Highlights
- The U.S. Department of Energy's (DOE) Office of Cybersecurity, Energy Security, and Emergency Response is seeking public comment on the implementation of Executive Order (EO) 14421, issued on August 26, 2026.
- EO 14421 authorizes DOE to restrict certain foreign-produced electric equipment in the bulk-power system that poses a national security risk and establishes a framework for reviewing covered transactions, existing equipment and potential mitigation measures.
- DOE is seeking input on a number of topics – including covered equipment and entities, supply chain risk management, existing equipment, domestic manufacturing and economic impacts – and written comments and other requested information must be submitted by October 9, 2026.
- Additionally, DOE will host a public webinar on September 16, 2026.
The U.S. Department of Energy's (DOE) Office of Cybersecurity, Energy Security, and Emergency Response is soliciting public comments on implementation of President Donald Trump's recent Executive Order (EO) 14421, issued on August 26, 2026. Subject to the determination of the Secretary of Energy, EO 14421 prohibits the acquisition, importation, transfer or installation of foreign-produced bulk-power system electric equipment under the control or jurisdiction of a Covered Foreign Entity if the transaction poses an unacceptable risk to national security.
EO 14421's definition of "bulk-power system" includes transmission lines rated at 69,000 volts (69 kV) or more but excludes facilities used in local distribution of electric energy. EO 14421 also defines a Covered Foreign Entity as a country or person owned by, controlled by or subject to the jurisdiction or direction of a foreign government. The term also includes entities that are subject to a U.S. arms embargo or sanctions regime or that the Secretary of Energy determines are engaged in conduct detrimental to the national security or foreign policy of the U.S.
EO 14421 declares a national emergency with respect to perceived risks associated with foreign-produced bulk-power system electric equipment and the increasing cybersecurity threats from foreign actors, including China and Iran. EO 14421 states that these actors can exploit the minimal restrictions on foreign equipment, a situation compounded by rapidly increasing electricity demand driven by advanced manufacturing, artificial intelligence infrastructure and defense production.
Under EO 14421, the Secretary of Energy gains broad authority to address transactions involving foreign-produced bulk-power system electric equipment. The Secretary of Energy may prohibit the acquisition, importation, transfer or installation of foreign equipment connected to a Covered Foreign Entity that poses a national security risk. Importantly, this authority extends to equipment already in use on the bulk-power system grid. In this case, DOE may mandate ongoing monitoring, physical or network isolation or the replacement or removal of the equipment. However, before directing isolation, disconnection, replacement or removal of existing equipment, the Secretary of Energy must consider effects on reliability and safety, the availability of secure replacements and continuity of essential service, and may establish phased compliance timelines.
EO 14421 also provides compliance pathways for industry. The Secretary of Energy may design or negotiate mitigation measures that can serve as preconditions for approving otherwise-prohibited transactions. Additionally, the Secretary of Energy may establish criteria for recognizing equipment and vendors as pre-qualified and therefore exempt from EO 14421's prohibitions and may publish a list of pre-qualified equipment and vendors.
By December 24, 2026, DOE must publish implementing regulations and designate which equipment and vendors are covered. By February 22, 2027, DOE must propose changes to the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) that give preference to domestically manufactured energy infrastructure equipment.
EO 14421's reach is broad and will affect electric utilities, independent generators, transmission developers, data center operators, manufacturers and vendors. Projects already in the pipeline that rely on foreign-sourced transformers, inverters, battery storage units, industrial control systems and related equipment could be subject to review and, in some cases, may be forced to switch suppliers or swap out key equipment. As discussed in a previous Holland & Knight alert, EO 14421 grants DOE broad authority to review and restrict certain transactions involving foreign-produced bulk-power system electric equipment that pose a national security risk.
Request for Information
On September 9, 2026, DOE's Office of Cybersecurity, Energy Security, and Emergency Response began accepting comments from parties interested in shaping DOE's implementation of EO 14421. Stakeholders – including electric utilities, independent power producers, equipment manufacturers, component and sub-tier suppliers, software providers, engineering firms and related parties – are encouraged to participate in the implementation process.
The request for information (RFI) is organized around eight topic areas:
- Scope, Definitions and Covered Transactions
- Covered Foreign Entities and Supply Chain Risk Management
- Risk Evaluation and Transaction Review
- Existing Equipment and Mitigation
- Licensing, Mitigation Measures and Prequalification
- Domestic Manufacturing, Secure Replacements and Federal Procurement
- Economic and Regulatory Analysis
- Implementation, Information Sharing and Other Matters
DOE encourages respondents to identify which of the more than 50 questions their comments address. Respondents should support their answers with data, explain any assumptions or estimates, identify applicable time periods, and note whether responses reflect current practices, anticipated practices or recommendations for DOE's consideration.
Key Dates
DOE will host a public webinar to discuss EO 14421 on September 16, 2026, from 3 to 4 p.m. ET.
By October 9, 2026, interested parties must submit written responses through the federal eRulemaking portal under docket number DOE-HQ-2026-1123 or by email to [email protected]. Hard-copy submissions may also be sent by mail or hand delivered to DOE's Office of Cybersecurity, Energy Security, and Emergency Response at 1000 Independence Avenue SW, Washington, DC 20585.
The content of this article is intended to provide a general guide to the subject matter. Specialist advice should be sought about your specific circumstances.
