{"id":140286,"date":"2026-04-21T13:38:53","date_gmt":"2026-04-21T13:38:53","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/my.legal500.com\/guides\/?post_type=comparative_guide&#038;p=140286"},"modified":"2026-04-21T13:38:53","modified_gmt":"2026-04-21T13:38:53","slug":"india-cartels","status":"publish","type":"comparative_guide","link":"https:\/\/my.legal500.com\/guides\/chapter\/india-cartels\/","title":{"rendered":"India: Cartels"},"content":{"rendered":"","protected":false},"template":"","class_list":["post-140286","comparative_guide","type-comparative_guide","status-publish","hentry","guides-cartels","jurisdictions-india"],"acf":[],"appp":{"post_list":{"below_title":"<div class=\"guide-author-details\"><span class=\"guide-author\">P&amp;A Law Offices<\/span><span class=\"guide-author-logo\"><img src=\"https:\/\/my.legal500.com\/guides\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/1\/2025\/04\/PA-Law-Offices-Logo.jpg\"\/><\/span><\/div>"},"post_detail":{"above_title":"<div class=\"guide-author-details\"><span class=\"guide-author\">P&amp;A Law Offices<\/span><span class=\"guide-author-logo\"><img src=\"https:\/\/my.legal500.com\/guides\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/1\/2025\/04\/PA-Law-Offices-Logo.jpg\"\/><\/span><\/div>","below_title":"<span class=\"guide-intro\">This country specific Q&amp;A provides an overview of Cartels laws and regulations applicable in India<\/span><div class=\"guide-content\"><div class=\"filter\">\r\n\r\n\t\t\t\t<input type=\"text\" placeholder=\"Search questions and answers...\" class=\"filter-container__search-field\">\r\n\t\t\t<\/div>\r\n\r\n\t\t\t\r\n\r\n\r\n\t\t\t<ol class=\"custom-counter\">\r\n\r\n\t\t\t\r\n\r\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t<li class=\"question-block filter-container__element\">\r\n\t\t\t\t\t\t<h3 class=\"filter-container__match-html\">What is the relevant legislative framework respect of cartel agreements and\/or conduct ?<\/h3>\r\n\t\t\t\t\t\t<button id=\"show-me\">+<\/button>\r\n\t\t\t\t\t\t<div class=\"question_answer filter-container__match-html\" style=\"display:none;\"><p>In India, the Competition Act, 2002, as amended (\u2018<u>Competition Ac<\/u>t\u2019), and several implementing regulations, provide the legislative framework for antitrust regulation and enforcement. The Competition Commission of India (\u201c<u>CCI<\/u>\u201d) is the nodal authority for the enforcement of the Competition Act.\u00a0 Given India\u2019s common law foundation, judicial interpretations and case laws play a significant role in supplementing and shaping the competition law enforcement regime.\u00a0 Competition law decisions of the European Union are of significant persuasive value.<\/p>\n<p>Section 3 of the Competition Act prohibits anti-competitive agreements, which includes cartels. Notably, the Competition Act defines an \u2018agreement\u2019 broadly to include unwritten arrangements, understandings and concerted practices. Cartels (which the Competition Act defines as agreements, arrangements, understanding or concerted action among competitors to fix prices or production quantities or allocate markets or customers or manipulate bids or hub-and-spoke arrangements where a non-competitor facilitates or intends to further collusion among competitors) are presumed to cause an appreciable adverse effect on competition (\u201c<u>AAEC<\/u>\u201d) under Section 3(3) and are considered as void. \u00a0However, if the allegedly infringing party succeeds in demonstrating that the conduct in question has not resulted in any AAEC, then it will not infringe Section 3(3), which is the absolute horizontal cartel prohibition. \u00a0\u00a0In contrast, no presumption of infringement applies to vertical agreements falling within Section 3(4) of the Competition Act.\u00a0 In respect of vertical agreements, the CCI is required to establish an AAEC.<\/p>\n<p>Notably, the CCI has concluded very early in its operational existence that Section 3 is not exhaustive, and that parties to a restrictive agreement can be found to infringe Section 3 even if the parties to the agreement are neither competitors nor in a vertical relationship.<\/p>\n<p>The Competition Act also acknowledges certain statutory exemptions to the prohibition on horizontal cartel conduct. First, the proviso to Section 3(3) provides an exception for efficiency enhancing joint ventures. Secondly, the Competition Act permits the imposition of reasonable restrictions for the protection or enforcement of intellectual property rights granted under Indian law. Thirdly, the Competition Act also exempts export cartels, provided that such arrangements do not cause any AAEC in the domestic market. In this context, the CCI examined allegations of cartelisation against leading producers of Guar seed and Guar gum, involving alleged price\u2011fixing and supply restrictions. The investigation was closed after the CCI found that approximately 95% of the output was exported, and, therefore, there was no apprehension of any AAEC in India. However, the CCI also emphasized that the mere fact that the impugned arrangement pertained to exports would not preclude the CCI from assessing \u201c<em>the substance of the potential effect in the markets (i.e. whether in India or abroad) arising out of such arrangements.<\/em>\u201d<\/p>\n<p>There are no industry specific\/sector specific exemptions from the cartel prohibition. Prior to 3 July 2021, vessel sharing agreements in the liner shipping industry were excluded from the general prohibition on anti-competitive agreements, including the prohibition on cartels. However, this exemption has not been renewed.<a href=\"#_ftnref1\" name=\"_ftn1\"><\/a><\/p>\n<\/div>\r\n\r\n\r\n\t\t\t\t\t<\/li>\r\n\r\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t<li class=\"question-block filter-container__element\">\r\n\t\t\t\t\t\t<h3 class=\"filter-container__match-html\">How is a cartel defined?<\/h3>\r\n\t\t\t\t\t\t<button id=\"show-me\">+<\/button>\r\n\t\t\t\t\t\t<div class=\"question_answer filter-container__match-html\" style=\"display:none;\"><p>Under the Competition Act, horizontal cartels are presumed to cause an AAEC in India. As a result, once the CCI establishes the existence of a restrictive agreement between\/among competitors, the CCI is not required to prove that the horizontal cartel caused an AAEC in India. However, this presumption may be rebutted based on specific evidence that could demonstrate that the anti-competitive agreement has resulted in benefits to consumers,\u00a0improvements in the production or distribution, or\u00a0promotion of technical\/scientific\/economic development, giving rise to benefits that outweigh any competitive harm.<\/p>\n<p>In our experience, it is very difficult to rebut the presumption of AAEC. To date, there has been only one (1) case where the presumption has been rebutted based on social considerations and the nature of the market, in which there were only three (3) large buyers, a few suppliers who, in turn, did not have any option but to sell their products to these buyers, the buyer (in question) exercised control over the prices of the cylinders that were supplied by the suppliers under various tenders, it was in the interest of the buyers that they place orders with multiple suppliers to prevent them from exiting the business, and the product in question was necessary to store cooking gas which is an essential commodity with prices being regulated by the Government.<\/p>\n<\/div>\r\n\r\n\r\n\t\t\t\t\t<\/li>\r\n\r\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t<li class=\"question-block filter-container__element\">\r\n\t\t\t\t\t\t<h3 class=\"filter-container__match-html\">Does the law apply to conduct that occurs outside the jurisdiction?<\/h3>\r\n\t\t\t\t\t\t<button id=\"show-me\">+<\/button>\r\n\t\t\t\t\t\t<div class=\"question_answer filter-container__match-html\" style=\"display:none;\"><p>The Competition Act applies to any anti-competitive conduct occurring outside India if it causes or is likely to cause an AAEC in India. Notably, the CCI has issued three (3) decisions finding horizontal cross-border cartels involving enterprises engaged in business in electric power steering systems, industrial and automotive bearings and maritime motor vehicle transport services. In each of these cases, the CCI found that although the cartels were formed outside India, they caused an AAEC in India.<\/p>\n<\/div>\r\n\r\n\r\n\t\t\t\t\t<\/li>\r\n\r\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t<li class=\"question-block filter-container__element\">\r\n\t\t\t\t\t\t<h3 class=\"filter-container__match-html\">Which authorities can investigate cartels?<\/h3>\r\n\t\t\t\t\t\t<button id=\"show-me\">+<\/button>\r\n\t\t\t\t\t\t<div class=\"question_answer filter-container__match-html\" style=\"display:none;\"><p>The CCI is the nodal authority for the enforcement of the Competition Act, including the prohibition against cartels. Once the CCI forms a prima facie opinion that a matter requires an investigation, the CCI directs the Office of Director General (\u201cDG\u201d) to conduct the investigation. The DG\u2019s powers have been discussed below.<\/p>\n<\/div>\r\n\r\n\r\n\t\t\t\t\t<\/li>\r\n\r\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t<li class=\"question-block filter-container__element\">\r\n\t\t\t\t\t\t<h3 class=\"filter-container__match-html\">How do authorities typically learn of the existence of a potential cartel and to what extent do they have discretion over the cases that they open?<\/h3>\r\n\t\t\t\t\t\t<button id=\"show-me\">+<\/button>\r\n\t\t\t\t\t\t<div class=\"question_answer filter-container__match-html\" style=\"display:none;\"><p>The CCI typically finds out about the existence of a potential horizontal cartel on the basis of a complaint filed by a private party (referred to as \u201can information\u201d under the Competition Act). The CCI may also learn about the existence of a potential cartel from a reference made by the central government or any state government or a statutory authority or from an application seeking the benefit of lesser penalty (i.e., a leniency application). Sometimes, the CCI may also initiate a suo motu investigation based on the information available to it (including from a whistleblower). In each case, the CCI will initiate investigation only if it forms a prima facie opinion based on the material available, that an investigation is warranted. This essentially means that the CCI must adopt a formal decision containing its prima facie opinion and direct the DG to initiate an investigation. To date, the CCI has dealt with one hundred and five (105) cartel cases. In sixty eight (68) of these cases, the CCI initiated the investigation on the basis of an information filed with it; in thirteen (13) cases, the CCI initiated investigation on the basis of a reference made by government\/statutory authorities; in twenty four (24) cases, the CCI initiated the investigation suo motu; and in nine (9) cases, the CCI learnt of the cartel on the basis of leniency applications.<\/p>\n<\/div>\r\n\r\n\r\n\t\t\t\t\t<\/li>\r\n\r\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t<li class=\"question-block filter-container__element\">\r\n\t\t\t\t\t\t<h3 class=\"filter-container__match-html\">What are the key steps in a cartel investigation?<\/h3>\r\n\t\t\t\t\t\t<button id=\"show-me\">+<\/button>\r\n\t\t\t\t\t\t<div class=\"question_answer filter-container__match-html\" style=\"display:none;\"><p>Key steps in a horizontal cartel investigation are as follows:<\/p>\n<p>(i) Formation of prima facie opinion: The CCI reviews material available with it to assess whether or not there exists a prima facie case that merits an investigation. If the CCI is of the view that there exists a prima facie case, then it directs the DG to conduct an investigation into the matter.<\/p>\n<p>(ii) Investigation by the DG: The DG is the investigative arm of the CCI and has wide ranging investigation powers (discussed below). Pursuant to the CCI\u2019s direction, the DG conducts the investigation and submits the investigation report to the CCI. Notably, the DG has some flexibility in expanding the scope of the investigation within the parameters established in the CCI\u2019s direction. The DG\u2019s investigation report is merely a recommendation (albeit, in practical terms, highly persuasive) but does not amount to any finding of contravention.<\/p>\n<p>(iii) Proceedings before the CCI following the conclusion of the DG\u2019s investigation: The CCI considers the investigation report submitted by the DG. If the CCI finds that the investigation report is lacking in material aspects, then the CCI may direct the DG to further investigate the facts. If the CCI is satisfied with the DG\u2019s investigation, then the CCI provides a copy of the investigation report to the affected parties and invites their objections and suggestions to the DG\u2019s findings. The CCI then proceeds to pass a final order in the matter after providing a hearing to the parties. If the CCI finds a contravention, it may impose penalties and pass any other order it deems fit which, among other things, could include a direction to cease and desist the cartel activity.<\/p>\n<p>Notably, the Competition Act does not provide a definitive timeline for the completion of the cartel investigation. In our experience, the CCI typically takes three (3) to five (5) years to complete cartel investigations.<\/p>\n<\/div>\r\n\r\n\r\n\t\t\t\t\t<\/li>\r\n\r\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t<li class=\"question-block filter-container__element\">\r\n\t\t\t\t\t\t<h3 class=\"filter-container__match-html\">What are the key investigative powers that are available to the relevant authorities?<\/h3>\r\n\t\t\t\t\t\t<button id=\"show-me\">+<\/button>\r\n\t\t\t\t\t\t<div class=\"question_answer filter-container__match-html\" style=\"display:none;\"><p>The DG, the investigation arm of the CCI, has been conferred with wide powers to conduct the investigation. These include:<\/p>\n<p>(i) summoning and enforcing the attendance of any person and examining him on oath;<\/p>\n<p>(ii) requiring the discovery and production of documents;<\/p>\n<p>(iii) receiving evidence on affidavit;<\/p>\n<p>(iv) issuing commissions for the examination of witnesses or documents; and<\/p>\n<p>(v) requisitioning any public record or document or copy of such record or document from any office, subject to provisions of Bhartiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023 (\u201cEvidence Act\u201d).<\/p>\n<p>The DG may also conduct dawn raids at the office premises of the enterprise under investigation or the residences of the key executives of the said enterprise. During these raids, the DG may seize physical documents, electronic devices, such as mobile phones, laptops, desktops, etc., and copy data stored on servers, including e-mails and WhatsApp messages, and record statements of the key executives. The seized material may include documents claimed to be legally privileged, subject to applicable legal protections. These raids frequently extend beyond 24 hours.<\/p>\n<\/div>\r\n\r\n\r\n\t\t\t\t\t<\/li>\r\n\r\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t<li class=\"question-block filter-container__element\">\r\n\t\t\t\t\t\t<h3 class=\"filter-container__match-html\">On what grounds can legal privilege be invoked to withhold the production of certain documents in the context of a request by the relevant authorities?<\/h3>\r\n\t\t\t\t\t\t<button id=\"show-me\">+<\/button>\r\n\t\t\t\t\t\t<div class=\"question_answer filter-container__match-html\" style=\"display:none;\"><p>Legal privilege in a horizontal cartel investigation is governed by the provisions of the Evidence Act. Privilege is attached to the advice rendered by the advocates and external legal counsels to their client(s). While communications with external legal counsels benefit from legal privilege to the extent the communications contain legal advice, there is no clarity on whether legal privilege would extend to advice rendered by an in-house counsel or the communications with the in-house counsel relating to legal advice. This is because different high courts have rendered conflicting decisions and observations and the Indian Supreme Court is yet to render a judgment on the parameters and boundaries of legal privilege.<\/p>\n<\/div>\r\n\r\n\r\n\t\t\t\t\t<\/li>\r\n\r\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t<li class=\"question-block filter-container__element\">\r\n\t\t\t\t\t\t<h3 class=\"filter-container__match-html\">What are the conditions for a granting of full immunity? What evidence does the applicant need to provide? Is a formal admission required?<\/h3>\r\n\t\t\t\t\t\t<button id=\"show-me\">+<\/button>\r\n\t\t\t\t\t\t<div class=\"question_answer filter-container__match-html\" style=\"display:none;\"><p>The CCI can impose a lesser penalty on a horizontal cartel participant (including up to a 100% reduction of penalties) if the applicant seeking the benefit of lesser penalty (i.e., leniency) provides vital, true, and full disclosure of information\/evidence that could enable the CCI to (i) form a <em>prima facie<\/em> opinion regarding the existence of the cartel (in cases where the CCI learns of the horizontal cartel through the lesser penalty application), or (ii) establish a contravention of Section 3 of the Competition Act (in cases where the DG\u2019s investigation is underway).<\/p>\n<p>The conditions for the grant of lesser penalty include the leniency applicant having to cease participation in the cartel (unless otherwise directed by the CCI), fully cooperate with the DG and the CCI, and ensure that it does not conceal, destroy, manipulate or remove any relevant documents that may help the CCI establish the existence of the cartel (\u201c<u>Leniency Conditions<\/u>\u201d).<\/p>\n<p>The leniency application should provide vital, true and full disclosure of information\/evidence relating to an alleged cartel, tantamount to an admission that it has engaged in cartelisation.<\/p>\n<\/div>\r\n\r\n\r\n\t\t\t\t\t<\/li>\r\n\r\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t<li class=\"question-block filter-container__element\">\r\n\t\t\t\t\t\t<h3 class=\"filter-container__match-html\">What level of leniency, if any, is available to subsequent applicants and what are the eligibility conditions?<\/h3>\r\n\t\t\t\t\t\t<button id=\"show-me\">+<\/button>\r\n\t\t\t\t\t\t<div class=\"question_answer filter-container__match-html\" style=\"display:none;\"><p>The leniency framework in India provides for a \u2018first past the post\u2019 mechanism where only the first applicant is allowed up to 100% reduction in penalty. Second and subsequent applicants are allowed up to 50% and up to 30%, respectively. All leniency applicants are expected to comply with the Leniency Conditions in order to avail the benefit of lesser penalties. However, to qualify for lower penalties, subsequent applicants must disclose additional valuable information that was previously not known to the CCI, or such information which adds significant value to the evidence already in possession with the DG\/CCI (i.e., the evidence should enhance the ability of the CCI or the DG to establish the cartel).<\/p>\n<\/div>\r\n\r\n\r\n\t\t\t\t\t<\/li>\r\n\r\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t<li class=\"question-block filter-container__element\">\r\n\t\t\t\t\t\t<h3 class=\"filter-container__match-html\">Are markers available and, if so, in what circumstances?<\/h3>\r\n\t\t\t\t\t\t<button id=\"show-me\">+<\/button>\r\n\t\t\t\t\t\t<div class=\"question_answer filter-container__match-html\" style=\"display:none;\"><p>Yes, the leniency regime in India operates on the basis of \u2018priority status\u2019 or marker. It is the position marked by the CCI in the queue of applicants in a particular case. Priority status or marker is based on the following: (i) the stage at which the applicant comes forward with the disclosure; (ii) the evidence already in possession of the CCI; (iii) the quality of the information provided by the applicant; and (iv) the entire facts and circumstances of the case.<\/p>\n<\/div>\r\n\r\n\r\n\t\t\t\t\t<\/li>\r\n\r\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t<li class=\"question-block filter-container__element\">\r\n\t\t\t\t\t\t<h3 class=\"filter-container__match-html\">What is required of immunity\/leniency applicants in terms of ongoing cooperation with the relevant authorities?<\/h3>\r\n\t\t\t\t\t\t<button id=\"show-me\">+<\/button>\r\n\t\t\t\t\t\t<div class=\"question_answer filter-container__match-html\" style=\"display:none;\"><p>The leniency applicant is required to provide full, true, continuous, expeditious and genuine co-operation to the DG\/ CCI during the investigation. The level of co-operation extended by the leniency applicant is one of the key factors determining the quantum of penalty reductions. Notably, a finding of a lack of continuous cooperation by the leniency applicant may lead to removal from the marker.<\/p>\n<\/div>\r\n\r\n\r\n\t\t\t\t\t<\/li>\r\n\r\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t<li class=\"question-block filter-container__element\">\r\n\t\t\t\t\t\t<h3 class=\"filter-container__match-html\">Does the grant of immunity\/leniency extend to immunity from criminal prosecution (if any) for current\/former employees and directors?<\/h3>\r\n\t\t\t\t\t\t<button id=\"show-me\">+<\/button>\r\n\t\t\t\t\t\t<div class=\"question_answer filter-container__match-html\" style=\"display:none;\"><p>In India, a horizontal cartel investigation is a civil matter and does not give rise to criminal prosecution under the Competition Act. Current and\/or former employees of the applicant could benefit from the leniency regime.<\/p>\n<\/div>\r\n\r\n\r\n\t\t\t\t\t<\/li>\r\n\r\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t<li class=\"question-block filter-container__element\">\r\n\t\t\t\t\t\t<h3 class=\"filter-container__match-html\">Does the investigating authority have the ability to enter into a settlement agreement or plea bargain and, if so, what is the process for doing so?<\/h3>\r\n\t\t\t\t\t\t<button id=\"show-me\">+<\/button>\r\n\t\t\t\t\t\t<div class=\"question_answer filter-container__match-html\" style=\"display:none;\"><p>No. In India, the settlement option is not available to horizontal cartel participants.\u00a0 Participants in infringing vertical agreements may apply for settlement.<\/p>\n<\/div>\r\n\r\n\r\n\t\t\t\t\t<\/li>\r\n\r\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t<li class=\"question-block filter-container__element\">\r\n\t\t\t\t\t\t<h3 class=\"filter-container__match-html\">What are the key pros and cons for a party that is considering entering into a settlement with the relevant authority?<\/h3>\r\n\t\t\t\t\t\t<button id=\"show-me\">+<\/button>\r\n\t\t\t\t\t\t<div class=\"question_answer filter-container__match-html\" style=\"display:none;\"><p>Not applicable (except for infringing vertical agreements). See above.<\/p>\n<\/div>\r\n\r\n\r\n\t\t\t\t\t<\/li>\r\n\r\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t<li class=\"question-block filter-container__element\">\r\n\t\t\t\t\t\t<h3 class=\"filter-container__match-html\">What is the nature and extent of any cooperation with other investigating authorities, including from other jurisdictions?<\/h3>\r\n\t\t\t\t\t\t<button id=\"show-me\">+<\/button>\r\n\t\t\t\t\t\t<div class=\"question_answer filter-container__match-html\" style=\"display:none;\"><p>Under the Competition Act, if any statutory authority (other than the CCI) is investigating a matter involving an interpretation of the Competition Act, such authority may make a reference to the CCI seeking its opinion on the issue. Conversely, if during the course of an inquiry under the Competition Act, the CCI finds that an issue falls withing the jurisdiction and expertise of another statutory authority, the CCI may make a reference to the concerned statutory authority seeking its opinion on the issue.<\/p>\n<p>Where the facts discovered by the CCI or the DG involve matters that fall within the jurisdiction of the Enforcement Directorate (\u201c<u>ED<\/u>\u201d), which is the authority responsible for investigating money laundering and violations of the foreign investment laws, the CCI is required to share information with the ED. Likewise, the ED may also choose to cooperate with the CCI and provide it with relevant information.<\/p>\n<p>The CCI also has the powers to enter into memorandums of understanding with competition authorities in other jurisdictions to ensure cooperation in respect of ongoing investigations, capacity building, networking and global best practices. Over the years, the CCI has entered into memorandums of understanding with the Egyptian Competition Authority, Competition Commissioner of Mauritius, Japan Fair Trade Commission, Administrative Council for Economic Defense of Brazil, the BRICS countries, Competition Bureau Canada, The European Commission (DG, Competition), the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission, United States Department of Justice (DOJ) and Federal Trade Commission (FTC), and the Federal Antimonopoly Service (Russia).<\/p>\n<\/div>\r\n\r\n\r\n\t\t\t\t\t<\/li>\r\n\r\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t<li class=\"question-block filter-container__element\">\r\n\t\t\t\t\t\t<h3 class=\"filter-container__match-html\">What are the potential civil and criminal sanctions if cartel activity is established?<\/h3>\r\n\t\t\t\t\t\t<button id=\"show-me\">+<\/button>\r\n\t\t\t\t\t\t<div class=\"question_answer filter-container__match-html\" style=\"display:none;\"><p>There are no criminal sanctions for horizontal cartel activities under the Competition Act. If the CCI finds an infringement of the Competition Act, it usually imposes a monetary penalty (of up to three times the profit for each year during the continuance of such an agreement or 10% of the global turnover for each year of the continuance of such agreement, whichever is higher). \u00a0The CCI may also impose other civil sanctions such as: (i) requiring the parties to cease and desist from cartelisation; (ii) modifying agreements to the extent necessary; (iii) behavioural directions; and (iv) any other directions that the CCI deems fit.<\/p>\n<p>The CCI has found contravention and issued final decisions in one hundred and five (105) cases relating to cartels, of which penalties have been imposed in seventy-four (74) cases.<\/p>\n<\/div>\r\n\r\n\r\n\t\t\t\t\t<\/li>\r\n\r\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t<li class=\"question-block filter-container__element\">\r\n\t\t\t\t\t\t<h3 class=\"filter-container__match-html\">What factors are taken into account when the fine is set?  Does the existence of an effective corporate compliance strategy impact the determination of the fine? Please provide some examples of recent fines?<\/h3>\r\n\t\t\t\t\t\t<button id=\"show-me\">+<\/button>\r\n\t\t\t\t\t\t<div class=\"question_answer filter-container__match-html\" style=\"display:none;\"><p>The Competition Act provides that the CCI may impose a penalty up to 10% of the average global turnover of the three (3) preceding financial years of an enterprise. In cartel cases, however, the CCI is also empowered to impose penalty of up to three times the profit generated during the infringement period or 10% of the turnover\/income for each year of the infringing period upon each producer, seller, distributor, trader or service provider in the cartel.<\/p>\n<p>The Competition Commission of India (Determination of Monetary Penalty) Guidelines, 2024 (\u201cPenalty Guidelines\u201d) provide guidance on the factors that may be considered by the CCI when deciding on the penalty amount. The Penalty Guidelines make it clear that the CCI will consider the relevant turnover while determining the quantum of penalties. The CCI, however, exercises discretion while determining the quantum of penalties and may consider aggravating factors and mitigating factors discussed below.<\/p>\n<p>The aggravating factors include duration of contravention, role of the enterprise in orchestrating the infringing conduct, recourse to coercive or retaliatory measures against other enterprises to participate in the conduct and repeated contraventions. Mitigating factors include admission of contravention and the stage of admission, evidence provided by the enterprise establishing that its involvement was limited, extent of cooperation, voluntary termination of alleged anti-competitive conduct, and implementation of a competition compliance programme. . The CCI, in its decisional practice, has, among other things, considered effective corporate compliance programmes as a mitigating factor while determining the quantum of penalties. As mitigating factors, the CCI has also considered factors such as the malicious intent of the informant, exigent economic circumstances such as the COVID-19 pandemic, size of the enterprise (particularly whether the enterprise concerned is a micro, small or medium enterprise) and low or no turnover. .<\/p>\n<p>The highest penalty imposed by the CCI in a cartel investigation is INR 87.1 billion (net of leniency reduction). In a cross-border cartel case, INR 0.65 billion has been the highest penalty imposed to date.<\/p>\n<\/div>\r\n\r\n\r\n\t\t\t\t\t<\/li>\r\n\r\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t<li class=\"question-block filter-container__element\">\r\n\t\t\t\t\t\t<h3 class=\"filter-container__match-html\">Are parent companies presumed to be jointly and severally liable with an infringing subsidiary?<\/h3>\r\n\t\t\t\t\t\t<button id=\"show-me\">+<\/button>\r\n\t\t\t\t\t\t<div class=\"question_answer filter-container__match-html\" style=\"display:none;\"><p>Under the Competition Act, there is no presumption of the liability of parent companies for contravention by subsidiaries. However, if the CCI finds that the enterprise responsible for the contravention is a member of a group, and other members of such group are also responsible for, or have contributed to the contravention, then the CCI may also impose penalty on such group members. Thus, the CCI can attribute liability to group companies depending on their role and involvement in the cartelisation conduct.<\/p>\n<\/div>\r\n\r\n\r\n\t\t\t\t\t<\/li>\r\n\r\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t<li class=\"question-block filter-container__element\">\r\n\t\t\t\t\t\t<h3 class=\"filter-container__match-html\">Are private actions and\/or class actions available for infringement of the cartel rules?  Are opt out class actions available?<\/h3>\r\n\t\t\t\t\t\t<button id=\"show-me\">+<\/button>\r\n\t\t\t\t\t\t<div class=\"question_answer filter-container__match-html\" style=\"display:none;\"><p>Under the Competition Act, any enterprise or person can make an application to the Appellate Tribunal, i.e. National Company Law Appellate Tribunal (\u201c<u>NCLAT<\/u>\u201d), to claim compensation for any loss or damage suffered as a result of an infringement of the substantive \u201cconduct-prohibition\u201d provisions of the Competition Act, such as the prohibition on cartels. Although the compensation claims can be filed based upon the CCI\u2019s decision itself, in practice, compensation claims are heard by the NCLAT only after the CCI\u2019s decision attains finality either after being upheld by the Supreme Court in appellate proceedings on the merits or where the CCI\u2019s decision has not been challenged on the merits. The Competition Act also provides that where loss has been suffered by numerous persons having the same interest, one person may make such application on behalf of all the interested parties suffering loss (similar to a class action). To date, neither the erstwhile Competition Appellate Tribunal (dissolved in 2017) nor the NCLAT has adjudicated or awarded compensation in cartel cases.<\/p>\n<\/div>\r\n\r\n\r\n\t\t\t\t\t<\/li>\r\n\r\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t<li class=\"question-block filter-container__element\">\r\n\t\t\t\t\t\t<h3 class=\"filter-container__match-html\">On what grounds can a decision of the relevant authority be appealed?<\/h3>\r\n\t\t\t\t\t\t<button id=\"show-me\">+<\/button>\r\n\t\t\t\t\t\t<div class=\"question_answer filter-container__match-html\" style=\"display:none;\"><p>The decision of the CCI or the NCLAT (rendered on appeal) may be challenged, <em>inter alia<\/em>, questioning the findings of fact, application of law and\/or the quantum of penalties. Any procedural lapses by the CCI may be challenged before the high courts in the exercise of their writ jurisdiction.<\/p>\n<\/div>\r\n\r\n\r\n\t\t\t\t\t<\/li>\r\n\r\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t<li class=\"question-block filter-container__element\">\r\n\t\t\t\t\t\t<h3 class=\"filter-container__match-html\">What is the process for filing an appeal?<\/h3>\r\n\t\t\t\t\t\t<button id=\"show-me\">+<\/button>\r\n\t\t\t\t\t\t<div class=\"question_answer filter-container__match-html\" style=\"display:none;\"><p>Any person aggrieved by the CCI\u2019s decision can file an appeal before the NCLAT, within a period of sixty (60) days from the receipt of the CCI\u2019s decision (extendable by 30 days for sufficient cause). Parties facing penalties must deposit 25% of the imposed amount upfront as a condition precedent to maintaining the appeal. \u00a0In a non\u2011cartel matter (involving allegations of abuse of dominance on account of WhatsApp&#8217;s 2021 privacy policy update), decided in November 2025, the NCLAT directed an additional 25% deposit, bringing the total to 50% in order to continue the interim stay on recovery pending final adjudication. Notably, the NCLAT has not examined or ruled on applications seeking a stay of penalty recovery in cartel matters since November 2025, and its position in cartel matters for stays since remains untested.<\/p>\n<\/div>\r\n\r\n\r\n\t\t\t\t\t<\/li>\r\n\r\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t<li class=\"question-block filter-container__element\">\r\n\t\t\t\t\t\t<h3 class=\"filter-container__match-html\">Practitioner points specific to the jurisdiction<\/h3>\r\n\t\t\t\t\t\t<button id=\"show-me\">+<\/button>\r\n\t\t\t\t\t\t<div class=\"question_answer filter-container__match-html\" style=\"display:none;\"><p>Recent decisions: In a landmark order, the CCI, for the first time, imposed penalties based on global turnover under the Competition Act. Holding that the cartelists\u2019 relevant turnover for the solid waste management tenders was nil or negligible, many being mere cover bidders with no sales in the relevant market, the CCI applied 10% of average global turnover for the preceding three (3) years to ensure effective deterrence. While the firms were MSMEs and the absolute penalties modest, this ruling is a watershed development in the determination of penalties. This is the first instance following the introduction of the Penalty Guidelines, where the CCI has expressly noted that even if as the \u2018relevant\u2019 India specific revenue is insignificant, the CCI can impose penalties based on the global turnover of the contravening parties to ensure that the objective of the Act is not rendered infructuous.<\/p>\n<p>In another instance, while the CCI held the Federation of Publishers and Booksellers\u2019 Association in India (\u201cFPBAI\u201d) liable for fixing currency conversion rates, it expressly directed the DG to confine the investigation to FPBAI alone, noting that the allegations were majorly levelled against FPBAI only, and that member publishers\/ officials and member regional associations had only implemented the mandate and directions of FPBAI (\u201cFPBAI Case\u201d). Accordingly, the conduct of member publishers and booksellers was not examined by the DG.<\/p>\n<p>Notable trends:<\/p>\n<p>(i) Penalties:<\/p>\n<p>a) Recent penalty decisions reflect a graduated enforcement approach by the CCI. In one (1) case, the CCI imposed penalties at the maximum statutory threshold, while in two (2) others it issued cease\u2011and\u2011desist orders without monetary penalties, citing the parties\u2019 status as first\u2011time offenders and small enterprises. By contrast, in the FPBAI Case, the CCI imposed a nominal penalty, despite noting that FPBAI had failed to ensure its members\u2019 compliance with the CCI\u2019s earlier directions in relation to the alleged contraventions. Taken together, these outcomes demonstrate the CCI\u2019s continued enforcement against cartels, calibrated to deterrence, proportionality, and recidivism.<\/p>\n<p>b) Notably, in appeals arising from the same Uttar Pradesh soil\u2011testing tenders, the NCLAT applied two (2) different penalty benchmarks, both departing from the relevant turnover principle. In one case, it upheld penalties based on total turnover, holding that relevant turnover was nil and would lead to a zero\u2011penalty outcome; and in another case, it reduced the penalty from 5% to 3% of the average turnover, calibrating sanction to the appellants\u2019 limited role as cover bidders.<\/p>\n<p>c) In its recent rulings in two (2) cartel matters, the Delhi High Court clarified that interest on penalties imposed by the CCI accrues only upon issuance of a valid, enforceable demand notice, with no interest running during the pendency of an appellate stay. Where recovery is stayed, the penalty is unenforceable and the statutory trigger (i.e., a valid demand coupled with default) does not arise. If the penalty is ultimately upheld, interest applies only after a fresh demand notice is issued and there is failure to pay within the prescribed period. The CCI has filed an appeal before the Supreme Court wherein the question of whether interest can accrue during the pendency of an appeal remains under consideration.<\/p>\n<p>(ii) First hub and spoke investigation: The CCI is probing MakeMyTrip for alleged hub and spoke cartelisation, examining whether the platform facilitated coordination among competing hotels on pricing and supply. This marks the first investigation under the 2023 amendment framework, signalling heightened scrutiny of digital platforms for facilitating cartel conduct.<\/p>\n<p>(iii) First investigation into no-poach agreements: The investigation was triggered by a leniency application, with emails disclosing alleged no poach \u201cgentlemen\u2019s agreements\u201d among global fragrance makers Givaudan, Firmenich, and International Flavors &amp; Fragrances. On this basis, the CCI found prima facie labour market cartelisation, marking India\u2019s first enforcement action against no poach\/employee non-solicitation cartel conduct.<\/p>\n<p>(iv) Publication of prima facie order: Previously, the CCI did not issue prima facie orders directing investigation into cartel matters in the public domain. However, the CCI is now publishing non confidential versions of its prima facie orders, directing investigation in cartel cases. As of 2025, it has released nine (9) such orders, marking a meaningful step toward greater transparency and visibility into its cartel enforcement process.<\/p>\n<p>Search and seizure operations: To date, the CCI has conducted around seventeen (17) dawn raids, including three (3) in 2025, underscoring its increasingly robust enforcement approach and reliance on unannounced searches to secure direct evidence. These included raids on advertising agencies and industry bodies for alleged commission\u2011rate collusion, paper mills supplying National Council of Educational Research and Training for suspected price\u2011fixing, and steel pipe manufacturers, including Jindal SAW Limited and Maharashtra Seamless Limited for alleged bid\u2011rigging in Oil and Natural Gas Corporation Limited and other public sector undertaking (\u201cPSU\u201d) tenders.<\/p>\n<p>Future developments: The CCI\u2019s Market Study on Artificial Intelligence and Competition signals its clear intent to scrutinise AI\u2011driven cartel risks, highlighting how algorithms can facilitate coordination and mask concerted conduct, placing AI\u2011enabled collusion firmly on the enforcement radar. Separately, following the 2023 introduction of the leniency\u2011plus regime, the CCI is expected to decide its first such confidential matter in 2026. The Supreme Court is also anticipated to rule in 2026 on the beer cartel appeal, involving penalties of INR seven hundred fifty-two (752) crore on United Breweries Limited, potentially shaping the contours of future penalties in cartel cases.<\/p>\n<\/div>\r\n\r\n\r\n\t\t\t\t\t<\/li>\r\n\r\n\t\t\t\t\r\n<div class=\"word-count-hidden\" style=\"display:none;\">Estimated word count: <span class=\"word-count\">4669<\/span><\/div>\r\n\r\n\t\t\t<\/ol>\r\n\r\n<script type=\"text\/javascript\" src=\"\/wp-content\/themes\/twentyseventeen\/src\/jquery\/components\/filter-guides.js\" async><\/script><\/div>"}},"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/my.legal500.com\/guides\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comparative_guide\/140286","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/my.legal500.com\/guides\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comparative_guide"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/my.legal500.com\/guides\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/comparative_guide"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/my.legal500.com\/guides\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=140286"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}