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ARTICLE · 29 MAY 2012

Competition Law Newsletter 2012

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In two judgments (Dow & DuPont) handed down on 2 February 2012 in the chloroprene rubber cartel case, the EU General Court upheld the European Commission's practice of holding two joint venture partners jointly and severally liable for a cartel infringement committed by their joint venture.

European UnionAntitrust/Competition Law
Herman Speyart
Herman Speyart

EUROPEAN UNION

Stretching the limits: parental liability in respect of a joint venture 

In two judgments (Dow & DuPont) handed down on 2 February 2012 in the chloroprene rubber cartel case, the EU General Court upheld the European Commission's practice of holding two joint venture partners jointly and severally liable for a cartel infringement committed by their joint venture. 

In December 2007, the Commission imposed fines totalling 2478 million Euros on a cartel which included, among others, DuPont Dow Elastomers ("DDE"). During part of the period under investigation, DDE was a full-function joint venture between DuPont and Dow Chemicals. (The creation of DDE by DuPont and Dow Chemicals was notified to and cleared by the Commission in 1996, which implies a finding by the Commission that DDE performed on a lasting basis all functions of an independent undertaking: Case IV/M.663 - DuPont/Dow.)

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