{"id":57668,"date":"2026-07-06T15:24:24","date_gmt":"2026-07-06T15:24:24","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/my.legal500.com\/developments\/?post_type=legal_developments&#038;p=57668"},"modified":"2026-07-06T15:24:24","modified_gmt":"2026-07-06T15:24:24","slug":"administrative-monetary-fines-of-the-capital-markets-board-of-turkiye-in-2025-key-types-of-breaches","status":"publish","type":"legal_developments","link":"https:\/\/my.legal500.com\/developments\/thought-leadership\/administrative-monetary-fines-of-the-capital-markets-board-of-turkiye-in-2025-key-types-of-breaches\/","title":{"rendered":"Administrative Monetary Fines of the Capital Markets Board of T\u00fcrkiye in 2025: Key Types of Breaches"},"content":{"rendered":"<p style=\"text-align: right\"><strong>\u0130layda Salk\u0131m<\/strong><\/p>\n<p><strong>Introduction<\/strong><\/p>\n<p><strong>Capital Markets Law No. 6362 (\u2018CML\u2019) confers upon the Capital Markets Board (\u2018Board\u2019) broad administrative enforcement powers designed to ensure that capital markets function in a sound, transparent, and efficient manner. Among the enforcement instruments available to the Board, administrative monetary fines, governed by Articles 103 and 104 of the CML, constitute one of the most frequently deployed mechanisms.<\/strong><\/p>\n<p><!--more--><\/p>\n<p>In 2025, across 68 published bulletins<a href=\"#_edn1\" name=\"_ednref1\">[i]<\/a>, the Board imposed administrative monetary fines on 297 natural and legal persons, with the aggregate amount of those fines reaching TRY 2,692,239,472.78 (approximately TRY 2.69 billion). Approximately 79% of this total derives from fines levied in respect of market abuse actions, whilst the remaining material share of infringement comprises violations of public disclosure obligations. Further notable categories of violation in 2025 include non-compliance with information systems regulations, violations relating to share sale information forms, breaches of corporate governance principles, and contraventions of the short-selling prohibition.<\/p>\n<p>This article analyses, within the framework of the administrative monetary fines imposed by the Board, market abuse actions and breaches of disclosure obligations that are particularly notable by reference to both the frequency of sanctions and the magnitude of the fines imposed. Comparative data in respect of the categories of violation most prominent in 2025 by number and by total monetary value are presented in the table below.<\/p>\n<table>\n<tbody>\n<tr>\n<td width=\"37\"><strong>\u00a0<\/strong><\/td>\n<td width=\"262\"><strong>Type of Violation<\/strong><\/td>\n<td width=\"149\"><strong>Number<\/strong><\/td>\n<td width=\"156\"><strong>Total Amount<\/strong><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td colspan=\"4\" width=\"604\"><strong>Most Frequently Sanctioned Violation Types (by Number)<\/strong><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td width=\"37\"><strong>1.\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 <\/strong><\/td>\n<td width=\"262\">Communiqu\u00e9 No. VI-104.1, Art. 6\/1 and 6\/4 (Market Abuse Actions Through Communication)<\/td>\n<td width=\"149\">88<\/p>\n<p>&nbsp;<\/td>\n<td width=\"156\">190,966,790.36<\/p>\n<p>&nbsp;<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td width=\"37\"><strong>2.\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 <\/strong><\/td>\n<td width=\"262\">Communiqu\u00e9 No. II-15.1, (Violations of Public Disclosure Obligations)<\/td>\n<td width=\"149\">38<\/p>\n<p>&nbsp;<\/td>\n<td width=\"156\">45,767,658.40<\/p>\n<p>&nbsp;<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td width=\"37\"><strong>3.\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 <\/strong><\/td>\n<td width=\"262\">Communiqu\u00e9 No. VI-104.1, Art. 5\/1 (a,b,\u00e7,d,f) (Market Abuse Actions Based on Orders or Transactions)<\/td>\n<td width=\"149\">35<\/td>\n<td width=\"156\">2,123,062,592.24<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td colspan=\"4\" width=\"604\"><strong>Violation Types with the Highest Sanctions (by Amount)<\/strong><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td width=\"37\"><strong>1.\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 <\/strong><\/td>\n<td width=\"262\">Communiqu\u00e9 No. VI-104.1, Art. 5\/1 (a,b,\u00e7,d,f) (Market Abuse Actions Based on Orders or Transactions)<\/td>\n<td width=\"149\">35<\/td>\n<td width=\"156\">2,123,062,592.24<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td width=\"37\"><strong>2.\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 <\/strong><\/td>\n<td width=\"262\">Communiqu\u00e9 No. VI-104.1, Art. 6\/1 and 6\/4 (Market Abuse Actions Through Communication)<\/td>\n<td width=\"149\">88<\/p>\n<p>&nbsp;<\/td>\n<td width=\"156\">190,966,790.36<\/p>\n<p>&nbsp;<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td width=\"37\"><strong>3.\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 <\/strong><\/td>\n<td width=\"262\">Communiqu\u00e9 No. VII-128.1, Art. 27 (Violations related to share sale information form)<\/td>\n<td width=\"149\">11<\/p>\n<p>&nbsp;<\/td>\n<td width=\"156\">74,072,884.42<\/p>\n<p>&nbsp;<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n<p>&nbsp;<\/p>\n<p><strong>Overview of Administrative Monetary Fines under the CML<\/strong><\/p>\n<p>Pursuant to Article 103 of the CML, the Board is empowered to impose administrative monetary fines on natural and legal persons acting in breach of the provisions of the law, the standards and forms established thereunder, the secondary legislation enacted on the basis of the CML, or the Board\u2019s decisions of a general or specific nature. The minimum and maximum thresholds of such fines are adjusted annually in accordance with the revaluation rate. The CML further provides that, in any case where a benefit has been obtained as a consequence of non-compliance with an obligation, the administrative monetary fine shall be no less than twice the amount of the benefit obtained. In determining the specific quantum of the fine, the Board takes into account the gravity of the infringement, the status of the offender, and the impact of the conduct on the market.<\/p>\n<p>With regard to administrative monetary fines imposed on legal entities, the applicable fine may be set at up to the higher of 1% of gross sales revenue or 20% of profit before tax, as reflected in the entity\u2019s most recent independently audited annual financial statements prior to the date of the infringement. Article 104 of the CML contains specific provision in relation to market abuse actions and stipulates that, where a benefit has been obtained through the violation, the administrative monetary fine shall be no less than twice the amount of such benefit.<\/p>\n<p>Within this framework, for a given act to be characterised as a market abuse action, three cumulative conditions must be satisfied: (i) the act must not be explicable by reference to a reasonable economic or financial rationale; (ii) it must be of a nature capable of disrupting the confidence, transparency, and stability of stock exchanges and other organised markets; and (iii) the act or transaction in question must not constitute a criminal offence. A pecuniary benefit need not be obtained for an act to be so characterised; however, where such a benefit is established, it will be factored into the determination of the quantum of the administrative monetary fine.<\/p>\n<ul>\n<li><strong>Inexplicability by reference to a reasonable economic or financial rationale:<\/strong> For a transaction or action to be characterised as a market abuse action, it must not be capable of justification by reference to ordinary investment behaviour or rational economic grounds. In this context, the assessment focuses on whether the transactions carried out by the investor are grounded in legitimate investment rationales such as portfolio management, risk mitigation, the discharge of collateral obligations, or fundamental and technical analysis. Where the transactions cannot be explained by reference to an economic purpose and are inconsistent with prevailing market practices and investor behaviour, this criterion will be regarded as met.<\/li>\n<li><strong>Being of a nature capable of disrupting the confidence, transparency, and stability of exchanges and other organised markets:<\/strong> The transaction or action must be capable of undermining the orderly functioning of the market, distorting the price formation process, or generating a false impression with respect to supply and demand conditions.<\/li>\n<li><strong>The act not constituting a criminal offence:<\/strong> Market abuse actions are classified as administrative infractions (misdemeanours) in terms of their legal character. Accordingly, where the relevant act simultaneously constitutes a capital markets offence under criminal law, the provisions of criminal law, rather than the provisions governing administrative infractions, shall take precedence.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p><strong>Market Abuse Actions: Communiqu\u00e9 on Market Abuse No. VI-104.1, Articles 5\/1 and 6<\/strong><\/p>\n<p>The categories of market abuse action are set out in detail under the Communiqu\u00e9 on Market Abuse No. VI-104.1 (\u2018Communiqu\u00e9 No. VI-104.1\u2019). Within this framework, the present analysis considers \u2018market abuse actions related to orders or transactions\u2019 and \u2018market abuse actions committed through communication or correspondence\u2019, as respectively governed by Articles 5 and 6 of Communiqu\u00e9 No. VI-104.1.<\/p>\n<p><strong><em>Market Abuse Actions Related to Orders and Transactions (Communiqu\u00e9 No. VI-104.1, Article 5\/1)<\/em><\/strong><\/p>\n<p>For Article 5\/1 of Communiqu\u00e9 No. VI-104.1 to be applicable, in addition to the conditions set out under Article 104 of the CML being satisfied, two further requirements must be met: (i) an act having a material or significant effect on the markets must have been carried out; and (ii) such act must have resulted in at least one of the following three alternative consequences: (i) disruption of market confidence, transparency, or stability; (ii) the creation of a misleading impression; or (iii) the impairment of fair price formation. It must further be established that the relevant act is the direct and proximate cause of the consequence in question. The infraction may be committed by a single person or by persons acting in concert.<\/p>\n<ul>\n<li><u>Subparagraph (a) Purchases\/sales, account transfers, and order submission\/cancellation\/amendment<\/u>: These constitute the core trading activities encompassing the entire process from the placement of an order through to the completion of settlement. Order submission refers to buy or sell instructions communicated by investors to investment firms, whether in written or oral form; order cancellation refers to the withdrawal of an order that has not yet been executed; and order amendment refers to the modification of elements such as price or quantity in respect of an order that has not yet been executed, within the framework of Article 29\/2 of the Borsa \u0130stanbul A.\u015e. Regulation on the Principles of Exchange Activities.<\/li>\n<li><u>Subparagraph (b) Placement of orders at different price levels<\/u>: This conduct involves placing orders simultaneously or consecutively at different price levels in respect of the same capital markets instrument.<\/li>\n<li><u>Subparagraph (\u00e7) Self-trading or matched orders (wash trades):<\/u> Self-trading denotes fictitious transactions effected by a person acting simultaneously as both buyer and seller across their own accounts, which do not give rise to any genuine transfer of ownership in the capital markets instrument<a href=\"#_edn2\" name=\"_ednref2\">[ii]<\/a> In the context of supervisory reviews, the brevity of the intervals between order submissions is regarded as a significant indicator that the transactions lack a reasonable economic rationale and are executed with the intention of disrupting the market<a href=\"#_edn3\" name=\"_ednref3\">[iii]<\/a>. Such conduct is characterised as market abuse by virtue of its capacity to generate artificial trading volume and price distortion, thereby misleading third parties.<\/li>\n<li><u>Subparagraph (d) Transactions directed at influencing opening or closing prices<\/u>: This category encompasses practices such as order stacking (layering) at the end of a trading session, or the artificial manipulation of the closing price through low-volume orders, typically with a view to reversing the price on the following trading day in order to realise a profit.<\/li>\n<li><u>Subparagraph (f) Transactions directed at artificially increasing, decreasing, or stabilising prices<\/u>: These involve deliberate attempts to drive prices upward or downward, or to peg them at a particular level, by placing buy orders above or sell orders below the prevailing market price.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p>In 2025, fines imposed pursuant to Article 5\/1 of Communiqu\u00e9 No. VI-104.1 ranked third by frequency, encompassing 35 separate infringements, whilst ranking first by aggregate monetary value, reaching TRY 2,123,062,592.24. This figure represents approximately 79% of all administrative monetary fines imposed during 2025. The highest fine levied against a single natural or legal person within this category amounted to TRY 362,123,139.86.<\/p>\n<p><strong>Market Abuse Actions Committed Through Communication (Communiqu\u00e9 No. VI-104.1, Articles 6\/1 and 6\/4)<\/strong><\/p>\n<p>Pursuant to Article 6\/1 of Communiqu\u00e9 No. VI-104.1, the following conduct is characterised as a market abuse action: furnishing false, inaccurate, or misleading information; spreading rumours; publishing news items; making material event disclosures; issuing commentary; or preparing reports that may influence the price or value of capital markets instruments or the investment decisions of market participants.<\/p>\n<p>Following a legislative amendment introduced in 2017, the characterisation of such acts as market abuse actions was made subject to an additional condition. Accordingly, the mere creation or dissemination of false or misleading information is no longer considered sufficient in itself; it is further required that the persons engaging in such conduct have placed orders or executed transactions in the relevant capital markets instrument either before or after such conduct. Put differently, the behaviour directed at influencing the market through misleading information must be demonstrably connected to the offender\u2019s own transactions in the capital markets instrument concerned.<\/p>\n<p>Article 6\/4 of Communiqu\u00e9 No. VI-104.1 further designates as a market abuse action the conduct of persons who, through mass media platforms such as newspapers, television, the internet, or analogous channels, publish commentary or investment recommendations on capital markets instruments and subsequently engage in transactions contrary to those recommendations; whether before revising them or, in any event, within five business days of doing so. By way of illustration, where a person who has issued a buy or hold recommendation in respect of a capital markets instrument thereafter executes a sale within that period, or where a person who has issued a sell recommendation subsequently carries out a purchase, such conduct falls within the scope of this provision.<\/p>\n<p>The overriding purpose of this provision is to prevent individuals from steering market participants in a particular direction through mass media platforms and thereafter securing illegitimate gains by assuming contrary positions, thereby preserving investor confidence in the integrity of the capital markets.<\/p>\n<p>On the basis of 2025 data, infringements of Articles 6\/1 and 6\/4 of Communiqu\u00e9 No. VI-104.1 represent the most frequently sanctioned category of violation, with 88 individual fines having been imposed. The aggregate amount of administrative monetary fines levied for these infringements reached TRY 190,966,790.36. The highest individual fine imposed on a single natural or legal person within this category amounted to TRY 16,973,240.42 and was imposed in connection with a social media-driven buy-and-sell manipulation scheme.<\/p>\n<p><strong>Breaches of Disclosure Obligations<\/strong><\/p>\n<p>The Communiqu\u00e9 on Material Events Disclosures No. II-15.1 (\u2018Communiqu\u00e9 No. II-15.1\u2019) imposes upon listed companies and capital markets institutions an obligation to disclose, fully and without delay, all information capable of influencing investors\u2019 investment decisions, by publishing such information on the Public Disclosure Platform (\u2018PDP\u2019). This regulatory framework is premised on the recognition that the reduction of information asymmetry facilitates the efficient functioning of capital markets<a href=\"#_edn4\" name=\"_ednref4\">[iv]<\/a>.<\/p>\n<p><u>Disclosure of Inside Information (Art. 5)<\/u>: For the disclosure obligation to be triggered under this article, the information in question must satisfy the definition of \u2018inside information\u2019, that is, information that has not yet been made public, relates to a specific financial instrument, and is of a character that could influence the investment decisions of a reasonable investor. Such information encompasses facts, events, and developments that may confer an informational advantage upon those in possession of it over other market participants, and that may affect the value, price, or investment decisions of investors once disclosed<a href=\"#_edn5\" name=\"_ednref5\">[v]<\/a>. The fact that the information has not yet attained a definitive character does not, of itself, extinguish the disclosure obligation. However, for the obligation to be engaged, the information must relate to existing circumstances or events, or to those that may reasonably be anticipated to occur, and must be sufficiently specific to permit an assessment of their potential impact on the value, price, or investment decisions of investors in relation to the relevant capital markets instrument.<\/p>\n<p><u>Transaction Notifications (Art. 11):<\/u> Pursuant to this article, persons discharging managerial responsibilities, persons closely associated with them, and the controlling shareholder of the issuer are required to make public disclosure of their transactions in the issuer\u2019s shares and in capital markets instruments derived from such shares. No disclosure obligation arises, however, unless the aggregate value of transactions effected within a calendar year reaches TRY 12,000,000<a href=\"#_edn6\" name=\"_ednref6\">[vi]<\/a> (as applicable for 2025). Once this threshold is exceeded, all transactions effected from the transaction by which the threshold was first crossed must be disclosed. The same notification requirement applies to transactions in capital markets instruments other than the issuer\u2019s publicly offered shares.<\/p>\n<p><u>Timely and Complete Disclosure (Art. 23)<\/u>: This provision requires that, where a material development occurs, it must be disclosed to the public without delay (Art. 23\/2), and that existing disclosures must be updated where a subsequent development arises that affects the content of a previously published disclosure (Art. 23\/7). Information relating to changes in capital structure or management control must be disclosed no later than the morning of the third business day following the occurrence of such change. All disclosures must be submitted using the designated forms available on the PDP.<\/p>\n<p><u>Character of Disclosure (Art. 24)<\/u>: This article requires that public disclosures be complete, clear, and non-misleading. Article 24\/3 expressly prohibits misleading disclosures and encompasses not only statements containing false information, but also those that, whilst factually accurate, generate an overall misleading impression by reason of being incomplete or selectively presented. Given that levels of financial literacy may vary considerably among investors, the standard to be applied in evaluating the clarity and adequacy of disclosures should be that of the reasonably informed average investor<a href=\"#_edn7\" name=\"_ednref7\">[vii]<\/a>.<\/p>\n<p>In 2025, infringements of Communiqu\u00e9 No. II-15.1 ranked second by frequency, with 38 individual fines and a total aggregate amount of TRY 45,767,658.40. The highest fine imposed on a single natural or legal person within this category amounted to TRY 5,833,734.00. It is worth noting that, in 2025, infringements were not confined to delayed disclosures; misleading disclosures in terms of content were equally subject to enforcement action on a frequent basis.<\/p>\n<p><strong>Conclusion<\/strong><\/p>\n<p>The 2025 data clearly illuminates the priorities underlying the Board\u2019s administrative enforcement policy: the fact that approximately 79% of total administrative monetary fines, surpassing TRY 2.69 billion in aggregate, derive exclusively from market abuse actions based on orders or transactions is indicative of the intensity of regulatory supervision in this domain and of the Board\u2019s resolute commitment to deterrence. By contrast, communication-based market abuse actions and violations of public disclosure obligations stand out as the most frequently sanctioned categories of infringement by reference to the number of individual fines imposed.<\/p>\n<p>Prior to the imposition of an administrative monetary fine under the CML, the person concerned must be given the opportunity to submit a defence. Once the administrative sanction decision has been notified, natural and legal persons may challenge the administrative monetary fine before the competent administrative courts. Against this backdrop, maintaining robust compliance frameworks and effective internal control mechanisms has become essential for capital markets participants, not only to minimise the risk of administrative sanctions and financial exposure but also to safeguard institutional reputation. As the Board\u2019s enforcement record demonstrates an increasingly proactive posture on the part of the Board, the 2025 administrative monetary fine data warrants consideration not solely as a retrospective empirical record, but as a substantive predictor of the regulatory and supervisory priorities that are likely to shape the enforcement landscape in subsequent periods.<\/p>\n<p>&nbsp;<\/p>\n<p><a href=\"#_ednref1\" name=\"_edn1\">[i]<\/a> The Board\u2019s 2025 Bulletins: https:\/\/spk.gov.tr\/spk-bultenleri\/2025-yili-spk-bultenleri?s=1<\/p>\n<p><a href=\"#_ednref2\" name=\"_edn2\">[ii]<\/a> Communiqu\u00e9 No. VI-104.1 on Market Abuse Actions, Article 3(1)(g)<\/p>\n<p><a href=\"#_ednref3\" name=\"_edn3\">[iii]<\/a> Tok, Ahmet: Sermaye Piyasas\u0131 Hukukunda Piyasa Bozucu Eylemler, \u0130stanbul, 2023, p. 150.<\/p>\n<p><a href=\"#_ednref4\" name=\"_edn4\">[iv]<\/a> Memi\u015f, Tekin \/ Turan, G\u00f6k\u00e7en: Sermaye Piyasas\u0131 Hukuku, Ankara 2022, p. 49.<\/p>\n<p><a href=\"#_ednref5\" name=\"_edn5\">[v]<\/a> Board, Guide on Material Event Disclosures, p. 4.<\/p>\n<p><a href=\"#_ednref6\" name=\"_edn6\">[vi]<\/a> As of 2026, the relevant amount has been set at TRY 15,000,000.<\/p>\n<p><a href=\"#_ednref7\" name=\"_edn7\">[vii]<\/a> G\u00fcrler, E. Hazal: Hukuki A\u00e7\u0131dan Sermaye Piyasas\u0131nda \u00d6zel Durum A\u00e7\u0131klamalar\u0131, \u0130stanbul, 2023, p. 168.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"featured_media":0,"template":"","class_list":["post-57668","legal_developments","type-legal_developments","status-publish","hentry"],"acf":[],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/my.legal500.com\/developments\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/legal_developments\/57668","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/my.legal500.com\/developments\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/legal_developments"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/my.legal500.com\/developments\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/legal_developments"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/my.legal500.com\/developments\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=57668"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}