The following courts of appeals decisions bear on different aspects of the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"), helping to clarify what plaintiffs must prove in order to establish that they have a disability, were denied a reasonable accommodation, or suffered some adverse employment action as a result of being disabled or asserting their ADA rights.
New Managers' Enforcement of Route-Rotation Did Not Constitute Withdrawal of Reasonable Accommodation of Truck Driver's Emotional Disorders
. In Champagne v. Servistar Corporation, decided by the First Circuit on March 12, 1998, the plaintiff was a truck driver who claimed that emotional disorders required him to drive only familiar routes, avoid high bridges, and not rotate driving routes as required by company policy. For several years, based on his own requests and a vague note from his doctor, he had been allowed to drive a set route. In 1993, however, new managers insisted that he and other drivers who were driving set routes begin to meet route-rotation requirements or transfer to light duty at the warehouse. After the plaintiff obtained a temporary restraining order in state court, Servistar agreed to let him continue driving his set route pending receipt of more specific information about his condition. All the plaintiff provided in response was another note from his doctor stating that a fixed routine was necessary to control his anxieties. Three months later, the plaintiff was fired, along with two other drivers, for falsifying his driving logs.The First Circuit rejected his claims of disability discrimination and retaliation under the ADA. The court observed that Servistar had produced evidence that it fired plaintiff after a neutral investigation of all drivers showed that he repeatedly had logged himself as driving at times when phone records showed he was at a motel. Servistar simultaneously fired two other drivers for the same misconduct. The court concluded that the plaintiff could not show that he had been singled out; additionally, his argument that the company had long been aware of and tolerated drivers' falsification of their logs was undercut by the fact that the responsible managers were new, and there was no showing that their decision to take action was motivated by the plaintiff's emotional problems or state court suit.
The court also held that Servistar did not impermissibly threaten to withdraw a reasonable accommodation required by the ADA when it told the plaintiff that he would have to rotate routes or transfer to the warehouse. Here again, the managers were new, and their decision to enforce company policy was uniformly applied. The court also expressed doubt that the plaintiff had made the required showing that he had asserted his rights under the ADA. When the managers informed plaintiff of their decision to enforce the policy, he had not yet filed his EEOC charge or claimed to be disabled; and, he never presented any medical evidence to support that he was disabled. Moreover, Servistar's voluntary decision to exempt him from route-rotation for several years did not establish that he was disabled or that this exemption constituted a reasonable accommodation required by the ADA.
Allergen-Free Workplace Not Required to Accommodate Breathing Disorder
. In Cassidy v. Detroit Edison Company, decided by the Sixth Circuit on March 12, 1998, the plaintiff claimed to be disabled as a result of breathing difficulties arising from her exposure to "stack gas" while working as a power plant operator in 1986. After a medical examination, her employer transferred her to work in its computer center. For two years, she experienced few breathing problems; thereafter, she experienced numerous allergic reactions from exposure in the workplace to cleaning chemicals, diesel fumes, food odors, paint fumes, and smoke. The company accommodated her by scheduling her to work straight day shifts, excusing her from work when known allergens were present, scheduling maintenance for times when she was not present, testing the air for compliance with environmental standards, and allowing her to wear a mask and use a breathing machine at work. The company also looked for, but was unable to find, a work environment with better air quality. Indeed, the air in the computer center was the best available because it was filtered to protect computer records. After several months on medical leave, the plaintiff was cleared by her doctor to return to work, so long as her workstation was "free of exposure to any agent that may trigger asthma or cause a drop in peak flow." Informed by its chief medical advisor that no such workstation existed, the company terminated her employment.The Sixth Circuit held that the employer had done all it could do to reasonably accommodate the plaintiff, particularly in light of the extremely broad and ill-defined accommodation that she had requested. The court concluded that "[p]laintiff's proposed accommodation for essentially an allergen-free workplace, which Defendant attempted to locate within the company, was simply too vague to reasonably inform Defendant of a reasonable accommodation, or was otherwise simply unavailable."
Absent Evidence of a Medical Diagnosis, Paranoia and Strange Behavior Not a Disability
. In Cody v. Cigna Healthcare, decided by the Eighth Circuit on March 16, 1998, the plaintiff, a nurse, claimed to be disabled as a result of depression. The plaintiff was assigned to conduct quality of care reviews at doctors' offices in St. Louis. She claimed that going into certain neighborhoods she considered dangerous exacerbated her anxiety and depression, and that when she told her supervisor about this problem, and mentioned also that she was undergoing therapy, her supervisor ignored her. She then brought her concerns to the company's executive director, after which her supervisor confronted her and threatened that "she would suffer the consequences." Soon afterwards, other employees told the executive director that plaintiff had been behaving strangely, specifically, sprinkling salt by her cubicle to keep away evil spirits, staring off into space for up to an hour at a time, drawing pictures of sperm, and talking about a gun.The executive director then met with the plaintiff and her supervisor. He offered the plaintiff a paid medical leave with her return to work contingent upon undergoing a psychiatric evaluation. Concerned by a bulge in her purse, he called human resources, and they sent in a security specialist, who was introduced to the plaintiff as a mediator. The purses of the plaintiff and her supervisor were searched, but no gun was found. After the meeting, the plaintiff's security card was confiscated. She subsequently refused to return to work and was fired.
The Eighth Circuit rejected the plaintiff's claims under the ADA because she had failed to show that she was disabled. The court observed that the plaintiff had presented no evidence of a medical diagnosis of depression, and that her anxiety, as she described it, had caused difficulties in her life but had not substantially limited her ability to work. Although the employer's medical expert did find that the plaintiff suffered from paranoia, which interferes with the ability to interpret facts, and also found that the plaintiff had a "schizotypal personality disorder," the court concluded that there was no evidence that the plaintiff actually had misperceived reality, or that any of her major life activities had been substantially impaired.
The court also rejected the plaintiff's arguments that she was disabled under the ADA because her employer regarded her as such. The executive director's knowledge that she was behaving strangely and undergoing therapy was not sufficient to show that he viewed her as disabled. Nor was his request that she undergo a mental evaluation -- "Employers need to be able to use reasonable means to ascertain the cause of troubling behavior without exposing themselves to ADA claims . . . ." As for the employer's security measures, they reflected concern that she might be carrying a gun, not a belief that she was disabled.
"Everyday Mobility" Is Not a Major Life Activity
. An employee who suffered from "Panic Disorder With Agoraphobia," which he claimed substantially limited the major life activity of "everyday mobility," was not disabled under the ADA, according to the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in Reeves v. Johnson Controls World Services. The employee was an Airport Operations Supervisor who began experiencing severe anxiety symptoms and panic attacks after a vacation trip to Disney World. According to the plaintiff, "upon seeing the enormity of the park and of the crowd," he "began to sweat, his heart began to pound, he vomited, became 'more anxious than [he] had ever felt in [his] life,' and passed out." Three months after returning from a leave of absence for psychiatric treatment for his panic disorders, the plaintiff was dismissed from his employment. The plaintiff brought suit under the ADA claiming that his panic disorder deprived him of the major life activity of everyday mobility. According to the plaintiff, the fear of his attacks incapacitated him from taking vacations or going to a shopping mall alone. The Second Circuit rejected the plaintiff's argument. It found that, by narrowly tailoring the definition of major life activity to fit the circumstances of his impairment, the plaintiff was attempting to lessen or circumvent his burden of showing a substantial limitation for purposes of the ADA. "If the courts permit individual tailoring of the scope of the major life activity," the court explained, "the case-by-case inquiry into whether an impairment entails a 'substantial limit[ation]' is essentially fixed from the outset -- it is, in short, pre-determined by a plaintiff." The court also rejected the plaintiff's argument that he was regarded by his employer as having an impairment.This article was first published in the Spring 1998 Issue of Mayer, Brown & Platt's Labor and Employment Newsletter.
Copyright © 1999 Mayer, Brown & Platt. This Mayer, Brown & Platt article provides information and comments on legal issues and developments of interest to our clients and friends. The foregoing is not a comprehensive treatment of the subject matter covered and is not intended to provide legal advice. Readers should seek specific legal advice before taking any action with respect to the matters discussed herein.
