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Amendments to the Electricity Market Licensing Regulation

The Regulation Amending the Electricity Market Licensing Regulation (the “Amending Regulation”) entered into force upon its publication in the Official Gazette dated 29 April 2026 (No.33238). Through these amendments, various additions, repeals, and textual revisions have been introduced to Articles 5, 27, 34, 34/A, 43, Provisional Article 47, and Provisional Article 48 of the Electricity Market Licensing Regulation (the “Regulation”).Given that the Regulation derives its legal basis from Electricity Market Law No. 6446 dated 14 March 2013, these amendments should be understood within the broader framework of secondary legislation governing the implementation of the licensing regime. In this sense, the recent changes appear to go beyond mere technical updates, rather, they introduce a framework that may have wider implications for license holders, particularly in relation to their corporate structures, market visibility, transfer transactions, compliance monitoring, and the overall sanctioning regime.When considered as a whole, the amendments suggest that the regulatory authority has acted along three main axes. The first relates to an increased sensitivity toward distinguishing between license holders, particularly in terms of trade names, branding, and market identity. The second axis reflects a more direct linkage between obligations imposed through Energy Market Regulatory Authority (“EMRA”) and its Board (the “Board”) decisions and enforcement mechanisms, especially in transactions such as license transfers, mergers, demergers, sales, leasing arrangements, and restructuring processes. The third axis points to a shift away from certain outcomes previously structured around increased license acquisition or amendment fees, toward a broader reliance on general sanctioning provisions.From this perspective, the amendments not only introduce new obligations for market participants but also provide meaningful signals as to the areas where the regulatory focus is now intensifying. The amendments are examined below on an article-by-article basis.Article 5 – Obligation to Obtain a Pre-License and LicenseOne of the most notable amendments introduced under Article 5 is the addition of a fourth paragraph. Pursuant to this new provision, if the obligations determined by the Board decision in relation to the transactions to be carried out within the scope of the third paragraph are not fulfilled within the prescribed period, the sanctions set forth in Article 16 of the Electricity Market Law shall apply to the legal entity deemed appropriate for the granting of a new license, in continuation of the previous one.The third paragraph referred to here covers various situations which, although not considered as a transfer of license, effectively allow the rights and obligations under the license to continue under a new legal entity. Scenarios such as mergers, demergers, transition to a newly established company with the same shareholding structure, transfer of the generation facility to another legal entity through sale or lease, or changes in ownership resulting from creditor-driven structures or enforcement proceedings within the scope of project finance are regulated under the third paragraph. For this reason, the scope of application of the sanction linkage introduced by the fourth paragraph appears to be quite broad.In the previous period, in such transactions, the consequences arising from the failure to fulfil the obligations determined by Board decisions could largely be assessed on a case-by-case basis and considering the specific circumstances. With the new provision, it has been more clearly established that the periods and conditions determined by the Board are not merely administrative formalities, and that failure to comply with them may give rise to consequences extending to the sanctions set forth under Article 16 of the Law.Within this framework, it appears that in transactions such as company mergers, intra-group restructurings, establishment of a new license-holder legal entity while preserving the shareholding structure, sale or leasing of generation facilities, not only the commercial law and financing aspects but also the timing under energy legislation will carry critical importance.The fifth paragraph under Article 5 stipulates that, in combined electricity generation facilities and combined renewable electricity generation facilities, the auxiliary source cannot, under any circumstances, be converted into the main source. This regulation can be seen as aiming to prevent any differentiation of the licensing regime through subsequent alterations to the nature of the source within hybrid or combined generation models.Given the potential for the auxiliary source to become dominant over time in terms of capacity, incentive regime, or licensing advantages, the provision indicates an intention on the part of the regulator to draw a clear boundary to preserve the distinction between the main source and the auxiliary source.Article 27 – Sanctions and Revocation of LicenseThe amendment introduced in the first paragraph of Article 27 is also noteworthy. Under the provision, not only legal entities holding a license but also legal entities holding a pre-license are now expressly included. In addition, alongside non-compliance with the relevant legislative provisions, the failure to fulfil the obligations determined by Board decision within the prescribed period has also been explicitly regulated as a ground for sanctions.This amendment indicates that the pre-license period is now more clearly regarded as a phase subject to sanction oversight. As is known, the pre-license period often encompasses stages such as project development, obtaining permits, preparation for project financing, and site development. Failure to fulfil the obligations imposed at this stage in a timely manner has now become an area capable of giving rise to more concrete consequences.On the other hand, the explicit inclusion in the provision of the obligations imposed through Board decisions is also significant. This is because, in the energy market, many processes are shaped not only by general legislation but also by individual Board decisions. The granting, renewal, or extension of licenses, as well as special permits or restructuring decisions, may often contain specific conditions. With the new regulation, the legal basis for sanctions in case of breach of such conditions has been clarified.This approach reflects a more visible role, at the level of secondary legislation, of the regulatory authority, not only as a rule-maker but also as an actor that shapes the market through its decisions.Article 34 – Differentiation of Trade Names and Brands for Supply License HoldersPursuant to the fifteenth paragraph added to Article 34, legal entities holding a supply license (other than incumbent supply companies) shall not include in their trade names the regional name of distribution license holder companies and shall not use the same brand or logo as distribution companies.Although this provision may at first glance appear to be a technical regulation concerning trade names, it may give rise to broader implications from the perspective of market design. In the electricity market, distribution activity is an area licensed on a regional basis and subject to detailed regulation, due to its structure being based on network infrastructure. By contrast, supply activity is essentially carried out within a market structure open to competition. The use of brand unity or similar trade names among companies within the same group may create perceptual confusion among consumers as between these two activities.With the new provision, it appears that the intention is to prevent supply companies operating in the liberalized market from creating the impression of being a distribution company. The prohibition on the use of regional names indicates an intention to prevent consumers from perceiving the relevant supply company as a mandatory or official service provider.This development is likely to bring to the agenda, for certain companies, the need to revise their trade names, update their logos, and adjust their websites and marketing materials, particularly considering existing brand structures.Article 34/A – Similar Restrictions for Aggregator License HoldersA similar provision has also been introduced under Article 34/A for legal entities holding an aggregator license. Accordingly, companies holding an aggregator license shall likewise not include in their trade names the regional name of distribution license holder companies and shall not use the same brand or logo as distribution companies.Considering that aggregation is a relatively new and still developing area within the Turkish electricity market, it appears that the regulatory authority intends to define this line of business with clearer boundaries at an early stage. The aim appears to prevent commercial representations that could create the impression of a corporate affiliation with distribution companies.Given that aggregation constitutes an innovative market function associated with producers, consumers, storage facilities, and flexibility resources, in this context, the development of this field under an independent commercial identity appears to be preferred.Article 43 – Abolition of the Incremental Application Regime for License FeesIt is observed that paragraphs 16, 17, 21 and 22, which were previously in force under Article 43, have been repealed. These provisions contained regulations regarding the application of the license acquisition fee or license amendment fee at three times or at increasing rates in cases of certain violations or delays.Upon examination of the repealed paragraphs, it appears that they targeted situations such as changes in shareholding structure carried out without prior approval, notification obligations relating to share transfers, failure to complete obligations in merger or division transactions, missing application deadlines in Environmental Impact Assessment (“EIA”) processes, and failure to fulfil obligations in a timely manner in sale/transfer/lease transactions within the scope of Article 5.We are of the view that the removal of these provisions may be regarded as a significant simplification in the regulatory approach. Under the previous system, certain violations would give rise to consequences through the application of multiplied license acquisition or amendment fees rather than administrative fines. Under the new system, it appears that these matters are preferred to be assessed within the framework of more general sanction provisions.We consider that this amendment signifies a transition to a sanction model that is more flexible depending on the nature of the violation, while at the same time allowing for a broader margin of discretion.Provisional Article 47 – Compliance Period and Final DeadlineWith the newly introduced Provisional Article 47, a compliance period has been granted until 31.12.2026 for legal entities that, as of the date the amendments entered into force, are in breach of the provisions of Articles 34/15 or 34/A/7.This transitional provision indicates that the regulatory authority has considered the current realities of the market. Indeed, changes such as alterations to trade names, brand differentiation, logo revisions, and modifications to commercial communication elements may not be processes that can be completed within a short period of time. It is natural that certain time will be required for trade registry procedures, trademark registration processes, contractual revisions, and customer communication.Accordingly, the period granted until 31 December 2026 reflects an intention to provide market participants with a reasonable window for compliance.Provisional Article 48 – A New Approach for Existing FilesPursuant to Provisional Article 48, in respect of legal entities that have not fulfilled their obligations under the relevant legislation as of the effective date, if no action has yet been taken within the scope of the repealed paragraphs of Article 43, action will be taken within the framework of Article 27/1.This provision demonstrates that the amendments are not limited to producing prospective effects only, rather, it clarifies which regime will apply to certain files that met specific conditions as of the effective date but in respect of which no action had yet been taken under the previous provisions.Accordingly, certain processes that could previously have been subject to the incremental application regime for license fees may now be handled within the framework of general sanction provisions. How this will be interpreted in practice for each specific case is likely to become clearer through Board decisions and administrative practice.The Significance of References to Article 16 of the Electricity Market LawIt is observed that, across various provisions of the amendments, explicit reference is made to Article 16 of the Electricity Market Law No. 6446. The said article establishes a broad enforcement framework, ranging from warnings and administrative fines to escalating sanctions in case of repeated violations, and, in certain circumstances, extending to the revocation of licenses.In this respect, the fact that the amendments at the regulatory level refer to Article 16 of the Law indicates that the relevant obligations are no longer regarded merely as procedural in nature, but rather as areas where non-compliance may give rise to more serious consequences.We are of the view that this approach may be intended to enhance predictability and discipline in the market.General AssessmentAlthough the amendments dated 29 April 2026 cover a limited number of provisions in quantitative terms, they introduce significant shifts in substance. In particular, the following aspects stand out: the strengthening of obligations introduced through Board decisions; the enhancement of timeline discipline in license transfer and restructuring processes; the introduction of a requirement for brand/title unbundling for supply and aggregator companies; the transition from an incremental application regime for license fee approach to a general sanctions regime; and the implementation of the new system through transitional provisions for ongoing files.For companies operating in the electricity market, it would be beneficial to assess these amendments not merely as changes to a legal text, but also from the perspectives of corporate structuring, compliance management, operational timelines, brand strategy, and administrative risk management.In the upcoming period, EMRA practices, Board decisions, and potential additional secondary legislation may further clarify the practical implications of these amendments. We will continue to monitor developments closely.

Türkiye Introduces a New Framework for Unlicensed Renewables After YEKDEM

With the enactment of Presidential Decision No. 11415, dated 12 June 2026, a framework has been introduced governing the pricing and sale of surplus electricity generated by unlicensed power plants operating under the Electricity Market Law No. 6446 after the expiration of their ten-year participation period in the Renewable Energy Resources Support Mechanism (“YEKDEM”).The Decision is particularly significant as it addresses several uncertainties that have emerged in practice regarding the post-support period for the growing number of unlicensed renewable energy facilities in recent years. It provides greater clarity on both the conditions under which surplus electricity may be sold and the pricing mechanism that will apply to such sales.One of the most notable aspects of the Decision is the distinction drawn between facilities whose generation and consumption units are located at the same metering point and those operating at different metering points. For facilities where generation and consumption are connected through the same metering point, all generated electricity may be sold. Conversely, where the generation facility and the consumption facility are located at different metering points, only surplus electricity may be sold, while the quantity eligible for sale will be determined by the Energy Market Regulatory Authority (“EMRA”). Any electricity injected into the system beyond the threshold to be set by EMRA will be treated as a non-remunerated contribution to YEKDEM.Another key element of the Decision concerns the pricing methodology. Under the new framework, the purchase price applicable to surplus electricity injected into the grid after hourly netting will be calculated based on 90% of the current YEKDEM tariff applicable to licensed generation facilities using the relevant resource type, rounded to two decimal places. However, the resulting amount may not exceed the hourly Market Clearing Price (“MCP”) formed in the electricity market. This approach establishes a degree of revenue certainty for facilities whose support period has expired, while at the same time preserving the link between compensation and prevailing market conditions. In this respect, the mechanism may also contribute to the management of overall system costs.The Decision further requires the relevant designated supplier companies to purchase the electricity eligible for sale. Such electricity will be deemed electricity generated and supplied to the system within the scope of YEKDEM. Accordingly, the regulatory treatment of surplus electricity within the broader market framework has also been clarified.Overall, the Decision establishes the fundamental framework enabling unlicensed generation facilities to continue operating after the expiry of their support period while creating a mechanism for integrating surplus electricity into the system. Nevertheless, for facilities operating through different metering points in particular, the way EMRA will determine the quantity of surplus electricity eligible for sale is likely to be one of the most important aspects of implementation. This issue may have a material impact on both operational planning and the economic expectations of affected facilities.Against this background, the practical implications of the Decision are expected to take shape through secondary legislation and implementation measures to be adopted by EMRA. In particular, the thresholds and procedural rules applicable to facilities operating at different metering points will play a decisive role in assessing the market impact of the new regime. Accordingly, the effects of the Decision will need to be monitored closely as the secondary regulatory framework develops, and implementation experience accumulates.

Construction and Financing of Electricity Distribution Facilities by Investors Seeking Network Connection

In recent years, the increasing demand in the energy and infrastructure sectors has brought various challenges to existing electricity distribution systems. The expansion of electricity services to growing residential areas and industrial zones has imposed significant financial and operational burdens on distribution companies. Traditionally, these infrastructures were established and operated by distribution companies. However, with the new regulation, both individuals and legal entities have been allowed to establish distribution assets. The main reason for this change is to accelerate investment processes and meet infrastructure needs through a more flexible model. The connection of generation or consumption facilities to the distribution system and the fulfillment of the increasing electricity demand of generation and consumption facilities are constrained by the system’s limited capacity. Due to the lack of sufficient installed capacity, new lines, transformers, and distribution centers may need to be constructed. If the demand for connection is not included in the current investment plans of the distribution company, or if physical conditions make it difficult to expand the existing grid or require the establishment of a new one, these factors can lead to delays in the application process. In such cases, allowing the applicant to finance and construct the necessary infrastructure themselves has become an important necessity to overcome these challenges rapidly. Since distribution companies can invest only within a specific budget and plan, it is not always possible for them to respond to every regional need at the same speed. Ensuring rapid infrastructure access is especially crucial for industrial facilities, large-scale housing projects, and commercial areas. However, existing procedures sometimes lead to delays. Furthermore, the regulatory framework and investment plans set for distribution companies make it difficult to meet all demands simultaneously. At this point, Establishment of Distribution Facilities by Individuals and Legal Entities and the Reimbursement Methodology (“New Methodology”) comes into play, allowing users (applicants) to establish the infrastructure that suits their needs, thereby expediting the process. From a financial perspective, this model reduces the financial burden on distribution companies. Consequently, in high-demand areas, infrastructure expansion processes accelerate, and economic resources are used more efficiently. In the first section of this document, we will discuss the opportunities that applicants may encounter. In the second section, we will analyze the new regulation by comparing it with Methodology for Establishment of Distribution Facilities by Users (“Repealed Methodology”) The terms “applicant”, “user”, and “investor” will be used interchangeably. Applicants may be individuals or legal entities. This includes Individual Consumers (residential subscribers who use electricity in their homes), Commercial and Industrial Consumers (factories, businesses, shopping malls, Organized Industrial Zones (OIZs), and other high-consumption commercial and industrial entities), Public Institutions and Municipalities, Irrigation Cooperatives and Agricultural Enterprises using electricity, and Electricity Producers. Indirect Gains for the Applicant Applicants who establish distribution assets do not generate direct profits but obtain economic advantages through indirect means. Under the new methodology, investors can benefit from reimbursement mechanisms, reduced operational costs, strategic advantages, and future business opportunities by improving the grid infrastructure. Reimbursement Mechanism to Cover Investments According to the New Methodology, applicants who invest in distribution assets can recover their expenditures. This reimbursement process follows TEDAŞ’s (Turkish Electricity Distribution Company) cost tariff and the Consumer Price Index (CPI) rates. The applicant finances and constructs (or has constructed) the necessary electrical infrastructure (transformers, lines, poles, distribution centers, etc.) to connect to the distribution system. All expenditures are documented and submitted to the distribution company. TEDAŞ and the distribution company verify the expenditures and calculate the reimbursement amount. Payments are made to the investor within the specified timeframe. However, no direct profit is made from this process; only the initial investment is reimbursed. The reason investors undertake such an investment lies in the potential indirect gains. For Electricity Producers: Increasing Electricity Sales Renewable energy producers (solar, wind, biomass, etc.) and large-scale energy producers can invest in distribution infrastructure with the aim of ensuring faster and uninterrupted access to the grid. If there is a capacity issue in the distribution system, producers can strengthen the infrastructure and accelerate the process of feeding the electricity into the grid. As a result, they can start selling electricity earlier and generate more revenue. They gain a competitive advantage by securing priority grid access. Example: A solar power plant investor facing transformer capacity issues can finance the necessary infrastructure, ensuring grid connection and generating income from electricity sales. For Industrial and Commercial Enterprises: Lower Electricity Costs Large-scale electricity consumers (industrial facilities, shopping malls, OIZs, large manufacturing factories) can reduce long-term energy costs and improve profitability by establishing distribution assets. A reliable and uninterrupted energy infrastructure prevents production losses. Minimizing operational halts due to power outages reduces overall costs. By increasing grid capacity, businesses can meet their future energy needs at lower costs. Example: A factory suffering from frequent power outages can invest in distribution assets to secure an uninterrupted energy supply, improving operational efficiency and achieving indirect financial gains. Preparing for Future Investments: Creating New Business Opportunities Investing in distribution assets provides long-term advantages for investors. Companies investing in electricity infrastructure may gain priority status in future energy projects. Government incentives and grants may become available. Example: An investor developing a transformer station in a specific region may gain a competitive edge and be prioritized in larger future energy projects in the area. Public and Strategic Advantages Large companies investing in energy infrastructure contribute to environmental and social sustainability goals. Investors supporting public projects may benefit from government incentives and long-term financing advantages. Lower energy prices and reduced operational costs can be achieved over time. Example: A municipality investing in distribution assets to reduce power outages can enhance public satisfaction and lower long-term infrastructure costs, leading to savings. Summary: How Do Investors Benefit from Establishing Distribution Assets? Applicants do not profit directly from reimbursements but can gain advantages through indirect means. Electricity producers investing in distribution infrastructure can expedite grid access and generate earlier revenue from electricity sales. Industrial and commercial enterprises can lower operational costs by securing a reliable power supply. Investors can create long-term business opportunities and secure priority positions in future projects. Government incentives, grants, and energy cost advantages can be utilized. Competitive advantages can be gained, strengthening the investor’s market position. Key Changes Introduced by the New Methodology The Energy Market Regulatory Authority (EPDK) approved the Methodology for the Establishment of Distribution Facilities by Users (“Repealed Methodology”) in a meeting on August 27, 2014. However, with EPDK’ s Decision No.13289, dated February 13, 2025, this methodology was repealed and replaced with the Establishment of Distribution Facilities by Individuals and Legal Entities and the Reimbursement Methodology (“New Methodology”). The New Methodology is based on Article 9 of the Electricity Market Law 6446, dated March 14, 2013, and Article 21 of the Regulation on Electricity Market Connection and System Usage. It was published in the Official Gazette No.32818 on February 19, 2025, and has since been in effect. This change restructured the processes between investors and distribution companies, increased investor responsibilities, and detailed reimbursement mechanisms. Key Innovations Introduced With the New Methodology, several significant changes and innovations have been implemented. These can be summarized in comparison with the previous methodology as follows:         Role of the Applicants Repealed Methodology: Only users could establish distribution assets in specific cases where there was insufficient capacity at connection points; the process was at the discretion of distribution companies. New Methodology: Now, both individuals and legal entities can establish distribution assets, and the process will have a broader scope. Additionally, a financing option has been introduced, allowing applicants to contribute directly to investments.         Connection Opinions and Agreements Repealed Methodology: Distribution companies evaluated connection requests based on their investment plans. However, connection opinions were not detailed enough and were not structured within a clear framework. New Methodology: Connection opinions will now be more detailed, specifying necessary network assets and required investment timelines in advance, making the process more transparent.         Reimbursement and Cost Calculations Repealed Methodology: The reimbursement process for facilities established by users were uncertain. New Methodology: Since TEDAŞ’s published unit prices and Consumer Price Index (CPI) rates will be used in reimbursement calculations, investors will have clarity on which costs will be reimbursed, and reimbursement processes will become standardized.         Guarantees and Process Management Repealed Methodology: The application of financial guarantees was unclear, and there were no established rules on how processes would operate. New Methodology: Distribution companies will now have the authority to request guarantees from applicants under specific conditions for facilities that affect investment plans.         Expropriation and Permit Procedures Repealed Methodology: Expropriation and permit processes were the responsibility of distribution companies, and the responsibilities of applicants were not clearly defined. New Methodology: Distribution companies will be able to assign specific responsibilities to applicants based on requests, potentially speeding up expropriation processes.         Provisional Provisions and Status of Previous Investments Repealed Methodology: Reimbursement procedures for previously established facilities were uncertain. New Methodology: The new regulation provides an opportunity to assess past investments under New Methodology and aims to address deficiencies in previous applications. Legal Precautions for Investors Carefully reviewing agreements related to the connection and reimbursement process, Seeking legal counsel regarding expropriation and permit procedures, Establishing written agreements with distribution companies regarding payments and cost calculations. Legal Precautions for Distribution Companies Preparing connection opinions and investment plans in compliance with regulations, Ensuring transparency in reimbursement processes, Maintaining clear communication with investors during expropriation procedures. Conclusion: The New Methodology aims to regulate the establishment of distribution facilities and reimbursement processes in a more detailed and transparent manner, addressing uncertainties from previous applications. However, since it may introduce new risks for both investors and distribution companies, it is essential for both parties to carefully manage the process and seek legal counsel as necessary.  

Türkiye 2026 - Investment Climate

Türkiye 2026 - Investment ClimateThe Investments Case Has Been Written Into LawA large, industrially capable economy at the crossroads of Europe, the Gulf and Central Asia has paired a restored macro framework with a 2026 tax and investment package built expressly to reward high value activity. For corporate and financial investors alike, the window is open and unusually well defined.For most of the last decade, allocators filed Türkiye under the same heading: a genuinely large and sophisticated market, held back by a macro story no one could underwrite with confidence. That framing is now out of date. Since the orthodox policy turn of mid 2023 the country has reassembled the conventional building blocks of a credible economy, and in the first half of 2026 it has done something the previous cycle never attempted. It has legislated, in detail, an invitation to international capital. The opportunity is no longer a matter of sentiment or promise. It is on the statute book.A macro story that now reads cleanlyStart with the numbers a credit committee actually checks. General government debt sits near 26 percent of GDP, close to half the median for Türkiye's rating peers, a fiscal position most emerging markets can only envy. The current account deficit, above 5 percent of GDP as recently as 2023, has narrowed toward roughly 1 percent. Reserves have rebuilt steadily (international reserves rose to around 155 billion dollars in 2024 and are projected toward 175 billion), and the share of foreign currency in central government debt has fallen below 60 percent.The rating agencies have noticed. Through the recent cycle Fitch, Moody's and S&P all moved Türkiye higher, making it, on several counts, the only sovereign upgraded by all three in that window, and Fitch shifted its outlook to positive in January 2026. The central bank, having engineered a visible disinflation, has been able to begin easing from a peak, cutting the policy rate to 37 percent while keeping real rates firmly positive. Growth, deliberately cooled to bring prices down, is projected by the World Bank to accelerate from roughly 3.5 percent in 2025 toward 3.7 percent in 2026 and 4.4 percent in 2027. This is the profile of an economy being managed back to normal, and capital has responded: foreign direct investment reached about 13.1 billion dollars in 2025, up more than 12 percent in a year when global flows were flat to negative.Law No. 7582: a package designed to be used"The centerpiece of the 2026 story is Law No. 7582, the wide-ranging tax and investment package adopted by Parliament on 21 May 2026 and published in the Official Gazette on 4 June 2026. Its provisions commence on a staggered basis: several take effect on publication, while the core corporate incentives (the Qualified Service Centre and transit trade deductions, and their treatment in the domestic minimum tax base) apply to taxation periods beginning on or after 1 January 2026, for returns filed from 1 July 2026. The reduced 12.5 percent manufacturing rate applies only from 2027. It is not a blunt rate giveaway. It is a precise attempt to make Türkiye the natural home for regional management, financing, supply chains and high value services, and several measures stand out.The Qualified Service Centre (QSC) regime is the headline. A company that serves a multinational group active in at least three countries, deriving most of its revenue from related parties abroad, may deduct 95 percent of qualifying foreign sourced income from its corporate tax base, rising to 100 percent inside the Istanbul Finance Centre (IFC) or in designated presidential zones. The qualifying activities are deliberately broad: treasury and funding, financial advisory, reporting and audit, legal and compliance coordination, human resources, brand management, technology and digital transformation. The benefit runs for twenty fiscal periods, and qualified staff enjoy income tax exemption on salary up to three times the minimum wage (five times in the IFC). For any group rethinking where to seat its treasury or shared services, that is a concrete and durable reason to choose Istanbul.Manufacturers gain a headline production rate of 12.5 percent (against the 24 percent effective rate otherwise available) from 2027. Internationally mobile individuals who become Turkish resident, having been non resident for the prior three years, receive a twenty year exemption on foreign sourced income, paired with a flat 1 percent inheritance and gift rate on assets passing during that period, a combination that is competitive with, and considerably cheaper than, several established relocation jurisdictions. Merchanting and intermediation become highly efficient: the deduction for income from goods bought and sold abroad without entering Türkiye rises to 95 percent (100 percent in the IFC and designated zones).The Istanbul Finance Centre itself is reinforced across the board: the deduction on financial services export income rises from 75 percent to 100 percent and runs to 2047, the financial activity fee exemption extends from five years to twenty, and the personnel exemption now reaches all IFC participants. Technology start ups, finally, get a friendlier equity compensation regime, with the exemption ceiling doubled and the full benefit holding period halved to six years.The detail that turns the incentive into a returnOne technical point separates the informed reader from the brochure, and it is the reason these measures price into a real internal rate of return rather than existing only on paper. Since 2025 Türkiye has run a domestic minimum corporate tax: companies pay the higher of 25 percent after deductions or 10 percent before most of them. In many jurisdictions a floor of this kind quietly cancels out headline incentives. Law No. 7582 is built the other way. The QSC, transit trade and enhanced IFC deductions are each expressly allowed to count in the minimum tax base calculation, which means they survive the floor rather than being neutralised by it. Read alongside the standing framework (a 25 percent standard rate, a treaty network covering more than 85 countries, and duty advantaged access to the European Union through the Customs Union), that is what makes the QSC and IFC propositions genuinely bankable.State capital pointing the same directionThe tax package sits on top of an industrial policy already pushing the same way. The HIT-30 programme commits up to 30 billion dollars of tax incentives, grants and market development support through 2030 to high technology and green investment: electric vehicles, batteries, semiconductors, solar and wind components, data centres, green hydrogen and R&D. Project economics can be striking at the margin, with grant support reaching a quarter of the investment, tax support running to 60 percent and beyond for strategic projects, and the state covering half the personnel cost of R&D centres set up by the world's largest companies. The six region incentive map front loads further benefits, and 2025 reforms now let large data centres qualify for top tier treatment even in Istanbul.Where the opportunity concentratesPulling the threads together, four propositions stand out for international capital, and they speak to European and North American investors in slightly different registers.• The regional hub play. An IFC based QSC combines a near complete exemption on foreign sourced income (protected from the minimum tax), generous personnel relief, a deep treaty network and a geography that bridges Europe, the Gulf, Central Asia and North Africa. For a US or European group rationalising its footprint, this is a credible, and cheaper, alternative to the incumbent hub locations.• High technology and mobility. Electric vehicles, batteries, chips and the data centre and clean energy build out are exactly where state money is concentrated and where investment is already rotating. A domestic EV champion has seeded a supplier ecosystem, and producers reach an enormous combined market within a few hours, with duty advantaged entry to the European Union.• Export oriented manufacturing. The new 12.5 percent production rate meets a nearshoring dynamic that European buyers increasingly favour for resilience and lead time, with automotive components, machinery and textiles the established beneficiaries.• Private and family capital. The twenty year foreign income exemption and the 1 percent succession rate reframe Türkiye as a serious relocation and wealth structuring jurisdiction, attractive to globally mobile individuals weighing where to base.A clear eyed footnote on riskNo allocation of this kind is made without judgement, and the prudent investor will note the familiar features of an emerging market in transition: inflation that is still being brought down, a currency whose stability has been earned through tight policy, and an institutional environment that the agencies, while upgrading, continue to watch. None of this is new information, and none of it has deterred the record capital that arrived in 2025. The salient point is direction of travel. Each of these variables is improving on the published trajectory, and the reform package has been calibrated precisely so that the upside is captured by those who structure their entry with care rather than left hostage to the macro weather.ConclusionThe honest way to describe Türkiye in 2026 is that the structural assets (a large and diversified economy, a low debt sovereign balance sheet, a young workforce, a strategic location and now a tax architecture engineered to reward high value activity and to survive its own minimum tax) are as attractive as they have been in a generation, and that the country has chosen to write that attractiveness into law rather than leave it to rhetoric. For the corporate investor with an operating reason to be present, the case for acting now, while the incentive windows are open and the entry point is favourable, is strong. For the financial investor, the same reforms have materially improved the risk adjusted proposition. In both cases the difference this year is simple: the upside is no longer a forecast. It is legislation.

Amendment to the Communique on Investment Project Financing - The Priority Financing Certificate

Significant amendments have been introduced to the procedures and principles governing the evaluation of investment projects within the scope of financing programs through the “Communiqué Amending the Communiqué on the Strategic Prioritization and Technical Evaluation of Investment Projects,” published in the Official Gazette dated 3 September 2026 and numbered 33359.The amendment preserves the existing Technological and Strategic Projects (“TSP”) Certificate while introducing a new evaluation mechanism, the “Priority Financing Certificate.” As a result, investment projects seeking access to financing programs will now be assessed through two separate Ministry evaluation channels, depending on the nature of the investment: one through the TSP Certificate and the other through the Priority Financing Certificate.The TSP Certificate remains relevant for certain projects relating to the Türkiye Century Development Initiative, project-based state aid, products included in the Strategic Priority Product List, technology fields included in the Technology Fields List, and items included in the Critical Raw Materials List. At the same time, the Priority Financing Certificate establishes a new financing evaluation channel, particularly for investments in the manufacturing industry.TSP Certificate and Priority Financing CertificateUnder the Communiqué, the TSP Certificate continues to apply to investments within the scope of the Türkiye Century Development Initiative, as defined in the Decision on State Aid for Investments enacted by Presidential Decision No. 9903 dated 29 May 2025, or investments within the scope of the Decision on Granting Project-Based State Aid to Investments enacted by Council of Ministers Decision No. 2016/9495 dated 17 October 2016, as well as to projects that meet the qualifications determined under the Strategic Priority Product List, the Technology Fields List, and the Critical Raw Materials List.The newly introduced Priority Financing Certificate creates a separate channel for investors holding an investment incentive certificate for the manufacturing industry to obtain the Ministry’s evaluation before applying to financing programs. The certificate indicates that the allocation of credit is deemed appropriate for the relevant project in line with the priority criteria determined by the Ministry.The Priority Financing Certificate is not an investment incentive certificate under the Communiqué. Rather, it is granted following the Ministry’s evaluation before the application to the relevant financing program. Investors wishing to benefit from a financing program must apply to the intermediary bank together with the TSP Certificate or Priority Financing Certificate obtained from the Ministry.The Regulation also provides specific exceptions for TSP Certificate applications submitted without an investment incentive certificate. Investors that are not able to benefit from support measures under the investment incentive legislation may apply for a TSP Certificate for projects falling within subparagraph (b) of the first paragraph, even if an investment incentive certificate has not yet been issued. In addition, for projects for which an invitation letter has been issued or a support decision has been adopted under subparagraph (a) of the first paragraph, applications and preliminary applications may be evaluated before the incentive certificate is issued. For these projects, however, the final application evaluation is conducted only after the incentive certificate has been issued.Investors seeking to obtain the Ministry’s evaluation regarding their projects prior to applying for financing are expected to submit their applications through the electronic portal established by the Ministry.A New Evaluation Channel for a Broader Group of InvestorsOne of the key differences between the two certificates concerns the investment amount thresholds. While the minimum investment amount for the TSP Certificate is set at TRY 1 billion, this amount is determined as TRY 100 million for the Priority Financing Certificate. In addition, while TSP Certificate applications require the equity or paid-in capital shown in the balance sheet for the most recently completed fiscal year to be at least TRY 50 million, no separate financial sufficiency requirement of the same nature is envisaged for the Priority Financing Certificate. These investment amounts are taken into account based on the projected total investment amount, including R&D expenditures, as of the application date.This distinction indicates that the Priority Financing Certificate offers an application opportunity based on a lower minimum investment amount compared to the TSP Certificate. In particular, a new evaluation channel has emerged for investments in the manufacturing industry that do not meet the investment size envisaged for the TSP Certificate, but that are TRY 100 million or more and satisfy the other conditions set out in the Communiqué.However, it should be noted that the minimum investment requirement of TRY 100 million alone is not sufficient to obtain a Priority Financing Certificate. For investments falling within the scope of Annex-5, a Priority Financing Certificate is issued without any additional evaluation, whereas for other applications, scoring is carried out according to the criteria set out in Annex-6, and a Priority Financing Certificate is issued for those receiving 50 points or more.Differentiated Process for Investments within the Scope of Annex-5Annex-5, added to the Communiqué through the amendment, constitutes one of the significant elements of the Priority Financing Certificate system. Annex-5 covers Project-Based State Aid, the Technology Initiative Program, the Local Development Initiative Program and the Strategic Initiative Program under the Türkiye Century Development Initiative, as well as the incentive of strategic investments under the repealed Decision No. 2012/3305.For investments holding an investment incentive certificate within the scope of Annex-5, a Priority Financing Certificate will be issued without applying the Annex-6 scoring system or conducting an additional evaluation. Accordingly, no separate scoring process is required at the Priority Financing Certificate stage for investments already covered by the relevant incentive programs.This differentiated procedure means that investments within the scope of Annex-5 are not subject to an additional scoring or evaluation stage at the Priority Financing Certificate phase.Scoring-Based Evaluation under Annex-6For Priority Financing Certificate applications that do not fall within the scope of Annex-5, the evaluation criteria set out in Annex-6 will apply. For a Priority Financing Certificate to be issued in such applications, the investment must receive at least 50 points according to the relevant criteria.The Annex-6 criteria ensure that the investment amount is not the sole determining factor. The evaluation also takes into account the economic and technological characteristics of the project, including value added and technology level, sectoral impact, capacity utilization rate, type of investment, stage of completion, export/turnover ratio, location in an Organized Industrial Zone or Industrial Zone, and indicators relating to R&D and innovation capacity.This structure includes elements that may provide points in the evaluation, particularly for companies operating in fields included in the Medium-High and High Technology List, companies that have an R&D or Design Centre, companies with a branch in a techno park, companies that have successfully completed a TÜBİTAK project within the last five years, or companies that have had at least one patent registered within the last five years. Similarly, the fact that more than 20% of the investment has been completed, that the average export/turnover ratio for the last three years exceeds 10%, and that the investment is located in an Organized Industrial Zone or Industrial Zone are also among the criteria taken into account under Annex-6.In this framework, the system attaches importance not only to the investment amount, but also to indicators relating to the technology level of the investment project, its sectoral impact, export capacity, stage of completion, and the company’s R&D and innovation capabilities.The fact that the scoring criteria are set out in the annex to the Communiqué also provides investors with the opportunity to assess their own projects before applying and to prepare the information and documents supporting the application accordingly. For this reason, for investments within the scope of Annex-6, it will be important to prepare the application not only in terms of formal requirements, but also by taking into account all of the scoring criteria.Prioritization of Financing ResourcesThe new system also addresses the possibility that resources allocated to financing programs may be limited. If the Financing Program is terminated or suspended, or if the limits allocated to the program are exhausted, the acceptance of new applications may be discontinued following the relevant announcement. Where deemed necessary, existing Priority Financing Certificate applications that have been scored may also be ranked by score and evaluated starting from the highest-scoring application.Accordingly, obtaining 50 points or more under Annex-6 does not, in all cases, mean that the applicant will actually benefit from the financing program. Particularly where financing resources are limited and applications are ranked based on their scores, the score obtained may affect the order in which applications are evaluated.This matter increases the importance of project preparation for investors. Properly and sufficiently demonstrating R&D and technology capacity, export performance, investment location, completion status and other scoring elements at the application stage may be significant not only for the issuance of the Priority Financing Certificate, but also for any possible score-based ranking among applications.Combined Use of Financing Support and Incentive ElementsThe amendment to the Communiqué also includes a provision limiting duplicate support for the same financing cost. Investors benefiting from the Financing Program will not be provided with separate interest or profit share support under the relevant incentive certificate in respect of interest or profit share payments arising from such financing.Therefore, when structuring their financing arrangements, investors will need to assess not only the eligibility requirements for the Priority Financing Certificate or the TSP Certificate, but also the relationship between the financing program and the existing investment incentive elements.Strategic Stock Arrangement for TSP Project SizeThe amendment also enables the amount invested by the project owner in strategic stocks relating to the final products or intermediate inputs that are the subject of the investment to be included in calculating the TSP project size, where deemed appropriate by the Technical Committee.This provision is also of particular importance for investments within the scope of the TSP, as it allows investments in strategic stocks relating to strategic products or intermediate inputs to be taken into account in calculating the project size.Importance of the Regulation for InvestorsOne of the most significant consequences of the amendment to the Communiqué for investors is that, in addition to the TSP Certificate, a separate evaluation channel through the Priority Financing Certificate has been established for investment projects that may be subject to the Ministry’s evaluation within the scope of financing programs. For manufacturing industry investments that do not meet the TRY 1 billion minimum investment amount envisaged for the TSP Certificate, but that meet the TRY 100 million minimum investment amount envisaged for the Priority Financing Certificate and satisfy the other conditions under the Communiqué, a new evaluation channel is now available.In addition, the regulation emphasizes not only the monetary size of the investment, but also its economic and technological nature. The inclusion of elements such as R&D and design activities, patents, technology level, export performance, stage of completion of the investment, and the sectoral impact of the investment in the scoring system enables project and company characteristics to be taken into account more comprehensively in the evaluation of financing program applications.The non-application of the scoring process for investments within the scope of Annex-5 ensures that no additional evaluation stage is applied for projects holding incentive certificates issued under certain priority investment programs. For investments within the scope of Annex-6, the fact that the criteria have been predetermined allows investors to assess, before applying, the elements on the basis of which their projects will be scored.Nevertheless, the new system should not be regarded as a process consisting merely of obtaining a certificate. After obtaining the certificate, the investor must apply for financing to the intermediary bank under the relevant Financing Program. In addition, the possibility that new applications may cease to be accepted if program limits are exhausted, and that existing applications may be ranked according to their scores where deemed necessary, makes it important for investors to prepare their application processes and project submissions carefully.Concluding RemarksThe amendment to the Communiqué on the Strategic Prioritization and Technical Evaluation of Investment Projects creates a more differentiated evaluation structure for access to financing programs by introducing the Priority Financing Certificate alongside the existing TSP Certificate.In particular, the creation of a new evaluation opportunity for manufacturing industry investments based on a minimum investment amount of TRY 100 million establishes a new application channel for certain investments that fall below the TRY 1 billion investment threshold envisaged for the TSP Certificate. At the same time, it is also noteworthy that, for TSP Certificate applications, in certain cases, applications and preliminary evaluations may be conducted even if an investment incentive certificate has not yet been issued.The differentiated process envisaged for investments within the scope of Annex-5 and the 50-point evaluation model under Annex-6 provide for two separate evaluation methods depending on the nature of the investments.Under the new structure, alongside investment size, factors such as technology and value-added level, export performance, R&D and innovation capacity, the location of the investment, and stage of completion also gain importance, making it necessary for financing program applications to be prepared in a more comprehensive and strategic manner.In this context, investors should first determine whether their projects fall under the TSP Certificate or the Priority Financing Certificate. For Priority Financing Certificate applications, they should also assess whether the project falls within Annex-5 or Annex-6. Where Annex-6 applies, investors should review the scoring criteria in detail before applying and prepare the documents needed to substantiate the relevant scoring elements. Financing program limits, possible score-based rankings, and the restriction on duplicate support for the same financing cost should also be considered at the financing planning stage.

The Principle of Separability

Fundamental Principles of Arbitration #2: The Principle of SeparabilityThe Principle of Separability: The Independence of the Arbitration Agreement from the Underlying Contract, Its Limits, and Its Application under Turkish LawABSTRACTAn arbitration agreement is regarded as legally independent from the underlying contract in which it is contained. The invalidity, termination, or expiry of the underlying contract does not, in itself, render the arbitration agreement ineffective.Under Turkish law, the principle operates on two levels: Article 412(4) of the Turkish Code of Civil Procedure (“CCP”) and Article 4(4) of the Turkish International Arbitration Act (“IAA”) preclude certain objections, whereas Article 422(1) of the CCP and Article 7(H) of the IAA prescribe the manner in which the arbitral tribunal is to assess the issue.The principle does not afford absolute protection. Where the alleged defect is directed specifically at the arbitration agreement itself—such as the absence of specific authority to agree to arbitration, a forged signature, or the complete absence of consent to arbitrate—the arbitration agreement may independently be found invalid.One of the most significant practical consequences of the principle is that the arbitration agreement may be governed by a law different from that governing the underlying contract. In English law, the new Section 6A introduced by the Arbitration Act 2025, which entered into force on 1 August 2025, has fundamentally altered the position in this respect.1. INTRODUCTIONIn the first article of this series, we examined the principle of Competence-Competence, which refers to the power of an arbitral tribunal to rule on its own jurisdiction. This article addresses the second structural principle which, together with Competence-Competence, constitutes one of the pillars of modern arbitration law: the principle of separability.Does the fate of an arbitration agreement depend on the fate of the underlying contract in which it is contained? At first glance, the answer may appear to be yes. In practice, an arbitration clause is often drafted as one of the provisions of the underlying contract between the parties. It might therefore be assumed that, where the underlying contract is invalid, terminated, rescinded, or alleged never to have come into existence, the arbitration clause must share the same legal fate.Modern arbitration law, however, does not accept this assumption. The prevailing approach in national arbitration legislation, international arbitration rules, and international arbitral practice is that an arbitration agreement must be treated as legally independent from the underlying contract. Pursuant to the principle of “separability” or “severability”, the existence and validity of the arbitration agreement do not, as a rule, depend on the validity of the underlying contract in which it is contained.In civil law jurisdictions, the principle is generally expressed in terms of the autonomy of the arbitration agreement (autonomie de la convention d’arbitrage), while Turkish law refers to the principle as the “separability,” “independence,” or “autonomy” of the arbitration agreement.Separability, however, is not a theoretical construct that completely detaches the arbitration agreement from the underlying contract. Rather, it is a functional rule designed to safeguard the effectiveness of arbitral proceedings, protect party autonomy, and prevent premature and unnecessary intervention by national courts.2. The Meaning of the Principle of SeparabilityIn its broadest sense, the principle of separability means that the arbitration agreement is treated as a legally independent transaction from the underlying contract. Accordingly, the formal and substantive validity of the arbitration agreement is assessed independently from the validity of the underlying contract in which it is contained. The fact that the parties have incorporated the arbitration clause into the underlying contract does not make the legal existence of the arbitration agreement dependent on that contract.The essence of the principle lies in the recognition that, although the parties may appear to have signed a single instrument, the law treats that instrument as containing two distinct agreements. The first is the underlying contract governing the parties’ substantive legal relationship; the second is the arbitration agreement, procedural in nature, which determines the mechanism by which disputes arising out of that relationship are to be resolved. Since the purpose, function, and legal nature of these two agreements differ, they cannot necessarily be expected to share the same legal fate in every circumstance.One of the best-known explanations of this approach was advanced by Stephen M. Schwebel, former President of the International Court of Justice. According to Schwebel, when parties enter into a contract containing an arbitration clause, they in fact conclude not one but two separate agreements. In his terminology, the arbitration agreement is the “arbitral twin” of the underlying contract and may continue to exist notwithstanding defects affecting the underlying contract at its inception or disabilities affecting it thereafter (Stephen M. Schwebel, International Arbitration: Three Salient Problems, “The Severability of the Arbitration Agreement”, Cambridge, Grotius, 1987, p. 5).The principle of separability should not, however, be understood to mean that the arbitration agreement has no connection whatsoever with the underlying contract. The arbitration agreement plainly serves to resolve disputes arising out of the underlying contract and is closely connected with it. That relationship does not mean, however, that every challenge directed at the underlying contract automatically affects the arbitration agreement as well. In this respect, separability does not confer absolute independence on the arbitration agreement; rather, it establishes a presumption against automatically tying the legal fate of the arbitration agreement to that of the underlying contract.3. Why Is the Principle of Separability Necessary?Separability is not merely a theoretical rule of law; it is a principle developed in response to a concrete problem encountered in international commercial arbitration.In the earlier development of arbitration law, the prevailing view was that an arbitration clause formed an inseparable part of the underlying contract. Under that approach, every challenge to the validity of the underlying contract also placed the validity of the arbitration clause in question. Consequently, a party that had initially agreed to resolve disputes by arbitration could later obstruct the arbitral process simply by alleging that the underlying contract was invalid. In such circumstances, the arbitral tribunal could not proceed with the dispute, and the parties were required first to apply to the national courts for a determination that the arbitration agreement was valid.This approach resulted in significant delays and materially increased dispute resolution costs. More importantly, it substantially undermined one of arbitration’s principal advantages: the prompt and effective resolution of disputes. The arbitration agreement could, in practice, be rendered ineffective merely by raising an objection to the validity of the underlying contract.The principle of separability developed precisely to address this problem. By preventing allegations concerning the invalidity, ineffectiveness, or termination of the underlying contract from automatically extinguishing the arbitration agreement, the principle safeguards the continuity and integrity of the arbitral process.4. Consequences of the Principle of Separability4.1. Challenges to the underlying contract do not automatically affect the arbitration agreementAn allegation that the contract is invalid on grounds such as fraud, mistake, duress, gross disparity (laesio enormis), illegality, or impossibility does not, as a rule, invalidate the arbitration clause. Likewise, the termination, expiry, performance, or discharge of the underlying contract does not automatically render the arbitration agreement ineffective.4.2. Disputes concerning the existence and validity of the underlying contract fall within the scope of arbitrationAs a natural consequence, the arbitral tribunal may determine disputes concerning whether the underlying contract was formed, whether it is valid, or on what basis it was terminated. A determination by the arbitral tribunal that the underlying contract is invalid does not retroactively deprive the tribunal of its jurisdiction.4.3. The principle operates in both directionsAn aspect often overlooked in practice is that separability is not a one-way principle. The Turkish Court of Cassation, 11th Civil Chamber, has expressly recognised this point: just as the invalidity of the underlying contract does not affect the validity of the arbitration agreement, the converse is also true—the invalidity of the arbitration agreement for any reason does not affect or invalidate the underlying contract (Court of Cassation, 11th Civil Chamber, 23 March 2010, E. 2008/5901, K. 2010/3203).4.4. A different law may govern the arbitration agreementOne of the most significant practical consequences of separability is that the law governing the arbitration agreement may differ from the law governing the underlying contract. The important point is that the principle does not require, or even presume as a matter of course, that two different laws will apply. It merely makes that result possible. The applicable law must be determined by reference to the relevant conflict-of-laws rule.Under Turkish law, the relevant conflict-of-laws rule is set out in Article 4(3) of the IAA: “The arbitration agreement shall be valid if it complies with the law chosen by the parties to govern the arbitration agreement or, in the absence of such choice, with Turkish law.” The legislature thus expressly permits the parties to make a separate choice of law for the arbitration agreement and, in the absence of such choice, refers directly to Turkish law.The same logic is reflected at the international level in Article V(1)(a) of the 1958 New York Convention. That provision assesses the validity of the arbitration agreement under the law to which the parties have subjected it or, failing any indication thereon, under the law of the country where the award was made. Although the Convention does not expressly codify the principle of separability, its provision of a distinct conflict-of-laws rule for arbitration agreements is one of the clearest indications of the principle’s implicit recognition.The most recent and far-reaching development in this field has occurred in English law. The Arbitration Act 2025, which entered into force on 1 August 2025, introduced a new Section 6A into the Arbitration Act 1996. Under this provision, an arbitration agreement is governed by the law expressly agreed by the parties or, in the absence of such an express agreement, by the law of the seat of arbitration. The provision further states that a choice of law made in respect of the underlying contract does not, by itself, constitute an express choice of law for the arbitration agreement. This legislative reform reverses the approach adopted by the UK Supreme Court in Enka İnşaat ve Sanayi AŞ v OOO Insurance Company Chubb ([2020] UKSC 38), under which the choice of law governing the underlying contract could also operate as an implied choice of law for the arbitration agreement.For Turkish parties, the practical significance of this development is considerable. Where London is chosen as the seat of arbitration, while Turkish law is selected as the governing law of the underlying contract, the validity of the arbitration agreement will now, as a rule, be assessed under English law.4.5. The continuity of arbitral proceedings is preservedA party’s allegation that the underlying contract is invalid no longer generally requires the arbitral proceedings to be interrupted or the dispute to be determined first by a national court.5. Limits of the Principle of SeparabilitySeparability does not confer absolute or untouchable validity on an arbitration agreement. The principle merely provides that grounds of invalidity or termination directed at the underlying contract do not automatically extend to the arbitration agreement. Defects relating to the formation or validity of the arbitration agreement itself may always be raised independently.Accordingly, an arbitration agreement may independently be found invalid where there is a defect in consent, incapacity, lack of authority, forgery of a signature, or no expression of consent to arbitrate at all. The decisive question is whether the alleged defect is directed specifically at the arbitration agreement.A particularly important distinction must be drawn in this context. An allegation that the underlying contract was never formed represents one of the most debated limits of separability, and there is no single answer applicable in all cases. Where the allegation concerns the substance of the underlying contract—such as fraud, illegality, or gross disparity—the separability principle applies and the arbitration agreement ordinarily survives. By contrast, where the allegation is that there was never any consent at all—such as a forged signature, a wholly non-existent agreement, or representation by a person entirely lacking authority—the same defect may directly affect the arbitration clause itself, in which case separability affords no protection.Comparative law supports this distinction. In English law, Lord Hoffmann expressly recognised in Fiona Trust  that where a signature is forged, the arbitration clause will not survive either. In the United States, the Supreme Court in “Buckeye” deliberately left outside the scope of its ruling the question whether the underlying contract was ever formed, while in Granite Rock Co. v. Teamsters (561 U.S. 287 (2010)), the Court confirmed the distinction between objections concerning “formation” and those concerning “validity”, holding that formation disputes may be determined by the courts. Likewise, in “Dallah Real Estate v Pakistan”[2010] UKSC 46), the UK Supreme Court accepted that where a party contends that it was never bound by the arbitration agreement at all, the court is entitled to undertake a full review of that issue.6. Separability and Competence-Competence: Complementary but Distinct PrinciplesThe two principles are frequently discussed together in practice and are sometimes even used interchangeably. Yet they answer different questions. Separability answers the question “what remains valid?” and ensures that the arbitration agreement does not automatically share the fate of the underlying contract. Under Turkish law, its statutory bases are Articles 412(4) and 422(1) of the CCP and Articles 4(4) and 7(H) of the IAA. Competence-Competence, by contrast, answers the question “who decides?” and allows the arbitral tribunal to determine the matter in the first instance; its statutory bases are Article 422(1) of the CCP and Article 7(H) of the IAA.The relationship between the two principles is rooted in practical logic. It would not be inaccurate to say that, without separability, the principle of Competence-Competence would be substantially deprived of its effectiveness. If that were not the case, an arbitral tribunal that found the underlying contract invalid would simultaneously destroy the very basis of its own jurisdiction. The final sentence of Article 422(1) of the CCP and the corresponding provision of Article 7(H) of the IAA are designed precisely to break this circularity.Indeed, in its judgment dated 19 June 2020, E. 2019/4, K. 2020/1, the “Court of Cassation General Assembly on the Unification of Judgments” considered the two principles in conjunction. It emphasised that, by virtue of the separability and independence of the arbitration clause, an arbitrator is empowered to rule on his or her own jurisdiction, and that the purpose of this framework is to promote the speed of arbitration and prevent arbitration from being frustrated merely by invoking the alleged invalidity of the arbitration clause.7. Development of the Principle in International Arbitration LawSeparability is now one of the most firmly established principles of international arbitration law. Its current status, however, is the product of judicial and doctrinal developments extending throughout the second half of the twentieth century.7.1. International instrumentsArticle 16(1) of the UNCITRAL Model Law expressly provides that an arbitration clause forming part of a contract shall be treated as an agreement independent of the other terms of the contract, and that a decision by the arbitral tribunal that the underlying contract is null and void shall not ipso jure entail the invalidity of the arbitration clause. The provisions of Turkish legislation on the matter were directly inspired by this rule.Although the 1958 New York Convention does not expressly codify the principle, Article V(1)(a), discussed above, provides a distinct conflict-of-laws rule for arbitration agreements and thereby establishes a legal framework conducive to the application of separability.As regards institutional arbitration rules, Article 6(9) of the ICC Arbitration Rules, Article 23.2 of the LCIA Arbitration Rules, and Article 23(1) of the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules expressly recognise the principle. The provision concerning the arbitral tribunal’s jurisdiction in the Istanbul Arbitration Centre (“ISTAC”) Arbitration Rules follows the same approach.7.2. English lawIn English law, the principle of separability developed over many years through judicial decisions, was extended to allegations of illegality in Harbour Assurance v Kansa General International Insurance ([1993] QB 701), and was ultimately codified in Section 7 of the Arbitration Act 1996.One of the most significant expressions of this approach is “Fiona Trust & Holding Corporation v Privalov” ([2007] UKHL 40, also referred to as Premium Nafta Products Ltd v Fili Shipping Co Ltd). In that dispute, one party argued that the underlying contract was invalid because it had been procured through bribery and corruption and that the arbitration clause should therefore also be treated as invalid. The House of Lords rejected this argument and emphasised that grounds of invalidity directed at the underlying contract do not affect the arbitration clause unless they are directed specifically at the arbitration agreement itself. The Court further observed that, in the ordinary course of commercial dealings, parties can be expected to intend that their disputes be resolved in a single forum and that arbitration agreements should therefore not be interpreted narrowly.7.3. United States lawThe U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Manufacturing Co. (388 U.S. 395 (1967)) constitutes a landmark in this area. The Court held that an allegation that the underlying contract was invalid on the ground of fraud did not, by itself, invalidate the arbitration agreement and that, unless the challenge was directed specifically at the arbitration agreement, objections concerning the contract as a whole were for the arbitrators to determine.This approach was reinforced in “Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna” (546 U.S. 440 (2006)), where the Court expressly held that even an allegation that the underlying contract was wholly void did not automatically invalidate the arbitration agreement. As noted above, however, the question whether a contract had ever been formed was left outside the scope of that decision, and this issue was subsequently addressed in “Granite Rock”.7.4. French lawFrench law has played a pioneering role in the development of the principle. Under the approach developed in “Ets Raymond Gosset c. Carapelli” (Cass. civ. 1re, 7 May 1963), an international arbitration agreement is, as a rule, unaffected by the invalidity of the underlying contract. The principle is now expressly codified in Article 1447 of the French Code of Civil Procedure (Code de procédure civile), which provides that an arbitration agreement is independent from the contract to which it relates and is not affected by the ineffectiveness of that contract.7.5. Swiss lawIn Swiss law, the principle is codified in Article 178(3) of the Swiss Federal Act on Private International Law (“PILA” / “IPRG” / “LDIP”). Under this provision, the validity of an arbitration agreement may not be challenged on the sole ground that the underlying contract is invalid. Swiss law likewise recognises that the principle is not absolute and that an arbitration agreement may independently be invalid where the defect in question directly affects the arbitration agreement itself.These developments demonstrate that, notwithstanding differences in terminology and legal reasoning, the various legal systems ultimately arrive at the same conclusion: the legal fate of the underlying contract does not, as a rule, determine the legal fate of the arbitration agreement.8. The Principle of Separability under Turkish Law and the Case Law of the Court of Cassation8.1. Statutory framework: a two-tier structureUnder Turkish law, the principle of separability is regulated on two distinct levels—one substantive and one procedural. Understanding this distinction is essential to appreciating how the principle operates.The first level consists of a prohibition on a particular objection. Article 412(4) of the CCP provides as follows: “An objection may not be raised against the arbitration agreement on the ground that the underlying contract is invalid or that the arbitration agreement relates to a dispute that has not yet arisen.” Article 4(4) of the IAA contains a provision to the same effect. These rules prevent a party from challenging the arbitration agreement merely by relying on the alleged invalidity of the underlying contract.The second level concerns the method by which the arbitral tribunal is to assess the matter. Article 422(1) of the CCP provides:“An arbitrator or arbitral tribunal may rule on its own jurisdiction, including any objections with respect to the existence or validity of the arbitration agreement. For that purpose, an arbitration clause forming part of a contract shall be treated as an agreement independent of the other terms of the contract. A decision by the arbitrator or arbitral tribunal that the underlying contract is invalid shall not automatically entail the invalidity of the arbitration agreement.”Article 7(H) of the IAA contains a parallel provision for international arbitration.In addition, Article 4(3) of the IAA, as discussed under Section 4.4 above, completes the conflict-of-laws dimension of the principle by providing a distinct rule for determining the validity of the arbitration agreement.8.2. Case law of the Court of CassationCourt of Cassation, 19th Civil Chamber, 15 November 1995, E. 1995/9108, K. 1995/9685. The Court expressly held that an arbitration clause is an independent agreement governing the resolution of disputes arising out of or relating to the underlying contract and that its formal and substantive validity must be assessed separately from the validity of the underlying contract. Accordingly, the termination, expiry, or suspension of the underlying contract does not, by itself, terminate the arbitration clause.The date of this judgment is particularly noteworthy. It was rendered during the period in which the former Code of Civil Procedure was in force, before Turkish law contained any express statutory provision on separability. The Court of Cassation thus recognised the principle through case law six years before the enactment of the International Arbitration Act and sixteen years before the adoption of the current Code of Civil Procedure.The judgments of the Court of Cassation, 11th Civil Chamber, 23 March 2010, E. 2008/5901, K. 2010/3203, and the Court of Cassation General Assembly of Civil Chambers, 22 February 2012, E. 2011/11-742, K. 2012/82, concern different stages of the same dispute. In proceedings for demurrage arising out of a contract of carriage, the first-instance court upheld the arbitration objection and dismissed the action for lack of jurisdiction. The 11th Civil Chamber reversed that judgment, the first-instance court resisted the reversal, and the General Assembly of Civil Chambers ultimately endorsed the Chamber’s reasoning and set aside the resistance judgment.In its judgment, the 11th Civil Chamber clearly articulated the principle of separability but found, on the facts, that the company acting as ship manager had not been granted authority to enter into an arbitration agreement and that the arbitration clause was therefore invalid. The judgment relied on Article 388(2) of the former Code of Obligations and Article 63 of the former Code of Civil Procedure. Their current equivalents are Article 504(3) of the Turkish Code of Obligations (“TCO”) and Article 74 of the CCP, both of which require specific authority for a representative to enter into an arbitration agreement. The judgment further noted that an agent may not conclude a contract in the name of its principal without specific and written authorisation.These judgments demonstrate that separability does not operate as an absolute shield preserving the arbitration agreement in all circumstances. The formation and validity requirements of the arbitration agreement itself remain subject to independent scrutiny. In Turkish practice, one of the most frequently encountered limitations on the principle of separability is precisely the absence of specific authority to agree to arbitration.The Court of Cassation General Assembly on the Unification of Judgments, 19 June 2020, E. 2019/4, K. 2020/1, concerned the appropriate avenue of review in insurance arbitration. Nevertheless, the judgment contains significant observations concerning the fundamental structure of arbitration. It identified the separability and independence of the arbitration clause, together with the tribunal’s power to rule on its own jurisdiction under the principle of Competence-Competence, as structural principles of arbitration law. The judgment is particularly significant in that it treats separability not merely as a theoretical rule concerning validity, but as a functional principle designed to promote the speed and effectiveness of arbitral proceedings.Taken together, these judgments demonstrate that Turkish case law has adopted an approach consistent with international arbitration law. On the one hand, the Court of Cassation protects the parties’ agreement to arbitrate by recognising the independence of the arbitration agreement; on the other hand, it delineates the limits of the principle by requiring defects relating specifically to the formation of the arbitration agreement to be examined independently.9. Practical TakeawaysThe principle of separability has concrete implications for contractual negotiations and dispute management. In light of the principle, we consider the following points particularly important in practice:Specify expressly and separately the law governing the arbitration agreement. When Article 4(3) of the Turkish IAA is considered together with the new Section 6A under English law, it is no longer safe to assume that a choice of law for the underlying contract will necessarily extend to the arbitration clause. The law governing the arbitration agreement should be stated in a separate sentence from the governing law of the underlying contract and the seat of arbitration.If the seat of arbitration and the law governing the underlying contract are different, make that choice deliberately. The divergence between these two connecting factors may result in the validity of the arbitration agreement being assessed under a law that the parties did not anticipate.Expressly include authority to agree to arbitration in powers of attorney, signature circulars, and other authority documents. Under Article 504(3) of the TCO and Article 74 of the CCP, entering into an arbitration agreement requires specific authority. A significant number of Turkish court decisions finding arbitration clauses invalid arise from the absence of such authority. Particular care should therefore be taken where contracts are signed by intermediaries acting as agents, ship managers, distributors, or in similar capacities.When terminating a contract, confirm that the arbitration clause survives. Including an express “survival” provision in termination, release, or settlement agreements stating that the arbitration clause remains in force can prevent subsequent disputes on this issue.Do not abandon reliance on the arbitration agreement merely because the counterparty alleges that the underlying contract is invalid. As a rule, such an allegation does not prevent the continuation of the arbitral proceedings and may be determined by the arbitral tribunal.10. CONCLUSIONThe principle of separability protects the parties’ agreement to arbitrate from general challenges directed at the underlying contract by requiring the arbitration agreement to be treated as a legally independent transaction. In this respect, separability, together with Competence-Competence, constitutes one of the two structural safeguards that make effective arbitral adjudication possible.The principle does not, however, confer absolute immunity on the arbitration agreement. Defects concerning the formation and validity of the arbitration agreement itself remain subject to separate examination. In Turkish practice, the clearest manifestation of this limitation is the requirement of specific representative authority to enter into an arbitration agreement.Turkish law has expressly embraced the principle at the statutory level through both the Code of Civil Procedure and the International Arbitration Act, while the Court of Cassation had already incorporated the principle into Turkish law through its case law long before the enactment of those statutory provisions. This demonstrates the alignment of Turkish arbitration law with the contemporary international approach to arbitration.In the next article of this series, we will examine the principle of arbitrability, which constitutes a prerequisite for the validity and effectiveness of the parties’ agreement to arbitrate.For the first article in the series: Fundamental Principles of Arbitration #1: The Competence-Competencehttps://kesikli.com/tr/news-insight/2026-06-15-kompetenz-kompetenz-ilkesi/(https://kesikli.com/tr/news-insight/2026-06-15-kompetenz-kompetenz-ilkesi/Frequently Asked QuestionsIf our contract is found invalid, does the arbitration clause also become invalid? As a rule, no. The invalidity, termination, or expiry of the underlying contract does not automatically invalidate the arbitration clause. For the arbitration clause itself to be invalid, the relevant defect must be directed specifically at the arbitration agreement.We have chosen the governing law of the underlying contract. Does that choice also govern the arbitration clause? Not necessarily. Under Article 4(3) of the Turkish IAA, where no separate choice of law is made for the arbitration agreement, Turkish law applies. Under English law, as of 1 August 2025, the law of the seat applies in the absence of an express agreement to the contrary. It is therefore advisable to determine expressly the law governing the arbitration agreement.What happens if the person who signed the contract lacked authority to agree to arbitration? Under Article 504(3) of the TCO and Article 74 of the CCP, entering into an arbitration agreement requires specific authority. The absence of such authority may render the arbitration clause invalid notwithstanding the principle of separability. The Court of Cassation has issued judgments to this effect.Are separability and Competence-Competence the same principle? No. Separability answers the question “what remains valid?”, whereas Competence-Competence answers “who decides?” The two principles are complementary, but they perform different functions.

Extraordinary Termination of Employment Contracts: Termination Due to Suspicion

Legal Analysis The termination of suspicion is not explicitly regulated under Labor Law No. 4857 ("the Law") but has been recognized in practice through decisions of the Supreme Court. Initially, the concept of termination due to suspicion emerged in German law and was first introduced into Turkish law by the 9th Civil Chamber of the Supreme Court in the decision with file number 2007/16878 and decision number 2007/30923. Definition and Doctrine The termination of suspicion is defined in Supreme Court precedents as follows: "Termination of suspicion is an exceptional type of termination applicable in cases where the employer cannot prove or is not yet in a position to prove that the employee has committed a crime or has significantly violated the employment contract." (See Supreme Court 22nd Civil Chamber, 17.10.2017, File No. 2017/40841, Decision No. 2017/21915) In the doctrine, it is argued that a serious, significant, and concrete suspicion justified by facts, which cannot be eliminated, renders the employee's performance of work meaningless in trust-intensive employment relationships. Moreover, strong suspicion by the employer eliminates the suitability of the employee for that job in employment contracts where the employee's personality holds significant importance (Yenisey, Şüphe Feshi, Sicil İş Hukuku D., September 2008, p. 66). In this aspect, termination due to suspicion is not a penalty imposed on the employee but a contractual tool that the employer can use to protect the interests of their business (Baysal, Şüphe Feshi Kavramı ve Şüphe Feshine İlişkin Yargıtay Kararlarının Değerlendirilmesi, Sicil İş Hukuku D., 2016/35, p. 89). Conditions Required for the Existence of Termination Due to Suspicion Several conditions must be met for termination due to suspicion to be considered valid: Suspicion: There must be a suspicion that the employee has committed a crime or engaged in behavior contrary to the contract. Strong suspicion: The suspicion must be based on objective facts and incidents. Efforts by the employer: The employer must have demonstrated all efforts reasonably expected of them, yet the suspicion remains unresolved. Employee’s defense: The employee's defense must have been taken. In a decision by the Supreme Court, it was stated that for termination due to suspicion to be applicable, there must be a strong suspicion based on objective facts and incidents capable of destroying the trust necessary for the continuation of the employment relationship. Furthermore, it is required that, despite the employer demonstrating all reasonable efforts to clarify the situation, the act in question cannot be proven. (See Supreme Court General Assembly, Date: 15.11.2018, File No. 2015/2715, Decision No. 2018/1720) It is necessary to prove the existence of serious, important, and concrete incidents that justify the suspicion, and what needs to be proven here is not the incident itself but the incident that justifies the suspicion. Indeed, if it is clearly understood that the employee's behavior falls within one of the valid or justified reasons regulated by the Law, then there should be no resort to termination due to suspicion in such a situation. In determining the termination due to suspicion, the employer's subjective assessment alone is insufficient. The presence of suspicion, whether the suspicion seriously undermines the employer's trust in the employee, and finally, whether the employer can continue to employ the employee despite this suspicion, is evaluated by the judge ex officio, considering the specifics of each case. Case Law Analysis In the case of termination due to suspicion, a strong suspicion justified by serious, important, and concrete events that cannot be dispelled leads to a breakdown in the trust relationship between the employer and the employee. As a result of a crime or serious breach of duty that cannot be proven to have been committed by the employee, but where there are concrete indications of the employee's involvement, the employer's expectation of the employee's performance becomes meaningless. On the other hand, termination due to suspicion executed by the employer is accepted as based on a valid reason according to high court decisions. In the decision of the Ankara Regional Court of Justice 7th Civil Chamber, Date: 14.11.2017, File No. 2017/3903, Decision No. 2017/2936, it was stated "The suspicion felt by the employer towards the employee in the employment relationship leads to a deterioration in the trust relationship between them. Due to a suspicion that cannot be tolerated by the employer, the employee's suitability for continuing the employment relationship is eliminated, and the suspicion, which causes the trust relationship to be shaken, emerges as a reason inherent in the employee's personality. A suspicion justified by serious, important, and concrete events eliminates the suitability of the employee for work that cannot be performed without a potential for trust. Thus, termination due to suspicion arises as a type of termination related to the employee's competence. The suspicion must be based on certain objective facts and indications existing at the time of termination. The employer's mere subjective assessment is not sufficient, and the examination must reveal that it is highly probable that the employee committed the suspected act. Termination due to suspicion is among the valid reasons for termination." the termination executed by paying severance and notice compensation is accepted as a termination based on a valid reason. Accordingly, it is possible to state that in the case of termination due to suspicion, the employee will be entitled to severance and notice compensation but will not be entitled to reinstatement. Conclusion Termination due to suspicion will come into play when there is a strong suspicion based on objective facts and incidents capable of destroying the trust necessary for the continuation of the employment relationship. Termination due to suspicion provided that the above-mentioned conditions are met, is an extraordinary type of termination that the employer can resort to and is accepted as termination with a valid reason. Therefore, if the conditions mentioned above are met by the employer, the termination due to suspicion option can be utilized, and the employee's contract can be terminated by paying severance and notice compensation.

Türkiye's 2026 Tax Reform

Türkiye's 2026 Tax Reform: A Practical Briefing for Corporates, Investors, and High-Net-Worth Individuals1. OverviewA legislative proposal (“Proposal”) amending certain laws has been submitted to the Grand National Assembly of Türkiye (“TBMM”) on 05.05.2026. The Proposal aims to align Türkiye’s legal framework with current economic developments while supporting growth, enhancing international competitiveness, and improving the balance of trade. It introduces a comprehensive set of measures to attract foreign capital, increase foreign currency inflows, and expand employment opportunities. Key elements include tax incentives for export-oriented production, the establishment of qualified service centers to boost high-value-added service exports, and extended benefits under the Istanbul Finance Center regime. The proposal also strengthens the technology and startup ecosystem through enhanced equity incentives and the introduction of alternative financing tools such as convertible debt instruments. In addition, it promotes voluntary tax compliance and asset repatriation, while offering targeted tax advantages to non-resident individuals, with the broader goal of improving Türkiye’s investment climate and positioning the country as a competitive global hub for innovation and services.Although the Proposal introduces amendments to a wide range of laws, this briefing note focuses specifically on the changes proposed to the Income Tax Law, numbered 193 (“Income Tax Law”) and the Corporate Tax Law, numbered 5520 (“Corporate Tax Law”).2. Article 4 of the Proposal amending Article 20 (bis) of the Income Tax Law.With Article 4 of the Proposal, the following Article has been proposed to be added to the Income Tax Law under the section titled “Income Tax Exemptions”:“Tax exemption for income and earnings derived from abroadArticle 20 (bis)/D: Income and earnings derived abroad by individuals deemed to be resident in Türkiye (1) shall be exempt from income tax for a period of twenty years, provided that such individuals have not had a domicile or tax liability in Türkiye during the last three calendar years prior to being deemed resident in Türkiye.The fact that individuals within the scope of the first paragraph had previously been subject to tax liability in Türkiye due to income from immovable property, movable capital income, or capital gains prior to entering the scope of this Article shall not prevent them from benefiting from this exemption.No annual income tax return shall be filed in respect of such income and earnings, and where a return is filed due to other income, such income shall not be included therein.Expenses and costs related to income and earnings benefiting from this exemption shall not be taken into account in the determination of taxable income.Taxes paid abroad in respect of the income and earnings covered by this exemption may not be credited against income tax assessed in Türkiye.In the event that the conditions for the exemption are subsequently determined not to have been satisfied, the taxes not accrued shall be deemed to have been lost.The Ministry of Treasury and Finance is authorized to determine the procedures and principles regarding the implementation of this Article.”3. Article 7 of the Proposal amending Article 10 of the Corporate Income Tax Law.With Article 7 of the Proposal, Article 10 (i) of the Corporate Income Tax Law (2) has been proposed to be amended as follows:“ (i) 95% of the income derived from the sale abroad of goods purchased from abroad without being brought into Türkiye (3), or from intermediary activities relating to the purchase and sale of goods carried out abroad (this rate shall be applied as 100% for corporations operating in the Istanbul Finance Center Zone with a participant certificate in accordance with Law No. 7412 dated 22/6/2022).In order to benefit from this deduction, it is required that the income be transferred to Türkiye by the deadline for filing the corporate tax return for the relevant accounting period in which the income is derived, and that neither the buyer nor the seller of the goods subject to the intermediary activities be located in Türkiye. The President (4) is authorized to reduce the rates stipulated in this subparagraph to zero or increase them up to 100%.”Article 7 of the Proposal also proposed adding the following subparagraph to Article 10 of the Corporate Income Tax Law:“j) 95% of the income derived exclusively from abroad within the scope of the activities of corporations operating as qualified service centers under Law No. 4875 dated 5/6/2003 on Foreign Direct Investment (this rate shall be applied as 100% for corporations operating as qualified service centers in the Istanbul Finance Center Zone with a participant certificate in accordance with Law No. 7412).This deduction shall be applied for twenty accounting periods as from the accounting period in which the qualified service center becomes operational, provided that the income is transferred to Türkiye by the deadline for filing the corporate tax return for the relevant accounting period in which the income is derived. The President is authorized to reduce the rates stipulated in this subparagraph to 50% or increase them up to 100%.”4. Article 8 of the Proposal amending Article 32/7 of the Corporate Income Tax Law.Article 8 of the Proposal proposes to amend Article 32/7 of the Corporate Income Tax Law as follows:“The corporate tax rate shall be applied at 9% to the income derived exclusively from the export of goods manufactured by manufacturing companies that directly export the goods they produce, and at 14% to the income derived exclusively from exports by exporting corporations.These reduced rates shall also apply to income derived from export activities carried out through foreign trade capital companies or sectoral foreign trade companies by manufacturer-exporters or supplier companies based on intermediary export agreements.”5. Article 10 of the Proposal adding Provisional Article 19 to the Corporate Income Tax Law.With Article 10 of the Proposal, the following Provisional Article 19 has been proposed to be added to the Corporate Income Tax Law:(1) In order to increase voluntary tax compliance, cash, gold, foreign currency, securities, and other capital market instruments held abroad by real or legal persons shall be declared to banks or intermediary institutions until 31 July 2027.(2) Assets declared pursuant to the first paragraph must be transferred, within two months from the date of declaration, to accounts opened in the name of the declarant with banks or intermediary institutions in Türkiye, or, if physically brought into Türkiye, deposited into such accounts. The physical importation of such assets shall be evidenced by documents relating to the declaration submitted to the Customs Administration. The Customs Administration shall notify the Revenue Administration of such declarations by the end of the month following the month in which the declaration is received.(3) Cash, gold, foreign currency, securities, and other capital market instruments owned by income or corporate tax taxpayers, which are located in Türkiye but not recorded in the statutory books, shall be declared to banks or intermediary institutions until 31 July 2027. Such assets must be evidenced by being deposited with banks or intermediary institutions as of the declaration date.(4) Assets declared under the first and third paragraphs shall be recorded in the statutory books as of the declaration date by taxpayers maintaining books under Tax Procedure Law No. 213. Taxpayers keeping books on a balance sheet basis shall establish a special reserve account under liabilities for the assets recorded pursuant to this Article. This reserve account shall not be withdrawn from the business for a period of two years from the declaration date, shall not be used for any purpose other than capital increase, and shall not be subject to taxation in the event of liquidation. Taxpayers maintaining books on a self-employment income ledger or on an operating account basis shall show such assets separately in their books. These assets shall not be taken into account in the determination of taxable income and may be withdrawn from the business after two years from the declaration date without being considered in the calculation of taxable income or distributable profits.(5) Real or legal persons without income or corporate tax liability shall benefit from the provisions of this Article without being subject to the conditions set forth in the fourth paragraph, provided that they bring the declared assets into Türkiye within the period specified in paragraph (2) and evidence domestic assets by depositing them with banks or intermediary institutions as of the declaration date.(6) Banks and intermediary institutions shall, as withholding agents, collect in advance a tax at the rate of 5% over the declared value of the assets and declare and pay such tax to their competent tax office by the evening of the fifteenth day of the month following the declaration. Insofar, the tax rate, provided that the assets are held in time deposits or government domestic borrowing instruments or lease certificates issued under Law No. 4749, shall be applied as: 0% if the assets are committed to be held for at least 5 years, 1% if held for at least 4 years, 2% if held for at least 3 years, 3% if held for at least 2 years, 4% if held for at least 1 year. For declarations made between 1 January 2027 and 31 July 2027 (inclusive), these rates shall be increased by 0.5 percentage points. If the deadline of 31 July 2027 is extended by authority, the tax rate shall be increased by an additional 0.5 percentage points (i.e. total 1 percentage point increase) for declarations made after such extended date.(7) Tax paid under this Article shall under no circumstances be treated as a deductible expense or offset against any other tax. Losses arising from the disposal of declared assets shall not be accepted as deductible expenses or allowances for income or corporate tax purposes.(8) No tax audit or tax assessment shall be conducted in respect of the declared assets. However, this shall not prevent the application of measures required under other legislation. Where a difference in tax base identified as a result of tax audits or assessment commission decisions is determined to arise from the assets declared under this Article, and the declared amount is equal to or greater than such difference, no tax assessment shall be made regarding such difference. If the tax base difference exceeds the amount of declared assets, despite being determined to have arisen due to such assets, tax shall be assessed only on the excess amount. If, as a result of tax audits or assessment commission decisions, a tax base difference is determined for reasons other than the declared assets, assessments shall be made without offsetting the amounts declared under this Article against the tax base difference found.(9) The provisions of the eighth paragraph shall not be benefited from in cases where assets declared pursuant to the first paragraph are not brought into Türkiye within two months from the declaration date; or are not transferred to an account opened at a bank or intermediary institution in Türkiye; assets declared pursuant to the third paragraph are not deposited with a bank or intermediary institution within the specified period; assessed taxes relating to the declared amounts are not paid on time; commitments are not fulfilled; or other conditions set forth in this Article are not satisfied. In addition, taxes not accrued in due time shall be collected together with default interest, without applying a tax loss penalty. The provisions of the eighth paragraph shall also not apply to assessments resulting from tax audits or assessment commission decisions where the declaration under this Article was made after the commencement of a tax audit or referral to an assessment commission. Failure to pay the accrued tax by the due date shall not prevent the collection of the principal tax together with late payment charges pursuant to Law No. 6183. Taxes already collected shall neither be rejected nor refunded.(10) No corrections are allowed to be made in respect of declarations once the declaration period has expired.(11) The President is authorized to extend the deadline of 31 July 2027 by periods not exceeding six months at a time, up to a maximum of one year. The Ministry of Treasury and Finance is authorized to determine the procedures and principles regarding the declaration, transfer, and inclusion of the assets within the scope of this Article, as well as the required forms and supporting documents.”6. Legislative Status and DisclaimerThe Proposal includes additional provisions beyond those summarized in this briefing note. The provisions referred to herein form part of the Provision submitted to the TBMM on 5 May 2026 and are currently under review by the Planning and Budget Committee.The Proposal has not yet been published in the Official Gazette and therefore has not entered into force. Accordingly, the content of the Proposal remains subject to change during the legislative process, and it is also possible that the Proposal may not be enacted in its current form or may not be enacted at all.(1) Residency in Türkiye is defined under Article 4 of the Income Tax Law as follows:The following persons shall be deemed to be resident in Türkiye:Those whose domicile is in Türkiye (domicile shall mean the places defined under Article 19 and the following Articles of the Turkish Civil Code);Those who stay in Türkiye for more than six months within a calendar year on a continuous basis (temporary absences shall not interrupt the period of residence in Türkiye).(2) Article 10 of the Corporate Income Tax Law regulates the deductions shall be made from the corporate income amount.(3) We understand from the aim of the Proposal that this part refers to transit trade.(4) The president of the Republic of Türkiye.

Energy and Carbon Reduction Support Programme (EKA)

On 29 June 2026, the Ministry of Energy and Natural Resources (the “Ministry”) announced the Energy and Carbon Reduction (“EKA”) Support Programme, which aims to support businesses that reduce the carbon intensity of their operations through improvements in energy efficiency.According to the announcement, applications will be accepted through the Energy Efficiency Support Management System (“EVDES”) between 1 July and 30 September 2026. The Ministry further stated that certain enterprises operating in the manufacturing industry and the buildings and services sectors will be eligible to apply, and outlined the applicable evaluation criteria, the methodology for calculating support amounts, and the procedures governing the reference, implementation, monitoring, and payment periods. In this respect, the Programme appears to constitute a performance-based support mechanism focused on energy efficiency and carbon reduction outcomes.Following the scoring process, the top ten applications in each sector will be selected for the monitoring phase. Upon completion of the monitoring period, a final assessment will be conducted. Businesses achieving a calculated reduction performance exceeding 70%, as determined under the applicable methodology, may be eligible for a grant of up to 30% of their 2026 energy expenditures, depending on the level of reduction achieved. The maximum support amount has been set at TRY 18,061,775. The Programme envisages a reference period covering January 2023 to December 2025, an implementation and monitoring period covering January to December 2026, and a payment period commencing in July 2027 and thereafter.The Ministry expressly states in the announcement that applications will be assessed in accordance with the Implementation Procedures and Principles on the Energy and Carbon Reduction Support Programme (the “Procedures and Principles”). As such, the EKA Support Programme should arguably not be viewed merely as a standalone incentive scheme applicable to a particular application period, but rather as part of the broader regulatory and institutional framework that has evolved over many years in the field of energy efficiency.Regulatory Framework of the EKA ProgrammeThe principal rules governing the implementation of the Programme are set out in the Procedures and Principles. These provisions address, among other matters, application requirements, evaluation criteria, monitoring procedures, payment mechanisms, and circumstances in which support payments may be reclaimed.The legal basis of the Procedures and Principles is found in Article 34 of the Regulation on Increasing Efficiency in the Use of Energy Resources and Energy (the “Regulation”). The relevant provision authorises the Ministry to prepare and publish the procedural framework relating to training, certification, authorisation, and support mechanisms in the field of energy efficiency. It therefore appears that the operational rules governing the EKA Programme have been established pursuant to this delegated authority.The Regulation also serves as the foundation for the authorisation regime applicable to entities operating in the energy efficiency sector. In this context, Procedures and Principles Governing the Issuance of Certificates of Authorization to Institutions and Organizations Providing Energy Efficiency Services regulate the entities entitled to provide energy efficiency services and the conditions under which such services may be rendered. Pursuant to these rules, legal entities satisfying the prescribed requirements may obtain a five-year authorisation certificate enabling them to operate as an Energy Efficiency Consultancy Company (“EVD”).The statutory basis of this authorisation framework can be traced to Article 5 of the Energy Efficiency Law No. 5627 (the “Law”). This provision defines the roles and responsibilities of universities, professional chambers, authorised institutions, and EVD companies within the energy efficiency ecosystem. It also sets out their functions concerning energy audits, consultancy services, energy efficiency projects, and related activities. Furthermore, the Authorisation Agreement for Institutions, annexed to the relevant authorisation procedures, expressly refers to Article 5 of the Law and emphasises that activities are to be carried out in compliance with the applicable energy efficiency legislation.Viewed from this perspective, the legal infrastructure underpinning the EKA Programme extends beyond the Ministry’s announcement itself. Rather, it appears to rest upon a multi-layered regulatory framework comprising Law No. 5627, the Regulation, and the secondary rules adopted pursuant thereto. While the Law establishes the fundamental authority and institutional framework, the Regulation shapes the practical application of energy efficiency policy, and the Procedures and Principles provide the Programme’s operational rules. The Ministry’s announcement may therefore be seen as the final step that operationalises this regulatory framework for a specific application period.Operational Framework of the EKA ProgrammeThe implementation of the Programme appears to be supported not only by legal rules but also by a range of technical and administrative mechanisms. Application File Formats, Monitoring File Formats, Calculation Methodologies, and Sample Calculation Documents are among the core instruments used to determine how energy efficiency and carbon reduction performance will be measured. The assessment of both application-stage data and monitoring-period results in accordance with these methodologies constitutes a significant element of the Programme’s performance-based structure.In practice, businesses may also seek technical support from Energy Efficiency Consultancy Companies in relation to the preparation of energy performance analyses, energy intensity assessments, and carbon reduction studies. This suggests that the EVD system functions not merely as a standalone authorisation mechanism but also as one of the institutional structures contributing to the implementation of broader energy efficiency policies.A review of the eligibility requirements set out in the Procedures and Principles further indicates that participation in the Programme is contingent upon compliance with a number of obligations. Requirements such as maintaining up-to-date EVDES records, appointing an energy manager, uploading the necessary documentation to the system, and, for certain enterprises, holding an ISO 50001 Energy Management System certificate, appear to be linked to obligations arising under various regulatory instruments. Accordingly, the Programme does not seem to be limited to a grant application process alone but rather forms part of a wider framework encompassing energy management and regulatory compliance obligations.The support process itself appears to consist of several consecutive stages. Following the submission of applications, a preliminary evaluation is carried out, after which a limited number of enterprises from each sector are admitted to the monitoring phase. A final evaluation is then conducted upon completion of the monitoring period. Accordingly, entitlement to support is influenced not only by the information submitted during the application stage but also by the actual performance achieved during the monitoring period. In particular, monitoring-period data and the monitoring file prepared on the basis of such data are likely to serve a critical role in the final assessment process.Against this backdrop, businesses considering participation in the Programme may wish to view the application process as extending beyond the mere preparation of documentary requirements. The accuracy of reference-period data, the sustainability of the performance improvements achieved during the monitoring period, and compliance with the relevant regulatory obligations may all constitute important aspects of a successful application strategy.The Programme also appears to incorporate a range of audit and verification mechanisms. These include the review of application documents, on-site inspections where deemed necessary, verification of monitoring-period data, and post-payment controls. Collectively, these measures form an integral part of the Programme’s oversight framework.In addition, where irregularities, misrepresentations, or non-compliance with applicable legislation are identified, not only the specific rules governing the EKA Programme, but also other areas of legislation may become relevant depending on the circumstances of the case. Situations involving false documentation or inaccurate records could potentially give rise to considerations under Article 359 of the Tax Procedure Law, while matters concerning the recovery and collection of public support payments may, in certain cases, fall within the scope of Law No. 6183 on the Procedure for the Collection of Public Receivables.Concluding RemarksTaken together, the foregoing considerations suggest that the EKA Support Programme may be viewed not merely as a grant scheme announced for a specific period, but as part of a broader legislative and institutional architecture established in the field of energy efficiency. An examination of the underlying Law, Regulation, and implementing rules indicates that energy management, data collection, performance monitoring, and authorisation mechanisms have been designed to operate in close connection with the support process.Ultimately, the EKA Support Programme may be regarded as one of the more recent examples of the integration of various regulatory and implementation tools developed under Turkey’s energy efficiency framework. Accordingly, a comprehensive assessment of the Programme's legal and technical dimensions, taking into account not only the announcement itself but also the relevant legislation, implementation rules, and related compliance obligations, is likely to be important for the effective management of the application and implementation process.

Guidance on CBAM and Possible Implications for Türkiye

Guidance on CBAM and Possible Implications for TürkiyeOverview and Key ImplicationsThe Guidance on CBAM Verification and Accreditation for Verifiers and National Accreditation Bodies, published by the European Commission on 24 August 2026, provides comprehensive explanations regarding the verification and accreditation system applicable during the definitive period of the Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM), which commenced on 1 January 2026. The Commission expressly characterises the document not as a new legislative instrument but as explanatory guidance intended to facilitate the implementation of the existing CBAM framework. Accordingly, the Guidance should be viewed not as introducing new legal obligations, but rather as a practical document explaining how the existing CBAM legislation is to be applied.The primary purpose of the Guidance is to explain in detail how emissions data from installations producing CBAM goods in third countries should be verified and how the entities performing such verification may obtain accreditation. The document is addressed principally to CBAM verifiers and to the National Accreditation Bodies (NABs) of EU Member States responsible for accrediting and supervising those verifiers. At the same time, it contains important practical clarifications for producers and other stakeholders intending to rely on actual emissions data.One of the key messages of the Guidance is that verification is not limited to reviewing the final emissions figures reported in an annual emissions report. Rather, the Commission treats verification as a comprehensive assurance process conducted at installation level. In this context, the verifier is expected to assess the installation's monitoring plan, production processes, emission sources, data flows, measurement systems, control activities, precursor data, and all information underlying the calculation of embedded emissions. Verification therefore constitutes a comprehensive audit-type exercise aimed at assessing not only the reported data itself but also how that data is generated and whether it can be regarded as reliable.The Commission also provides detailed guidance on the fundamental principles governing verification activities. According to the Guidance, verification should be based on the principles of completeness, consistency, comparability, accuracy, methodological integrity, and continuous improvement. Verifiers are required to perform their work at a reasonable level of assurance. This approach requires verifiers not merely to accept information provided by operators, but actively to test its reliability, obtain sufficient verification evidence, and apply professional scepticism throughout the verification process. Verifiers are also required to identify misstatements, non-conformities, and instances of non-compliance, assess their materiality, and evaluate their effect on the final verification opinion.The Guidance describes the verification process as a highly structured and detailed exercise. The process begins with a pre-contract assessment and includes information gathering, strategic analysis, risk analysis, preparation of a verification plan, process analysis, testing of data and control systems, analytical procedures, assessment of the correct application of the monitoring methodology, and evaluation of any data gaps. This approach demonstrates that installations must establish a verifiable data infrastructure well before the end of the reporting period. The Guidance also requires verifiers to maintain comprehensive internal verification documentation, including risk assessments, evidence collected, site visit findings, sampling methodologies, materiality assessments, and the basis for the final verification opinion.One of the most significant sections of the Guidance from a practical perspective concerns site visits. The Commission maintains physical site visits as a fundamental component of the verification system. Physical visits are regarded as the primary means of examining measurement instruments, interviewing personnel, and comparing the monitoring plan with the installation's actual operations. Nevertheless, virtual site visits or even the waiver of a site visit may be permitted under certain circumstances. These options are not intended as general simplification measures but rather as exceptions subject to specific conditions. In all cases, the verifier must obtain sufficient evidence to reach a reasonable level of assurance. Where adequate assurance cannot be achieved through remote means, a physical site visit remains necessary.The Guidance places particular emphasis on the independence and impartiality of verifiers. Special attention is given to potential conflicts of interest that may arise where a verifier has participated in the preparation of a monitoring plan, the development of emissions reports, or the provision of consultancy services to the same installation. Common ownership structures, management links, financial relationships, and personnel movements may also undermine independence. In certain circumstances, a separation period of at least two years is cited as an appropriate safeguard. Additional measures such as staff rotation, separation of advisory and assurance functions, and formal independence controls are also encouraged.With respect to accreditation, one of the most important clarifications provided by the Guidance is that the authority to grant CBAM accreditation rests exclusively with the National Accreditation Bodies of EU Member States. Verification bodies established in third countries may apply to NABs offering CBAM accreditation services. However, NABs are not obliged to accept applications from third-country entities. The Guidance further explains that existing accreditations obtained under standards such as ISO 17029 and ISO 14065 may be considered evidence of competence and may facilitate the accreditation process. Nevertheless, such accreditations do not replace CBAM accreditation, which must ultimately be granted by an EU NAB. Accreditation assessments include document reviews, audits at the verifier's premises, and at least one witness audit. Accreditation may remain valid for a maximum period of five years and is subject to ongoing surveillance and reassessment.The Guidance also establishes a simplified pathway for entities already accredited as EU ETS verifiers. However, the Commission makes clear that prior EU ETS experience alone is insufficient. Additional expertise is required in relation to CBAM-specific matters, including monitoring plan assessments, precursor data, indirect emissions, and related calculation methodologies. Existing EU ETS accreditation may therefore facilitate the accreditation process, but it does not remove the need to demonstrate the additional competencies required for CBAM accreditation.Under the system established by the Commission, accreditation alone is not sufficient. Verifiers must also be registered in the CBAM Registry before they can operate within the CBAM verification framework. According to information published by the European Commission, Registry access for accredited verifiers will become available from 1 September 2026, following verification of their accreditation status by the relevant National Competent Authority (NCA). The Commission has further indicated that accredited and registered verifiers will be able to generate verification reports through the CBAM Registry from January 2027, enabling declarants to use verified actual emissions data in respect of imports made during 2026.Possible Implications for TürkiyeThe Guidance is particularly significant for Türkiye in terms of the development of CBAM verification capacity and the future role of Turkish verification bodies during the definitive period. As Türkiye is one of the European Union's major trading partners for CBAM-covered goods, Turkish producers wishing to rely on actual embedded emissions rather than default values will require access to a reliable and accessible verification infrastructure. The Guidance provides important clarification regarding the operation of that infrastructure, particularly in relation to accreditation and verification procedures.One of the most important implications for Türkiye is that verification bodies established in third countries may apply for CBAM accreditation. The Guidance does not impose a requirement to establish a separate legal entity within the European Union as a condition for applying for CBAM accreditation. In practice, the availability of NABs willing to accept applications from third-country entities may become an important consideration for Turkish verification bodies seeking to obtain CBAM accreditation.A second important point is the distinction between TÜRKAK accreditation and CBAM accreditation. The Guidance recognises that accreditations granted in third countries under relevant international standards may serve as evidence of competence. However, the final accreditation required to obtain CBAM verifier status must be granted by an EU Member State NAB. As a result, verification bodies in Türkiye that already possess significant experience in greenhouse gas verification and hold TÜRKAK accreditation may benefit from an important starting advantage. Nevertheless, they will still be required to complete the relevant NAB accreditation process in order to become CBAM verifiers.The Guidance also demonstrates that, from the perspective of Turkish exporters, verification is not simply a matter of appointing a verifier at the end of the reporting period. In order to use actual embedded emissions, monitoring plans, data flows, measurement systems, control activities, and supporting documentation must be designed in a manner that allows for effective verification. Consequently, installations operating in sectors such as iron and steel, aluminium, cement, fertilisers, and hydrogen should begin preparing for verification well before the end of the reporting period.The site visit framework may also have practical implications for operators and verification bodies in Türkiye. As physical site visits remain the default verification approach, the implementation of verification activities may, in some circumstances, require additional planning, logistical coordination, and resources, particularly where verifiers are located outside Türkiye. Over time, the accreditation of verification bodies established in Türkiye could contribute to the development of domestic verification capacity and broaden the availability of verification services for exporters.The Guidance further demonstrates that the CBAM verification framework should not be confused with the national ETS and MRV systems currently being developed in Türkiye. A verifier authorised or accredited under Turkish national legislation will not automatically become a CBAM-accredited verifier on the basis of that status alone. Compliance with the separate accreditation and Registry requirements established under EU law remains necessary. At the same time, greater alignment between the two systems could reduce administrative burdens by enabling installations to rely on more consistent monitoring, reporting, and verification infrastructures for different regulatory purposes.Finally, the Guidance points to a broader strategic issue for Türkiye. The ability to use actual emissions under CBAM is not merely a technical reporting matter. It may also have implications beyond technical reporting and compliance considerations. In particular, for installations whose emissions intensity is lower than the applicable default value, the ability to demonstrate actual emissions through a robust monitoring and verification framework may become increasingly relevant in the context of CBAM compliance. Accordingly, in the coming years it may be useful to monitor not only the level of CBAM compliance achieved by Turkish producers, but also the extent to which a sufficient pool of CBAM-accredited verifiers with appropriate sectoral expertise becomes available to support exporters operating in CBAM-covered sectors.

Netting Procedures in Unlicensed Electricity Generation

The Procedures and Principles on the Netting Transactions of Unlicensed Electricity Generation Facilities and Their Associated Consumption Facilities (“Procedures and Principles”) entered into force upon its publication in the Official Gazette dated 5 May 2026 and numbered 33244. The regulation in question sets out the technical and operational framework governing the netting processes carried out under Article 26 of the Regulation on Unlicensed Electricity Generation in the Electricity Market (“Regulation”). In this context, the scope of netting, the categories of facilities included in the system, the role of the market operator, as well as the core concepts and data structures to be considered in practice are elaborated in detail. The Procedures and Principles also address hourly and monthly netting mechanisms, the treatment of surplus energy, the relationship with the Renewable Energy Resources Support Mechanism (“YEKDEM”), and the operational structure of group-based models. In this respect, we are of the view that the Procedures and Principles constitute an important secondary legislation instrument aimed at establishing a more centralized, data-driven, and systematic structure for netting processes within unlicensed generation activities.The provisions of the Procedures and Principles will be examined below on an article-by-article basis.PurposeArticle 1 sets forth that the purpose of the Procedures and Principles is to determine the way netting transactions relating to generation and/or consumption facilities falling within the scope of Article 26 of the Regulation on Unlicensed Electricity Generation shall be carried out.The express stipulation that netting transactions will be conducted directly by the “market operator” demonstrates that the system is no longer designed merely as a technical process operating at the level of distribution companies, but rather as a centralized market mechanism integrated with the systems of EPİAŞ. Furthermore, the fact that the regulation simultaneously considers both generation and consumption facilities indicates that the unlicensed generation model is structured around a balancing approach linked to consumption.Within this framework, the core logic of the netting mechanism is based on comparing the electricity drawn from the grid by the consumption facility with the electricity injected into the system by the associated generation facility over specified periods. Accordingly, it may be stated that the concepts of “net consumption” and “net generation” constitute the foundation of the system.ScopeArticle 2 regulates both the generation and consumption facilities to which the Procedures and Principles shall apply and the structures that shall remain outside their scope.The regulation covers the netting transactions of generation and/or consumption facilities falling within the scope of Article 26 of the Regulation and, in this respect, reflects an approach under which generation facilities established for self-consumption purposes and consumption-associated structures are assessed within the same netting system.That said, certain categories of facilities are expressly excluded from the scope. Facilities falling under Article 23 of the Regulation are subject to a separate netting regime, while generation facilities that have completed their ten-year support period are also excluded from the system. Likewise, facilities falling within the scope of the eighth paragraph of Article 30 of the Regulation are subject to a different assessment framework.The regulation further provides that the Procedures and Principles shall not apply where multiple unlicensed generation facilities subject to netting under Articles 23 and 26 of the Regulation are included within the same netting structure.Overall, the regulation appears to aim at defining the scope of the netting system through clearer boundaries, establishing distinct regimes for different categories of facilities, and adopting a more controlled implementation approach particularly with respect to multi-facility structures.Definitions and AbbreviationsArticle 4 sets out the principal concepts and definitions forming the basis for the implementation of the regulation. In particular, the definitions relating to the netting system, generation limits, distribution regions, and digital infrastructure appear to establish the overall framework of the implementation.The concept of “subscriber group” refers to the subscriber categories set out under the tariffs of distribution companies and incumbent supply companies. In this respect, it is understood that netting and tariff practices may produce different outcomes depending on the relevant subscriber group.The term “remunerated generation limit” refers to the amount of generation that may be subject to netting and sale. The regulation thereby reflects that the unlicensed generation model continues to be fundamentally based on the principle of self-consumption.“Distribution region” refers to the region defined under the licence of the relevant distribution company or the holder of an Organized Industrial Zone(“OIZ”)/Industrial Zone (“IZ”) distribution licence. The requirement that generation and consumption facilities be located within the same distribution region appears to carry particular significance in terms of the netting relationship.The Unlicensed Generation Module (“LÜM”) refers to the digital infrastructure through which netting transactions are carried out within the Market Management System (“PYS”). It is envisaged that the processing of generation and consumption data, the calculation of netting transactions, and settlement processes will all be conducted through this infrastructure.The concept of “netting” itself refers to the hourly or monthly netting transactions carried out on a group basis. The definition also suggests that netting is directly linked to the billing period.Among the other definitions, it is specified that the relevant system operator may refer to TEİAŞ, the distribution company, or the holder of an OIZ/IZ distribution licence, while the market operator is identified as EPİAŞ. In addition, the “amount of generation subject to system usage charges” refers to the portion of generation exceeding consumption needs, whereas YEKDEM denotes the renewable energy support mechanism.Overall, the regulation appears to establish a system architecture centred on data management, supported by digital infrastructure, and based on group-based netting. At the same time, it may be observed that the regulation seeks to preserve the self-consumption principle while keeping excess generation within certain limits.General PrinciplesArticle 5 regulates the core operational principles of the netting system. The regulation appears to establish a more centralized, data-driven, and traceable framework for the netting structure. While generation and consumption relationships are subjected to stricter rules, the group-based netting approach is positioned at the centre of the system.Pursuant to Article 5/1, generation and consumption facilities are required to be associated with persons holding the same Tax Identification Number (“TIN”). It is further stipulated that, where a change in the TIN occurs, such change will only be considered in the netting process as of the following calendar year.Article 5/2 allows real and legal persons, under certain conditions, to establish one or more groups. However, the freedom to form groups is not left entirely unrestricted and remains subject to the conditions set out under the Regulation and the Procedures and Principles.Under Article 5/3, consumption facilities included within the same group are required to belong to the same subscriber group. Accordingly, the combination of different tariff structures and consumption profiles within the same netting system is restricted.Article 5/4 permits facilities associated with the same TIN to be linked to different groups during different periods within the same year. However, in the event of a group change, the remaining limit is required to be transferred to the new group.Within the scope of Article 5/5, certain consumption facilities are required to procure electricity from a single supplier.Article 5/6 provides that the relevant legislation and Board decisions concerning activity-based tariff schedules shall be taken into consideration in netting transactions.Article 5/7 stipulates that the netting mechanism shall apply solely to facilities and groups falling within the scope of Article 26 of the Regulation.Under Article 5/8, generation exceeding the installed capacity is expressly excluded from consideration within the netting calculation.Article 5/9 sets out that, in respect of facilities connected at the transmission level, group formation procedures shall be carried out by the relevant distribution company. It is further regulated that such procedures shall be conducted through the Unlicensed Generation Module (“LÜM”).Articles 5/10 and 5/11 contain provisions regarding transfer transactions. Accordingly, transferred generation and consumption facilities may be incorporated into the netting system; however, it is envisaged that the remunerated generation limit shall be recalculated for the new user.Article 5/12 refers to Article 23 of the Balancing and Settlement Regulation (“DUY”), thereby establishing the connection between the netting system and market operation and settlement processes.Article 5/13 requires generation and consumption data to be recorded within the Market Management System (“PYS”).Overall, Article 5 appears to transform the netting system into a structure based on group-oriented and centralized data management, operating under a stricter set of rules. In this respect, it may be stated that the regulations aim to ensure that limit tracking, data management, group structures, and netting processes are carried out within a more controlled and standardized framework.Association ProceduresArticle 6 regulates the technical and operational infrastructure of the netting system. The provision sets out how generation and consumption facilities will be associated, on what basis group structures will be established, and which data will be recorded within the central system.It is stipulated that initial association procedures shall be carried out through applications submitted to the relevant system operator using Annex-1 forms. It is further provided that information such as the group number, resource type, installed capacity, hourly generation amount, contracted capacity, the European Transmission System Operators (“ETSO”) code, and the remunerated generation limit shall be recorded within the Unlicensed Generation Module (“LÜM”).Generation amounts are envisaged to be monitored and recorded within LÜM on an hourly basis, by resource type and group number. In addition, the remunerated generation limit is required to be registered within the system, while other generation facilities connected to the same metering point must also be notified. The regulation further provides that generation deemed to constitute an uncompensated contribution to YEKDEM will also be recorded in the LÜM system.The regulation limits the possibility of making amendments relating to past periods. However, in respect of material errors such as ETSO codes or group numbers, corrective actions may be carried out in subsequent periods.Article 6 also contains provisions regarding the relationship between subparagraphs 5/1(ç), 5/1(h), and 5/1(d) of the Regulation. It appears that broader association opportunities are preserved for facilities that submitted applications prior to 2 April 2026, whereas the scope of association possibilities has been narrowed for new applications.While the requirement to be located within the same distribution region is maintained for certain categories of facilities, it is observed that this condition is not sought for some other facility types. Furthermore, the regulation provides that, in certain cases within the same system operator region, the requirement to submit a new application may be waived.Overall, Article 6 appears to establish a group-based netting model founded upon centralized registration and data transfer infrastructure, incorporating strict registration and verification mechanisms. In this respect, elements such as the LÜM system, ETSO codes, remunerated generation limits, restrictions on retroactive amendments, and the requirement to remain within the same distribution region may be regarded not only as technical components of the netting system, but also as mechanisms of economic and regulatory control.Remunerated generation limitArticle 7 regulates the monitoring of the remunerated generation limit within the netting system and the principles applicable in cases where such limit is exceeded. The regulation sets out how the concept of the “remunerated generation limit” will be monitored, on what basis the limit will be calculated, and which mechanisms will apply where the limit is exceeded.Within the scope of the provision, the remunerated generation limit is to be monitored through the infrastructure of the Unlicensed Generation Module (“LÜM”) and the market operator. It is expressly stipulated that the limit shall not remain as a fixed value determined only at the outset; rather, the remaining portion within the same calendar year will continue to be calculated and monitored during subsequent periods. The calculation and monitoring of the remaining limit are placed under the responsibility of the market operator.The regulation further provides that any amendments relating to the remunerated generation limit must be recorded within the system together with their underlying justifications. In this respect, it is understood that not only the final data itself, but also the reason, legal basis, and historical record of the amendment will be maintained within the system.One of the notable aspects of Article 7 is the proportional limit reduction mechanism applied on a group basis. Although netting is carried out at the group level, it is regulated that limit usage will continue to be monitored individually for each consumption facility. Accordingly, even where netting is conducted on a group basis, the limit utilisation of each consumption facility will continue to be tracked separately.It is also expressly stipulated that the remunerated generation limit shall not apply to unlicensed generation facilities associated with residential subscribers.The regulation clearly provides that the expiration of the remunerated generation limit shall not mean the complete termination of the netting relationship. Generation and consumption will continue to be netted even after the limit has been exhausted; however, surplus generation exceeding consumption needs will thereafter be treated as an “amount subject to system usage charges.”Article 7 further provides that the limit shall be monitored on the basis of the “same calendar year.” Accordingly, limit calculations will be carried out annually, and the utilisation of the limit will be assessed within the relevant calendar year.Overall, Article 7 appears to establish a structure in which the remunerated generation limit is monitored through the infrastructure of LÜM and the market operator, while preserving individual limit control within the group-based netting mechanism and systematically managing the economic consequences of surplus generation. When considered together with the system usage charge approach, limit monitoring, registration obligations, and the exemptions applicable to residential subscribers, it may be stated that the regulation seeks both to preserve the self-consumption principle and to maintain control over the financial impacts of surplus generation and the economic balance of the netting system.Incumbent Supplier Company Responsible for Netting OperationsArticle 8 regulates the duties of the incumbent supplier company responsible within the netting system, the principles governing its designation, and its obligations relating to data access. The regulation further determines through which structure payments for surplus energy shall be carried out and which incumbent supplier company shall bear responsibility within group-based netting processes.Under Article 8/1, the responsible incumbent supplier company is designated as the entity responsible for making payments to the generator in respect of surplus energy amounts arising as a result of the netting process.Article 8/2 sets out the procedure for determining the responsible incumbent supplier company. Accordingly, the principal criterion is the incumbent supplier company operating within the system operator region where the highest total installed capacity is located. In this way, payment processes within the group structure are envisaged to be conducted through a single responsible incumbent supplier company.The phrase “as of January” included in the provision indicates that the determination of the responsible incumbent supplier company is based on the status existing as of January of the relevant year. In respect of groups established for the first time during the year, however, the first month subject to the netting process is taken as the basis.Pursuant to Article 8/3, the responsible incumbent supplier company is determined only once during the relevant calendar year. Even if the distribution of generation facilities or installed capacity within the group subsequently changes, the same incumbent supplier company will continue to perform its duties until the end of the year.Article 8/4 further provides that the responsible incumbent supplier company is not only responsible for payment processes, but also for the other obligations regulated under Article 14.Within the scope of Article 8/5, provisions regarding data access and netting reports are regulated. Accordingly, the responsible incumbent supplier company may access facility-based netting reports prepared by the market operator, provided that it obtains the consent of the holder of the unlicensed generation facility and declares such consent through the Unlicensed Generation Module (“LÜM”).Overall, Article 8 appears to consolidate payment processes, data access, and group-based operations within the netting system under a single responsible structure. When the annual fixed designation model, the highest installed capacity criterion, the consent-based data access mechanism, and the facility-based netting reports are assessed together, it may be stated that the regulation seeks to transform the netting system into a more centralized, traceable, and operationally integrated structure.Calculation of Amounts Subject to NettingArticle 9 regulates in detail the technical functioning of the netting system and determines which generation amounts shall be regarded as surplus generation, which portion shall fall within the scope of remunerated generation, and based on which data and methodology netting calculations shall be carried out. In this respect, the regulation appears to transform the netting mechanism, particularly for commercial groups, into a structure operating largely on an hourly, data-driven basis through centralized digital infrastructures.First, the regulation prevents the operational consumption of the generation facility itself from being automatically included within the netting mechanism. In the absence of an associated consumption facility within the same distribution region, the internal consumption of the generation facility cannot be netted. Accordingly, it appears that the regulation limits the inclusion of the generation facility’s own internal consumption within the scope of netting.The provision further establishes that netting processes shall be conducted entirely through digital data infrastructures. Data derived from the Unlicensed Generation Module (“LÜM”) and the Market Management System (“PYS”) form the basis of the calculations, while metering points, hourly data flows, and automated data processing systems constitute the foundation of the calculation methodology. In this respect, it is understood that centralized data infrastructures and a centralized data management approach have been further reinforced within the calculation process.One of the most significant changes introduced by the regulation is the broader adoption of hourly netting. Generation, consumption, and surplus energy calculations are assessed separately for each hour. In this way, generation profiles, consumption behaviour, and grid impacts may be monitored with greater precision.Where meter data cannot be read on an hourly basis, the “profiling” method is applied. In cases such as missing data, communication failures, or meter malfunctions, the system is not entirely suspended; instead, netting operations may continue through an alternative calculation methodology.The provision also sets out the fundamental mathematical logic underlying the netting mechanism. Hourly total generation is compared against hourly total consumption, and only the remaining energy following consumption is treated as surplus generation. Where generation remains below consumption, surplus generation is deemed to be zero.The methodology for applying the remunerated generation limit is also regulated. The netted energy amount is deducted from the remunerated generation limit and, where the limit is exceeded, certain generation amounts are classified as “generation subject to system usage charges.” Accordingly, it appears that the remunerated generation limit functions as an economic threshold mechanism.The regional allocation mechanism is likewise regulated under the provision. Generation amounts subject to system usage charges are allocated among the regions within the group in proportion to their hourly generation amounts. In this manner, cost-sharing is intended to be balanced in accordance with each region’s contribution to generation.A separate regime is envisaged for residential subscribers. In the case of residential subscriber groups, netting shall be carried out monthly, and the remunerated generation limit shall not apply. Furthermore, provided that no circumstance requiring uncompensated contribution to YEKDEM arises, the entirety of the generation is treated as remunerated generation.Article 9 also establishes special netting mechanisms for certain facility categories falling within the scope of Article 5 of the Regulation. Generation is first netted against the facility’s own consumption, after which the remaining portion may, subject to certain conditions, be associated with other facilities. However, important limitations are also introduced, including the same metering point requirement, the condition of being located within the same distribution region, distinctions based on call letter dates, and the risk of uncompensated generation.The sanctions applicable in cases of non-compliance are likewise regulated. Where the netting requirements are not fulfilled or incomplete data is submitted, no netting operation is carried out, and the relevant generation may instead be evaluated within the scope of “uncompensated generation.” For OIZ and IZ structures, on the other hand, a different calculation methodology is applied based on separate metering and settlement data.Finally, the progressive tariff system is integrated into the netting mechanism. Hourly netting calculations are performed by considering the distinction between lower and higher tariff tiers, thereby aiming to ensure more precise pricing of consumption behaviour.Overall, Article 9 appears to establish a next-generation netting model operating on an hourly basis, utilizing intensive data flows, managed through centralized digital infrastructures, and incorporating economic threshold mechanisms. In this respect, it may be considered that the regulation aims to ensure real-time monitoring of the generation-consumption balance, more precise management of grid impacts, and enhanced data-driven supervisory capacity, while also seeking to place commercial usage limits under tighter regulatory control.Entry of Data into Virtual MetersArticle 10 regulates under which economic and technical categories the generation amounts resulting from the completion of netting calculations shall be recorded within the system. While the preceding provisions determine how netting shall be carried out, how surplus generation shall be calculated, and which generation amounts shall be regarded as paid or uncompensated generation, this article establishes how those outcomes will be transferred into the market registration system. In this respect, it may be stated that the provision establishes the settlement, financial obligation, and digital registration infrastructure of the netting system.At the core of the regulation lies the “virtual meter” system. Independently from physical meters, the generation categories arising as a result of netting, the generation amounts forming the basis of settlement, and the categories of energy giving rise to financial obligations are monitored within separate digital registration layers. Accordingly, the system enables not only the monitoring of physical electricity flows, but also the tracking of the economic character of generation, its netting status, and its financial consequences.The first significant category regulated under the article is the “paid virtual meter.” The netted consumption amount and the portion of surplus generation remaining within the remunerated generation limit are recorded under this virtual meter category. In this way, energy having economic value and falling within the payment mechanism is monitored as a separate generation category.In addition, through the “virtual meter subject to system usage charges” mechanism, surplus generation exceeding the remunerated generation limit is separately classified. Generation exceeding the limit is not entirely excluded from the system; however, it is treated as a distinct category subject to additional financial obligations. In this respect, it may be considered that the regulation aims both to impose additional costs on generation exceeding the prescribed limits and to prevent unlimited economic benefit.One of the notable mechanisms introduced by Article 10 is the “uncompensated virtual meter” application. In situations giving rise to non-compliance with the legislation, all generation amounts within the relevant group may be recorded under the uncompensated virtual meter category. Accordingly, it may be stated that this mechanism is intended to prevent structures contrary to the legislation and uses of the netting system that fall outside its intended purpose.The article further provides that generation amounts shall be recorded under separate virtual meters on the basis of resource type. Through the separate tracking of different resource categories such as solar, wind, and biomass, it appears that a data infrastructure capable of supporting resource-based support and reporting processes is being established.Another important aspect of the regulation concerns the centralized sharing of data through the Unlicensed Generation Module (“LÜM”). Netting results are required to be transferred to LÜM on the basis of tax identification number, group number, system operator, and resource type. In this way, the regulation appears to establish a structure reinforcing centralized data sharing. The calculated generation amounts are directly reflected in settlement processes, virtual meter records, and market transactions.Article 10 also demonstrates that the netting system has become directly integrated with the settlement infrastructure. The data recorded under virtual meters no longer serves merely as technical registration data, but also carries direct implications for payment processes, financial calculations, revenue flows, market costs, and system usage charges.Overall, Article 10 appears to transform the netting system into a structure based on centralized data management, operating through digital platforms, divided into financial categories, and fully integrated with the settlement mechanism. Through the distinctions between paid virtual meters, virtual meters subject to system usage charges, and uncompensated virtual meters, it is understood that the regulator can separately monitor which generation amounts possess economic value, which generation amounts give rise to additional costs, and which generation amounts fall within the scope of sanctions. In this respect, the regulation may be regarded as signalling the evolution of the unlicensed generation regime toward a highly data-driven structure with enhanced centralized monitoring capabilities.Calculation of Amounts Subject to NettingArticle 11 regulates the financial dimension of the netting mechanism and sets out the methodology for calculating the payments to be made by the market operator to incumbent supplier companies and unlicensed generators. In this respect, the article gives concrete financial effect to the hourly netting system and the distinction between paid and uncompensated generation established under the preceding provisions.One of the principal characteristics of the regulation is that calculations are carried out not only on the basis of total consumption, but also with reference to the tax identification number (“TIN”), group structure, system operator region, applicable tariff, consumption facility, and hourly intervals. Accordingly, the system appears to evolve into a highly detailed, data-intensive structure operating on the basis of hourly data processing.The first scenario addressed under the article concerns situations where total hourly generation is equal to or greater than total hourly consumption. In such cases, the netted consumption amount is taken as the basis, and the amount payable to the incumbent supplier company is calculated on the basis of the relevant tariff price. Accordingly, the system primarily considers the portion of generation covering consumption and establishes the corresponding financial value for that energy.In scenarios where generation remains below consumption, the total generation amount is distributed in proportion to pre-netting consumption ratios, and the netted consumption amount is calculated accordingly. This mechanism, which is particularly significant for group-based structures, determines the netted consumption amount according to the pre-netting consumption ratios of the relevant consumption facilities.The article further regulates the method for calculating payments to be made to unlicensed generators in respect of surplus generation. In this regard, it appears that the “relevant tariff prices” determined under Article 28 of the Regulation form the basis of the payment calculation. Accordingly, the financial value of surplus energy generation is determined within the framework of tariff-based parameters.The “Total Amount Payable to Unlicensed Generators” (“LÜYTOB”) mechanism set out under the fourth and fifth paragraphs demonstrates that the netting system is not limited solely to the producer-consumer relationship. It is envisaged that payments to be made by incumbent supplier companies to suppliers and unlicensed generators shall be calculated within the LÜYTOB system. Accordingly, it is understood that the netting structure is also integrated into the financial reconciliation processes between the market operator and incumbent supplier companies.One of the significant elements of Article 11 concerns the provisions relating to tiered tariffs. For consumption facilities subject to tiered tariffs, the tariff structure approved by the Board is considered in the calculation of tariff prices. In particular, the distinction between lower-tier and upper-tier tariffs for residential subscribers may directly affect the economic outcome of the netting mechanism.The regulation also contains important provisions regarding system usage charges and the Renewable Energy Resources Support Mechanism (“YEKDEM”). The relevant charges are calculated based on generation amounts subject to system usage charges. Furthermore, in respect of energy considered as uncompensated contribution to YEKDEM, it is expressly stated that no separate invoice shall be issued to the owner of the unlicensed generation facility.Overall, Article 11 appears to constitute one of the core provisions establishing the financial infrastructure of the netting system. Hourly data processing, intra-group allocation, tariff differentiation, surplus generation payments, LÜYTOB integration, and the effects of tiered tariffs are all brought together within a single financial structure. In particular, the formula-based calculation methodology demonstrates that the system relies heavily on automation and data accuracy. Accordingly, the proper management of metering data, group structures, and tariff classifications may become increasingly significant from an implementation perspective.Supply of Electricity under the Last Resort Supply TariffArticle 12 regulates the financial structure applicable where consumption facilities within the scope of the netting system procure electricity under the last resort supply tariff. In particular, the regulation clarifies the pricing mechanism through which generation amounts remaining after netting shall be evaluated for high-consumption subscribers. It also introduces a separate implementation framework for OIZs and IZs.Under the article, for consumers subject to the last resort supply tariff, the portion of generation corresponding to the consumption amount subject to netting is calculated on the basis of the last resort supply tariff. Generation remaining after the netting process is evaluated under the relevant tariff price framework within the scope of the remuneratedenergy limit. Accordingly, it is regulated that the generation amount remaining after netting shall be calculated on the basis of the applicable tariff price, provided that it remains within the remunerated energy limit.The regulation also establishes the calculation principles applicable to consumption facilities subject to the last resort supply tariff in relation to the netting mechanism. Particularly for high-consumption commercial and industrial subscribers, the financial consequences of netting become directly linked to the applicable tariff structure. It is expressly stated that the remunerated energy limit mechanism shall also apply to such subscribers.The second paragraph introduces a special provision regarding Organized Industrial Zones and Industrial Zones. Where the main OIZ/IZ meter falls within the relevant categories, the same provisions shall also apply to consumption facilities procuring electricity from the OIZ/IZ and exceeding the last resort supply limit. Accordingly, it is regulated that the calculation principles set out under the first paragraph shall likewise apply to such consumption facilities.Overall, Article 12 appears to clarify the financial consequences of netting for consumers subject to the last resort supply tariff. The regulation determines the pricing structure through which netting revenues shall be calculated, clarifies the relationship between the remunerated energy limit and the tariff system, and establishes a separate implementation framework particularly for large-scale consumers and OIZ/IZ structures.Responsibilities of the Network OperatorArticle 13 regulates the duties and responsibilities of the network operator within the operation of the netting mechanism. The regulation demonstrates that the netting process is not merely a calculation system operated by the market operator, but that distribution companies and other network operators also assume an active role in data management, meter records and application procedures.Within the scope of the article, the network operator is obliged to verify the accuracy of the information included in Annex-1 forms, ensure that the association processes comply with the legislation, and notify the outcome of the application within five business days following the application. In addition, the creation of meter records for consumption facilities within the scope of subparagraphs (a), (b), (c) and (ç) of the second paragraph of Article 17 of the Electricity Market Balancing and Settlement Regulation (“DUY”), the creation of meter records for consumption facilities procuring electricity within the boundaries of OIZs and IZs, the submission of consumption data in accordance with the DUY calendar for use in electricity market settlement and/or netting processes, and the maintenance of up-to-date Market Management System (“PYS”) records are also included among the responsibilities of the network operator. It is further stipulated that applications must be submitted to the market operator for the performance of the necessary virtual meter procedures for each new resource type in relation to new group registrations or group updates.The regulation also places emphasis on data accuracy and record management with respect to Unlicensed Generation Management System (“LÜM”) records. The timely submission of data to the system in the correct format, the monitoring of LÜM notifications, and the implementation of the necessary corrections are listed among the obligations of the network operator.The article also includes provisions concerning users’ rights to request information and file objections. The network operator is required to respond within five business days to requests relating to hourly generation and consumption data, remunerated and uncompensated generation quantities, generation quantities subject to system usage charges, and the used and remaining remunerated generation limit amounts on a consumption facility basis. In addition, the obligation to calculate the generation quantities subject to system usage charges and share such calculations with the incumbent supplier has also been regulated.With respect to generation and consumption facilities connected to the transmission grid, it is separately stipulated that certain procedures will be carried out by the relevant distribution company.Overall, Article 13 positions the network operator not merely as a technical data provider, but as a central actor assuming multifaceted responsibilities such as data accuracy, meter management, responding to user requests, and carrying out calculations relating to system usage charges. It may be considered that the regulation aims to strengthen data management and operational coordination within the netting system.Responsibilities of Incumbent Supplier CompaniesArticle 14 regulates the operational, financial and administrative responsibilities of incumbent supplier companies within the scope of the netting mechanism. The regulation demonstrates that incumbent supplier companies are not merely passive actors implementing the results of netting calculations but also assume an active role within the system in terms of monitoring data flows, conducting financial calculations, managing payment processes and responding to user requests. It aims to ensure the monitoring of processes carried out through the Unlicensed Generation Management System (“LÜM”) infrastructure and the timely implementation of netting results.Within the scope of the article, incumbent supplier companies are obliged to notify the market operator, in the prescribed format, of receivable and payable amounts relating to facilities located within their respective service areas, monitor notifications received through LÜM, carry out the necessary control and correction procedures, and follow the final netting results published in LÜM. Accordingly, it may be considered that the regulation aims to ensure the orderly operation of data flows and the standardization of payment processes within the netting system.The regulation further requires that the amounts determined in LÜM be paid to the relevant suppliers and/or unlicensed generators within the prescribed period. In addition, incumbent supplier companies are expected to respond, within specified time periods, to requests for information and objections relating to netted consumption amounts, surplus generation amounts and the relevant financial amounts. The inclusion of system usage charges within the “Total Amount Payable to Unlicensed Generators” (“LÜYTOB”) mechanism, as well as the transfer of collected charges to the relevant grid operator, are also listed among the responsibilities of incumbent supplier companies.The article also stipulates that no financial claim may be asserted in respect of generation quantities recorded under the virtual meter created within the scope of subparagraph (c) of the first paragraph of Article 10. It may be considered that this approach is based on the treatment of such generation quantities within the system as uncompensated contribution.Overall, Article 14 positions incumbent supplier companies not merely as market participants supplying electricity, but as central actors undertaking key roles in data management, financial calculations, payment processes and objection mechanisms. It may be considered that the regulation aims to make the financial and operational functioning of the netting system more standardized, transparent and traceable.Correction ProceduresArticle 15 regulates the procedures and principles regarding the subsequent correction of data used in the netting system. The regulation demonstrates that the netting mechanism is designed not as a fixed and immutable structure, but rather as a dynamic system capable of being updated within the framework of certain procedures. It aims to eliminate metering errors, correct incomplete or inaccurate data entries, and ensure consistency between netting results and settlement data.Within the scope of the article, network operators are granted the authority to make corrections to data recorded in the Unlicensed Generation Management System (“LÜM”). It is envisaged that errors arising from measurement or recordkeeping relating to hourly generation and consumption data, as well as various data used within the scope of netting, may subsequently be corrected.The regulation further provides that corrections relating to the current period shall be made by considering the Electricity Market Balancing and Settlement Regulation (“DUY”) calendar and the settlement-relevant injection and withdrawal values. Final netting results are also envisaged to be published in LÜM in parallel with the final settlement notification calendar. Accordingly, a direct connection is established between the netting system and settlement processes, with the objective of reconciling financial liabilities.The article also permits corrections relating to previous periods. Within certain periods and under specified conditions, historical data may be updated through LÜM, and metering errors, incomplete data entries or incorrect classifications may be retrospectively updated. In addition, by specifying that correction data must be recorded within defined calendar limits, the regulation seeks to prevent the emergence of a constantly changing netting structure.It is further regulated that corrections may affect not only the relevant period, but also subsequent netting periods. In line with the updated data, netting calculations and the related financial liabilities may be recalculated accordingly.Overall, Article 15 aims to enhance data accuracy within the netting system, correct erroneous calculations, and ensure the harmonized operation of the settlement system and the netting mechanism. The regulation demonstrates that the system has been designed in a manner that allows updates within the framework of specific procedures to ensure that final financial outcomes can be generated in a manner that more accurately reflects actual conditions.General Assessment and Transitional ProvisionsArticle 16 stipulates that the previous regulations are repealed upon the entry into force of the new Procedures and Principles. The regulation does not merely introduce a technical amendment; rather, it demonstrates that the netting system has been transformed into a new model based on centralized data management, a LÜM-centred data flow structure and a group-based structure. It is understood that a structure departing from the previous netting approach has been envisaged. Accordingly, relevant stakeholders may need to align their operational processes, data management methods and contractual structures with the new system.Provisional Article 1 regulates how remunerated generation limits relating to the year 2026 will be transferred within the scope of the transition to the new system. Accordingly, the remaining remunerated generation limit data relating to consumption facilities included in existing and newly established groups must be transferred to LÜM by the relevant grid/network operators. Through the regulation, it is aimed to integrate the remaining remunerated generation limits relating to both existing and newly established groups into the new system. In addition, it is envisaged that group records, consumption facilities and the used and remaining limit information will be processed into the system in a manner compatible with the LÜM data structure.From a general perspective, it may be considered that the regulation does not merely constitute a technical update to the netting mechanism. It may be stated that the new system establishes a new structure based on centralized data management and a group-based netting approach. In addition, it is also considered that the regulation may give rise to additional operational harmonization processes in practice in terms of data transfer, limit tracking, correction procedures and coordination between grid/network operators and incumbent supplier companies.In ConclusionIn our view, the Procedures and Principles aim to transform the netting mechanism in unlicensed electricity generation into a more centralized, data-driven structure operating in integration with digital infrastructures. It appears that the regulation seeks to establish a more traceable, standardized and auditable framework for netting processes through LÜM- and PYS-based data management, the hourly netting approach, the group-based association system and virtual meter mechanisms. In addition, we are of the opinion that the distinction between remunerated generation limits, generation subject to system usage charges and uncompensated generation is intended to enable the economic consequences of surplus generation to be managed in a more controlled manner.On the other hand, the regulation may also give rise to significant operational obligations for market participants in terms of data transfer, group management, hourly metering infrastructure, settlement processes and financial calculations. It may be expected that the technical and operational implications of the new system for network operators, incumbent supplier companies and unlicensed generators will become clearer during the implementation phase. Within this framework, the Procedures and Principles may be regarded as constituting an important secondary regulation aimed at moving the netting system in the unlicensed generation regime toward a more controlled and centralized structure.

Arbitrators’ Challenges In International Arbitration: Insights From LCIA Decisions

Introduction In today's global world, international arbitration is increasingly preferred due to its qualities of speed, confidentiality, and flexibility. The most crucial element determining the effectiveness and legitimacy of international arbitration is the principle of independence and impartiality that arbitrators must possess in carrying out the arbitration process. This principle is not only a legal obligation but also a necessity for creating an acceptable and valid resolution between the parties. Independence and impartiality, while distinct concepts, complement each other and are often difficult to distinguish due to their interconnected nature. Independence refers to an arbitrators’ ability to be free from external factors, especially the influences of the parties or third parties. In this context, an arbitrator is obligated to make decisions without being subject to any social, political, economic, or intellectual pressures. External factors influencing the appointment of an arbitrator, such as political, economic, or social pressures from the parties, may also be considered as external influences. The existence of any potential external factor threatens the fairness and validity of the decision. On the other hand, impartiality is the arbitrators’ ability to maintain an equal distance from both parties without favoring the interests of any side. Impartiality requires that the arbitrator is free from personal beliefs and biases when making decisions. In this regard, an arbitrator must demonstrate an objective approach throughout the arbitration process, recognizing that both parties have equal rights, and each party's arguments must be evaluated fairly. While independence refers to the arbitrators’ detachment from external influences, impartiality is more related to internal factors, encompassing the arbitrators’ ability to approach both parties equidistantly. In this context, these two principles are fundamental criteria for ensuring that the decision rendered in the arbitration process is valid and effective. If these principles are violated, the mechanism for challenging the arbitrator comes into play. When an arbitrator acts in violation of the principles of independence and impartiality, the parties acquire the right to request the removal of the arbitrator under specific conditions. Procedures for Challenging an Arbitrator (An Evaluation Within the Scope of ICC, LCIA, ICSID, and UNCITRAL Arbitration) Under the rules of the International Chamber of Commerce (“ICC”), the time limit for challenging an arbitrator is 30 days from the notification of the appointment or confirmation of the arbitrator, or 30 days from the date the party becomes aware of the event or circumstances that warrant the challenge. A challenge may be submitted to the Secretariat, and if the ICC Court determines that the arbitrator is unable to perform their duties or is not acting in accordance with the rules, it may replace the arbitrator sua sponte. After a challenge is made to the Secretariat, the arbitrator and the other party are given an opportunity to submit their views in writing. If the ICC Court accepts the challenge, the arbitrator will be replaced. The decision of the ICC Court is final and binding. Under the rules of the London Court of International Arbitration (“LCIA”), a request to challenge an arbitrator must be made within 14 days of the arbitrators’ appointment or within 14 days of the date the party learns of the event that warrants the challenge. Parties may submit their requests in writing to the arbitrator, or the LCIA Court may replace an arbitrator sua sponte. The written notification of the challenge is sent to the LCIA Court, which then seeks the views of the challenged arbitrator and the other party. If the parties agree to the replacement of the arbitrator, the LCIA Court may cancel the appointment without providing reasons. If the arbitrator resigns or the parties fail to agree, the final decision is made by the LCIA Court. According to the arbitration rules of the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (“ICSID”),each party may challenge the arbitrator immediately after learning of the event that warrants the challenge. This challenge may be based on the argument that the arbitrator lacks the necessary qualifications or that they did not possess the necessary qualifications at the time of their appointment. The decision regarding the challenge is made by the other arbitrators. If no unanimous decision can be reached on this matter, or if the challenged individual is the sole arbitrator, the decision regarding the challenge is made by the President of the ICSID Administrative Council (President of the World Bank). Without being monopolized by any arbitral institution, the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (“UNCITRAL”) Arbitration Rules, which establish standard arbitration procedures, state that if a party wishes to challenge an arbitrator, the challenge must be submitted in writing to the other party, the challenged arbitrator, and the other members of the arbitral tribunal within fifteen days from the date of the appointment of the challenged arbitrator or the date the grounds for the challenge are known. The grounds for the challenge must be stated in the notification. If the challenge is not accepted by all parties or the challenged arbitrator does not withdraw from the proceedings within 15 days of the notice, the party making the challenge must request a decision from the appointing authority within 30 days from the date the notice was made. Acceptance of the challenge by the parties or the withdrawal of the challenged arbitrator does not imply acceptance of the validity of the grounds for the challenge. Grounds for Challenging an Arbitrator Under the ICC Rules, the grounds for challenging an arbitrator are not specifically defined, and a claim of a lack of impartiality or independence, or any other relevant reason, is generally considered sufficient. The rules provide a broad approach, allowing challenges based on these general grounds. Similarly, the LCIA Rules adopt a general approach, where the presence of circumstances that raise justifiable doubts about an arbitrators’ impartiality or independence is deemed sufficient grounds for a challenge. In addition, the LCIA Court may also remove an arbitrator sua sponte if it finds that the arbitrator has intentionally breached the arbitration agreement; failed to act fairly and impartially between the parties; failed to demonstrate a reasonable level of efficiency, diligence, and professionalism during the arbitration process; or has not participated in the arbitration proceedings. Under the ICSID Rules, any situation that clearly shows that the arbitrator does not possess the required qualifications (see ICSID Rules, Art. 14(1)) is considered a valid ground for challenging the arbitrator. This ensures that any deficiency in the necessary qualifications of the arbitrator may lead to their removal. The UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules stipulate that, when an arbitrator is appointed, they must disclose any circumstances that may give rise to justifiable doubts regarding their impartiality or independence. In this context, if there is a risk or presence of such doubts, the arbitrator is required to provide an explanation regarding the issue. The disclosure requirement is aimed at ensuring transparency and mitigating any concerns that could undermine the fairness of the arbitration process. An Evaluation Under the IBA Guidelines When it comes to challenges against an arbitrator, one of the most important soft law sources to consider is the International Bar Association Guidelines on Conflicts of Interest in International Arbitration (“IBA Guidelines”). Published by the IBA Arbitration Committee, these guidelines provide standards regarding when arbitrators should withdraw and when they must disclose potential conflicts of interest. The general purpose of the IBA Guidelines is to ensure consistency in practice, prevent unnecessary challenges, and avoid the removal or resignation of arbitrators without cause. In this context, the IBA Guidelines categorize the situations in which an arbitrator may or may not serve, or when disclosure is required, into four main categories: - Green Category: Situations where it is absolutely acceptable for an arbitrator to serve, and no disclosure is required. - Orange Category: Situations where there are circumstances that may raise doubts about the arbitrators’ independence or impartiality, and therefore disclosure is required. - Red (Waivable) Category: Situations where there are justifiable doubts about the arbitrators’ impartiality or independence, but the parties are aware of these concerns and have expressly accepted them. - Red (Non-Waivable) Category: Situations where it is impossible for the arbitrator to be impartial or independent, and the parties cannot waive this disqualification. According to the guidelines, if there is any justifiable doubt about an arbitrators’ impartiality or independence, or if a third party has legitimate reasons to believe that the arbitrator cannot remain impartial or independent, or if the arbitrator falls under a red (non-waivable) category or a red (waivable) category but the parties cannot reach a consensus, the arbitrator should not accept the appointment or should withdraw from the arbitration. The IBA Guidelines also provide specific scenarios in which an arbitrator is required to disclose their circumstances. In the Green Category, for example, disclosure is not required for situations such as when an arbitrator has previously provided services to one party, entered into a contract with a party or another arbitrator, or expressed an opinion in favor of one party on the issue at hand. In the Orange Category, disclosure is necessary when an arbitrator is actively providing services to one of the parties, holds a position in the arbitral institution managing the arbitration, or has a controlling interest in the organization that one of the parties is affiliated with. The Red (Waivable) Category involves situations where an arbitrator has a direct or indirect financial interest in the outcome of the dispute, has a personal relationship with one of the parties, or is otherwise in a position where their impartiality could reasonably be questioned, but the parties have expressly agreed to continue with the arbitrators’ appointment. In the Red (Non-Waivable) Category, the guidelines set out situations where the arbitrator should be disqualified, and their continued participation in the arbitration is not allowed. These situations include cases where the arbitrator is acting as an advisor to one of the parties for financial gain, serves as legal counsel for one of the parties, or is directly controlling one of the parties. The IBA Guidelines aim to set general standards for the impartiality and independence of arbitrators in international arbitration and guide the parties in making informed decisions. While these guidelines are not legally binding, they are widely cited and frequently applied in practice as a soft law source. Of course, due to the unique factual circumstances of each case, rigid rules or general standards may not always lead to fair outcomes. Therefore, in situations where there may be a theoretical conflict of interest that could affect the arbitrators’ impartiality or independence, the specific circumstances of the case will be carefully assessed to determine whether there is an actual issue of impartiality or independence. Evaluation of Arbitrator Challenge Decisions Published by the LCIA In line with the principle of transparency, the London Court of International Arbitration (LCIA) regularly publishes summaries of decisions regarding challenges to arbitrators. The LCIA made its first publication in 2011, summarizing 28 arbitrator challenge decisions from 1996 to 2010. Subsequently, summaries of 32 arbitrator challenge decisions from 2010 to 2017 were made available online, and most recently, in December 2024, the LCIA published 24 additional arbitrator challenge decisions. This initiative provides a valuable resource for practitioners and researchers seeking insight into the LCIA's processes for handling arbitrator challenges. The latest publication from December 2024 once again highlights the LCIA's commitment to procedural transparency, while also demonstrating the effectiveness of its arbitrator challenge mechanisms. These summaries allow for a better understanding of the reasoning behind the arbitrator challenge decisions, thereby enhancing predictability in arbitration proceedings and reinforcing trust in the institution. The decisions published by the LCIA offer an important perspective on how institutional arbitration rules and soft law norms are applied in concrete disputes, providing insight into the situations where challenges to arbitrators are accepted or rejected. Our review of the 2024 publication reveals that of the 24 arbitrator challenge decisions issued by the LCIA between 2017 and 2022, only two were upheld. This suggests that challenges to arbitrators are considered exceptional in arbitration proceedings. For instance, in one of the decisions published in 2024 (see Decision No. 14, dated 2019), the LCIA Court evaluated a challenge based on the claim that an arbitrator was connected to the claimant's expert. It was found that the expert had been appointed in another arbitration case by the law firm where the arbitrator had worked. However, since the arbitrator had not directly selected the expert, had no prior relationship with the expert, and the reports from the expert in the related cases addressed entirely different issues, the LCIA Court concluded that there was no link that would undermine the arbitrators’ impartiality, and the challenge was rejected. In this case, the arbitrator had initially considered resigning but decided to stay on after the parties agreed to change the expert. The arbitrators’ transparency in disclosing the relationship and readiness to resign, if necessary, was considered a positive factor by the LCIA Court. Similarly, in a challenge against an arbitrator for having expressed firm opinions on various issues in previous cases, the LCIA Court concluded that when the parties accepted the same panel of arbitrators for similar cases, it was a natural consequence for the arbitrators to decide on similar issues in the previous case. The challenging party’s argument, based on the nemo iudex in causa sua principle, which asserts that no one should be their own judge, was not seen by the LCIA Court as an absolute loss of impartiality. Therefore, the challenge was rejected, with the LCIA Court finding no conflict with the arbitrators’ impartiality (see Decision No. 21, dated 2021). As demonstrated by the above decisions, the LCIA's approach to challenges is that the mere existence of a connection is not sufficient to justify the removal of an arbitrator. When examining the decisions alongside others, it is clear that even when an arbitrator has represented one of the parties, the disclosure of such a relationship to the parties and the LCIA Court, along with the necessary examination, is sufficient to ensure that no doubt arises regarding the arbitrators’ impartiality and independence. This approach is consistent with the categories outlined earlier. Similarly, in cases where the arbitrator is a member of a professional organization or association that also includes lawyers representing one of the parties, or where the arbitrator has attended conferences or events without informing the parties, no doubt regarding impartiality or independence was found. On the other hand, in two challenges accepted by the LCIA in its December 2024 publication, one challenge was based on the existence of a prior employment relationship between the arbitrator and a party, a pending case between one of the parties and the arbitrator, the arbitrators’ involvement in regular academic projects with one of the party’s attorneys, and the arbitrators’ participation as a speaker in events organized by the respondent. While these situations alone would not constitute a valid challenge, the LCIA Court accepted that the subjective concerns arising from these circumstances objectively gave rise to legitimate doubts. For example, the arbitrators’ long career spent largely with one of the parties created, in the LCIA Court’s view, legitimate concerns about the arbitrators’ independence and impartiality from a third-party perspective (see Decision No. 3). In another challenge accepted by the LCIA, the arbitrator had provided consultancy to the law firm that drafted some of the contracts in the dispute for about eight years and had frequently organized events with the law firm. The LCIA Court found that the relationship between the arbitrator and the law firm, which was allegedly involved in the dispute, raised doubts about the arbitrators’ impartiality. Although the law firm was unlikely to be directly involved in the dispute, the relationship between the arbitrator and the law firm was considered sufficient to accept the challenge (see Decision No. 19). In summary, the LCIA Court’s decisions demonstrate that when parties accept the same arbitrator panel for different arbitrations, they also accept the associated risks. In cases where an arbitrator has previously represented one of the parties, disclosing this relationship and making the necessary notifications can alleviate concerns. The mere fact that an arbitrator has a relationship with one of the parties (such as attending events) does not, by itself, provide grounds for a challenge, and each case must be evaluated based on its specific facts. Furthermore, the LCIA Court has emphasized that challenges based solely on procedural reasons (such as an arbitrator not accepting a time extension) will fail unless there is concrete evidence of bias. Acceptance and Rejection Criteria in Light of Published Decisions When analyzing the two accepted challenges by the LCIA (see Decision No. 3 and No. 19 of LCIA’s 2024 Release), it becomes clear that certain circumstances, such as a significant professional connection between the arbitrator and one of the parties (for instance, the arbitrator having worked at a law firm previously representing one of the parties), or the failure to disclose critical relationships, can raise justifiable doubts about the impartiality of the arbitrator. In cases like Decision No. 3 (of LCIA’s 2024 Release), where professional connections were not disclosed, or Decision No. 19 (of LCIA’s 2024 Release), where communications between the arbitrator and a party were not disclosed, the LCIA accepted the challenge on the grounds that, from the perspective of a reasonable and informed observer, these undisclosed relationships gave rise to doubts about the arbitrators’ impartiality. As a result, the challenges in these cases were found to be valid and were accepted. On the other hand, when reviewing rejected challenges, several important criteria emerge regarding the powers of arbitrators in arbitration proceedings. For instance, in Decision No. 2, a challenge was raised against the arbitrators’ decisions on procedural matters (bifurcation) such as scheduling and the request for security for costs. However, the LCIA ruled that these issues fell within the arbitrators’ discretionary authority. This underlines that the LCIA does not interfere with decisions made by the arbitrator unless there is a clear and justifiable reason to do so. Moreover, in cases where a challenge is based on the alleged incorrectness of the arbitrators’ decisions (either legally or factually), the LCIA maintains that it is not responsible for reviewing the substance of the arbitrators’ decisions unless there is an issue related to impartiality or independence. In situations where the arbitrator expresses preliminary opinions or comments on specific issues, as seen in Decision No. 1, where an arbitrator mentioned that one of the parties might face difficulties in presenting evidence, the LCIA emphasized that such statements do not, by themselves, constitute grounds for a valid challenge. The LCIA noted that the arbitrator did not present this as a final decision or opinion, and thus, the challenge was not accepted. This shows that the LCIA takes a pragmatic approach and distinguishes between casual observations and definitive rulings that might affect impartiality. The LCIA’s stance on challenges related to an arbitrators’ decisions is also evident in its approach to challenges based solely on the arbitrators’ favoring or disfavoring one of the parties. In these cases, where the challenge is based solely on the perceived bias of the arbitrator, the LCIA found that such challenges were not sufficient grounds for rejection unless there was clear and objective evidence that would lead a reasonable observer to believe that the arbitrator was indeed partial. Therefore, challenges based solely on an arbitrators’ decision that one party’s position is stronger, without further evidence of bias, were considered unfounded and were rejected. The LCIA’s approach to arbitrator challenges emphasizes the importance of maintaining the stability and efficiency of the arbitration process. For example, in Decision No. 13, the LCIA highlighted the broad discretion that arbitrators have in making procedural decisions, asserting that procedural challenges based solely on the dissatisfaction of one party were not sufficient grounds for a challenge. This reinforces the need to respect the arbitrators’ authority and prevents unnecessary interference in procedural decisions. Similarly, in Decision No. 17, the LCIA refused to allow parties to accumulate grievances throughout the arbitration process and present them all at once as a challenge. This decision emphasized that objections should be raised in a timely manner during the process to ensure that the arbitration can proceed without disruption. The LCIA’s decision to reject such accumulative challenges further serves to protect the efficiency of the process and prevent abuse of the challenge mechanism by the parties. In conclusion, the LCIA's decisions show a clear distinction between legitimate and illegitimate challenges to arbitrators. Challenges based on undisclosed connections or comments that raise legitimate concerns about impartiality are typically upheld, whereas those based on procedural dissatisfaction or the mere perception of bias without substantive evidence are generally rejected. The LCIA's approach aims to safeguard the integrity and effectiveness of the arbitration process by ensuring that challenges are based on substantial and reasonable grounds and by discouraging misuse of the challenge mechanism. Conclusion The case law of the LCIA is shaped by principles aimed at preserving the efficiency and order of the arbitration process. Upon examining the general approach of the LCIA Court, it is evident that the Court maintains a consistent stance that mere dissatisfaction of the parties with the arbitrators’ decisions cannot, by itself, serve as a valid ground for a challenge. In some cases, parties have raised objections claiming that the arbitrators’ decisions were inadequately reasoned or that the arbitrators failed to address all issues. However, the LCIA has rejected these objections, making it clear that the challenge mechanism is not intended to serve as a means for a comprehensive review of the arbitration process from start to finish. The LCIA’s summaries of decisions regarding arbitrator challenges serve as an important guide for understanding how such objections are handled and which situations are deemed to have legitimate grounds. These summaries provide a roadmap for parties in arbitration, offering a framework for similar situations that may arise. Additionally, the publication of anonymized decisions on arbitrator challenges by the LCIA represents a significant step toward increasing transparency and accountability in international arbitration. When considering all of these factors, it becomes apparent that challenges to arbitrators do not constitute an appeal process for the decisions rendered in the course of arbitration. In order for an objection to succeed and be accepted, there must be reasonable and tangible evidence of doubt concerning the arbitrators’ impartiality and independence, and this doubt must be substantiated with clear evidence. Speculative or tactical objections are likely to be rejected by the LCIA. In conclusion, the LCIA’s approach emphasizes the need for challenges to be based on legitimate, evidence-backed concerns rather than dissatisfaction with the outcome of the arbitration. This approach upholds the integrity of the arbitration process and reinforces the importance of impartiality and transparency in arbitration proceedings.  

Squeeze-Out and Exit Mechanisms in Joint Stock Companies

A. Introduction The Turkish Commercial Code ("TCC") No. 6102 and the Capital Markets Law ("CML") No. 6362 regulate the right of a dominant shareholder to remove minority shareholders from a company. In foreign legal systems, this process is often referred to as a "squeeze-out" or "freeze-out." The TCC addresses this under Article 208 as the "right to purchase," while the CML refers to it in Article 27 as the "right to remove from the partnership." Additionally, Article 141 of the TCC provides justification for this mechanism as the "removal of a partner through a merger." The squeeze-out mechanism grants dominant shareholders, holding a qualified majority, the right to purchase the shares of minority shareholders at a fair price, thereby expelling them from the company. The primary aim is to prevent decision-making deadlocks caused by minority shareholders and enhance the company’s operational efficiency. This mechanism is particularly critical for ensuring agility and effectiveness in large-scale corporate structures. The right of the dominant shareholder to remove minority shareholders is anchored in corporate group law and merger and acquisition frameworks. In group company law, this right ensures effective coordination among affiliated companies and facilitates centralized management. Within mergers and acquisitions, it streamlines public tender offers and accelerates acquisition processes by reducing resistance from minority shareholders. These frameworks share a common focus on overcoming obstacles caused by minority shareholders, enhancing strategic alignment, and enabling swift execution of corporate decisions. B. Legal Assessment of the Squeeze-Out Concept The squeeze-out mechanism under Turkish law is grounded in the concept of "dominance," setting it apart from traditional expulsion mechanisms. Unlike international systems where squeeze-outs often lack this requirement, TCC Article 208 necessitates just cause to justify expulsion. In contrast, CML Article 27, applicable to publicly traded companies, omits this requirement, enabling a more flexible approach focused on corporate efficiency. This distinction highlights the differing policy objectives between the two regulations: while the TCC emphasizes shareholder rights and fairness, the CML prioritizes governance and operational efficiency. C. Conditions for Exercising the Dominant Shareholder’s Right Conditions Under TCC Article 208 The right to expel, regulated under TCC Article 208, applies to capital companies and is a provision related to group company law. This regulation grants the dominant company the right to expel minority shareholders by purchasing their shares under certain conditions. According to TCC Article 208, in order for the right to be exercised, the dominant company must: Hold at least 90% of the company’s capital and voting rights, either directly or indirectly. Demonstrate just cause for the expulsion, such as obstruction of operations, violations of good faith, or actions that disrupt company management. The 11th Civil Chamber of the Court of Cassation, in decision 2019/915 E. and 2019/7720 K., confirmed that this right is exclusive to group companies and cannot be invoked by individual shareholders. Similarly, in decision 2021/4719 E. and 2022/9173 K., the court ruled that the right is available only to corporate shareholders. Just Cause in Turkish Law TCC Article 208 introduces the concept of just cause as a unique condition. Just causes include: Actions violating good faith principles. Obstruction of the company’s basic operations. Harmful or reckless behavior disrupting corporate sustainability (Harun Keskin, Hakim Pay Sahibinin Azınlığı Şirketten Çıkarma Hakkı (Squeeze-Out), 2022). In this context, just causes include situations where minority shareholders engage in conduct that endangers the sustainability of the company’s operations or violate the principles of honesty and trust. Minority shareholders obstructing the company’s basic functions, harming its commercial activities, or excessively disrupting management may be expelled. This just cause condition ensures stability in intra-company relations and preserves managerial peace. Therefore, the right to expel can only be exercised against minority shareholders whose behavior disrupts the company’s operations, violates principles of good faith, and harms sustainability. Scope and Conditions Under CML Article 27 CML Article 27 grants the dominant shareholder of a publicly traded joint-stock company the right to expel minority shareholders if they reach a qualified majority through a public tender offer or other means. Unlike TCC Article 208, CML Article 27 does not require just cause, making it more flexible. Under CML, expulsion occurs by canceling minority shareholders’ shares, with the dominant shareholder purchasing them through newly issued shares. A key distinction is that under CML Article 27, the expulsion right does not require a public tender offer. The dominant shareholder may acquire the necessary stake through a tender offer or acting in concert with others. According to the Communiqué on Squeeze-Out and Sell-Out Rights II-27.3 (“Communiqué”) Article 3/(c), the dominant shareholder can be a natural person or a legal entity, offering flexibility. Article 4 requires holding at least 98% of voting rights to exercise the expulsion right. The threshold must be met before exercising this right, and shares based on usufruct or call options are excluded from this calculation. If the 98% threshold is reached, the dominant shareholder must: Make a public announcement. Prepare an appraisal report within one month and disclose a summary. Complete the expulsion process within two months, paying the share price in compliance with the Communiqué’s provisions. D. Exercise of the Right and Determination of the Expulsion Price TCC Article 208 provides two methods for determining minority shares' value: Stock Market Value: If available, market price applies. Actual Value: If no market price exists, shares are valued based on net asset value. Unlike TCC Article 208, which requires a court decision, CML Article 27 requires a Capital Markets Board-determined period for share cancellation and issuance of new shares. E. Minority Shareholder’s Right to Exit TCC Article 202/1(b) protects minority shareholders by ensuring an exit if the dominant shareholder misuses control and causes financial harm. Minority shareholders can: File a compensation lawsuit. Request the court to compel the dominant shareholder to purchase their shares. F. Expulsion from the Company in Cases of Termination for Just Cause TCC Article 531 allows minority shareholders to seek company termination for just cause. If termination is not feasible due to economic or social factors, the court may expel minority shareholders and compensate them at actual value. Just causes include: Poor management. Systematic denial of shareholder rights. Misuse or waste of company assets (Prof. Dr. Reha Poroy et al., Ortaklıklar Hukuku Cilt II, 2017). G. Conclusion The squeeze-out mechanism in Turkish law balances corporate efficiency and minority shareholder rights. TCC requires a 90% majority, just cause, and judicial approval, prioritizing fairness. CML allows expulsion with a 98% majority, streamlining governance. TCC Article 531 provides an alternative expulsion remedy in termination cases. Both frameworks ensure predictability and sustainability in corporate governance while protecting minority rights.

Amendments to the Wetlands Regulation - Implications for Renewable Energy Projects

The Regulation Amending the Regulation on the Protection of Wetlands (“Amending Regulation”), published in the Official Gazette dated 5 September 2026, introduces a number of amendments to the Regulation on the Protection of Wetlands (“Regulation”). The amendments cover a broad range of issues, including the introduction of new definitions, rules governing water use in wetlands, permitting mechanisms applicable to existing facilities, planning and conservation instruments, and implementation principles for certain activities.Although the Regulation is not a sector-specific piece of legislation governing energy investments, it is nevertheless relevant to hydroelectric power plants, dams, reservoirs, water storage facilities, and other energy projects that interact with wetlands. In this regard, Annex-2 of the Regulation lists hydroelectric power plant projects, water storage facilities, solar power plants, wind power plants above certain thresholds, and various energy infrastructure investments among the activities that are subject to the Ministry’s approval.Against this background, the recent amendments introduce new provisions concerning water use, the permitting of existing water structures, the management of artificial wetlands, and renewable energy facilities in certain designated areas, alongside the existing mechanisms aimed at wetland protection. The key developments from the perspective of energy and infrastructure projects are discussed below.Further Clarification of Rules Governing Water Use in WetlandsThe amendments expand the provisions governing water use in connection with wetlands.Most notably, the Amending Regulation now introduces the concept of “environmental flow”. Environmental flow is defined as the quantity of water that must be released from a water structure to ensure the continuity of the river ecosystem downstream and the natural habitats of flora and fauna dependent on that ecosystem.In parallel, water structures planned or operated for energy generation, irrigation, or drinking water purposes on wetlands, as well as on permanent or seasonal streams connected to wetlands, are now required to release the environmental flow quantity calculated in accordance with the procedures and principles to be determined by the General Directorate of Nature Conservation and National Parks (the “General Directorate”). The Amending Regulation further stipulates that this quantity may not be lower than the environmental flow quantity determined pursuant to the Regulation on the Procedures and Principles Regarding the Execution of Water Use Right Agreements for Electricity Generation Activities.In addition, the amendments provide that, in order to maintain sustainable water levels within wetlands, an additional volume of water specified in the ecosystem assessment report must be released outside the irrigation season.These requirements are likely to be particularly relevant for hydroelectric power plants and other energy projects dependent on water resources, as they may affect both project design and operational parameters. That said, the practical and economic implications of environmental flow obligations are expected to become clearer once the relevant implementing procedures and administrative practices are established.Introduction of a New Permitting Mechanism for Existing Water StructuresThe amendments are not limited to new projects and also introduce a transition regime for certain existing facilities.Pursuant to Temporary Article 3, water structures operated by private sector entities for energy generation, irrigation, or drinking water purposes and commissioned after 30 January 2002 must obtain a permit document from the General Directorate within two years from the publication of the Regulation. Such permits will remain valid for five years and may be renewed upon confirmation of compliance with the applicable conditions. Failure to submit an application within the prescribed period may result in administrative consequences under the Regulation. In addition, where an environmental flow quantity has previously been determined, the amendments allow for its reassessment during the permitting process where required by climate change considerations or changes affecting upstream water use rights.Accordingly, operators of facilities falling within the scope of the new transitional regime should carefully review their permitting status and assess the timelines introduced by the amendments. In particular, existing hydroelectric power plants and other privately operated water structures may need to evaluate whether their current permits and operational arrangements remain aligned with the revised regulatory framework.Introduction of Artificial Wetlands and Artificial Water Pits into the Regulatory FrameworkThe amendments also introduce the concepts of “artificial wetland” and “artificial water pit” into the Regulation.An artificial wetland is defined as a storage facility constructed for purposes such as recreation, drinking and utility water supply, wastewater treatment, agricultural irrigation, or electricity generation, while exhibiting wetland characteristics. An artificial water pit, on the other hand, refers to depressions formed through human activities such as mining, excavation, sand extraction, or material removal that are periodically or permanently filled with water.The Amending Regulation further establishes management principles for these areas. Under the new framework, unregistered artificial wetlands will be managed by the relevant operating entity with due regard to the protection of biodiversity, while the management and use of artificial water pits will fall under the responsibility of the institution that created or is otherwise responsible for such areas.These provisions are significant both because they broaden the range of areas that may be subject to the Regulation and because they clarify the allocation of administrative responsibilities in relation to such areas.New Provision on Renewable Energy Facilities in Artificial WetlandsOne of the most notable developments from the perspective of the energy sector concerns the new provision relating to sustainable use zones.The amendments provide that renewable energy generation facilities may be authorised by the General Directorate within sustainable use zones of artificial wetlands for which protection zones have been designated.This provision establishes an explicit legal basis for the assessment of renewable energy projects in such areas. However, it does not identify any specific technology, capacity threshold, or investment model, nor does it create an automatic entitlement to obtain a permit. Each project will continue to be assessed on a case-by-case basis under the applicable legal framework.Accordingly, the amendment may be viewed as introducing an additional regulatory pathway for the consideration of renewable energy projects in certain artificial wetlands. Nevertheless, the feasibility of any particular project will still depend on the legal status of the relevant area, the applicable protection measures, and the outcome of other permitting processes. The practical scope of the provision and the criteria that will be applied in the permitting process are expected to become clearer as administrative practice develops.Adoption of a Cumulative Impact Assessment ApproachThe amendments also introduce provisions aimed at assessing impacts on wetlands on a cumulative basis.In this respect, organised industrial zones, industrial zones, free zones, and specialised organised industrial zones located within controlled use zones are now required to prepare a cumulative impact assessment report.The Amending Regulation provides that a permit document may be issued in the name of the relevant zone administration where mitigation and compensatory measures are considered adequate. Importantly, however, such permit document does not eliminate other environmental permitting requirements, and each facility within the relevant zone remains individually responsible for compliance with obligations arising from its own activities.This approach may have important implications for industrial and infrastructure projects located in areas interacting with wetlands, as environmental impacts may increasingly be assessed in conjunction with those arising from neighbouring activities rather than solely on an individual project basis. The scope and methodology of cumulative impact assessments will therefore be an area to monitor closely in future permitting processes.Other Amendments Relating to Conservation, Planning, and EnforcementThe amendment package extends beyond provisions concerning energy projects and water use.Among other changes, the Amending Regulation introduces the concept of a “National Wetlands Strategy” and sets out the principles governing its preparation in line with the Ramsar Strategic Plan. The strategy is to be prepared for ten-year periods and will enter into force following approval by the National Commission.The amendments also require fisheries production areas to be taken into account when delineating wetland protection zones, revise the approval process applicable to management plans, and introduce new provisions concerning inspections aimed at identifying the impacts of activities carried out within wetlands.Taken together, these changes indicate that the wetland protection framework is no longer centred solely on activity-based permitting mechanisms. Rather, it increasingly relies on an integrated system that incorporates planning, management, monitoring, and enforcement tools.Concluding RemarksThe amendments published on 5 September 2026 introduce significant changes to the Regulation on the Protection of Wetlands, particularly in relation to water use, permitting requirements for existing water structures, the management of artificial wetlands, renewable energy facilities in certain designated areas, and cumulative impact assessment requirements.From the perspective of energy and infrastructure investments, projects involving water resources, as well as activities interacting with wetlands, are likely to require careful consideration in light of these developments during both project development and permitting stages. At the same time, it should be borne in mind that the practical scope and implications of several provisions will depend on future implementing rules and the evolution of administrative practice.Accordingly, the project-specific implications of the amendments should be assessed on a case-by-case basis, taking into account the characteristics of the relevant project, the legal status of the affected area, and the broader body of environmental and sector-specific legislation that may apply. As the regulatory framework begins to take shape through implementation, further guidance on the practical application of these provisions is likely to emerge.

Implications of Amendments to the Electrical Facilities Project Regulation

In the energy market, the term electrical facility refers to facilities related to the generation, storage, transmission, distribution and consumption of electrical energy. This article examines and assesses the amendments made to the Regulation governing electrical facilities. The Regulation on Amendments to the Electrical Facilities Project Regulation, published in the Official Gazette dated 09.02.2025 and numbered 32808, introduces significant updates to the existing Regulation. These amendments, which took effect upon publication, include various revisions aimed at ensuring that electrical facilities comply with modern technology standards. The key focus areas of the amendments include project approval processes, authorization procedures, and new regulations for storage facilities. Key Amendments: Purpose The Regulation’s objective has been revised to ensure that electrical facility aligns with modern technological advancements. New procedures for authorization and certification of individuals or entities responsible for project approvals and commissioning have been introduced. Scope The updated Article 2/1 states that authorization processes for individuals conducting facility commissioning and certification are included within the Regulation’s scope. The amendment to Article 2/2(d) states that, within the premises of electrical facility, any facilities that are not directly involved in electricity generation, storage, transmission, distribution, or consumption are excluded from the Regulation. Definitions Several key definitions have been updated or added, including: Electrical facility (Article 4/1(m)): Now explicitly includes energy storage facilities. Installed capacity (Article4/1(çç)): Now considers the maximum power (Mwe) from storage units that can be supplied to the system. Preliminary project (Article 4/1 (hh)): Now defined as a document covering the characteristics of storage-integrated power plants. Facility (Article 4/1 (tt)): Now explicitly includes all activities related to electricity generation, storage, transmission, distribution, and consumption. Storage unit (Article 4/1 (bbb)): Expanded to independent storage units that can store and discharge energy. New concepts are introduced (Articles 4/1 eee-rrr) Relevant Standards & Documents Article 5/3 prohibits the use of non-standardized materials or equipment in electrical facilities unless they comply with regulatory standards. Delegation of Authority Project approvals and acceptance processes are now under the authority of the Ministry (Article 8/1). The Ministry publishes approval formats online and updates them as necessary (Article 8/2). Procedures and Principles It is stipulated in Article 9/1 that the public institution/organization Project Approval Units (“PAU”) may determine and publish the relevant procedures and principles under the specified conditions. Project Preparation & Submission Electrical Facilities Project Scope/ Power Plant, Storage Integrated Power Plants, and Storage -Based Generation Facility Preliminary Project Scope must now be included in project documentation (Article 10/1). Project submission rules have been revised to require specific conditions for preliminary licensed and licensed storage-integrated power plants and preliminary licensed and licensed storage-based generation facilities (Article 11/1, 11/2). Project Approval Electromechanical equipment must now be certified by accredited institutions or meet standard compliance requirements (Article 12/7). Construction Suitability Reports are now required for storage-integrated power plants and storage-based generation facilities along with power plants, before submission (Article 12/8). Electronic signatures are now allowed for project approvals (Article 12/10). Preliminary Project Approval Preliminary licenses now allow for the preliminary project approval of a power plant, storage integrated power plant, and storage -based generation facility (Article 13/1). Preliminary project approval will only be granted for preliminary licensed/licensed power plants, preliminary licensed/licensed storage integrated power plants and preliminary licensed/ licensed storage-based generation facilities (Article 13/3). Facility Construction The construction of licensed power plants, licensed storage-integrated power plants, and licensed storage-based generation facilities may begin only after the listed tasks and procedures have been completed (Article 14). Multi-Source Electricity Generation Facilities A new article (15/A) has been added to cover regulations for hybrid and multi- source power plants. All existing power plant regulations will now apply to multi-source generation facilities. In license applications, one energy source must be designated as the “main source” while others will be classified as “auxiliary sources”. General Assessment It is expected that the revisions will promote the use of renewable energy, ensuring energy supply security and increasing the stability of the electricity market. By allowing electronic approval processes and better defining hybrid, storage-integrated power plants, and storage-based generation facility, the Regulation is anticipated to contribute to the modernization and efficiency of the electricity sector.  

The Competence-Competence Principle

The Competence-Competence Principle: The Arbitral Tribunal’s Power to Rule on Its Own Jurisdiction and Its Reflections Under Turkish Law1. IntroductionArbitration has become increasingly significant, particularly in commercial disputes, due to its consensual nature, the expertise offered by arbitrators, and its ability, in many cases, to provide a faster and more flexible dispute resolution mechanism than state court proceedings. However, the effectiveness of arbitration as a dispute resolution mechanism depends not only on the parties’ willingness to submit their disputes to arbitration, but also on the existence of fundamental structural principles that protect and support that intention. Among these principles, one of the most important is the competence-competence principle, which refers to the authority of an arbitrator or arbitral tribunal to rule on its own jurisdiction.The principle is not merely a technical jurisdictional rule. Rather, it is a fundamental doctrine that delineates the boundaries between arbitration and state courts and directly affects the functionality of arbitral proceedings. Questions concerning whether a dispute is arbitrable, whether an arbitration agreement is valid, or what its scope encompasses are often determinative of the fate of the arbitral process. By regulating which authority should assess such objections and at what stage, the competence-competence principle ensures the proper functioning of the arbitration system.2. Conceptual Framework of the Competence-Competence PrincipleThe term competence-competence originates from German and literally means “jurisdiction over jurisdiction.” The principle refers to the authority of an arbitrator or arbitral tribunal to determine the existence, scope, and limits of its own jurisdiction. Within this framework, an arbitral tribunal may examine issues such as the existence, validity, scope, applicability, and arbitrability of an arbitration agreement.Legal doctrine generally recognizes two dimensions of the principle. Its positive effect refers to the arbitral tribunal’s authority to decide directly on challenges to its jurisdiction. Its negative effect, on the other hand, requires state courts to refrain from intervening in the arbitral process before the arbitral tribunal has had the opportunity to assess such issues. In this way, parties are prevented from delaying or undermining arbitral proceedings by prematurely resorting to state courts.As one of the cornerstones of arbitration, the competence-competence principle constitutes a fundamental structural mechanism that secures the functional autonomy of arbitral tribunals and enhances the efficiency of arbitral proceedings. By allowing arbitrators to determine issues relating to the validity, scope, and arbitrability of an arbitration agreement, the principle helps ensure that arbitral proceedings are not disrupted by unnecessary judicial intervention.3. The Place of the Principle in International Arbitration LawThe competence-competence principle has become a well-established principle of international arbitration law. Article 16 of the UNCITRAL Model Law expressly provides that an arbitral tribunal may rule on its own jurisdiction. Likewise, the 1958 New York Convention indirectly supports the principle by giving priority to the recognition and enforcement of arbitration agreements. Furthermore, the ICSID system, as well as the rules of leading arbitral institutions such as the ICC, LCIA, and SCC, expressly empower arbitral tribunals to determine their own jurisdiction. Accordingly, the competence-competence principle is not merely a theoretical concept but is widely recognized as an essential mechanism for ensuring the effectiveness of international arbitration.A comparative law analysis reveals that the principle is subject to varying approaches across different jurisdictions. French law is regarded as one of the legal systems that most strongly embraces the negative effect of the competence-competence principle. Under the French approach, state courts may not intervene in arbitral proceedings unless the arbitration agreement is manifestly void or manifestly inapplicable. Accordingly, jurisdictional issues must, in principle, first be examined by the arbitral tribunal. This approach is intended to preserve the autonomy and continuity of arbitral proceedings.In contrast, U.S. law adopts a more balanced and contract-oriented approach. Under U.S. arbitration law, threshold issues such as the existence and scope of an arbitration agreement are generally determined by courts. However, where the parties have clearly and unmistakably agreed to submit such issues to arbitration, arbitrators may determine their own jurisdiction. This approach, which became particularly prominent following the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan, reflects a model that places significant emphasis on party autonomy.4. The Competence-Competence Principle Under Turkish LawThe Turkish legal framework expressly adopts the competence-competence principle through both the Civil Procedure Law No. 6100 (“CPL”) and the International Arbitration Law No. 4686. Accordingly, arbitrators and arbitral tribunals are empowered to determine matters concerning the existence, validity, scope, and arbitrability of an arbitration agreement in both domestic and international arbitration proceedings.Through this framework, priority is given to party autonomy, while judicial intervention in the arbitral process is limited in order to safeguard the independence of arbitral proceedings. The objective is to prevent parties from delaying or frustrating arbitration at the outset by resorting to state courts.Nevertheless, the competence-competence principle does not confer unlimited authority upon arbitrators. The principle generally comes into play when a party challenges the tribunal’s jurisdiction, and decisions rendered by arbitrators on jurisdictional issues are not final and immune from review. Indeed, both the CPL and the International Arbitration Law provide for the possibility of setting aside arbitral awards. In particular, courts may exercise judicial review where arbitrators exceed their jurisdiction or render decisions beyond the scope of the arbitration agreement.This review mechanism serves a dual purpose: it ensures legal certainty while simultaneously preventing arbitral proceedings from becoming arbitrary. Turkish law therefore seeks to strike a careful balance between the effectiveness of arbitration and judicial supervision.5. How Do Turkish Courts Apply the Competence-Competence Principle?Turkish courts have consistently applied the competence-competence principle in disputes involving arbitration agreements. The role of the principle under Turkish law was expressly acknowledged by the General Assembly for the Unification of Judgments of the Court of Cassation in its decision dated 19 June 2020 and numbered E. 2019/4, K. 2020/1:“In order for arbitration to achieve its intended purpose, the arbitrator’s authority to decide on its own jurisdiction has been accepted pursuant to the principles of separability and independence of the arbitration agreement. Through the regulation introduced under Article 422 of the CPL, it was intended to expedite arbitration proceedings and prevent arbitration from being frustrated at later stages through jurisdictional objections or allegations concerning the invalidity of the arbitration agreement.”In this decision, the Court emphasized that, in order to ensure the effectiveness of arbitration, arbitrators must be empowered to rule on their own jurisdiction pursuant to the principles of separability and independence of the arbitration agreement. The Court further noted that Article 422 of the CPL was enacted to expedite arbitration proceedings and to prevent parties from derailing arbitration through jurisdictional challenges at later stages.For example, in the decision of the Istanbul 17th Commercial Court of First Instance dated 28 May 2019 (E. 2019/52, K. 2019/261), the parties’ transportation agreement contained the following arbitration clause: “If arbitration is required, it shall be conducted in London and English law shall apply as the governing law.” One party argued that the phrase “if arbitration is required” rendered the parties’ intention to arbitrate uncertain. The Court rejected this argument, taking into account the parties’ status as merchants and holding that the phrase should be interpreted, in accordance with the prudent merchant principle, as meaning “in the event of a dispute.” The Court further referred to the doctrine of separability and held that any assessment regarding the validity of the arbitration clause should be conducted independently of the underlying contract. Relying on the competence-competence principle, the Court concluded that the authority to determine the validity of the arbitration agreement belonged to the arbitral tribunal and therefore upheld the arbitration objection, dismissing the action for lack of jurisdiction.The decision was subsequently upheld by the 12th Civil Chamber of the Istanbul Regional Court of Appeal in its decision dated 19 December 2019 (E. 2019/1503, K. 2019/1611). The Regional Court of Appeal emphasized that the designation of London as the seat of arbitration and English law as the governing law did not undermine the parties’ intention to arbitrate. The Court further confirmed that the authority to determine whether a valid arbitration agreement existed belonged to the arbitral tribunal pursuant to the competence-competence principle. It stressed that, for purposes of assessing the validity of an arbitration agreement, the decisive factors were the parties’ written agreement and their intention to submit disputes to arbitration. Accordingly, the Court concluded that a valid arbitration agreement existed and upheld the arbitration objection.Taken together, these decisions demonstrate that Turkish courts tend to interpret arbitration agreements in a manner that preserves, rather than restricts, the parties’ intention to arbitrate whenever reasonably possible. This approach indicates that the negative effect of the competence-competence principle has also been functionally embraced in Turkish practice.Similarly, in its decision dated 2 November 2015 (E. 2015/4467, K. 2015/11347), the 11th Civil Chamber of the Court of Cassation addressed a claim seeking a judicial declaration that an arbitration clause was invalid. Referring to Article 422 of the CPL, the Court held that objections concerning the validity of an arbitration agreement must first be examined by the arbitral tribunal and therefore upheld the lower court’s decision declining jurisdiction. The decision is significant insofar as it confirms that challenges to the validity of an arbitration clause should, in principle, be addressed by arbitrators before being brought before state courts.Furthermore, in its decision numbered E. 2017/4281, K. 2018/1519, the 11th Civil Chamber of the Court of Cassation held that an arbitral tribunal may rule on the validity of an arbitration clause, while emphasizing that such decisions remain subject to judicial review in setting-aside proceedings. Likewise, in its decision numbered E. 2014/3274, K. 2015/3439, the 15th Civil Chamber of the Court of Cassation recognized that arbitral awards rendered beyond the scope of the arbitration agreement may be annulled. These decisions demonstrate that, although the competence-competence principle is firmly recognized under Turkish law, arbitrators’ determinations regarding their own jurisdiction remain subject to judicial scrutiny and may constitute grounds for annulment proceedings.On the other hand, the Court of Cassation has consistently emphasized that the parties’ intention to arbitrate must be expressed clearly and unequivocally. In its decision dated 8 November 2023 (E. 2023/1944, K. 2023/3131), the 3rd Civil Chamber of the Court of Cassation examined an attorney fee agreement that referred both to arbitration and to state courts. The Court concluded that the parties’ intention to arbitrate was neither clear nor definitive and therefore held the arbitration clause invalid. This decision is particularly important because it demonstrates that the competence-competence principle can operate only where a valid and unambiguous arbitration agreement exists.6. ConclusionThe competence-competence principle occupies a central position within arbitration and serves as a fundamental structural mechanism that enables arbitral tribunals to determine the boundaries of their own jurisdiction. By doing so, it protects arbitral proceedings from dilatory judicial interventions based on jurisdictional objections and ensures that party-driven dispute resolution mechanisms operate efficiently, effectively, and without interruption.The Turkish legal system has expressly embraced this principle both through statutory provisions and judicial precedent. While arbitrators are granted the primary authority to decide jurisdictional issues, their determinations remain subject to limited judicial review. This approach reflects a dual-layered control mechanism that preserves legal certainty without undermining the autonomy of arbitration.Accordingly, Turkish law adopts a balanced model under which the arbitral tribunal’s primary authority is recognized, provided that such authority is grounded in a valid arbitration agreement and remains ultimately subject to limited judicial supervision. This model strengthens both the effectiveness and attractiveness of arbitration while simultaneously safeguarding judicial oversight, an indispensable component of the rule of law.

Understanding the New Regulation on Aggregation Activities in the Electricity Market

The Regulation on Aggregation Activities in the Electricity Market (“Regulation”), long anticipated by the energy sector, was published in the Official Gazette on December 17, 2024 (No. 32755), and came into effect on January 1, 2025. Aggregation activities were first introduced into the legislative framework through a December 22, 2022, amendment to the Electricity Market Law (“Law”) and are now comprehensively regulated under this Regulation, issued pursuant to Article 12/A of the Law. The Regulation aims to optimize portfolio management, facilitate trade and enhance system balance by consolidating small and medium-sized energy generation and consumption facilities. An aggregator is defined as a legal entity holding either an aggregator license or a supply license and authorized through agreements with network users to manage their electricity production and/or consumption schedules, execute related market transactions, and participate in ancillary service supply processes. The Regulation provides a robust legal framework for aggregation, clearly delineating the aggregator's role in the energy market. Aggregation is a cornerstone of energy market transformation and sustainable energy management. It integrates renewable energy sources and reduces energy costs. With the digitalization of energy markets and the expansion of distributed energy systems, the importance of aggregation continues to grow. This article examines the Regulation’s impact on existing legislation, the application areas and future prospects of aggregation, and insights from the Energy Market Regulatory Authority’s (“EMRA”) workshop held in May 2024, attended by sector stakeholders. Trends in Aggregation Activities In energy management, aggregation is often associated with electric vehicles (“EVs”), leveraging two key technologies: Grid-to-Vehicle (“G2V”) and Vehicle-to-Grid (“V2G”). G2V enables EVs to draw energy from the grid for charging, creating a unidirectional energy flow. V2G, on the other hand, allows EVs to feed stored energy back into the grid, enabling bidirectional energy flow. Globally, G2V is widely adopted in countries such as China, the United States, and several European nations. In contrast, V2G remains in pilot stages in countries like Denmark, Japan, and the United Kingdom, demonstrating its potential for energy management and grid balancing. Both technologies are expected to play significant roles in Turkey’s energy transition, especially under aggregator management, where EVs can provide energy storage and grid balancing services. Effective aggregation requires robust technical infrastructure. Aggregators must implement real-time monitoring systems, communication networks, and end-to-end data transmission systems to seamlessly interact with grid operators and ensure operational efficiency. Key Regulatory Changes Introduced by the Regulation The Regulation has brought notable amendments to related legislation, particularly the Balancing and Settlement Regulation in the Electricity Market (“DUY”). Key changes include: Balancing Areas A "balancing area" is a new concept introduced in the DUY. Defined as “a section of the network determined by Turkish Electricity Transmission Company (“TEİAŞ”),” it encompasses production, consumption, and/or storage facilities participating in ancillary services or the balancing power market. While balancing areas do not involve separate pricing, they serve as a labeling method to enhance system flexibility by enabling aggregators to guide consumption and production processes effectively. Opportunities for Small Investors Aggregation provides small energy investors with a viable revenue model. Rather than establishing costly balancing teams, investors can rely on aggregators to manage their operations. By leveraging storage facilities and flexible business models, aggregators can enhance system efficiency while opening new revenue streams for small-scale producers. Market Participant Code Aggregation introduces key distinctions from existing portfolio systems like the Balancing Responsible Group (“DSG”). Unlike DSG participants, facilities under an aggregator’s management lose their individual market participant codes, with all transactions conducted under the aggregator’s single code. This streamlines market operations and shifts responsibilities for collateral and imbalance management to the aggregator. Deviation Amount from Finalized Production Plan (KÜPST) Under the aggregator model, KÜPST penalties for deviations are calculated at the portfolio level rather than per unit, allowing for greater flexibility. Amendments to Article 110/5 of the DUY enable the Board to implement tailored methodologies for energy imbalances and deviations, incentivizing aggregation. Unlicensed Producers and Aggregation Aggregation presents significant opportunities for unlicensed producers benefiting from the Renewable Energy Support Scheme (“YEKDEM”). Producers nearing the end of their 10-year YEKDEM incentive period face a choice: join aggregators for potentially better payment terms or remain with supply companies while avoiding imbalance risks. Unlicensed producers entering aggregation can benefit from full Market Clearing Price (“PTF”) payments, as opposed to the partial payments offered under YEKDEM. This shift could create a competitive environment where portfolio management becomes increasingly critical. Separation of Supply and Aggregation Activities The Regulation allows aggregation activities to be conducted under either an aggregator license or a supply license. While these activities may seem complementary, some stakeholders advocate for separating them to avoid conflicts of interest. Aggregators focus on demand-side participation, balancing services, and load optimization, while suppliers aim to maximize sales. Separating these roles could ensure clearer objectives and operational efficiency. Conclusion The Regulation on Aggregation Activities in the Electricity Market marks a significant step toward enhancing portfolio management and system balance in Turkey’s energy market. By consolidating small and medium-sized production and consumption facilities, the Regulation paves the way for more efficient, flexible, and sustainable energy management. Market participants with technical expertise and robust infrastructure are expected to lead the transition to aggregation. While practical challenges will emerge during implementation, the Regulation is a dynamic framework that will continue to evolve with market needs. Aggregation activities are set to play a pivotal role in shaping the future of energy markets in Turkey and beyond.
Content supplied by Kesikli Law Firm