The Differences Between Commission’s Assessment Of Vertical Mergers Before The Merger Guidelines And Under The Guidelines

Previously the Commission's competitive assessment of vertical mergers focused predominantly on the parties' ability to foreclose rivals. The Commission infrequently evaluated in-depth the parties' incentives to foreclose rivals. Moreover in certain cases, market power in only one of the affected markets was considered "a sufficient condition" to conclude that the proposed merger was likely to restrict competition in the Common Market.

For example, in Skanska / Scancem, a merger between Sweden's main producers of cement and construction materials (Scancem) and ready-mixed concrete, dry concrete and pre-cast concrete products (Skanska), the Commission examined in detail the ability of the merged entity to foreclose rivals where it had: roughly over 80% of the Swedish market for cement production; roughly between 40-50% of the Swedish market in ready mix concrete; and up to 80% of the Swedish market in other building materials. Based mainly on high market shares, the