The Malta Model: Towards a Harmonised European iGaming Market Beyond Regulatory Fragmentation

A European Industry Without a European Market

The European Union has spent decades constructing a single market founded upon the free movement of goods, persons, services and capital. Its legislative institutions have progressively developed sophisticated regulatory frameworks for industries once considered too complex, sensitive or nationally significant to be governed through common European rules. Financial services, payments, electronic money and, more recently, crypto-assets have all become subject to harmonised regimes which combine market access with regulatory supervision, consumer protection and national enforcement.

Yet one significant segment of Europe’s digital economy remains conspicuously absent from this process: online gaming.

Despite its inherently cross-border nature, technological sophistication and substantial economic contribution, online gaming continues to operate within a fragmented European regulatory landscape. Operators authorised in one Member State cannot generally rely upon that authorisation to provide services in another. Instead, they encounter a patchwork of national licensing requirements, exclusive rights, restrictions, taxation regimes and enforcement measures, frequently justified by reference to public policy, consumer protection or public health.

This regulatory fragmentation sits uneasily alongside the broader objectives of European economic integration. It is particularly difficult to reconcile with the Union’s success in developing harmonised frameworks for other digital and financial activities involving substantial risks to consumers, financial integrity and market stability.

The resulting question is increasingly difficult to avoid: if Europe can establish a common regulatory framework for crypto-assets and facilitate the cross-border provision of complex financial services, why should online gaming remain subject to fundamentally different treatment?

The answer lies less in the technical impossibility of harmonisation than in the historical and political treatment of gambling as an activity warranting exceptional national discretion.

However, the continued reliance upon fragmented national regulation raises a more fundamental question of regulatory effectiveness. Restrictions upon licensed European operators do not necessarily eliminate consumer demand for online gambling. Where regulated services become inaccessible or commercially unattractive, consumers may instead seek alternatives offered by operators established outside the European regulatory perimeter.

The consequences extend beyond competition. Such displacement risks undermining consumer protection, reducing regulatory visibility, diminishing taxable economic activity and encouraging the growth of an offshore market operating beyond effective European supervision.

The time has therefore come to reconsider whether the existing regulatory architecture genuinely advances the public-interest objectives upon which it is founded.

A European iGaming Regulation, incorporating harmonised licensing standards, mutual recognition, passporting rights and coordinated national supervision, could provide a more coherent response. Far from representing deregulation, such a framework would offer an opportunity to bring online gaming activity within a transparent, accountable and economically productive European regulatory environment.

1. The Treaty Freedoms and the Limits of Judicial Integration

The starting point remains Article 56 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, which prohibits restrictions on the freedom to provide services within the Union in respect of nationals established in a Member State other than that of the recipient.

Online gambling constitutes an economic activity falling within the scope of the Treaty freedoms. Nevertheless, the Court of Justice of the European Union has consistently recognised that gambling possesses particular characteristics which may justify restrictions upon cross-border provision.

In Gambelli and Others (Case C-243/01), the Court confirmed that national restrictions upon gambling services must satisfy the requirements of proportionality and pursue their stated objectives in a consistent and systematic manner. A Member State cannot simply invoke public-interest considerations while simultaneously pursuing policies fundamentally inconsistent with those objectives.

The judgment established an important limitation upon national regulatory discretion: restrictions must be justified by their actual purpose and practical operation, rather than merely by the terminology employed to defend them.

In Placanica and Others (Joined Cases C-338/04, C-359/04 and C-360/04), the Court further examined the compatibility of national licensing restrictions with the Treaty freedoms, reinforcing the principle that national regulatory arrangements remain subject to judicial scrutiny.

However, the Court’s subsequent jurisprudence also demonstrated the limitations of relying exclusively upon the Treaty to achieve cross-border market integration.

In Liga Portuguesa de Futebol Profissional and Bwin International (Case C-42/07), the Court accepted that a Member State could restrict the provision of internet gambling services by an operator lawfully established in another Member State. The absence of harmonisation, together with the particular risks associated with internet gambling, informed the Court’s reasoning.

Similarly, in Stoß and Others (Joined Cases C-316/07 and others), the Court recognised the discretion afforded to Member States in determining their desired levels of protection, while maintaining the requirement that restrictive measures pursue legitimate objectives consistently and proportionately.

The jurisprudence consequently presents an important distinction. Online gaming falls within the scope of the European internal market, but the freedom to provide services does not presently confer an automatic right to operate across national borders on the strength of an authorisation issued elsewhere in the Union.

This distinction has permitted the continued coexistence of divergent national regimes.

The difficulty is that judicial review, however important, cannot itself construct a comprehensive system of mutual recognition. The Court assesses the compatibility of individual restrictions with existing Treaty obligations. It does not establish the common licensing conditions, supervisory arrangements or institutional structures necessary for a genuinely integrated European gaming market.

The current legal position should therefore be understood not as a definitive rejection of European passporting, but as a reflection of the absence of the legislative harmonisation necessary to support it.

The next stage of integration requires legislative initiative rather than continued dependence upon litigation.

2. The European Commission Identified the Problem More Than a Decade Ago

The challenges arising from fragmented national gambling regulation are not new. Indeed, the European Commission examined them extensively in its Green Paper on Online Gambling in the Internal Market, COM(2011) 128 final, and subsequently in its Communication Towards a Comprehensive European Framework for Online Gambling, COM(2012) 596 final.

The latter document remains particularly relevant to the present debate.

The Commission acknowledged that the cross-border characteristics of online gambling created regulatory challenges which individual Member States could not adequately address in isolation.

It recognised the importance of regulatory cooperation, consumer protection, fraud prevention, anti-money laundering controls and the development of effective national enforcement mechanisms.

Significantly, the Commission also identified the relationship between the availability of authorised gambling services and the prevention of consumer migration towards unregulated operators.

The underlying principle was straightforward: consumers who wish to participate in online gambling should have access to credible, properly regulated services rather than being driven towards operators outside effective supervisory control.

The Commission’s analysis therefore recognised that restrictions designed to protect consumers may become counterproductive where they undermine the attractiveness or accessibility of the regulated market.

Nevertheless, the 2012 Communication stopped short of proposing sector-specific European legislation. Instead, it favoured administrative cooperation, regulatory convergence and coordinated action between Member States.

That approach reflected the political and regulatory circumstances of the period.

More than a decade later, however, the European digital economy has undergone considerable transformation. Payment infrastructure has become increasingly integrated, digital identity and verification technologies have advanced, and regulators possess substantially more sophisticated tools for monitoring transactions, player behaviour and financial risk.

The European Union has also demonstrated an increased willingness to legislate comprehensively in complex digital markets.

The question is therefore whether the cautious approach adopted in 2012 remains appropriate in 2026.

The Commission’s original analysis identified many of the problems which continue to characterise the European gaming market. What remains absent is the legislative architecture capable of addressing them comprehensively.

Regulatory cooperation, although necessary, cannot fully substitute for mutual recognition, harmonised authorisation and legally enforceable cross-border market access.

3. Lessons from Financial Services and the Regulation of Crypto-Assets

The development of the European financial services market offers a compelling example of how national regulatory supervision can coexist with cross-border economic integration.

Under frameworks governing payment services, electronic money and investment services, authorised entities may, subject to applicable conditions, provide regulated services across Member States without obtaining an entirely separate authorisation in each jurisdiction.

These regimes do not eliminate national supervisory authorities. Rather, they allocate responsibilities between home and host regulators within a harmonised legal framework.

The result is a system in which common European rules facilitate cross-border activity while preserving mechanisms for supervision, enforcement and consumer protection.

The adoption of Regulation (EU) 2023/1114 on Markets in Crypto-Assets, commonly known as MiCA, provides an even more recent illustration.

Crypto-assets presented European legislators with a technologically complex and rapidly evolving industry involving financial crime risks, consumer losses, market manipulation and significant regulatory uncertainty.

Rather than accepting permanent national fragmentation as inevitable, the Union established a common framework addressing authorisation, governance, market integrity, transparency and consumer protection.

Article 59(7) of MiCA expressly permits authorised crypto-asset service providers to provide services throughout the Union, whether through establishment or the freedom to provide services, without requiring a physical presence in every host Member State.

This is particularly significant.

The Union has accepted that a regulated activity involving substantial financial and technological risks can be governed through a system of common standards, cross-border authorisation and national supervisory responsibility.

There is no suggestion that online gambling and crypto-asset services present identical risks. Gambling raises particular concerns relating to addiction, vulnerable consumers, minors and the social consequences of excessive participation.

Nevertheless, those differences do not necessarily justify the permanent exclusion of gaming from the harmonisation process.

They may instead support the development of sector-specific safeguards within a European framework.

Indeed, online gaming already incorporates many of the compliance mechanisms familiar to regulated financial services, including customer identification, transaction monitoring, anti-money laundering procedures, risk assessments, suspicious activity reporting and ongoing regulatory supervision.

Gaming operators additionally deploy specialised player-protection measures, including self-exclusion, deposit limits, affordability assessments where applicable, behavioural monitoring and mechanisms for identifying potentially harmful gambling activity.

A European framework could establish minimum binding standards across these areas, ensuring that cross-border market access is conditional upon compliance with a comprehensive and enforceable regulatory regime.

The relevant lesson from MiCA is not that gaming should be treated as a financial product. It is that the European Union possesses both the institutional capacity and the legislative experience to reconcile cross-border market access with robust regulation.

4. Regulatory Fragmentation and the Unregulated Market

One of the principal weaknesses of fragmented national gambling regulation is the assumption that restricting authorised supply necessarily reduces gambling activity.

Online gambling is fundamentally different from traditional land-based gaming. Digital services can be accessed remotely, consumers can encounter offers from operators established in multiple jurisdictions, and technological barriers to cross-border participation are frequently difficult to enforce comprehensively.

National prohibitions, restrictive licensing structures and burdensome compliance requirements may therefore influence where consumers gamble rather than whether they gamble.

Where regulated European operators are prevented from serving a particular market, consumer demand may migrate towards offshore providers operating without equivalent standards of player protection, financial transparency or regulatory accountability.

This outcome creates a paradox.

Measures introduced in the name of consumer protection may, in certain circumstances, weaken the practical protection available to consumers by directing activity towards operators over which European authorities exercise limited control.

The European Commission recognised this difficulty in its 2012 Communication, acknowledging the importance of an attractive authorised gambling market in discouraging consumers from accessing unregulated services.

The distinction between regulation and prohibition is therefore fundamental.

A prohibition may remove a licensed operator from a national market without eliminating the underlying demand. Effective regulation, by contrast, seeks to ensure that such demand is met within a supervised environment where safeguards can be enforced.

A harmonised European system would not eliminate unlicensed gambling. However, it could improve the competitiveness and accessibility of regulated operators, reduce unnecessary licensing duplication and strengthen cooperation between supervisory authorities.

It could also facilitate coordinated enforcement against genuinely unauthorised operators, rather than concentrating enforcement resources upon disagreements between European regulators over competing national licensing models.

A further advantage would arise from the establishment of common technical and reporting standards.

Regulators could exchange information concerning suspicious transactions, player-protection interventions, operator compliance failures and other relevant supervisory matters within an agreed legal framework.

The result would be greater regulatory visibility across the internal market, rather than the present division of supervisory information along national lines.

The objective should not be to eliminate national oversight. It should be to make that oversight more effective through European integration.

5. Malta as an Economic and Regulatory Case Study

Malta provides a particularly relevant example of the economic potential associated with a structured and internationally oriented gaming regulatory framework.

Over more than two decades, Malta has developed an established gaming ecosystem comprising licensed operators, software providers, payment specialists, technology companies, compliance professionals and an extensive network of supporting professional services.

The industry has contributed to the diversification of Malta’s economy and the development of employment opportunities in areas extending well beyond traditional gambling operations.

The Malta Gaming Authority’s annual reporting demonstrates the scale of this contribution.

In the first half of 2025 alone, the gaming industry generated an estimated €714.4 million in gross value added, representing approximately 6.5% of Malta’s total gross value added. When indirect effects are considered, the industry’s overall contribution to value added rises to approximately 9.8%.

These figures illustrate the economic significance of gaming within a small European Member State and the extent to which a regulated digital industry can support broader economic activity.

The contribution extends beyond direct gaming revenue.

Licensed operators require employees specialising in software engineering, cybersecurity, data analysis, risk management, compliance, financial operations, customer support, product development and commercial management.

Their activities also generate demand for legal, accounting, banking, real estate, telecommunications and other professional services.

Consequently, the fiscal contribution of the industry cannot be assessed exclusively by reference to gaming duties or licence fees.

Employment generates income tax and social security contributions. Profitable businesses may contribute corporate taxation, while expenditure by employees and businesses supports consumption-related tax receipts and additional economic activity.

This wider fiscal dimension is particularly relevant to the debate surrounding national gambling restrictions.

A policy which excludes regulated operators from a domestic market may preserve a particular national licensing or taxation model, but it may also forego the employment, investment and wider fiscal opportunities associated with attracting legitimate gaming businesses.

Malta’s experience demonstrates that the economic value of a gaming jurisdiction extends considerably beyond the taxation of gambling transactions themselves.

It also demonstrates the importance of a functioning regulatory infrastructure.

Malta’s experience should not be interpreted as evidence that every Member State would replicate its economic performance. Differences in population, infrastructure, taxation, labour markets and industrial policy would inevitably influence outcomes.

Nevertheless, it provides a tangible example of how a regulated online gaming sector can develop into a substantial contributor to national economic activity.

At European level, a harmonised regulatory framework could allow more Member States to participate in the industry’s value chain, while reducing the barriers that currently discourage cross-border investment and operational expansion.

The objective should be to create a European industry rather than a collection of isolated national markets.

6. Public Health, Taxation and the Case for Regulatory Integration

The principal arguments advanced in support of restrictive national gambling regimes generally concern consumer protection, public health, the prevention of crime and the preservation of national regulatory autonomy.

These objectives are legitimate and have been recognised as such by the Court of Justice.

However, the legitimacy of an objective should not render the effectiveness of the measures adopted in its name immune from scrutiny.

A regulatory policy must be assessed not merely by reference to its stated intentions, but also by its practical consequences.

Where national restrictions succeed in reducing harmful gambling activity, they may serve an important public-interest purpose. Where they principally redirect consumers towards unregulated offshore services, their effectiveness becomes more questionable.

A harmonised European framework could offer a different approach.

Rather than allowing each Member State to construct an entirely separate licensing regime, the Union could establish common minimum standards governing player identification, responsible gambling, anti-money laundering compliance, technical certification, financial integrity and regulatory reporting.

Member States would retain meaningful responsibilities for local supervision, enforcement and the protection of their residents.

Crucially, the fiscal benefits arising from a regulated market could also be used to support the public-health objectives that national restrictions seek to advance.

A European framework could permit, or potentially require, participating Member States to allocate a proportion of gambling-related public revenue towards addiction treatment, prevention programmes, public education, research and other relevant healthcare initiatives.

This would create a direct relationship between the economic activity being regulated and the public costs associated with it.

Rather than treating economic development and public health as irreconcilable objectives, the regulatory framework could integrate both within a coherent policy structure.

The same reasoning applies to taxation.

National fiscal sovereignty is an important consideration, but it need not be incompatible with cross-border market access.

European financial services passporting does not require the abolition of national tax systems. Likewise, a European gaming passport could coexist with appropriately designed national taxation arrangements, including rules allocating taxable gaming activity by reference to the location of consumers.

The key distinction is between taxation as a legitimate fiscal instrument and licensing fragmentation as a barrier to the provision of otherwise regulated services.

A European operator should not necessarily be required to establish multiple corporate structures, duplicate technical certifications and undergo substantially overlapping authorisation procedures merely to serve consumers in different Member States.

The Union could instead establish a common licensing framework while preserving transparent and proportionate national fiscal obligations.

Such an approach would encourage legitimate economic activity to remain within the European regulatory perimeter, generating employment, investment and tax revenues that can be directed towards public priorities.

Public health and economic development need not be competing policy objectives. Properly designed regulation can make them mutually reinforcing.

7. Towards a European iGaming Regulation

A genuinely integrated European gaming market would require more than voluntary cooperation between national authorities.

It would require a binding legislative framework establishing common authorisation standards, cross-border operating rights and clearly defined supervisory responsibilities.

The proposed model could draw upon the principles already established within European financial services regulation.

Operators satisfying harmonised European licensing requirements would obtain an authorisation from their home-state regulator, enabling them to provide specified online gaming services throughout participating Member States.

The home regulator would retain primary responsibility for authorisation, corporate governance, financial suitability, technical compliance and ongoing prudential or operational supervision.

Host-state authorities would retain defined responsibilities concerning local consumer protection, enforcement, complaints, taxation and the application of harmonised player-safeguarding requirements.

A coordinated European supervisory mechanism would facilitate information-sharing, resolve jurisdictional disagreements and establish common standards for regulatory intervention.

Such a framework could also provide for enhanced requirements applicable to higher-risk products or operators, recognising that not all forms of gambling present equivalent risks.

The legal foundation would require careful consideration of the Union’s internal market competences, particularly Article 114 TFEU, together with the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality.

The objective would not be to transfer every aspect of gambling regulation to Brussels, nor to prevent Member States from addressing genuine and demonstrable local risks.

Rather, it would be to establish the conditions under which a duly authorised European operator may exercise the freedom to provide services without encountering unnecessary or duplicative national barriers.

This would represent an important evolution from the current position, under which mutual recognition remains largely absent and market access is determined by divergent domestic regimes.

A phased approach may offer the most practical route towards implementation.

Initial harmonisation could address technical certification, anti-money laundering standards, operator suitability, player-funds protection and regulatory reporting.

Subsequent measures could establish common consumer-protection requirements, mutual recognition of authorisations and ultimately a comprehensive European passport.

The European Union has already demonstrated that such regulatory integration is achievable in other complex sectors.

What is required is a willingness to reconsider the exceptional treatment historically afforded to online gambling and to assess whether the existing model continues to serve the Union’s economic and public-interest objectives.

From Political Fragmentation to European Economic Opportunity

The European Union stands at an important crossroads in the regulation of online gaming.

For decades, the sector has remained subject to a fragmented system of national licensing regimes, restrictions and competing regulatory priorities. Although justified principally by reference to public policy and consumer protection, this fragmentation has also created legal uncertainty, duplicated compliance obligations and opportunities for operators situated beyond the effective reach of European regulators.

Meanwhile, the Union has successfully developed harmonised frameworks for financial services, payment institutions, electronic money and crypto-assets, demonstrating that complex and risk-sensitive digital activities can be regulated through common European standards without abandoning national supervisory responsibilities.

Online gaming should not remain permanently excluded from that process.

The question is not whether gambling presents social risks. It unquestionably does. The question is whether those risks are better addressed through fragmented national restrictions or through a coordinated European framework capable of combining effective consumer protection with legitimate economic development.

Malta’s experience demonstrates the considerable economic value that a regulated gaming industry can generate through employment, investment, technological innovation and wider fiscal contributions.

At European level, the potential benefits extend beyond the interests of licensed operators.

A properly structured European iGaming Regulation could bring more activity within the regulated market, strengthen supervisory cooperation, support the creation of skilled digital employment and generate public revenues capable of contributing to healthcare, addiction prevention and other social priorities.

The public-interest objectives invoked to justify national restrictions should not be viewed in isolation from their economic and regulatory consequences.

Protecting public health is essential. However, a regulatory model which inadvertently strengthens the offshore market, diminishes fiscal revenues and discourages legitimate employment may ultimately undermine the very objectives it seeks to advance.

European policymakers should therefore be prepared to reconsider whether the preservation of fragmented national licensing arrangements continues to justify the economic and regulatory costs associated with them.

The creation of skilled digital employment, the generation of sustainable public revenue and the effective protection of consumers should take precedence over the preservation of regulatory fragmentation for its own sake.

The objective should not be a race towards deregulation, but a commitment to better regulation: one which brings economic activity onshore, channels public revenues towards social protection and allows legitimate businesses to operate across borders under common, enforceable standards.

Europe has already demonstrated its ability to establish a single market for financial services and a harmonised regulatory framework for crypto-assets.

It now has the opportunity to apply that experience to online gaming and establish the world’s first genuinely integrated continental market for regulated iGaming.

The necessary legal and institutional foundations already exist.

What remains is the political willingness to build upon them.