Authored by Pragalbh Bhardwaj, Associate Partner, KSK 

A. INTRODUCTION 

The Hon’ble Bombay High Court (“High Court”) in its judgment dated 20.07.2026 in Reliance Asset Reconstruction Co. Ltd. vs. Hiroo Hotchand Advani (Commercial Appeal (L) Nos. 14725 and 15441 of 2026), provided much needed clarity on a pertinent issue, being, whether a party aggrieved by an executing court's order in arbitration proceedings can appeal that order under the Commercial Courts Act, 2015 (“CCA”), or whether the right of appeal depends on the order fitting within the narrow categories carved out under the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (“Arbitration Act”). 

The High Court held that a Commercial Appeal under Section 13(1-A) of the CCA does not lie against an execution order that falls outside the three categories enumerated in Section 37 of the Arbitration Act. 

The judgment provides significant clarity, particularly in the backdrop of the fact that the CCA and the Arbitration Act both claim overriding effect over other laws. Section 21 of the CCA states that its provisions prevail over any inconsistent law for the time being in force. Section 37 of the Arbitration Act, since its amendment in 2019, opens with a similar phrase, "Notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force". This led to a direct conflict whenever an order passed at the execution stage of an arbitral award was sought to be challenged. The question for consideration was which of these two provisions would actually govern the right of appeal. This article examines the judgment and what it means for parties seeking to challenge execution stage orders in arbitration matters. 

B. FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 

The case arose out of two arbitral awards dated 22.10.2012, in favour of Reliance Asset Reconstruction Co. Ltd. (“Award Holder”), as later modified by orders dated 24.11.2018. To recover under these awards, the Award Holder instituted Commercial Execution Applications before the Commercial Division of the High Court against Hiroo Hotchand Advani (“Award Debtor”). 

During execution, the Award Debtor claimed to have discharged both awards through a payment made out of court, one that had never been certified or recorded by the executing court in the manner required under Order XXI Rule 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (“CPC”). The Award Holder disputed that an uncertified payment of this kind could amount to satisfaction of the awards, and the dispute was carried through Chamber Summons No. 550 of 2019 and Chamber Summons No. 552 of 2019, filed within the execution proceedings. 

By a common order dated 23.03.2026, the Ld. Single Judge, functioning as the executing court, rejected the Award Holder's Chamber Summons and held that both awards stood fully satisfied on the strength of the uncertified out of court payment. Since the awards were treated as satisfied, the two Execution Applications were disposed of. 

The Award Holder filed an appeal before the Division Bench, vide Commercial Appeal (L) No. 14725 of 2026 and Commercial Appeal (L) No. 15441 of 2026 under Section 13 of the CCA. Its case was that neither party had ever applied under Order XXI Rule 1 or Rule 2(1) or Rule 2(2) of the CPC, that no payment had at any stage been certified by the executing court, and that treating an uncertified out of court payment as complete satisfaction of a decree was contrary to Order XXI Rule 2(3) of the CPC.  

However, before either appeal could be examined on this ground, the Award Debtor raised a preliminary objection disputing whether the appeals were maintainable at all. 

C. RELEVANT STATUTORY PROVISIONS 

The High Court examined Section 13 of the CCA, which permits an appeal against a Judgment or Order of a Commercial Court, but also has a proviso confining that appeal to orders “specifically enumerated under Order XLIII of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 ... and section 37 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996.” Section 13(2) further provides that no appeal shall lie from any order or decree of a Commercial Division otherwise than in accordance with the provisions of the CCA. 

Section 37 of the Arbitration Act permits an appeal only from three categories of orders, an order refusing to refer parties to arbitration under Section 8, an order granting or refusing an interim measure under Section 9, and an order setting aside or refusing to set aside an award under Section 34, and states expressly that an appeal shall lie from these orders “and from no others.” Since its amendment in 2019, Section 37(1) also opens with the words “Notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force,”. 

Additionally, the Section 21 of the CCA, gives the CCA overriding effect over any inconsistent law for the time being in force, and Section 5 of the Arbitration Act, restricts judicial intervention in arbitration matters to what the Arbitration Act itself permits. 

D. ANALYSIS AND REASONING OF THE HIGH COURT: 

The High Court began by tracing how Section 13 has evolved over time. The original provision allowed an appeal against the “decision” of a Commercial Court. The amended provision instead speaks of a “Judgment or Order,” and the proviso restricting that appeal to orders listed under Order XLIII of the CPC and Section 37 of the Arbitration Act is provided immediately after sub-section (1-A). Read together, the proviso works as an exception to a wider main provision, and the real question was how far that exception could be stretched. 

The Award Holder relied heavily on the Supreme Court's decision in MITC Rolling Mills Private Limited vs. Renuka Realtors 2025 SCC ONLine SC 2375, which the Division Bench had itself applied earlier in Vishal Prafulsingh Solanke vs. Controller of Patent and Designs (Commercial Appeal (L) No.13430/2025) decided on 09/03/2026.  

In MITC Rolling Mills, an order rejecting a plaint under Order VII Rule 11 of the CPC had been held appealable even though it does not appear in Order XLIII, because the CPC treats rejection of a plaint as a decree, and a decree that finally decides the dispute between the parties remains appealable regardless of the proviso's wording. The High Court, however, declined to extend this reasoning to orders passed under the Arbitration Act. It reasoned that the Arbitration Act is a special, self-contained statute meant to keep judicial intervention to a minimum, that Chapter VIII of the Arbitration Act gives finality to arbitral awards, and that Chapter IX confines the remedy of appeal strictly to the orders listed under Section 37, and from no others. 

The High Court placed considerable weight on the 2019 amendment to Section 37. It traced this amendment to the report of the Committee chaired by Justice B.N. Srikrishna and to the Statement of Objects and Reasons accompanying the amending Act. According to the High Court, Parliament was conscious of the overriding effect Section 21 of the CCA could otherwise claim, and deliberately inserted the words “Notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force” into Section 37 to restore the primacy of the appeal scheme under the Arbitration Act. This view found support in Kandla Export Corporation vs. OCI Corporation (2020) 4 SCC 234, which relied on Fuerst Day Lawson Ltd. vs. Jindal Exports Ltd. (2011) 8 SCC 333 to hold that Section 21 of the CCA can only apply once Section 13(1) of the CCA is itself attracted, and that a special, exhaustive statute like the Arbitration Act permits only what it expressly allows. 

The High Court also rejected the Award Holder's attempt to draw a line between the words “Judgment” and “Order” to get around the proviso. It held that a Judgment is simply the reasoning behind an Order and is not separately appealable, and that although the word “Order” in the Arbitration Act covers both interim directions and final decisions, as seen from Section 37(1)(c) treating an order under Section 34 as an appealable order even though it finally decides the challenge to the award, this wider usage cannot be used to bring in a category of appeal that Section 37 does not list. Drawing such a distinction to sidestep Section 37 would run against the limited role the Arbitration Act gives to courts. 

Applying this reasoning, the High Court held that an order treating an arbitral award as satisfied in execution, passed under the Arbitration Act read with Order XXI Rule 2 of the CPC, did not fall within any of the three categories under Section 37(1). It was not an order refusing reference to arbitration under Section 8, nor one granting or refusing an interim measure under Section 9, nor one setting aside or refusing to set aside an award under Section 34. Since the main part of Section 13(1-A) could not be read apart from its proviso where an order under the Arbitration Act was concerned, and the proviso could not be used to create a fresh route of appeal for orders that Section 37 leaves out, the preliminary objection was upheld and both Commercial Appeals were dismissed as not maintainable. 

E. IMPLICATIONS AND CONCLUSION 

The decision in the present case establishes several important principles, including that the proviso to Section 13(1-A) of the CCA cannot be read to enlarge the categories of appeal already fixed by Section 37 of the Arbitration Act, that the non obstante clause inserted into Section 37 in 2019 overrides the overriding effect otherwise available to the CCA under Section 21. 

The judgment brings much needed clarity to an area where two statutes, each carrying its own overriding clause, could otherwise pull in different directions. It strikes a balance between preserving a genuine right of appeal where the CCA and CPC intend one, and respecting the deliberately narrow appeal structure that Parliament has built into the Arbitration Act. 

For award holders, the judgment is a reminder that a Commercial Appeal under the CCA is not always available simply because an executing court has passed an order in arbitration proceedings. Where that order does not fall within Section 37 of the Arbitration Act, the appropriate remedy will usually lie elsewhere, such as a petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. 

For award debtors and other parties defending execution proceedings, the judgment brings welcome certainty. An order deciding satisfaction at the execution stage cannot be reopened through a Commercial Appeal unless it falls within Section 37, in keeping with the Arbitration Act's character as "a special Statute with the limited scope for judicial intervention."