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ARTICLE · 15 NOVEMBER 1995

Financial Law - The Eurolist Project

Linklaters De Bandt
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BelgiumAntitrust/Competition Law
Eurolist consists of a special screen list which is to be created on all member securities exchanges and which will contain European "blue chips".

In order to qualify for Eurolist, a European company must be listed on at least three participating securities exchanges in addition to its home market; it must have a market capitalization of at least ECU 1 billion and an annual turnover of more than ECU 250 million. Admission to Eurolist shall entail simultaneous admission on the Eurolist screen list of all member securities exchanges.

The Eurolist project is conducted by the Federation of European Stock Exchanges ("FESE"), whose ambition is to enhance the provision of services to the major European companies.

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