Introduction
For the past two decades, leniency programmes have increasingly
been adopted by antitrust authorities around the globe as one of
the main tools in cartel prosecution. As in other jurisdictions,
the Brazilian authorities have been striving to build a
well-respected leniency programme. Evidence from the past couple of
years suggests that before allowing a company to benefit from its
leniency programme, the Administrative Council for Economic Defence
(CADE) has become more demanding, requesting strong evidence of the
existence of collusion, as well as proof of any (potential) impact
in the country.
Based on recent experience, the standard of what is considered
acceptable to secure an agreement seems to be higher than in the
past, when leniency agreements were accepted in any global cartel
case under the presumption that it could potentially have had an
impact in Brazil. This new trend (ie, accepting leniency
applications only for cartels that are
