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ARTICLE · 15 FEBRUARY 2019

Bigger Is Better. . .Or Maybe Not: The Siemens/Alstom Railway Merger

The European Commission recently reaffirmed that industrial policy objectives have no role to play when it comes to applying the EU merger control rules. Despite unusually intense industrial

European UnionAntitrust/Competition Law

The European Commission recently reaffirmed that industrial policy objectives have no role to play when it comes to applying the EU merger control rules. Despite unusually intense industrial and political pressure to get the Siemens/Alstom railway merger done, Competition Commissioner Vestager has forcefully reiterated that the substantive test under the EU Merger Regulation remains exclusively competition based.

Prior to the promulgation of the EU Merger Regulation (EUMR), the issue of whether industrial policy should be factored into the European Commission's (EC's) review of a merger was a heated one. Industrial policy has, however, been categorically excluded as a factor to be taken into account when reviewing a transaction's compatibility with the EU internal market. The test under which transactions are assessed under the EUMR is, and has always been, exclusively competition based. General Electric/Honeywell (2001), Schneider/Legrand (2001), Volvo/Scania (2000)

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