Danielle Cohen Immigration Law Solicitors Limited

The government released a statement on the government's asylum and returns policy on 17 November 2025.  It stated that, as a result of severe strain on the asylum system, it has been decided to have a new plan to achieve control over the border in order to maintain confidence in values.  The Home Secretary said, "In an increasingly volatile and more mobile world, huge numbers of people are on the move.  Whilst some are genuine refugees, others are economic migrants, seeking to take advantage of the asylum system.  Even amongst those who are genuine refugees, economic incentives are at play.  Instead of stopping at the first safe country, even genuine refugees are searching for the most attractive place to seek refuge.  Many now asylum shop their way across the continent, in search of the most attractive place to seek refuge.  The impact on the country has been profound." Below you will find our easy-to-follow key topics and ideas of this proposal. If you are concerned as to how this may affect you or the impact it will have on your family, please contact us [Omer: please insert link to the phone]. Introduction: Why the Government Is Changing the Asylum System? Asylum system under severe strain. Aim: restore control, maintain public confidence, and address system abuse. Home Secretary’s key concerns: Sharp rise in asylum claims in the UK vs. decline in Europe. UK seen as a “destination of choice”. Growing taxpayer cost (100,000+ people in asylum accommodation). Many refugees remaining unemployed for years. System feels “out of control and unfair”. What is the Government’s Diagnosis of the Problem? Asylum system outdated and designed for a simpler time. Failure to adapt compared to other countries (example: Denmark). Increasing “asylum shopping” across Europe. System exploited by economic migrants. High numbers of failed removal attempts. Rising backlog and slow legal processes. PART ONE: WHAT IS THE ASYLUM SYSTEM REFORM? Introduction of a New Asylum Model Move towards a Danish-style model. Refugee status becomes temporary, tied to safety in home country. Reduced generosity of current asylum support package. Stronger distinction between genuine refugees and those abusing the system. What Are the Changes to Refugee Protection (Core Protection Offer)? Once granted refugee status the leave to remain lasts for five years.  At the end of that period, refugees can immediately apply for settlement.  This application is fee-free, and the Home Secretary stated that it is essentially automatic, being almost entirely absent of requirement, and until recently family reunion options were also available without incurring a fee and without having to demonstrate that they can accommodate or otherwise support them. The changes are: Initial leave reduced from 5 years → 30 months. Leave only renewable if protection still required. Removal if protection need ends. No automatic route to settlement: Current: settlement after 5 years. New: 20-year minimum under core protection. Upcoming consultation on “earned settlement”. Refugee Council Criticism of the New Asylum Plans – Key Points The Refugee Council has condemned the proposed reforms as “highly impractical and inhumane.” The organisation warns that if the new policy were already active, the Home Office would need to review the status of approximately 1.4 million people by 2035. This would place enormous pressure on an already overstretched asylum and immigration system. The cost implications are severe: £523: current Home Office cost of processing one ILR (Indefinite Leave to Remain) application. £730 million: estimated total cost to review 1.4 million statuses under today’s rates. £872 million: projected cost after inflation. The Refugee Council argues that this scale of review is neither financially sustainable nor operationally deliverable. They also highlight the human impact, warning that temporary protection and constant reassessment would create instability and anxiety for refugees rebuilding their lives in the UK. What Is the New Work & Study Protection Route? As there will be no path for settled status under the core protection route until a refugee has spent 20 years in the country, refugees will be encouraged to switch out from the core protection route whenever possible, introducing a new in-country protection “work and study route”. Refugees who can switch from core protection to a work/study route. Requires: A job or appropriate study programme. Payment of relevant fees. Benefits: Faster route to settlement. Ability to sponsor family members (following normal visa rules). What Are the Family Reunion Restrictions? No automatic right to family reunion under core protection. Family sponsorship only allowed under the new work/study route. What Is the Reform of Asylum Support? Ending legal duty to support all destitute asylum seekers (previously based on EU law). Discretionary support restored. Support withdrawn for: Those who have the right to work. Those who make themselves destitute deliberately. Individuals breaking laws or refusing relocation. Contributions required from asylum seekers with assets/income. What Are the Asylum Accommodation Changes? Commitment to close all asylum hotels by end of Parliament. Move towards: Large sites. Military facilities. Crackdown on illegal working: Closing right-to-work loopholes. Digital ID checks mandatory by end of Parliament. PART TWO: INCREASING REMOVALS What Is the New Approach to Failed Asylum Seekers? Strong emphasis on removals once claims fail. Using agreements with countries like France: Small boat arrivals can be returned to France. Returns considered to: Countries where returns were previously paused (e.g., Syria). Countries where regime has now changed. What Is the New Approach for Returns of Families? The government began supporting people to return to Syria on a voluntary basis. Whilst currently the government has not prioritised the return of families the hesitancy around returning families created, according to the Home Secretary, a particular perverse incentive and therefore, the government will offer all families financial support to enable them to return to their home country, and should they refuse that support, it will be escalated to enforce return, As part of the consultation, the government will consult on commencing measures in the 2016 Immigration Act, which allowed to remove support for families who do not have genuine obstacles to leaving in the country. Return Hubs & Country Cooperation Negotiation with third countries to accept failed asylum seekers. Countries expected to issue travel documents promptly. The government expects countries to take back their citizens who have no right to be in the UK, and this includes providing travel documents within a reasonable time period. If they refuse: Nationals of these countries will suffer visa penalties under Section 72 Nationality and Borders Act 2022. Suspension of entry visas. Recent agreements: The government signed a new agreement with Iraq to establish a formal process to swiftly return those with no legal right to be in the UK, and announced a new agreement with Vietnam. Iraq (Aug 2025). Vietnam (Oct 2025). What Are the Appeal Reforms? What Are the Current challenges? The government increased judicial sitting days in the First-tier Tribunal, and the Border Security and Asylum Immigration Bill introduced statutory timelines for appeals brought by those in asylum accommodation and non-detained foreign national offenders who are liable to deportation. But the: Appeal backlog rose from 7,000 (2023) → 51,000 (2025). 54-week average wait for a hearing. Proposed changes to speed up the system: New independent appeals body (following Denmark’s model). Single, faster appeal process. Expedited appeals for: Removal cases High-harm cases Foreign national offenders Those detained and readily removable Late claims will not automatically suspend removal. New rules: failed asylum seekers must meet same criteria as all other migrants (fees + ECHR evidence). The government proposes changing the immigration rules so that a failed asylum seeker will only be able to apply to stay in the UK if they do so in the same way as everyone else.  That is, by paying relevant fees and evidencing why removal would be contrary to ECHR. It is the Home Secretary’s view that this will close the current loophole that allows failed asylum seekers to make unlimited and free Article 8 claims to slow down the impending removal and prolong their time in the UK. What Is the Law Society Response to UK Asylum Appeal Reforms? The Law Society of England and Wales stresses that the right to a fair hearing must be protected as the UK Government continues major immigration system reforms. Law Society President Mark Evans warns that: “Unfair treatment in our justice system harms us all.” Asylum reforms should prioritise accurate first-time decision-making rather than “moving the goal posts”. Fairness benefits both individuals and the wider public. The right to a fair hearing is essential, particularly for people fleeing danger or persecution. Reforms must remain compliant with the UK’s international legal obligations, including: The 1951 Refugee Convention The European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) Adherence to these agreements: Strengthens cooperation with other countries. Maintains consistent international standards for protection. Provides safeguards for everyone by ensuring clear, predictable rules. Any asylum or immigration reform must be: Tested against core legal principles Implemented with proper accountability and transparency However, the government’s position is that it will expand the capacity of the appeals system by creating a new appeals body.  Decisions on appeal will remain fully independent, and the new body will be staffed by professionally trained adjudicators with safeguards to ensure high standards.   What Is the Resetting Article 8 (Family Life) & Article 3? Article 3 and 8 claims are considered to slow down the impending removal and prolong immigrants’ time in the UK.  In relation to Article 8, the government believes that the individual’s Article 8 rights and the public interest need to be fundamentally reset to place much greater emphasis on complying with the immigration rules, and non-compliance should not be rewarded.  Family, for the purpose of Article 8, should not go usually beyond immediate family members and there would be a new interpretation of Article 3, inhuman or degrading treatment. Modern Slavery Reforms Addressing misuse of the Modern Slavery system by migrants. Legislative changes to clarify obligations and reduce abuse while keeping essential protections. Credibility, Abuse Prevention & Miscellaneous Changes Single interview process for clear protection claims. Return trips to home country before claiming asylum = automatic disqualification. When people entered the UK on a visa and subsequently sought asylum, yet make return journeys to the home country without issue during the stay in the UK, this behaviour will disqualify their claim. Deporting foreign national offenders: Immediate deportation from first day of sentence. In regard to deporting foreign national offenders where they are awaiting trial for other more minor offences, there will be a balance between prosecution and deportation.  This builds on reforms in the Sentencing Bill, which makes foreign national offenders eligible for immediate deportation from the first day of their prison sentence. Improved age assessments using science and technology.

Introduction The Home Secretary, Mahmood, recently announced that she had dispatched a team of Home Office officials to Denmark to study the Danish immigration and asylum system. She praised Denmark’s apparent success in reducing the number of successful asylum claims and expressed her intention to model future UK measures on the Danish approach. While the full details of the UK’s proposed reforms are yet to emerge, the focus is expected to be on individuals who have already been granted refugee status, with potential changes, reflecting Denmark’s restrictive and deterrence-based model. Overview of Danish Asylum and Immigration Policy According to the House of Commons Library Research Briefing (10 November 2025, No. 10391), the Danish asylum model is characterised by a series of restrictive and highly managed policies. Denmark has received fewer asylum claims per head of population than the UK in recent years, having reduced its asylum acceptance rate sharply since 2015, when a spike in applications from Syrian nationals temporarily increased the figures. Since then, Denmark’s asylum rates have fallen significantly, while the UK’s have increased. Key Policy Measures in Denmark The Migration Policy Institute think tank and other observers have identified several notable features of Denmark’s asylum framework: Short-term residence permits for refugees Creation of “departure centres” to encourage voluntary return of refused asylum seekers Tighter family reunification rules for recognised refugees Confiscation of asylum seekers’ valuables to fund support Exploration of offshore asylum processing arrangements, including with Rwanda These measures signal a deliberate policy shift from promoting integration through labour market participation toward deterrence and containment. Legal and Institutional Context Denmark benefits from specific opt-outs under Protocol 22 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, meaning it is not bound by most EU asylum laws. However, it remains a participant in the Dublin Regulation (for transferring asylum seekers) and the Schengen Agreement (for passport-free travel). Consequently, some provisions of the EU Pact on Migration and Asylum will still apply. Short-Term Residence Permits Under Danish policy: Refugees are typically granted temporary residence permits of one to two years, reduced from the previous five-year standard. These permits are renewable but regularly reviewed, with revocation possible if the country of origin improves, even marginally. The path to permanent residence has become significantly tougher — the required qualifying period rose from five years to eight years. Earlier settlement is possible (after four years) only for those demonstrating sustained employment, income, and Danish language proficiency. While designed to allow easier removal, once protection is no longer deemed necessary, this policy has created a legal limbo for some, notably Syrian nationals whose temporary protection has been revoked but who cannot safely return home. These individuals lose lawful status, housing, and access to employment or education, and must instead reside in state-run deportation centres offering only basic services. Departure Centres Individuals with no right to remain and who fail to cooperate with removal are required to live in departure centres. Residents receive no cash allowances and must eat in communal canteens. These centres function as both holding facilities and deterrence mechanisms, signalling to prospective asylum seekers that conditions in Denmark will be deliberately restrictive. Family Reunification Restrictions Refugees with temporary protection status have no automatic right to family reunification. Offshore Processing Provisions In June 2021, Denmark passed legislation allowing for asylum claims to be processed outside Europe. A 2022 joint statement with Rwanda confirmed exploratory discussions on such an arrangement, but no operational agreement has yet been implemented. The proposal mirrors aspects of the UK’s own Rwanda Partnership approach to externalising asylum responsibilities. Confiscation of Valuables (“Jewellery Law”) Under Section 40(9) of the Danish Aliens Act, asylum seekers’ assets exceeding approximately £1,200 may be confiscated to offset the costs of asylum support. This controversial measure has been criticised internationally but remains part of Denmark’s deterrence-based strategy. Narrative and Political Strategy The Clingendael Institute, a Dutch think tank, argues that Denmark’s “tough” asylum narrative has been politically effective in reducing applications. While only a small number of revocations and returns have actually occurred, the rhetoric of deterrence — emphasising confiscations, offshore processing, and temporary protection — has influenced migrant decision-making and shaped public perceptions. As the report notes: “If you come to Denmark, we will take your valuables and place you in a remote centre while you await return. If you are granted protection, it is temporary. You will be sent home as soon as conditions allow.” This deliberate projection of an unwelcoming state represents a conscious political choice rather than a purely administrative one. Classification of Immigrant Housing Areas (“Ghettos”) The Public Housing Act (2024 Consolidation) provides a four-level classification for housing areas, based on factors such as employment, education, income, and the share of non-Western residents. Under the Public Housing Act (2024 Consolidation): Refugees living in designated public housing estates that risk becoming “parlour societies” are ineligible for family reunification, including through marriage. An area may be classified as a parlour society if more than 50% of residents are from non-Western backgrounds. There are four levels of classification for housing areas, based on criteria including social vulnerability and resident demographics. In “prevention areas,” housing cannot be allocated to individuals on benefits for more than two years or to non-EU nationals, though current residents are not affected. Children in vulnerable residential areas must attend day care from age one, and no more than 30% of children in a day-care centre may come from these designated areas. Only parlour societies can be reclassified as “transformation areas,” where local councils and housing associations must develop formal plans to alter the area’s demographic composition and improve integration outcomes. Implications for UK Policy The UK’s interest in the Danish system suggests a potential shift towards more restrictive and conditional refugee protection, focused on temporary status, limited family rights, and integration controls, tied to residence and community composition. If adopted, these measures could represent a significant redefinition of refugee protection under UK law, raising both legal and human rights considerations — particularly regarding compliance with the 1951 Refugee Convention and the European Convention on Human Rights.    

MPs often receive questions from constituents about the UK asylum system and financial support for people seeking asylum. The House of Commons Library published on 16th September 2025 a list of the common questions asked and the issues which were covered. Below is a summary of some of the questions published by the research briefing. 1. Why are people who arrive by small boat allowed to stay in the UK? Those who arrive on small boats claim asylum and under UK law, which reflects the United Nations Refugee Convention, someone with a pending asylum claim cannot be sent back to their home country, because the basis of the asylum claim is fear of persecution or serious harm at home. If an asylum claim is accepted, they are granted refugee status which gives them legal residence in the UK and if it is refused, they can legally be removed but in practice removal is difficult if the home country does not cooperate. On 18th September 2025, the first channel migrant was deported to France under the prime minister’s ‘one in, one out’ deal. He is the first of up to one hundred channel migrants detained by Border Force at the start of August who are to be sent back to France. The second migrant is to be sent after the Home Secretary saw off the fresh high-court challenge by his lawyers seeking to delay his removal to France. Moving forward, migrants will only be allowed to appeal through Judicial Review after being deported to France. The Home Secretary also ordered a review of the UK’s modern slavery laws to prevent migrants making “vexatious last-minute appeals” to block their deportations. According to the Telegraph, this removal follows three consecutive days, when the Home Office failed to remove a single migrant, based on the challenge of being victims of modern slavery and trafficking. If the migrant from India has his asylum claim refused, he is likely to face expulsion to India as France has a reciprocal arrangement with India to accept enforced returns. 2. Why aren't small boat arrivals arrested and detained? Unauthorised migrants are administratively arrested by immigration officers and briefly detained for questioning, but they cannot be detained beyond the initial examination. UK law only allows for people to be detained for immigration purposes where there is a realistic prospect of removal within a reasonable period of time. Someone who has claimed asylum usually has a legal right to be in the UK until that claim is decided. So, there is no realistic prospect of removal within a reasonable period, given that asylum decisions take months or years to process. 3. Can asylum be refused if the person could have claimed it in another safe country such as France? The UN Refugee Agency says that it is not required by the Refugee Convention or international law for people to claim asylum in the first safe country they reach. People who have passed through a safe country can nevertheless be denied access to the UK’s asylum system and the law allows the Home Secretary to declare an asylum claim as inadmissible if the person was previously in another country where they could have claimed asylum. However, this is not enforceable unless another safe country is likely to accept the person “within a reasonable period of time”. Therefore, the Home Office is not able to arrange this in practice. Although it began a pilot scheme with France. The Telegraph reported on 19th September 2025 that asylum seekers told the newspaper “that if deported back to France, they would return to Britain again and again”. 4. Why are unauthorised migrants provided support with maintenance money and accommodation? Illegal immigrants who are outside the asylum system are not allowed to claim most forms of social welfare. By contrast, asylum seekers who state they are destitute can apply to the Home Office for accommodation or subsistence payment, or both while they are waiting for a decision on their asylum claim. This is commonly referred to as asylum support. A person is destitute if they do not have adequate accommodation or any means of obtaining it, or if they have adequate accommodation or the means of obtaining it but cannot meet their other essential living needs. 5. When can asylum seekers be granted legal residence in the UK? There are two main types of legal status that can be granted to people who claim asylum. These are refugee status or humanitarian protection. Under the Immigration Rules, the central requirement for refugee status is that the person is a refugee, as defined in Article 1 of the 1951 convention. Humanitarian protection does not require a person to be a refugee under the 1951 Convention, but instead allows them to be granted asylum if they would face a real risk of suffering serious harm. The Immigration Rules define “serious harm” to mean the death penalty, unlawful killing, torture, inhumane or degrading treatment or punishment. People granted either refugee status or humanitarian protection status have a right to work in the UK and access the welfare system on the same basis as British citizens and permanent residence.

What are the concerns with the student visa? In recent years, there has been an increase in students staying in the UK following their studies, as well as an increase in sponsored study visas for law and banking education institutions. The Government believes there has been exploitation of student visas, and that too many graduates are allowed to stay in the UK following the successful completion of their studies, despite not moving into graduate level roles for which the graduate visa route was created. For these reasons, the Government is setting out reforms that will recognise the benefits that international students bring to the UK, but will raise standards and compliance to prevent visa misuse and strengthen the requirements to work and contribute for graduates who stay on after the courses have been completed. The evidence suggests that, in some cases, the integrity of the UK student visa system is being undermined, and the number of students claiming asylum is increasing. How does the Government intend to bring numbers down? 1. To prevent the misuse of the student visa, the Government is stressing the requirements that all sponsoring institutions must meet in order to recruit international students and the measures to be implemented to this end. It will raise the minimum pass requirement of each BCA metric by 5% points, so that a sponsor must maintain a course enrolment rate of at least 95%, and a course completion rate of 90% in order to pass the compliance threshold. Simultaneously, the Government implementing a new red, amber and green banding system to rate the BCA performance of each sponsor, makes it clear to them, the authorities, and the public, which institutions are achieving a higher rate of compliance, and which are at risk of failing. 2. Introducing new interventions against sponsors who are close to failing their metric, including placing them on a bespoke action plan designed to improve their compliance, while imposing limits on the number of new international students they can recruit while they are subject to those plans. 3. All sponsors wishing to use recruitment agents for overseas students will need to sign up the Agent Quality Framework. Together, all these measures will ensure that the sponsors are encouraged to recruit their students responsibly, only offering places to genuine students who meet the requirements of the route and ensuring that when failing to do so, the Home Office can intervene and ensure compliance in the future. 4. The graduate scheme will be reviewed, as the Government will reduce the ability of graduates to remain in the UK for a period of eighteen months after their studies. The Government will also look into introducing a levy on higher education providers’ income from international students, to be reinvested into a higher educational skill system. While these steps are enforceable on paper (the Home Office has an established sponsor licensing system), the concern is whether the UKVI has the capacity to monitor and intervene across hundreds of educational institutions. Placing a university on an “amber” rating with recruitment caps, for example, is a serious measure that could provoke legal challenges, especially if the institution disputes the data. Smaller private colleges might quietly close if they cannot meet requirements, which could be an intended effect (to weed out sub-par providers) but also could inadvertently harm local economies that benefit from those students. Reducing the Graduate visa to 18 months is straightforward to enforce – it’s simply a rule change – but its feasibility in terms of impact is debatable. The Home Office expects 7,000 fewer students per year as a result of the mooted 6% levy, and presumably an additional drop due to the shorter post-study period. If this holds true, universities may lose income and could downsize or cut courses. Enforcement of the student fee levy also raises feasibility questions – how exactly will it be implemented (as a tax collected by HMRC, or a surcharge via the immigration system)? And, if passed on as higher tuition, could it price out some applicants, leading to unintended socio-economic selection effects among students? These details are to be consulted on; until resolved, uncertainty itself might deter students or complicate university planning. In the longer run, the UK’s reputation as a welcoming destination for global talent may suffer; competitors like Canada and Australia might scoop up students deterred by UK’s stricter post-study rules and additional costs. There is an irony, that even as the White Paper talks of “supercharging UK growth in strategic industries,” by bringing in top talent, it simultaneously undermines one of the UK’s key sectors – higher education – and possibly the pipeline of young talent it produces. The tech and startup ecosystem could also feel an impact: the reduction in Graduate visa time and tougher settlement rules might dissuade some foreign graduates from staying to set-up companies or join UK startups (they may instead choose countries with more straightforward paths to residency). Conversely, the expansion of Innovator and Global Talent routes might mitigate this for a select few. What are the reforms to the Family routes? Family immigration rules are particularly important as British citizens meet and marry people from all over the world. However, the family migration, argues the paper has become overly complex, developing increasingly around core decisions in case law, including Court interpretation of Article 8 of the Human Rights Act. An overly high proportion of family related immigration cases are now decided on the basis that they are an “exception” to the normal rules, rather than being in line with the rules set out by Parliament. The Government will reform the framework for family immigration and, before the end of the year, will set out a new family policy that will cover all UK residents, including those who are British, settled, on work routes, or refugees seeking to bring family to the UK. The new requirements are: • A clear relationship requirement to ensure that only those in genuine, subsisting relationships qualify, to reduce forced marriages and to include protection for victims of domestic abuse. • Ensure that those coming to the UK have an appropriate level of English language skills to be able to integrate effectively into local communities. • Ensure the family unit has sufficient financial resources to support any migrants who are relying on the taxpayer, through reviewing and extending the financial requirements to other dependents routes. • In relation to exceptional circumstances, there will always be exceptional circumstances, but greater specificity about where the balance is considered to lie in the majority of cases is hoped to reduce the volume of cases and clarify the approach for applicants and case workers.

What are the concerns with the student visa? In recent years, there has been an increase in students staying in the UK following their studies, as well as an increase in sponsored study visas for law and banking education institutions. The Government believes there has been exploitation of student visas, and that too many graduates are allowed to stay in the UK following the successful completion of their studies, despite not moving into graduate level roles for which the graduate visa route was created. For these reasons, the Government is setting out reforms that will recognise the benefits that international students bring to the UK, but will raise standards and compliance to prevent visa misuse and strengthen the requirements to work and contribute for graduates who stay on after the courses have been completed. The evidence suggests that, in some cases, the integrity of the UK student visa system is being undermined, and the number of students claiming asylum is increasing. How does the Government intend to bring numbers down? 1. To prevent the misuse of the student visa, the Government is stressing the requirements that all sponsoring institutions must meet in order to recruit international students and the measures to be implemented to this end. It will raise the minimum pass requirement of each BCA metric by 5% points, so that a sponsor must maintain a course enrolment rate of at least 95%, and a course completion rate of 90% in order to pass the compliance threshold. Simultaneously, the Government implementing a new red, amber and green banding system to rate the BCA performance of each sponsor, makes it clear to them, the authorities, and the public, which institutions are achieving a higher rate of compliance, and which are at risk of failing. 2. Introducing new interventions against sponsors who are close to failing their metric, including placing them on a bespoke action plan designed to improve their compliance, while imposing limits on the number of new international students they can recruit while they are subject to those plans. 3. All sponsors wishing to use recruitment agents for overseas students will need to sign up the Agent Quality Framework. Together, all these measures will ensure that the sponsors are encouraged to recruit their students responsibly, only offering places to genuine students who meet the requirements of the route and ensuring that when failing to do so, the Home Office can intervene and ensure compliance in the future. 4. The graduate scheme will be reviewed, as the Government will reduce the ability of graduates to remain in the UK for a period of eighteen months after their studies. The Government will also look into introducing a levy on higher education providers’ income from international students, to be reinvested into a higher educational skill system. While these steps are enforceable on paper (the Home Office has an established sponsor licensing system), the concern is whether the UKVI has the capacity to monitor and intervene across hundreds of educational institutions. Placing a university on an “amber” rating with recruitment caps, for example, is a serious measure that could provoke legal challenges, especially if the institution disputes the data. Smaller private colleges might quietly close if they cannot meet requirements, which could be an intended effect (to weed out sub-par providers) but also could inadvertently harm local economies that benefit from those students. Reducing the Graduate visa to 18 months is straightforward to enforce – it’s simply a rule change – but its feasibility in terms of impact is debatable. The Home Office expects 7,000 fewer students per year as a result of the mooted 6% levy, and presumably an additional drop due to the shorter post-study period. If this holds true, universities may lose income and could downsize or cut courses. Enforcement of the student fee levy also raises feasibility questions – how exactly will it be implemented (as a tax collected by HMRC, or a surcharge via the immigration system)? And, if passed on as higher tuition, could it price out some applicants, leading to unintended socio-economic selection effects among students? These details are to be consulted on; until resolved, uncertainty itself might deter students or complicate university planning. In the longer run, the UK’s reputation as a welcoming destination for global talent may suffer; competitors like Canada and Australia might scoop up students deterred by UK’s stricter post-study rules and additional costs. There is an irony, that even as the White Paper talks of “supercharging UK growth in strategic industries,” by bringing in top talent, it simultaneously undermines one of the UK’s key sectors – higher education – and possibly the pipeline of young talent it produces. The tech and startup ecosystem could also feel an impact: the reduction in Graduate visa time and tougher settlement rules might dissuade some foreign graduates from staying to set-up companies or join UK startups (they may instead choose countries with more straightforward paths to residency). Conversely, the expansion of Innovator and Global Talent routes might mitigate this for a select few. What are the reforms to the Family routes? Family immigration rules are particularly important as British citizens meet and marry people from all over the world. However, the family migration, argues the paper has become overly complex, developing increasingly around core decisions in case law, including Court interpretation of Article 8 of the Human Rights Act. An overly high proportion of family related immigration cases are now decided on the basis that they are an “exception” to the normal rules, rather than being in line with the rules set out by Parliament. The Government will reform the framework for family immigration and, before the end of the year, will set out a new family policy that will cover all UK residents, including those who are British, settled, on work routes, or refugees seeking to bring family to the UK. The new requirements are: • A clear relationship requirement to ensure that only those in genuine, subsisting relationships qualify, to reduce forced marriages and to include protection for victims of domestic abuse. • Ensure that those coming to the UK have an appropriate level of English language skills to be able to integrate effectively into local communities. • Ensure the family unit has sufficient financial resources to support any migrants who are relying on the taxpayer, through reviewing and extending the financial requirements to other dependents routes. • In relation to exceptional circumstances, there will always be exceptional circumstances, but greater specificity about where the balance is considered to lie in the majority of cases is hoped to reduce the volume of cases and clarify the approach for applicants and case workers.

What are the concerns with the student visa? In recent years, there has been an increase in students staying in the UK following their studies, as well as an increase in sponsored study visas for law and banking education institutions. The Government believes there has been exploitation of student visas, and that too many graduates are allowed to stay in the UK following the successful completion of their studies, despite not moving into graduate level roles for which the graduate visa route was created. For these reasons, the Government is setting out reforms that will recognise the benefits that international students bring to the UK, but will raise standards and compliance to prevent visa misuse and strengthen the requirements to work and contribute for graduates who stay on after the courses have been completed. The evidence suggests that, in some cases, the integrity of the UK student visa system is being undermined, and the number of students claiming asylum is increasing. How does the Government intend to bring numbers down? 1. To prevent the misuse of the student visa, the Government is stressing the requirements that all sponsoring institutions must meet in order to recruit international students and the measures to be implemented to this end. It will raise the minimum pass requirement of each BCA metric by 5% points, so that a sponsor must maintain a course enrolment rate of at least 95%, and a course completion rate of 90% in order to pass the compliance threshold. Simultaneously, the Government implementing a new red, amber and green banding system to rate the BCA performance of each sponsor, makes it clear to them, the authorities, and the public, which institutions are achieving a higher rate of compliance, and which are at risk of failing. 2. Introducing new interventions against sponsors who are close to failing their metric, including placing them on a bespoke action plan designed to improve their compliance, while imposing limits on the number of new international students they can recruit while they are subject to those plans. 3. All sponsors wishing to use recruitment agents for overseas students will need to sign up the Agent Quality Framework. Together, all these measures will ensure that the sponsors are encouraged to recruit their students responsibly, only offering places to genuine students who meet the requirements of the route and ensuring that when failing to do so, the Home Office can intervene and ensure compliance in the future. 4. The graduate scheme will be reviewed, as the Government will reduce the ability of graduates to remain in the UK for a period of eighteen months after their studies. The Government will also look into introducing a levy on higher education providers’ income from international students, to be reinvested into a higher educational skill system. While these steps are enforceable on paper (the Home Office has an established sponsor licensing system), the concern is whether the UKVI has the capacity to monitor and intervene across hundreds of educational institutions. Placing a university on an “amber” rating with recruitment caps, for example, is a serious measure that could provoke legal challenges, especially if the institution disputes the data. Smaller private colleges might quietly close if they cannot meet requirements, which could be an intended effect (to weed out sub-par providers) but also could inadvertently harm local economies that benefit from those students. Reducing the Graduate visa to 18 months is straightforward to enforce – it’s simply a rule change – but its feasibility in terms of impact is debatable. The Home Office expects 7,000 fewer students per year as a result of the mooted 6% levy, and presumably an additional drop due to the shorter post-study period. If this holds true, universities may lose income and could downsize or cut courses. Enforcement of the student fee levy also raises feasibility questions – how exactly will it be implemented (as a tax collected by HMRC, or a surcharge via the immigration system)? And, if passed on as higher tuition, could it price out some applicants, leading to unintended socio-economic selection effects among students? These details are to be consulted on; until resolved, uncertainty itself might deter students or complicate university planning. In the longer run, the UK’s reputation as a welcoming destination for global talent may suffer; competitors like Canada and Australia might scoop up students deterred by UK’s stricter post-study rules and additional costs. There is an irony, that even as the White Paper talks of “supercharging UK growth in strategic industries,” by bringing in top talent, it simultaneously undermines one of the UK’s key sectors – higher education – and possibly the pipeline of young talent it produces. The tech and startup ecosystem could also feel an impact: the reduction in Graduate visa time and tougher settlement rules might dissuade some foreign graduates from staying to set-up companies or join UK startups (they may instead choose countries with more straightforward paths to residency). Conversely, the expansion of Innovator and Global Talent routes might mitigate this for a select few. What are the reforms to the Family routes? Family immigration rules are particularly important as British citizens meet and marry people from all over the world. However, the family migration, argues the paper has become overly complex, developing increasingly around core decisions in case law, including Court interpretation of Article 8 of the Human Rights Act. An overly high proportion of family related immigration cases are now decided on the basis that they are an “exception” to the normal rules, rather than being in line with the rules set out by Parliament. The Government will reform the framework for family immigration and, before the end of the year, will set out a new family policy that will cover all UK residents, including those who are British, settled, on work routes, or refugees seeking to bring family to the UK. The new requirements are: • A clear relationship requirement to ensure that only those in genuine, subsisting relationships qualify, to reduce forced marriages and to include protection for victims of domestic abuse. • Ensure that those coming to the UK have an appropriate level of English language skills to be able to integrate effectively into local communities. • Ensure the family unit has sufficient financial resources to support any migrants who are relying on the taxpayer, through reviewing and extending the financial requirements to other dependents routes. • In relation to exceptional circumstances, there will always be exceptional circumstances, but greater specificity about where the balance is considered to lie in the majority of cases is hoped to reduce the volume of cases and clarify the approach for applicants and case workers.

The New Practice Direction of the Immigration and Asylum Chambers of the First-tier Tribunal (IAC) was published on 1 November 2024. It replaces the previous practice Directions of 13 May 2022 and supersedes Practice Statement No 1 of 2022 dated 13 May 2022.  The issues-based approach and procedural rigour of the new Practice Direction Under guiding principles Part 1 of the Practice Direction, it is stated that “the overriding objective to the Tribunal is that cases are dealt with fairly and justly”. Its aim “allowing appropriate resources, both of the Tribunal and the parties, to be allocated in proportion to the nature and extent of the issues in dispute; avoid unnecessary delay and ensure that both parties can fairly present evidence and submissions. The Practice Direction applies to appellants without representatives in the same way as it does to parties represented by lawyers.  It does not apply to applications of Immigration Bail. Bundles, Appeal Skeleton Arguments (ASAs) and Respondent’s Review Significant new rules on bundles emphasises conciseness, specifying that the Appeal Skeleton Argument should be no more than 12 pages of numbered paragraphs and the text must be “in no less than size 12 font with 1.5 line spacing” and expert reports should be no more than 20 pages, although it is possible to apply for permission to exceed these limits.  The Practice Direction makes clear that the appellant may be directed to provide an ASA or an explanation of their case and evidence (not represented appellants), even if the Respondent fails to provide a bundle. Any bundle that is prepared by a legal representative must be in a digital, indexed, bookmarked and paginated format where every page is A4. Any evidence submitted after the Respondent’s Review, must be prepared as a bundle and accompanied by “a written explanation of why it was not provided earlier in the appeal process”. Parties relying on material within country guidance decisions or additional country background information must include a country information evidence schedule (‘the country schedule’) within the bundle. The country schedule must: contain the country guidance paragraph references and/or extracts of additional country information relied upon by reference to each disputed issue; not exceed 12 pages; and include the relevant hyper-link to the additional country background information source document. Witness statements In relation to witness statements, a witness statement must be in the intended witness own words and it need not be in the language that the witness understands.  If it is drafted in English and this is not a language understood by the witness it must include a signed and date attestation by both the witness and the person who interprets, stating that the statement has been read back to the witness in the language they understand and that it accurately reflects their evidence. This statement should be included in bundles and should be capable of standing as the totality of the evidence in chief of the person giving that statement.  It may be added to the provision of a supplementary statement provided that the supplementary statement is produced and served in accordance with any directions given in the appeal.  Only where there is a good reason and with permission of the judge will a witness be permitted to provide additional evidence in chief. The witness statement should be expressed in the first person and should also state the full name of the witness, their place of residence and if they are making the statement in their professional business or other occupational capacity the address at which they work, the position they hold and the name of the firm or employer.  They must state that they are party to the proceedings or they are the employees or relative or such party and the process by which it has been prepared, for example face to face, over the phone, or through an interpreter. The statement should have the date it was signed and must include a statement that it was made from the witness’ own knowledge and which matters of information or belief and the source for any matters, information or belief.  An exhibit or document that is referred to within the witness statement should be verified and clearly identified by the witness and should remain separate from the witness statement.  Where a witness refers to an exhibit or document, they should refer to a description of the document at page X. The status of documents, skeletons and bundles prepared and submitted prior to 1 November 2024 seems unclear.  If documents already submitted to the Tribunal are non-compliant, presumably the judge will accept the lack of notice and additional resources required to comply with requirements. Adjournments An application for an adjournment of an appeal must be supported by full reasons and any reasonably available supporting material or evidence made no later than 4.30pm one clear working day before the date of the hearing.  It must be accompanied by proposed draft directions for the judge to consider.  An application made later than the end of the period mentioned above must be made at the hearing and will, save in exceptional circumstances, require the attendance of the party or the representative of the party seeking the adjournment.  If an adjournment is not granted and the party fails to attend the hearing the Tribunal may proceed with the hearing in that party’s absence.  If an adjournment is granted the Tribunal shall issue an order containing directions to ensure that the appeal can finally be determined within a reasonable time. Decisions and Reasons In some non-deportation Article 8 human rights and EUSS cases, the Tribunal may be able to give its decision shortly after the conclusion of the hearing by providing a short Notice of Decision or by stating its reasons orally. Reasons will only be provided orally where the Judge is satisfied that the audio recording facilities are available, and an audio recording will be made of the oral reasons. In other cases, written reasons should only be provided where they are expressly required by the Procedure Rules or where the interest of justice otherwise compels written reasons to be given and only to the extent and in terms necessary to dispose justly of the matter in hand. The reasons provided for any decision should be proportionate to the significance and the complexity of the disputed issues. Stating reasons at greater length than is necessary is not in the interests of justice. To do so is an inefficient use of judicial time. New Practice Direction Of The Immigration And Asylum Chamber Of The First-tier Tribunal

Since 31 January 2024, victims of transnational marriage abandonment can apply for a visa to return to the UK. This follows the landmark case of R on the application of AM -v- Secretary of State for the Home Department 2022. Transitional marriage abandonment refers to the practice where a sponsor or their family abandons the partner abroad, often without financial support, to prevent their return to the UK. This may also involve children, who could be either abandoned with or separated from the partner. It is a coercive and controlling act that leaves the partner isolated, vulnerable, and unable to escape. Southall Black sisters were on the forefront of the fight for the rights of these migrant victims of domestic abuse and argued that when these women are abandoned abroad it amounts to an extreme form of psychological abuse, and it denies the women access to justice in the UK and amounts to a gross violation of human rights. Practice Direction 12J of the Family Proceedings Rules 2010 confirms that transnational marriage abandonment is a form of domestic abuse. Until recently immigration law lagged behind family jurisdiction in its response to this phenomenon and women in this position found it very difficult to return to the UK.  Stranded spouses have no recourse to returning to the UK because victims of domestic violence had to be in the UK in order to make an application under Section DVILR of Appendix FM.  In other words, the Rules have created a loophole where abusers can prevent their spouses from exercising their right to apply for indefinite leave to remain as a victim of domestic violence. In the case of AM -v- Secretary of State, a Pakistani national was married to a British citizen and she suffered severe financial, physical, emotional and sexual abuse at the hands of her husband for years whilst she was in the UK.  One day he forced her to travel to Pakistan with her two-year-old daughter and whilst in Pakistan he took her travel document away and came to the UK with their daughter.  Had she been in the UK she could have applied for indefinite leave to remain as a victim of domestic violence relying on section DVILR indefinite leave to remain (settlement as victim of domestic violence) but as we said above she could not have done it from abroad, therefore she applied for leave outside the Rules and asked to be granted indefinite leave to enter on the basis that she was a victim of domestic abuse.  The Home Office only granted her leave to enter outside the Rules for six months with no recourse to public funds and she challenged that decision.  The decision came in front of the Administrative Court and the Home Office granted her indefinite leave to remain. The Court found that victim of transnational marriage abandonment is an analogous situation to victims of domestic abuse in the UK and they have the expectation of settlement in the UK and suffer the same form of domestic abuse. Judge Lieven found that the lack of provision in the Rules for victims of transnational marriage abandonment was very great and not proportionate to the interference with their Article 8 rights and therefore she concluded that the differential treatment between victims of spousal abandonment inside and outside the UK is not justified and therefore in breach of Article 14 of the Human Rights Act 1998.  The Home Office did not appeal the Judgment and had to remedy the breach.  Now victims in this position can make an application under the new rule. The rules for victims of transnational marriage abandonments can be found in Appendix Victims of Domestic Violence that are very similar to the rules for victims of domestic abuse in the UK, although the guidance confirms that the standard of proof that victims of transnational marriage abandonment must meet is the reasonable degree of likelihood while victims of domestic abuse in a country must meet the higher balance of probability standard. What are the requirements for the application to succeed? An application must not fall for refusal under general grants of refusal which are found at Part 9 of the Immigration Rules. Regardless of whether they are inside or out, in order to be able to succeed, the last grant of leave must be on the basis of the relationship to someone who is a British national or has indefinite leave to be in the UK or is an EA national and has lived under the EU settlement scheme or is refugee. Those who have leave on the basis of a relationship to someone who is not settled such as a relationship with a student, will not be able to use this rule. The Applicant must show that the relationship broke down due to domestic abuse. The abuser does not necessarily need to be the partner, it could be another family member, as long as the abuse is the thing that led to the breakdown of the relationship. The requirement of abandonment outside the UK. This requirement is self-explanatory because victims of transnational marriage abandonment must have been abandoned outside the UK. Tuberculosis (TB) test. An applicant who has been abandoned in a country on the list of tuberculosis or have been there for six months or more will need to take a TB test. What application form does one need to complete? Applications are submitted online for return to the UK and if the Applicant is destitute and unable to pay the fee for the application, the Applicant can show that they do not have the means to pay the fees, they will be granted a fee waiver.  If the caseworker is not satisfied that the Applicant is eligible for a fee waiver, they should make additional enquiries.  Applicants will have to attend biometrics at the visa application centre and the guidance confirms that the Home Office can excuse Applicants from this requirement relying on the separate biometric guidance. The Applicant will have to provide evidence of identity. If an Applicant cannot provide, for example, a valid passport, the application might be rejected as invalid but there is a discretionary element to it.  The caseworkers have discretion to waive this requirement and then ask the Applicant not to submit proof of identity in some circumstances, for example when they have good reasons beyond their control why they cannot provide proof of their identity.  The Home Office in any event should have had a record of their identity and the caseworkers should consult the relevant Home Office records to make a decision and an application.  In practice, lots of victims of transnational marriage abandonments will not have the passport or biometric residence permit because their abusers will often take them away.  If obtaining a new passport is impossible, that should be explained, and the Applicant may use an alternative form of evidence such as national identity or birth certificate. What evidence is necessary to submit with the application? There is no mandatory evidence to be submitted, however, we would suggest That the Applicant provide a statement outlining: When and how the relationship started when she relocated to the UK The history of the domestic abuse in the UK, by whom and in what form and when they travelled abroad What was their understanding for the purpose and length of travel What happens once she was abroad, with whom she stayed, when did she realise that she was abandoned and what prevents her from returning to the UK. If she has children, whether the children are with her or have been separated from her and what difficulty she experienced abroad. If there has been a delay in making the application, an explanation as to the reason for the delay should be provided and confirm that the relationship ended and ended due to domestic abuse. Details of financial circumstances will be relevant if a fee waiver application is being made. If there are family proceedings in the UK such as wardship proceedings for the children or previous criminal proceedings or injunctions, this evidence will be helpful and should be provided. Before submitting any Family Court Orders one must make sure that she has permissions to do so and should get in touch with a family lawyer to find out whether permission can be obtained from the court and whether the documents can be disclosed. If there are other independent evidence of abuse such as text messages or approaching charities in the UK, that should be provided as well. Grants of status Successful Applicants will be granted indefinite leave to enter the UK and would be issued a visa valid for three months during which time they should travel to the UK and apply for E-visas.  The new Rules do not cater for victims of domestic violence who last leave was not in the relevant categories, a partner or those who left the UK of their own volition.  These will continue relying on caseworker discretion hoping to be granted leave outside the Rules.  There is no right of appeal against refusals.  

On the first day of his second term of office, President Donald Trump issued ten Executive Orders and Proclamations seeking to change the face of US Immigration Law and Policy. According to the American Immigration Council, in their Fact Sheet of 22 January 2025, the Trump Administration has followed up the record of its first term, and the promises of his presidential campaign. This Fact Sheet aims to explain not just the scope of the Executive Orders, but also what precisely they aim to do and on what timescale. Most of the policy changes take the form of instructions to Federal departments or agencies. The key policy changes are: (a) Ordering the expansion of “Expedited Removal” which allows the US to deport someone without a court hearing. US Officials will be authorised to arrest someone accused of entering the country without inspection anywhere inside the US and subject them to Expedited Removal if they believe that person has been there for less than two years, with the burden on the immigrant to prove that they have been in the US for longer. “Expedited Removal” is a process by which a low level Immigration Officer can summarily remove certain non-citizens from the United States without a hearing before an immigration Judge. Undocumented immigrants placed in expedited removal proceedings are entitled to access the asylum system if they express a fear of persecution or torture if returning to their own country. (b) Requiring all non-citizens to register and present their fingerprints to the US Government under a rarely used provision of US law and declaring that all those who have not registered will be subject to criminal penalties. (c) Instructing the Department of Homeland Security to ensure that work permits are not given to people without other legal status even if they have a pending immigration application. This change will radically restrict the population of people who are eligible to work in the US legally. (d) Directing the Office of Management and Budget to take action to ensure that no public benefits are provided to unauthorised immigrants. (e) Threatening the revocation of all Federal funding to States and Localities deemed to be sanctuary jurisdictions. Over the past decade, an increasing number of states, counties and cities have adopted a variety of policies intended to promote a greater level of trust and cooperation between local law enforcement and communities with sizeable immigrant populations, regardless of their immigration status. (f) Revoking all Biden’s policy setting priorities for immigration enforcement and directing audits of any Federal contracts with non-governmental organisations engaged directly or indirectly in assisting undocumented immigrants in any way including freezing all funding during these audits and threatening to order the return of those funds following the audit. According to the American Immigration Council Fact Sheet, the immediate effect of the above measure are: The expansion of expedited removal will subject millions of recent arrivals and others to potential deportation without a court hearing and increase racial profiling through the expansion funding threats, criminal prosecution to sanctuary jurisdictions so as to potentially intimidate localities. Depriving applicants of legal status for the ability to work legally which creates a strain on local government by preventing people from being able to support themselves. However, Trump is not alone in pushing a restrictive immigration agenda as many EU Member States have also been looking at ways to limit irregular migration and increase returns. Trump’s actions in this regard could serve as inspiration for EU leaders. It is predictable that proposals for mass deportation may increasingly appear in the European far right narrative. Both the US, United Kingdom and Australia have been experimenting already with offshore detention abroad. In recent months, the British Prime Minister, Sir Keir Starmer, has made joint statements on irregular migrations with Italy and Germany. A new joint mission exists between the UK and Bulgaria to tackle the people smuggling gangs making millions from ferrying irregular migrants across the English Channel. The alliance is part of the UK’s wider mission to bolster partnership with EU Member States. This increased focus on Bulgaria comes after the country became a full member of the EU Schengen borders and travel zone on 1 January 2025. This has made the country’s border with Turkey a key target for people trafficking others illegally, seeking to reach the European countries. In addition, current UK changes to the immigration rules state that refugees who arrive in the UK after making a dangerous journey or via irregular routes will not be allowed to claim citizenship under a change to the immigration laws. The new guidance for staff assessing naturalisation claims states that any person applying for citizenship from 10 February 2025, who previously entered the UK illegally will normally be refused. This change to the rules comes as the Prime Minister seeks to present a hardline on migration and border security. Even the current UK Immigration Rules are not too different to some of Trump’s new proposals. In the UK Immigration Enforcement Officers have a wide range of powers provided to them under schedule 2 of the Immigration Act 1971 – their powers include locating, arresting and detaining individuals for the purposes of removal. Immigration Officers are allowed to detain individual even when removal directions haven’t been made against them – as long as officers have “reasonable grounds” for suspecting that the individual in question may be given removal directions, they are able to exercise these powers, meaning they have similar powers to US officials working under Trump’s new “Expedited Removal” system. The Labour Party announced in their official manifesto how they intend to “set up a new returns and enforcement unit, with an additional 1,000 staff, to fast-track removals”. There also a number of Immigration Removal Centres, Short-Term Holding Facilities and Pre-Departure Accommodations in the UK – as per the Home Office report titled ‘How many people are detained or returned?’ published on 13 June 2024, 16,031 people entered immigration detention between March 2023 and March 2024. Sometimes the Home Office releases through liable to detention in removal centres Immigration Bail, during which they must frequently report to the Home Office. The UK is also part of the Eurodac system – this is a Europe-wide fingerprint database. As per Eurodac regulations, any person aged 14 or above who has either claimed asylum in the UK or come to the UK illegally must be fingerprinted. These requirements to submit fingerprints is not only applicable to asylum seekers and illegal entrants in the UK – as per the UK’s Biometric enrolment policy, all individuals over the age of 5 who make any applications under the Immigration Rules are required to give their biometrics, which means they must attend a biometric appointment to provide scans of their fingerprints and a digital photograph of themselves. This is of course not dissimilar to Trump’s plan to require non-citizens to register and present their fingerprints to the government. Further, most people without valid leave in the UK are not permitted to work, even if they have outstanding immigration applications which are pending a decision. The Home Office guidance titled ‘Permission to work and volunteering for asylum seekers’ confirms that asylum seekers specifically cannot apply for permission to work unless they have been waiting for more than 12 months for a decision. Even when asylum seekers have been waiting for more than 12 months for a decision, they can only apply for permission to work if they have highly specialised skills which would allow them to obtain a job on the immigration salary list – this list only has 23 jobs on it, many of which require advanced qualifications. Employers also face heavy sanctions if they employ anybody without valid immigration status in the UK – the government’s guidance titled ‘Employer’s guide to right to work checks’ summarizes how they can face civil penalties of up to £60,000 per illegal worker, face criminal convictions carrying a prison sentence of up to 5 years and an unlimited fine, or have their business closed by way of a court order. There is also quarterly report published by the Home Office outlining the companies which have faced illegal working penalties. Landlords in the UK can also face similar penalties for renting those without the right to rent – these penalties can also range from fines to a period of imprisonment. Those in the UK without valid leave don’t have the right to rent – this includes asylum seekers who are awaiting decisions on their claims. Despite most individuals awaiting decisions on their immigration applications not being able to work whilst their applications are pending, the UK also does not allow these individuals to access public funds. Under the Immigration and Asylum Act 1999, people who do not have any immigration permission are excluded from benefits and housing. It also outlines the ‘NRPF’ condition – NRPF stands for ‘No Recourse to Public Funds’, which is a condition applicable to most visas in the UK, meaning many immigrants who have valid leave are also unable to access public funds. When it comes to asylum seekers specifically, they cannot claim mainstream welfare benefits or housing assistance whilst their asylum claims are pending decision – instead, they receive a specific, limited amount of support from the Home Office called “asylum support”, to cover basic needs like food and accommodation. Asylum seekers in self-catered accommodation receive £49.18 weekly for their needs, whereas those in catered accommodation receive £8.86 per week. There are also several other examples of immigration policy in the UK which could be considered hostile – over the last few years, for example, the Immigration Rules have been changed to prevent Care Workers and Students below PhD level from bringing their dependents with them. The minimum salary level which Skilled Workers and individuals intending to bring Partners to the UK has also increased – all of these measures are likely intended to deter immigration from various demographics. The UK also has very strict provisions within the Immigration Rules which prevent those with custodial sentences from coming to the UK – anybody who has ever received a custodial sentence of any length, for example, can generally not come to the UK as a visitor. Those applying for work visas also need to meet several suitability requirements – they must show that they do not fall for refusal under Part 9 of the Immigration Rules, which is a section preventing many people with custodial sentences and previous immigration offences from applying to enter the UK legally in future. The Home Office also sometimes certifies asylum and/or human rights claims as “manifestly unfounded”, under section 94(1) of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 – if a claim is certified as being manifestly unfounded, this prevents the individual in question from appealing their refused decision. The Home Office guidance on this section clearly outlines that the policy intention behind certifying claims as manifestly unfounded is to enable individuals to be removed once the claim is refused and certified. The difference between Trump’s new policies, and existing policies in the UK and Europe, therefore, is not too large – Trump does not hesitate to use the word “deportation”. European leaders, on the other hand, speak of returns or return hubs. Whilst Trump qualifies some migrants as illegal, European leaders call it irregular. A new role within the European Union is that of the EU Return Coordinator, a novelty introduced by the new Pact on Migration and Asylum. The main task of the EU Return Coordinator is to bring together different strands of EU return policy to support coherent implementation and establish a common EU system for returns of illegal immigration. The European Commission appointed Ms Mari Juritsch as Return Coordinator in March 2022. She works with a high-level network of return officials and, together with her network, provides practical and operational support to member states to increase the effectiveness of the overall returns process. The role will help identify the best use of member states’ national return systems because operational realities vary greatly from one country to another. The network aims to link member states’ return activities more closely with the EU and member state engagement with third countries on their readmission, making cooperation with third countries more effective.

What is the UK India Trade Deal? The United Kingdom and the Republic of India concluded talks on a free trade agreement (FTA). The agreement was reached on 6 May 2025 between the Prime Minister and Prime Minister Modi, and is expected to increase the UK GDP gross domestic product by £4.8 billion and UK wages by £2.2 billion each and every year in the long run.  As a result of the deal, businesses will now be able to trade with India with “confidence and security”, the Prime Minister stated, as the mission of the government is to secure “sustained economic growth” and that the UK “will benefit from open export markets and access to competitive imports that support production at home.”  India represents one of the most dynamic and exciting economies in the world and has the highest growth rate in the G20.  However there has been significant challenges for UK business seeking access to this growing market and despite challenging conditions, the UK business have high ambitions for the future of trade with India.   From an Indian perspective, the government of India announced that the major trade deal signed with the UK will provide “greater global mobility for aspirational young Indians” and expand opportunities in Britain.  Addressing the House of Commons, the Minister of State and Department for Business in Trade said in a statement that the deal ensures the UK point based immigration systems remain unaffected.  He later emphasised that the agreement covers temporary business mobility, not immigration and it is aligned with the existing UK properties.  A key feature of the Free Trade Agreement is a provision exempting Indian workers temporarily posted in the UK from paying UK social security contributions for up to three years! The press release around this stated that the FTA eases mobility for professionals including contractual service suppliers, business visitors, investors, intercorporate transferees, partners and dependent children of intercorporate transferees who try to work and independent professionals like yoga instructors, musicians and chefs.  The opposition pointed out that the agreement will come at a significant cost to the British taxpayer.  It may be that it will be 20% cheaper for companies in the UK to hire Indian workers over British workers.  Harriet Baldwin said in the House of Commons that she was shocked and asked “will the convention really mean that an Indian owned restaurant chain in the UK could pay no National Insurance for its chef while a British pub next door pays full National Insurance for its chef?”   What is the advice to employers recruiting from India? The new trade deal will streamline access to skilled workers and global talent route.  The FTA creates a framework to simplify the application process for Indian professionals in key sectors and although eligibility is still governed by the skilled worker visa requirements and the global talent route, the agreement commits to reducing procedural barriers particularly for recognised roles and qualifications such as tech, health and cultural services.   How will new business mobility provisions be improved? Indian nationals can benefit from up to 12 months of temporary entry and an easier movement under the global business mobility service supplier and secondment workers’ route.  It will also improve processing and documentation guidance.  This is not a route to settlement and is designated for short-term contractual or intercompany work.   What would be the effect on intercompany transfers? The FTA facilitates smoother movement of skilled staff from Indian companies to the UK branches through the global business mobility senior specialist worker route.  The key improvement will include reduced documentary burden, consistent eligibility standards and National insurance exemption.   How will it benefit recognition of professional qualifications? A framework is being introduced to mutually recognise qualifications in fields such as accountancy law, architecture, engineering and details will depend on professional body agreement, but the process will support easier visa access via recognised status under the skilled worker or the global talent route.   What will be the effect on the youth mobility route? Indian nationals continue to benefit from India Young Professionals Scheme allowing for two years’ work and travel stay in the UK and has 3,000 spots annually.  The key limitations are that none of those create settlement rights and all applications must comply with Immigration Rules.   Where can I find the relevant guidance? More specific Home Office guidance that is dedicated to the India/UK Free Trade Agreement and its immigration measures can’t be found because the deal is not yet in force. The Home Office will issue guidance once the final text of the FTA is legally verified and published, the UK Parliament complete its scrutiny and approve it, and the implementation legislation (the Home Office rules) are drafted.  The likely publication will be May 2026, based on current timelines.

The Home Secretary, Yvette Cooper, argues in the paper that immigration needs to be properly controlled and managed and that for too long it has not been.  The premise is that, as a nation, we need to be able to control our borders, control who is lawfully in the country, who is entitled to work or use public services and the terms on which people can bring family into the UK.  As part of this plan for change, the Government wants to bring down net migration and restore control and order to the immigration system. How does the Government intend to bring net migration down? The first suggestion is to underpin a more controlled point-based immigration system that informs policy development, so that there will be a process for measuring and modelling immigration and its impacts. However, criticism of the Office for National Statistics (ONS) revolves around accuracy, methodology and timelines of its data. One way to assist is with the roll out of digital border arrangements including e-visas, e-gates, and new information systems, which will improve the accuracy of data gathered and measures taken, and would not affect the cooperation of common travel areas. In addition, the Government will work with the Migration Advisory Committee, the ONS and the OBR to overhaul future data gathering and research needed to develop accurate measures and forward-looking policies. However, ONS statistics generally do not capture irregular migration. Hence, the true scale of migration is unknown, particularly regarding illegal entrants, small boat arrivals, and overstayers. Reducing overseas recruitment in favour of training UK workers and also changing the pattern and skill mix of migration which would allow to ensure subsequent better contribution to the UK. This will include: a. very specific new and stronger visa controls; b. increasing the threshold for skilled worker visas to graduate level so there will be a reduction in lower skilled migration; c. only allowing a narrow list of critical shortage occupations on to temporary shortlists; d. closing the social care visa route to overseas recruitment; e. restricting dependents for lower skilled workers on temporary shortage lists and increasing salary thresholds for all visa holders seeking to bring in dependents; and f. increasing English language requirements for visa holders and their dependents. Separately, new reforms for asylum and border security would be put in place to reduce small boat crossings, dismantle the gangs responsible for them and increase deportations and returns. What are the changes for Skilled Worker Visa? The skilled worker visa was introduced in late 2020, replacing the Tier 2 work visa, and the new route included a work visa requirement for EU Nationals and a lowering of the skills threshold for skilled workers.  In August 2020, the Health and Care Worker route was introduced and expanded in February 2022 to include the social care workforce. Following concerns of exploitation and abuse in the care sector, and subsequent scrutiny of employers in adult social care, the number of healthcare worker visas granted for both main applicants and their dependents fell in 2024. Increasing the salary threshold in April 2024 resulted in declining visas across the skill levels, but the average skill level is still lower than it was historically. At the same time as overseas recruitment, including of lower skilled workers, shot up, labour market participation in the UK residents has dropped. Under-investment in training in the UK workforce contributed to poor levels of productivity and hindered its economic growth. The Government intends to reverse the long-term trend stated above, by reducing the overseas recruitment and by reducing the level of unemployment and economic inactivity in the UK. To support this goal, they will draw on better data available to make informed decisions about the state of the labour market and the role different policies should play, rather than being reliant on migration. What’s the new threshold? The Immigration Salary List, which gives people discounts from salary thresholds will be abolished. The Government will ask MAC to undertake a thorough review of salary requirements, including discounts to ensure that international recruitment is never a cheaper alternative to fair pay, and ensure that salary levels reflect the new changes to the immigration system. In relation to those who are already utilising the skilled worker visa, from the point that the skills threshold is raised, existing skilled worker visa holders will continue to be able to renew their visa, change employment and take supplementary employment in currently eligible occupations. However, new applicants from overseas or those applying to switch from other immigration routes will have to follow the new rules. The Government will establish a new Temporary Shortage List to provide time-limited access to the points-based immigration system. Occupations below RQF Level 6 must be listed on the Temporary Shortage List in order to qualify.  Sectors will only be potentially added to the Temporary Shortage List if they are key to the industrial strategy or delivering critical infrastructure, and only following advice from the MAC. These jobs, falling below RQF Level 6, will also be subject to new restrictions on bringing dependents. What is wrong with the new threshold? The feasibility concern is whether the domestic labour market can fill the resulting gaps. Sectors like hospitality, agriculture, manufacturing, and parts of the public sector (e.g. education, healthcare assistants) have relied on non-graduate workers from abroad in recent years. The government’s new Temporary Shortage List, in theory allows some below-RQF Level 6 roles if truly needed, however, it remains unspecified. Fewer workers – especially in lower-wage jobs – can have a variety of economic effects. On one hand, it may lead to upward pressure on wages for those jobs (as employers must raise pay to attract scarce domestic workers), potentially benefiting some British workers. However, there’s a flip side: if businesses face sharply higher labour costs or simply cannot find enough staff, they may cut services, raise prices, or even go out of business. This is because migrants contribute to the economy as workers and consumers. They fill jobs, but also spend money, pay taxes, and spur demand for goods and services, creating additional jobs in a virtuous cycle. The Office for National Statistics has found that migrant workers often earn more and experience faster wage growth than their UK-born peers, meaning their contribution to per-capita GDP is positive. If the bar is set too high or the process too slow, industries facing acute shortages may simply experience unfilled jobs, harming services and output. On the other hand, if the “shortage list” loophole is used too liberally, it could undermine the goal of reducing migration. The White Paper floats the idea of even barring sponsors from issuing new visas if they fail to invest in UK talent. Enforcing this would require robust audits and data-sharing between education/training bodies and the Home Office – a level of coordination that may be difficult to achieve in practice. Past initiatives, such as the Immigration Skills Charge, have raised funds for training broadly, but directly compelling individual firms to prove training efforts is unprecedented. It may face resistance or evasion. What about the Adult Social Care visa? The Government has been clear about its concerns about the adult social care visa and the introduction of this route has led to significant concerns of abuse and exploitation of individual workers. They will, therefore, end overseas recruitment for social care visas in line with the wide reforms to the skills threshold and will close the social care visa to new applications from abroad. For a transition period until 2028, they will permit visa extensions (including switching employment and applying for settlement) and in-country switching for those already in the country with working rights, but this will be kept under review. Critics for the closure of this route may emphasise that the social care sector in the UK has long struggled to attract sufficient domestic workers due to low pay, tough conditions, and an aging population driving up demand. Recent figures show thousands of vacancies and heavy reliance on migrant carers. The White Paper’s solution is essentially to stop the inflow of new migrant carers and force the sector to improve wages and conditions to attract UK workers. However, without a significant injection of funding (most social care is state-funded or capped by local authority budgets), it is unclear how care providers can raise pay enough to recruit domestically. The Home Secretary has indicated that a “fair pay agreement” will accompany the visa closure, implying some wage floor or national bargaining outcome. Even if that materialises, it will take time to implement. Meanwhile, from 2025 to 2028, no new overseas care staff can be hired. Fewer working-age taxpayers also means less revenue. The government might save slightly on not having to provide as many services (though many immigrants have limited recourse to public funds anyway during their initial years). However, if labour shortages in healthcare or social care worsen, that could increase costs; for instance, if elderly people can’t get home care due to staff shortages, they might end up in NHS hospitals longer, costing more. What are the changes to the Global Talent visa? The current immigration system includes targeted routes for individuals who promote growth to come to the UK including entrepreneurs, through the Innovator Founder route, future leaders in key fields through the routes including global talent and high potential individuals. The Government will go further in ensuring that the very highly skilled have opportunities to come to the UK and access the targeted  routes for the brightest and best global talent by increasing the number of people arriving on the very high talent route, alongside faster routes for bringing people into the UK who have the right skills and experience to supercharge UK growth in strategic industries. a. The Government will make it simpler and easier for top scientists and design talent to use global talent visas and will review the Innovation Founder visa to ensure it supports entrepreneurial talent currently studying in UK universities to move into the visa, so that they can build their business and career in the UK. b. The Government will double the number of workers at an overseas business with the aim of establishing the presence in the UK and will explore a targeted and capped expansion of the HPI route, looking to double the number of qualifying institutions while maintaining the focus of the route on individuals that will have the most benefit to the UK workforce. c. The Government will also streamline the process for employers and skilled workers to get visas, reducing bureaucracy and supporting growth. What is wrong with these reforms? The volume of reforms means the Home Office will be extraordinarily busy rewriting rules, updating guidance, and retraining staff. New visa conditions (e.g., the Temporary Shortage List process, increased English testing, and extended monitoring of migrants over 10 years) will require upgraded IT systems and staffing. Even with streamlining, caseworkers and Home Office solicitors will have more work. The department’s notoriously large backlogs (for example, in asylum decision-making and certain visa queues) raise doubts about bandwidth. In short, administrative capacity is a limiting factor: any issues, such as IT failures, insufficient staff training, poor inter-agency communications, could delay or blunt the reforms’ impact.

Kuwait has long grappled with issues surrounding nationality, particularly the exclusion of the Bidoon community, a stateless population that has been denied citizenship for decades.Recently, however, the situation has escalated under the new Emir, with the government increasingly revoking the citizenship of thousands. This trend has sparked widespread international concern, highlighting the growing risks to individuals' rights and the creation of an expanding stateless population. Since at least March 2024, the Kuwaiti government has been engaged in an aggressive campaign to strip individuals of their citizenship, justified on the grounds of fraud or dual citizenship. The government's Supreme Committee to Investigate Kuwaiti Citizenship, chaired by high-ranking officials such as Sheikh Fahad Yusuf Saud al-Sabah, has been at the centre of this initiative. As of January 2025, over 10,000 people lost their citizenship, with reports indicating that more than 35,000 individuals were stripped of their nationality between August and December 2024 alone. This surge in denaturalisations is tied to ongoing amendments to Kuwait’s 1959 Nationality Law, which once provided a clear pathway for acquiring nationality, but has become increasingly exclusionary over time. Recent changes have further restricted access to citizenship, intensifying the marginalisation of stateless groups, particularly Bidoon rights activists. Key amendments include Article 8, which allowed foreign women married to Kuwaiti men to acquire citizenship, and modifications of Article 13, now grants the government sweeping powers to revoke nationality from individuals involved in activities deemed harmful to the state or Emir. These revisions are reshaping Kuwait’s approach to nationality, further entrenching discrimination and statelessness. While these legal changes were enacted in December 2024, they took retroactive effect after Cabinet approval in September, violating constitutional protections, particularly Article 32, which safeguards against retroactive laws. This legal shift reflects of a broader trend of increasing political repression in Kuwait, particularly following the Emir’s decision in May 2024 to dissolve parliament and suspend key constitutional provisions. Article 27 of the Kuwaiti Constitution mandates that nationality cannot be revoked without due process. However, citizenship has often been stripped arbitrarily, bypassing established legal protections. Individuals affected by these decisions have no right to appeal, and these actions are not subject to judicial review. With no legal recourse, this mass denaturalization initiative risks rendering individuals stateless, leaving them vulnerable to exploitation and depriving them of fundamental rights, including access to healthcare, education, and employment. Without nationality, these individuals face discrimination and systemic exclusion, conditions particularly acute for the Bidoon, who have long been marginalised in Kuwaiti society. One of the most troubling aspects of Kuwait’s nationality laws is their gendered nature. Like many Gulf states, Kuwait follows a patrilineal descent system, where nationality is passed through the father. While foreign men who acquire Kuwaiti nationality can pass it on to their children, they are unable to extend this right to their foreign wives. Indeed, under recent changes Kuwaiti women married to foreign nationals are prohibited from passing their nationality to their children, with only a few exceptions, such as the father’s death or divorce. This disparity leaves the children of Kuwaiti women particularly vulnerable to statelessness, as their nationality status remains uncertain. Furthermore, the recent revocation of nationality from women who married Kuwaiti men highlights the gendered nature of this crisis. Stripping women of their citizenship based on accusations of fraud or political dissent not only isolates them but also reinforces a societal tendency to marginalise and demonise women, perpetuating deep-rooted gender inequality within the country. The revocation of citizenship is not just a domestic issue, it has broader implications for international human rights. States are obligated under customary international law to prevent statelessness, even if this is not explicitly enshrined in international law. The UN has long recognised the harmful consequences of statelessness, and international frameworks exist to protect individuals at risk of losing their nationality. Kuwait's policies, however, have exacerbated the problem of statelessness, creating a legal vacuum for thousands of individuals who no longer have access to the rights and protections associated with citizenship. The stripping of citizenship, particularly without due process or avenues for appeal, constitutes a violation of fundamental human rights and undermines the rule of law. Kuwait’s actions are part of a broader regional trend across the Gulf states, where governments have increasingly used the revocation of citizenship as a means of political repression. The UAE, Saudi Arabia, and Oman have all employed similar tactics, stripping dissidents, ethnic minorities, and political opponents of their citizenship.  These policies, while framed under the guise of protecting national security or preventing fraud, are designed to silence political opposition and further marginalise vulnerable groups. In Oman, for instance, recent amendments to the nationality law allow for the revocation of nationality in cases where individuals engage in activities deemed harmful to the state's interests. While these laws claim to protect national security, they also underscore the region's tendency to use citizenship as a political weapon. Kuwait's ongoing practice of revoking citizenship has far-reaching implications, not just for the individuals directly impacted. As more people risk becoming stateless, there is growing concern over the potential for stateless persons to seek refuge abroad, exacerbating the global challenge of addressing statelessness. Countries like the UK, which are home to many Kuwaitis, may now be confronted with addressing the legal status of individuals at risk of denaturalisation or statelessness. If these individuals are unable to return to Kuwait without facing the threat of losing their nationality, this situation could place added pressure on immigration systems worldwide. At the time of publication, Kuwaiti women who had previously lost their nationality under Article 8 of 1959 Nationality Law will now have their citizenship restored, following a new directive from the Ministry of Justice. This decision follows the findings of the Supreme Committee for the Investigation of Nationality, which have been reviewing cases of revoked citizenship. While this development marks a significant shift, many of the issues discussed in this article remain relevant and we are yet to see how this change will unfold.  

The Convention In many European countries, the number of asylum applications and illegal migration continues to rise, as does the popularity of right-wing parties. In response, the EU and Member States attempt to ‘outsource’ asylum to third countries. Critics say that this is a manifestation of the States’ shrinking their legal responsibility for people in need of protection and that is inconsistent with the objective and spirit of the Refugee Convention. The world’s largest asylum receiving countries are not in Europe. According to data from the UNHCR published in 2024, Iran leads with more than 3.8 million, with Turkey following with more than 3.1 million; Colombia 2.8 million; Uganda 1.7 million; Lebanon 1.5 million; Pakistan harbours 1.4 million; and Bangladesh 932,000. Among European countries, only Germany makes it unto this list with 2.7 million refugees. What this list reveals is that the globalization of the 1951 Refugee Convention has not been accompanied by a corresponding globalization of responsibilities for the fate of the world’s refugees. It is still neighbouring countries in the Middle East and Africa that bear the burden of refugee movements caused by international conflicts and civil wars. In many cases, territorial jurisdictional lines drawn between these countries were simply the product of past imperialist conquests and made little sense for the daily existence and well-being of the populations involved. For many countries in these regions, it is increasingly impossible to distinguish state failure, official corruption, and grinding poverty from well-grounded fears of persecution. The 1951 Convention does not recognize conditions of extreme poverty and material deprivation as grounds for legitimate asylum. Economic migrants are considered individuals who raise spurious claims to protection and refuge. The binary between “deserving refugees” and “undeserving migrants” is one that governs popular imagination as well as state policy. But how valid is this distinction? Why are extreme poverty and material deprivation not legitimate ground for seeking opportunities to escape from them? The Convention is an increasingly inadequate instrument to deal with the global movement of people. Climate change, financial collapse and natural disasters are growing societal inequalities, and in the absence of an instrument to deal with these, there is a more general risk for people to move and for the Refugee Convention to be abused as a surrogate protection. The scope of the refugee definition in the Convention has long been identified as being a limiting factor and the grounds of persecution that are stipulated leave too much scope for their interpretation, making it easier for those so inclined to deny its application when it comes to causes that are not specifically mentioned. In 2024, there was a notable surge in support of right-wing parties coming to power in Europe in comparison to previously years, with a dozen European countries moving towards hardline anti-immigration parties. Over decades, European voters have abandoned mainstream parties across Europe as they grappled to contain multiple cost of living crises, a major financial crash, millions of refugees crossing its eastern and southern borders, terror attacks in major capitals and drastic energy spikes amid a stagnating war. Even if far-right are not the majority, it has been seen that they can still win by pressuring centre-right parties to take on all of their rhetoric and policies, especially when it comes to immigration policies. There is no doubt that this is what we see happening in Europe right now - the rise of these various right-wing parties across Europe has influenced the policies on asylum and immigration of EU Member States at the national level, as well as at the Union level. One of the main types of policies that have been implemented across European countries, as well as at an EU level, is the externalisation of asylum procedures. The Externalisation In this context, the externalisation of asylum procedures has three main objectives. Firstly, it is aimed at discouraging those who are considering unregulated migra­tion or seeking protection from under­taking the dangerous journey to request asylum in the EU. Secondly, it should facilitate repatriation in the event the asylum request is denied. Thirdly, it is intended to signal that decisive action is being taken against unregulated migration and the smuggling organisations involved. The various efforts to externalise responsibility for people in need of protection can be divided into three types. Type 1: Extraterritorial Asylum Procedures The first type of asylum procedure is known as the Extraterritorial Asylum Procedure. This type involves the physical relocation of asylum procedures to third countries while still applying the law of the externalising state. The most known historical example is the Pacific Solution, which Australia implemented from 2001 to 2007 in Nauru and Papua New Guinea, despite massive human rights violations. If refugees received a positive decision in their asylum claims, they were to be brought to Australia, although some were transferred to third countries. The recent agreement between Italy and Albania similarly foresees the externalisation of asylum procedures, with Italian law being applied throughout. The bilateral agreement with Albania involves holding asylum seekers in Albania’s detention centres built by Italy that can hold up to 3,000 persons at a time. Asylum seekers could be held there until Italy adjudicates in an expedited manner their asylum claim. In the event of a positive decision in an asylum claim, protection will only be granted in Italy. The Italy-Albania agreement has been ratified and its planned duration is expected to be from 2024 to 2029. Under the deal, signed by Meloni and her Albania counterpart EDI Rama, those intercepted in international waters, crossing from Africa to Europe will be held at the centre while the claims are being processed. However, an Italian court ordered the return of 12 asylum seekers to Italy, and this decision casts doubt on the feasibility and legality of the EU’s plans for offshore centres for deportees. The Italian court also asked the European Court of Justice to weigh in on the legality of the overall programme, in particular whether Italy’s recent designation of 19 countries as safe for quick returns is in compliance with EU law. The European Commission president Ursula van der Leyen said recently that the EU leaders were discussing the idea of developing return hubs outside the European Union for people with no right to stay and said that the EU should learn from the Italian deal with Albania. The Italian leader urged other EU leaders to review their policy on Syria so that refugees from that country can return voluntarily, safely and sustainably. The Danish Prime Minister said at a recent summit that many countries are willing to work together on this and the Dutch Prime Minister confirmed that there is a different mood in Europe. His government was considering a plan to send rejected African asylum seekers to Uganda and the Greek Prime Minister said that he is happy that the EU recognises the need to think outside the box. Spain’s Prime Minister is not in favour of the Italian model and preferred to work with countries of origin to ensure migration in an orderly, secure and equalised fashion. Many European leaders have voiced support for Poland’s Prime Minister Donald Tusk who recently announced plans to suspend the rights of asylum because of the exceptional situation his country finds itself in (the Polish government has accused Belarus and Russia of seeking to destabilise the EU by luring the migrants from the Middle East and Africa to storm the Polish border. Type 2: Transfer of Responsibility for Procedures and Protection A second type of asylum procedure involves the legal transfer of asylum procedures to third countries, in addition to territorial transfer. The most prominent recent exam­ple was the agreement between the UK and Rwanda. Under this agreement, asylum seekers were to be transferred from the UK to Rwanda and would be subject to Rwanda’s asylum laws. Unlike the Extraterritorial Asylum Procedure (type 1), in the event of a positive asylum claim, asylum seekers would receive protection in Rwanda rather than the UK. Germany is now exploring the use of asylum processing facilities in Rwanda and Priti Patel said that Europe will reap the rewards of the UK Conservative government’s plans. This move by Germany can be embarrassing for Keir Starmer after his government scrapped the Rwanda Migration Scheme and opens the space for conservative figures to criticise him for prematurely discarding the policy that other nations see as viable. Furthermore, the Prime Minister is now exploring an immigration agreement with Albania having met with the Italian Prime Minister. Critics question whether it will act as a sufficient deterrent and whether it can address the scale of the issue the Rwanda plan aimed to tackle. Whilst the UK Labour government was extremely critical of the previous Tory government’s Rwanda deal, the UK is currently in talks with Kurdistan for deals similar to the current Italy-Albania agreement. The potential Kurdistan deal will aim to stop illegal migrants from coming to the UK. In addition to Kurdistan, it is reported that the Home Secretary Yvette Cooper is currently in talks with other countries for similar, but bespoke, returns deals. Some sources say that the various deals the UK is hoping to establish with Kurdistan and other countries, would include UK agencies helping train local law enforcement bodies to identity and break up smuggling gangs operating in their countries. In addition to the Kurdistan deal, the Home Office is also expected to revamp an earlier deal signed with Vietnam under the Tory Government, which would involve the blitzing of social media sites with adverts targeting nationals in the country to deter them from travelling to the UK. Type 3: Return to Transit Countries Lastly, the third type of asylum procedure is one which involves agreements between states, which include pro­visions for the return of those seeking pro­tection to the transit countries through which they have passed. The most well-known example is the EU-Turkey agreement of 2016. Hundreds of thousands of migrants transited Turkey to reach EU soil and under this agreement, irregular migrants attempting to enter Greece will be returned to Turkey. In exchange, the European Union agreed to reduce visa restrictions for Turkish citizens, pay billions of euros in aid for Syrian migrant communities, and reenergise talks of Turkey’s succession to the European Union. The deal was subject to criticism from human rights advocates and humanitarian organisations, and in the Spring of 2020, Turkey threatened to let hundreds of thousands of migrants into Greece before backing off, showing just how much the EU relies on Turkey as a ‘stop force’. Since 2016, multiple bilateral migration agreements have been implemented within European migration management. Italy negotiated agreements with transit nations in Africa, including Tunisia, to win their cooperation in curbing migration to Europe. A recent agreement with Tunisia signed on 17 April 2024 would grant Tunisia €55,000,000 as part of a plan to prevent migrants from travelling through the country to reach Europe. Finally, in January 2024, Italy held a summit with African nations in which it unveiled the Mattei Plan in which Italy would provide €5B in energy and education investment in return for the prevention of migration from those countries. With the plan, Italy is boldly positioning itself as a regional power capable of independently engaging in Mediterranean affairs, separate from other EU countries. Moreover, through five main policy pillars (education and training, agriculture, health, water, and energy), the plan could help spur economic growth in Africa, and by default, reduce some of the economic causes driving mass migration from the continent. In 2017, the EU endorsed an agreement between Italy and Libya on migration in which Libya would receive economic assistance in exchange for preventing asylum seekers from leaving in boats to Europe and in receiving returned migrants intercepted at sea. The result has been the return of 82,000 migrants to deplorable conditions in Libya from 2017 to 2022, which the United Nations Commission for Refugees estimated that 40% were eligible for asylum in Europe. The agreement with Libya has been compared to the 2016 EU Turkey deal, but if the agreement with Turkish President Erdogan raised some questions over the respect of the human rights of migrants, in Libya’s case the violations of basic rights are almost certain. This is not really an EU Libya deal, rather an EU endorsement of a bilateral memorandum of understanding between Italy and the Presidency Council of Libya headed by Fayez al-Sarraj. The memorandum contains three main elements; first, it restarts full implementation of the 2008 Friendship Treaty between Italy and Libya which already included a big chapter on migration containment. Second, it boosts support to the Libyan navy and coastguard in order to rescue as many migrant boats as possible in Libyan territorial water and third, it provides funds to improve healthcare in detention centres which migrants are locked once they are rescued by the Libyan coastguards. The memorandum does not mention respect of international conventions, nor does it establish an independent monitoring mechanism. Libyan law does not distinguish between migrants and asylum seekers as Libya is not party to the Geneva Convention. According to the laws approved under the former Libyan leader Gaddafi all individuals arriving without a permit are deemed illegal migrants and jailed. It is commonly thought that the Central Mediterranean route, of which Libya is the main country of transit, is mostly a route for economic migrants but this is not supported by facts as 39% of the migrants from this route who were examined by Italian asylum panels received either reduced status or humanitarian protection. The EU and Morocco first entered into a cooperative agreement on migration in 2004. In March 2023, the EU extended the relationship providing an aid package to Morocco which includes €152,000,000 for border management, repatriation and reintegration programmes for migrants. Morocco stopped 83,000 asylum seekers from reaching Europe in 2023. Mauritania has become both a transit and receiving country for potential asylum seekers, with a majority of more than 7,270 migrants to Spain leaving from Mauritania in January 2024. In February 2024, the EU provided €210,000,000 to Mauritania for migration control and economic development efforts. The EU and Egypt signed a joint declaration on strategic comprehensive partnership on 17 March 2024 which includes cooperation on migration. The EU agreed to provide €8B in assistance including funding to fortify its borders and to help hold 560,000 Sudanese feeling Sudan’s civil war. Egypt is a strategic crossroads between Africa and the Middle East which Europe, including Italy, concerned at Palestinians feeling the Israel-Hamas war in Gaza, could attempt to reach Europe. The Repatriation Improvement Act passed by German parliament on 19 January 2024 would expedite deportations, extend asylum detention to 28 days and increase the powers of the German police to search residents and to depart asylum seekers. In addition, the German government is negotiating bilateral migration agreements with Georgia, Moldova, Kenya and Colombia among other countries in order to be able to send asylum seekers there. Germany recently passed a law which creates a card for benefits rather than cash payments in order to deter asylum seekers from sending the payments to relatives. Time will tell if all these schemes are but nothing more than costly pieces of political theatre to demonstrate politician’s commitment to battling irregular immigration.