Introduction

India’s company laws are a rare phenomenon in Asia as far as the codification of directorial duties are concerned. Section 166 of the Companies Act, 2013 (the “Indian Framework”), which prescribes the law on the duties of a company’s directors, places wide reliance on the virtues of good faith and diligence in dealing with the company – arguably creating statutory standards to measure directorial accountability. However, violations of such standards are dealt primarily with ascribing monetary liability to violating directors. It may well be that monetary penalties have not been that successful in addressing the issue of directorial responsibility and diligence – this has significant ramifications for not only companies but also the various stakeholders who interact with companies.

Singapore offers some common-law guidance in this regard. On 24 April 2025, the Singapore High Court (“SHC”), revised the sentencing framework for breaches of a director’s statutory duty to act honestly and be diligent in their dealings with and towards the company. The judgment of the SHC in Public Prosecutor v Zheng Jia [2025] SGHC 75 (“Zheng Jia”) has escalated the degree of strictness with which courts are required to assess breaches of directorial duties. This is in stark contrast to the Indian Framework, which does not mention custodial sentencing for breaches.

This thought-piece aims to dissect the rationale in Zheng Jia in the context of the Indian Framework and gauge the viability of a similar regime of custodial sentencing in India. For the sake of clarity, the authors will not assess statutory provisions for the criminal breach of trust by directors under Indian company law or ancillary statutes.

The Background and Judgment in Zheng Jia

Background

In Zheng Jia, the respondent was a chartered accountant (the “Respondent”) who offered accounting and corporate secretarial services through three companies. Their services ranged from incorporating companies in Singapore on behalf of foreign clients to advising on procedural matters. Interestingly, the Respondent would register himself as a local resident director for incorporated companies and also assisted in opening bank accounts in their names.

Judgment

In 2020, significant monetary sums – being the proceeds of frauds on foreign soil – were routed through the bank accounts of two such companies incorporated by the Respondent. The Respondent and a colleague (also a co-accused) were directors in these companies. A district judge convicted the Respondent of charges under Section 157 of the Companies Act, 1967 (the “Singapore Framework”) – ruling that, as director, they failed to exercise reasonable diligence in the discharge of their duties towards the respective company and aided similar activities on the co-accused’s part (the “DJ Ruling”).

The prosecution appealed against the DJ Ruling, expressing their dissatisfaction with the non-imposition of a custodial sentence. The SHC, after hearing both sides, stated their displeasure with the former-extant ruling precedent in Abdul Ghani [2017] SGHC 125 and revised the guiding factors (the “Revised Guidance”) to impose custodial sentences for directors in Singapore. Previously, in Abdul Ghani, the SHC had held that directors breaching their duties would usually face fines, with jail reserved for more serious, intentional, or reckless breaches – Singapore courts followed this precedent until the judgment in Zheng Jia. In this regard, a relevant extract from Abdul Ghani reads as follows:

“…I am of the view that the starting point for purely negligent breaches of the duty to exercise reasonable diligence is a fine (where there are no weighty aggravating factors) with custodial sentences being imposed where the director breaches this duty intentionally, knowingly or recklessly.” [emphasis supplied]

That said, the Revised Guidance in Zheng Jia can be summarised as follows:

Calibrating the indicative sentence for offence-specific factors: After determining the band, courts adjust the sentence considering mitigating or aggravating circumstances, such as the director’s prior record, cooperation with authorities, or whether the breach was isolated or repeated.

The SHC also extended the application of the Revised Guidance to offences of abetment, thereby extending liability to the co-accused in Zheng Jia. Finally, the SHC allowed the prosecution’s appeal and substituted the monetary penalty imposed through the DJ Ruling with a custodial sentence of ten months’ imprisonment.

Custodial Sentencing under the Indian Framework

Before assessing the Indian Framework, it would be prudent to underline the semantic similarities between the Indian and Singapore Frameworks. On a textual comparison, the two frameworks overlap on two markers: (a) both demand “honesty”/ “diligence” (India expands to “good faith” and “independence”); and (b) there is a strong alignment concerning the bar on profit-motives and conflicts of interest.

Semantics aside, the Indian Framework diverges from the Singapore Framework when it comes to custodial sentencing for breaches of duty. The Singapore Framework, in Section 157(3)(b) explicitly mentions that a director will be guilty of an offence for breaching their duties and liable “…to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 12 months.” No such equivalent exists in the text of the Indian Framework.

The absence of an explicit statement concerning custodial sentences presents a conundrum for directorial accountability in India. Is it a wise proposition to address directorial duty breaches through the sole force of a monetary penalty? How effectively are stakeholders protected if one can pay their way out? Recent Indian judgments such as Rajeev Saumitra v. Neetu Singh, (2016) 198 Comp Cas 359 and Rajeev Kapur v. Grentex and Co. (P) Ltd., (2013) 178 Comp Cas 28 (Bom), where the defendant directors were found in breach of their duties under the Indian Framework for incorporating new companies to compete with their primary companies, suggest that the Indian Framework ought to be reconsidered.

What does the Indian Framework stand to gain through revisions?

We believe that considering a revision to the Indian Framework would help initiate discourse about improving corporate governance measures, especially regarding the standards for directorial duties. This discussion will help the legislature, regulators and concerned stakeholders perceive the following consequences:

 Protecting Stakeholders: Stricter enforcement of directorial duties, through explicit legislative force, lessens the likelihood of scenarios where shareholders, creditors, and the public are harmed by corporate misconduct, potentially leading to greater trust in the corporate sector.

Considerations before Revising the Indian Framework

Having discussed the perceived benefits of revising the Indian Framework, it would only be appropriate to ‘weight’ our suggestions on the basis of practical realities. These may be understood as follows:

Conclusion

A move towards explicit custodial sentencing for breaches of directorial duties would mark a significant shift in India’s corporate governance landscape. The Singapore experience shows that monetary penalties alone may not deter failures in upholding responsibilities among directors. While careful calibration is needed to avoid overreach and unintended consequences, introducing imprisonment as a potential sanction could strengthen accountability, help align with global best practices, and provide stakeholders with a globally-tested standard to benchmark directorial misconduct, thereby setting the stage for reimagined corporate governance measures that foster a culture of self-regulation from within the profession.

Authors:

Sujoy Bhatia, Head of Corporate & M&A

Bhaskar Vishwajeet – Associate