A comparative analysis of self-reporting and cooperation mechanisms under FCPA and Turkish Criminal Code

This year, Vimpelcom, a telecommunications company based in the Netherlands, has agreed to pay $397 million to US authorities to settle the charges that it made corrupt payments to Uzbek officials. However, this was not the only blow to the company, as the case was also prosecuted in the Netherlands and Vimpelcom was also fined in the amount of $397 million.¹ This is what we call the spill-over effect. It is the inherent risk in all corrupt conduct. In a similar, but hypothetical example, a Turkish company having a subsidiary in the US, would be very likely fined in both the US and Turkey, for its corrupt conduct elsewhere in the world. In today's robust anti-corruption enforcement environment, the question remains for our hypothetical company when corrupt conduct occurs, how, if at all possible, to mitigate the consequences?