In public M&A deals, bidding and target companies often
agree on payments in the event that the deal cannot close. Payments
from the target to the bidder are known as (direct) break fees.
Reverse break fees are payments from the bidder to the target. Both
types of fee serve to protect the deal and to control parties'
behaviour.
Reverse break fees can compensate the target if the deal is not
carried out because of issues that are either the bidder's
responsibility (such as the lack of approval of its shareholders),
or are outside of both parties' control (such as the refusal of
regulators to grant merger approval). Conversely, a reverse break
fee, particularly if it is designed as a walk-away right, can be
seen as the price for the bidder's option not to complete the
transaction. Compared to (direct) break fees, reverse break fees
are typically significantly higher, and because they do not affect
competition between bidders, are generally less heavily
regulated.