MAPping Out Grocery Prices

Like consumers around the world, Canadians have concerns about grocery price increases. These concerns were noted as one of the motivations for recent Competition Act amendments,¹ as well as for significant funding increases which the Competition Bureau has received.² One of the main areas of focus, both with respect to these statutory changes and also the Competition Bureau’s recent enforcement efforts, has been with respect to property controls in relation to grocery stores. That is, provisions in leases and restrictions on title to lands preventing possible competitors from operating grocery stores near incumbent retailers. We have written about these efforts on a number of occasions, and, most recently, the Bureau announced on September 22, 2026 that it had reached a Consent Agreement with a major grocery retailer restricting its use of property controls.

The Bureau’s latest sortie into the supermarket aisles seeks input from the public. In June 2026 the Bureau announced that it was seeking views on questions of interest with respect to food production and processing, food transportation and distribution, and retail pricing of grocers. The Bureau expects to report on the results of this study in the spring of 2027.

On September 28, 2026, as an aspect of its broader public consultation, the Bureau launched an investigation into the use of Minimum Advertised Price (MAP) policies in grocery retailing. MAP policies generally involve some sort of agreement or arrangement between the supplier of a product and a retailer by which the retailer agrees or is encouraged not to advertise the supplier’s product below some established price point. Typically MAP policies do not prohibit selling below that price, just advertising below it.

Minimum Advertised Price arrangements, as well as minimum sale price agreements, both fall within the definition of Resale Price Maintenance (RPM) under the Competition Act. Until 2009, RPM was criminally prohibited. Since that time, however, RPM has been a reviewable practice under the Competition Act, and is only subject to sanction or prohibition if it has had, is having, or is likely to have an adverse effect on competition in a market.

Since its decriminalization, the use of RPM, whether through actual minimum pricing arrangements, via MAP policies, or both, has become widespread in Canada — most commonly in connection with the sale of luxury goods. It is not clear how widespread such policies are in relation to grocery retailing, or what, if any, impact they may have on competition in the supply of groceries. Presumably that is why the Bureau is examining MAP policies in the sector, continuing its focus on the supply of groceries to Canadians as a primary area of interest and enforcement. We note in particular that in its September 28, 2026, explanatory note the Bureau indicated that the increased prevalence of online shopping may be relevant to the impact which MAP policies may have.

In addition to analyses under the price maintenance provisions of the Competition Act, the Bureau has indicated that its MAP investigation will consider these issues under the recently amended abuse of dominance and anti-competitive agreements provisions of the Competition Act.³ We have discussed the potentially expanded application of these provisions here.

The inquiry with respect to MAP policies in grocery retailing, under various provisions of the Competition Act, may signal renewed interest by the Bureau in respect of Resale Price Maintenance more generally. Since the decriminalization of price maintenance in 2009, the Competition Bureau has devoted limited resources to challenging the conduct, and in fact no successful cases have been brought. Insofar as the call for public comments may indicate renewed interest in the topic, and insofar as the Bureau has suggested that other provisions of the Act may also be considered in respect of RPM enforcement, it may be appropriate for firms employing MAP or RPM policies, within the grocery sector or otherwise, to review their go-to-market approach in light of apparently heightened enforcement interest.

Footnotes

1. See our bulletin from September 2023, “Competition Act Amendments on a Rocket Docket”, which focused on the amendments to the Competition Act originating from Bill C-56, the “Affordable Housing and Groceries Act”.

2. On June 11, 2026, the Government’s National Food Security Strategy publication announced in its that it would be “[s]trengthening he enforcement capacity of the Competition Bureau and Competition Tribunal ($12.9 million per year ongoing) to increase the ability to carry out enforcement, tackling a larger share of issues that come to the attention of the Bureau and helping bring down consumer costs. These funds will build upon previous enhances to the Competition Act to strengthen competition across the agriculture and agri-food supply chain.” (see page 20).

3. We note, however, that under the anti-competitive agreements provision and under some aspects of the abuse of dominance provisions, there is a requirement to show substantial injury to competition, whereas the RPM provision only requires demonstration of an adverse effect on competition, which is a lower standard.