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ARTICLE · 16 JUNE 2021

Antitrust Enforcers Need Merger Presumptions To Reduce Market Power?

Proskauer Rose LLP
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Under the Clayton Act (15 U.S. Code § 18), certain business acquisitions are prohibited where "the effect of such acquisition may be substantially to lessen competition...

United StatesAntitrust/Competition Law

Under the Clayton Act (15 U.S.  Code § 18), certain business acquisitions are prohibited where "the effect of such acquisition may be substantially to lessen competition, or to tend to create a monopoly." Long-standing jurisprudence has established that merger challenges require, at the outset, a prima facie showing of the likelihood of a substantial lessoning of competition that would result from the merger or acquisition.  Such prima facie showing typically takes the form of claims and evidence related to market shares above a certain level, but can take other forms.

Proposals afoot would turn things around and provide instead that certain acquisitions by "dominant platforms" (undefined in the Report) might be presumed anticompetitive – unless the merging parties affirmatively establish that the transaction was "necessary for serving the public interest and that similar benefits could not be achieved through internal growth and expansion."1 Other proposals, such

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