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Switzerland's New Efforts to Prevent the Abuse of Bankruptcy Proceedings

On 1 January 2025 new regulations entered into force in Switzerland to prevent the abuse of bankruptcy proceedings by certain persons to circumvent financial obligations to the detriment of their creditors and the Swiss social security insurance. Objective of the new regulations The main objective of the new regulations is to address situations in which certain persons are using bankruptcy proceedings in order to obtain an unfair advantage over their competitors and avoid their financial obligations. The typical scheme that the new regulations try to weed out is that a person controlling a company is allowing on purpose such company to go bankrupt, only to incorporate immediately thereafter a new company, which is then hiring most of the old company's workforce and acquiring – typically at a low price – assets from the bankrupt company. Such scheme not only causes significant damage to the bankrupt company's creditors, but also to the Swiss social security insurance system, as the Swiss state unemployment insurance will have to partially pay the unpaid salaries of the employees of the bankrupt company, and, in addition, distorts competition. Furthermore, the new regulations also seek to restrain the sale of factually liquidated and overindebted companies, which are used by the new owners for incurring additional debt until bankruptcy proceedings are opened with respect to such companies. To tackle such abuse, the new regulations consist of the following five main measures: Improvement of the criminal prohibition to carry out professional activities; Introduction of the possibility to search for individuals in the Swiss Central Business Name Index; Enforcement of public law claims by way of bankruptcy proceedings; Abolition of the retroactive opting-out; Nullity of sale of shell companies. Criminal prohibition to carry out professional activities Already before the new regulations were implemented, the Swiss criminal code provided the criminal courts with the possibility to prohibit a person from carrying out a specific professional activity for a certain period, if such person committed a criminal offence (e.g., mismanagement or fraudulent bankruptcy) while carrying out such professional activity, and if there was a danger of repetition by such person. So far, such prohibition mainly applied to activities performed by such person independently or for a company as a member of a corporate body (i.e., as board member). The new regulations now extend the possibility for such prohibition, enabling the court to prohibit such person also from acting for a company in any function which requires registration with the commercial register. For as long as such a prohibition is in place, the affected person cannot carry out an activity for a company as an officer, as manager of a branch office, or having signing authority inscribed in the commercial register. In addition, the enforcement of such prohibitions, which have been imposed by the criminal courts, has been enhanced by the introduction of a new obligation of the Federal Registry of Commerce to verify and to report detected violations of such prohibitions. Finally, a new duty of the bankruptcy officials to report any criminal offences, of which they become aware, has also been introduced, the aim being to increase the prosecution of fraudulent bankruptcies and thus the number of persons eventually sanctioned with a prohibition to carry out such activities. Possibility to search for individuals Another measure, which will be newly introduced by the new regulations, is the possibility to search for individuals online: The Swiss Central Business Name Index, which is available online, will provide for a new possibility to search for individuals and thereby obtain information on all such individuals' current and past positions in companies which have been registered with a commercial register in Switzerland. On the one hand, this new search possibility – and the possibility to thereby detect behavioral patterns relating to the involvement in bankruptcies – should have a deterrent effect. In addition, the new search possibility will also allow criminal authorities to have more information in order to decide whether to impose a prohibition to carry out a commercial activity. Enforcement of public law claims by way of bankruptcy proceedings As a general rule, if a company does not pay a due liability, ultimately, bankruptcy is opened. As an exception to such rule, so far, claims against companies based on public law, such as tax claims or claims for social security contributions, could only be enforced by the respective public creditor (e.g., by the tax authority or the respective social security institution) by way of seizure of such a company's assets. Such "public creditors" did not have the right to request the opening of bankruptcy proceedings over companies if such companies did not pay their liabilities. The reason for such exception was twofold: On the one hand, this rule was established in favor of the debtors: a debtor should not have to expect bankruptcy proceedings to be initiated against it because of every (perhaps minor) tax or other public law liability. On the other hand, this rule was also designed to facilitate the enforcement of such public law claims: Not only did the public creditors not have to compete with private creditors in the context of bankruptcy proceedings, but in addition, and unlike in bankruptcy proceedings, the enforcement by way of seizure can be requested by a creditor without any advance payment of costs. In practice, however, this rule often led to the situation that the overindebted debtor did not pay its public creditors but its other creditors, thereby trying to avoid or at least delay the opening of bankruptcy proceedings. Because of this rule, already overindebted or insolvent companies could continue to participate in the economy, thereby distorting competition and harming its existent (as well as new) creditors, until a private creditor asked for the opening of bankruptcy proceedings. Under the new regulations, this exception has been abolished: Public law claims which are not paid by the debtor in the context of a debt enforcement cannot be enforced anymore by way of seizure of assets, but the public creditors will have to enforce their claims, like private creditors, by requesting the opening of bankruptcy proceedings over the debtor. It is expected that this change will result in a shorter lifespan of overindebted or insolvent companies, and reduce the damage created by such companies by continuing to operate and accumulate debt. Abolition of retroactive opting-out Under Swiss corporate law, larger companies must have their annual accounts audited in an ordinary audit. Smaller companies, which in at least one of the previous two business years did not exceed two out of the three thresholds of a balance sheet amount of 20 million Swiss Francs, sales revenue of 40 million Swiss Francs, and 250 FTEs on annual average, are not required to perform an ordinary audit but only need to submit their annual accounts to a limited audit (Review) - except in case they are listed, have bonds outstanding or are required to prepare consolidated accounts. Companies which are not required to perform an ordinary but only a limited audit and which do not have more than 10 FTEs on an annual average, can even waive the limited audit (Review) with the consent of all their shareholders (so-called opting-out). Before the implementation of the new regulations, it was possible to opt out not only for the future but also retroactively: If the waiver was declared within six months of the close of the financial year (and before the annual accounts of such last financial year were approved by the annual general meeting), then such waiver applied not only to the annual accounts of the current financial year (as well as of the future financial years) but also retroactively to the accounts of such last financial year. The possibility of a retroactive opting out was sometimes abused: In case the auditors raised issues in the context of their audit of the annual accounts of the last financial year, such as irregularities in the book-keeping or concerns regarding going-concern/overindebtedness of the company, some companies opted out from the limited audit (Review), thereby ending such audit and avoiding further scrutiny by their auditors or consequences thereof. To prevent such abuse, under the new regulations, an opting-out is only possible for the future financial years and not for the annual accounts of the current and the last financial year. Furthermore, the opting-out declaration will need to be filed with the commercial register before the beginning of the financial year from which on such opting out shall apply. While the abolition of the retroactive opting-out will help to prevent the abuse of the opting-out rules, such abolition will also render impossible the so far legitimate use of the retroactive opting-out in the context of certain solvent restructurings, such as e.g., group-internal mergers, to avoid unnecessary costs and delays due to the audit requirement. In addition to the abolition of the retroactive opting-out, a new obligation of the tax authorities has been introduced to inform the competent commercial register in case a company does not submit its annual accounts within the required deadline, as this may be an indication that accounts are not correctly maintained and the requirements for an opting-out may thus not be fulfilled anymore. In case such a company is subject to an opting-out, the commercial register will require the company to either renew its opting-out declaration or alternatively elect an auditor. Nullity of sale of shell companies According to the jurisprudence of the Federal Supreme Court, the sale of shares in a shell company is null and void. Shell companies are companies which have ceased their business activities, have liquidated their assets, and typically have no economic substance anymore, but have not formally been dissolved and are still registered with the commercial register. The sale of such a company is considered by the Federal Supreme Court as a circumvention of the formal legal requirements regarding the liquidation and foundation of a company and, therefore, as being null and void. Notwithstanding such established and longstanding jurisprudence of the Federal Supreme Court, the sale of shell companies still happens in practice, as it allows the seller and the buyer to save time, money (and sometimes taxes) by not complying with the legal rules regarding the liquidation of the old and the foundation of a new company. Apart from the sale of shell companies purely for the purposes of saving time and money, another related scheme has also surfaced: In case a company is nearly insolvent or overindebted, the owner depletes the company of its remaining assets and sells the depleted and overindebted company to a new owner. Upon acquisition, the new owner transfers the registered seat, and changes the name of the company and uses the company to make purchases, knowing that the company will never be able to pay and will soon be declared bankrupt, thereby harming the (existing and new) creditors. The new regulations try to address the second type of trading of shell companies, by declaring share transfers to be null and void if the transferred company no longer operates as a business, has no disposable assets, and is overindebted. In deviation of the jurisprudence of the Federal Supreme Court, the new regulations require, therefore, not only that the company has ceased its business activities (and liquidated its disposable assets), but also that the company is overindebted. However, given that the legislator explicitly mentioned that the jurisprudence of the Federal Supreme Court should not be affected by the new regulations, it is to be assumed that also the sale of a not overindebted shell company continues to be null and void. The new regulations also provide that if the commercial register reasonably suspects, in connection with a registration request, that an over-indebted shell company is transferred (e.g., combined change of seat and change of name depending on circumstances) it has to request the company to submit its current, signed, and, if the company has an auditor, audited annual accounts. If the company fails to submit the requested annual accounts, or if the submitted annual accounts confirm the suspicion of the commercial register, then the commercial register will refuse the requested registration and request the company to prove that no deletion of the company is necessary, i.e., that the over-indebtedness has been eliminated and that the company has resumed business activities. Unfortunately, some of the commercial register offices have decided to not only make such information requests in case of founded suspicion, but announced, that whenever they are aware of a transfer of 100% of shares, particularly in case of limited liability companies who have to register such transfer in the commercial register, they will always require (audited) annual accounts before registering the transfer. This may particularly inhibit and complicate share transfers for limited liability companies during the first quarter of their financial year, as such annual accounts may not yet be available and is, in our view, an improper applying of the law by the respective commercial registers. Conclusion While the new regulations have a legitimate aim to curtail the abuse of bankruptcy proceedings, they, unfortunately, entail an increased administrative burden and also limit flexibility relating to legitimate retroactive opting outs for the large majority of companies. It will also have to be seen whether such measures will effectively reduce the abuse of bankruptcy proceedings. Authors Luca Jagmetti [email protected] Thomas Rohde [email protected] Christoph Neeracher [email protected]

New Provisions regarding Financial Distress

On 1 January 2023, the long-awaited reform of Swiss corporate law entered into force. Amongst various changes this reform also introduced some new regulations regarding the duties of the board of directors when a company is in financial distress. While some of these new regulations bring clarification to long disputed questions, others introduce new obligations which seem rather impractical and it has yet to be seen, whether they will overall support corporate restructurings or not. This short article tries to briefly highlight significant changes and potential points of uncertainty regarding such new regulations. It is important noting that there is no group perspective in Swiss insolvency law. The board of directors of a company therefore needs to safeguard the interests of its respective legal entity (and its creditors) only and may not take decisions in the benefit of "greater good" of the group. Existing intra-group relationships and dependencies must in financial distress be scrutinized and treated as if they were regular third-party relationships. This applies in particular to up-/cross-stream loans and payments such as in cash pools.   Emphasis on Liquidity Already under the previous law, if the board could not reasonably expect the continuation of the company's business activities during the next 12 months (the company thus not being a going concern anymore), typically due to a lack of liquidity, financial accounting had to switch to – usually substantially lower – liquidation values (art. 958a II Swiss Code of Obligations (CO)), and the board of directors in principle had to file for bankruptcy if the interim balance sheet applying liquidation values showed an over-indebtedness. Lack of liquidity is thus one of the main reasons for corporate bankruptcies in Switzerland. The reform takes this into account by introducing a new art. 725 CO, according to which the board must supervise the liquidity of the company and, if there is a threat of illiquidity, take appropriate measures. Though such duties are not new, as they could so far already be derived from the board's general duty of care, they are now explicitly set forth in the law, and remind boards of the paramount importance of liquidity. While there is no legal definition of illiquidity under Swiss law, temporary failure to meet payment deadlines is not regarded as illiquidity. Whether illiquidity, or rather a threat of illiquidity, exists should rather be measured based on the company's expected ability to pay its debts during the next twelve months (and thus its expected access to sufficient liquidity to do so). A threat of illiquidity and the consequently necessary appropriate measures should anyhow not be regarded as clear cut criteria but rather as a spectrum where with increasing indicators of liquidity problems, the board should gradually resolve on more and more drastic measures. Such measures can range from the liquidation of unnecessary assets and operative measures such as terminations of employment contracts, which are within the boards' responsibility, to measures affecting the company's share capital (e.g., capital increase), which require a shareholders' meeting. Despite the fact that the obligation to draw up a liquidity plan as provided for in the draft bill was finally not included in the new law, such plan (which may be more or less granular) is in most cases not only helpful but simply required in order for the board to be able to assess the expected development of the company's liquidity situation and take the appropriate measures in time. As a rather concerning point, with the new art. 725 CO, also a provision was introduced that "the board files for composition proceedings if required". Legal doctrine is rightfully of the view that this provision does not introduce an additional obligation of the board to file for composition proceedings in case of threatened or existing liquidity problems. As the exact interpretation of this provision by the courts is not yet certain, however, we recommend that in potential distress situations the board seeks legal advice at an early stage. Particularly also, since the new law (in case of a threat of illiquidity as well as capital loss or over-indebtedness) expects the board to take action "with the required urgency". This term is not defined as well and therefore some scholars consider this provision superfluent, but the board should make sure that there is proof of the board's quick response later, for example by holding board meetings more often and have them properly documented.   New Regulations and Clarifications regarding Capital Loss Already under the previous law, if a company‘s annual balance sheet showed that the company's net assets no longer covered half of (i) its nominal share capital and (ii) the statutory capital reserve and statutory profit reserve (a so-called "capital loss"), then this triggered additional obligations for the board. The new law clarifies that for calculating the relevant statutory capital reserve and statutory profit reserve only the blocked part of such reserves (i.e. the part not freely distributable) counts in the calculation and not their entire amount. As no more than reserves in the amount of 50% of the nominal share capital are blocked (or 20% for holding companies), this means that a capital loss may only exist if the net assets fall below 75% of the nominal share capital (or 60% of the nominal share capital for holding companies). This is a welcome clarification, as this question was debated under the old law. In case of a capital loss, the old law obligated the board to immediately call a shareholders' meeting to resolve on restructuring measures. Under the new art. 725a CO the board is now obligated to implement restructuring measures itself and propose further measures to the shareholders' meeting only if necessary. This means that the focus to react to a capital loss lies more with the board and may also spare a struggling company the extra expense to call a shareholders' meeting, which is a welcome change. Additionally, a company facing a capital loss must newly have its financial statements reviewed (limited audit) by an external auditor even if it otherwise validly opted out from an audit. While this new duty is meant to ensure that the board does not depict the financial situation of the company in its financial statements better than it actually is, it is questionable, whether this new requirement will have much influence on the restructuring of the company (apart from triggering additional costs). As mentioned above, as in case of threatened illiquidity, also in case of a capital loss, the board has to act with the required urgency. Interpretations vary from a duty to take action within a few weeks up to one quarter. In our view, the appropriate timing needs to be assessed individually based on the intensity of the capital loss and the complexity of the intended measures.   New Rules regarding Suspected Over-indebtedness As under the previous law, if the board has, at any time, a justified concern that the liabilities of the company are no longer covered by its assets (so-called "over-indebtedness"), it must prepare interim accounts at both going concern and liquidation values and have them audited by its auditor. The new law now explicitly states that if the board reasonably expects the business to be continued (i.e., if the going concern assumption still applies) and the balance sheet at going concern value does not show an over-indebtedness, the interim accounts at liquidation value can be omitted. If on the other hand the going concern assumption does not apply anymore, the interim accounts at going concern value can be omitted (and are no longer decisive). The courts' practices vary whether they request an audit of the interim accounts even if an over-indebtedness is very obvious and the board files for bankruptcy. If the interim accounts show an over-indebtedness, the board must file for bankruptcy or for composition proceedings (similar to chapter 11 in the US) (art. 725b III CO), unless creditors subordinate their claims in an amount sufficient to cover the over-indebtedness (art. 725b IV 1 CO). Such subordinations need to be open-ended and also include a prohibition for the creditor to set-off the subordinated claim. Under previous case law, in case of over-indebtedness the board could delay a bankruptcy filing during a grace period if it promptly implemented restructuring measures and there was a realistic prospect of financial recovery. The duration of such grace period was much debated but often 4-6 weeks were indicated. The revision codified the concept of a grace period, stating that the board may delay a bankruptcy filing if there is realistic prospect that the over-indebtedness is cured within 90 days from the date the interim financial statements are available and if the creditors' claims are not additionally jeopardized (art. 725b IV 2 CO). While the duration of the grace period has been arguably extended, the new law rather narrows room for manoeuvre as the over-indebtedness must actually be cured within the grace period (i.e., a delay is not permitted if the effect of the implemented measures unfolds later than 90 days) and does not allow for any extension of the grace period. Due to the uncertainty of the assessment of realistic prospect in hindsight, it might under the circumstances be preferable to file for composition proceedings when facing an over-indebtedness. On a positive note, the new art. 634a CO clarifies that a debt- equity swap is permitted even in situations where the company is over-indebted – which was disputed by some scholars under the old law.   Conclusion The provisions regarding financial distress of the revised Swiss corporate law bring some welcome clarifications but raise new questions and concerns at the same time. While the new focus on liquidity makes sense and the supported restructuring by means of debt-equity-swap are welcome, the lack of safe harbour rules in case of financial distress causes uncertainty and thus bears the danger of resources of already struggling companies being allocated ineffectively. Major clarifications by case law may take ample time. Meanwhile, the already mentioned composition proceedings may thus sometimes be the preferred solution.   Thomas Rohde   Luca Jagmetti   Christoph Neeracher