Dr. Yaqoub AlSanea & Partners (YYA)

Dr. Yaqoub AlSanea & Partners (YYA)

Kuwait

News and developments

Kuwait's PPP Pipeline: What the 23-Project Tender Signals for Private Investors

KAPP's January 2026 advisory-services tender spans waste treatment plants, public markets, slaughterhouses, and commercial projects under PPP Law No. 116 of 2014 — a live, current pipeline story that signals where private capital is being invited in next.   On 3 January 2026, the Kuwait Authority for Partnership Projects (KAPP), in cooperation with the Ministry of Finance, announced a public competitive procedure to appoint a consultant to prepare feasibility studies and tender documents for twenty-three projects located on state-owned real estate. The local press carried it as a routine procurement notice. In fact, it is the first detailed map to appear in years of the assets the State has decided to open to private management and development, and of the kind of capital it wants to attract. What Was Actually Offered The procedure itself goes no further than appointing a consultant: a local, regional or international firm or consortium to carry out the technical, economic and legal feasibility studies, draft the terms of reference, and support evaluation through to financial close. It was launched under PPP Law No. 116 of 2014 and the procedures of Public Tenders Law No. 49 of 2016, on a two-envelope, points-scored basis, with a minimum of ten years' experience in comparable projects required. The attached list is what deserves reading. It falls into four groups: •       Environment and waste: two construction-waste treatment plants. •       Food security and logistics: the Farwaniya, Jahra and Ahmadi slaughterhouses; the meat, vegetable and fish market in Jleeb Al-Shuyoukh; the meat and vegetable market in Jahra; and the central fruit and vegetable market in Sulaibiya. •       Public markets: Mubarakiya, Kuwait Market, the National Market, Safat, Al-Manakh, Al-Watiya, Al-Maseel (the Grand Market), the International Center (the United Market) and Al-Khaima Mall. •       Waterfronts and leisure: Al-Kout in Fahaheel, Phase 5 of the waterfront project (Marina Mall), Kuwait Beach 11 (Kuwait Magic), the International Golf Club and the International Building property. The procedure's own trajectory is also worth recording: the submission deadline was extended from 5 March to 5 April 2026; the award was referred to the State Audit Bureau on 28 July; the Bureau returned the file on 6 August; and it was re-referred on 13 August at a value of KWD 2,150,540. As of the time of writing, it is still awaiting approval. This prior oversight is not an administrative choice: Article 31 of the Law subjects all partnership contracts to it, including consultancy contracts. Why Now Three factors explain the timing. The first is fiscal. The draft budget for 2026/2027 projects a deficit of KWD 9.8 billion on revenues of no more than KWD 16.3 billion, following an actual deficit of KWD 7.1 billion in fiscal year 2025/2026. In that context, state real estate ceases to be an administrative file and becomes a source of non-oil revenue to be maximised, which is what KAPP expressed when it set the objectives of the offering as raising the efficiency of management and operation, improving service, and increasing the financial return to the State. The second is legal. Article 7 of the PPP Law provides that build-operate-transfer contracts concluded before the Law came into force continue until their term expires, after which the land and installations revert to the State, with only a single one-year transitional extension permitted. As the terms of an entire generation of those contracts have run out, the State now holds a stock of operating assets that cannot be left without a clear operating framework. Article 30 charted the route: re-tendering their management, or their management and development, in a competition. The third is momentum. The partnership programme gathered pace with the signing in February 2026 of the contract for Phases 2 and 3 of the Az-Zour North plant with a consortium of ACWA Power and the Gulf Investment Corporation, and with the Umm Al-Hayman project proceeding in execution. An authority that has shown it can close deals worth billions of dinars is now looking to broaden its base horizontally. First Reading: From Construction to Operation The essential difference between this list and what came before it is that most of its projects are facilities already in operation. Mubarakiya opens its doors every morning, the Farwaniya slaughterhouse runs, and Al-Kout is crowded at the weekend. The State is not asking the investor to build, but to manage, develop and raise efficiency. That changes the risk equation at its root. There is little construction risk to speak of, there is a historical revenue record to analyse, and the payback cycle is shorter than for any infrastructure project. Indeed, Article 30 requires the project's audited financial statements for the last three years to be among the published tender documents, giving the investor a basis for due diligence rarely available in new projects. Second Reading: The Sectors Being Opened The clearest message in the list is sectoral. The State is pointing to three directions. Municipal environmental services are the only structural component of the list. The two construction-waste treatment plants mark the beginning of private entry into municipal waste after years of talk about the Kabd project. They are the closest to what banks and international operators look for: long contracts, estimable volumes and a clear fee mechanism. Food security and logistics appear at this scale in the partnership programme for the first time. Three slaughterhouses and four central fresh-produce markets are the country's food infrastructure. The message is that the State is prepared to entrust their operation to the private sector, but within regulatory constraints: Article 40 obliges the project company to treat all users equally in prices and terms, and Article 36 reserves to the public entity the right to modify operating rules and prices within the limits of the contract. A stable return, but not a free one. Leisure and retail on state land reclaim their place after the Al-Kout and Marina Mall experiences showed that waterfronts can generate sustainable revenue. Phase 5 of Marina Mall, the International Golf Club and Kuwait Beach 11 are projects commercial developers know well. Third Reading: Who Is Being Invited In At Az-Zour North, the counterparty sought was an international consortium with financing capacity in the billions. Here the picture is different. A slaughterhouse, a central market or a mid-sized shopping centre are opportunities sized for Kuwaiti and Gulf real-estate companies, retail and food operators, facilities-management firms and local investment funds. The Law reinforces that reading. Projects whose total cost does not exceed KWD 60 million are offered under Article 12 in a direct competition, and the winner establishes and wholly owns the project company, with no public shareholding company and no citizens' subscription. That is the likely track for most facilities on the list. The implicit message is that the State wants to widen the base of participants in the partnership programme, not confine it to the largest consortia. That does not close the door to foreign investors. Article 34 exempts companies established under the Law from the nationality requirement of the Commercial Code where the winning consortium includes approved foreign companies, and Article 28 requires the terms of reference to set out the benefits granted to the contractor, including tax and customs exemptions by decision of the Supreme Committee. But the nature of the assets makes a local partner a necessity rather than an option. Fourth Reading: The Rules That Will Govern the Round Anyone who wants a seat in this round needs to know that the Law distinguishes two tracks, and that characterisation decides everything. If a project is offered as a re-tender of an asset that has reverted to the State, Article 30 governs it: a management contract may not exceed ten years, a management-and-development contract may not exceed twenty, and the operator whose contract has expired enjoys a preference in award of 5% over the best bid if it takes part in the competition, rising to 10% if it is a public shareholding company. If it is offered as a new project, the term may run to fifty years under Article 18, and the Article 12 and 13 track applies according to cost. Under both tracks, the Law grants the investor safeguards unavailable in conventional leases: no rescission of the contract except by court judgment, save for serious breach (Article 25); fair compensation on termination in the public interest (Article 19); amendment of the contract to restore its financial equilibrium when legislation changes (Article 36); and arbitration with Supreme Committee approval (Article 29). Against these stand mandatory provisions: the land may not be mortgaged (Article 23); assets revert to the State without consideration, save those expressly excluded in the contract documents (Article 18); and no assignment without Supreme Committee approval (Article 24). What Comes Next Appointing the consultant is the first step in a sequence that will not be short: the studies, then approval by the Supreme Committee chaired by the Minister of Finance, then announcement, then qualification, then competition. The actual offerings will most likely stretch into 2027 and beyond, in tranches led by the assets whose characterisation is clearest. But the window that matters is not the day of the announcement. It is the current stage, where the shape of each offering is set: the legal characterisation, the term, the assets excluded from reversion, the incentives included and the qualification criteria. It is also the stage at which what the market says is usually heard. The offering tells the investor four things: that the State wants partners to operate what it owns; that the sectors being opened this time are waste, food and leisure rather than power and water; that the size of the opportunities has been designed to accommodate local and regional capital; and that the rules that will govern the round are already written in the Law, so that whoever reads them today enters tomorrow's competition with a bid rather than a hope.

EARN-OUTS AND DEFERRED CONSIDERATION IN KUWAIT M&A

Kuwaiti law has never stood in the way of the earn-out. It is the market practice that has simply been slower to embrace it. The Civil Code's conditional-obligation regime, the prohibition on interest, and a layered set of CMA controls each impose real structuring discipline on any earn-out intended to survive enforcement scrutiny. In our experience, earn-outs and deferred consideration remain the exception in Kuwaiti M&A Practice. That pattern reflects market convention rather than any prohibition under Kuwaiti law. For counsel advising on the next Kuwaiti-law share purchase agreement, understanding where these boundaries actually sit is a genuine point of differentiation. The Statutory Foundation: Price, Conditions, and the Sole-Will Limit Kuwaiti law does not require a share sale price to be fixed at signing. Article (459) of the Civil Code (Decree-Law No. 67 of 1980, as amended) allows the price to be determined by reference to valid, objective bases, including delegation to a third party; if that third party fails to fix the price, it defaults to fair market value. This is the doctrinal foundation for a Kuwaiti-law earn-out. The deferred amount must rest on a clear, external basis, not on one party's unilateral say-so. Articles (323 to 328) set the relevant boundary. An earn-out is essentially a suspensive condition: part of the purchase price that only becomes payable once a future, uncertain event happens. Article 325 sets the key limit on this: if that event is simply "whatever the obligor decides," no obligation ever arises at all. So, an earn-out payable "if the buyer decides the target performed satisfactory" fails, it depends entirely on the buyer's own say-so. However, one payable on audited EBITDA (i.e. earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation, and amortization) or revenue crossing a set threshold does not fail, because the trigger is objective and outside the buyer's control. That difference is what separates a payment obligation the seller can actually enforce from one that legally never existed in the first place.   No Interest, and a Statutory Good-Faith Backstop Kuwaiti law prohibits interest, and any advantage granted to a creditor that is not matched by genuine value delivered is liable to be re-characterized as interest and struck down; deferred consideration should not carry an express interest coupon, with any true cost of deferral reflected in the headline price itself. However, this does not prevent parties from agreeing on the “commercial value” of a deferred payment structure as part of the overall transaction economics. Moreover, Kuwaiti law also supplies, by statute, much of what common-law earn-outs achieve through negotiated operating covenants. Article 197 of the Civil Code imposes a mandatory duty of good faith in contractual performance, and Article 30 codifies the prohibition on abuse of rights; neither is excludable by agreement. Together they give a seller a statutory basis, independent of the drafting, to challenge a buyer who manipulates results to suppress payment, though well-advised counsel will still draft explicit operating covenants rather than rely on the implied protection alone. Listed Targets: A Layered Set of CMA Controls For Boursa Kuwait-listed targets, Module Nine (M&A - Book) of the CMA's Executive Bylaws constrains deferred consideration on several fronts, not only through the cash-only requirement that attaches once the mandatory-offer threshold is crossed. First, disclosure obligations bear directly on how a deferred element must be presented. For mergers, item (8) of Article 2-6 requires the draft merger contract to state the consideration to be received by partners or shareholders, and the bases followed in determining it , a direct textual anchor for disclosing an earn-out's formula, not merely its target value. The acquisition-offer regime is less explicit: Article 3-3-1 requires disclosure of the total amount of the submitted offer among a twelve-item list, without a dedicated bases-of-determination requirement of its own. Counsel should nonetheless disclose an earn-out's calculation method in an acquisition offer document as a matter of prudent practice, even where Article 3-3-1 does not compel it as precisely as Article 2-6(8) does for mergers.   Second, the equal-treatment principle in Article 3-1-2 requires the offeror to treat all shareholders within each separate category of shares equally and prohibits sharing information with some shareholders that is not made available to the rest during the offer period. Article 3-1-14 reinforces this: an offeror who buys shares above the offer price during the offer period must raise its own offer to match the highest price paid. A deferred payment made available only to major shareholders or incumbent management risks operating as an undisclosed price increase to a favored subset of sellers , precisely the outcome these two provisions are designed to prevent. Performance-linked payments to continuing management are accordingly best structured, and disclosed, as separate post-completion arrangements rather than as consideration for the shares.   Third, the investment-advisor mechanism supplies an institutional check, even though it is not tailored to deferred consideration specifically. Article 3-1-5 requires the investment advisor to any party to the offer to be independent and free of conflicts, and Article 3-3-10 requires the offeree board's response to the Authority to incorporate that advisor's opinion before it goes to shareholders. Module Nine does not prescribe a bespoke fairness opinion for an earn-out or deferred element, but a genuinely independent advisor reviewing the offer as a whole is, in practice, the closest the Bylaws come to testing whether a deferred component is fair and its targets realistic.   Fourth, and most restrictively, a mandatory acquisition offer must be a cash offer for the highest price under Article 3-5-2, once a person's ownership exceeds the 30% threshold that triggers the mandatory-offer obligation under Article 3-5-1, and a partial acquisition offer is subject to an analogous cash requirement under Article 4-1-4. The constraint runs deeper than price form: an earn-out is, in substance, a condition attached to part of the price, and the mandatory-offer regime leaves materially less room for conditional consideration than a voluntary offer under Article 3-8 (Non-Cash Voluntary Acquisition) of the Bylaws, or a private transaction that does not cross the mandatory-offer threshold.   The CMA amends its Bylaws from time to time. As with any regulatory citation, the provisions referenced above should be checked against the version of Module Nine, and any subsequent CMA decisions, in force on the relevant transaction date. Structuring for Enforceability Three principal drafting disciplines should be observed. First, anchor the earn-out to an externally verifiable metric with independent-expert determination of disputes, mirroring Article 459's third-party pricing model. The earn-out consideration should be tied to an objectively measurable metric that is capable of independent verification. Second, any deferred consideration should preferably be secured through an escrow arrangement or contractual holdback, rather than documented by way of an interest-bearing promissory note or other debt instrument. Third, where the seller remains in a relationship with the company post-completion, any payments attributable to or arising from that continuing relationship should be documented separately and distinctly from the sale consideration. This separation is particularly important because applicable local-law rules may otherwise result in the earn-out payments being subjected to an unintended legal characterization or regulatory analysis. Dispute Resolution Deserves Equal Care Dispute-resolution provisions deserve particular attention because earn-out disputes often combine legal, accounting and valuation issues. Kuwait is a contracting state to the New York Convention, and foreign arbitral awards may be recognized and enforced in Kuwait subject to the applicable statutory and Convention requirements, including the relevant procedural conditions and mandatory public-policy considerations. Arbitration may nevertheless offer practical advantages for a disputed earn-out, particularly where the dispute involves confidential financial information, specialist accounting evidence, or a cross-border transaction , and, in the absence of published Kuwaiti case law addressing earn-outs specifically, it is generally the more predictable forum for a contested metric. A useful approach may be to distinguish between two categories of dispute: •         disputes concerning the application of an agreed accounting methodology or the calculation of the relevant metric, which may be referred initially to an independent expert; and •         wider disputes concerning contractual interpretation, alleged breach of operational covenants, or the validity of the earn-out provisions, which may be referred to arbitration or the agreed court forum. This division can materially reduce the scope and cost of a subsequent dispute. For cross-border transactions, the governing-law and dispute-resolution analysis should form part of the initial structuring exercise rather than being addressed only at the final stage of negotiation. The enforceability of the pricing mechanism, the location of relevant assets and parties, and the likely place of enforcement should all be considered together. Market practice bears this out: mid-to-upper-tier transactions involving a foreign party frequently opt for foreign governing law and arbitration altogether, with English law and London-seated arbitration among the more frequent choices, reserving Kuwaiti law mainly for purely domestic deals , a pattern drawn from deal practice rather than any published survey, and one counsel should treat as a starting point for negotiation rather than a rule. CONCLUSION Earn-out and deferred-consideration provisions though being in rise, they remain, on current market practice, relatively infrequent in Kuwaiti M&A. They occasionally surface to bridge valuation gaps or to account for forward-looking earnings after major disruptions, but completion accounts and locked-box pricing remain the default for many transactions. That is a market observation, not a legal constraint, and it does not mean that deferred consideration lacks a place in Kuwaiti dealmaking. For the transaction where a genuine valuation gap cannot otherwise be bridged, Kuwaiti law and CMA practice together provide a coherent, if unforgiving, framework for making deferred consideration work , provided the mechanism is built on objective metrics, expert determination, full disclosure of its basis, and a clear-eyed view of where the boundaries lie.

Where You Sell, Not Where You Sit: When a Deal With No Kuwaiti Party Still Needs CPA Clearance

Kuwait’s April 2026 reforms raised the merger-control thresholds and added a target-sales condition. For foreign-to-foreign deals, what they left untouched matters more. An Italian catering-equipment maker agrees to buy a Spanish rival. Neither has a Kuwaiti shareholder, subsidiary or branch, and the target has never sold into Kuwait. The buyer, however, sells about KWD 2 million of equipment a year direct to Kuwaiti hotels. Kuwait is not on the merger-control tracker. On the current wording of Kuwait’s rules, it should be. The CPA already reviews transactions between foreign parties. In August 2025 the Competition Protection Agency (CPA) cleared the Public Investment Fund’s acquisition of 54% of MBC Group: a Saudi buyer, a Saudi target. Three questions, often run together Jurisdiction. Law No. 72 of 2020 on the Protection of Competition and its Executive Regulations reach conduct outside Kuwait that prevents, restricts or harms competition inside it. Notification. Article 12 is narrower, and arithmetical: the parties to a concentration must apply to the CPA before completion where their registered assets or annual sales in Kuwait exceed thresholds set by the CPA Board. The thresholds are based on Kuwaiti sales and assets, rather than worldwide turnover. Although the Law contains language linking concentrations to the Kuwaiti market, the 2026 Resolution’s single-party test can, on its wording, be met by the buyer’s Kuwaiti sales alone. Clearance. Kuwait is not a notify-and-close jurisdiction. The parties apply for prior approval, Article 14 bars any act to complete the deal until the CPA Board approves it, and silence is not approval. The Executive Director’s review period starts when a complete application is referred to the Executive Director and can run to 90 days, extendable by a further 90 days. The Board then has a separate 30-day period to decide once the application is presented to it. Third-party objections suspend the review clock. The 2026 thresholds and the gap in the target test CPA Board Resolution No. 32 of 2026, in force since 5 April 2026, sets three alternative tests, each measured on audited accounts for the last financial year before completion: •      any one party’s annual sales in Kuwait exceed KWD 1.5 million (roughly USD 4.9 million); •      the parties’ combined Kuwaiti sales exceed KWD 3 million, provided the company or activity being acquired has Kuwaiti sales of at least KWD 1.5 million; or •      the parties’ combined registered assets in Kuwait exceed KWD 7.5 million. The target floor has been welcomed as bringing Kuwait closer to international practice, which generally requires a local footprint for the target or for at least two parties. The text delivers less. The floor qualifies only the combined-sales test; the single-party test applies to “one of the parties”, and the asset test has no target condition. With only a buyer and a target, any deal the floor screens out is caught by the single-party test anyway. The Italian deal meets that test on the buyer’s sales alone. The Resolution does not explain how the target-sales condition is intended to interact with the other two tests. Pending clarification from the CPA, scrutinise the buyer’s footprint as closely as the target’s. Footprint without presence A local entity is not required. The Resolution defines Kuwaiti sales as those actually achieved in the Kuwaiti market, “whether directly or through branches, subsidiaries or controlled companies”, so, on its natural reading, direct exports and online sales to Kuwaiti customers count. Kuwaiti assets include those registered, owned or used in an economic activity in Kuwait. The Resolution is silent on revenue routed through independent regional distributors and on sales by a buyer’s parent and sister companies; both need case-by-case analysis. The same tests apply to every form of concentration: mergers, acquisitions of direct or indirect control by any means, and joint ventures carrying on a lasting, independent activity. Buying a foreign parent therefore catches its Kuwaiti business. Only the target floor, written around “the company or activity being acquired”, sits awkwardly with mergers and joint ventures. Control means decisive influence. A minority investment may therefore confer control where the accompanying rights give the investor decisive influence over the business. Failure to file can attract fines of up to 10% of the parties’ total revenues for the previous financial year, and the Law does not say whether Kuwaiti or worldwide revenues count. The Constitutional Court struck down other fining limbs of the same article in 2025; this one remains in force. What dealmakers should take away Kuwait asks where you sell, not where you sit. The 2026 reform raised the bar but did not, on its text, make the target’s Kuwaiti sales a precondition for every filing. Kuwait belongs on the filing matrix whenever any party, buyer included, approaches KWD 1.5 million of Kuwaiti sales or the parties’ Kuwaiti assets approach KWD 7.5 million. Assess whether minority rights confer decisive influence. Budget time for Arabic filings and legalised powers of attorney, and use the CPA’s pre-notification consultation where the filing obligation or the attribution of Kuwaiti sales and assets is unclear. Where a threshold is met, write CPA approval into the conditions precedent from the first draft.

Liability under Kuwait’s Digital Commerce Law

A concise review of enforcement and personal liability under Decree-Law No. 10 of 2026 Decree-Law No. 10 of 2026 regulates Kuwait’s digital commerce sector by imposing obligations relating to registration, disclosure, invoicing, consumer withdrawal rights, advertising, influencers, payments, and cybersecurity. Its enforcement provisions are particularly significant because liability may extend beyond the service provider to the individual who actually managed the relevant activity. Key Features of the Law Instrument and publication. Amiri Decree-Law No. 10 of 2026 on the Regulation of the Digital Commerce Sector (the “Law”) was published in the Kuwait Official Gazette on 1 March 2026. It comprises 10 chapters and 45 articles. Regulatory authorities. The Ministry of Commerce and Industry (“MOCI”) is the primary regulator, while the Communications and Information Technology Regulatory Authority (“CITRA”) performs a technical and data-related role. Enforcement bodies. The Violations Committee reviews alleged violations and may refer, dismiss, or settle them. The Dispute Settlement Committee is responsible for consumer disputes. Implementing regulations and entry into force. Under Article 44, the implementing regulations are due within one year of publication. Article 45 provides that the Law enters into force one month after those regulations are published; accordingly, the precise effective date remains pending. Personal Liability under Article 41 Article 39 criminalizes breaches of specified obligations and provides for imprisonment for a term not exceeding one year, a fine ranging from KD 1,000 to KD 10,000, or both. The penalties are doubled for repeat offenses. Article 40 also permits the confiscation of any instruments used in, and proceeds derived from, the offense. Under Article 41, personal liability may attach to the natural person responsible for the entity’s actual management if that person knew of the violation and failed to perform duties in a manner that contributed to its occurrence, or if that person derived a personal benefit from it. The entity remains jointly liable for fines and compensation; accordingly, corporate and personal liability may arise concurrently. The phrase “responsible for actual management” is interpreted functionally rather than formally. Liability may therefore extend to the person who, in practice, directed or controlled the relevant conduct, regardless of that person’s job title or whether the person was named in the commercial license. Likely Enforcement Process Enforcement proceedings are likely to commence with a consumer complaint or an inspection report documenting an alleged violation. The Violations Committee would then review the matter and may dismiss it, refer it to the Public Prosecution, or approve a settlement under Article 42 before a final judgment is rendered. ·       Initiation: receipt of a consumer complaint or issuance of an inspection report, followed by documentation of the alleged violation. ·       Administrative review: examination by the Violations Committee, which may dismiss the matter, refer it to the Public Prosecution, or approve a settlement. ·       Criminal proceedings: investigation by the Public Prosecution and, where appropriate, referral to the competent court if no settlement is reached. ·       Evidence: internal approvals, delegations of authority, board minutes, escalation records, and payment records may be relevant to establishing knowledge, contribution to the violation, or personal benefit. ·       Potential outcomes: personal and corporate liability may arise concurrently; repeat offenses may result in increased penalties, and confiscation may create additional operational consequences. Practical Implications for Managers and Boards The provision has direct implications for managers, boards and groups operating multiple digital storefronts. Legal Commentary From a practitioner's perspective, Article 41's shift toward functional rather than titular liability calls for proactive risk management ahead of the implementing regulations. Companies operating digital storefronts in Kuwait should: map actual decision-making authority against formal organisational charts and commercial licenses, since enforcement bodies are likely to look past job titles to identify who exercised real control; strengthen internal documentation, including board minutes, delegations of authority, and escalation records, both to support compliance monitoring and to help demonstrate the absence of knowledge of or contribution to a violation should one occur; review director and officer liability insurance to confirm it extends to Kuwait-specific regulatory and criminal exposure, since the entity's joint liability for fines does not displace individual criminal exposure under Article 41; and track the implementing regulations due under Article 44, which will materially shape day-to-day compliance obligations and the practical scope of personal liability.

The Limits of Administrative Regulatory Authority in Light of Judicial Rulings Concerning the Regulation of Delivery Platforms in the State of Kuwait

First: Introduction On 8 July 2026, the Minister of Commerce and Industry issued Ministerial Resolution No. 109 of 2026, promulgating the Regulation of Electronic Platforms and Applications Acting as Intermediaries for the Display, Ordering and Delivery of Products to Con‐ sumers. This Resolution replaced Ministerial Resolution No. 10 of 2026, which had regu‐ lated the delivery of restaurant orders and prepared food. The Regulation aims to govern the relationship between electronic platforms and the restaurants and stores dealing with them by establishing maximum commission rates and delivery fees, setting out contractual and regulatory obligations, and introducing mechanisms for handling complaints and violations. The importance of this Regulation arises from the expansion of electronic commerce in the State of Kuwait and the accompanying need to regulate relationships between plat‐ forms and providers of products and services, while balancing the freedom to conduct commercial activities with the protection of the economic interests of the contracting parties. The implementation of the Regulation has nevertheless raised a legal issue concerning the limits of administrative regulatory authority. During September and October 2026, the Administrative Court issued first-instance judgments in cases brought by compan‐ ies operating in the electronic platform sector, resulting in the annulment of Article 15 of the Regulation, which concerned violations and administrative sanctions. These judgments raise an important legal question concerning the extent of an admin‐ istrative authority’s power to introduce measures affecting commercial licences and the continuity of economic activities through a ministerial resolution without a legislative provision expressly authorizing such measures. A further issue concerns the continued validity of the other regulatory obligations con‐ tained in the Regulation following the annulment of Article 15, and whether sanctions provided for under other legislation remain applicable. Second: The Legal Framework Governing Administrative Regulatory Authority The Minister of Commerce and Industry derives certain powers to regulate commercial activities and services from Decree-Law No. 10 of 1979 concerning the Supervision of Trade in Goods, Services and Craft Activities and the Determination of Certain Prices, as amended. This legislation grants the administrative authority powers relating to the regulation of certain services and prices and the issuance of resolutions necessary for implementing its provisions. Nevertheless, regulatory authority differs in nature and scope from the power to im‐ pose sanctions. Regulatory authority permits the administration to establish general rules and require‐ ments necessary for conducting an activity, within the limits of its statutory powers. Measures of a punitive nature, by contrast, are subject to the principle of legality, which requires a legislative basis specifying the nature and scope of the sanction and the au‐ thority competent to impose it. This distinction is particularly important where a measure involves administrative clos‐ ure, suspension of business activities or cancellation of a licence, given the direct con‐ sequences of such measures for the legal and economic positions of commercial estab‐ lishments. Accordingly, the mere existence of administrative authority to regulate an economic activity does not independently confer unlimited power to introduce new sanctions un‐ less the law expressly authorises such measures within prescribed limits. This distinction follows from the principle of legality and the hierarchy of legal rules, under which ministerial resolutions must comply with the laws they implement and must not exceed the powers conferred by the legislature. Third: The Legal Issue Concerning Article 15 and the Related Judicial Rulings Article 15 of the Delivery Platform Regulation established a graduated system of admin‐ istrative measures, including warnings, administrative closure, suspension of activities and temporary blocking of the electronic platform, extending to cancellation of li‐ cences and permanent blocking, depending on the nature and recurrence of the viola‐ tion. This provision raised questions concerning the Minister of Commerce and Industry’s authority to introduce such measures and their compatibility with the limits estab‐ lished by the legislature under the laws regulating commercial activities. In this context, first-instance judgments were issued annulling Article 15 because of its connection with the issue of administrative regulatory powers exceeding their lawful limits. The principal legal issue is that Decree-Law No. 10 of 1979 already regulates certain vi‐ olations, penalties and related powers, including the provisions of Articles 13 and 15, as well as the authority concerning temporary administrative closure under Article 12 bis, subject to legally prescribed conditions. Consequently, where legislation establishes a system of sanctions, the administration must observe the limits prescribed by the legislature and must not introduce a parallel punitive system through a ministerial resolution. The existence of similar measures under other legislation, such as laws governing com‐ mercial licences or consumer protection, does not constitute a legal basis for imposing those measures under a regulation governing a different activity. Administrative powers cannot be extended by analogy from other legislation. Instead, they must derive from legal provisions defining their scope. Furthermore, the graduated nature of sanctions according to the seriousness or recur‐ rence of violations does not, in itself, establish their legality. Proportionality does not eliminate the requirement for an express legal basis authorising the measure. It should be emphasised that the judgments referred to were issued by courts of first in‐ stance. Their final legal consequences depend on the outcome of any appeals and the legal rules governing the binding effect and enforcement of annulment judgments. Fourth: The Effect of Annulment of Article 15 on the Remaining Provisions of the Regulation The annulment of Article 15 requires a distinction between regulatory rules establish‐ ing obligations and provisions prescribing sanctions for breaches of those obligations. Annulment of the provision concerning sanctions does not automatically result in the annulment of the remaining provisions of the Regulation, provided that those provi‐ sions were not included within the scope of the annulment judgments. Accordingly, provisions concerning maximum commission rates, delivery fees, con‐ tractual relationships between platforms and stores, and other regulatory obligations do not cease to apply merely because the sanctions provision has been annulled. Nevertheless, the continued existence of these provisions does not exempt them from judicial review. Their legality remains subject to examination of their compatibility with the legislation on which they are based and whether the administrative authority has acted within its statutory powers. The annulment of Article 15 also raises an issue concerning Article 5 of the operative provisions of the Ministerial Resolution, which refers to the measures prescribed under Article 15. A reference to a provision annulled by judicial judgment cannot independently consti‐ tute a legal basis for reapplying the measures contained in that provision, subject to the scope and binding effect of the judgment. From a practical perspective, the annulment of the sanctions framework contained in the Regulation affects the administrative mechanisms available for its enforcement. It does not, however, extinguish the regulatory obligations themselves or eliminate legal liability for conduct independently constituting a violation under other legislation. Fifth: The Extent to Which Measures Under Other Legislation Remain Applicable Following an examination of the legal consequences of annulling Article 15, an import‐ ant question arises concerning the extent to which regulatory authorities retain their powers to address violations committed by electronic platforms. As a general principle, the annulment of sanctions prescribed under a ministerial resol‐ ution does not invalidate measures independently authorised by other legislation. Nevertheless, the application of such measures requires satisfaction of their statutory conditions. They cannot be treated as an automatic substitute for the sanctions an‐ nulled by the court. 1) Decree-Law No. 10 of 1979, as Amended This legislation constitutes one of the legal foundations governing the powers of the Ministry of Commerce and Industry to supervise certain goods, services and prices. It contains provisions concerning violations and penalties, together with certain powers relating to temporary administrative closure. Accordingly, where a regulatory obligation under Ministerial Resolution No. 109 of 2026 is breached, reference must be made to the relevant law to determine whether the con‐ duct constitutes an offence punishable under its provisions and whether the prescribed measure falls within the competence of the administrative authority or the judiciary. Not every violation of the Regulation necessarily justifies the closure of an establish‐ ment, suspension of its activities or cancellation of its licence without an express legal basis authorising the particular measure. 2) Law No. 72 of 2020 Concerning the Protection of Competition The Competition Protection Authority is responsible for applying provisions concern‐ ing practices prohibited by law, including agreements restricting competition and ab‐ use of a dominant position, subject to the conditions prescribed by the legislature. Within this framework, certain commercial practices by electronic platforms may fall within the Competition Protection Law where the statutory elements of a violation are established. Nevertheless, a breach of the Delivery Platform Regulation does not automatically con‐ stitute a violation of the Competition Protection Law. For example, the imposition of contractual conditions on a store does not, in itself, es‐ tablish an abuse of dominance. The existence of a dominant position, prohibited con‐ duct and the other elements required by law must first be established. Consequently, the Competition Protection Authority exercises its powers within the scope of the legislation governing it, without automatically extending those powers to impose the sanctions annulled under Article 15. 3) Law No. 39 of 2014 Concerning Consumer Protection, as Amended The Consumer Protection Law regulates various obligations relating to the provision of goods and services and the protection of consumer rights. Accordingly, practices involving consumer deception or infringement of legally protec‐ ted consumer rights are subject to the relevant provisions and procedures, provided that the conditions for applying the law are satisfied. By contrast, violations arising exclusively from the commercial relationship between a platform and a store cannot automatically be brought within the scope of consumer protection legislation without examining the nature of the violation and the extent of the protection established by law. 4) Legislation Governing Commercial Licences The provisions governing commercial licences and the supervision of licensed activit‐ ies apply within their prescribed legal scope. Nevertheless, any measure affecting a licence or the continuity of a business activity re‐ quires an express statutory basis and must be issued by the competent authority in ac‐ cordance with the applicable procedures and safeguards. Accordingly, the annulment of Article 15 does not grant electronic platforms immunity from legal liability. Equally, it does not authorise administrative authorities to reintro‐ duce the annulled sanctions under different designations. Each violation must instead be assessed under the legislation governing it, subject to the conditions and limits of the powers prescribed therein. Sixth: The Relationship Between the Regulation and Decree-Law No. 10 of 2026 Concerning the Regulation of Activities in the Digital Commerce Sector The legislature enacted Decree-Law No. 10 of 2026 concerning the Regulation of Activit‐ ies in the Digital Commerce Sector, containing provisions governing commercial activ‐ ities conducted through digital means, obligations imposed on providers of products and services, consumer protection, and mechanisms for supervision, violations and sanctions. Article 45 provides that its provisions shall enter into force one month after the publica‐ tion of its Executive Regulation in the Official Gazette. This requires a distinction between the enactment of legislation and its entry into force. The mere issuance of a law does not authorise reliance on its procedural or punitive provisions before their effective date. This legislation also regulates certain measures relating to violations, including tem‐ porary blocking, in accordance with the requirements and powers prescribed therein. This reflects the importance of identifying the competent authority, the scope of each measure and its duration. Accordingly, reliance on this Decree-Law to impose measures against electronic plat‐ forms depends on the commencement of its provisions and satisfaction of the condi‐ tions prescribed under the relevant legal texts. The entry into force of legislation does not automatically legitimise earlier measures that lacked a legal basis when issued. Nor does it confer authority on the administration to exceed the limits established by the legislature. This highlights the importance of completing the implementing framework for the Di‐ gital Commerce Law so that obligations, procedures, sanctions and competent authorit‐ ies are clearly identified and disputes concerning overlapping powers are reduced. Seventh: Legal Opinion and Analysis 1) Regulatory Authority Does Not Include an Unrestricted Power to Introduce Sanctions In our opinion, the administration’s authority to regulate commercial activities does not inherently include the power to prescribe punitive measures. Where the legislature specifies the nature of a measure and the authority competent to impose it, the administration must comply with that framework and cannot introduce additional measures exceeding the limits of its statutory authorisation. 2) Annulment of a Sanction Does Not Extinguish the Regulatory Obligation The continued existence of obligations prescribed by the Regulation is a separate mat‐ ter from the legality of the sanctions imposed for their breach. The annulment of Article 15 does not automatically result in the annulment of maxim‐ um commission rates, delivery fees or other provisions not covered by the annulment judgments. Conversely, imposing any measure for breach of those provisions requires reference to the legislative text authorising that measure. 3) Other Legislation Must Not Be Used to Circumvent Annulment Judgments We consider that applying competition protection, consumer protection and commer‐ cial licensing legislation must be directly connected to conduct falling within the scope of each respective law. A violation of the Regulation alone is not sufficient to establish a violation of competi‐ tion protection or consumer protection legislation. Nor is it permissible to transfer sanctions from one legislative framework to another by analogy or to rely on powers prescribed under other laws to circumvent the legal effect of the judgment annulling Article 15. 4) Continued Judicial Review of the Remaining Regulatory Provisions The fact that provisions concerning commissions and delivery fees have not been an‐ nulled does not necessarily establish their final legality. Those provisions remain subject to judicial review, including examination of the stat‐ utory basis for determining financial consideration for services and whether the ad‐ ministration has complied with the limits of its regulatory authority. 5) The Need to Complete the Legislative Framework for the Sector In our opinion, disputes concerning the Delivery Platform Regulation confirm the im‐ portance of establishing a clear legislative framework defining obligations, sanctions and the authorities competent to enforce them. Completing the procedures necessary for the entry into force of Decree-Law No. 10 of 2026 concerning the Regulation of Activities in the Digital Commerce Sector represents an important step towards regulating this sector. Where the nature of an activity requires additional sanctions beyond existing statutory powers, the appropriate legal approach is legislative intervention rather than introdu‐ cing such sanctions through a ministerial resolution without statutory authority. Eighth: Conclusion The judicial disputes concerning Article 15 of the Delivery Platform Regulation demon‐ strate the importance of distinguishing between the administration’s regulatory author‐ ity and its power to impose sanctions. The legality of regulating economic activities does not necessarily establish the legality of every enforcement mechanism adopted by the administration. Both regulatory oblig‐ ations and sanctions must rest on clear statutory powers. Furthermore, annulment of a provision concerning sanctions does not automatically invalidate the remaining regulatory provisions. Nor does it prevent the application of other relevant legislation where the statutory conditions for doing so are satisfied. In light of the relationship between consumer protection, competition regulation and the rights of commercial establishments, the sector requires a clear legislative frame‐ work defining obligations, sanctions and the powers of regulatory authorities, while en‐ suring that administrative decisions remain subject to judicial review. The fundamental principle is that the administration must exercise its authority to reg‐ ulate economic activities within the limits of the law. The introduction of punitive measures requires a legislative basis clearly defining the nature and scope of each measure and the authority competent to impose it. k

Beyond Oil: What KPC's New Renewable-Energy Mandate Means for Business

ENERGY AND INSTITUTIONAL TRANSFORMATION Renewable energy is the headline change in Decree-Law No. 67 of 2026, but it is not the whole story. The decree-law also modernises KPC's commercial foundation, corporate and financing tools, governance, contracting and control framework. Those wider reforms will determine what the new mandate means for companies seeking to contract, invest or form joint ventures with KPC and its subsidiaries. A wider institutional reform, not merely a new statutory object Renewable energy is the most visible feature of Decree-Law No. 67 of 2026, but the reform is broader. Article 1 confirms that KPC is managed on commercial foundations. Article 3 adds the provision of renewable energy for KPC and its subsidiaries to the Corporation's statutory objects and confirms that KPC may pursue its objects directly or through any subsidiary. The result is a combined reform of commercial character, legal capacity and implementation flexibility. The renewable-energy object remains purpose-specific. It is directed to group requirements. It does not, by itself, make KPC a public electricity utility or give it an unrestricted right to sell power to third parties. Grid connection remains subject to approval by the Ministry of Electricity, Water and Renewable Energy and applicable requirements. This boundary helps define the immediate market as projects that reduce the group's operating cost and emissions and strengthen operational resilience. From a national oil company towards a broader energy and investment platform The reform does not displace oil and gas. It creates room to manage the energy portfolio more broadly. Potential projects include solar generation for fields, refineries and storage facilities, battery storage, microgrids, load management, green hydrogen and derivatives, and carbon-abatement, capture, utilisation and storage solutions. KPC can build on existing experience, including KOC's Sidrah 500 project and renewable-energy and green-hydrogen feasibility work. The amendment also provides a practical statutory tool for KPC's 2040 Strategy and its Energy Transition 2050 roadmap, which targets net-zero Scope 1 and Scope 2 greenhouse gas emissions from KPC's global operations by 2050, while aligning with the New Kuwait 2035 objectives of economic diversification and greater private-sector participation. Diversification is not limited to power generation. It can localise technology, engineering services, finance, knowledge and supply chains, and create domestic capabilities that may scale within Kuwait and beyond. Modern corporate and financing tools can support larger projects The decree-law modernises KPC's corporate toolkit. Article 5 confirms powers to establish and participate in companies, own and reorganise existing companies, including by merger, enter joint activities, borrow and issue bonds in local and foreign markets, and lend to companies that KPC owns or in which it holds an equity interest and guarantee their loans, subject to Supreme Petroleum Council approval where required. Article 14 separately empowers the Board to approve the liquidation or merger of subsidiaries. Related amendments permit future capital changes by decree, provide flexibility in setting the general reserve and move the financial year to 1 April through 31 March. These powers offer a clearer platform for project companies, shareholders' agreements, strategic alliances, corporate or project financing and partnerships with international energy companies, technology providers and infrastructure investors. They do not make every structure self-approving. Establishing or participating in companies requires Board approval under Article 14. Certain borrowing, financing and bond issuance require Supreme Petroleum Council approval under Articles 5, 14 and 16, while Article 5 also requires its approval for lending to companies that KPC owns or in which it holds an equity interest and guaranteeing their loans. Tendering, award and contracting remain subject to the applicable procurement regime. Land, environmental, licensing and grid-connection requirements arise under applicable sectoral legislation, with Article 3 requiring Ministry approval for connection of renewable generation to the national grid. A clearer division between strategy and execution The decree-law is designed to move operational decisions closer to KPC while preserving strategic oversight. Article 13 regulates the Board and gives the chief executive officer, as Deputy Chairman, an express implementation, supervision and reporting role. Article 14 expands the Board's authority over plans, programmes, investment policy, subsidiaries, internal regulations, staffing, contracting, financing and assets. Article 16 keeps strategic directions, capital changes, accounts, profit allocation, borrowing, financing, bonds and securities within the Supreme Petroleum Council's approval framework. This allocation could shorten parts of the decision cycle and give partners a more predictable governance map. It does not mean that Board approval always replaces approval by the Supreme Petroleum Council or a competent ministry. Each project should have an approvals matrix identifying the decision, approving body, sequencing, conditions and legal effect. Contracting and control: calibrated flexibility, not a blanket exemption Under Article 14, the Board approves rules for tendering, award and contracting by KPC and its wholly owned companies, except for contracts that are subject to Public Tenders Law No. 49 of 2016. The first legal question is therefore classification, not exemption. A bidder should identify the applicable procurement regime, legal basis of the tender, approvals chain, signing authority and any conditions attaching to financing or guarantees. Article 18 prohibits the use of a local agent or commission agent in contracting with KPC or its wholly owned companies, whether when entering into or performing the contract. The provision may reduce intermediation costs and support direct technical relationships. Foreign businesses should nevertheless redesign market-entry models around direct contracting, a properly licensed presence or a genuine value-adding partnership. Article 22 removes specified prior-control regimes to support speed in contracting and commercial transactions, but it does not remove subsequent audit, internal controls, Supreme Petroleum Council oversight or independent audit. Where will the commercial opportunities arise? KPC group demand may create opportunities for developers, engineering and construction contractors, solar and battery suppliers, technology providers, operation and maintenance companies, banks, infrastructure investors and technical, environmental and legal advisers. The strongest propositions are likely to combine technology, funding, performance guarantees and operating capability rather than offer stand-alone equipment. ·      Joint ventures and investment: project companies and shareholders' agreements covering funding, governance, reserved matters, transfers and exit. ·      Development and delivery: EPC, design-build, design-build-operate or build-own-operate-transfer structures, with long-term operation and maintenance arrangements. ·      Technology and energy: technology and software licences, performance guarantees, intra-group PPA-like structures, and hydrogen or ammonia offtake where the regulatory framework permits. ·      Financing and risk allocation: project or corporate financing addressing performance, delay, grid access, curtailment, feedstock, change in law, force majeure and termination. A legal roadmap for potential partners Before forming a consortium or committing bid costs, a company should identify the counterparty and KPC's ownership interest, the procurement regime, Board, Supreme Petroleum Council, ministry and regulatory approvals, and land, environmental, grid and local-content requirements. Foreign-investment, licensing, tax, profit-repatriation and security-enforcement routes should be tested early, together with compliance with the Article 18 agency prohibition. The contract should allocate each risk to the party able to control or price it. Core provisions include performance and availability, approval delay, intellectual property, data protection, cybersecurity, change in law, termination compensation, lender step-in rights and insurance. Governing law and dispute resolution should also address authority to agree arbitration and enforcement against the relevant counterparty and project assets. Renewable energy is the entry point, while institutional reform is the wider opportunity The significance of Decree-Law No. 67 of 2026 lies in the combination of a new renewable-energy object with commercial foundations, modern corporate and financing tools, clearer governance, and a more specialised contracting and control framework. If implementing regulations and project pipelines are clear and the reform is applied with discipline and transparency, KPC may develop from a purchaser of individual transition technologies into a partner capable of delivering integrated energy projects and shaping a new market around the group's requirements.

Dr. Yaqoub AlSanea & Partners (YYA) Accelerates GCC Expansion with Strategic Alliances and Legal Era Accolades

KUWAIT CITY – Reflecting a period of rapid institutional growth, Dr. Yaqoub AlSanea & Partners (YYA) has successfully scaled its cross-border capabilities via a strategic alliance with Galadari Advocates & Legal Consultants in the UAE. This collaboration seamlessly bridges corporate and commercial operations between Kuwait and the Emirates, providing clients with unparalleled dual-jurisdiction legal architecture. The alliance closely follows the firm being awarded "Emerging Law Firm of the Year in Corporate & M&A"at the Legal Era Middle East Awards. Under the forward-thinking guidance of CEO Yousef Al-Sanea, YYA is aggressively positioning itself as a core architect for cross-border capital flow, structural joint ventures, and FDI in alignment with Kuwait Vision 2035.
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