AM and her manager R McD wherein he instructed that the Complainant was to be asked to make a statement and to be allowed to go home. According to this text thread the Complainant himself opted to stay working on his shift, albeit in a separate barbecue area. AM told the WRC that she immediately began investigating the incident, including having a preliminary conversation with Mr. M. The Complainant provided AM with a formal statement one week after making his verbal complaint. The Complainant told the WRC that he never saw any notes of the investigation conducted by the Respondent into the incident and was never kept up to date with the investigation. R McD gave evidence on behalf of the Respondent that he contacted the Complainant via WhatsApp assuring him that they were taking the matter very seriously and a full investigation was underway. He required some clarifications on the Complainant’s statement and met with the Complainant however no notes were taken of this meeting. At the conclusion of the investigation and disciplinary process the Respondent terminated Mr. M’s employment. Decision: The Adjudicator, Penelope McGrath, noted that the Complainant was critical of the fact that AM did not immediately invite him to make a formal complaint or direct him to the dignity at work policy. However the Adjudicator noted the Complainant was aware there was a dignity at work policy in operation in the workplace, albeit he seemed to suggest in cross-examination that the policy failed to give adequate guidance. The Adjudicator also referred to AM’s preliminary conversation with Mr. M following the incident and accepted it was not necessarily clear to the Complainant at that point that anyone had even talked to Mr. M about it. The Complainant repeatedly stated that he felt that he was not given adequate information about the investigation however the Adjudicator noted the balancing act required to be undertaken by employers in these types of investigations, to ensure that the rights of both the victim and alleged perpetrator are protected appropriately. The Adjudicator highlighted the direct conflict of evidence regarding the Complainant not going home after the incident and stated that she could not ignore the corroborative nature of the real-time text messages produced by the Respondent. The Adjudicator also noted that the complaint document was well-crafted and that she understands the Complainant may have had the assistance of Chat GPT. The Adjudicator commented that in general she has no issue with this, “save that the Complainant must ensure the language used perfectly reflects what happened”. The Adjudicator referred to the Complainant’s accusation in the complaint document that management had done nothing, when the evidence indicates that management took the matter very seriously. In her findings the Adjudicator noted the investigation involved ten separate meetings with up to seven members of staff. It was put to the Complainant that he was prompted by AI to include this element of his complaint, which was ultimately a misrepresentation of what happened. On balance, the Adjudicator determined that the claim was not well founded. The Complainant had made out a prima facie case of discrimination, in that he was subjected to an incident with undeniable sexual undertones in the workplace, which can constitute discrimination on the gender ground under the Acts. However, the Respondent took the complaint seriously from the start and the Adjudicator accepted that this was known to be a workplace wherein such behaviour was not and is not tolerated. The Respondent was able to demonstrate that it had taken all reasonable steps to prevent incidents of this nature occurring and responded appropriately to this particular incident. Takeaway for Employers: This WRC decision demonstrates how an employer may effectively protect itself against possible claims under the Acts. As noted in our article on a WRC decision last year, where €30,000 was awarded in compensation to the Complainant, employers can be held vicariously liable for the actions of others under the Employment Equality legislation when sexual harassment occurs during the course of a person’s employment. However, there is a defence available where an employer can prove they took reasonably practicable steps to prevent the contravening act(s) and responded appropriately to the reported incident(s). In the current case the employer was able to avail of this defence. At a minimum, employers should ensure that they have a dignity at work policy in place which is well communicated to staff and that line managers receive appropriate training on how to respond to complaints of this nature. It is interesting to note that in this case, the Complainant’s knowledge of the Dignity at Work policy seemed to satisfy the pre-incident obligation of the Respondent and that their actions in response to the incident was what defended the case for them. This decision also highlights the potential impact of the increasingly widespread use of AI tools such as Chat GPT on cases before the WRC. While the use of AI tools may be of assistance to lay litigants before the WRC, particularly where English may not be their first language, issues can arise where the content generated by AI departs from the facts of the case at hand. Link - https://www.workplacerelations.ie/en/cases/2025/may/adj-00053151.html Authors – Tara Kelly and Anne O’Connell 30th June 2025 Anne O’Connell Solicitors 19-22 Lower Baggot Street Dublin 2. www.aocsolicitors.ie

Employee Put on Unpaid Leave Pending Medical Assessment of Fitness to Work Wins Payment of Wages Claim

In Noel Kelly v Go Ahead Bus Ireland (ADJ-0005112), the Workplace Relations Commission (“the WRC”) found for the Complainant Mr Kelly in a Payment of Wages claim. The Complainant was not paid by his employer while an investigation took place surrounding his fitness to work. The WRC Adjudicator, Catherine Byrne, found that the Complainant ought to have been paid during this time and accordingly awarded him the wages he was not paid from October 6th 2023 until he submitted his complaint to the WRC six months later on April 5th 2024. Facts: The Complainant was employed by the Respondent as a bus driver since October 2022. The Complainant’s weekly pay was €680.00 gross. He had been absent from work since June 19th 2023, for a period of sick leave. On June 21st 2023, the Complaint attended a doctor, referred to as “the Ciywest doctor”, who prescribed medication for high blood pressure and stress and advised the Complainant to remain out of work and to come back for a review on July 5th, 2023.  The Complainant returned for his appointment on July 5th, and the Citywest doctor certified the Complainant as fit to return to work the next day. However, as the Complainant’s role as a driver was a safety critical role, the Respondent referred him to an occupational health provider (the “Occupational Health Provider”) for an appointment on July 6th, 2023. Following that appointment there was a mix up on the part of the Occupational Health Provider whereby the file of the Complainant and a file of another patient with the same name were incorrectly merged together.  This mistake appears to have caused considerable confusion. However, the WRC Adjudicator also identified delays on the part of the Respondent in addressing matters as well as resistance on certain aspects by the Complainant. Of significance in this case was the fact that the Complainant’s contract of employment contained the following clause at Section 15.1: “The Company reserves the right to ask you not to attend work at any time at its sole discretion, during any period that you are not required to work, you will continue to be employed by the company and will continue to receive your normal pay and benefits, except that you will not receive any bonus or commission payment that is dependent on work being undertaken on sales of leads being generated.” Owing to all of the confusion and delays mentioned above, the Complainant was not permitted by the Respondent to work from 6th July 2023 and remained out of work at the date of the WRC hearing in September, 2024. He was unpaid for all this time with the exception of 15 days sick pay. Decision: The Adjudicator accepted that the role of a bus driver is a safety critical role and that drivers must be assessed as fit for work based on certain medical criteria. Nonetheless the Adjudicator held that the management and the occupational health provider “should have acted with a greater degree of energy, persistence and tenacity to get the complainant back to work.” The Adjudicator agreed with the Complainant’s position that he was not absent from work due to illness but rather he was absent on the instructions of his employer and, in these circumstances, section 15.1 of his contract of employment (mentioned above) applied. The Adjudicator concluded that while the Complainant was absent waiting for the occupational health consultant to complete their assessment of his fitness for work, the Complainant’s wages were properly payable and it followed that the Respondent’s failure to pay him any wages amounted to an illegal deduction from his wages. The Adjudicator directed the Respondent to pay the Complainant compensation equivalent to the wages he was not paid from October 6th 2023 to the date he submitted his complaint to the WRC six months later on April 5th 2024.  The Adjudicator calculated the Complainant’s gross earnings during this period to be €17,680.  As he received three weeks’ sick pay in November 2023, the Adjudicator reduced the amount to be paid in compensation to €15,640.  The Adjudicator determined that under section 6 of the Payment of Wages Act 1991 (as amended), she is required to direct the Respondent to pay compensation as a net amount.  In estimating the deductions for PAYE, PRSI and USC, the Adjudicator directed the Respondent to pay the Complainant compensation of €13,000. Takeaway for employers: This decision highlights the need for an employer to act as promptly as possible whenever an employee is incurring a loss of pay as a result of a decision of the employer. In this case, even though the Adjudicator accepted it was entirely reasonable and necessary for the Respondent to want to further investigate the Complainant’s medical fitness to work before allowing his return to his safety critical role, the Respondent’s efforts in trying to get to the bottom of the matter and return the Complainant to paid work were simply not sufficient. More energy, persistence and tenancity was required. Link - https://www.workplacerelations.ie/en/cases/2025/may/adj-00051123.html Authors- Jane Holian, Laura Killelea 30th June 2025 Anne O’Connell Solicitors 19-22 Baggot Street Lower Dublin 2 www.aocsolicitors.ie

One Year’s Remuneration Awarded to Marketing Manager Demoted Following her Return to Work from Maternity Leave

In A Marketing Manager v A Drinks Retail Company (ADJ-00051379), the Workplace Relations Commission (“WRC”) found that the Complainant was discriminated against by her employer on the grounds of gender by not being returned to her position following maternity leave, contrary to section 26 of the Maternity Protection Acts (the “Acts”). Facts: The Complainant worked for the Respondent company from June 2018 and resigned on 15th March 2024. The Complainant was employed as a Premium Spirts Customer Marketing Manager, and her job title was subsequently changed to Premium Spirts Marketing Manager. The Complainant took a period of maternity leave. The Complainant claimed that upon her return to work after approximately one year and 21 days, she was demoted from her Manger role to a Portfolio Department Lead. The Complainant told the WRC that on Friday, 19th January 2024, she was notified that when she returned to work on Monday, 22nd January, she would be moving to another role and that the employee who was hired to cover her while she was on maternity leave would be staying in the Premium Spirits Marketing Manager role. She was given an overview of the new role, and she informed the Respondent that it sounded like a demotion. The role was subsequently referred to as Portfolio Department Lead. The Complainant received a job description after close of business on 22nd January and it became even more apparent that the role was more junior. The Complainant described feeling “side-balled”, she had expected to come back to her own role. There was no consultation about the new role, no notice, and no justification provided for not returning her to the role she did before commencing maternity leave. The Complainant stated that her reservations about the new role stemmed from the absence of “Manager” from the job title and from the reporting structure and the fact that the role had no budget or people management elements and was a much more operational role. The Complainant expressed these concerns to her manager but was told that it was not a demotion. The Respondent announced to everyone on a Teams call that the Complainant would be starting in her new role, when the Complainant had never actually accepted the new role. This eventually led to the Complainant handing in her resignation. The Complainant submitted that it was “irrefutable” that the Respondent’s change in attitude and treatment of her arose directly as a consequence of her maternity leave. The Respondent argued that the Premium Spirits Marketing Manager role had expanded and that there was a need for additional resources to support the coffee side of the business. It became clear that there was too heavy a workload for one person. The Respondent stated that a decision was made to “split” the role. It was the Respondent’s position that although the term “Manager” was not included in the Portfolio Department Lead title, it would be regarded as a managerial post in the industry. Decision: The Adjudicator, Patricia Owens, decided that the Complainant had proven the primary facts on which she relied in alleging discrimination. The Adjudicator examined the claim in relation to the role change being a demotion and found that there was no real or equivalent budget assigned to the role. She clarified that if this was the only difference she would not necessarily regard it as a demotion, however when taken in combination with the other differences outlined by the Complainant, the Adjudicator was satisfied that the new post was at a lower level from the Complainant’s previous role and that it constituted a demotion for the Complainant. The Adjudicator then considered the Complainant’s position that the change was presented to her as a fait accompli – that when it was first put to her, she believed it to be an open discussion, but that it soon became apparent that she was not being given an option. The Adjudicator concluded that on the balance of probabilities the Respondent had already decided that the Complainant would move on to the new role upon her return and there was no intention to provide her with options. She agreed that the new role was a fait accompli. The Adjudicator then considered the Respondent’s position that changes were being implemented due to organisational change and were not personal to the Complainant. The Adjudicator accepted that there may have been a need for additional staff to support the Complainant’s former role of Premium Spirits Marketing Manager. However, the Adjudicator found that it was the Respondent’s responsibility to set out clearly any options that were available to the Complainants in relation to the job role and the Respondent did not do so, which led her to believe that there was only one option available to the Complainant. The Adjudicator also concluded that there was no immediate imperative to make any change to the Complainant’s role upon her returning from maternity leave, as the workload issues giving rise to the change had existed for several years. The Adjudicator was satisfied that the Complainant had raised facts of sufficient significance to create a presumption of discrimination and established a prime facie case to meet the requirements of section 85(A) of the Act. She found that the Respondent had not discharged its burden and concluded that the Complainant was discriminated against on the grounds of gender by not being returned to her position after maternity leave as required by section 26 of the Acts and by being demoted by the Respondent. The Adjudicator directed the Respondent to pay the amount of €68,000 to the Complainant as compensation for the discrimination. Takeaway for Employers: This decision reminds employers of the general entitlement of employees to return to the same role following a period of maternity leave. While the Acts make provision for circumstances in which it might not be “reasonably practicable” for an employer to permit an employee to return to the same role, in which case a suitable alternative role should be offered, this decision makes it clear that employers must exercise care in such circumstances and ensure effective communication with the retuning employee, and a fair and transparent process. It is also important to ensure that the alternative work is on terms that are not “less favourable” than those enjoyed by the employee before commencement of maternity leave. Moreover, employers need to ensure that any changes are justifiable and do not amount to discrimination. Legal advice is recommended. Link:https://www.workplacerelations.ie/en/cases/2025/june/adj-00051379.html Authors- Abigail Ansell, Jane Holian, Jenny Wakely 31st July 2025 Anne O’Connell Solicitors 19-22 Lower Baggot Street Dublin 2. www.aocsolicitors.ie

Seconded Employee Succeeds in Unfair Dismissal Claim Due to Failure in Investigation of Complaints

In the recent decision of Krzysztof Machinkowski v Spectrum Telecom Installations Limited (ADJ-00052842), the Workplace Relations Commission (“WRC”) found that the Complainant was unfairly dismissed from the Respondent’s client placement due to the failure of either the Respondent or the client to carry out a proper investigation. The Complainant was on a final written warning at the time and some form of procedure was followed but no witnesses were interviewed in relation to the investigation into the allegation. The Adjudicator also criticised the Respondent for not making sufficient efforts to find an alternative role for the Complainant when its client refused to allow the Complainant work for them. Facts: The Complainant commenced work as a Lead Rigger Engineer with the Respondent company in August 2020. The Complainant was seconded to Company B following a downturn in the business of the Respondent in late 2023, however he remained an employee of the Respondent. In December 2023 following complaints and an investigation in relation to the Complainants’ driving, he was issued with a Final Written Warning but was not dismissed. The Respondent also received a number of complaints in December 2023 in relation to his work with Company B, however he continued to work for Company B in January 2024. On 29 January 2024, the Respondent was contacted by Company B stating that they did not have work for the Complainant. The Respondent determined that Company B were not happy with his work. The Respondent submitted that the Complainant was placed on paid suspension while the matter was investigated. During a meeting on 9 February 2024, it was outlined to the Complainant that they had lobbied with Company B for his return to work and had also sought to find him alternative work at other sites to no avail. The Respondent also discussed other roles the Complainant could undertake however, this was deemed impossible as other sites were downsizing. The Complainant was subsequently dismissed on 20 February 2024 and was also unsuccessful in his appeal of his dismissal. His employment with the Respondent ended on 3 March 2024 and he lodged complainants to the WRC under the Payment of Wages, 1991 and the Unfair Dismissals Act, 1977. The Respondent submitted that the Complainant’s dismissal was fair and he was dismissed for ‘some other substantial grounds’, that is, there was no alternative work for him.  Ms Conway responsible for HR administration gave evidence on behalf of the Respondent. She indicated that Company B did not conduct an investigation concerning the complaints. She conducted an investigation herself; however, when asked for details, she clarified that no witness statements were obtained and the process was carried out via telephone conversations between the Respondent’s general manager and Company B’s operations manager. When asked why this was classified as a dismissal rather than a redundancy, Ms Conway stated that if Company B had been satisfied with his performance, they would have retained him. The Complainant submitted that he had been treated unfairly by the Respondent in that no proper investigation had been carried out. He further submitted that the efforts of the Respondent in relation to alternative work fell short of what was to be expected as reasonable efforts. Decision: The Adjudicator, Roger McGrath, upheld the Complainant’s claim that he was unfairly dismissed by the Respondent. The Adjudicator stated that, for an employee working for a client to be dismissed fairly, either the client company must conduct a fair and comprehensive investigation resulting in a recommendation for dismissal, which the employer should then evaluate, or the employer must perform its own thorough and fair investigation that may justify dismissal. The Adjudicator concluded that neither Company B nor the Respondent conducted adequate investigations. Furthermore, the Adjudicator found that the Respondent failed to make reasonable efforts to find a suitable alternative role, stating that reasonable efforts should go beyond a few phone calls and a few e-mails. The Adjudicator also considered the efforts made by the Complainant to find alternative work and awarded him his full financial loss of €8,100 equivalent to ten weeks salary. The Adjudicator did not take into account the Complainant higher salary in his new job when calculating his financial loss. The Complainant also succeeded in his Payment of Wages claim, which concerned the unlawful deduction of one day pay in December 2023 which amounted to €192. Takeaway for Employers: It appears from the decision that there was scant investigation in relation to the complaints against the Complainant and a failure by the Respondent to follow proper procedure. This decision is a reminder that employers are required to carry out fair and thorough investigations adhering to the principles of natural justice in respect of complaints being made against an employee and especially where such complaints may result in the employee’s dismissal. The case also emphasises the requirement of proper procedures in disciplinary matters even where an employee is seconded. Employers must also make reasonable efforts in seeking alternative roles for employees. The Adjudicator noted that the Respondent in this instance made only a few calls and sent a few emails in their efforts to find alternative work. This was deemed insufficient to warrant reasonable efforts.  The Adjudicator stated that “It behoves an employer to do their utmost to find alternative work in circumstances as those outlined above.” Link - WRC Decision Authors – Ethna Dillon & Anne O’Connell 31st July 2025 Anne O’Connell Solicitors 19-22 Lower Baggot Street Dublin 2. www.aocsolicitors.ie

WRC Finds Unfair Dismissal where Employer Failed to Engage with Employee during Period of Absence

In Barry Colclough v Grange Mockler Holdings Ltd t/a Lanigan’s Bar (ADJ-00050044) the Complainant claimed that he was unfairly or constructively dismissed from his employment as Head Door Supervisor with the Respondent in breach of section 8 of the Unfair Dismissals Acts 1977 – 2015. Facts: The Complainant was a Head Door Supervisor with the Respondent and commenced employment on 15th March 2013. He was promoted to Head Door Supervisor in early 2016, and had a great working relationship with the Respondent up until September 2023. In September 2023, two new door staff started work. The Complainant was assured that he would remain in his role as Head Door Supervisor. However, the Complainant was unhappy with the arrangement, and stated that he was bullied by the new door staff and that he was not treated with the respect that he deserved and expected as a long-term employee and a Head Doorman. The Complainant asked for two weeks’ leave to reflect on his position. The Complainant acknowledged that he was subsequently involved in an altercation with the new door staff, where Gardai who were passing by asked the parties to move along. Mr Lanigan, Director of the Respondent, told the WRC that he expected an apology for what happened that night. The Complainant submitted in his evidence that his last pay day was 28th August 2023, and that his last day of work was 15th September 2023. The Complainant gave evidence that, since that date, he had not received any communication from the Respondent, despite his numerous attempts to contact him, including via Facebook, telephone and text messages on WhatsApp. Mr Lanigan denied recollection of having received any texts from the Complainant during this time, but was aware that the Complainant wished to continue working after his two-week break. At the hearing, the Complainant stated that he was waiting for the Respondent to contact him with his roster. Given the circumstances, he believed that another company was now supplying door staff and that he had been removed from the roster. The Complainant gave evidence that he sent the Respondent three letters: one dated 24th October 2023 in which he requested a written statement outlining the reason for his dismissal and requiring a response within 14 days, followed by further letters in January 2024 and February 2024. The Complainant did not receive a response to those letters. Mr Lanigan denied blocking the Complainant’s phone number and denied dismissing him. He confirmed that the Complainant was still employed. When asked about whether or not there was an employment contract and grievance policy, Mr Lanigan stated that the Complainant had started working a long time ago and that, while he was provided with a contract, he had refused to sign it. Decision: The Adjudicator,Úna Glazier-Farmer, upheld the Complainant’s claim that he was unfairly dismissed by the Respondent. Dismissal was at issue in this case. While the “general sequence” of events was not in dispute between the parties, what was disputed by the Respondent was the Complainant’s efforts to contact Mr Lanigan, with the exception of a registered letter in January 2024 which the Respondent accepted had been received. This letter set out the Complainant’s employment history, his September 2023 leave, his attempts to contact Mr Lanigan, and a reference to having been refused entry to the premises. The letter also made reference to a complaint being lodged with the WRC. There was no evidence that the Respondent replied to the letter or took any steps to rebut the claims therein. The Adjudicator found this particularly surprising in circumstances where the Complainant, a long-term employee, had been absent since the previous September without explanation. The Adjudicator stated as follows: “Where there is an onus on the Respondent to actively manage its staff in the event of an unknown or unauthorised absence, it is incumbent on the Respondent to engage with the employee. An employer cannot simply sit back and ignore an absent employee.” The Adjudicator found that an expression of a desire to end employment in the future does not constitute a resignation, and pointed out that there was no letter of resignation or any formal notification from the Complainant to the Respondent expressing such a desire. The Adjudicator found that the Respondent’s failure to engage with or, at a minimum, respond to the January 2024 registered letter amounted to its dismissal of the Complainant within the meaning of the Unfair Dismissals Acts. The Adjudicator also found that the Complainant’s dismissal was unfair. In doing so, she referred to the burden of proof on the Respondent to demonstrate that the Complainant’s dismissal was justified, the presumption that the dismissal of an employee is unfair unless there are “substantial grounds” justifying the dismissal, and the requirement to consider the reasonableness or otherwise of an employer in dismissing an employee. She also noted the complete lack of fair procedures in this case. As the Complainant was found to have been unfairly dismissed, the Adjudicator found that he had not been constructively dismissed. The Complainant was awarded the sum of €6,750 in compensation for the 27 weeks he was out of work. Takeaway for Employers: This decision is notable in respect of the finding that a failure on the part of the Respondent to engage with the Complainant during a period of “unknown” or “unauthorised” absence constituted its dismissal of the Complainant. In other words, it was the Respondent’s failure to act that was found to amount to its dismissal of the Complainant. Ordinarily “dismissal” by an employer requires a positive action on the employer’s part to terminate an employee’s contract of employment. From time to time, employers may find themselves in a situation where an employee is absent without authorisation and/or without explanation. This case highlights that there is an obligation on employers to try and engage with an employee in such circumstances. While the accepted receipt of the January 2024 registered letter, and the Respondent’s failure to respond to same, were key in this particular case, employers cannot simply sit back and do nothing if an employee fails to turn up to work. Link: ADJ-00050044 - Workplace Relations Commission Authors - Abigail Ansell and Jenny Wakely 21st July 2025 Anne O’Connell Solicitors 19-22 Lower Baggot Street Dublin 2. www.aocsolicitors.ie

Finance Manager Dismissed after Making Protected Disclosure Awarded €34,737

In a recent case A Finance Manager v A Charity (ADJ-00051548) the Complainant claimed he was unfairly dismissed and submitted a complaint to the Workplace Relations Commission (“WRC”) under the Unfair Dismissals Acts 1977-2015. Because the Complainant had less than a year’s service, ordinarily he would not have the protection of the Unfair Dismissals Acts. However, the Complainant successfully argued the dismissal was wholly or mainly as a result of him having made a protected disclosure and was awarded €34,737. Such cases do not encompass a minimum service requirement on the part of the employee. Interestingly the Respondent employer made a successful application for the hearing to be heard in private, and the parties’ names anonymised, which was contested by the Complainant. In normal course all WRC hearings are heard in public following the significant Supreme Court decision Zalewski v Adjudication Officer & Ors [2021] IESC 24. The Adjudicator deemed that special circumstances existed in this case, including that ongoing investigations by other state bodies may be prejudiced if the case was heard in public. The work of the Respondent charity is also of a very sensitive nature and this too played a part in the decision to anonymise. Facts: The Complainant worked as the Finance Manager for the Respondent from 1st  September 2023 to 2nd November 2023 (having previously worked for the Respondent as an independent contractor). This case revolves around an email that the Complainant sent to the Respondent's CEO on 27th October 2023, which the Complainant alleges was a protected disclosure. The Complainant submitted to the WRC this email disclosed issues with accounting records in the Respondent. Specifically, in the email the Complainant was looking for more time to prepare management accounts and mentioned that he must do a “thorough clean up” in order to “pass audit”.  Later emails were exchanged between the Respondent and the Complainant that same day in which further issues were raised by the Complainant regarding the possibility of a conflict of interest in respect of a suggestion that a particular board member would assist the Complainant with anomalies in the management accounts and other outstanding matters. These emails happened on a Friday, following which the Complainant called in sick and remained out sick until his dismissal. The Complainant was then dismissed by letter dated and received on 2nd November. The Complainant claimed this was retaliation for his protected disclosure. The Respondent denied the Complainant’s email of 27th October was a protected disclosure and contended it was simply a request for more time to submit management accounts and proof that the Complainant regularly could not meet deadlines. The Respondent submitted there were existing performance issues, and the Complainant was terminated during his probation period in line with his contract of employment. The Respondent went into detail in submissions to the WRC and in evidence at the hearing as to the various performance issues it allegedly had with the Complainant. There was one documented meeting around some performance issues prior to the emails of 27th October and subsequent dismissal. Some but not all of the alleged performance issues relied upon by the Respondent at the WRC hearing were referenced in the dismissal letter of 2nd November. There was also a conflict of evidence around the frequency of performance related discussions between the Respondent and the Complainant prior to the emails of 27th October and the subsequent dismissal. Decision: The Adjudicator, Michael MacNamee, considered the legislative framework established by the Protected Disclosures Act 2014 and its amendments (the “Acts”). The Acts provide for remedies for individuals penalised for making protected disclosures. There are different categories of claims under the Acts. The Adjudicator noted that dismissal-based penalisation claims are processed as unfair dismissal claims under the Unfair Dismissals Acts. These claims are a unique category of unfair dismissal claim, removing the service requirement of one years’ service to bring a claim and increasing the maximum compensation from 2 years remuneration to five years remuneration if the dismissal results wholly or mainly from the making of a protected disclosure. As well as carefully analysing the relevant legislation, the Adjudicator in his detailed written Decision also engaged in an analysis of the relevant Superior Court Case law on protected disclosures including the recent Court of Appeal Judgement of Ní Raifeartaigh J in the case of Barrett v. Commissioner of An Garda Síochána and Minister for Justice [2023] E.L.R 165. The Adjudicator noted paragraph 114 of that Judgment which sets out a summary of points to be considered when determining whether a disclosure is a “protected disclosure”. Among the other principles discussed by the Adjudicator from that summary, the Adjudicator paid close attention to Ní Raifeartaigh J’s comment that: “A Court should be alive both to the possibility that actions by the employer which ostensibly appear legitimate on their face may in reality be connected to a protected disclosure, and the possibility that an employer is taking bona fide steps in respect of an employee who is making unfounded allegations of a connection between the two events.” Ultimately, notwithstanding the Respondent’s arguments to the contrary, the Adjudicator determined that the first email from 27th October from the Complainant was a protected disclosure. The Adjudicator noted that there is no provision in the Acts which requires an employer to be aware that a disclosure is a protected disclosure in order for it to be deemed as such.  The Adjudicator observed that as this claim was a dismissal-based penalisation claim the burden of proof was on the employee to establish that the dismissal resulted wholly or mainly from making the protected disclosure. Upon review of the evidence presented, the Adjudicator found it probable that the CEO of the Respondent had concerns (whether justified or not) about the Complainant's performance, which were discussed at least once. However, the Adjudicator found the sudden shift from coaching in respect of those alleged performance issues to the Complainant’s dismissal without warning to be rooted in the email sent on 27th October. On the balance of probabilities, the Adjudicator found it likely that the CEO had a strong averse reaction to the email and that this email “started a chain reaction which led directly to the Complainant’s dismissal”. The Complainant requested reinstatement. However the WRC Adjudicator did not believe this was a workable or practical remedy in this case. The Complainant was awarded the sum of €34,737 by way of compensation for the unfair dismissal. The Adjudicator went into detail on the calculation of this compensation representing losses attributable to the dismissal, and indicated he reduced the amount to reflect the partial failure by the Complainant to mitigate his losses. The Decision contains a useful outline of how the Adjudicator calculated recoverable losses in this case in circumstances where the Complainant had obtained but then subsequently lost new employment following the dismissal and later taken up further new employment. Takeaway for Employers: Employers should note that whistleblowers who raise concerns of wrongdoing by their employers have strong legal protections.  They are protected from being penalised or suffering detriment at work as a result, even in circumstances where their protected disclosure is ultimately determined to be factually incorrect (as long as at the time the worker held a reasonable belief they were reporting a genuine wrongdoing). As many employers are aware, an employee normally requires at least one years’ service to bring a claim of unfair dismissal before the WRC. However, there are specific exceptions; notably, if the complainant's dismissal is found to have been penalisation for making a protected disclosure. Here, no service is required. Employers need to tread carefully where employees flag items of concern or bring issues to their attention. As is evident from this case, it is not a requirement that the employer is aware a certain report or communication is a protected disclosure, for it to be deemed as such. Public organisations and all private organisations with over 50 employees have a legal obligation to ensure they have a whistleblowing policy in place detailing reporting channels. However, it is best practice for all organisations to have well-documented protected disclosure/whistleblowing policies in place in order to give employees and employers a clear framework for the reporting and the investigation of protected disclosures.  Link - https://www.workplacerelations.ie/en/cases/2025/june/adj-00051548.html Authors – Tara Kelly and Laura Killelea 31st July 2025 Anne O’Connell Solicitors 19-22 Lower Baggot Street Dublin 2. www.aocsolicitors.ie

WRC Condemns Sham Redundancy Carried out by Football Club in “Ruthless and Dishonest Manner”

David Henderson v The Bohemian Football Club CLG (ADJ-00056820) concerned an employee of the Respondent football club who claimed he was unfairly dismissed in a sham redundancy process, in the absence of any fair procedures. The Complainant submitted his complaint to the Workplace Relations Commission (“WRC”) under the Unfair Dismissals Acts 1977-2015. Facts: The Complainant gave evidence to the WRC of his involvement in various aspects of football in Ireland and abroad as a player, scout and coach. His most recent period of employment with the Respondent commenced on 1st January 2023. He described carrying out various roles for the Respondent including head of recruitment, men’s first team goalkeeper coach, women’s first team coach, chief scout for the Academy and liaison with the Respondent’s partner club. According to the Complainant the League of Ireland season had ended in November 2024, and no issues had been raised with him. On 30th November 2024 during a phone call with the Respondent’s Director of Football he was informed his employment was being terminated. The Complainant submitted to the WRC that during this phone call the Director of Football initially referred to budgeting issues when he informed him of his dismissal but when pressed he referenced “anonymous verbal complaints” and a “historic letter of complaint”. Following his dismissal the Complainant wrote to the Director of Football requesting clarification and evidence of these allegations, but he received no response. He then wrote to the Respondent’s Board of Management, who refused to provide specific details. The Complainant, concerned for his reputation and professional standing, escalated his concerns to the FAI. In January the FAI confirmed to the Complainant that the Respondent had informed them that no letter of complaint ever existed. The Respondent’s President gave evidence to the WRC that the football club had experienced significant losses in 2023 and the projected losses for 2024 had come to fruition. He stated that the budget for 2025 was reviewed in October/November 2024 and cutbacks were required. He submitted that the decision to make the Complainant’s role redundant was made at a board meeting in early November 2024 where it was decided the recruitment role was not needed. The Respondent’s Director of Football was instructed to inform the Complainant that his “services were no longer required and that his services were being dispensed with”. Decision: The Adjudicator, Christina Ryan, found the Complainant was unfairly dismissed from his employment. Under the Unfair Dismissals Acts the dismissal of an employee is deemed not to be unfair if it results wholly or mainly from redundancy. However, the Adjudicator found there was no evidence before the WRC to support this contention. The Adjudicator noted no documentary evidence was adduced to substantiate the Respondent’s assertions regarding the financial position of the football club and that there was a “marked absence” of any minutes from the board of management meeting where the decision to make the Complainant’s role redundant was made. The Adjudicator commented it was difficult to reconcile how the Complainant’s role, in particular, was identified for redundancy when the President could not give evidence on all the functions the Complainant carried out for the Respondent save to say “recruitment”. The Adjudicator was critical of the issues of misconduct referenced by the Director of Football which went un-investigated and uncorroborated, calling them a “gross fabrication”. She expressed her astonishment that the Respondent’s President confirmed in evidence at the hearing that no letter of complaint ever existed. It was also not disputed by the Respondent’s President that the Complainant was not put on notice that redundancies were being considered by the Respondent or that he was at risk of redundancy. The President also confirmed no consultation process was carried out and no possible alternatives to redundancy were considered. The Adjudicator commented that the Respondent showed a “cavalier disregard for due process and an unmitigated disregard for the law” and found the Complainant’s dismissal “was nothing more than a sham redundancy carried out in a ruthless and dishonest manner without a single thought for the personal damage the Respondent was inflicting on the Complainant”. The Adjudicator noted that the preferred remedy was compensation and was satisfied the Complainant’s efforts to mitigate his ongoing losses were reasonable. Under the Unfair Dismissal Acts an Adjudicator can award compensation for a Complainant’s loss of earnings not exceeding 104 weeks/ 2 years’ gross remuneration. The Complainant earned €250 net per week, which was referred to in the decision, and the  Adjudicator awarded €26,000 as compensation for the unfair dismissal. It is unclear whether it is a coincidence that this figure amounts to 104 weeks of the Complainant’s weekly net salary. The WRC decision is also silent on whether the Complainant received his statutory redundancy pay or contractual notice pay. However the Adjudicator noted the award was the upper limit of what she was in a position to award and that it was “just and equitable having regard to all the circumstances”. It is worth noting that since the release of this WRC decision a spokesperson for the Respondent football club gave a statement to the Irish press that it fully accepts the decision and apologises unreservedly to Mr Henderson. Takeaway for Employers: This case is a stark reminder to employers of their legal obligations in Ireland. An employer cannot escape their obligations under the Unfair Dismissal Acts by simply calling what is otherwise an unfair dismissal “a redundancy”. There is an onus of proof on employers to show a genuine redundancy situation existed and that their conduct was reasonable by engaging in a fair consultation process with the employee. As the Adjudicator quoted in her decision (from a significant judgment in this area, JVC Europe Ltd v. Ponisi [2012] E.L.R. 70) “without that requirement, vagueness would replace the precision necessary to ensure the upholding of employee rights”. Apart from the blatant lack of procedural fairness in this case, it is interesting that the Respondent’s lack of documentary evidence was highlighted by the Adjudicator. Readers are reminded of a recent WRC decision covered in our AOC April Newsletter where the WRC found that redundancy was used as a “cloak” to exit a senior employee and highlighted the absence of minutes from the senior management meeting where the decision to make the role redundant was made. Respondents are now often required to provide this type of evidence at WRC hearings to show that the redundancy was legitimate and that proper procedures were observed. Link - https://www.workplacerelations.ie/en/cases/2025/july/adj-00056820.html   Authors – Tara Kelly and Anne O’Connell 31st July 2025 Anne O’Connell Solicitors 19-22 Lower Baggot Street Dublin 2. www.aocsolicitors.ie

WRC Orders Tesco to Re-Engage Worker Dismissed After Calling Manager “Useless”

In the recent high profile decision of the Workplace Relations Commission (“WRC”) in Cathal Hussey v Tesco Ireland Limited (ADJ-00052619), Tesco has been ordered to re-engage a worker who was dismissed after calling his manager “useless”. Facts: The Complainant had 16 + years service with the Respondent prior to the decision to dismiss. In terms of the issues giving rise to dismissal, the Complainant had referred to his line manager as “useless” following which his line manager had filed a grievance under the Respondent’s bullying and harassment procedure. An investigation was undertaken by the Respondent. Following the investigation there was a disciplinary process the outcome of which was to impose a sanction of a final written warning on the Complainant. This was appealed by the Complainant and on appeal the Respondent elevated the sanction to that of dismissal. It seems a further appeal was offered against the sanction of dismissal and the Complainant exercised that additional right of appeal. The outcome of the additional appeal was to uphold the dismissal. The Complainant brought a claim against the Respondent under the Unfair Dismissal Acts 1997-2015 (the “Acts”) and sought the remedy of reinstatement. Decision: Re-Engagement: The Complainant was successful in his unfair dismissal claim and the Respondent was directed to re-engage him within four weeks from the date of the WRC decision but with a final written warning to remain on the Complainant’s file from the date of re-engagement for one year. The WRC directed that the period between the date of the Complainant’s unfair dismissal and the date of re-engagement be treated as a period of unpaid suspension. The Adjudicator made it clear that she was not directing re-engagement in the Complainant’s previous role. She was satisfied there were many options for General Warehouse Operative roles such as that held by the Complainant given the nature and size of the Respondent’s enterprise. This decision is significant in light of the Supreme Court decision last year in the case of An Bord Banistíochta, Gaelscoil Moshíológ v The Labour Court and Aodhagán Ó Súird and the Department of Education [2024] IESC 38 where the Supreme Court emphasised that re-instatement and re-engagement are remedies that are “exceptional in nature”. Our previous article on that case is available here (https://aocsolicitors.ie/supreme-court-rules-high-court-erred-in-re-engaging-school-principal-in-a-manner-that-meant-he-was-effectively-reinstated/ ). The Adjudicator confirmed she was mindful of the Supreme Court decision in the Gaelscoil Moshíológ case and quoted the following passage from the Judgement: “The remedy of reinstatement under s. 7(1)(a) can normally be said to be only applicable in a case where the WRC or Labour Court considers that the employee’s dismissal has been totally unfair and unjust, such as to require the employer to take the person back in the same job, without any break in service or loss of pay, and notwithstanding the inevitable breakdown in the relationship between them. It is a very strong remedy, and is only applicable in clear cut cases, where it is the appropriate response to perhaps high-handed and unjustifiable conduct on the part of an employer, and where any other remedy is not sufficient vindication of the employee.” The Adjudicator determined that she did not find compelling the submission of the Respondent that because it was opposed to re-instatement, it should not be granted. However, having considered the totality of the evidence she did find beyond doubt  that the Complainant contributed to a significant degree to the circumstances in which he now found himself. She took this into account when considering his request for re-instatement and ultimately she did not find re-instatement to be an appropriate form of redress in this case. Having ruled out re-instatement the Adjudicator went on to set out her analysis as to how she arrived at a decision to order re-engagement. She confirmed she had taken into consideration the age of the Complainant, the length of his service with the Respondent together with the fact that the Respondent employs over 13,500 employees in this jurisdiction and plans to open ten new stores nationwide. She confirmed the size of the Respondent enterprise was a significant factor in her decision to direct re-engagement. Fair Procedure Points: As well as being noteworthy due to the re-engagement order this WRC decision is  interesting from the perspective of guidance for employers around the rules of fair procedures when conducting workplace investigations, disciplinary processes and appeals processes. For instance,, the Adjudicator’s decision highlights the following points and could act as a helpful precedent for employers conducting internal investigations and disciplinary processes: It is possible that as part of investigating one set of allegations further allegations against the employee may naturally come to light. This does not in and of itself render the process unfair. Where an investigation process is frustrated by the failure of an employee to attend it may be reasonable for the employer to conclude the investigation bearing in mind the passage of time. Employers should be careful to ensure investigators doe not overstep their remit which in many cases will be solely to establish the facts and collect evidence. We would caution that employers should always check what their own policies say on this. There may be circumstances where an investigation is so flawed it will contaminate the entire process, however procedures do not need to be“a counsel of perfection” but rather “they must be fair.” The power to increase a sanction on appeal is one that should be exercised cautiously and relied upon only in exceptional cases. Sanctions should be proportionate. For example in this case “when balancing the impact of the Complainant’s conduct on the Respondent as against the impact of the dismissal on the Complainant” the Adjudicator was of the view the sanction was disproportionate to the actions of the Complainant in referring to his line manager as “useless”. Takeaway for Employers: Workplace investigations and disciplinary processes are difficult to get right. It can be worthwhile to take legal advice early on in the process in order to avoid costly mistakes that cannot be rectified later. Employers (and larger employers in particular) should be mindful that an award of compensation may not be the only thing they will be exposed to in an unfair dismissal claim by an employee. They could find themselves subject to an order to reinstate or re-engage the employee. The  Supreme Court’s guidance in the Gaelscoil Moshíológ Judgement as to the “exceptional nature” of those remedies makes such orders less likely but it is evident the WRC are still willing to consider them. For example, see our recent article here (https://aocsolicitors.ie/wrc-orders-reinstatement-of-employee-who-was-unfairly-dismissed/ ) which discusses a recent case where the WRC ordered re-instatement. Links: https://workplacerelations.ie/en/cases/2025/july/adj-00052619.html https://aocsolicitors.ie/supreme-court-rules-high-court-erred-in-re-engaging-school-principal-in-a-manner-that-meant-he-was-effectively-reinstated/ https://aocsolicitors.ie/wrc-orders-reinstatement-of-employee-who-was-unfairly-dismissed/ Author – Laura Killelea 31st July 2025 AOC Solicitors 19-22 Baggot Street Lower Dublin 2 www.aocsolicitors.ie

WRC Upholds Sexual Harassment Complaint but Reduces Award

In Lenianastasia Shanahan V Roots Health Food (ADJ – 00054550) the Complainant claimed that she experienced sexual harassment in her employment with ‘Roots’ under section 79 of the Employment Equality Acts 1998 – 2015. Facts: The Complainant commenced employment with the Respondent in March 2024 as a server/assistant production. She worked for 16 weeks until her resignation in July 2024. The Complainant claimed that during this period she was subject to persistent unwanted conduct by a male colleague (“MR”) including sexualised comments, repeated requests to go out with him and remarks on her appearance. The Complainant said that she did not report these incidents during her employment due to fear and uncertainty, alleging that she was not made aware of any procedure or policy and concern about the owner’s close relationship with the perpetrator. The Respondent stated that while the Complainant wasn’t aware there was a harassment policy in place that their policy was stored under the till in the shop. Once the Respondent was notified of the complaint, they commenced an investigation but stated there was not enough evidence to corroborate the allegations and therefore no prima facie case of discrimination was made. The Respondent also expressed that once they were notified of the complaint the Respondent took reasonably practicable steps for the size and structure of the business to prevent sexual harassment in the workplace. Decision: The Adjudicator, Pat Brady, upheld the Complainant’s claim that she was discriminated on the grounds of gender involving sexual harassment in the workplace. He found that there was no clear anti-harassment or dignity at work policy in place before the harassment occurred, nor was there any other preventative measures in place. The Adjudicator held that steps taken by the Respondent subsequent to the alleged breaches of the Act do not provide a defence. The Adjudicator also found the Respondent’s statement that “there was not enough evidence to corroborate the Complainants allegations, and therefore no prima facie case of discrimination established” to be an ‘erroneous misunderstanding of the law’. He stated that it is the duty of an investigator to reach conclusions and that the absence of corroboration is not determinative. The Adjudicator held that the Complainant had established a clear prima facie case, and the investigator provided no explanation as to why he could not reach any conclusion. However, with fairness to the investigator, the refusal of the Complainant to engage with the investigation was deemed unhelpful. He also referenced the timeframe in which the Complainant submitted her complaint. While he accepts that the Complainant was not aware of any policy in place, he finds this explanation not convincing, and that despite a series of incidents from April to July, she did not think to mention any aspect to her employers to whom, according to them she had a good working relationship. The Complainant’s refusal to attend for interview along with her withdrawal from the process was regarded as ‘not acceptable’ and was taken into account by the Adjudicator in making his award of compensation. The claim was well founded, but the Complainant was only awarded €5,000 due to her delay in raising her complaint with her employer and her refusal to engage in their internal process. Takeaway for Employers: This decision illustrates that it is not sufficient to have a Bullying and Harassment Policy in place as a defence for a claim of sexual harassment or discrimination. The employer needs to be able to prove communication and training to the staff, regardless of the size of the business. The Adjudicator clarifies the burden of proof in relation to internal investigations of harassment and the subjective element of it. He also confirmed that the lack of corroborating evidence in such investigations should not be determinative. It is interesting that the Adjudicator was so critical of the Complainant not raising the issue sooner with the Respondent and taking this into account in the amount of compensation awarded. Link  - https://workplacerelations.ie/en/cases/2025/july/adj-00054550.html Authors – Abigail Ansell and Anne O’Connell 31st July 2025 AOC Solicitors 19-22 Baggot Street Lower Dublin 2 www.aocsolicitors.ie

WRC Deems Compromise Agreement Invalid - Employees Should Have Opportunity To Take Legal Advice

Andrea Myers v Clay Youth Project Clg (ADJ-00056614) is a recent unfair dismissal case that was before the Workplace Relations Commission (“WRC”). The Complainant brought a complaint under the Unfair Dismissal Acts 1977-2015 (the “Acts”) claiming she had been constructively dismissed by her employer. However, in an interesting set of circumstances, the Complainant had signed a compromise agreement with her employer settling all claims prior to bringing the WRC action. Background: The Complainant was involved in a road traffic accident which resulted in her being absent from work for extended periods throughout 2024. Following her return to work the parties entered into discussions on a compromise agreement which was signed on 20th December 2024. The Complainant referred a complaint to the WRC just over a month later. As a preliminary matter, the Respondent questioned the WRC’s jurisdiction to hear the case as the signed agreement was expressed to be in full and final settlement of all and any claims against the Respondent. The Acts were specifically mentioned in the agreement as one of the statutes under which the complainant would not pursue complaints. Decision: The Adjudicator found that the Complainant was not estopped from pursuing her complaint of constructive dismissal on the basis of the compromise agreement. The Adjudicator noted the signed compromise agreement included the following wording: “The employee hereby confirms that she has had the opportunity of taking legal advice on the provisions of this agreement and that she understands the effect and the implications of this agreement, and that she is signing this agreement voluntarily and without any duress whatsoever.” The Adjudicator noted that as a matter of uncontroverted fact, the Complainant was not given the opportunity to take legal advice on the document. The Respondent gave examples of prior case law confirming the position that validly executed compromise agreements will be upheld and the Respondent sought to rely on such case law. The Adjudicator distinguished this case from the case law mentioned by the Respondent. For example, the Adjudicator noted that in the case of Angela Thompson v County Wexford Education Centre UD 581/2012, the Employment Appeals Tribunal had made specific reference to the fact the agreement itself was clear and that the claimant informed the Respondent that she had taken independent legal advice. The Adjudicator engaged with the principles outlined in the other cases relied upon by the Respondent i.e. Healy v Irish Life Assurance (DEC E2015-002) and Sunday World Newspapers Limited v Steven Kinsella and Luke Bradley [2008] ELR 53. However, the Adjudicator determined that the references in the latter case to “appropriate steps” and “professional advice of an appropriate character before the agreement was signed” were fatal to the Respondent’s position in this case as the Complainant’s evidence was that she was not even shown the entire document, just the signature page, and that she was not allowed to retain a copy of it. The Adjudicator accepted that there were “meaningful negotiations and discussions” in this case but stated that the requirement for “informed consent” is a critical one. On this point he commented, “If it can be shown that a party has waived their right to do so that will be a different matter, but it is not what happened here on the basis of the complainant’s uncontested evidence”. Accordingly, the Adjudicator allowed the Complainant to proceed with her constructive dismissal claim against the Respondent notwithstanding having signed the Compromise Agreement. Takeaway for Employers: This case is an interesting look at how the WRC may deal with complaints that still make their way to hearing even though a settlement agreement was signed by the parties. As it happens the Complainant in this case was ultimately unsuccessful in her constructive dismissal claim and received no WRC award. Nonetheless, the case should act as a warning for employers as it reinforces the principle that employees should be given an opportunity to take legal advice on any proposed settlement agreement in order for it to be enforceable. Link - https://www.workplacerelations.ie/en/cases/2025/july/adj-00056614.html   Authors – Tara Kelly and Laura Killelea   31st July 2025 Anne O’Connell Solicitors 19-22 Lower Baggot Street Dublin 2. www.aocsolicitors.ie

WRC Finds that Victimisation Can Occur in Response to Proceedings Issued against a Different but Related Entity

In Aoife Cleary v St. Patrick’s National School Lurgybrack (ADJ-00053384) the Complainant lodged several complaints with the Workplace Relations Commission (“WRC”), including a complaint of victimisation under the Employment Equality Acts. She claimed that she was victimised by the Respondent school as a result of Employment Equality Act proceedings that she had brought against a nearby school. The Respondent raised a preliminary argument in this matter that victimisation cannot arise where the proceedings in question were against another employer. The WRC’s decision on this preliminary argument is interesting and noteworthy. Facts: The Complainant is a teacher. She brought WRC proceedings against Kilmacrennan National School in Donegal, the first hearing date of which coincided closely with an interview process in the Respondent school which was located only 15 kilometres from Kilmacrennan National School. The two schools also share a parish priest. The Complainant was unsuccessful in her application for a position in the Respondent school, but the Principal could not explain why she had not been successful. The Complainant also wrote to the Respondent school requesting marking sheets from the interview process and also questions regarding what she regarded as irregularities and improper procedures during the interview process. She also asked for confirmation as to whether or not there had been communications between the two schools regarding her WRC complaint against Kilmacrennan National School. The Complainant did not receive answers to her questions. The Complainant was subsequently offered the role due to another candidate obtaining alternative employment, and the Complainant was informed that she was the “next person on the list according to scoring, in the interview process.” Two new teachers were also appointed, but they were appointed on fixed term contracts meaning that they received holiday pay in the summer whereas the Complainant was only given work “to the end of the year” meaning that she got no holiday pay in the summer. The Complainant repeatedly sought equal pay and conditions for equal work, but to no avail. The Complainant subsequently applied for and was interviewed again for one of three posts on the Letterkenny Supply Panel, a role which she had successfully been working in for almost two years. She was unsuccessful. The interview process for this post coincided closely with the second WRC hearing date in respect of her Employment Equality Act proceedings against Kilmacrennan National School. The Complainant claimed that she was victimised by the Respondent in the form of discrimination during the interview process, by not appointing her on two occasions; giving her inferior conditions of employment; and not providing her with written terms of employment. She claimed that she was victimised because of her WRC Employment Equality Act complaint against a neighbouring school. The Respondent raised a preliminary issue claiming that victimisation could not arise because the Complainant’s WRC proceedings as a result of which she claimed to have been victimised, were against a different employer. The Respondent relied on the Labour Court decision in Public Appointments Service v Kevin Roddy [EDA1019] in support of its position. In that case, the Labour Court held that the complainant’s victimisation claim was “unsustainable in law”, finding that there was no “causal link” between the complainant’s proceedings against another employer and his non-selection by the respondent for a job with the respondent. Decision: The Adjudicator, Shay Henry, referred to section 74(2)(b) of the Employment Equality Act 1998 which defines victimisation as follows: “(2) For the purposes of this Part victimisation occurs where dismissal or other adverse treatment of an employee by his or her employer occurs as a reaction to – (b) any proceedings by a complainant” He noted that the Act is silent on whether or not victimisation must relate to acts of the organisation against whom the proceedings were taken. He found that the Act does not restrict victimisation proceedings in the way that the Respondent claimed that it did, stating that: “If the authors of the Act had wished to confine victimisation to actions resulting from proceedings between an employee and the employer against whom proceedings were taken they would have said so explicitly in the Act.” The Adjudicator noted that in the Roddy case referred to above, there was no connection between the two employers which were not even located in the same jurisdiction. The Adjudicator was satisfied that as the two employers in this case were national schools located in close proximity and under the same patronage, it was possible that there could be a causal connection. He therefore rejected the Respondent’s preliminary argument. Takeaway for Employers: While the Complainant was ultimately unsuccessful in her victimisation complaint against the Respondent, the decision is noteworthy in making it clear that victimisation complaints under section 74(2)(b) are not necessarily confined to the same employer. This means that, for example, victimisation could occur between two sister companies. What is clear, however, is that there must be a causal connection and victimisation complaints will not be sustainable in law where the two entities are in no way connected. It will be interesting to see how this reasoning is applied in future cases. Link: https://www.workplacerelations.ie/en/cases/2025/july/adj-00053384.html Author - Jenny Wakely 31st July 2025 AOC Solicitors 19-22 Baggot Street Lower Dublin 2 www.aocsolicitors.ie

Recent Decisions on Mandatory Retirement Highlight Requirement for Appropriate Contractual Provisions and Retirement Policies

The Workplace Relations Commission (“WRC”) and the Labour Court (the “Court”) each recently issued a decision on the subject of mandatory retirement ages in Denise Murphy v Royal College of Surgeons in Ireland (ADJ-00046831) (WRC decision) and Deepak fasteners (Shannon) Ltd v Liam Murphy (EDA2545) (Labour Court decision). The decisions demonstrate the requirement for employers to ensure that they have in place appropriate contractual provisions and retirement policies. Denise Murphy v Royal College of Surgeons in Ireland (ADJ-00046831) Facts: The Complainant in this case had worked for the Respondent on a contract of indefinite duration from May 2012. She worked as a secretary to the Respondent’s Pathology Department. The Complainant’s contract of employment stated that the normal retirement age would be the Complainant’s 65th birthday. The Complainant turned 65 on 24th February 2022. She was aware of the mandatory retirement age and the Respondent’s retirement age policy, but she wanted to continue working. Before her 65th birthday, the Complainant spoke to the Head of the Department who discussed the matter with the Complainant’s manager. The Respondent allowed the Complainant to continue working for an additional one-year period on an exceptional basis, and she was provided with a fixed term contract and worked for another year. The Complainant’s request for a further extension was refused and she was officially retired on 23rd February 2023. The Complainant learned that other staff members had been permitted to continue working beyond the age of 66. She viewed this as diluting the “exceptional” nature of her one-year extension, and she lodged a discrimination complaint in the WRC. The Respondent accepted that, at the date of hearing, 27 employees were working who were over the age of 66. However, the Respondent’s position was that those employees worked in technical and academic roles that were more difficult to replace. Decision: The Adjudicator, Penelope McGrath, noted that the Complainant’s contract of employment “very clearly stipulated” that the normal retirement age would be the Complainant’s 65th birthday. She also referred to what she described as a “well-advertised and formal” in-house policy that was in force throughout the Complainant’s employment. This policy clearly described the reasons or justifications for the mandatory retirement age. The Adjudicator referred to the Respondent’s decision to facilitate a one-year extension for the Complainant, which was objectively justified by the Respondent as a measure that would greatly assist a smooth transition during a period of change that the Department of Pathology was experiencing at that time. The paperwork also demonstrated that there was a clear succession plan for the transfer of the Complainant’s role to her replacement in advance of the end of her extended period of employment. The Adjudicator noted that the one-year extension provided to the Complainant was in line with the in-house retirement age policy which specifically permits such extensions as follows: “In exceptional circumstances RCSI reserves the right to engage with employees, if agreeable, post-retirement age. This will be done on a case-by-case basis, subject to business needs and each case will be objectively justified on its own merits. The furtherance of the employment relationship will be subject to the terms and conditions as set out in the contract for which the post-retirement age engagement is required and agreed. Any contracts issued to staff employed beyond 65 will be temporary, time bound, subject to specific objective justification and will note the changes in eligibility to staff benefits, including, pension provision and insurance cover. All staff have the right to retire at 65. Subject to agreement by both parties, RCSI continues to reserve the right to retain the services of strategically important employees and retain the expertise of experienced staff in specialist roles e.g. Surgeon Prosectors. The extension of these roles will be objectively justified.” The Adjudicator further noted the clear language used in the Complainant’s fixed term/extension contract in respect of the objective justification for the issuance of a fixed-term contract rather than a contract of indefinite duration, and the fact that the contract was an “exceptional post-retirement one-year fixed term contract to support the department of Pathology.” In response to the Complainant’s argument that the Respondent’s implementation of the retirement policy was selective and discriminatory, given that a significant number of employees were permitted to work beyond 66, the Adjudicator found that these “derogations” from the implementation of the retirement policy did not serve to “de-legitimise” or “undermine” the retirement policy. She accepted the Respondent’s argument that it needed to retain specialist skills and technical know-how and that certain staff could not be easily replaced. The Adjudicator found that the Complainant had not been discriminated against by the Respondent when it terminated her employment in February 2023. Deepak fasteners (Shannon) Ltd v Liam Murphy (EDA2545) Facts: This case was an appeal by Mr Murphy (the “Complainant”) from a decision of the WRC that his discrimination complaint was not well-founded. In this case, the Complainant had been employed as a General Operative from February 1977 until he was compulsorily retired on his 65th birthday on 27th February 2022. He had asked to be allowed to continue working after that date, but the Respondent did not agree. The Complainant gave evidence that he was still “fit and competent” to carry out his work and that he had not been asked to undertake a risk assessment or occupational health assessment before he was compulsorily retired. The Respondent’s CEO gave evidence about the business needing to “pivot in a new direction”, making it necessary for it to hire new employees with specific skills. He accepted that no meeting had taken place with the Complainant in respect of his application for longer working, and conceded that he could not remember having reviewed the Code of Practice on Longer Working. He also accepted that another employee had been allowed to continue working after his 65th birthday. Decision: The Court found that there was no mandatory retirement provision in the Complainant’s contract of employment. It also found that there was no evidence that the Respondent had ever given “serious consideration” to putting in place a “contemporary” retirement policy in line with the Code of Practice on Longer Working and the “evolution of employment equality legislation”. The Court criticised the Respondent for having had “no regard whatsoever” to the Code of Practice and for not having engaged “in any meaningful way” with the Complainant’s request to work beyond 65. The Court noted that had been no performance, health and safety or concentration issues with the Complainant. The Court concluded that the Respondent discriminated against the Complainant in compulsorily retiring him, noting that there was “no objective justification that the Respondent can rely on in support of its decision of [sic] compulsorily retire the Complainant simply because he reached the age of 65.” The Complainant was awarded €18,000 for the effects of the discrimination, equivalent to approximately six months’ gross pay. Takeaway for Employers: The WRC and Labour Court have issued a number of recent decisions on the issue of mandatory retirement (links to a sample of some of our recent articles on mandatory retirement, post-retirement fixed term contracts, and the Code of Practice on Longer Working are below). Recent decisions have not always been consistent in approach including, for example, in respect of the importance placed on the Code of Practice for Longer Working (referred to by the Labour Court in Deepak decision, but not by the WRC in the Denise Murphy decision). However, what remains clear from WRC and Labour Court decisions is the need for employers to ensure that if they intend to rely upon a mandatory retirement age, it needs to be clearly set out in their contracts of employment, and appropriate retirement policies ought to be in place and adhered to. Employers need to ensure that they properly engage with any requests for longer working and, while some decisions do not specifically refer to the Code of Practice, employers should have due regard to the Code, and it ought to be reflected in their retirement policies. Employers should always be cognisant of the requirement to objectively justify any decision to compulsorily retire an employee/permit an employee to work beyond its mandatory retirement age, and to communicate the objective justification to employees. This area of employment law is a complex one and legal advice is advisable.  Links: WRC decision: https://workplacerelations.ie/en/cases/2025/july/adj-00046831.html Labour Court decision: https://workplacerelations.ie/en/cases/2025/august/eda2545.html Links to some previous articles on mandatory retirement, post-retirement fixed term contracts, and the Code of Practice on Longer Working: Recent Caselaw: Mandatory Retirement Ages and Post-Retirement Fixed Term Contracts: https://aocsolicitors.ie/recent-caselaw-mandatory-retirement-ages-and-post-retirement-fixed-term-contracts/ WRC Find it is Not Unlawful for Employer to Enforce Mandatory Retirement Age, Despite Shortcomings in Following Code of Practice: https://aocsolicitors.ie/wrc-find-it-is-not-unlawful-for-employer-to-enforce-mandatory-retirement-age-despite-shortcomings-in-following-code-of-practice/ Author - Jenny Wakely 31st July 2025 AOC Solicitors 19-22 Baggot Street Lower Dublin 2 www.aocsolicitors.ie

Teacher Told in Interview to “enjoy every moment at home with the baby” Awarded €85,000 as Compensation for Discrimination

In Emily Williams v Board of Management, St Tola’s National School (ADJ-00055461) the Complainant alleged she was discriminated against by reason of her family status by the Respondent primary school. The Complainant submitted a complaint to the Workplace Relations Commission (“WRC”) under the Employment Equality Acts 1998-2015 (the “Acts”). Facts: The Complainant was employed by the Respondent as a teacher on a series of fixed-term contracts from September 2022 to August 2024. The Complainant felt she was treated less favourably than others when being considered for teaching roles because she was on maternity leave. The discrimination complaint submitted by the Complainant focused on two main incidents: The awarding of a Contract of Indefinite Duration (“CID”) to her colleague – “Comparator A” Not being appointed to a further fixed-term position available within the Respondent school - losing out to “Comparator B” and her treatment during this interview process In February 2024 a permanent vacancy arose in the Respondent school due to a resignation while the Complainant was on maternity leave. At the time the Complainant and another teacher “Comparator A” were eligible for a CID, both having worked at the school for two years on fixed-term contracts. The Complainant submitted to the WRC that the Principal of the Respondent awarded the CID to Comparator A without informing her (she found out through a colleague) and without any transparency regarding the decision-making process. The Complainant made inquiries and was later informed that the CID had been awarded based on the highest score from a previous interview round in 2023. The Principal of the Respondent gave evidence to the WRC that this was school policy. On 18th June 2024 the Complainant interviewed for a fixed-term position in the school for the new school year. At the end of the interview, the Principal congratulated her on the birth of her baby daughter and stated “you really should enjoy every moment at home with the baby”. The Complainant gave evidence to the WRC that she felt it was unprofessional to discuss her maternity leave in front of the interview panel and that the comment seemed to hint at her not receiving the position. The Respondent gave evidence to the WRC that the interview was over when the comment was made and all questions had already been asked and answered. The following day the Complainant was informed that her application was unsuccessful. The Complainant requested her interview scores from the Respondent following contact with her union, the Irish National Teachers’ Organisation (“INTO”). The Complainant told the WRC that she learned from INTO that the school could “roll-over” a teacher’s contract in their third year and there was no requirement to hold another fixed-term position interview. The Complainant believed that the Board of Management decided to proceed with interviews for the fixed-term position, and score her unfairly, because of the possibility that she might have decided to extend her maternity leave if offered the position. When there was still no reply to her request for her interview scores by 27th August, INTO suggested to the Complainant that she contact the Principal and let her know that she was uncomfortable with the two incidents referred to above, and ask if she would take a call from INTO. The Principal emailed the Complainant later that day re-iterating that the CID was awarded to the candidate with the highest score from the previous interview round. On 29th August the Principal emailed the Complainant her interview scores, however there were no interview notes attached. Decision: The Adjudicator, Patricia Owens, firstly addressed a preliminary matter regarding statutory time limits. In normal course, complaints under the Acts must be submitted to the WRC within 6 months of the alleged contravention (with an extension of a further 6 months possible in limited circumstances if there was reasonable cause for the delay). The Complainant submitted her complaint to the WRC in November 2024, and the most recent occurrence of alleged discrimination was the interview for the fixed-term position on 18th June 2024. While the CID was awarded in May 2024 and the Respondent argued that a claim relating to that matter was out of time, the Adjudicator found that a continuum of discrimination existed that began with the awarding of the CID and culminated in the Complainant not being appointed to a fixed term position for the new school year. On that basis, the Adjudicator was satisfied that all of the issues forming part of the Complainant’s claim were within time. The Adjudicator referred to settled law that, in the first instance, the onus is on the employee to establish an arguable case of discrimination before the Respondent is required to rebut it. The Adjudicator was satisfied that the Complainant had discharged this evidential burden. The Adjudicator noted in particular the Complainant’s arguments that she was treated unfavourably compared to her comparators not on maternity leave; that Comparator A, who was not as experienced as her, was awarded the CID based on a previous interview process in 2023; and that Comparator B, who had only previously provided ad hoc cover to the school, was appointed to the fixed-term position. After proceeding to hear the substantive case, the Adjudicator found that the complaint of discrimination was well-founded and ordered the Respondent to pay €85,000 in compensation for the discrimination. The Adjudicator concluded that no satisfactory explanation was given for the decision to award the CID based on the order of merit in the previous fixed-term competition in 2023. The Adjudicator noted that the equal entitlement of the Complainant to be considered for the CID was disregarded even to the point that the Respondent believed she had no entitlement to be informed a viable CID was available. The Respondent’s explanation that it was school policy was rejected by the Adjudicator, as it emerged during the course of the hearing that no such policy existed. The Adjudicator had regard to the Department of Education and Skills’ Circular No. 44/2019. This circular provides that reference may be made to a panel of suitable applicants being set up for future vacancies when advertising teaching positions, but that “permanent vacancies may not be filled from a panel established following interviews for a fixed-term post”. In addition, the circular provided that where a panel is compiled, it is applicable for any vacancies filled “within four months”. The Adjudicator noted that the CID was a permanent vacancy, and that the appointment for the CID in 2024 based on the 2023 panel was well outside the four-month timeline prescribed in the circular. In relation to the fixed-term position, the Adjudicator concluded that the Respondent failed to provide any evidence (such as interview notes) to explain how the interview panel arrived at their conclusions for the interview scores. The Adjudicator considered the absence of such evidence to be “fatal” to the Respondent’s defence of the inference of discrimination. In relation to the qualifications category, both the Complainant and Comparator B received the same score. However, in nearly all other categories the members of the interview panel scored the Complainant lower. In particular, the Adjudicator noted that the Complainant, who had 2 years’ experience working in the school, was marked lower in relation to both “Classroom Management & Administration” and “Awareness of School Procedures” than a candidate who had provided ad hoc cover. One of the marking sheets for the Complainant also had a reduction in one of the scores which was not adequately explained at the hearing. In relation to the comments made by the Principal, the Adjudicator found that the Respondent had failed to demonstrate that these comments did not have an adverse effect on the interview outcome. The Adjudicator appreciated that it may well have been the Principal’s intention to pass on her well wishes, however the interview had not yet closed when the comments were made. Even if the questioning had concluded, the scoring had not yet been completed, and the Adjudicator found it “entirely inappropriate” that comments relating to the Complainant’s family status were addressed to her during the interview. Takeaway for Employers: This WRC decision illustrates the evidential burden that employers bear in employment equality cases. While the initial burden is on the employee to successfully make out a prima facie case, the employer is then required to provide evidence to rebut the inference of discrimination. The absence of interview notes in this case was fatal to the school’s defence, particularly where the identified comparator appeared to have less experience than the Complainant. It is important that all documentation from recruitment processes is retained so that employers can demonstrate their appointments are based on objective criteria and not based on any of the nine discriminatory grounds. Link - https://www.workplacerelations.ie/en/cases/2025/august/adj-00055461.html Authors – Tara Kelly and Jenny Wakely 30th September 2025 Anne O’Connell Solicitors 19-22 Lower Baggot Street Dublin 2 www.aocsolicitors.ie

Supreme Court Recognises Claim For Damages For Emotional Stress Short Of Psychiatric Injury But Not As A ‘Personal Injury’ Claim

The Supreme Court judgement (of O’Donnell CJ, Dunne J, Hogan J, Murray J and Collins J) in Patrick Dillon v. Irish Life Assurance PLC which was handed down on 24th  July 2025, considered whether claims for emotional distress as a result of a data breach falls within the definition of ‘personal injury’ under the Personal Injuries Assessment Board Act 2003 and whether obtaining PIAB authorisation to initiate proceedings was required. It found that such a claim did not come within the definition of a ‘personal injury’ claim. It will be interesting to see the application of this decision going forward to other potential claims in the employment law area. Facts: The Plaintiff, Patrick Dillon, held a life assurance policy with the Defendant,  Irish Life. The Defendant issued in error six letters in relation to the Plaintiff’s policy containing  his personal and financial data between 2008 and 2020 and sent them to a  third party. The Plaintiff issued proceedings in the Circuit Court alleging that the data breaches were caused by negligence and breach of duty, including breach of statutory duty and caused him “distress, upset, anxiety, inconvenience, loss and damage”. This was due to the alleged breach by the Defendant of the Data Protection legislation. The Defendant argued that the Plaintiff’s claim fell  within the definition of ‘personal injury’ within the meaning of the Civil Liability Act 1961 which requires a pre-authorisation from PIAB, which the Plaintiff had not obtained. Also, it argued  that he should have commenced proceedings by Personal Injuries Civil Bill rather than the Equity Civil Bill in which they were instituted. Both the Circuit Court and the High Court on appeal found that the proceedings sought damages for ‘personal injury’ and that PIAB authorisation should have been obtained before instituting proceedings and therefore they dismissed his claim. The Supreme Court granted Plaintiff the leave to appeal the High Court decision as it considered this case raised issues of general public importance about whether a claim for damages for “distress, upset and anxiety” arising from a data breach could possibly be seen as a claim for damages for personal injury and the compatibility of PIAB authorisation requirement with EU law. Decision: In this decision there was two key issues that fell for consideration . One being whether the non-material damage (distress, upset and anxiety) fell within the statutory definition of ‘personal injury’ as found by the High Court. The second issue being if the Plaintiff’s claim is a form of ‘personal injury’ , whether a requirement to apply to PIAB for pre-authorisation  would render it extensively difficult for the plaintiff to exercise his rights to compensation for non-material damage under the GDPR in breach of the EU Directive. The Supreme Court judgement delves into the statutory and common law definition of the term ‘personal injury’. This judgment highlights that in relation to the various statutory definitions: ‘it is easy to lose sight of the fact that while the definition of ‘personal injury’ used in these statutes is comprehensive, in none of them does it purport to be of general application. It is instead used for various distinct, related but quite specific purposes.’ The Court also refers to the case of Clark v O’Gorman where it was held that a personal injury action is not a claim in which standalone damages are sought to compensate for distress and anxiety. Mr. Justice Brian Murray held that the Plaintiff’s claim in negligence was misconceived as he cannot obtain damages in negligence for mental distress that falls short of a psychiatric injury. However, he held that the Plaintiff had a standalone claim for non-material damage pursuant to the unique claim set out in Section 117 of the Data Protection Acts. He also held that where a plaintiff’s claims are solely for mental distress, upset and anxiety that the plaintiff cannot expect anything other than very, very modest awards. Takeaway for Employers: The Supreme Court’s Decision in Dillon v Irish Life Assurance Plc is important to note where claims for emotional upset, distress, or anxiety without a recognised psychiatric illness do not qualify as personal injury but also illustrates where such claims may still proceed in respect of certain statutory obligations. While this decision specifically related to the breach of GDPR and the remedy provided for in that legislation, it will be interesting to see if the decision will be applied to other statutory remedies where there is non-material damage such as under the Protected Disclosures Acts or under the Safety, Health and Welfare at Work Acts. Link: https://www2.courts.ie/view/judgments/56f5ca9a-b457-4cc2-b47d-430d66ec47d2/94687f75-3845-4430-be87-9699d49b9460/2025_IESC_37.pdf/pdf Authors – Anne O’Connell & Abigail Ansell 18 September 2025 AOC Solicitors 19-22 Baggot Street Lower Dublin 2 www.aocsolicitors.ie

Labour Court Overturns WRC Decision on Mandatory Retirement of Civilian Garda Driver

The Labour Court recently issued its decision on an appeal of a Workplace Relations Commission (“WRC”) decision which found that Mr Tom Ronan, a civilian garda driver (the “Complainant”), was discriminated against when he was forced to retire at 70. The WRC Adjudicator, Brian Dalton, ordered re-engagement of the Complainant in his role as a driver and a three-year extension of his employment from the date of re-engagement. We examined the WRC decision in our newsletter article “WRC Orders Re-Engagement of Driver Forced to Retire at 70 – Mandatory Retirement ‘Highly Likely’ to Cause Him Financial Hardship” here. In An Garda Siochana v Tom Ronan (EDA2560) the Labour Court overturned the WRC decision. Facts: The Complainant was a Civil Servant who commenced employment as a driver with the Department of Justice in January 2020, and was subsequently transferred to An Garda Síochána. He was retired from his role when he reached the mandatory retirement age of 70. The Complainant argued that some of his colleagues in comparable roles were permitted to work past 70. He claimed that he was discriminated against on the ground of age and that he needed to keep working due to his personal circumstances, arguing that he would endure financial hardship post-retirement. The Adjudicator in the WRC agreed that he was discriminated against notwithstanding that the retirement age had already been found to be objectively justified, placing significant emphasis on the issue of financial hardship. He decided that on the facts of the case, the mandatory retirement age for the Complainant was unreasonable. The Complainant then sought a High Court injunction to essentially give effect to the WRC Order which was under appeal to the Labour Court. An interim injunction was initially granted, but an interlocutory injunction was refused on the basis that there was a statutory remedy available and the WRC and Labour Court were the most appropriate fora to decide on the matter. Mr Justice Mulcahy pointed out that section 43(3) of the Workplace Relations Act 2015 makes it clear that where a WRC decision is appealed to the Labour Court, the WRC Order cannot be enforced by the District Court and a WRC Order which is under appeal should not be considered as being operative. We wrote an article examining the High Court decision entitled “Leave to Appeal to Supreme Court Sought by Civilian Garda Driver who was Refused Interlocutory Injunction by High Court” here. Labour Court decision: The Labour Court referred to the Supreme Court decision in Mallon v The Minister for Justice, Ireland and the Attorney General [2024] IESC 20 in which, at paragraph 88 of the judgment, Mr Justice Collins emphatically endorsed the State’s decision to apply a mandatory retirement age of 70 to the majority of public servants. The Court referred also to paragraph 92 of the judgment where Collins J pointed out that this is “considerably higher” than the current pensionable age of 66 in respect of the Social Welfare Consolidation Act 2005. The Labour Court noted that it was bound by the Supreme Court’s decision in Mallon and found that the Complainant’s complaint that he was discriminated against by the Respondent when he was compulsorily retired was not well founded. The Court stated that the Respondent’s decision was “nothing more than the implementation of the State’s policy as embodied in the 2018 Act and that Act does not give any discretion to individual public sector employers to extend an individual public servant’s employment beyond his or her seventieth birthday.” Finally, the Labour Court found that the Complainant’s attempt to compare his situation to colleague civilian drivers who were recruited between 2004 and 2012 (and do not have a mandatory retirement age) was inappropriate: “It is a matter of public record that the State decided against retrospectively applying a mandatory retirement age to this cohort of public servants when enacting the 2018 Act as to have done so could have given rise to a perception of unfairness and may have been inconsistent with those workers’ legitimate expectations.” Takeaway for Employers: The area of mandatory retirement and age discrimination is a complex one which has given rise to numerous WRC and Labour Court decisions in recent times. As noted in our article “WRC Orders Re-Engagement of Driver Forced to Retire at 70 – Mandatory Retirement ‘Highly Likely’ to Cause Him Financial Hardship” (link above), employers will not be used to having to consider an employee’s financial situation in making a decision about mandatory retirement in an individual case. The Labour Court decision is welcome clarification on this point and appears to be the right decision, particularly in circumstances where the retirement age had already been found by the Supreme Court to be objectively justified. Link: https://www.workplacerelations.ie/en/cases/2025/august/eda2560.html  Author - Jenny Wakely 19th September 2025 AOC Solicitors 19-22 Baggot Street Lower Dublin 2 www.aocsolicitors.ie

WRC Finds No Genuine Redundancy where Employee was Dismissed Following Refusal of New Contract Terms

In Dariusz Kowalski v Nvd Limited (ADJ-00034716) the Complainant claimed that he was unfairly dismissed by the Respondent because of his refusal to sign a new contract that altered the terms and conditions of his employment to his detriment. Facts: The Complainant began working for the Respondent as a driver in 2005 transporting new cars on trucks to various destinations in Ireland, the UK and the EU. In 2009, the Respondent engaged with SIPTU to introduce new terms and conditions including a reduction to the Complainant’s pay without his agreement. The Complainant engaged in prolonged efforts over twelve years to revert to the terms and conditions of his 2005 contract without success. In 2021 he was offered a new contract with non-negotiable terms, including the requirement to serve a probationary period, even though he had been working for the Respondent since 2005. There were other less favourable terms, including relating to the Complainant’s hours of work, the inclusion of a fixed retirement age of 60, higher cash penalties in the event of damage to vehicles, and uncertainty regarding the details relating to his bonus and times of work, which could be changed without his agreement. The 2021 contract also provided that the Respondent could vary terms solely on the basis of business needs whereas the 2005 contract required the agreement of both parties to alter the terms of the contract. The Complainant refused to sign the new contract. The Complainant was dismissed on 19th February 2021, purportedly on the basis of redundancy, and paid eight weeks’ salary in lieu of notice. The Complainant’s position was that the contract was being made “redundant” and not the work/the role. He pointed out that the dismissal letter referred to the contract and argued that a unilateral change in contractual terms does not give rise to a redundancy situation. He also argued that at the time of his dismissal, the market was expanding and there was no reduction in the requirement for drivers on the part of the Respondent. The Complainant contended that his dismissal arose not from a requirement to reduce the number of drivers, but instead as a result of his refusal to sign the new contract. Without prejudice to the Complainant’s position that there was no genuine redundancy, the Complainant also argued that there was no fair redundancy process: the Complainant was not put on notice of redundancy; the Respondent did not follow a fair selection process, but simply selected the Complainant and three of his colleagues who also refused to sign the new contract; and the Complainant was simply informed that he was being made redundant. The Respondent’s position was that the Complainant was not unfairly dismissed, and it was a genuine redundancy. The Complainant refused the offer of suitable alternative employment and therefore was not entitled to receive a statutory redundancy payment. The Respondent provided details of market changes in respect of car importations as a result of the worldwide economic crash in 2008, and those associated with Brexit. Details were provided regarding the Respondent’s engagement with SIPTU in respect of pay restructuring, and a pay cut negotiated with SIPTU in 2009, to be restored when pre-2009 revenue returned. SIPTU sought a return to pre-2009 pay in negotiations with the Respondent between 2010 and 2011. However, the Labour Court ruled against it. In 2013 there were further negotiations between SIPTU and the Respondent, and drivers were given an option to either accept a new contract with €8000 in compensation for changes to conditions and salary reduction, or voluntary redundancy. The Complainant held out for a return to the 2005 contract. Further efforts to get the Complainant to agree to the new 2013 contract (between 2014 and 2018) were unsuccessful. The Complainant lodged a civil bill in the Circuit Court in 2018 for breach of contract when the Respondent amended his terms and conditions in accordance with the terms of the 2009 agreement to which the Complainant never agreed. This was settled in December 2020. Further attempts were made to secure the Complainant’s agreement to the new contract in December 2020 and January 2021, but these efforts were also unsuccessful. The Respondent issued the Complainant with a new contract in 2021 and informed him that he would be made redundant if he did not sign it, and that no statutory redundancy would be paid because suitable alternative employment was offered. The Complainant rejected the contract and was made redundant. Decision: The Adjudicator, Máire Mulcahy, found that the requirement for the transportation of cars had not reduced, and the “manner of doing business” remained unchanged. She noted that the Respondent had not considered anyone else for redundancy except the Complainant and his three colleagues who took legal action against the company. The Adjudicator referred to the dismissal letter which made it clear that the reason for the Complainant’s redundancy was his refusal to accept the new contract. She was satisfied that the Complainant’s dismissal was not due to a genuine redundancy: “The altered terms in the contract put to the complainant in 2021 did not indicate a diminished need for [sic] a reduction in the service to customers as opposed to requiring greater flexibility on his part to meet the needs of those customers. It’s not a redundancy that meets the statutory definition as the requirement for truck drivers had not diminished. That his refusal may have been unreasonable to accept the altered contractual terms is not a matter which fits in with the definition of a redundancy.” The Adjudicator then considered whether or not the Respondent unfairly dismissed the Complainant. In doing so, the Adjudicator identified the Respondent’s failure to dismiss the Complainant through a fair disciplinary process as the “biggest defect” in the Respondent’s conduct. She noted that the Complainant was given an ultimatum, and then the same person who gave him the ultimatum dismissed him a month later. She concluded that the Complainant was unfairly dismissed. However, the Adjudicator acknowledged that the Complainant behaved unreasonably in failing to accept the challenges facing the Respondent and in his dealings with the Respondent, noting that this was “short” of what the Respondent was entitled to expect. She found that his “mistrust in the bone fides” of the Respondent who had engaged in “painstaking efforts to find a resolution and avert dismissal was either misplaced or manufactured”. While she noted that opportunism is not a substantial ground for dismissal, she took the Complainant’s behaviour into account in assessing the amount of compensation to award by way of redress. The Complainant’s loss was €9,173 and the Complainant was awarded €3,500 by way of compensation which the Adjudicator regarded as just and equitable in all the circumstances. Takeaway for Employers: While this case was quite fact-specific, the decision highlights that although redundancy is a fair reason for dismissal, “redundancy” has a specific statutory definition contained in the Redundancy Payments Act 1967. Section 7(2) sets out the various circumstances that may give rise to a redundancy situation. The fact that an employee’s contract of employment may no longer be fit for purpose does not mean that the employee’s role is redundant. Employers that find themselves in this situation should note that the Adjudicator in this case suggested that an employer ought to address an employee’s unreasonable refusal to negotiate necessary amendments to his/her contract of employment through a fair disciplinary process. Careful consideration must be given to the provisions of section 7(2) of the 1967 Act and whether or not a genuine redundancy situation exists before determining the appropriate course of action.   Link: ADJ-00034716 - Workplace Relations Commission   Authors- Abigail Ansell and Jenny Wakely   29th October 2025 AOC Solicitors 19-22 Baggot Street Lower Dublin 2   www.aocsolicitors.ie  

WRC Upholds TUPE Complaint Four Years After the Transfer

 In Sara Halpin v Robert & F Warren Ltd (ADJ-00058438), one of the claims that the Complainant sought adjudication from the Workplace Relations Commission (“the WRC”) was under the European Communities (Protection of Employees on Transfer of Undertakings) Regulations 2003, commonly referred to as “TUPE Regulations”. Her claim was that she was never notified of the transfer which occurred in 2021. Although the claim was lodged in April 2025, approximately 4 years after the transfer took place, the WRC Adjudicator, Conor Stokes, found that the contravention of the TUPE Regulations was within time for him to hear the claim. Facts: The Complainant held a role in Human Resources within the Respondent company. The Complainant claimed that she was never made aware that a transfer of undertakings had taken place, and that her employment transferred from one employer to another. The Complainant stated that she understood the transfer of undertakings to have taken place in 2021 but only became aware of this fact from communications with the Revenue Commissioners during the 12 months prior to lodging the complaint with the WRC. The Respondent confirmed that it never made the Complainant aware of the existence of a transfer of undertakings. The Respondent confirmed the principals of both entities were the same person. Therefore, the Respondent had not complied with Regulation 8 of the TUPE Regulations in respect of consultation and providing the required information to the Complainant but that was four years ago. Regulation 10 of the TUPE Regulations refers to the time limits within which to make a claim for such breaches and states that: “A rights commissioner shall not entertain a complaint under this Regulation unless it is presented to the commissioner within the period of 6 months beginning on the date of the alleged contravention to which the complaint relates..” The six-month time frame is mirrored in section 41(6) of the Workplace Relations Act 2015. Section 41(8) of the Workplace Relations Act provides for an extension of time: “An adjudication officer may entertain a complaint or dispute to which this section applies presented or referred to the Director General after the expiration of the period referred to in subsection (6) or (7) (but not later than 6 months after such expiration), as the case may be, if he or she is satisfied that the failure to present the complaint or refer the dispute within that period was due to reasonable cause.” Notwithstanding that the Adjudicator appears to have accepted that the transfer of undertakings took place in 2021, the Adjudicator found that the complaint fell within the period envisioned in the Act. The Adjudicator stated: “The respondent confirmed that it never informed the complainant of the change of ownership of the business.  Accordingly, I consider that the date of the contravention to which this complaint refers falls within the period comprehended by the Act and is validly before the WRC.” It is not clear from the written decision why the Adjudicator granted the extension “later than six months after” the expiration of the time limit i.e. beyond the 12-month extended period - was it due to the Respondent never informing the Complainant or was it due to the fact that the Complainant discovered the transfer within 12 months of her lodging her claim. The author of this article was not involved in this case nor present at the hearing. It is possible that the parties are clearer to the basis for this decision. The Adjudicator ordered the Respondent to pay the Complainant four weeks in compensation for the breach of Regulation 8. Takeaway for Employers: While the principles in this decision are straightforward, employers should be aware the laws governing TUPE are complex. The transferring employer must provide TUPE information, including the proposed date of transfer and reasons for the transfer, at least 30 days before the transfer of undertakings takes place, or at the very least, in good time before the transfer. Employers should remember that the purpose of the TUPE Regulations is to protect employees’ rights where a transfer of undertaking occurs. While time limits apply for TUPE related complaints to the WRC, organisations should be aware that they may be exposed to further extensions if they fail to inform the employees at all about the transfer of undertaking and it is better to inform the employees, even if late, to start the time limit to run and limit the exposure.   Link –  ADJ-00058438 - Workplace Relations Commission   Authors- Jane Holian, Anne O’Connell   29th October 2025   AOC Solicitors 19-22 Baggot Street Lower Dublin 2 www.aocsolicitors.ie  

Pharmacist Awarded €86,717 for Sexual Harassment where Respondent “wholly failed” to Protect Complainant from Continued Harassment

In A Female Complainant v The Health Service Executive (ADJ-00055810), the Workplace Relations Commission (the “WRC”) found that the Complainant was discriminated against by her employer on the grounds of gender. The Adjudicator, Conor Stokes, found that the Complainant was sexually harrassed by a senior colleague for over a year, and that the Respondent did not react robustly enough in order to protect the Complainant. The Adjudicator awarded the Complainant 52 weeks’ remuneration (€86,717) for the effects of the discrimination. Facts: The Complainant is a pharmacist working in a HSE hospital setting. The Complainant lodged an employment equality claim with the WRC on 10th December 2024 alleging gender discrimination and sexual harassment. The Complainant described a series of incidents in which she was sexually harassed by a senior male pharmacist, the first of which took place in May 2023. Further incidents occurred, culminating in an incident in June 2024 during which the senior pharmacist showed her a picture of naked male genitalia while they were along in the pharmacy office together. The Complainant lodged a complaint of sexual harassment the following Monday when her line manager returned to work. The Complainant sent an email to HR in which she sought a formal investigation into seven separate incidents. The Complainant submitted that she was only interviewed more than eight months after making a complaint. She stated that the harasser continued to work in the workplace for over a year while she had to move elsewhere to try and avoid him, and she continued to encounter him in the workplace. The Complainant had to take stress leave twice during that time. The Respondent stated that it was required to give the senior pharmacist due process and noted that he was entitled to natural justice and fairness. It referred to the investigation that was carried out and the report that was issued in respect of the complaint. The investigation found in favour of the Complainant. While the Respondent submitted that it put certain safety measures in place, it accepted that it did not do enough to protect the Complainant. Decision:  The Adjudicator found the Complainant to be credible, and in the absence of any evidence to the contrary, he found that all the incidents described by the Complainant took place (not just those upheld in the investigation which the senior pharmacist had admitted to). The Adjudicator found that the senior pharmacist repeatedly violated the safeguarding direction put in place by the Respondent. This was confirmed by the Respondent’s witness who confirmed that she had to speak to him repeatedly. The Adjudicator was satisfied that the Complainant had “amply” established facts from which it could be presumed that she had been discriminated against. Accordingly, the burden shifted to the Respondent to prove the contrary. The Respondent did not challenge the Complainant’s version of events and affirmed many of the details given by her including the timeline and how long it took to address matters while the senior pharmacist remained in place and the Complainant was moved around. The Adjudicator found that the Respondent “wholly failed” to take steps to prevent the senior pharmacist from continuing to sexually harass the Complainant. He “repeatedly inserted himself” into the Complainant’s work environment, resulting in the Complainant taking stress-related sick leave. Up to the date of the WRC hearing, 13 months after the sexual harassment had been reported, no disciplinary action had been initiated against the senior pharmacist. The Adjudicator was critical of the relevant HSE policies and the delay, as well as the inadequacy of the safeguarding mechanisms put in place. He concluded that the Respondent did not take such steps as were reasonably practicable to safeguard the Complainant. He found that the Respondent was liable for the discrimination of the Complainant, and was unable to rely on the defence in section 15(3) of the Employment Equality Acts. In considering the appropriate redress, the Adjudicator noted that it is important that any award should serve the purpose of dissuading a potential harasser, of persuading an employer to comply with the legislation, and should be proportionate to the infringement and breach of the Act. The Adjudicator awarded the Complainant compensation in the amount of €86,717, equivalent to 52 weeks’ remuneration, for the effects of the discrimination in this case. Interestingly, the Adjudicator also ordered the Respondent to disregard the two periods of sick leave for work-related stress taken by the Complainant arising from the harassment for the purposes of annual and multi-annual sick leave calculation. Takeaway for Employers: This decision is a strong reminder to employers of their obligations to employees under the Employment Equality Acts. Breaches of employment equality legislation can be very costly for organisations, as awards of compensation are made for the “effects” of the discrimination and are not dependent on loss of earnings, increasing the potential exposure for employers. Employers must ensure that they have robust policies in place that protect the rights and interests of employees who may experience harassment. It is essential that employers ensure that their policies are effectively communicated to employees and appropriate training is advisable. When complaints of harassment or discrimination are made in the workplace, employers should act without delay in order to protect the rights of all parties concerned. Legal advice is recommended in navigating this sensitive area. Link- ADJ-00055810 28th November 2025 Authors – Jane Holian, Jenny Wakely Anne O’Connell Solicitors 19-22 Lower Baggot Street Dublin 2. www.aocsolicitors.ie    

WRC upholds Eircom’s defence in retirement age claim

In the case of Patrick Donnellan and Eircom Limited (ADJ-00051860) the Complainant brought a complaint under section 77 of the Employment Equality Act, challenging the Respondent’s enforcement of a mandatory retirement age of 65 and its refusal of his application for an extension of his contract. Facts: Prior to his retirement in April 2024, the Complainant had been employed by the Respondent (and/or its predecessor) for 44 years. The Complainant submitted that his contract of employment did not specify a retirement age. He submitted that it made reference to 65 in terms of receipt of pension but there was no requirement to retire at that age. The Complainant was employed as a field technician. The Complainant submitted that he had substantial financial commitments for example putting a family member through third level education and was not in a position to retire at 65. Both sides acknowledged that he sought an extension of his contract but that this was refused citing factors such as intergenerational fairness, health and safety concerns and succession. He appealed this internally within the Respondent but his appeal was unsuccessful. The Respondent gave evidence at hearing to the effect that the Respondent’s defined benefit pension scheme has historically been drawn down at age 65 and that retirement at 65 is custom and practice across the organisation. Evidence was given of the Respondent’s retirement policy having been reviewed back in 2020 following external benchmarking and union engagement. Evidence was also provided around the rationale behind the retirement age of 65, naming succession planning, career progression, headcount management and the need to maintain an age balanced workforce. The Respondent submitted that 70% of its 900 staff are employed as field technicians (like the Complainant) and 60% of field technicians are currently over the age of 60. The Respondent submitted there is an aim of avoiding sudden loss of skilled staff.  Reference was also made to the field technician role being a “safety critical” role. The Respondent outlined the succession planning in place for the Complainant’s territory and the hiring of an apprentice in 2023 and in 2024 to address anticipated retirement in the Clare area. A witness for the Respondent gave evidence that “retirement age of 65 was to support intergenerational fairness, career progression, workplace diversity and health and safety, particularly relevant in physically demanding roles like those in open Eir, where 65% of the workforce is over 60, and in Clare, 88% are over 60”. The Respondent gave evidence that the Complainant’s annual salary after 44 years of service had been €48,463.11 and that upon retirement, he received a tax-free lump sum of €68,087.34 and an annual pension of €22,695.00. Decision: In this decision, the WRC Adjudication Officer Úna Glazier- Farmer relied on the current legal position on retirement age as set out in Seamus Mallon v The Minister for Justice, Ireland and the Attorney General [2024] IESC 20 (see end of this article for a link to our previous article on Mallon). The Adjudication Officer referred to the Supreme Court’s finding in Mallon that a mandatory retirement age does not constitute unlawful age discrimination where it pursues a legitimate aim and the means of achieving that aim is appropriate and proportionate in accordance with article 6)1) of the Directive 2000/78/EC and the relevant CJEU jurisprudence. The Adjudicator listed some examples of what can constitute a legitimate aim as set out by the Supreme Court and referred to the Supreme Court having found that the avoidance of an individual capacity assessment has been recognised as a legitimate aim in favour of justifying a general retirement age. The Adjudication Officer also referred to another recent WRC Decision on the topic of retirement age namely Valentine Reilly v Meath County Council ADJ-00050118 and the analysis of the Adjudication Officer in that case. Ultimately, the Adjudication Officer found that in the instant case there had been a “consistent and systematic” and “coherent” application of the mandatory retirement rules by the Respondent, that the Respondent’s legitimate aims were identified in a letter to the Complainant communicating its decision to refuse an extension of his contract and were based on intergenerational fairness, succession planning, and health and safety. She noted the Respondent’s Retirement Policy which also refers to maintaining an age balance in the workplace. She found all four aims were noted by the Supreme Court in Mallon as legitimate. The Adjudication Officer relied on the Supreme Court’s finding that an employer is “better placed than the court to assess what [is] necessary or appropriate for the effective operation of the coronial system” and found that this limits the role of the WRC to consider whether the Respondent’s judgement appeared to be unreasonable. She found that the Respondent is best placed to assess what is necessary or proportionate for the effective operation of its business. The Adjudication Officer found the Respondent had acted reasonably in accordance with its Retirement Policy and the mandatory retirement age was objectively and reasonably justified by legitimate aims. She commented that while it is entirely understandable that the ongoing costs associated with supporting his family are substantial, in the circumstances, the Respondent’s mandatory retirement age of 65 was appropriate and necessary in light of the pension provision. Takeaway for Employers: This decision serves as reminder that while mandatory retirement ages are permissible if they pursue a legitimate aim and the means of achieving that aim are appropriate and proportionate, they provide fertile ground for dispute and are regularly challenged by employees in the WRC. Employers should consult with their lawyers to ensure they are up to date on the topic of retirement ages and are operating in a manner that is consistent with the findings of the Supreme Court in Mallon. Link  – https://workplacerelations.ie/en/cases/2025/october/adj-00051860.html Links to some other recent articles we have written on this topic: https://aocsolicitors.ie/supreme-court-clarifies-law-on-mandatory-retirement-ages/ https://aocsolicitors.ie/recent-decisions-on-mandatory-retirement-highlight-requirement-for-appropriate-contractual-provisions-and-retirement-policies/ Authors – Abigail Ansell and Laura Killelea 30 November 2025 Anne O’Connell Solicitors 19-22 Lower Baggot Street Dublin 2. www.aocsolicitors.ie    

Auto-Enrolment is Nearly Here – What Does it Mean for Employers?

The Government’s new statutory retirement savings system will go live from 1st January 2026. The scheme known as MyFutureFund, will be overseen and administered by the National Automatic Enrolment Retirement Savings Authority (NAERSA). NAERSA will identify which employees meet the eligibility criteria for auto-enrolment using Revenue payroll data and will enrol them, which should result in minimal administrative work for employers. Employees will be enrolled automatically in the new pension scheme if they are: * Aged between 23 years and 60 years; * Not currently part of a pension plan; and * Earn €20,000 or more per year (there is an earnings threshold of €80,000). Employees will have the option to opt-out (after 6 months, but before 8 months) or suspend their participation in the scheme. Employees who are under 23 or over 60 years of age, or who earn less that €20,000 a year, may opt into the scheme, with all contributions from their employer(s), the employee and the State applying. The fixed contribution rates from the employer, the employee and the State will be phased over a period of 10 years and are set out below: Year of the auto-enrolment scheme Employee Contribution Rate Employer pays Government pays 1 to 3 1.5% 1.5% 0.5% 4 to 6 3% 3% 1% 7 to 9 4.5% 4.5% 1.5% 10 and after 6% 6% 2% Employees who are already a member of an occupational pension scheme or trust, Retirement Annuity Contract (RAC) or have a Personal Retirement Savings Account (PRSA) or Pan-European Personal Pension Product (PEPP), which is recorded in payroll, will not be auto-enrolled and will not be able to opt in based on that employment. However, where an employee has a second employment where pension contributions are not paid, the employee can be auto enrolled or opt into the scheme in respect of that second employment if they meet the eligibility requirements. Employers and employees should be aware that when an employee has multiple jobs, NAERSA will take into account the combined earnings to determine eligibility for auto-enrolment and an employee will be enrolled for any job without existing pension coverage if the total earnings are over €20,000. Takeaway and Considerations for Employers: Employers, if they have not done so already, need to ensure that they meet their auto-enrolment obligations. Failure to do so will result in penalties and possible prosecution. Employers should consider: * Review existing pension schemes – employers with existing pension schemes in place should ensure that their existing scheme qualifies for exemption. Employers should bear in mind that any employees who are not part of an existing pension scheme will be auto-enrolled if they meet the eligibility criteria. * Updating payroll software – employers should update their payroll software and should ensure that it can take instructions for enrolment, calculate and pay employer and employee contributions to NAERSA. * Budgeting for contributions – contributions will commence in January 2026, with an incremental increase over the next ten years, employers should ensure that they have budgeted appropriately. * Clear communications with employees – employers will be obliged to inform employees when they are first enrolled. Employers are also reminded that it is an offence to take any action that hinders or attempts to hinder an employee from participating in the MyFutureFund scheme. The employer portal contains sample correspondence that employers can use to issue to employees. * Employer Portal is now open – As of 1st December 2025,the MyFutureFund employer portal is open and employers must: 1. Complete their profile on the MyFutureFund Portal before the end of December. 2. Set up a payment method. 3. Run payroll as usual. 4. Employers should also keep an eye out for NAERSA notifications and communications via the portal. Links – MyFutureFund Portal * Auto-Enrolment Retirement Savings System for Employers – Department of Social Protection Authors- Ethna Dillon, Jenny Wakely Anne O’Connell Solicitors 19-22 Lower Baggot Street Dublin 2. www.aocsolicitors.ie

Irish Prison Service Ordered to Find Position for Prison Officer within Three Months

In Kim Dempsey v Irish Prison Service (ADJ-00043513) the Complainant brought a complaint under section 77 of the Employment Equality Acts (as amended) against her employer Irish Prison Service, for failing to provide her with reasonable accommodation following a workplace incident that left her unable to carry out her regular duties. Facts: The Complainant commenced employment with the Respondent as a prison officer in 2008. In May 2017 while working for the Respondent, the Complainant suffered multiple injuries as a result of a serious assault by a prisoner. Since the incident the Complainant has suffered with chronic and ongoing back pain requiring her to undergo specialist treatment. She has been medically advised that she is not fit for manual duties and that she should return to work in an office-based capacity. The Complainant has not returned to work since this incident and has remained on sick leave since 2017. It seems that while the Complainant was on sick leave, she obtained the qualifications for the role of Work Training Officer Integrated Sentence Management (“WTO”) and was later offered a position in Cloverhill prison but the Complainant submitted she was never permitted to start this role. The duties of the WTO were in dispute in the case. In summary, the Respondent argued it was not possible to re-employ the Complainant as a WTO/Prison Officer, as all positions involved prisoner contact or the potential for prisoner contact in conflict type scenarios. The Complainant on the other hand argued the role of WTO is a primarily office based role albeit that in some understaffed prisons such as Cloverhill, some WTO’s do not perform the WTO role full time due to having to fill in for staff shortages elsewhere in the prison. However, it was the Complainants position that there are full time WTO positions available in other prisons that do not entail carrying out general prison officer duties and if they do, this arises only exceptionally and therefore any such requirement could be dealt with by way of a reasonable accommodation. It is worth noting that in the Complainant’s submission reference was made to the case of XXX v. HR Rail SA C-485/20 (10th February 2022) where the Court of Justice of the European Union (the “CJEU”) handed down a judgement in the context of a worker becoming permanently incapable of remaining in their job because of the onset of a disability. The CJEU recognised in that case that the concept of reasonable accommodation may include reassignment to another job within the undertaking for which the worker has the necessary competence, capability and availability and where such reassignment would not impose a disproportionate burden. The CJEU recognising that the possibility of assigning the person to another job was aimed at a situation where there is “at least one vacancy” which the worker concerned would be able to occupy, so as not to impose a disproportionate burden on the employer. Decision: WRC Adjudication Officer Jim Dolan upheld the Complainant’s claim. In his decision he quoted detailed sections of the landmark Supreme Court ruling in Nano Nagle School v Daly [2019] IESC 63 which examined the obligations of an employer to provide reasonable accommodation for an employee with a disability. See a link to our previous article on the Nano Nagle judgment here (https://aocsolicitors.ie/landmark-supreme-court-decision-on-the-obligation-to-provide-reasonable-accommodation-to-employees-with-disabilities/). The Adjudicator also referred to the judgment in Robert Cunningham and Irish Prison Service [2020] IEHC 282 where Mr Justice Barr commented that it was clear from the decision in the Nano Nagle case, that there has been a “paradigm shift” in the way disability is to be viewed in European and Irish law. Mr. Justice Barr commented that the legislation and case law clearly provide “rights of real substance to persons of disability, who wish to enter or remain in work”. The Adjudication Officer ordered the Respondent to pay compensation to the Complainant in the sum of €60,000. He also made an order to reasonably accommodate the Complainant by finding a position which will permit her continued employment as a prison officer within three months. While the Adjudicator did not directly comment on the Complainant’s reference to the XXX case (which post dates Nano Nagle), the order to find a position which will permit the employee’s continued employment as a prison officer within three months is arguably consistent with that Judgement. It is also worth noting that in his decision the Adjudicator remarked upon the fact the Complaint had not been invited to attend a conference that had taken place to discuss her possible return to work. He commented that he believed she should have been invited to attend that conference. The Adjudicator ordered that the Complainant should be included in any discussion/decision in the tasking of finding her a position. Takeaway for Employers: In so far as the order to find a position within three months is concerned, it is worth pointing out that the Respondent in this case was a large public body where the likelihood of an alternative position being available may be higher than in a small private business. It does not necessarily follow that a similar order would be made in respect of a smaller organisation. Nonetheless, this decision serves as an important reminder that the right of reasonable accommodation is a right of “real substance” and employers should be mindful of their duty to provide reasonable accommodation measures to employees unless the measures would impose a disproportionate burden on the employer. Link: https://www.workplacerelations.ie/en/cases/2025/november/adj-00043513.html Authors- Abigail Ansell, Laura Killelea   2nd January 2026 AOC Solicitors 19-22 Baggot Street Lower Dublin 2 www.aocsolicitors.ie

Adjudicator Includes “lump sum” from Pension in Constructive Dismissal Compensation Award

Karen McHale v Mayo University Hospital (ADJ-00053715) involved a constructive dismissal complaint under the Unfair Dismissals Acts 1977 – 2015. The Complainant claimed that she was left with no option but to resign from her employment due to the Respondent’s treatment of her when a complaint was made against her under the Respondent’s grievance procedure. Her complaint was upheld and she was awarded compensation, including a lump sum in respect of her pension. Facts: A complaint was made against the Complainant by one of her colleagues following their return from leave. The Complainant’s line manager required the Complainant to carry out the return-to-work meeting with that employee. During that meeting, the employee mentioned to the Complainant that he had made a complaint about her, of which he assumed she was aware. The Complainant had not received a copy of the complaint and was not aware that a complaint had been made against her. She asked the Respondent to provide her with a copy of the complaint, but they did not, and she was directed to attend mediation in an attempt to resolve the complaint. When she attended the mediation, the mediator was surprised that the Complainant had not been given details of the complaint or provided with a copy of it. Further issues arose in respect of reporting lines, and the Complainant submitted that she was bypassed in the reporting structure. She went on certified sick leave, still without having been provided with a copy of the complaint. The Complainant was offered alternative positions that were not suitable, and she felt that she was bullied into accepting one of those positions. The Complainant ultimately resigned. She did not submit a grievance before doing so, because she felt that she was unable to rely on the Respondent’s grievance procedure given the lack of fairness afforded to her in respect of the complaint made against her under that same procedure. The Respondent sought to defend the claim on the basis that the Complainant had failed to exhaust the internal options available to resolve her grievances prior to resigning from her employment. It did not dispute that the Complainant had not been provided with a copy of the complaint against her before commencement of an investigation into the complaint and before commencement of the mediation process. Decision: The Adjudicator, Conor Stokes, upheld the Complainant’s claim. He referred to the decision in Re: Haughey [1971] IR 217 and the fundamental principles set out in that decision, which included the entitlement to be provided with the case being made out against you, and having the opportunity to rebut that case. He found that those principles did not appear to have been included in the Respondent’s grievance procedure, and were not afforded to the Complainant in respect of the complaint made against her. He was satisfied that a reasonable employer would regard the grievance procedure as flawed, and would not (and should not) expect or require her to have engaged with that flawed grievance procedure prior to her resignation. He found that she had been constructively dismissed. What is particularly interesting about this decision, is the Adjudicator’s calculation of the Complainant’s financial loss and the award of compensation made by him. Having found that compensation was the most appropriate remedy, the Adjudicator assessed the Complainant’s financial loss, noting her loss of a pension entitlement/lump sum as a result of the termination of her employment. He requested and obtained post-hearing submissions regarding financial loss and mitigation. From that information, the Adjudicator noted that the pension “built up” by the Complainant was preserved for her to “draw down” upon retirement, but he noted that that did not appear to be the case in respect of the Complainant’s pension lump sum of approximately €41,831. The Complainant had about 17 years left to qualify for a full pension. The Adjudicator included a lump sum of €41,831 in his award of compensation, reflecting the loss of this pension lump sum. Takeaway for Employers: The inclusion of a figure specifically relating to loss of a pension lump sum in an award of compensation is very interesting. It is not clear from the decision, but it would seem more likely that the Complainant’s pension was a defined benefit pension as opposed to a defined contribution pension. The inclusion of such a loss in calculating the Complainant’s financial loss is nonetheless an interesting approach, and it will be interesting to see if it is followed in subsequent decisions and/or if a similar approach might be taken in circumstances where a complainant’s pension is a defined contribution scheme rather than a defined benefit scheme. Link – https://www.workplacerelations.ie/en/cases/2025/november/adj-00053715.html 26th January 2026 Author – Jenny Wakely AOC Solicitors 19-22 Baggot Street Lower Dublin 2 www.aocsolicitors.ie

Auto-Enrolment Update

“MyFutureFund” Ireland’s new auto-enrolment pension system is now in effect as of 1st January automatically enrolling “eligible” employees. While many employers were prepared for this development, what came as a surprise were the further regulations signed into law on 22nd December, 2025 (S.I. No. 668/2025 - Automatic Enrolment Retirement Savings System Regulations (Amendment) (Section 52) Regulations 2025, hereafter the “Regulations”). The Regulations set out minimum standards that must be met in respect of contributions to occupational pension schemes and PRSAs in order for employments to be “exempt” from autoenrollment to MyFutureFund. These Regulations setting out minimum standards had not been expected for some time. The Regulations which are already in effect since January 1st stipulate the following minimum standards. Minimum Standards For Defined Contribution Schemes and PRSAs: Employer contributions must amount to not less than 1.5% of the employee’s gross pay or €1,200 in any year, whichever is less. In addition the aggregate contributions of the employer and the employee cannot be less than 3.5% of the employee’s gross pay or €2,800 in any year whichever is less. It is important to note the reference to “gross” as opposed to base pay. This is significant as traditionally many pension contributions have been calculated with reference to an employee’s base salary. It is important to be aware that “gross” pay reflects more than just an employee’s base salary. It can include things like commission, bonus etc. Minimum Standards For Defined Benefits Schemes: Where a scheme is a defined benefit scheme continuing service in that employment entitles the employee to accrue a long service benefit. Takeaway for Employers: Employers who are treating their employee’s employments as exempt from autoenrollment to MyFutureFund on the basis of contributions being made to an occupational pension scheme or PRSA should (if they have not already done so) review the contribution levels to ensure they meet the new minimum standards. In many cases the contributions may satisfy the standards, however, where there is a shortfall, employers need to be careful about how that shortfall is addressed. Some employers are choosing to make up the short fall through an increased employer contribution in circumstances where seeking to compel an increased employee contribution from existing employees likely presents additional legal issues/challenges. Employers may also like to review the “FAQ for Employers/Agents” that is available on the MyFutureFund Website (link below). Links: https://myfuturefund.ie/employer-faq https://www.irishstatutebook.ie/eli/2025/si/668/made/en/print?q=enrolment&years=2025 Author –Laura Killelea 23 January 2025 Anne O’Connell Solicitors 19-22 Lower Baggot Street Dublin 2. www.aocsolicitors.ie      

Reeling In The Year 2025

As we journey into 2026, it's timely to reflect on some key developments and noteworthy cases that shaped Irish Employment law last year. Minimum Wage The start of 2025 saw an increase in minimum wage to €13.50 per hour.  From 1st January 2026 it has increased further to €14.15 per hour. Gender Pay Gap Reporting  2025 saw gender pay gap reporting requirements extended to employers with at least 50 employees. Employment (Contractual Retirement Ages) Act 2025 This new legislation provides for a process whereby employees whose contract of employment specifies a retirement age below the state pension age (currently age 66) may notify their employer that they do not consent to retire at that age. There are certain notification requirements and on receipt of the notification, the employer must not enforce the contractual retirement age before providing the employee with a “reasoned written reply”. The new legislation was signed into law by the President just before Christmas 2025 however the provisions are not effective until such time as the Minister of Enterprise, Trade and Employment makes the necessary commencement order. Further details can be found in our Article, written on the first publication of the new Bill. General Scheme of the Equality (Miscellaneous Provisions) Bill 2024 The Bill proposes a number of noteworthy amendments to equality legislation. Further details can be found in our Article. However, significant amendments to these proposals are expected. WRC Looks Past the Corporate Veil  In Paul Lingard v Randridge International Ltd (In Examinership) (ADJ-00053934), the Workplace Relations Commission (“WRC”) found that a contractor satisfied the test for an employee set out by the Supreme Court in Revenue Commissioners v Karshan Midlands (Ltd t/a Domino’s Pizza) [2023] IESC 24. Although the contractual relationship was between two limited companies, the WRC looked behind this arrangement and found that there was a “contract of services”, i.e. an employment relationship. Further details can be found in our Article. Debenhams Case - High Court The High Court reversed a decision of the Labour Court which found Debenhams Retail Ireland owed their former employee €1,140 for a breach of its obligations in relation to collective redundancies. The Labour Court found that the Respondent employer had failed to commence the consultation process in good time and that by delaying the consultation until after the liquidators had been appointed, they had limited the options available in terms of coming to an agreement. However, the High Court found there was no evidence put before the Court of any options being lost or unavailable as a result of the 8-day delay. The High Court also found that a consultation process can start in advance of the first consultation meeting and took into account the surrounding circumstances (Covid-19 restrictions, Easter Bank Holiday weekend). Further details can be found in our Article. Employer Found Not to be Data Controller of Non-Work Related Personal Data The High Court upheld a decision of the Data Protection Commissioner (“DPC”) dismissing a complaint in relation to the HSE hack in 2021. The Applicant had discovered his personal email accounts had been compromised as well as his personal cryptocurrency account. The Applicant believed his work mobile phone was the source of the hack. The DPC decided that the HSE was not a “data controller”, within the meaning of that term in article 4.7 of the General Data Protection Regulation (EU) 2016/679 as the HSE did not authorise use of personal data on the work phone under their Acceptable Use Policy. Further details can be found in our Article. Significant Award for Breaches of Organisational of Working Time Act The WRC made an award of €34,999.99 for multiple breaches of the Organisation of Working Time Act 1997. The Complainant gave credible evidence he was not afforded his daily and/or weekly rest periods and worked in excess of the maximum weekly working hours set out under the 1997 Act. This decision was noteworthy in circumstances where the Adjudicator found that the Complainant’s working hours were determined by the needs of the business (he was a Chef) notwithstanding that the Complainant was responsible for rostering his own hours. Further details can be found in our Article. Significant Decisions Upholding Mandatory Retirement Ages:  2025 saw some noteworthy decisions from the WRC and the Labour Court in which mandatory retirement provisions were upheld.  In August, 2025 the Labour Court overturned the WRC decision which found that Mr Tom Ronan was discriminated against on the grounds of age when he was forced to retire at 70. This case had an interesting background as Mr Ronan was successful in his High Court application for an interim injunction requiring the Garda Commissioner to immediately re-engage him as a civilian driver pending the outcome of his proceedings. However, his application for an interlocutory injunction (to continue the interim order) was refused by the High Court, who found the appropriate route to pursue his claim was the WRC and Labour Court and that it would not be appropriate for the High Court to “trespass” on this statutory mechanism (a link to our Article on this aspect of the matter is also found below). The Labour Court noted that it was bound by the Supreme Court decision in Mallon v The Minister for Justice, Ireland and the Attorney General [2024] IESC 20 in which Mr Justice Collins emphatically endorsed the State’s decision to apply a mandatory retirement age of 70 to the majority of public servants.  Further details can be found in our Article.  Further details on the High Court Application can be found in our Article.  In October, 2025, the WRC upheld the enforcement of a mandatory retirement age provision by Eircom Limited where it determined Eircom had acted reasonably in accordance with its Retirement Policy and the mandatory retirement age was objectively and reasonably justified by legitimate aims. Further details can be found in our Article. Supreme Court Recognised Claim for Damages for Emotional Stress as a Result of a Data Breach But Not as a “Personal Injury” Claim The Supreme Court considered whether a claim for emotional distress as a result of a data breach falls within the statutory definition of “personal injury” and whether obtaining PIAB authorisation to initiate proceedings was required. It found that such a claim did not come within the definition of a “personal injury” claim. It was held the Plaintiff had a standalone claim for non-material damage pursuant to s117 of the Data Protection Acts. Mr. Justice Brian Murray also held that where a plaintiff’s claims are solely for mental distress, upset and anxiety that the plaintiff cannot expect anything other than very, very modest awards. Further details can be found in our Article.   Pension Auto-Enrolment The Government’s new statutory retirement savings system, MyFutureFund, went live from 1st January 2026. Employees are automatically enrolled if they are between 23 and 60 years of age, earn €20,000 or more per year and are not in “exempt employments”. Late in 2025 many employers were conscientiously preparing for this go-live date, especially upon the opening of the MyFutureFund Portal in December. New regulations were introduced relatively suddenly at the end of 2025 (and are already in effect since 1st January, 2026) setting out minimum standards that must be met in respect of contributions to occupational pension schemes and PRSAs in order for employments to be “exempt” from autoenrollment to MyFutureFund. See more about pension auto-enrolment in our original Article and January update here. A Quick Look at Noteworthy EU Developments… In the case of G.L. v AB SpA (C-38/24) the Court of Justice of the European Union (“CJEU”) ruled employers are required to provide reasonable accommodation to employees who are caregivers of their child with a disability. This decision broadens the protections for caregivers and the concept of discrimination “by association”. Further details can be found in our Article. The full judgement dated 11 September 2025 can be found here. On 11 November 2025 the CJEU annulled part of the Adequate Minimum Wages Directive while confirming the validity of the majority of the Directive. Article 5(2) and 5(3) of the Directive were found to constitute direct interference by EU law in the determination of pay and so were annulled. This judgement will likely require an update to the European Union (Adequate Minimum Wages) Regulations 2024 (S.I. No. 633 pf 2024). However, the judgement did not impact the promotion of collective bargaining, as required by the Directive. This is underway in Ireland with the publication of Ireland’s Action Plan to Promote Collective Bargaining 2026-2030 in early November 2025. Further details can be found in our Article. The full judgement can be found here. Authors – Tara Kelly, Ethna Dillon and Laura Killelea 27th January 2026 Anne O’Connell Solicitors 19-22 Lower Baggot Street Dublin 2 www.aocsolicitors.ie  

Employee Unfairly Dismissed by Employer Following Client Request to Remove Him from Site

Tony Molloy v Kaefer Limited (ADJ-00053834) is a recent unfair dismissal case that was before the Workplace Relations Commission (“WRC”). The Complainant brought the complaint under the Unfair Dismissal Acts 1977-2015 (the “Acts”) claiming his dismissal was both procedurally and substantively unfair. The Respondent denied this and claimed that his dismissal was necessary because it was impossible for the Complainant to continue in his role due to its client’s insistence that he be removed from their site. Facts: The Complainant was employed by the Respondent from 17th October 2016 until his dismissal on 29th May 2024. He was employed as a mechanical technician/fitter and was based on a site managed by a primary client of the Respondent since the beginning of 2024. Under the commercial contract between the Respondent and the client in question, the Respondent, through the Complainant and his team, completed specified mechanical works as outlined in permits issued by the client. The Respondent submitted that on 26th April 2024, and in the following days, the Complainant repeatedly refused to take responsibility for the permits or carry out duties as a permit holder, despite ongoing requests from his supervisor and other members of management. The Complainant gave evidence that his refusal was due to the recent initiation of the disciplinary procedure against a colleague because of a defect under such a permit and his belief that the permit process conferred an unacceptable level of liability upon him (regardless of the cause of the defect itself). He wanted his concerns addressed before he took up these duties again. The Respondent told the WRC that the Complainant was suspended with immediate effect from 15th May 2024 following his continued refusal to perform his duties. The Complainant emailed an apology to the Respondent following his suspension, accepting that his actions had been unacceptable. The Respondent intended to proceed with a disciplinary process, however prior to the scheduled disciplinary hearing the client issued the Respondent with  a formal letter requesting the Complainant’s removal from their site on an indefinite basis. The Respondent gave evidence that they asked the client to reconsider, but the client refused and insisted that the Complainant be removed from site. The Respondent submitted that they were contractually obliged to follow this directive and for that reason, they made the decision not to pursue the disciplinary process. They dismissed the Complainant and communicated this to him in correspondence on 29th May 2024. The Respondent’s Operations Manager gave evidence that their preferred outcome from the disciplinary procedure would have been a disciplinary sanction short of dismissal and the imposition of a Performance Improvement Plan (“PIP”), however the client’s reliance on a pre-agreed contractual term “forced their hand”. Evidence was given on behalf of the Respondent that they increased the Complainant’s notice pay from four to eight weeks as a gesture of goodwill. The Complainant appealed his dismissal, but it was upheld. The Complainant identified a number of procedural failures on the part of the Respondent, and argued that dismissal was disproportionate. The Respondent argued that the dismissal was fair because there were other substantial grounds justifying the Complainant’s dismissal, namely the client’s refusal to have him back on site, and he was not dismissed for misconduct. Decision: The Adjudicator, Mr. Brian Dolan, found that the Complainant had been unfairly dismissed. Under the Acts, the dismissal of an employee is deemed unfair unless, having regard to all the circumstances, there were substantial grounds justifying the dismissal. There are a number of grounds that an employer can rely on to demonstrate that a dismissal was substantively fair under section 6(4) of the Acts. A further basis on which an employer can rely in defending an unfair dismissal claim is contained in section 6(6) which provides as follows: “In determining for the purposes of this Act whether the dismissal of an employee was an unfair dismissal or not, it shall be for the employer to show that the dismissal resulted wholly or mainly from one or more of the matters specified in subsection (4) of this section or that there were other substantial grounds justifying the dismissal.” [our emphasis].   The Adjudicator noted that section 6(6) is often invoked by employers seeking to justify dismissal in circumstances where a client refuses to permit an employee on site, arguing that this amounts to  “other substantial grounds” under that subsection. The Adjudicator noted the client in question was a primary source of work for the Respondent. However, the Adjudicator referred to a series of decisions addressing the reliance on “other substantial grounds justifying the dismissal” by employers experiencing pressure from third parties to remove employees from their sites. He pointed out that these authorities have established an onus on employers in these circumstances to consult with the third party, advocate on behalf of their employee, and consult with the affected employee on other roles that may be available in their organisation. In Merrigan v Home Counties Cleaning Ireland Ltd (UD904/1984), the Employment Appeals Tribunal (“EAT”) (as it then was) found that “The job of an employee cannot be at risk on the mere whim of a third party to the employment relationship”. In Derek Hevey v Provincial Security Services Ltd (UD447/2011), the EAT found that a Respondent “…will be expected to show that it has concluded an investigation into the reasons for the refusal of the respondent’s customer to have the claimant work on the site.” In An Employee v An Employer (UD205/2010), the EAT held that: “Every case must be considered in the light of its own particular facts. The dismissal of an employee brought about through pressure from third parties whether customers, clients, fellow employees or others may be justified provided the employer acts fairly and handles the procedure and investigation properly.” In the present case, the Adjudicator found that the Respondent could not rely on section 6(6) of the Acts and held that the Complainant was unfairly dismissed. The Adjudicator observed that it seemed apparent that the Respondent simply accepted the client's decision to remove the Complainant at face value and did not appear to advocate on his behalf. While evidence was given that the Respondent did speak with the client in this regard and asked them to reconsider, the Adjudicator found that the Respondent’s efforts were inadequate. The Adjudicator awarded compensation to the Complainant. In relation to the level of the award, the Adjudicator commented that “it is clearly apparent that the Complainant viewed his own behaviour as unacceptable and in consideration of the factual matrix presented by the parties, it is clear that these issues directly contributed to his dismissal.” The Adjudicator awarded €10,000 in compensation, taking into account the Complainant’s contribution to his own dismissal and his efforts to mitigate his losses. Takeaway for Employers: This case highlights the obligations on employers who are faced with a decision by a client not to permit one of their employees back on site. This type of scenario can pose a significant problem for employers in circumstances where the employee in question works primarily, or exclusively, on that client’s site. Such a decision does not always arise in response to a misconduct or performance issue, making it very difficult for employers to address in line with their policies. Even where there are misconduct or performance issues, employers are often placed in a difficult position when clients refuse to permit an employee to remain on site while they conduct an investigation or disciplinary process What is clear from the case law in this area, including this decision, is that employers have obligations to their employees that cannot be circumvented because of a client’s directive. What will be appropriate in one situation may not be suitable in another and employers need to ensure that their approach and response is tailored to the particular facts and circumstances. It is advisable for employers to seek legal advice as this can be a complex area. Links: https://www.workplacerelations.ie/en/cases/2025/december/adj-00053834.html You may also be interested in our previous article on a WRC case involving dismissal of an employee arising from a cancelled SLA. Link available here . Authors – Tara Kelly and Jenny Wakely   27th January 2026 Anne O’Connell Solicitors 19-22 Lower Baggot Street Dublin 2 www.aocsolicitors.ie

One TUPE Transfer, Two Different WRC Decisions re Whether Employee Resigned When Didn’t Sign New Contract

Two WRC decisions arising from the same transfer under the EC (Protection of Employees on Transfer of Undertakings) Regulations 2003 (“TUPE Regulations”) reached different outcomes on whether the lack of confirmation by the employee re transferring amounted to a resignation by the employee. The cases are Jason Franzoni v. Hibernia Homecare Ltd (ADJ-00056751) and Charlotte O’Connor v. Hibernia Homecare Ltd (ADJ-00057021). Facts: Hibernia Homecare Ltd (the Respondent) submitted that it had to transfer its business to its parent company, Hibernia Homecare Group Ltd in order to meet the HSE requirements in the new Service Level Agreement. Formal notice was emailed to its employees on 31 October 2024 in line with the TUPE Regulations. The consultation process began on 5th November 2024. During this meeting David Wallace, Managing Director, informed the employees that they had a choice as to whether or not they wished to transfer but if they refused to transfer that this would be considered a resignation. During this meeting a small number of employees objected to the transfer in support of one of the directors who was not included in the transferee company. The meeting got heated and these employees, including both Complainants, walked out of the meeting. The Respondent appointed a mediator who represented both the transferor and transferee in the consultation meetings. A new contract was issued to the employees with the transferee named as the employer but it was on the same terms and conditions of employment. The employees were pushed to sign it but had been informed that their existing contract would transfer. The transfer deadline was extended to 31st January 2025. The employees were given until 4pm on 31st January 2025 to sign the contracts or be dismissed. At 4.01pm a notice was sent to the employees who did not sign the contract informing them that their employment had ceased. Neither Complainant signed the contract but both stated that they did not object to transferring. The Respondent acknowledged that the employees were not required to sign a new contract and could rely on their existing contracts in a TUPE transfer. The question was whether the Respondent employer could properly equate signing the new contract with consenting to the TUPE transfer. Each Adjudicator analysed this question differently and came to different outcomes. Decisions: Decision 1 - Franzoni v. Hibernia Homecare Ltd – dated 4th December 2025 Mr Fanzoni was employed as a Health Care Assistant from 9 September 2021. He claimed his employment was unfairly dismissed on 31st January 2025 because he refused to sign a new contract of employment when his role was due to transfer under TUPE Regulations. The Respondent denied dismissal and stated that the Complainant refused to transfer and thereby resigned. The Complainant relied on the wording in the Respondent’s memo of 31st October 2024 which stated that the transferring employees “will however, retain their current contracts of employment”.  The Respondent placed considerable emphasis on what is alleged that the Complainant said on 5th November 2024 meeting. While there was a dispute as to what exactly the Complainant said, the Adjudicator was satisfied that the Complainant indicated that he would not transfer and walked out of the meeting with a few other employees. The Adjudicator pointed out that this was almost 3 months before the transfer date and was stated in a heated meeting. The Respondent argued that this together with the failure to sign the new contract constituted resignation. The Adjudicator (Patricia Owens) rejected the Respondent’s argument and found that the Complainant was unfairly dismissed. The Adjudicator referred to case law in relation to establishing a genuine resignation and stated that a resignation must be clear, unambiguous and unequivocal. The Adjudicator held that if the Respondent genuinely believed the Complainant intended to resign or refuse to transfer then it would have been “reasonable and appropriate” for the Respondent to write seeking clarification of the Complainant’s position. The Adjudicator said that she was at a loss as to why the Respondent did not send a single email asking the Complainant to clarify his position. The Adjudicator criticised the Respondent for equating signing the new contract with confirming agreement to transfer, noting that there is no legal requirement for an employee to sign a new contract and also referring to the Respondent’s memo of 31st October 2024 stating that the employees would be retained on their current contracts. She stated that under the TUPE Regulations, a transferee or transferor is not entitled to insist that an employee sign a new contract and held that refusal to sign did not amount to resignation and did not provide any fair or lawful basis for termination. Although the Adjudicator acknowledged the Respondent acted fairly in its general consultation, she stated that it did not remove its obligation to seek clarification from the Complainant when he had not participated in some of the meetings and had not signed the contract and the alleged rejection was nearly 3 months earlier in a heated meeting. The Adjudicator found that the Complainant did not resign but was unfairly dismissed and awarded him 13 weeks’ pay. Decision 2 – O’Connor v. Hibernia Homecare Limited dated 18th November 2025 Ms O’Connor was employed from 9th June 2022 until 31st January 2025. Her employment ceased when she did not confirm her willingness to transfer under TUPE. She worked 30 hours per week. The Complainant gave evidence that the memo of 31st October 2024 stated that employees would become employees of the new company and retain current contracts/terms/benefits and that there would be no redundancies/layoffs because of the change. The Complainant refused to sign the new contract and had questions about why she had to sign and was concerned it might affect her hours. The Complainant did not work on Fridays and missed phone calls on the final date. The final day communication gave employees until 4pm to confirm agreement to transfer. It is not very clear in the decision whether or not she actually stated her rejection to transferring but it appears that like in the Franzoni case, she only expressed her objection to the transfer at the meeting on 5th November 2024 and not again afterwards. The Adjudicator found that she had resigned and relied on TUPE case law in relation to objection to transferring. Interestingly, the Adjudicator found that the Complainant effectively resigned because “she persistently refused to confirm willingness to transfer even though there was no change to her terms and conditions” (emphasis added).   The Complainant stated in evidence that other than signing the contract she did not know how else to confirm her willingness to transfer. The decision does not find that the Complainant “refused to transfer” which is what is referred to in TUPE case law to amount to a resignation. The Adjudicator was satisfied that the Complainant was not dismissed but resigned and therefore could not be unfairly dismissed. Takeaway for Employers: It is clear from these decisions that an employer involved in a TUPE transfer should not require the signing of a new contract as the method of indicating that the employee is not objecting to transferring. An employee is not required to consent to the transfer but has the option to reject or ‘opt out’ of transferring which needs to be clearly communicated to the employer. Where an employer believes an employee is refusing to transfer, it should seek clear written clarification from that employee. Remember resignation must be clear, unambiguous and unequivocal and should be in writing. Resignation in the heat of the moment can also be retracted. Ensure communications during the consultation period are consistent and clear and if refusal to transfer is going to be treated as resignation, ensure that this is clearly communicated to the employees well in advance of the transfer date in writing and that there are not contradictory messages sent to the employees. It should be noted that the first decision above is the most recent of the two decisions. It will be interesting to see if this is followed when this arises again. Links  - ADJ-00056751; ADJ-00057021 Authors – Anne O’Connell 21st January 2026 Anne O’Connell Solicitors 19-22 Lower Baggot Street Dublin 2. www.aocsolicitors.ie

Labour Court Upholds Decision of WRC that Company Sick Pay Scheme was less favourable overall than Statutory Sick Pay Scheme.

The Labour Court recently considered an appeal of a Workplace Relations Commission (“WRC”) decision in Ann Britton v. Amcor Flexibles Ltd ADJ-00050138. The complaint was in relation to the Sick Leave Act 2022 (“the Act”). The WRC Adjudicator had found that the company sick pay scheme (“CSP scheme”) overall was not more beneficial than the Statutory Sick Pay scheme (“SPS scheme”) and on that basis awarded the Complainant compensation of €1,000. The Respondent appealed this decision to the Labour Court who ultimately upheld the decision of the WRC. Facts: For ease, the Complainant and Respondent as they were referred to in the WRC remain the same in the Labour Court. The Complainant had commenced employment with the Respondent on 20th April 2023. The Respondent operated a CSP scheme which provided that, following 12 months service an employee may be paid sick leave of up to ten days once a medical certificate was provided on the third day. In the third and fourth year of employment, this would increase to 15 days and 20 days in the fifth year. In January 2024, the Complainant was on certified sick leave for five days. The Complainant did not qualify for the CSP scheme as she did not have the 12-month service requirement, and she was also informed that she would not receive any payment under the SSP scheme as the CSP scheme was deemed more favourable overall. At the time, the SSP scheme provided five days sick pay over a twelve-month period, after 13 weeks continuous service. This was payable from day 1 of absence and at a rate of 70% of normal pay up to a maximum of €110. The Complainant argued that she was entitled to SSP during the relevant period. The Respondent argued that the CSP scheme was as a whole more favourable than the SSP as per Section 9 of the Act and on that basis the obligations to pay SSP did not apply to the Respondent. Section 9 also sets out the various factors to be taken into consideration in determining when the Act will not apply. The Respondent accepted that the service requirement and the number of days before eligibility for payment were less favourable in the CSP than the SSP. However, the Respondent submitted that in terms of the period for which sick leave is payable, the amount of sick leave payable and the reference period, the Respondent’s scheme was more favourable as a whole and on that basis their appeal should be upheld. Decision:  The Court upheld the WRC decision and using the factors set out in Section 9(2) compared the CSP and SSP over the course of a reference period being January to December 2024. The applicable absences were 5 days from 2nd January to 8th January. Section 9 Considerations: Period of service of an employee that is required before sick leave is payable. Company Sick Pay Scheme: 52 weeks Statutory Sick Pay Scheme: 13 weeks Section 9 Considerations: Waiting Period before sick leave is payable Company Sick Pay Scheme: Three days Statutory Sick Pay Scheme: No waiting period Section 9 Considerations: The period for which sick pay is payable. Company Sick Pay Scheme: Less than 12 months service. O days Statutory Sick Pay Scheme: Five days Section 9 Considerations: The amount of sick leave that is Payable. Company Sick Pay Scheme: Entitlement during this absence Nil. Entitlement during the reference period with 12 months service, 2 days only = €252.80 Statutory Sick Pay Scheme: Entitlement in 12-month reference period with one absence of five days, capped ay 70%  =  €442 Section 9 Considerations: The reference period for the scheme. Company Sick Pay Scheme: 12 months rolling from the first date of absence. Statutory Sick Pay Scheme: 12 months, time starts to run from 1 day of absence in the year Takeaway for Employers: This decision confirms the importance of reviewing and thoroughly evaluating any company sick pay scheme in determining whether the scheme is truly more favourable than the statutory sick pay scheme, within the reference period. An assessment can be carried out pursuant to Section 9(2) of the 2022 Act, and should a company sick pay scheme be deemed more favourable overall, then the statutory sick pay scheme is not applicable. This Labour Court decision gives a good guidance in respect of such assessment. Links- Labour Court Decision – Amcor Flexibles Ltd v Ann Britton SLD251 WRC Decision - Ann Britton v Amcor Flexibles Ltd (ADJ-00050138) Sick Leave Act 2022   Authors – Ethna Dillon and Anne O’Connell

WRC lifts Statutory Cap of €13,000 in Employment Access Case and awards €40,000 instead

In a recent decision of the Workplace Relations Commission (WRC) in the case of Noel O’Connell v National Council for Special Education (ADJ-00042837), the National Council for Special Education (NCSE) was found to have indirectly discriminated against a deaf applicant for the role of “Advisor Deaf/Hard of Hearing (ISL)”. The case is significant not only for its discrimination finding, but also because the Adjudication Officer disapplied the statutory €13,000 compensation cap applicable in access-to-employment discrimination claims, awarding €40,000 in compensation instead. Facts: In March 2022 the Complainant who is deaf and fluent in Irish Sign Language (“ISL”) applied for a role with the National Council for Special Education (“NCSE”). The role was entitled “Advisor Deaf/Hard of Hearing (ISL)” (the “Role”). In order to be eligible for consideration for the Role, the NCSE required applicants to hold a formal Irish Sign Language (“ISL”) qualification. As is typical for native sign language users, the Complainant did not hold a formal academic ISL qualification. There was also a requirement to demonstrate excellent oral communications skills. The Complainant’s application was rejected. The Complainant requested a review explaining the denial of his application. That internal review upheld his complaint, finding that he met the essential criteria. However, the NCSE did not reopen the competition for the Role or provide the Complainant with any remedy. Decision: The Adjudication Officer decided in favour of the Complainant. The Adjudicator determined that the Respondent’s actions amounted to indirect discrimination against the Complainant and the Complainant’s discrimination claim was well founded. The Adjudication Officer then turned to the question of what should be ordered by way of redress for the discrimination suffered by the Complainant. Significantly, national law in Ireland (namely Section 82(4) of the Employment Equality Act 1998) provides an upper compensation limit of €13,000.00 in cases involving discrimination in respect of access to employment (which is the category this case would fall under). However, the Complainant’s legal team sought to rely on European Law namely Article 17 of Directive 2000/78 which provides that “The sanctions, which may comprise the payment of compensation to the victim, must be effective, proportionate and dissuasive”. The Complainant’s legal team also relied upon Case C-378/17 Minister for Justice and Equality & Commissioner of An Garda Síochána v. Workplace Relations Commission where the European Court of Justice (“ECJ”) held that bodies such as the WRC who are called upon to apply EU law are obliged to adopt all the measures necessary to ensure that EU law is fully effective including “disapplying if need be any national provisions or national case-law that are contrary to EU law”. The Complainant was successful in his plea for effective compensation as the Adjudication Officer did in fact disapply the national compensation cap of €13,000.00 and instead ordered the Respondent to pay the Complainant compensation in the amount of €40,000.00. Takeaway for Employers: This is a highly significant decision by the WRC as it demonstrates a willingness to exercise its power to disapply national law when it conflicts with EU law. On the specific point of compensation caps, suffice to say that employers should be prepared for strong arguments against the imposition of the €13,000.00 compensation cap in access to employment claims going forward. However, employers should also be ready for arguments by employees that potentially go beyond that i.e. arguments that other statutory compensation caps should similarly be set aside in cases where more effective and dissuasive redress is required in accordance with EU law. Link to decision  –ADJ-00042837 Authors – Jane Holian and Laura Killelea 28th February 2026 Anne O’Connell Solicitors 19-22 Lower Baggot Street Dublin 2. www.aocsolicitors.ie

CJEU Rules Employers Are Required To Provide Reasonable Accommodation To Employees Who Are Caregivers Of Their Child With A Disability

Published in the Irish Employment Law Journal 2025, volume 22 Issue 3, pgs 69-71 The Court of Justice of the European Union (the “CJEU”) delivered judgment on 11 September 2025 in the case of G.L. v AB SpA (C-38/24), which concerned a preliminary ruling request from the Supreme Court of Cassation, Italy. The request for preliminary ruling concerned the interpretation of Council Directive 2000/78/EC (the “Directive”) of 27 November 2000, establishing a general framework for equal treatment in employment and occupation. The judgment confirmed that the Directive prohibits both direct and indirect discrimination by association with a person who has a disability and that the obligation to provide reasonable accommodation extends to the caregiver, despite the fact that they do not have a disability themselves. The Facts G.L. was employed by the company AB as a “station operator” where she was responsible for monitoring and supervising an underground station. G.L. was also the caregiver of her severely disabled child, and in that capacity, she requested her employer to assign her, on a stable basis, to a fixed morning shift for her duties. Alternatively, she requested that she be given lower-level duties to enable her to follow a care programme at a fixed time in the afternoon for her minor child, who lived with her, and was severely disabled, whilst continuing to pursue her professional activity on an equal basis with other employees. AB did not grant her request but did provide her with some accommodation on a temporary basis, assigning her a fixed workplace with a preferential schedule as compared to other station operators. G.L. brought an action before the District Court, Rome, Italy, seeking a declaration that her employer’s behaviour towards her was discriminatory. She requested that her employer be ordered to assign her definitively to a shift with fixed hours, between 8:30 and 15:00, or, in any event, one compatible with her child’s needs, to adopt a plan to eliminate the discrimination, and to pay her compensation for damages. G.L. claimed that AB had treated her differently from her colleagues, who, for health reasons, were considered to be temporarily or permanently unfit to perform their work in the normal manner. Whereas those colleagues were temporarily assigned to other tasks pending retraining in different duties, being assigned to a subsidised or “assisted” service with a fixed workplace, she was not given that opportunity since, in her case, the assessment of fitness was made on the basis not of the health status of her child, but on her own health status. G.L. claimed that AB adopted measures of a temporary and nondefinitive nature over an unreasonably long period of time, which was not sufficient. Furthermore, she claimed that AB failed to take any action in respect of her request to be potentially assigned, if necessary, to lower-level duties in order to resolve her difficulties. The District Court dismissed G.L.’s action on the ground that she could not bring the action as she was not the disabled person. The Court of Appeal dismissed her case on its merits, finding that no discriminatory conduct on the part of AB had been established and that, in any event, AB had provided reasonable accommodation. G.L. brought an appeal on a point of law to the Supreme Court of Cassation, claiming that she met the legal requirements for the protection of her right to nondiscrimination on grounds of disability in the workplace. She disputed that AB provided reasonable accommodation, which she was fully entitled to and that the temporary measures granted by AB did not rule out the alleged discrimination. After she brought her appeal, she was dismissed on 10 October 2022. The Supreme Court noted that Italian law at the time of the main proceedings did not provide for general protection against discrimination and harassment in the workplace for caregivers. However, it noted the judgment of the CJEU in Coleman (C-303/06, EU:C:2008:415, 17 July 2008) provided that the family caregiver of a disabled person is entitled to protection against direct discrimination on the ground of disability in the workplace. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court did not know if this should also apply to indirect discrimination. It also noted that the Coleman judgment restricted the provision of reasonable accommodation to those with disabilities. Furthermore, since the Coleman judgment, the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (the “UN Convention”) and the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (the “Charter”) both came into force. Therefore, the Supreme Court decided to stay the proceedings and refer the following questions to the CJEU: “1) Should European Union law be interpreted- where applicable on the basis also of the [UN Convention] – as meaning that a family caregiver of a severely disabled child who claims to have suffered indirect discrimination in an employment context as a result of the care provided by that individual is entitled to rely on the anti-discrimination protection that would be afforded to that disabled person, if they were the worker, by [the Directive]? 2) If the answer to [the first question] is in the affirmative, should European Union law be interpreted – where applicable on the basis also of the [UN Convention] – as meaning that it is incumbent on the employer of the abovementioned caregiver to make reasonable accommodation to guarantee compliance – also in favour of that caregiver – with the principle of equal treatment in relation to other workers, modelled on the provisions laid down in relation to persons with disabilities in Article 5 of [the Directive]? 3) If the answer to [the first and/or second questions] is in the affirmative, should European Union law be interpreted – where applicable also on the basis of the [UN Convention] – as meaning that the relevant caregiver for the purposes of [the Directive], should be understood as any person, whether a member of the family or a de facto cohabiting partner, who cares in a domestic setting, even informally, free of charge, for a significant number of hours, on an exclusive, continuous and long-term basis, for a person who, by reason of their severe disability, is not absolutely self-sufficient in the performance of the daily activities of living, or should European Union law be interpreted as meaning that the definition of the caregiver in question is broader or even narrower than as stated above?” The Decision The CJEU followed the Opinion of Advocate General Rantos. It held that the UN Convention and the Charter are an integral part of the EU legal order and their provisions may be relied upon in order to interpret the provisions of the Directive. Answer to the First Question The CJEU referred to the Coleman judgment in which it was held that direct discrimination by association on the ground of disability is prohibited by the Directive. Where an employer treats an employee who does not himself/herself have a disability less favourably than another employee is, has been or would be treated in a comparable situation, and it is established that the less favourable treatment of that employee is based on the disability of his/her child, whose care is provided primarily by that employee, such treatment is contrary to the prohibition of direct discrimination under the Directive. It stated that an interpretation of the Directive limiting its application only to persons with disabilities is liable to deprive that Directive of an important element of its effectiveness and to reduce the protection which it is intended to guarantee. The CJEU also referred to the decision in CHEZ Razpredelenie Bulgaria (C-83/14, EU:C:2015:480) in respect of Directive 2000/43, which was drafted in similar terms to the Directive but in respect of “race or ethnic origin” rather than “disability”. In that case, all the electricity meters were placed on pylons forming part of the overhead electricity supply network at a height of between six and seven metres in an urban district mainly inhabited by those of Roma origin. Such meters were placed at a height of less than two metres in the other districts. The CJEU held in that case that the principle of equal treatment to which that directive refers applies not to a particular category of person but by reference to the ground in art.1, here being race or ethnic group. Therefore, those who suffered the less favourable treatment on that ground but were not of a Roma origin still benefited from the protection of that directive. Therefore, the court expressly held that indirect discrimination by association fell within the scope of Directive 2000/43. The CJEU referred to the Charter and, in particular, arts 21, 24 and 26. Article 21(1) of the Charter, prohibits “any discrimination” based, inter alia, on disability. Article 24 of the Charter provides that children are to have the right to such protection and care as is necessary for their well-being and that in all actions relating to children, the child’s best interests must be a primary consideration. Article 26 provides that the European Union is to recognise and respect the right of persons with disabilities to benefit from measures designed to ensure their independence, social and occupational integration and participation in the life of the community. Reference was also made to the decision of the European Court of Human Rights in Guberina v. Croatia (22 March 2016 CE:ECHR:2016:0322JUD002368213) which held that discriminatory treatment suffered by a person on account of the disability of his or her child, with whom he or she has close personal links and for whom he or she provides care, is a form of disability-based discrimination covered by art.14 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, without distinction as to whether that discrimination was direct or indirect. The CJEU stated that the UN Convention provides that the concept of “discrimination on the basis of disability” covers “any” distinction, exclusion or restriction on the basis of disability which has the purpose or effect of impairing or nullifying the recognition, enjoyment or exercise, on an equal basis with others, of all human rights and fundamental freedoms and that concept includes “all forms of discrimination” including denial of reasonable accommodation. In light of the above, the CJEU answered the first question in the affirmative stating that the Directive read in light of arts 21, 24 and 26 of the Charter and arts 2, 5 and 7 of the Convention, must be interpreted as meaning that the prohibition of indirect discrimination on grounds of disability applies to an employee who does not himself or herself have a disability but who is subject to such discrimination because of the assistance that that person provides to his or her child who has a disability, which enables that child to receive the primary care required by virtue of his or her condition. Answer to the Second Question Regarding the second question, the CJEU referred to the above-mentioned arts 24 and 26 of the Charter. It also had regard to art.2 of the Convention, which expressly provides that the concept of discrimination on the basis of disability includes all forms of discrimination, “including denial of reasonable accommodation”. In accordance with the fourth paragraph of that article, “reasonable accommodation” means: “necessary and appropriate modification and adjustments not imposing a disproportionate or undue burden, where needed in a particular case, to ensure to persons with disabilities the enjoyment or exercise on an equal basis with others of all human rights and fundamental freedoms.” The court referred to point 53 of the Advocate General’s Opinion in which he stated that “reasonable accommodation”, as defined in art.2, is not restricted to the needs of persons with disabilities in the workplace. Accordingly, that accommodation must, where necessary, also be provided to a worker who provides the assistance which enables that person with a disability to receive the primary care required by virtue of his or her condition. Article 7(1) of the Convention further provides that the States Parties are to take all necessary measures to ensure the full enjoyment by children with disabilities of all human rights and fundamental freedoms on an equal basis with other children. Point (x) of the Preamble to the Convention refers to the need to assist the families of persons with disabilities to enable families themselves to contribute towards the full and equal enjoyment of the rights of persons with disabilities. It follows that the employer must adapt the working conditions of the employee who is providing the assistance for his or her child with a disability. As regards the type of reasonable accommodation that the employer of a caregiver is required to make, the CJEU held that art.5 of the Directive should be read in light of art.2 of the Convention, which prescribes a broad definition of the concept of “reasonable accommodation”. It held that the reduction of working time may constitute one of the measures of accommodation and/or the reassignment to another job may constitute such a measure. However, the CJEU confirmed that this does not oblige an employer to take measures that would impose a disproportionate burden on it. While the CJEU held that it is for the national court to determine whether or not a measure is disproportionate, it stated that account should be taken of the financial costs entailed, the scale and financial resources of the organisation and the possibility of obtaining public funding or any other assistance. In addition, the possibility of assigning a person with a disability to another job is only available where there is at least one vacancy that the worker in question is capable of holding. The answer to the second question is that the Directive, in particular art.5, read in light of arts 24 and 26 of the Charter and art.2 and 7(1) of the Convention must be interpreted as meaning that an employer is required, in order to ensure compliance with the principle of equal treatment of workers and the prohibition of indirect discrimination referred to in the Directive, to make reasonable accommodation, within the meaning of art.5, in respect of an employee who does not himself or herself have a disability but who provides, to his or her child who has a disability, the assistance which enables that child to receive the primary care required by virtue to his or her condition, provided that that accommodation does not impose an unreasonable burden on the employer. Finally, the CJEU ruled that question number three, as asked by the referring court, was inadmissible. The concept of a caregiver is not provided for in the Directive, and the CJEU noted it appears to fall under national law. The CJEU also noted that the referring court did not provide an explanation as to the link between the third question concerning the concept of a “caregiver” and the dispute in the main proceedings. CONCLUSION The Directive was transposed in Ireland by the Employment Equality Acts. While this CJEU decision broadens the protection for caregivers and the concept of discrimination by association, it raises a number of questions. For example, will the sixmonth qualifying period under the Code of Practice for Employers and Employees on the Right to Request Flexible Working be deemed to be discriminatory, as employees with disabilities do not have to wait six months to get flexible working hours as a reasonable accommodation, where necessary and not disproportionate. Also, there does not seem to be a de minimis level of disability for the child or person for whom the employee provides care. Will employers be able to seek medical evidence in respect of the person with the disability? It is also not clear as to the definition of a “caregiver”. Furthermore, the protection of discrimination by association is very broad, only requiring the person to have suffered less favourable treatment due to one of the protected grounds but not requiring the person to come within the definition of such a ground. It will be interesting to see if this decision will result in an increase in claims under the Employment Equality Acts on the ground of discrimination by association, including refusal of remote working applications, and if so, what level of awards will be granted. Anne O’Connell Solicitors 19-22 Lower Baggot Street Dublin 2. www.aocsolicitors.ie

Advocate General Delivers Controversial Opinion Regarding Minimum Wage Directive

Published in the Irish Employment Law Journal 2025, volume 22 Issue 2, pgs 41-42 Advocate General (“AG”) Nicholas Emiliou delivered his opinion on 14 January 2025 in Kingdom of Denmark v European Parliament and Council of the European Union, a recent action concerning Directive (EU) 2022/2041 on adequate minimum wages in the European Union (the “AMW Directive”). The Kingdom of Denmark, supported by the Kingdom of Sweden, asked the Court of Justice of the European Union (the “CJEU”) to annul the AMW Directive, on grounds that the European Parliament and the Council lacked competency to adopt the AMW Directive (C-19/23). Emiliou noted that the European Union (EU) is only allowed to act within the limits of the competences conferred upon it by the Member States and set out in the Treaties, referred to as the “principle of conferral”. The AG considered this principle and the relevant EU legislation in his opinion on the AMW Directive. What is the AMW Directive? The AMW Directive, which was to be transposed into national law in the Member States by 15 November 2024, sets out procedural obligations regarding the adequacy of statutory minimum wages in the EU. This Directive provides that minimum wages are considered adequate if: “they are fair in relation to the wage distribution in the relevant Member State and if they provide a decent standard of living for workers based on a full-time employment relationship”. It was observed that not all workers in the EU are effectively protected by minimum wages and that in particular, this affects women, young workers, low-skilled workers, people with disabilities and migrant workers. Article 5 of the AMW Directive provides that Member States are to be guided by certain criteria in the setting and updating of statutory minimum wages, with the view of achieving a decent standard of living within the EU and reducing in-work poverty. These criteria shall include consideration of the purchasing power of statutory minimum wages, taking into account the cost of living in the Member State and the growth rate of wages. The AMW Directive provides that where more favourable provisions exist in the current national framework, these rights should continue to apply. The AMW Directive states that the Directive is without prejudice to the full respect for the autonomy of the social partners and their right to negotiate collective agreements in the Member State. In addition, Article 4 of the AMW Directive requires Member States to promote collective bargaining on wage-setting. An action plan is required to be established in each Member State where the collective bargaining coverage rate is less than 80 per cent (this includes Ireland). Prior to the current action before the CJEU, the Danish Parliament had already indicated its opposition to the AMW Directive, giving an opinion in December 2020 that, in its view, wage conditions were best regulated at a national level. The Law Article 153 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (“TFEU”) provides that the EU shall support and complement the activities of the Member States in certain fields, such as working conditions, representation and collective defence of the interests of workers and employers. However, subs.5 provides that the “provisions of this Article shall not apply to pay, the right of association, the right to strike or the right to impose lock-outs.” As its principal head of claim, the Kingdom of Denmark submitted to the CJEU that the AMW Directive directly interferes with the exclusions on pay and the right of association. The Opinion The AG noted that several instruments have been adopted over the years on the basis of Article 153 TFEU, for example, the recent Directive (EU) 2019/1152 on transparent and predictable working conditions in the EU. However, the AG observed that the current action does not exist in a vacuum, and instead it is linked to a broader perception of “competence creep” by the EU and specifically the Nordic Member States’ opposition to EU actions which they regard as interfering in their labour law. He also notes that the AMW Directive, from a practical perspective, will not affect the national systems in the countries of Sweden or Denmark to any great extent and that one may regard this action as a mere “principled opposition”. However, ultimately, the AG considered the motivations of these countries as irrelevant to the case before him. The AG described the European Parliament as walking on “thin ice” in their interpretation of the pay exclusion in Article 153(5). They argued that pay refers to the level of wages, not procedures for setting wages. However, in the AG’s view, the term “pay” in Article 153(5) is not limited in this way and is intended to cover all aspects of Member States’ wagesetting systems. It was not accepted by the AG that the AMW Directive only imposes procedural obligations. The AG referred to Article 5, which outlines criteria that Member States shall consider when establishing procedures for setting and updating statutory minimum wages and commented as follows: “I do not see how, for example, the obligation contained in Article 5(2)(c) of that directive that the procedure for the setting and updating of statutory minimum wages is to be guided by the growth rate of wages could mean anything other than that the level (amount) of minimum wages must be based on and reflect that growth rate. What is presented as a procedural obligation is, in fact, a substantive obligation in disguise.” The AG also reviewed other relevant Articles of the AMW Directive and submitted that, as it has as its object the regulation of pay, it directly interfered with the pay exclusion in Article 153(5) of TFEU. In relation to the right of association exclusion, the AG was not convinced by the argument of the Danish and Swedish governments that the right of association equals the right to collective bargaining. He commented that these are separate and distinct rights, one being the right to join organisations to protect economic interests (such as trade unions) and the other being related to a specific mandate of those organisations. It is interesting that the AG’s opinion seemed to take a contradictory approach in utilising a very broad interpretation of pay and a very narrow interpretation of the right to association. The AG found it difficult to conclude that Article 4 of the AMW Directive concerning collective bargaining has as its object the regulation of the right to association. Ultimately, the AG concluded that the European Parliament and the European Council had indeed acted in breach of their jurisdiction by legislating in an area, i.e. pay, specifically excluded from the EU’s competence and proposed that the AMW Directive be annulled. The Irish Perspective The Minister for Enterprise, Trade and Employment in Ireland enacted the European Union (Adequate Minimum Wages) Regulations 2024 (S.I. No. 633 of 2024) in November last year to transpose the AMW Directive. The Minister noted that Ireland’s minimum wage setting framework was already largely in compliance. The changes included the addition of wording requiring the Low Pay Commission (“the Commission”) to consult with representatives of employers and employees prior to making a recommendation in respect of the national minimum hourly rate of pay to the Minister. It also introduced additional criteria the Commission shall have regard to when making the recommendation, in line with Article 5 of the AMW Directive. If the AMW Directive is annulled, S.I. No. 633 of 2024 will likely be repealed. The action plan on the promotion of collective bargaining, as required by Article 4 of the AMW Directive, will no longer be required. The Irish government was actively working on this plan, as a public consultation on how Ireland can increase and promote collective bargaining just recently closed for submissions on 12 May 2025. It has been reported in Irish media that trade union officials are dismayed by the AG’s opinion, as they view the AMW Directive as having the potential to promote collective bargaining in the private sector. It is important to note that even if the AMW Directive is annulled, employers in Ireland will still be required to comply with existing national legislation concerning minimum rates of pay, namely the National Minimum Wage Acts 2000 and 2015. Conclusion The AG’s opinion has been met with some surprise and criticism, considering the significant support for the AMW Directive by other Member States bar Sweden and Denmark and how the AG’s opinion appears contrary to previous case law and other Directives. It is considered uncommon for the CJEU not to follow an AG’s opinion. However, it is very rare for the CJEU to annul an entire Directive. Some commentators have offered their view that it is unlikely the CJEU will annul the entire AMW Directive, and that “conflicts over competence are generally settled on the political stage”. It is also deemed likely that the European Parliament’s more restrictive interpretation of the pay exclusion will be considered within the band of reasonableness in light of existing case law. It remains to be seen how the final CJEU decision will impact future EU directives concerning industrial relations and labour law. The decision of the CJEU is expected in the coming months, so this is one to watch! Anne O’Connell Solicitors 19-22 Lower Baggot Street Dublin 2. www.aocsolicitors.ie

CJEU Annuls Part of the Adequate Minimum Wages Directive

Published in the Irish Employment Law Journal 2025, volume 22 Issue 4, pgs 98-99.  Readers will recall our article in this journal earlier this year¹ on the Opinion of Advocate General Emiliou, in Kingdom of Denmark v European Parliament and Council of the European Union concerning Directive (EU) 2022/2041 on adequate minimum wages in the European Union ("EU") (the "AMW Directive"). On 11 November 2025, the Court of Justice of the European Union ("CJEU") issued its judgment² in which it annuls part of the AMW Directive while confirming the validity of the majority of it. This case was where the Kingdom of Denmark, supported by the Kingdom of Sweden, asked the CJEU to annul the AMW Directive in its entirety, on the grounds that the European Parliament and the Council lacked competency to adopt the AMW Directive. The Law Article 153 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union ("TFEU") provides that the EU shall support and complement the activities of the Member States in certain fields, such as working conditions, representation and collective defence of the interests of workers and employers. However, subs.5 provides that the: "provisions of this Article shall not apply to pay, the right of association, the right to strike or the right to impose lock-outs." As its principal head of claim, the Kingdom of Denmark submitted to the CJEU that the AMW Directive directly interferes with the exclusions on pay and the right of association provided for in subs.5 above. The Advocate General's Opinion The Advocate General ("AG") in his opinion stated that as the AMW Directive has as its object the regulation of pay, it directly breached the pay exclusion in art.153(5) of TFEU. However, in relation to the right of association exclusion, the AG did not agree that the right of association equals the right to collective bargaining. The AG rejected the argument that the AMW Directive has as its object the regulation of the right to association. Ultimately, the AG concluded that the European Parliament and the European Council had indeed acted in breach of their jurisdiction by legislating in the area of pay, specifically excluded from the EU's competence and proposed that the entire AMW Directive be annulled on that point. The Judgment The CJEU did not agree with the AG that the entire Directive should be annulled but alternatively decided to annul only part of the Directive. However, it did agree with the opinion of the AG in that the exclusion of the EU's competence by the TFEU in respect of pay and the right of association does not extend to any sort of link with those areas being provided for in EU provisions. It also stated that the exclusion does not cover any measure which, in practice, would have effects or repercussions on the level of pay. The exclusion applies only to direct interference by EU law in the determination of pay and in the right of association. The CJEU referred to a number of decisions in respect of its decision. In respect of art.4, which provides for measures to promote collective bargaining on wage-setting, the CJEU found that it is merely a means of achieving the main objective of the AMW Directive rather than being a distinct purpose of it. Article 4 does not require Member States to reach the threshold of 80 per cent of collective bargaining coverage, but to establish a "framework" of enabling conditions for collective bargaining and draw up an "action plan" to promote such bargaining with the involvement of the social partners. It found that, as art.4 does not oblige Member States to require a larger number of workers to join trade unions or to declare a collective agreement universally applicable, then it does not amount to direct interference by EU law in the determination of pay or the right of association. However, in respect of art.5, the CJEU found that art.5(2) amounted to direct interference by EU law in the determination of pay within the European Union. It found that art.5(2) requires Member States with statutory minimum wages to ensure the use of the four elements listed in that provision in respect of the setting and updating of the statutory minimum wage. Those four elements are: "the purchasing power of statutory minimum wages, taking into account the cost of living"; "the general level of wages and their distribution"; "the growth rate of wages"; and "long-term national productivity levels and developments". The CJEU also found that the portion of art.5(3) which requires that Member States that use an automatic mechanism for indexation adjustments of wages not to decrease the level of statutory minimum wage amounts to a direct interference by EU law in the determination of pay within the European Union. The remaining provisions of art.5 and arts 6 to 8 were found to provide for measures establishing a framework for the setting of adequate minimum wages with a view to improving living and working conditions in the EU and in relation to the scope of "working conditions" and fall within the competence of the EU. Based on the above, the CJEU annulled art.5(2) and the part of the sentence "provided that the application of that mechanism does not lead to a decrease of the statutory minimum wage" in art.5(3) on the ground that those provisions fall within the exclusions of the EU's competences under art.153(5) TFEU. The annulment of art.5(2) necessitated the annulment of the part of the sentence in the fifth sentence of art.5(1) "including the elements referred to in paragraph 2". As the Kingdom of Denmark was successful in part of its application, it was awarded one-third of its costs, but it had to pay two-thirds of the costs of the European Parliament and the Council of the European Union. Conclusion The social parties are delighted with the decision, as it did not have any impact on the promotion of collective bargaining. This is underway in Ireland with the publication of Ireland's Action Plan to Promote Collective Bargaining 2026-2030 in early November 2025. However, the European Union (Adequate Minimum Wages) Regulations 2024 (S.I. No. 633 of 2024), which was enacted in November 2024, amended the National Minimum Wage Act and included the four elements set out in the annulled art.5(2) of the AMW Directive. Therefore, a change in this legislation may be required as this amendment no longer has a valid legal foundation. Irish Employment Law Journal – Volume 22, No.4, 2025 Anne O’Connell Solicitors 19-22 Lower Baggot Street Dublin 2. www.aocsolicitors.ie

Labour Court Reduces WRC’s Record Award and Clarifies Calculation of Remuneration

The recent Labour Court decision of X Internet Unlimited Company v. Gary Rooney, arises from an appeal of a Workplace Relations Commission (“WRC”) decision, (ADJ -00044246) in which the Complainant was found to be unfairly dismissed and was awarded the sum of €550,131. See our previous article on that decision here. Both parties appealed this decision to the Labour Court on 9 September 2024 in accordance with Section 8A of the Unfair Dismissals Act 1977 – 2015. On appeal, the Labour Court reduced the Complainant’s award to €201,458. Facts: The Complainant was an employee of the Respondent from 23 September 2013 up to when his employment ended in December 2022. Following Elon Musk’s acquisition of the Respondent in October 2022, employees widely received the ‘fork in the road email’. This required them, within 46 hours to opt in to remain in employment under new, unspecified terms, failing to do so, would be confirming their decision to resign. The Complainant did not opt in, citing he had not been provided with sufficient information to make an informed decision. The Respondent treated this as a resignation. The Complainant lodged a complaint with the WRC under the Unfair Dismissals Act seeking compensation based on his full earnings including bonus and Restricted Stock Units (RSUs). The WRC found that he had been unfairly dismissed and awarded him €550,131. Both parties appealed this decision to the Labour Court. The Labour Court had to determine whether, firstly a dismissal took place rather than a resignation, and if so, whether compensation is the appropriate form of redress. It also had to determine what formed part of his remuneration for the purposes of the Unfair Dismissal Act. Decision: The Labour Court found that the Respondent, in setting an arbitrary deadline for a response to the ‘fork in the road’ email did so knowing that employees were being asked to sign up to unknown terms and conditions of their employment. In response to the Respondent’s defence that an FAQ was issued that referenced what would happen if an employee did not tick the box but did not want to resign, no clarification on this was issued within the said arbitrary deadline. Additionally, it was found that there was no justification for limiting the response time to 46/68 hours. The Court emphasised that resignation  is not passive or conveyed by silence and rejected the Respondent’s position that failure to opt in amounted to a voluntary resignation. The Court found that the conduct of the Respondent was not reasonable. The Court found the Complainant to have been unfairly dismissed. The Court having established an unfair dismissal occurred, considered the appropriate measure of compensation for the Complainant. It was agreed that the Complainant’s basic salary including pension contributions and health and dental insurance for 2022 was €151,225. The significant question was whether his bonus and RSU’s should be taken into consideration as part of his remuneration in respect of compensation under the Act. The Complainant did not dispute that no bonuses were paid to any staff in 2022. Accordingly, even if he had remained in employment, he would not have received a bonus. In light of this, the Court determined that any bonus should not form part of the calculation of his remuneration. In respect of the RSUs, they were available to staff at a certain level in the Respondent. To receive the RSU’s, the Complainant had to sign a contract on each occasion he was granted them. The Labour Court referenced a number of clauses from those contracts including the following: Termination: “Participants right to vest in the RSU under the plan, if any, will terminate as effective as of the date that participation is no longer actively employed or providing services and will not be extended by any notice period” Section 10 nature of grant: “the grant of the restricted stock units is voluntary and occasional and does not create any contractual or other right to receive future grants of restricted stock units, or benefits In lieu of restricted stock units” “all decisions with respect to future restricted stock units or other grants, if any, will be at the sole discretion of the company” The Complainant sought to rely on Section 13 of the Act which deems that a provision would be void if it was to exclude or limit the application or was inconsistent with the provision of the Act. The Court having reviewed the documents found that nothing in the agreement seeks to exclude or limit the application of the Act or is inconsistent with it, finding that the provisions did not prevent an employee taking a case under the Unfair Dismissals Act..  In response to the Complainant’s claim that he never sought legal advice before signing up to any of the RSUs, the Court determined that he read and understood a description of the plan which he entered into and benefited on each occasion from it and is bound by the agreement. Therefore, the Court found that the RSUs were to be excluded from the calculation of remuneration for the purpose of compensation under the Act. The Court found that the Complainant did not in any way contribute to his dismissal and was satisfied that the Complainant sufficiently mitigated his loss. The Court awarded the Complainant’s loss of earnings from December 2022 up until he obtained alternative employment in September 2023, amounting to €113,419. It also awarded the monthly difference of €1,777 in the salary of the new job calculated up until July 2025 giving a loss of €47,988. In August 2025 the Complainant received a pay increase, giving a monthly difference of €1,355 over six months until the Labour Court hearing, totalling a loss of €8,010.00. These figures total to an amount of €167,417. The Court took into account the fact it took over 2 years for the Complainant to get a pay increase in his new job and therefore awarded prospective losses for 2 years of €32,041, bringing the total compensation awarded to €201,458. Takeaway for Employers: This case is particularly notable as it represents a significant recalibration of how remuneration is assessed for the purposes of calculating someone’s financial loss in an Unfair Dismissals claim. The Labour Court has emphasised clear contractual wording excluding RSUs from ‘normal remuneration’. The decision suggests contractual drafting in relation to such schemes is decisive so long as there is consideration to the employee and the agreement does not limit the employee’s rights to take a claim in relation to his/her dismissal. Employers operating bonus schemes, share or other incentive plans should review their documentation to ensure they can be relied upon. This decision materially reduces the potential value of claims for senior employees with complex remuneration structures but may form part of negotiations on hiring key employees in the future.   Link: https://workplacerelations.ie/en/cases/2026/april/udd2612.html   Authors- Abigail Ansell and Anne O’Connell   29th April 2026 AOC Solicitors 19-22 Baggot Street Lower Dublin 2   www.aocsolicitors.ie  

WRC Seeks to Clarify Calculation of “Remuneration” under the Unfair Dismissals Acts

In Caroline O’Connell v Lionbridge International Unlimited Company (ADJ-00057077), the Workplace Relations Commission (the “WRC”), awarded the Complainant €142,984 in compensation for unfair dismissal, which figure represented the full value of her financial loss. The Adjudicator, Breffni O’Neill, was satisfied that the Complainant’s financial loss arose entirely from the Respondent’s actions. Facts:- The Complainant commenced employment with the Respondent in June 2000, where she worked up until her employment was terminated, purportedly by reason of redundancy as of 8th November 2024. The Complainant had a long successful career with the Respondent, having been promoted several times during her employment. At the time her employment was terminated, she was working in the role of Managing Director, EMA GLT. The Complainant claimed that her dismissal was unfair, which the Respondent conceded. The WRC decision therefore focused solely on the issue of redress. Decision: The Adjudicator decided that compensation was the appropriate remedy. The Adjudicator went on to calculate the Complainant’s actual “renumeration” in accordance with the Unfair Dismissals Acts. The Complainant earned a base salary of €275,000 at the time of her dismissal. She was also in receipt of an employer pension contribution, health insurance and her mobile phone and plan were paid for by her employer. The Adjudicator found that all these elements constituted “renumeration” for the purposes of the Unfair Dismissals Acts. The Complainant argued that her unvested Restricted Stock Units (“RSUs”) and her annual bonus should also be deemed “renumeration”. Firstly, the Adjudicator considered the bonus point and the company’s Discretionary Management Bonus Plan. The Adjudicator made a distinction between guaranteed or contractual earnings, and payments which remain contingent upon the employer’s discretion. Despite the Complainant having a reasonable expectation to her annual bonus, the bonus was nevertheless discretionary and did not form part of her renumeration. In relation to the RSUs, the Adjudicator found that the Restricted Stock Unit Agreement was with a different corporate entity in the United States and not with the Respondent company that employed the Complainant. This was a “separate corporate arrangement” and therefore the RSUs were not held to constitute part of the Complainant’s renumeration and could not therefore be taken into consideration in calculating her financial loss. The Complainant also argued that expenses relating to private counselling following her loss of employment and pension advice fees should be included as part of the award. This was rejected by the Adjudicator, as such losses cannot be said to constitute “renumeration” that would have been earned under contract but for the dismissal. Considering the above, the Adjudicator found that the basis for the calculation of compensation included the Complainant’s annual salary, the employer pension contribution, the private health cover, and the mobile phone expenses which totalled €290,766 per annum. The Complainant was out of work for just over 25 weeks, resulting in financial loss of €142,984. On 6th May 2025 she commenced working in a new role on a higher salary than her previous role. Therefore, her financial loss ended on that date. The Adjudicator was satisfied that the Complainant’s efforts to mitigate her loss were satisfactory, noting that the Complainant was employed at a very senior level with few comparable roles available. The Complainant produced evidence of engagement with professional contacts and recruiters which established reasonable and proactive efforts to mitigate her loss. Finally, the Adjudicator considered whether the statutory redundancy payment that had been made to the Complainant should be deducted from the compensatory award, as the Respondent argued that it should. The Adjudicator noted that there is conflicting and inconsistent case law on this matter. However, the Adjudicator was satisfied that the legislation provides a clear definition of “financial loss,”, and in his view: “It is only in circumstances where a loss of up to the statutory maximum of 104 weeks has been calculated—creating a real risk of double recovery—that the question of deducting statutory redundancy properly arises.” There was no question of “double recovery” in this case. As the Complainant’s financial loss was only 25.5 weeks, the Adjudicator did not consider it appropriate to make a deduction from the award. He regarded the statutory redundancy payment as a “distinct statutory entitlement” which accrued over the course of the Complainant’s service with the Respondent. As there was no reason to apply a reduction to the award, the Adjudicator directed the Respondent to pay the Complainant €142,984, the Complainant’s total loss, for the unfair dismissal. Takeaway for Employers: This decision highlights the potentially significant financial exposure arising from unfair dismissals, particularly at senior executive level. This decision provides guidance on the calculation of “remuneration” and financial loss under the Unfair Dismissals Acts. Employers should note that benefits such as employer pension contributions and private health insurance may all be treated as remuneration when assessing compensation, increasing the value of any award granted by the WRC. The decision is particularly interesting in respect of the finding that the Complainant’s unvested RSUs did not form part of her remuneration for the purpose of the Unfair Dismissals Acts. The WRC reached a different conclusion in Gary Rooney v X Internet Unlimited Company ADJ -00044246. However, interestingly, although the reasoning is somewhat different, the Labour Court has now overturned that decision and found that Mr Rooney’s unvested RSUs did not form part of his remuneration and should not be taken into consideration in calculating his financial loss in X Internet Unlimited Company and Gary Rooney UDD2612. Please see our article on this decision entitled “Labour Court Reduces WRC’s Record Award and Clarifies Calculation of Remuneration”. Another particularly interesting aspect of the decision was the treatment of the Complainant’s  statutory redundancy payment. The Adjudicator acknowledged the lack of clarity in this area, arising from conflicting decisions on the point. However, in this case he found that redundancy is a distinct statutory entitlement and will not necessarily be deducted from an award of compensation for unfair dismissal. Where an employee’s actual financial loss is less than the statutory cap of 104 weeks’ remuneration, employers cannot assume that redundancy payments will be deducted from an award of compensation. This remains an area to watch. Finally, while this decision demonstrates that a Complainant’s mitigation efforts will be closely examined, it also underlines that even a relatively short period of unemployment can result in a high-value award where the Complainant is a high earner. For employers, the primary protection remains ensuring that redundancies are justified and procedurally fair, rather than relying on an employee’s mitigation or post-termination earnings to limit exposure. Legal advice is recommended.   Link - https://workplacerelations.ie/en/cases/2026/march/adj-00057077.html   Authors:-  Jenny Wakely, Jane Holian   Anne O’Connell Solicitors 19-22 Baggot Street Lower Dublin 2   www.aocsolicitors.ie

Requirements to Mitigate Loss – Recent Decisions from the Labour Court and WRC

The Workplace Relations Commission (“WRC”) and the Labour Court (the “Court”) each recently issued a decision in Conor Gilligan v Derrin Group Management Limited (ADJ-00058189) (WRC decision) and Accountancy & Business College (Ireland) Limited t/a Dublin Business School v Amir Sajad Esmaeily (UD/24/134) (Labour Court decision) which provide useful guidance on a Complainant’s duty to mitigate their financial loss in claims for unfair dismissal and the consequences where they have not appropriately mitigated their loss. Conor Gilligan v Derrin Group Management Limited (ADJ-00058189) Facts: The Complainant commenced employment with the Respondent as CEO in July 2022. The Complainant was dismissed on 8th November 2024 for alleged gross misconduct and brought a claim for unfair dismissal and argued that his dismissal was substantively and procedurally unfair. The Respondent, which dealt with the construction of residential properties, stated that he was not unfairly dismissed and without prejudice to the foregoing, argued that the Complainant had contributed to his dismissal and failed to sufficiently mitigate his loss. The Respondent argued that the Complainant had delayed in looking for work following his dismissal in November 2024 and the 17 applications (3 of which were board appointments) he had made were not sufficient. The Complainant stated that he had received a provisional offer of employment in January 2025, however it fell through. The Complainant also confirmed that he did not limit his applications to CEO applications and that his current role was that of an MD reporting into the CEO at a lower salary. Decision: The WRC Adjudicator, Brid Deering, determined that the Respondent had failed to establish substantial grounds for the dismissal and did not follow fair procedures. The Complainant was also found not to have contributed to his dismissal. The Adjudicator deemed compensation was the appropriate remedy for the Complainant’s unfair dismissal, subject to the statutory cap of 104 weeks’ remuneration. In determining the mitigation of loss of the Complainant, the Adjudicator considered the decision in Sheehan v Continental Administration Company Limited (UD/858/1999) “The Claimant is obligated to seek and secure such measures that will minimise the losses potentially sustainable. In other words the Claimant must reasonably avoid the consequences of the Respondent’s wrongful act of dismissal. Thus, the Tribunal by virtue of section 7 (2) (c) is required to have regard to “.. the measures (if any) adopted by the employee or, as the case may be, his failure to adopt measures, to mitigate the costs aforesaid...”  In considering the element of mitigation under section 7 (2) (c) it is necessary to establish: What steps (if any) the Claimant took to lessen the losses sustained; Were the steps so taken, reasonable, adequate and sufficient; and Ought the Claimant to have taken other steps, not necessarily obvious steps, which a reasonably careful and reasonably prudent employee, would have taken? In assessing the loss the Tribunal is conscious of the fact that the Claimant cannot recover for losses that could have been reduced or off-set by a course of action which the Claimant ought reasonably to have undertaken . . .   the issue is not a question of what the Claimant could have done, but rather what he could reasonably have been expected to do . . . . ” The Adjudicator also noted the decision of the Labour Court in Q-park Ireland Limited v. Fitzpatrick (UDD2135), that it is a well-established principle that a dismissed employee’s time is not their own and they are required to apply part of every normal working day to securing alternative employment. While the Respondent in the case argued that the Complainant failed to mitigate his loss; the Adjudication Officer was satisfied that following his dismissal in November 2024 the Complainant made reasonable and sufficient efforts to secure alternative employment, having regard to his senior executive status and the limited availability of comparable roles. It was noted that the Complainant had registered with a recruitment agency within a month of his dismissal. The Complainant then secured a first interview in January 2025 for the position of CEO. He had a second interview in February 2025, however he was informed in March 2025 that he had not being successful but was thanked for the “significant time and effort [he] invested throughout the interview process”. For the remainder of March 2025, the Complaint interviewed/applied for three further senior positions and registered with Public Jobs. From April to June the Complainant registered with other agencies and platforms and applied for four to six positions each month. Efforts made by the Complainant in September 2025 resulted in him securing a position in October 2025. In calculating financial loss, the Adjudication Officer determined that the Complainant should be compensated in full for his actual loss, with the deduction of the six‑month contractual notice period, which was awarded separately under a Payment of Wages claim. Actual loss was therefore limited to 23 weeks’ net pay from May 2025 to September 2025, amounting to €51,169.94. The Complainant was also paid €715.50 less weekly in his new position than his previous position with the Respondent. Although ongoing prospective loss was accepted, the Adjudicator did not accept that it should be until retirement age. The Adjudicator noted the Complainant’s age, seniority of position, likelihood of future pay increases, likelihood of other opportunities to mitigate his loss prior to retirement and awarded two years’ prospective loss as just and equitable, in the amount of €74,412. The total compensation awarded for the unfair dismissal was €125,581.94. Accountancy & Business College (Ireland) Limited t/a Dublin Business School v Amir Sajad Esmaeily (UD/24/134) Facts: This case was an appeal by Mr Amir Sajad Esmaeily (the “Complainant”) from a decision of the WRC in relation to the quantum of the award from his unfair dismissal claim. The Complainant was awarded €53,000 in compensation in the WRC. The Complainant had been employed as a lecturer by the Respondent from 2018 until his employment was terminated on 3 February 2023 for breach of company policies. The Complainant argued that the compensation awarded was inadequate and “did not reflect the impact and duration of his losses”, as his annual income had consistently exceeded €91,000. The Complainant submitted that he had applied for more than 65 roles prior to the WRC hearing and a further 51 roles prior to the Labour Court hearing in February 2026, in both academic and corporate sectors. The Complainant obtained two part-time lecturing positions and earned approximately €52,000 in the two years from his dismissal, far lower than the €185,00 he would have earned had he still been employed by the Respondent. The Complainant submitted that in total he had made 114 applications, yet the WRC award was considerably lower than that awarded in comparable cases where few applications were made to demonstrate sufficient efforts to mitigate loss. The Respondent had accepted that fair procedures were not followed in terminating the Complainant’s employment and conceded that the dismissal was unfair. On that basis, the Complainant contended that a just and equitable award should be in the range of €150,000. The Respondent submitted that the Complainant failed to mitigate his losses in an adequate manner, stating that it appeared he had only applied for 36 positions from February 2023 to August 2024, and none outside his area of expertise Artificial Intelligence /data analyst and very few positions outside academia. The Respondent also noted that there was several months where no applications were made and in 2024 there was only evidence of 5 applications. The Respondent argued that this fell short of the test established in Sheehan and Continental Administration Company Limited UD 858/1999 The Respondent also noted the decision in Murphy v Independent News & Media UD841/2013, which found that the claimant limited her search for alternative work to her area of expertise only and her award of compensation was reduced as a result. Decision: The Court noted from the decision in Sheehan what was required to be established when considering mitigation and “the issue is not a question of what the Claimant could have done, but rather what he could reasonably have been expected to do”. It is then for the Respondent to show that the Complainant did not act reasonably in all the circumstances to minimise his loss. In considering whether the Complainant could have done more to offset his loss, the Court accepted that the Complainant gave credible evidence of his job applications in 2023 and 2024. The Court also accepted that it was reasonable to focus his initial job search efforts to his academic areas of expertise and noted that when this proved unsuccessful the Complainant expanded his applications outside of academia. The Court was of the view that having regard to all the circumstances, the Complainant had made reasonable efforts to mitigate his loss. However, the Court was “not fully satisfied that the efforts made were sufficient and adequate in nature to mitigate fully against all losses incurred”. The Court noted the limited evidence provided to mitigate his loss since 2024 and several months where no applications were made. The maximum award payable was €182,266 (two year’s remuneration), with the adjustment of the earnings the Complainant received for his part-time lecturing positions of €52,000. The Court considered both the mitigating and aggravating factors and determined the appropriate amount of compensation was €104,000 being just and equitable having regard to all the circumstances. Takeaway for Employers: These recent decisions from the WRC and Labour Court underline that mitigation of loss remains a significant factor in the assessment of compensation for unfair dismissal. However, it is not the only factor and the discretion provided by the wording just and equitable in all the circumstances was exercised by the Labour Court in their findings in the case above. While an employee is expected to take reasonable steps to secure alternative employment, the adequacy of those efforts will be assessed in light of their individual circumstances, including seniority, expertise and the availability of comparable roles. For employers, the key point is that any argument on failure to mitigate should be supported by clear documentary evidence, including gaps in job-search activity, limited applications, or a failure to broaden the search over time. However, these decisions also demonstrate that even where mitigation efforts are found to be less than fully sufficient, substantial awards may still be made. Accordingly, fair procedures and substantive justification for dismissal remain an employer’s primary protection, with mitigation arguments operating mainly to reduce, rather than eliminate an award of compensation. Links to Decisions: Labour Court Decision - Accountancy & Business College (Ireland) Limited t/a Dublin Business School v Amir Sajad Esmaeily (UD/24/134) WRC Decision - Conor Gilligan v Derrin Group Management Limited (ADJ-00058189)   Authors- Ethna Dillon and Anne O’Connell 24th April 2026 AOC Solicitors 19-22 Baggot Street Lower Dublin 2 www.aocsolicitors.ie

WRC finds Discrimination where “Neutral” Policy Failed to Accommodate Disability

In Kim Murphy v Ryan’s Investments Unlimited Company t/a Hertz Rent A Car, the Complainant brought a claim to the Workplace Relations (“WRC”) under the Equal Status Act 2000 after she was charged with a €150 ‘valet fee’ due to having her guide dog in the car. The WRC Adjudicator, Gaye Cunningham, found in favour of the Complainant on the basis that the apparent ‘neutral’ provision put the Complainant at a particular disadvantage compared with other persons. Facts: The Complainant Kim Murphy is a registered blind person that relies on her guide dog as her sole mobility aid. The Respondent is a car hire business. The Complainant’s husband entered into a contract with the Respondent and rented a vehicle from the Respondent. Ms Murphy travelled in the vehicle with her guide dog which primarily sat on a towel in the footwell. Upon returning the vehicle on 8 April 2024, the Respondent noted the vehicle was found to be excessively dirty with dog hair, the floor mats wet and a strong odour inside of the vehicle. The Respondent subsequently imposed a €150 valet charge, which the Respondent stated was required as the car had to be sent for extensive cleaning outside their standard preparation procedures. The Complainant’s husband informed the Respondent that the charge was related to the Complainant’s guide dog therefore it was inappropriate to charge them. The Complainant sought a refund of the charge and on 10 April 2024 lodged a complaint with the Respondent. The Respondent wrote back to the Complainant informing her that it could not discuss the matter further with her due to data protection concerns as she was not the main driver of the vehicle. That same day the Respondent wrote to the Complainant’s husband to state that the fee was justified due to the vehicle requiring to be sent for extensive cleaning and was subsequently removed from the fleet whilst this was performed. The Complainant filed a Form ES1 in accordance with the Equal Status Acts 2000 – 2018 alleging that the Respondent unlawfully discriminated her on the grounds of her disability. The Respondent filled out Form ES2 which denied same. The Respondent stated that the fee was justified pursuant to their Terms and Conditions stating, “a rectification charge where the vehicle is returned with the interior in an excessively dirty condition” and not because there was a guide dog in the car. The Respondent further stated the “charge is applied regardless of whomever rents the vehicle.” On 30 September 2024 the Complainant lodged a complaint with the Workplace Relations Commission under the Equal Status Act 2000 alleging discrimination on the ground of disability. Decision: The WRC Adjudicator’s  decision was based on the consideration of the Respondent’s neutral policy setting out the rectification charge applied universally to any customer who returned the car in an unacceptable condition which gave rise to the question -  ‘has the Complainant been discriminated against in circumstances where a person with a disability or different disability would be subjected to the same treatment?’ In relation to the question as to whether the Respondent provided the Complainant with a service in the circumstance where her husband entered the contract with the Respondent, the Complainant’s submissions referenced the analogy where a family eats at a restaurant with one member making the booking and paying the bill, the other family members eating there are unquestionably in receipt of the service. The Adjudicator made reference to Section 3(1)( c ) of the Act: ‘Where an apparently neutral provision would put a person referred to in any paragraph of scion 3(2) at a particular disadvantage compared with other persons, i.e those persons not suffering a disability requiring the assistance of a guide dog.’ The Adjudicator found that the ‘apparently neutral provision ‘did in fact put the Complainant at a particular disadvantage compared with other persons i.e those not suffering a disability requiring the assistance of a guide dog. The WRC Adjudicator found the determination of the Respondent to stand by their decision to impose a charge that was not reasonable and demonstrated their failure to do all that was reasonable to accommodate the needs of the person with a disability under Section 4(2) of the Act. Taking into account the Von Colson principles that sanctions must be effective, proportionate and dissuasive, the WRC Adjudicator awarded €10,000 as compensation to the Complainant for the effects of the discrimination suffered. She also ordered that the Respondent offer an apology to the Complainant and to update its policies and procedures to make specific provisions for people with disabilities, including blind customer who require the carriage of a guide dog. Takeaway for Employers: This decision serves as an important reminder to employers and service providers that neutral or blanket clauses that ‘apply to everyone’ can still amount to discrimination if their impact may fall more harshly on people with disabilities. The same principles apply under the Employment Equality Act for employees. Employers should ensure their contractual clauses are being reviewed through an equality lens. A Clause that is lawful in general may require certain exceptions to comply with disability discrimination law. Employers must consider making specific provisions for persons with disabilities. Where a disability is brought to the attention of employers or service providers, they must pause and consider whether an exception or modification is needed in order to be compliant with the Equal Status Acts/ Employment Equality Acts. Employers and service providers relying on rigid policies without considering reasonable accommodations are opening themselves up to potential liability. Link: https://www.workplacerelations.ie/en/cases/2026/january/adj-00054235.html Authors- Abigail Ansell and Anne O’Connell  31st January 2026 AOC Solicitors 19-22 Baggot Street Lower Dublin 2 www.aocsolicitors.ie

New WRC Code of Practice on Part-Time Workers

In January 2026, a new Code of Practice on Access to Part-Time working (“the Code”) was introduced by the Workplace Relations Commission (“WRC”). The new Code aims to provide practical guidance for employers and employees in agreeing part-time working arrangements, reflecting the importance of flexible and inclusive work environments. The Code is underpinned by the Protection of Employees (Part‑Time Work) Act 2001   which prohibits employers from treating part‑time employees less favourably than comparable full‑time employees, unless there are objective grounds for doing so. Key Features of the Code and Best Practice Recommendations Review and Development of Company Policies and Practices   Employers should review their training, performance management and career development policies to ensure that part‑time employees are not disadvantaged and that no direct or indirect barriers impede their progression. The Code encourages employers to proactively identify part‑time working opportunities across all levels. Recruitment When recruiting new employees, employers should consider the content, status, and responsibilities of each new position and whether those roles could be offered on a part-time basis. Requests for Part-time Working The Code advises as best practice that a request for a transfer from full-time working to part-time working and vice versa, or an increase in working hours, should be considered where possible by employers. The Code does however acknowledge that a change to existing working hours is a matter to be agreed between the employee and employer rather than a statutory right. The Code recommends that employers consider establishing a procedure to include the following aspects: - The Application: The employee applicant should set out the reasons for the request and whether it is temporary or permanent. A reasonable timeframe should be given to consider the application. - Relevant Consultation and Discussion: Both the employer and employee should consider all factors relevant to the organisation and personal to the employee which may include, inter alia: personal and family needs of the applicant; the business and operational needs required to meet part-time cover; the urgency of the request; how the proposed revised hours will fit with the employee’s tasks and procedures for reviewing the arrangement. - Decision and Response: A decision should be issued in a timely manner. If the application is successful, the details of the arrangement can be discussed with the employee, and an agreement may be drawn up, to be signed by the parties with any changes to the terms and conditions of employment. If the application is unsuccessful, the grounds for the refusal should be clearly outlined. - Managing the Outcome: If a mutually satisfactory solution is not reached then recourse to an appeal mechanism should be provided. An employer may refuse a request for part-time working if it would have an adverse effect on the operation of the business. The new Code also highlights Section 16 of Employment (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 2018 which provides a statutory right to banded hours of work, where the contracted hours of an employee do not reflect the actual hours worked by the employee under Section 18A of the Organisation of Working Time Act 1997. Training The Code recommends that when considering the time, location and structure of training, the needs of part-time employees should be taken into account where possible. Career Opportunities As best practice the Code recommends that organisations review their training, performance appraisal, and career development policies to ensure that there are no career development barriers, direct or indirect, to the progression of part-time workers in the organisation. Information to Employees and Representative Bodies The Code recommends that employers should regularly review how employees are provided with information on the availability of both part-time and full-time posts. Organisations who have representative bodies in place e.g. staff forums, work council or collective bargaining arrangements should ensure that they are kept informed in relation to their policies and the use of part-time working. Protection from Penalisation The Code provides that employees cannot be penalised for exercising their rights under the Act or for refusing a request from their employer to transfer from full-time work to part-time work or vice versa. Following a successful complaint of penalisation before the WRC, an employee may be entitled to compensation of up to a maximum of 2 years’ remuneration. Take Away for Employers While the Code does not create new legal rights or impose mandatory obligations on employers, it does provide a clear framework for best practice where flexible working has become a significant consideration in a working relationship. The Code is also admissible in evidence in any proceedings before the WRC, the Labour Court or the Civil Courts, and while employers retain the right to refuse requests where legitimate business needs would be adversely affected, the Code does emphasise the importance of consultation, timely decision-making and transparent reasoning to part-time working requests. Links: WRC Code of Practice on Access to Part-Time Work Authors –Ethna Dillon and Jenny Wakely 23 February 2026 Anne O’Connell Solicitors 19-22 Lower Baggot Street Dublin 2. www.aocsolicitors.ie

Labour Court Finds Employer Not Required to Pay SSP Where Employee Did Not Qualify for Company Sick Pay

SK Biotek Ireland Ltd v Shannon Reina (SLD262) is a recent decision by the Labour Court in respect of an appeal of a Workplace Relations Commission (“WRC”) decision concerning statutory sick pay. The Complainant lodged the original claim under the Sick Leave Act 2022 (the “Act”) in circumstances where she did not receive sick pay under her employer’s sick pay scheme due to a failure to follow their absence management policy, and she did not receive statutory sick pay either. The WRC Adjudicator upheld the Complainant’s claim and awarded her compensation of €500, but on appeal the Labour Court overturned this decision. Facts: The Complainant was employed by the Respondent as a Quality Control Analyst from 14th August 2023 until her resignation with effect from 12th July 2024. The Complainant had a number of certified sickness-related absences during her employment with the Respondent and had previously received a verbal warning for breach of the Respondent’s absence management policy. As the Complainant submitted her complaint to the WRC on 14th July 2024, only one period of sick leave, that between 13th and 17th May 2024 was within the cognisable period for the purpose of her WRC claim. The Respondent operates a sick pay scheme for employees that includes an initial qualifying period of six months’ service. This was outlined in the Complainant’s contract of employment. Following the qualifying period, the scheme provides for payment of basic salary during sick leave up to a maximum of four weeks during any 12 consecutive months, provided that the employee complies with the rules of the sick pay scheme. Thereafter it provides that employees may be eligible to receive 50% pay for a further 4 weeks, subject to terms and conditions. The Complainant was regarded as being ineligible to benefit under the Respondent’s sick pay scheme because she had been found to be in breach of its absence management policy. The Respondent’s position was that it was not subject to the statutory sick pay scheme provided for under the Act because its sick pay scheme confers benefits on employees which, as a whole, are more favourable than statutory sick pay. The Respondent’s legal representative, Des Ryan BL, provided a detailed comparison between the Respondent’s sick pay scheme and the statutory scheme. It was submitted on behalf of the Respondent that under section 9 of the Act, an employer’s sick pay scheme may be regarded as more favourable as a whole than statutory sick pay notwithstanding that it may be subject to certain conditions or eligibility criteria. The Complainant told the Court that she agreed that the Respondent’s sick pay scheme was more favourable than statutory sick pay. Furthermore, she did not dispute the Respondent’s position that she did not meet the eligibility criteria of the Respondent’s scheme in May 2024 due to the extent of her absences from the workplace. However, the Complainant argued that in circumstances where she became disentitled to benefit from the Respondent’s sick pay scheme, the Respondent was obliged to apply the statutory scheme to her. Decision:  The Labour Court did not agree with the Complainant’s contention and found that it was not consistent with the proper interpretation of the Act. The Labour Court found that the words used in section 9(1) of the Act are clear and unambiguous: “The obligations under this Act shall not apply to an employer who provides his or her employees a sick leave scheme where the terms of the scheme confer, over the course of a reference period set out in the scheme, benefits that are, as a whole, more favourable to the employee than statutory sick leave.” [our emphasis]. The Court overturned the WRC Adjudicator’s decision and held that as the Respondent’s sick leave scheme fell squarely within section 9, which exempts the Respondent from the obligation to pay statutory sick pay, the Respondent was not obliged to pay the Complainant sick pay. The Court commented “The section admits of no exceptions to this exemption and does not confer any discretion on this Court to imply any such exception into it.” Takeaway for Employers: This decision makes it clear that employers are permitted to apply conditions to their sick pay scheme, and that where an employee does not qualify for company sick pay, employers are not required to pay statutory sick pay if the company scheme is exempt under section 9 of the Act. While the decision may be regarded as harsh, and indeed the Adjudicator in the original WRC decision regarded the Respondent’s actions as being “somewhat harsh” (in circumstances where the Complainant’s absences through illness were certified and genuine), the decision is in line with the provisions of the Act. The Act makes it clear that contractual sick pay and statutory sick pay don’t run in parallel. It is one or the other. To quote the decision of the Court in relation to section 9, “The section admits of no exceptions to this exemption and does not confer any discretion on this Court to imply any such exception into it.” Since the introduction of statutory sick pay there have been several notable decisions, including Ann Britton v. Amcor Flexibles Ltd as discussed in our most recent newsletter. Employers who have company sick pay schemes should give these schemes careful consideration and seek legal advice to ensure they are not in breach of their obligations under the Act. Links- Labour Court: https://www.workplacerelations.ie/en/cases/2026/february/sld262.html WRC: https://www.workplacerelations.ie/en/cases/2025/march/adj-00052845.html Authors – Tara Kelly and Jenny Wakely 27th February 2026 Anne O’Connell Solicitors 19-22 Lower Baggot Street Dublin 2. www.aocsolicitors.ie

Failure to Provide Reasonable Accommodation Results in €28,000 Award in WRC

The Workplace Relations Commission (“WRC”) recently awarded €28,000 in  Lukasz Swiercz v Lidl Ireland GmbH (ADJ-00059764) as compensation to an employee who was found to have been discriminated against on the grounds of disability, arising from a failure by his employer to provide reasonable accommodation. The employee brought the claim under the Employment Equality Acts 1998 - 2015 (the “Acts”). Facts: The Complainant, a Warehouse Operative, had been employed by the Respondent since October 2013. In early 2025, he was diagnosed with a hernia and subsequently obtained a medical certificate. On or around 10th March 2025, the Complainant submitted a medical certificate confirming that he was fit to return to work, subject to “light duties only, no heavy lifting”. Despite providing this medical certification, the Respondent did not permit the Complainant to return to work. The Complainant told the WRC that the Respondent effectively required him to be “fully fit” before resuming duties. Over a period of several months, the Complainant repeatedly sought to return to work and requested referral to Occupational Health. However, there was a delay of approximately four to six months before the Respondent arranged an Occupational Health assessment. During this time, the Complainant was not in receipt of any income or social welfare, as he had been certified fit to attend work. The Complainant contended that there were a number of roles or modified duties available within the warehouse which would not involve heavy lifting. It was the Respondent’s evidence that no reasonable accommodation could be implemented for the Complainant. The Respondent denied that any suitable “light duties” existed and maintained that the role of Warehouse Operative was inherently physical in nature. Decision:  The Adjudicator, Elizabeth Spelman, noted that it was accepted that the Complainant had a disability within the meaning of the Acts and therefore enjoyed the protections of the Acts. The central issue for determination was therefore whether the Respondent had discharged its obligation to provide reasonable accommodation. The Adjudicator was critical of the Respondent’s approach, noting in particular that no evidence of a meaningful assessment of possible accommodations had been put before her e.g. risk evaluations or relevant correspondence. The Respondent’s interpretation of the Complainant’s medical certificate, that “light duties” meant the Complainant could only carry out a desk job, was rejected by the Adjudicator. The Adjudicator also noted the significant delay in referring the Complainant to Occupational Health for approximately four to six months and noted that the Respondent seemed to rely on a broad approach that lighter duties were not facilitated. The Logistics Manager, who gave evidence, stated that “the position is that we do not facilitate lighter duties”. In addition, the Adjudicator noted with concern that the Respondent sent a letter to the Complainant in April 2025 outlining its issues regarding the Complainant’s absence from work and what they regarded as a failure to follow the absence process (by failing to provide sick certificates) and threatening disciplinary action notwithstanding that the Complainant had provided a medical certificate stating that he was fit to return to work. The Adjudicator concluded that the Respondent had failed to properly consider or implement reasonable accommodation and that this failure amounted to discrimination on the grounds of disability. The Adjudicator found that the Respondent had failed to demonstrate how the accommodation sought would be unduly burdensome and noted the scale of the Respondent’s business. The Adjudicator awarded the Complainant €28,000, approximately one year’s salary. This took into account the Complainant’s financial loss of six months’ pay and, in particular, the Respondent’s conduct as follows: failure to engage in any meaningful way regarding Occupational Health until the Complainant instructed a solicitor unexplained delay in organising the Occupational Health appointment letter sent in April 2025 indicating that the Complainant may be subject to disciplinary action failure to assess comprehensively what reasonable accommodation could be implemented broad-brush position in refusing reasonable accommodations to Warehouse Operatives. Takeaway for Employers: This case provides a useful reminder of the importance of meaningful engagement with employees seeking to return to work following illness or injury. It also highlights the obligation on employers to  properly assess requests for reasonable accommodation on a case-by-case basis and to seek appropriate guidance from Occupational Health at an early stage. Employers should avoid adopting a blanket approach/policy and engage in a timely and meaningful manner with employees with a disability. They should also document their assessment of any requests for reasonable accommodation, and any assessments carried out in consideration of such requests. Link- https://workplacerelations.ie/en/cases/2026/april/adj-00059764.html Authors – Tara Kelly and Jenny Wakely   29th May 2026 Anne O’Connell Solicitors 19-22 Lower Baggot Street Dublin 2. www.aocsolicitors.ie

WRC Publishes Annual Report for 2025

The Workplace Relations Commission (the "WRC") has recently published its Annual Report for 2025. The report provides a useful overview of complaint trends, adjudication activity, mediation outcomes, inspection and enforcement work, and wider strategic developments across the employment law landscape. Set out below is a summary of some of the key points from the Report. Complaints and Adjudication Hearings Complaint levels remained high in 2025. The WRC received 10,559 complaint applications representing 19,068 individual complaints, averaging approximately two specific complaints per application. As in previous years, the Unfair Dismissals Act, Payment of Wages Act, Organisation of Working Time Act and Employment Equality Act featured prominently among the redress legislation most commonly relied upon by complainants. Equality related complaints were particularly notable, with referrals under the Employment Equality legislation increasing by 30%. and referrals under the Equal Status Act increasing by 15%. Disability, gender and race remained the most frequently cited discriminatory grounds in employment equality complaints. The report also points to growing pressure on adjudication services. 8,690 adjudication files were created during the year, representing a 30% increase on 2024. At the same time, 7,727 hearings were scheduled and 4,289 hearings were held, both down on the previous year. The WRC issued 2,506 decisions and recommendations in 2025, with a median period of 39 working days from hearing to decision. However, the median waiting time from receipt of complaint to first hearing rose from 133 days in January 2025 to 174 days by December 2025, suggesting continued capacity pressure within the system. While remote and hybrid hearings remain available to complainants, the majority of hearings were in person, with an average split of 60% in person hearings and 40% hybrid or remote hearings. Appeals The report also contains useful information on appeals. The WRC was notified of 300 Labour Court decisions relating to appeals from WRC decisions and recommendations in 2025. Of these, 68% were upheld, 17% were varied and 15% were overturned. Mediation Mediation continued to play an important role in early dispute resolution. Pre-adjudication mediation exceeded 1,000 cases for the first time, with 1,034 mediations taking place in 2025. The overall resolution rate was 54%, while telephone mediation achieved a particularly strong 69% resolution rate. The report also notes that a further 515 cases were withdrawn following engagement with the mediation service before adjudication, meaning that a significant number of disputes concluded without the need for a hearing. Inspections and Enforcements Inspection and enforcement activity remained substantial. The WRC closed 5,145 inspection cases in 2025, involving 5,596 workplace inspection visits. Contraventions of employment law were identified in 1,775 cases, and €1,578,924 in unpaid wages was recovered. The WRC also conducted 223 prosecutions, 183 of which resulted in successful outcomes, giving an 82% success rate. This represented an increase of 27.5% in the number of prosecutions brought by the WRC. AI and Other Developments The report is notable for the WRC's increasing focus on AI and digital capability. In 2025, the Legal Division published guidance on the use of AI before the WRC in response to a growing trend of parties using AI to draft submissions. The report emphasises the importance of human oversight and the need to ensure that submissions remain accurate and relevant. The WRC also commenced work on an internal AI-powered chatbot trained on WRC documentation. In addition, the WRC published a ten-year anniversary case report highlighting 50 employment and equality cases. The report is also significant in that it reflects the WRC's tenth anniversary year and the publication of its Strategy Statement 2025 to 2027, titled "A Decade of Impact - A Future of Fair Work and Equality". The WRC also established its new Knowledge, Information and Advisory Division in 2025, reinforcing a broader strategic emphasis on dispute prevention, accessibility, training and early intervention. Take Away for Employers Overall, the 2025 Annual Report reflects a year of increased complaint volumes, continued growth in mediation, significant inspection and enforcement activity, and a clear strategic focus on digitalisation, AI and dispute prevention. For employers and practitioners alike, the report provides a useful indication of the areas most likely to generate disputes and the operational pressures currently affecting the WRC.   Links: annual-report-2025.pdf   Authors –Ethna Dillon and Laura Killela 28 May 2026 Anne O’Connell Solicitors 19-22 Lower Baggot Street Dublin 2. www.aocsolicitors.ie

Commencement of the Employment (Contractual Retirement Ages) Act 2025

The Employment (Contractual Retirement Ages) Act 2025 (Commencement) Order 2026 has now been published. After a period of delay pending a review of the existing Code of Practice on Longer Working, the Order confirms that the Employment (Contractual Retirement Ages) Act 2025 (“the Act”) will come into operation on 29th June 2026. The Act adopts a consent-based approach to retirement in circumstances where an employee’s contractual retirement age is lower than the State pension age (currently aged 66). This gives employees a statutory mechanism to seek to remain in employment beyond their contractual retirement age. Where an employee does not consent to retire at the applicable Contractual Retirement Age, they may notify their employer in writing of their intention to continue working. This notification must be provided: no less than 3 months and no more than 12 months before the contractual retirement date; or where the employer’s notification period is greater than 3 months, not less than the period specified or 6 months (whichever is shorter). A key feature of the legislation is the obligation on the employer to engage with such requests. Where an employer receives a notification: they should not enforce the contractual retirement age unless doing so can be objectively and reasonably justified by a legitimate aim, and the means of achieving that aim are appropriate and necessary; and where the employer intends to enforce the contractual retirement age, they must provide a reasoned written response within one month of receipt of the notification. Failure to do so, without reasonable cause, may be a criminal offence. On summary conviction, this may result in a fine of up to €5,000 and/or imprisonment for up to 12 months. Liability may attach not only to the employer entity itself, but also to directors, managers and other officers, where it can be shown that the offence was committed with their consent or connivance.  An employee can also refer a complaint to the WRC for an employer’s failure to meet its obligations under the Act. In the case of well-founded claims, the WRC can order compensation up to 104 weeks remuneration or €40,000, whichever is greater. In parallel with the Act, a revised Code of Practice on Longer Working will also come into effect on 29th June 2026. The Code is intended to guide employers and employees in engaging constructively in advance of retirement, including where employees wish to continue working beyond a contractual retirement age or beyond age 66. The Code draws an important distinction in how the objective justification test is applied. Takeaway for Employers: This legislation represents a material shift in the operation of contractual retirement ages and increases the level of scrutiny on employer decision-making in this area. Employers should: Review contracts and policies to ensure that retirement provisions are consistent with the new regime; Ensure that there is a clear internal process for handling requests to work beyond a contractual retirement age; Prepare to give reasoned and documented responses to requests, supported by objective justification where retirement is being enforced; and Be mindful of the potential for criminal liability arising from a failure to engage appropriately with employee requests. Given the legal and practical complexities, and the potential exposure arising from non-compliance, employers should seek legal advice at an early stage when dealing with requests to extend employment beyond a contractual retirement age. Links:   Employment (Contractual Retirement Ages) Act 2025 Code of Practice on Longer Working 29th May 2026 Authors- Jane Holian and Ethna Dillon
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