Introduction
The law is not so absurd as to force a man to take an estate
against his will (Townson v Tickell [1819] 3 B. & Ald.
31) is a well-known judicial pronouncement from the 19th century.
This principle underpins the legal operation of disclaimers, which,
along with deeds of family arrangements, are regularly encountered
by advisers dealing with testate and intestate estates and their
beneficiaries.
Although the taxation consequences of disclaimers have a
statutory footing, the legal consequences are largely rooted in
historical English case law and academic commentary. The recent
decision of Twomey J in Kieran Egan and Michael Egan Junior v
Helen Egan and Alan Egan [2023] IEHC 259 is therefore to be
welcomed in that, for the first time in this jurisdiction, the High
Court has considered the legal effect of a disclaimer in favour of
a third party.1